Defense Chronology

Events related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development

Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles. These military activities by North Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and international community.

While appreciating the significance of another clear promise by Chairman Kim Jong-un in a written document to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the joint declaration from the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018, it is important to closely monitor specific actions by North Korea to eliminate nuclear and missile capabilities.

Taking into consideration the fact that North Korea possesses and deploys several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan as well as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, there is no change in our basic recognition concerning the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.

Security Situation Surrounding Japan

While appreciating the significance of another clear promise by Chairman Kim Jong-un in a written document to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the joint declaration from the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018, it is important to closely monitor specific actions by North Korea to eliminate nuclear and missile capabilities.

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Collaboration with related countries

Current status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development

- **Nuclear development**
  - Possibility that the September 2017 nuclear test was a hydrogen bomb test
  - Possibility of having achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and developed nuclear warheads

- **Ballistic missile development**
  - Deployment of several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan
  - Possessing and enhancing capabilities for a surprise ballistic missile attack
Further expansion of operational areas of China’s sea and air power

China's sea and air power is expanding its operational areas surrounding Japan, including the area around Senkaku Islands.

China's recent activities surrounding Japan (for illustrative purposes)

Military activities by Russia are generally becoming more active

Russia tends to increase its military activities in areas around Japan, including the Northern Territories.

Deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories (for illustrative purposes)

The number of Japan's press releases on China's military aircraft's flights through the strait between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island

Trends in the number of scrambles against Russian planes (past 10 years)
Part I  Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview
The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.

Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

1. In the area surrounding Japan, there is a concentration of nations with large-scale military capabilities, and a regional cooperation framework on security has not yet to be fully institutionalized, leading to the existence of uncertainty and unclarity, including the persistence of territorial disputes and unification issues.

2. Meanwhile, there has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations; that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests.

3. There has also been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. The security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region are characterized below:
   - North Korea’s military development such as nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development represents an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat.
   - The unilateral escalation of China’s military activities poses a strong security concern for the region including Japan and international community.
   - Russia has tendency to intensify its military activities, including in areas surrounding Japan, and this trend needs to paid due attention.

4. Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved.

Recent Security Related Issues around Japan

The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.

United States

The Trump Administration’s Security Policy


2. Within these documents, the Trump Administration cites the following three types of main challengers competing with the United States and states the main security concern of the United States is not terrorism, but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia.
   - China and Russia: Revisionist powers
   - Iran and North Korea: Rogue states
   - Jihadist terrorists: Transnational threat organizations

3. Given this recognition, the United States emphasizes maintaining military superiority, its commitments to the Indo-Pacific Region, and strengthening relations with allies.

Nuclear Strategy and Missile Defense Policy

1. In terms of nuclear posture, in the near term the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the long term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.

2. As for the country’s missile defense posture, the United States plans to reinforce both mainland defense and regional defense as well as work on the development of cutting edge technologies, in order to respond the threat of not only ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and other weapons systems.

Indo-Pacific Strategy

1. The United States champions a vision of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific in the Indo-Pacific Region.

2. This vision calls for the following U.S. policies:
   - North Korea’s nuclear and missile development: while maintaining negotiations with North Korea on denuclearization, keep sanctions until denuclearization becomes apparent, and continue to maintain presence of the United States Forces Korea.
   - China’s maritime advances: remain involved in the free and lawful use of the seas through the Freedom of Navigation Operations, while not tolerating unilateral changes in the status quo.

Global Security Environment

1. Emerging global security challenges include regional conflicts growing in complexity, international terrorism becoming more serious, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and securing the stable use of new domains such as maritime space, cyberspace, and outer space.
North Korea

Since 2016, North Korea has willfully conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles. These military trends in North Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security, and significantly damage the peace and security of the region and the international community.

In the joint declaration at the first-ever U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018, North Korea gave a commitment to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and confirmed that it plans to continue the negotiations between the two sides. It is highly significant that Chairman Kim Jong-un reiterated his intention for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and made a clear promise to do so in a written document.

It is important to closely monitor specific actions by North Korea to eliminate nuclear and missile capabilities.

Taking into consideration the fact that North Korea appears to possess and deploy several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan as well as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, there is no change in our basic recognition concerning the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.

In terms of ballistic missiles, North Korea appears to be aiming to (1) advance long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability, (2) enhance the accuracy and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks, (3) improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks, and (4) diversify the forms of launches.

If North Korea advances further in development of ballistic missiles and other activities and overconfidently and wrongly believes that it has obtained strategic deterrence against the United States, there is possibility of increased and more serious military provocations in the region and could lead to circumstances that raise strong concerns for Japan.

Development of WMD and Ballistic Missiles

North Korea willfully conducted its sixth nuclear test in September 2017. The yield of the weapon is estimated at around 160kt, making it the largest yielding test to date. It is difficult to deny the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb test.

Considering the technological maturity estimated to have been achieved through these six nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has already achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads so that nuclear weapons can be loaded into ballistic missiles.

As for whether North Korea has demonstrated warhead reentry technologies, while detailed analysis is necessary, North Korea can be accumulating related technologies through its repeated missile launches.

North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on ballistic missiles.
Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Part I

China

Rapid modernization

1. Underpinned by high level of increases in defense budget, China is considered to reinforce its military capabilities broadly and rapidly with a focus on nuclear and missile force, as well as its Navy and Air Force. As part of this China has been strengthening its so-called A2/AD capabilities.

2. Besides this type of strengthening military capabilities from past years, China is pursuing new types of practical operational capabilities, such as those of electronic and cyber warfare, in recent years.

3. Considering Xi Jinping’s further consolidation of authoritative power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, China’s military modernization to improve practical operational capabilities can be accelerated more strongly in the future.

4. China aims to realize fundamental modernization of its military forces, namely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by 2035 and transform the PLA into one of the world’s top militaries by the middle of the 21st century, intending to rapidly enhance its military capabilities in accordance with its increasing national strength.

Unilateral escalation of China’s activities around Japan

5. China’s sea and air power is expanding its operational areas, including the area around Senkaku Islands, undertaking further activities which are seemingly based on its own claim regarding the islands.

6. China is considered to attempt to routinize its naval ships’ navigation in waters close to Japan and its presumable sea and air power’s training attempts at changing the status quo by coercion.

7. Sufficient attention should be paid to issues regarding China’s offshore platforms.

Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget

China’s attempts to change the status quo by coercion

1. China, over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’ continues to act in a way which can be considered assertive, such as attempts at changing the status quo by coercion.

2. China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation on seven features in the Spratly Islands, installing military facilities such as artillery batteries, and transforming these features into military installations. Furthermore, China is promoting militarization of the Paracel Islands too, as bomber takeoff and landing exercises are pointed out to be implemented, for example. China’s military activities in South China Sea are expanding, and the expansion itself is to change the status quo by coercion and to promote the changed status as an accomplished fact.

3. The United States is conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the waters such as South China Sea to cope with over-claiming of maritime interests, including one by China.

4. However, China is exhibiting interest in initiatives to avoid and prevent unexpected contingency in the sea and airspace. For example, in May 2016, Japan and China officially agreed to implement “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China.”

5. Nevertheless, China’s rapid modernization of the PLA, enhancement of operational capabilities, and unilateral escalation of activities in areas close to Japan, without sufficient transparency, are generating strong security concerns in the region and international community, including Japan.

6. It is probable that the PLA plays a backing role in Belt and Road Initiative through its activities such as sea lane protection. In addition, development of infrastructure under the initiative can lead to further expansion of the PLA’s activities in the area such as the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

An image of the PLA’s recent activities in the sea and airspace around Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shang-class submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent advancements into the Pacific Ocean passing between Shikine and Miyako Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Russia joint exercise joint Sea 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bomber advances at the way to the area off the Kit Peninsula (August 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier-based fighter (unconfirmed flight in the Pacific Ocean (April 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underwater submarine and destroyer’s intrusions into the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands (January 2018)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates.*
**Russia**

1. President Putin, who has called for Russia to become a strong and influential nation, was re-elected in March 2018. With regards to Russia's future, he emphasized to further bolster its defense capability, while stating his commitment to pursue constructive relations with other countries without the intention of starting an arms race.

2. With regards to Europe, Russia is negative about the expansion of NATO, and has deployed three divisions near the border with Ukraine etc., and conducted the large-scale training exercise Zapad-2017 in September last year.

3. As for Syria, Russia announced naval and air bases in Syria will continue to operate on a permanent basis. Attention will continue to be paid to Russia’s moves to expand its influence in the Middle East.

4. In the Far East, Russia has been developing its newest class of frigate (Steregushchiy class) and fighter jets (Su-35 and Su-34). In 2018, Russia also plans on holding a large-scale military exercise called Vostok-2018.

5. Russia announced deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories (Etorofu and Kunashiri islands), and it is also intensifying activities in Etorofu island, including designation of a civilian airport to both civilian and military use and deployment of fighters.

6. Russia tends to increase its military activities, including in areas near Japan, and it is necessary to closely observe this trend.

**Trends in Regional Conflicts and International Terrorism**

1. ISIL has lost nearly all of the territory it once controlled as a result of military operations by the U.S.-led coalition and local forces. However, ISIL-affiliated groups continue to actively carry out terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

2. The threat for terrorism is spreading globally, including “homegrown” terrorism perpetrated by individuals or groups who are inspired by extremist ideologies and foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin after fighting for ISIL.

3. It is essential for Japan to once again address the threat of international terrorism head-on in light of ISIL’s repeated reference to Japanese people as targets of attack and the attack in Dhaka (Bangladesh) in 2016.

4. In the Syrian theater, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France concluded that the Assad regime used chemical weapons and carried out attacks on Syria’s chemical weapon facilities. Related countries and various forces remain in conflict, as seen in strong criticism of this action by Russia, a key supporter of the Assad regime. There is still no end in sight to military clashes in Syria.

**Outer Space**

1. Major countries are making efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR* functions. (*The term “C4ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.)*

2. Countries are rapidly developing capabilities in outer space for securing their own military superiority in outer space. It is pointed out that China and Russia have been developing anti-satellite weapons such as killer satellites.

3. It is pointed out that China could threaten U.S. information superiority in outer space in the future.

**Cyberspace**

1. As military dependence on information communication networks grows further, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. Many foreign militaries develop their capability to execute cyber attacks.

2. It has been pointed out that China and Russia are reinforcing their military’s cyber attack capabilities in order to disrupt networks and destroy infrastructure.

3. Cyber attacks are frequently carried out against information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries. It is suggested that government organizations of countries such as China, Russia, and North Korea are involved in those attacks.
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The National Security Strategy

Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the Principle of International Cooperation

- The National Security Strategy (NSS) developed in December 2013 sets forth Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, which is that Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken as a peace-loving nation, and contribute even more proactively to security peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as a proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.

The National Defense Program Guidelines

- The current National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), developed in December 2013 based on the NSS, emphasize the following:
  1. Effectiveness of deterrence and response to various situations (1) Ensuring the security of the sea and airspace around Japan (2) Responding to an attack on remote islands (3) Response to ballistic missile attacks (4) Responses in outer space and cyberspace (5) Responses to major disasters
  2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and improvement of the global security environment (1) Holding training and exercises (2) Promoting defense cooperation and exchange (3) Promoting building assistance (4) Ensuring maritime security (5) Implementing international peace cooperation activities (6) Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation

- The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP/FY2014-FY2018) developed in December 2013 based on the NDPG specifies the review of major units, major projects concerned with the capability of the SDF, the maintenance scale of main equipment, and required expenses.

Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018

- Japan will steadily build up its defense capability through programs that include the following in FY2018, which is the final fiscal year for the current NDPG and the current MTDP.

     - Research on element technologies of a new anti-ship missile intended for the defense of remote islands
     - Conduct research on element technologies of a HGVF (Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile) intended for the defense of remote islands
     - Deploy a missile that can be launched from a Standoff missile (JSM)
     - Construct a new type of hypersonic more compact and with improved multi-blast capability

Defense-Related Expenditures

- In FY2018, in order to strengthen the posture for protecting the life and property of the Japanese people as well as Japan’s territorial land, sea, and airspace in light of the increasingly severe security environment, Japan has increased defense-related expenditures following on from FY2017 (increased 0.8% from the previous year to 4.9388 trillion yen).

Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact in local communities and expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: ¥4,502.0 billion in FY2004, ¥4,816.0 billion in FY2005, ¥4,831.8 billion in FY2006, ¥4,817.2 billion in FY2007, ¥4,728.5 billion in FY2008, ¥4,747.7 billion in FY2009, ¥4,763.8 billion in FY2010, ¥4,775.5 billion in FY2011, ¥4,773.8 billion in FY2012, ¥4,864.0 billion in FY2013, ¥4,886.2 billion in FY2014, ¥4,988.6 billion in FY2015, ¥5,054.1 billion in FY2016, ¥5,125.1 billion in FY2017, and ¥5,191.1 billion in FY2018.)

Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Expenditures (Trillion Yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>¥4,502.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>¥4,816.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>¥4,831.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>¥4,817.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>¥4,728.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>¥4,747.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>¥4,763.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>¥4,775.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>¥4,773.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>¥4,864.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>¥4,886.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>¥4,988.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>¥5,054.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>¥5,125.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>¥5,191.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Establishment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and SDF Activities Following the Enactment

The Legislation for Peace and Security, consisting of the Act for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the International Peace Support Act, was passed and enacted in September 2015 and entered into force in March 2016.

Main activities of the SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Types of SDF Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed attack situations and survival-threatening situations</td>
<td>Defense operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation that will have an important influence on national security</td>
<td>Support activities (including logistical support), search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining public order and responding to infringements that do not amount to an armed attack</td>
<td>Public security operations, maritime security operations, anti-piracy activities, interception measures for ballistic missiles, measures against airspace invasions, rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, provisions for the protection of weapons and other equipment of the U.S. Armed Forces, provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed Forces, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to peace and stability of the international community</td>
<td>Response to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing (cooperation and support operations, search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations). The International Peace Cooperation Assignments (UN PKO and internationally coordinated operations for peace and security). International disaster relief operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implementation of Training Pertaining to the Legislation for Peace and Security

- After the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF has conducted a range of training sessions that pertain to new laws which have been enacted in the process of developing the Legislation for Peace and Security.
- In accordance with the guidelines, both countries will continue to conduct more joint training and exercises, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and jointly utilize both countries’ facilities and areas of operation for these activities.

The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security

- The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.
- “The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements” sets forth the following guidelines:

  1. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is centered on bilateral security arrangements, functions as a “public good” that contributes to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.
  2. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe and the United States maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the SDF has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.

Core Efforts to Strengthen the Alliance

- The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (April 2015) set forth policy concerning initiatives such as “seamlessly ensuring Japan’s peace and security”, “cooperation for regional and global peace and security” and “space and cyberspace cooperation”.
- In accordance with the guidelines, both countries will continue to conduct more joint training and exercises, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and jointly utilize both countries’ facilities and areas of operation for these activities.

Policy Discussions between Japan and the U.S.

- U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2 meeting)
  1. During U.S.-Japan “2+2” talks held in Washington DC on August 17, 2017, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening their alliance and the alliance continuing as a foundation for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Japan-U.S. Security Ministerial Meeting
  1. Discussions at Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings to date have focused mainly on the following areas:
    - Close Japan-U.S. cooperation towards North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of any capability of launching any type of weapon of mass destruction or ballistic missile of any range
    - Continued scrutiny of conditions in the East China Sea and Japan-U.S. cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in this region
    - Defense cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and Southeast Asian nations to address conditions in the South China Sea
    - Cooperation in ensuring the safe operations of U.S. Armed Forces to promote understanding in local regions, including Okinawa
    - Continued Cooperation for making improvements in challenges regarding FMS (Foreign Military Sales)

Protection of Weapons, etc. of U.S. and Other Armed Forces

Part II
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Chapter 4

Effective Deterrence and Response

In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to ensure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense system. If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. The MOD/SDF take the following initiatives.

Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

- The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the water and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. Information gathered through these activities are shared with other relevant government agencies.

Suspicion Illegal Transfer of Goods at Sea (Ship-to-ship Transfer) by North Korea-related Vessels

- As part of its warning and surveillance activities in the water surrounding Japan, the SDF gathers information on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council resolutions.

- In order to conduct warning and surveillance by aircraft and ships against illegal activities at sea including “ship-to-ship” transfer, the Australian and Canadian patrol aircraft were deployed to Japan for about a month from the end of April in 2018. "Ship-to-ship" transfers are highly likely to be illegal transfers of goods at sea (so-called “ship-to-ship transfer”) by North Korea-related vessels.

Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

- The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in the airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor them as necessary.

In 2017, the ASDF scrambled 904 times. Among these, 500 were against Chinese aircraft, and 390 were against Russian aircraft.

Part III
Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Changes in the Number and Area of USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa

The relocation of MCAS Futenma is the only solution to eliminate its danger as quickly as possible while simultaneously maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. Thus, the Government of Japan is making all-out efforts to realize the relocation.

The following progress has been made involving the return of USFJ land:
- March 2015: West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (about 51 ha) was returned. This land was returned to the owner in March 2018 after soil pollution surveys, etc.
- December 2016: The return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area, was achieved, the largest of its kind since the reversion of Okinawa to the main island.
- July 2017: A portion of MCAS Futenma (about 4 ha along Ginowan City road 11) was returned.
- March 2018: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (about 3 ha of land to expand Route 58) was returned.

Training relocation - Osprey aircraft landing at a maneuver area in Miyagi Prefecture as part of field training (Forest Light 02) with the U.S. Marine Corps’ MV-22 Osprey aircraft.

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to consolidate facilities and areas of USFJ and to proceed with the realignment of USFJ. Such measures are aimed at securing the stable presence of the U.S. Forces while maintaining its deterrence capabilities and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni began in August 2017 and was completed in March 2018.

Measures to Mitigate the Impact Posed by Facilities and Areas Used by USFJ

- Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations. The two countries cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring the safety so that accidents or incidents will not occur.

In order for the U.S.-Japan Alliance to function sufficiently as a deterrent that contributes to the defense of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to have a USFJ presence and to be prepared to respond to emergencies with speed and agility.

For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of USFJ, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa Stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa

Importance of Stationing U.S. Forces in Japan

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Security Arrangements.

Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

- In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to ensure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense system. If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. The MOD/SDF take the following initiatives.

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- In order to conduct warning and surveillance by aircraft and ships against illegal activities at sea including “ship-to-ship” transfer, the Australian and Canadian patrol aircraft were deployed to Japan for about a month from the end of April in 2018. British Royal Navy’s frigate HMS Sutherland engaged in information gathering operations in the high seas surrounding Japan in early May.

- The SDF gathers information on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council resolutions.

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- The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in the airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor them as necessary.

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- As part of its warning and surveillance activities in the water surrounding Japan, the SDF gathers information on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council resolutions.

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Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

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- In 2017, the ASDF scrambled 904 times. Among these, 500 were against Chinese aircraft, and 390 were against Russian aircraft.
Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Response to Attacks against Japan’s Remote Islands ► P. 320

- In order to respond to attacks on remote islands, it is important to position units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to detect signs at an early stage through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF as well as obtaining and securing maritime and air superiority. Initiatives taken by the MOD/SDF include the following.

Enhanced Defense Posture in the Southwestern Region

1. GSDF: Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was newly established in March 2018. (Security units will be positioned on Amami Oshima, Miyako Island, and Ishigaki Island.)
2. MSDF: Acquired equipment including fixed wing patrol aircraft P-1 and SH-60K rotary wing patrol helicopters.

Securing Capabilities for Swift and Large-scale Transportation and Deployment

Enhanced rapid deployment capabilities through the improvement of transport LST and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft.

Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks ► P. 322

1. Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is based on an effective multi-tier defense system with upper tier interception with Aegis-equipped destroyers and lower tier with Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). In order to defend Japan, at all times, it is necessary to drastically improve ballistic missile defense capabilities. Therefore, the National Security Council and the Cabinet approved in December 2017 the introduction of two land-based Aegis System (Aegis Ashore) to be operated by the GSDF.
2. The introduction of Aegis Ashore will reinforce upper tier interception Aegis-equipped destroyers.

Response to Attacks against Japan’s Remote Islands

1. There is a growing threat against the stable use of outer space such as the rapid increase of space debris.
2. The MOD/SDF launched an X-band defense communications satellite called Kirameki-2 in January 2017, and another one named Kirameki-1 in April 2018, to be used for the information communications of extremely important command and control in unit operations.

Response in Outer Space ► P. 329

1. With regard to cybersecurity, the number of cases recognized as threats to Japanese governmental organizations in FY2016 reached approximately 7,110,000, and these threats have become increasingly serious.
2. In order to appropriately deal with cyber attacks, the MOD has increased the number of personnel in the SDF units responsible for responding to cyber attacks approximately from 350 to 430.

Response in Cyber Space ► P. 332

1. When natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaging in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, offering medical treatments and preventing epidemics. There were 501 disaster-related dispatches in 2017.

Response to Large-scale Disasters ► P. 335

1. The SDF stands ready to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, the SDF maintains operational readiness by which the GSDF designates vessels such as transport ships, and the ASDF designates airlift units. In addition, the SDF strengthens its joint operational capability through exercises in and outside Japan.

Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas and Others ► P. 339

1. With cooperation from relevant government organizations, the MOD/SDF has held training with participation of local governments, etc. In addition, the MOD/SDF also actively participates and cooperates in civil protection training implemented by local governments.

Efforts for Civil Protection ► P. 343
### Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

#### Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

The MOD/SDF will enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and will more actively promote United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO), counter-piracy operations, international peace cooperation activities, and other relevant missions to address global security issues.

#### Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogues

- Initiatives under the multilateral framework such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is a security cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacific region, have made steady progress and serve as an important foundation for cooperation and exchanges in the areas of defense and security.
- Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region, for example, by annually holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum.

#### Capacity Building Assistance

- Through the capacity building assistance program launched in 2012, Japan has provided assistance in various areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, PKO, maritime security, and international law to 14 countries and 1 organization mainly in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Between January and March, and October and December 2017, Japan provided assistance programs for the Djiboutian Armed Forces to help strengthen its disaster response capability, including training on the operation of facilities and equipment.

#### Multilateral Joint Training

- In the Asia-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF actively participates in multinational training in non-traditional security fields, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to conventional training conduct in preparation for combat situations.

#### Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries

- As for defense cooperation and exchanges, Japan will continue its effort to alleviate any conditions of confrontation and tension, as well as fostering a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere through bilateral dialogues and exchanges.
- In addition, recognizing the increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means including joint exercises and capacity building assistance, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and establishing institutional frameworks such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA).

### Ensuring Maritime Security

- For Japan, a maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on fundamental rules, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for peace and prosperity, which is extremely important.
- In cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF engages in counter-piracy operations and promotes various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this field for those coastal states alongside the sea lanes, and makes the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan.
- For counter-piracy operations, the SDF surface force and air force have participated in the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) and conducted its missions in cooperation with other countries. Furthermore, the SDF dispatched a CTF 151 commander from March to June 2018.

### Efforts for International Peace Cooperation Activities

#### International Conferences etc. with regard to UN Peacekeeping Operations

- The MOD hosted the Tokyo preparatory meeting for the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Meeting in August 2017.
- At the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Canada in November 2017, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto announced that Japan would further contribute to the “UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities” and take initiatives to increase the number of female PKO personnel.

#### United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

- Japan continues to dispatch SDF personnel to UNMISS Headquarters although the SDF engineering unit was withdrawn at the end of May 2017.
- Japan will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members.

#### Dispatch of MOD personnel to UN Secretariat

- The uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched to UNHQ as instructors, and administrative officials as well as the uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Department of Field Support.
- GSDF personnel have been dispatched as instructors to the UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities. So far, until last year the dispatched GSDF personnel here provided 6 training sessions on the operation of heavy equipment for about 170 personnel participants from 6 countries in Africa.
Part III

Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force, and Active Participation of Female Personnel

Establishing a New Benefit to Ensure Understanding and Cooperation for Duties of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others.
- A new system was introduced in FY 2018 in order to gain understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel for their duties. In the new system, a special benefit is provided to the companies in case the employed SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: 1) responds to orders such as defense operation, civil protection or disaster relief dispatch orders; 2) must miss their civilian jobs due to injuries sustained while on duty.

Safety Management Initiatives
- Any incident that can cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. The MOD/SDF is committed to safety management.

Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active Participation of Female Personnel

Working Style Reform
- The MOD/SDF is going forward with working style reform to promote work-life balance through initiatives such as holding “Competition for initiatives to promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” in 2017, and also taking full effect of telework in the Internal Bureau of the MOD head office.

Reform to Realize a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care.
- A workplace nursery was newly opened at Ichigaya district where the MOD is located in April and within National Defense Medical College in October 2017.
- As for the re-employment of SDF personnel who left the SDF mid-career, the system was reassessed in January 2017 to welcome back personnel who retired mid-career due to childrearing and nursing. Their re-employment began in January 2018.

Enhancement of Medical Functions

Establish an efficient and high-quality medical care system through measures such as improving operation of the National Defense Medical College Hospital, etc., as well as promoting consolidation, upgrade, etc. of SDF hospitals.

Secure and Train Personnel, Enhance Capabilities
- More emphasis will be placed on securing and training medical officers and nurses, etc. Further, strengthen the first aid capabilities on the frontlines as well as the abilities to respond to infectious diseases.

Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring Technological Superiority
- The MOD formulated the Defense Technology Strategy in August 2016, which presents a specific direction for various measures that should be implemented strategically. This aims to ensure Japan’s technological superiority, develop advanced equipment in an effective and efficient manner, and deal with various policy issues pertaining to defense and civilian technologies.
- Additionally, the MOD formulated the Medium-to Long-term Defense Technology Outlook for future technologies expected to be established in the next 20 years and the Research and Development Vision that presents the concept of future equipment and the R&D roadmaps. The MOD promotes a variety of measures based on these documents.
- 33 proposals have been selected by the end of FY2 2017 in the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (funding program), which aims to discover inventive and promising research at research organizations and corporations.

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
- Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the national security of Japan, the promotion of peace and international cooperation, and the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases. The most recent initiatives include the following:
  - Five MSDF TC-90 training aircraft were granted to the Philippine Navy.
  - Japan decided to grant the GSDF UH-1H spare parts and maintenance equipment to the Philippine Air Force.
  - The MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft was displayed and gave the first demonstration flight at ILA Berlin 2018.
  - Bilateral Defense Industry Forum began (with the participation of Indonesia, India, Vietnam and Australia in FY2017).
  - The MOD has been carrying out technology cooperation with the U.K. and started the very first cooperative research with France.

Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

Collaboration with Local Communities
- The MOD/SDF conducts a variety of cooperation activities such as the disposal of unexploded ordnance and mines to support civilian life. Such activities further deepen the trust between local communities/people and the SDI, as well as significantly contribute to the maintenance and vitalization of local communities.

Various Public Relations Activities
- The MOD/SDF widely publicizes current circumstances of the SDF both at home and abroad through various information communication platforms including Social Networking System (SNS) and events such as the SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review.

Initiatives for Information Disclosure and Management of Public Documents
- In light of the issue of the daily reports related to the PKO in South Sudan and the daily reports in Iraq, the MOD/SDF is committed to regaining trust of the public by thoroughly implementing measures pertaining to information disclosure and management of public documents to prevent similar incidents.