Section 2 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance

1 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance

Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology and also contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines¹ and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War.

In light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006.

Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009.

At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint ISR activities.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and as the activities and responsibilities of the SDF have expanded, it had become necessary for the nature of the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to adapt to those changes. Against

¹ The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner.
that background, based on the Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines by the end of 2014, as a result of extensive work to revise them on the part of both countries, new Guidelines were approved in April 2015.

**Overview of the Revision of the 1997 Guidelines**

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulfill in case of an armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, with a view to responding rapidly to such an event.

The Guidelines and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role-sharing between Japan and the United States. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States have continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations.

**Background to the Revision of the Guidelines**

Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities.

As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions.

Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment, Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the revision of the Guidelines and other matters. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in February 2013, Prime Minister Abe stated to then U.S. President Obama...
that, “in response to the changing security environment, Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines through discussions on the two countries’ views of the roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).”

Against the background described above, at the Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by the end of 2014.

The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting at that time identified several objectives for the revision of the 1997 Guidelines, including ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation; expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy; evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives.

Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States, Japan and the United States conducted extensive work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines.

In October 2014, based on the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held in July 2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” In addition, in December 2014, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the discussions to work towards finalizing the revision of the Guidelines during the first half of 2015, taking into account the progress of Japan’s legislative process.

The Japan-U.S. SCC approved the new Guidelines recommended by the SDC at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, thereby accomplishing the objective of revising the Guidelines as outlined by the Ministers in October 2013.

**2 Content of the Guidelines**

The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

**(1) Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines**

The Guidelines newly specified the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.

- In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:
  - seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
  - synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
  - a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
  - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
  - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

- The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination.

- The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

**(2) Basic Premises and Principles**

The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below:

- The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged.
- All actions and activities undertaken under the...
### III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

**A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism**

In order to address issues seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

**B. Enhanced Operational Coordination**

The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

### IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

**C. Bilateral Planning**

In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

### Table: Self-Defense Forces (SDF) vs. United States Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</th>
<th>United States Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Defend Airspace</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Defend Maritime Areas</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Counter Ground Attacks</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

VII. Bilateral Enterprise

VIII. Processes for Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Outline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Domain Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space / cyberspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Support Activities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Communications and Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Cooperation on Space</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Cooperation on Cyberspace</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VII. Bilateral Enterprise</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Educational and Research Exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIII. Processes for Review</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Guidelines will be consistent with international law.

- All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.

- The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

3 Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance

The Guidelines define that the two countries will work on a variety of measures, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, and bilateral training and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to cooperate for Space and Cyberspace Cooperation which are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense equipment and technology cooperation for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. Many of these items are incorporated into the NDPG to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas.”

1 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance

(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the ACM in order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.

Based on the framework shown in Fig. II-4-2-4, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

Since the establishment of the mechanism, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the mechanism to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose...
of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security.

In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level direction and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism.

The expansion of these ISR activities will function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

(2) Missile Defense

Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by sharing operation information and establishing response procedures. For the repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea, Japan and the United States have conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress.

(1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

With regard to bilateral ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) activities, from the perspective that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries, the two countries set up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013 consisting of director-level defense officials from Japan and the United States, which is further deepening the cooperation between the two countries.

Fig. II-4-2-3 The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BMP)
(3) Maritime Security

The Guidelines allow Japan and the United States to develop and enhance the system for sharing maritime surveillance information from peacetime and to cooperate where appropriate for the maintenance and enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United States through ISR as well as training and exercises. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the U.S. Navy plan to maintain and enhance both countries’ presence in the Western Pacific through multiple joint training and exercises.

(4) Bilateral Training and Exercises

Bilateral training in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability through the deepening of mutual understanding of tactics and other aspects and the enhancement of mutual communication, but also are useful in improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.

In addition, conducting bilateral training at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises.

Bilateral training have been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units there. Ongoing efforts are being made to enhance
interoperability and Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training.

Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise. From January to February 2018, command post exercises were conducted at the Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya.

Also, in May and June 2017 Japanese and U.S. vessels, including the destroyer JS Izumo conducted bilateral maritime exercise in the South China Sea. Furthermore, as bilateral exercises in the waters and airspace around Japan, the MSDF conducted cruising exercises with U.S. Navy vessels including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan that extended from the waters around Okinawa to the Bashi Channel from September to October 2017. In November the same year, the MSDF conducted bilateral exercise in the Sea of Japan with a strike force comprising three aircraft carriers the USS Ronald Reagan, the USS Nimitz, and the USS Theodore Roosevelt and other vessels of the U.S. Navy for the first time. In conjunction with this, the MSDF conducted Japan-U.S. bilateral cruising exercise with the strike force from October to November 2017 in the waters and air of the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and around Okinawa, and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) conducted tactical exercises with F/A-18, carrier-based fighters from the aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz.

Also in March 2018, the MSDF conducted bilateral
exercises with the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and other vessels of the U.S. Navy in the waters and air from the northern part of the South China Sea to the area around Okinawa. The ASDF also conducted multiple training with U.S. Air Force B-1B, B-52 and U.S. Marine F-35B in the airspace around western Kyushu and around Okinawa.

The Japan-U.S. bilateral training were conducted with the aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It is believed that bolstering Japan-U.S. collaboration and demonstrating bilateral ties as an outcome of implementing these Japan-U.S. bilateral training have the effect of further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall Japan-U.S. Alliance and demonstrating Japan’s determination and high capacity towards stabilizing the region in an increasingly severe security environment for Japan.

In recent years, USFJ have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments.

(5) Logistics Support

Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.

The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, UN peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so. In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, the two countries confirmed that they would expeditiously work on the negotiations on the ACSA to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. Subsequently, following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into force on April 25. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that by December 2017 food and fuel has been provided to U.S. Forces engaged in information collection and other activities.

(6) Joint/Shared Use

The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of USFJ in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training and exercises and increased interoperability between the...
SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in the case of a disaster.

Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, in December 2013 and between June and July 2014, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.

In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through Operation Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation Tomodachi involved the deployment of a large-scale force at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft, resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for USFJ.

On the other hand, some issues have emerged, such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S.
Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism.

In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014 based on the scenario of an earthquake occurring in the Nankai Trough. USFJ also participated in the Wakayama Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training (October 2014) and Michinoku ALERT 2014 (November 2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Northeastern Army. In this manner, the SDF and USFJ have been enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness.

In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22) of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Office locally established by the joint task force organized for the earthquake response.

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4  Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

(1) Cooperation in International Activities

The SDF has conducted activities in close cooperation with the United States and other participating countries through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, international disaster relief activities and international peacekeeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan and the United States worked closely together at local multilateral coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison officers to the U.S. Africa Command in October 2014, coordinating efforts and collecting information with relevant countries including the United States, for close cooperation.

As for maritime security, both Japan and the United States have made efforts as maritime nations to maintain and develop “open and stable seas” according to fundamental rules such as securing the freedom and safety of navigation, and the rule of law including peaceful dispute resolution based on international law. The two countries have been working closely together on various multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives supported by countries along the sea lanes, including participation in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 for countering piracy since December 2013, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise Pacific Protector 17, hosted by Australia in September 2017.

See See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security) Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Proliferation Security Initiative)

(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises

The Guidelines enable Japan and the United States to promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating in trilateral (e.g., Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States.

5  Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

(1) Cooperation on Space

With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in the area of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of-government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis.

Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG has held four meetings in total since its establishment in October 2015 (the most recent

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4 See part II, Chapter 2, Section 4-2, Footnote 4
meeting was in February 2018). Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to develop and secure experts, and (4) continued participation to tabletop exercises.

(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace
Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the Department of Defense (DoD) to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation.

The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate development of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. Governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and bilateral exercises were also cited. Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement.

(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and production bases and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America.5 In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America6 was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums.

At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in June 2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU).7 The MOU promotes measures concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.).

Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains initiatives for the common maintenance infrastructure for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys8 deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the Osprey planned to be deployed by the GSDF7 as well as initiatives for the onsite maintenance locations (regional depots) in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35 fighter aircraft.

(2) Education and Research Exchange
The Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual cooperation relating to security and defense, and the two governments will deepen exchanges between members of relevant organizations, and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. To this end, the MOD/SDF has been working on education and research exchanges by accepting students from abroad and holding Japan-U.S.

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5 Official title: Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America
6 Official title: Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America
7 The official title is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement.
8 The GSDF plans to deploy 17 tiltrotors (V-22 Osprey), which are expected to supplement and enhance the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA), during the current Mid-Term Defense Plan (five years; FY2014-2018) for responses to attacks on islands.
bilateral or multilateral seminars that include the United States so that security and defense personnel can share knowledge and enhance cooperation.

4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

1 Various Policy Consultations

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Asia-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the SDC. As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

In addition, the MOD organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. DoD and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between Japan and the United States concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues.
the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives.

Reference 24 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since FY2015))
Fig. II-4-2-6 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues)

2 “2+2” Meeting (August 17, 2017)

The “2+2” Meeting was held in Washington DC on August 17, 2017. Foreign Minister Kono and Defense Minister Onodera attended from the Japanese side, and then U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of U.S. Defense Mattis attended from the U.S. side.

The following is a summary of the “2+2” Meeting and Joint Statement.

a. Overview

Amongst an increasingly severe security in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and reconfirmed that the Alliance continues to be the cornerstone of the regional peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

b. Regional Strategic Environment

The Ministers concurred that North Korea’s nuclear and missiles development is completely unacceptable, and that it is necessary to apply more pressure on North Korea, including the strict and full implementation of the newly adopted United Nations Security Council resolution. In addition, while maintaining Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea cooperation closely, that the Ministers urge China and Russia to play a greater role, as well as to continue taking concrete measures to reinforce the defense posture of the Alliance and enhance its capabilities in order to deter the threat of North Korea.

Regarding the situation in the South China Sea, the Ministers agreed that Japan and the U.S. would continue to cooperate for the peace and stability of the East China Sea, reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku islands, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.

The Ministers confirmed the significance of continued engagement of Japan and the United States including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation.

c. Strengthening Security and Defense Cooperation

The Ministers shared the view to develop measures to further enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In particular, they proposed practical measures and actions to further strengthen the Alliance, including trough reviewing the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations.

• Japan expressed the intent to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, in anticipation of its next planning period for it Mid-Term Defense Program.

• The United States committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan.

• In order to expedite work already underway in this regard, the Ministers gave the following guidance to their stance. (1) Accelerate implementation of the Guidelines and pursue additional types of cooperation under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security. (2) Explore new and expanded activities in various areas such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), training and exercises, research and development, capacity building, and joint/shared use of facilities.

The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ commitment to the implementation of the 2015 Guidelines.

• The Ministers welcomed to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the new Japan-U.S. ACSA.

• The Ministers reaffirmed the critical role of the U.S.’ extended deterrence that is essential to ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the Asia-pacific region.

• The Ministers affirmed to enhance and accelerate of cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defenses, Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), cooperation on defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security.

• Aiming to enhance cooperation in outer space and cyberspace, and deepen discussions towards cooperation.
d. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

- The Ministers highlighted efforts to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region, notably ROK, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries.

- The Ministers emphasized to expand Japan-U.S.-Korea trilateral exercises (missile warnings, anti-submarine warfare, and maritime interdiction operation exercises), and enhance information-sharing. They affirmed the intention to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers to the Southeast Asian countries. They confirmed the commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building.

e. The U.S. Force Presence in Japan

- Realignment of USFJ
  - The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the existing arrangements to maintain a robust U.S. Force presence in Japan, while maintaining deterrent capability of U.S. Force and mitigating their impact on local communities, and enhancing from local communities for the presence and operations of USFJ.
    - The Ministers reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. They underscored their strong determination to achieve relocation of facilities to Henokosaki and the return of MCAS Futenma as soon as possible.
    - The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to steadily implement the existing realignment plan (Consolidation Plan, relocation of marine corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam, field carrier landing practice, relocation of training of tilt-rotor aircraft/rotary wing aircraft, etc.).

- Host Nation Support (HNS)
  - The Ministers reaffirmed the overall level of HNS, and the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) funding.

- Other issues
  - The Ministers reaffirmed promotion of joint/shared use. They welcomed supplementary arrangements of the Status of Forces Agreement regarding the environmental stewardship and the civilian component, and they stressed the importance of steadily implementing these arrangements.

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Reference 25 (Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Joint Statement (provisional translation) (August 17, 2017)
between Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea, as well as to urge relevant countries including China and Russia to secure the full implementation of the resolution and to further work on maximizing the pressure against North Korea.

(3) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 23, 2017)
Minister Onodera and Secretary Mattis took the opportunity of ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM plus) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting from 12:45 (LT) for about 65 minutes. An overview is as follows.

a. Response to issues of North Korea
The Ministers shared information on the situation and outlook of nuclear and missile development by North Korea. Minister Onodera described the situation where threats of North Korea to security of the region including Japan have become unprecedentedly major and imminent. Based on that fact, Minister Onodera stated the necessity of a proper discussion with Secretary Mattis to take close measures to any situation as an alliance. Secretary Mattis expressed the similar view and renewed strong determination on defense of Japan including commitment for extended deterrence.

In light of increasing threat of ballistic missile by North Korea, the Ministers agreed to ensure the best defense posture, confirmed cooperation on introduction of new BMD assets focusing on Aegis Ashore, and agreed to promote closer cooperation on operational side between assets of Japan and the U.S. assets including Aegis ship.

The ministers welcomed that they are keeping a high level of communication through telephone calls on the occasion of repeated provocative acts by North Korea, and confirmed that they will keep working closely together in information sharing. Also, they confirmed that they will continue to exert pressure on North Korea in a tangible way, and reiterated the importance of coordinating closely on future measures between Japan and the United States.

In addition, the Ministers reaffirmed to advance close trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Republic of Korea.

b. Regional Situations
The Ministers agreed that they will continuously keep paying attention to the situation of the East China Sea and both Japan and the United States will cooperate for its peace and stability.

Also, the Ministers confirmed the importance of commitment to South-East Asia in light of the situation including the South China Sea, and welcomed development of multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the region under the framework of ADMM plus. Minister Onodera stated that Japan will proceed with the effort to improve capability of ASEAN based on the guidelines for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, “the Vientiane Vision.” The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to promote defense cooperation including capacity building assistance with South-East Asian countries.

In addition, as for the accident of CH-53E, Secretary Mattis showed recognition on the importance of flight safety, and Minister Onodera conveyed to Secretary Mattis that it is vital to win the support of local communities to ensure stable stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan and asked to operate safely.

(4) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (November 6, 2017)
Prime Minister Abe held a working lunch and Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump when he visited Japan, and held discussions on the bilateral security situation, including North Korea, the regional situation, and Okinawa.

a. North Korea
○ Introduction
The two leaders confirmed that both countries are 100% together on the issue of North Korea, and that the U.S. commitment to the region is unwavering, backed by the U.S. presence based on the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance. President Trump also reconfirmed the ironclad U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional.

○ Reinforcing Pressure to North Korea
The two leaders shared the view that now is not the time for dialogue, that maximum pressure must be applied to North Korea, and the recognition that North Korea will not see a bright future unless it changes its course of actions toward denuclearization.

Prime Minister Abe announced that Japan intends to take additional measures, which President Trump welcomed in response.

The two leaders welcomed deepened coordination among Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and reaffirmed to further foster coordination among three countries.

Both leaders reaffirmed that the full implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea is imperative and confirmed that they intend to encourage related countries including China and Russia, including through direct engagement with their counterparts, so that the international community as a whole maximizes pressure on North Korea.
b. Regional / Global Affairs

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
The two leaders confirmed that a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law is a cornerstone for peace and prosperity of the international community and called on all states to respect freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the seas, and reiterated that both countries intend to continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

The two leaders stressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, which is the core of the vitality of the world with its vast population and economic dynamism.

In addition, both leaders affirmed that Japan and the United States will work together to promote peace and prosperity in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific as free and open and directed relevant ministers and institutions to flesh out detailed cooperation, in particular, in the following areas:

1. Promotion and establishment of fundamental values (rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc.)
2. Pursuit of economic prosperity (improvement of connectivity, etc.)
3. Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, etc.)

Both leaders reiterated that they will cooperate with any country that shares this vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

East China Sea and South China Sea
The two leaders expressed concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas and they reaffirmed their opposition to unilateral coercive actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions.

They reiterated that maritime disputes should be settled peacefully in accordance with international law.

Taking note of the progress of discussion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), they emphasized the importance of demilitarization of the disputed features in the South China Sea.

China
The two leaders welcome China’s positive contribution to regional and global peace and prosperity, and stressed the importance for Japan and the U.S. to continue constructive dialogue with China.

c. Japan-U.S. Relations
The two leaders shared the view that they intend to continue to work toward enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance amid an increasingly severe security environment in the region. Along with appreciating the achievements made at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”) held in August 2017, they directed relevant ministers to continue to follow up with these achievements.

The two leaders reaffirmed the commitment to the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with previous affirmations, maintaining operational and deterrent capability of U.S. forces in Japan. Both leaders reaffirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henokosaki is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma and called for the steady implementation of the construction plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), noting the adverse impact of further delays on the ability to provide for peace and security. Prime Minister Abe stated that it is essential to be responsive to local communities’ concerns regarding incidents, accidents and other issues. Both leaders reaffirmed the importance of engaging local communities about the purpose of training and of allaying concerns about safety.

(5) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 17 and 18, 2018) (Security Field)
Prime Minister Abe held Japan-U.S. Summit Meetings with U.S. President Trump three times.

a. North Korea
The two leaders reaffirmed the close coordination between the two countries with respect to the actions to be taken on the issue of North Korea including the upcoming U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, and expressed their intention for Japan and the US to remain fully aligned on all areas of talks with North Korea. They also confirmed the importance of Japan-U.S.-ROK close trilateral coordination.

Both leaders shared the recognition that maximum pressure campaign to North Korea under the close cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and ROK in coordination with the international community including China, has recently driven North Korea to seek dialogue. The two leaders also commended the efforts by the ROK Government up to this point.

The two leaders noted that concrete measures toward denuclearization hadn’t been announced yet by North Korea, and shared the view that they needed to continue careful analysis of its intention.

Nonetheless, both leaders affirmed that they would maintain maximum pressure against North Korea. As the US maintains the policy of “all options are on the table,” Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed his support for this President Trump’s principled position. Moreover, both leaders shared the recognition that North Korea must not be given any reward for merely engaging with other countries, and that the international community should uphold this policy.
Both leaders reaffirmed that they are committed to achieving the denuclearization of North Korea. They also reaffirmed that North Korea needs to abandon all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The two leaders shared the recognition that specific actions need to be taken by North Korea to realize these goals.

Prime Minister Abe requested President Trump to raise the abductions issue during the upcoming U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, and President Trump assured that he will bring up the matter in his meeting with Kim Jong-un and urge North Korea to promptly resolve its abduction of Japanese citizens, referring to the strong impression he received when he met the families of the abductees during his visit to Japan last November. Both leaders agreed to work towards the early resolution of the abductions issue.

Both leaders shared the importance of addressing North Korea’s sanctions evasion and full implementation of the pertinent United Nations Security Council Resolutions by the international community under close cooperation with international partners including ROK. In this context, President Trump commended Japan’s effort to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea related vessels, and expressed that the U.S., with other multilateral partners, would continue efforts on this issue in coordination with Japan.

Both leaders shared the expectation that the situation will improve following the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, etc. They also shared the recognition that North Korea is situated in a truly fortunate location, adjoining the growth region of Asia and the Pacific, and it has an industrious labor force as well as natural resources. Both leaders also shared the view that if it were to make use of those, there could be a path towards North Korea dramatically growing its economy and improving public welfare, and reaffirmed that is where North Korea’s bright future lies.

b. Japan-U.S. Alliance
Against the backdrop of the current situation regarding North Korea, President Trump reaffirmed unwavering commitment of the U.S. to Japan’s defense through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional.

Both leaders reaffirmed that they would further promote the Japan-U.S. security cooperation through steady implementation of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

Both leaders expressed their intention to work together to mitigate impact of the U.S. forces on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining operational and deterrent capability of the U.S. forces, Japan. The leaders reaffirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to the Camp Schwab/Henoko area and in adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and as such called for the steady implementation of the construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to ensure the Alliance’s ability to provide for peace and security in the region. Both leaders also shared a continued commitment to safety operations.

The two leaders shared concern regarding the situation in the East and South China Seas, and reaffirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to coordinate together on this issue. The two leaders also reaffirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to change the status quo.

Prime Minister Abe conveyed President Trump that it is important for Japan to continue introducing sophisticated equipment including U.S.-made defense equipment in strengthening Japan’s defense capability and responding to the severe security environment. President Trump welcomed Prime Minister Abe’s remarks.

c. Others
Both leaders welcomed progress in discussions between Japan and the United States, toward achievement of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that they would further advance concrete cooperation in areas that follow international standards including development of high quality infrastructure.

Both leaders also discussed China, and agreed on the importance of urging China to make further contributions to the peace, security, and prosperity of the region and the international community.

(6) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (April 20, 2018)
Minister of Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting at the U.S. Department of Defense.

a. North Korea
The Ministers closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on the way ahead, including the meeting between leaders of United States and North Korea, regarding the issue of North Korea. Despite that North Korea’s attitude is changing and they are showing their willingness to talk, the Ministers noted that no concrete measures by North Korea towards denuclearization has been seen and agreed to keep close watch on North Korea’s actions. Minister Onodera
stated the necessity of maintaining maximum pressure against North Korea to make them abandon all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, and the Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, Secretary Mattis applauded measures implemented by Maritime Self Defense Forces, and noted the U.S. willingness to continue pursuing such activities in coordination with Japan and other various partners. In addition, the Ministers reaffirmed to advance close trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea as well as multinational cooperation through conducting joint exercises.

The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain close communication to take concerted action as an alliance in response to any situations.

b. Enhancing the Alliance Capability to Deter and Respond
The Ministers welcomed the Japan-U.S. cooperation in new areas implemented under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan U.S. Defense Cooperation such as protection mission against U.S. Forces’ assets and provision of goods and services to U.S. Forces by Self Defense Forces, and the Ministers reaffirmed to make further improvement of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation through steady implementation of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

In light of the build-up of Japan’s future defense capability, Minister Onodera explained that Japan is in the process to review the National Defense Program Guidelines and to develop the next Mid-Term Defense Program towards the end of this year, and the Ministers agreed to continue to work closely and exchange information. Minister Onodera also stated that, in order to address the severe security environment, it is essential for the strengthening of Japan’s defense capability that Japan continues to introduce high-performance defense equipment including U.S. made assets. The Ministers affirmed that both countries will make efforts to realize Japan’s smooth and timely procurement of U.S. made assets, including Aegis Ashore, by making improvements in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales.

c. U.S. Forces in Japan, Okinawa
Minister Onodera requested continued efforts to ensure safe operation of U.S. Forces, including U.S. military aircrafts in Okinawa and the CV-22 expected to be deployed in Yokota Air Base this year. Secretary Mattis expressed his recognition that it is important to ensure safe operations. Furthermore, Minister Onodera requested cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, and the Ministers agreed to work together in obtaining understanding of local communities.

(7) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (May 29, 2018)
Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Hawaii.

a. North Korea
The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. Minister Onodera expressed his view that the meeting between the leaders of U.S. and North Korea should be an opportunity to advance outstanding issues of concern such as nuclear, missile and abductions issues. The Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in complete, verifiable and irreversible way.

In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, the Ministers welcomed measures implemented by Japan in coordination with partner countries including United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and agreed that they will continue to take actions with the voluntary countries, and reaffirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea.

Secretary Mattis expressed U.S. renewed commitment to Japanese defense. The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain close communication to take concerted action as an alliance in response to any situations.

b. Regional State of Affairs, etc.
The Ministers exchanged opinions on regional challenges, and in light of China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, agreed that it is important for both countries to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, to cooperate for the peace and stability, and to be continuously engaged in the South China Sea. The Ministers noted that China has enforced its military capability and intensified its activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and also agreed to reinforce the Alliance capability to deter and respond through enhancement of defense capability based on the close cooperation of Japan and U.S. for the peace and stability of the region.
c. Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of cooperating with the allied countries and various partners to assure the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that Japan and U.S. or Japan, U.S., and Australia proceed with coordination in the promotion of the basic principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and in capacity building.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan
Minister Onodera requested efforts to ensure safe operations of U.S. Forces and cooperation in efforts to obtain consent from local communities including those in Okinawa.

(8) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (June 7, 2018) (Security Field)
Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Trump held Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in Washington, DC.

The two leaders closely coordinated the future policy with regard to the issue on North Korea, including responses to the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting that was scheduled for June 12, and shared the view that Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), would coordinate closely to ensure that the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting would be a historic meeting marking progress on the issues of concern, including the abductions, nuclear, and missile issues.

The two leaders confirmed that following the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the ROK, will promptly share information and coordinate policy.

(9) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (June 29, 2018)
Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting at the Ministry of Defense.

a. North Korea
The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. The Ministers agreed that, complying with the UNSCRs, they will work together to realize CVID of all of its WMD including biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in coordination with the international community, and confirmed that Japan and U.S. continue to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea in coordination with their partner countries.

Secretary Mattis explained the suspension of U.S.-ROK combined military exercises, and the Ministers reaffirmed that neither withdrawal nor reduction of the USFK has been considered, and reconfirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. Secretary Mattis expressed renewed U.S. commitments to defend Japan, and the Ministers agreed to proceed with the reinforcement of the alliance’s deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. joint exercises steadily, as planned. The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain a close channel of communication to take concerted actions as an alliance in response to every situation.

b. Regional Affairs
The Ministers exchanged their views based on Secretary Mattis’s visit to China, the Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, and to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability.

The Ministers also confirmed the importance to collaborate towards consolidating basic principles such as rule of law and freedom of navigation.

c. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
The Ministers welcomed the progress and improvements being made in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the Ministers also confirmed the U.S. will continue to work to help Japan achieve efficient procurement.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers agreed to closely work towards the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, and Minister Onodera’s requested to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.