President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, successfully achieved reelection to his fourth term in March 2018. In his inaugural address in May of that same year, President Putin stated that Russia is a strong, active and influential participant in international life, and that the country’s security and defense capability are reliably assured. He also stated that quality of life, wellbeing, security and health were his main goals, and that Russia has risen like a phoenix a number of times throughout history and would achieve a breakthrough again.

At the annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in March of that same year, held prior to the presidential election, President Putin said, “Russia ranks among the world’s leading nations with a powerful foreign economic and defense potential.” After it became certain he would win reelection, President Putin also called for the further strengthening of Russia’s defense capabilities, while on the other hand, also making remarks to the effect that Russia has no intention of starting an arms race, and that Russia seeks constructive relations with other countries.1

At that same presidential address, President Putin talked about modernizing Russia’s military equipment, including its strategic nuclear forces, and emphasized that Russia would be developing new nuclear weapons as a measure in response to the deployment of missile defense systems by the United States domestically and abroad. President Putin also expressed the recognition that Russia’s military power helped maintain strategic parity in the world, and made remarks to the effect that Russia is prepared to negotiate toward construction of a new system for international security and sustainable development of civilization.

President Putin once remarked, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century,” and he has been working to unify and strengthen the sphere of the former Soviet Union through such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.

With regard to the situation in Ukraine, ever since the efforts to implement ceasefire agreements (Minsk Agreements)2 in the destabilized region of eastern Ukraine following the illegal “annexation” of Crimea by Russia, there have been no major developments in particular. The West has alleged that Russia attempted to change the status quo by force by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” and it is increasing its sense of caution toward Russia.3

In addition, Russia has been conducting military intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has indicated that it has the ability to continually and swiftly deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring bases in Syria. At the same time, it is thought that Russia considers the intervention as an opportunity to test and demonstrate its equipment. In December 2016, Syrian government troops seized Aleppo, which is a

1 President Putin made this statement at a meeting that he invited other presidential candidates to after it seemed certain that he would win the election (March 2018).

2 The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.

Then, the Minsk Memorandum was signed in September 2014, and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreement was signed on February 2015. These are collectively called the Minsk Agreements.

3 See Chapter 2, Section 4, footnote 2. Due to the complex nature of hybrid warfare that combines economic, intelligence operation, and diplomatic aspects, some suggest that the rising threat of hybrid warfare will drive closer cooperation between NATO, which is a military alliance, and the EU, which is reinforcing its security and defense initiatives.
strategic location in Syria, and at the end of the month a ceasefire agreement entered into force between the Assad Government and opposition forces led by Russia and Turkey. Since January 2017, Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East, including the hosting of Syrian peace talks brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, while continuing the fight against ISIL and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front). Furthermore, Russia concluded an agreement with the Government of Syria for its continued use of bases in Syria in the future. Focus of attention will be the extent to which Russia will expand its influence in the Middle East including Syria.

While Russia faces severe economic conditions, forecasts indicate that following the recovery in oil prices, a major export product, the country will maintain positive economic growth in 2018. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is believed to have cooperated on the maintenance of Russia’s ICBMs. It is said that the suspension of Ukraine’s technical support following the deterioration of the bilateral relation could impair the operations of Russian equipment that rely highly on Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” revised in December 2015. The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region for undermining global and regional stability.

In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and the RAF.

The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); formation of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia.

The doctrine continues to regard nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It states that

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4 The IMF predicted that Russia’s GDP growth rate for 2017 would be 1.9% but would decrease to 1.6% in 2018.
Russia will maintain a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other WMDs are used against it or its allies, or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons are used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime.

As for Russia’s defense budget, the executed FY2017 budget registered a year-on-year decrease of around 25% compared to the amount spent in the previous year, while the amounts executed for FY2011-FY2016 showed year-on-year double-digit growth. Although Russia faced a difficult fiscal situation in 2015 and 2016, including declines in economic growth, it is said that the country has worked to secure a budget for national defense in order to achieve the goals of the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) by 2020 and other targets. However, having used up the reserve fund set aside for fiscal replenishment, it is expected that in 2018, as it was the case in 2017, Russia’s national defense budget will continue to be allocated based on the amount of economic growth achieved.

### Fig. I-2-4-1 Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget

#### Table: Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense Budget (in 100 million rubles)</th>
<th>Year-on-year growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-30.0</td>
<td>(FY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>(FY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>(FY)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20.0</td>
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<td>(FY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>(FY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>(FY)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The information on execution of budgets of the Russian Federation announced by the Russian Federal Treasury (figures for FY2009-FY2017 are expenditures and figures for FY2018 are the budget amount).

Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization.

Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” that was approved by then President Dmitry Medvedev in September 2008, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one), strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the RAF such as the development and introduction of new equipment.

Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that RAF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, Russia is working to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70%, and it announced in December 2017 that it had increased said proportion to approximately 60%. Within the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2018-2027 that appears to have been approved by President Putin, it is said that Russia will continue to invest 19 trillion rubles over ten years to update equipment and an additional 1 trillion rubles to develop infrastructure needed for the deployment of that equipment. It is expected that Russia will continue modernization efforts in the future.

Regarding the professionalization of the military
forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system (for noncommissioned officers and soldiers) which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage of contract servicemen is set to increase further.\(^\text{10}\)

In the context of the gradual increase in difficulties in securing the defense budget due to the recent severe economic situation, attention will be paid to the trends related to Russian efforts to improve the capacity of conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence capability provided by nuclear weapons.

### 3 Military Posture and Trends

Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such as the RAF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The RAF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness of its nuclear forces unit.

Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) comparable to the United States in scale.

Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States.\(^\text{11}\) Russia is working on accelerating the development and introduction of new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its GPV.

In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of RS24, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM.\(^\text{12}\) Since December 2012, three Borey-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) vessels, which carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” were commissioned. There are plans to deploy four such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in the future.

In October 2017, firing training took place using an ICBM “Topol” from Plesetsk Cosmodrome as well as SLBMs from a SSBN in the Okhotsk Sea and a SSBN from the Barents Sea. Cruise missile firing training also took place using long-range bombers. President Putin, at the Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board held in December 2017, noted that the share of modern weapons in Russia’s nuclear triad had reached nearly 80%, and stated that Russia would increase that percentage to 90% by 2021. He also stated that Russia could overcome both existing and future missile defense systems.

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\[^{10}\] Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease in the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (since January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2016, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel strength adequacy was around 93% and contracted soldiers totaled approximately 384,000.

\[^{11}\] In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and the treaty came into force in February 2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. The United States announced that as of February 2018 Russia had 1,350 deployed strategic warheads and 562 deployed delivery platforms, while Russia announced that as of February 2018, it had 1,444 deployed strategic warheads and 527 deployed delivery platforms.

\[^{12}\] In addition, it is believed that Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM “Sarmat” (RS-26) that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and be equipped with many warheads, a light-weight mobile solid-fuel ICBM “Rubezh” (RS-26) as well as new warheads aimed at enhancing the capability to penetrate MD.
As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them onshore in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces. In the midst of this, in December 2017, the U.S. Department of State concluded that Russia had deployed Ground-
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in violation of the INF Treaty, and that the U.S. Department of Defense had begun review of military concepts and options including ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. On the other hand, Russia has criticized the U.S. as well, saying that it is in effect in violation of the INF treaty, calling the Aegis Ashore system a potential platform for the launch of Tomahawk missiles. Different assertions about the treaty still exist between Russia and the U.S.

Russia is considered to be developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. Close attention will need to be paid to Russia’s development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the “PAK FA” (Su-57) currently under development as the so-called “fifth generation fighter” and the T-14 Armata.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (announced in December 2014) asserts that Russia retains the right to strike with nuclear weapons not only if nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction are used but also in the case of an invasion involving conventional weapons that threatens the country’s survival. In this way, Russia is placing priority on modernization of nuclear capabilities from the standpoint of a nuclear equilibrium with the US and supplementation of weaknesses in conventional forces.

Strategic nuclear force initiatives are promoting multiple warheads, increased nuclear output, and other improvements, including the new Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for mobile and silo use and deployment of new Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, Russia is moving forward with deployments of the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile (land-to-land) that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads and the Kalibr cruise (ship-to-land) missile.

Additionally, Russia has stated that it is pursuing nuclear capabilities to destroy the missile defense system being installed by the US domestically and abroad on the basis that it undermines the balance of nuclear forces with the United States. At the State of the Union Address given in March 2018, President Putin introduced a variety of new weapons, including the Sarmat large silo-type ICBM, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, a nuclear-powered unmanned submarine weapon, the Kinzhal hypersonic missile for fighter planes, and the Avangard strategic missile with winged aircraft in the warhead.

Japan needs to continue to closely monitor activities by the Russian military, including modernization of nuclear forces and developments, including in light of Russia’s deployments of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles and strategic bombers in the Far East region.

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According to various reports, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation President Yuri Slyusar stated in January 2015 that test versions of Russia’s fifth generation PAK-FA (“Prospective Aviation Complex of Frontline Aviation”) fighter jet had started to be handed over to the Russian Air Force. However, he also indicated that mass production is scheduled for 2020.
tank,\textsuperscript{14} in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fighter and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.”

Along with carrying out a range of exercises,\textsuperscript{15} since February 2013, the RAF have been conducting surprise inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{16} These inspections are contributing to the improvement of long-distance mobilization capability of the RAF.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, outside of Russia, the RAF have been deploying vessels mainly formed of the Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, from October 2017 to January of the following year, Steregushchiy-class frigates belonging to the Baltic Fleet navigated the long distance from the North Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. A plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfields in the Arctic, and in August and October 2017, a flotilla mainly comprising Northern Fleet Udaloy-class destroyers took part in a landing drill while navigating the long distance from Severomorsk on the Kola peninsula to the Novosibirsk islands.\textsuperscript{19} The RAF has been intensifying its activities in the Arctic, which include not only such deployment and exercises of naval vessels and resumption of military facility operation, but also strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol flights by long-range bombers.

In addition, in April 2017, Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew as far as the coast off Alaska, and in December that year, Tu-95 bombers also visited Biak Airport in Indonesia. In addition, in January 2018, Tu-160 long-range bombers flew to the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the North Sea.

The RAF has thus intensified activities not only in the Asia-Pacific, but also in the Arctic, Europe, areas near the U.S., and the Middle East. In particular, Russia’s vessels and aircraft tend to expand their area of activity.\textsuperscript{20}

As for the future of RAF, there are uncertain elements which may be influenced by Russia’s future economic and social development and trends in Russia’s diplomatic relations with European and other countries; therefore, it is necessary to keep our attention on future developments.

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**Su-35 fighter**

*<Specifications, performance>*

- Speed: Mach 2.25
- Main armament: Air-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 200 km), air-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 285 km)
- Description: New type of multipurpose fighter of the Russian Air Force, it has been deployed in the Far East since 2014.

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**T-14 Armata tank**

*<Specifications, performance>*

- Maximum speed: 80 km
- Armament: 125 mm smooth-bore cannon
- Description: Main next-generation tank, displayed at the 2015 parade and reportedly currently under development.
Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unified operation of these services.

The current presence of the RAF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the trend related to deployment of new units and military facility development.

Given that the RAF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the RAF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

(1) Nuclear Forces
As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, three Delta III-class SSBNs and two Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying four Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacific Fleet by 2020.

(2) Ground Forces
As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be reorganizing the command structure from a division-based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of eleven brigades and one division with approximately 80,000 personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system.

(3) Naval Forces
The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 640,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 320,000 tons. Additionally, it plans on deploying four multipurpose Steregushchyi-class frigates.
(the first of these, the Sovershennyy, was commissioned in July 2017, and the second, the Gromky, is expected to be commissioned in October 2018.)

**2 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories**

Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed.\(^{22}\)

After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island for the first time as head of state in November 2010, Russian ministers and others have made repeated visits to the Northern Territories.\(^{23}\) Between July and September 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev and six minister-level dignitaries also visited Etorofu Island, among other areas. Also, Russia is proceeding with the development of military facilities in the Northern Territories.\(^{24}\) In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands.\(^{25}\) Although in February 2017, Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu stated at a meeting

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\(^{21}\) According to Military Balance 2018, in addition to 34 Su-35 fighters, 24 Su-34 fighter-bombers have been deployed to the Eastern Military District (11th Army of Air and Air Defence Force).

\(^{22}\) The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which is comprised of two regiments, is one of the few division units making up the RAF since most divisions were transformed into brigades due to military reform, and is stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted in the Eastern Military District and elsewhere in July 2013. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500. At the Japan–Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov revealed that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo. In February 2011, a senior official of the General Staff was said to have stated that troops on the Northern Territories would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel in the process of reorganizing divisions into brigades. In May 2014, Commander Sergey Surkovkin of the Eastern Military District announced the buildup of military facilities on the Northern Territories. In August 2014, Russia opened a new airport in Etorofu Island. Through such measures, Russia has stepped up its activities in the Northern Territories under de facto occupation.

\(^{23}\) After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by then First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin in January to February 2011, followed by then Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov in May 2011. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, then Deputy Minister of Defence Dmitry Bulgaev, and in February 2011, then Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there. Furthermore, Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers visited Kunashiri Island in July 2012. In July 2015, Minister of Healthcare Veronika Skvortsova visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island, and in August 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoys to the Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev, Minister for the Development of Russian Far East Galushka, and Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livov visited Etorofu Island. In September 2015, Minister of Agriculture Alexander Tkachev visited Etorofu Island, and Minister of Transport Makim Sokolov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island.

\(^{24}\) At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence of Russia in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that a total of 392 buildings and facilities are actively being built in the military facility areas on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Subsequently, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence in January 2016, the Minister noted that completing infrastructure construction in the areas was one of the priorities for 2016.

\(^{25}\) In March 2016, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that it planned to deploy surface-to-ship missiles “Bastion” and “Bal” to the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands before the end of the year. In November 2016, Boyevaya Vakhta, a newsletter published by the Pacific Fleet, mentioned that a “Bastion” coastal missile unit is being rotated to Etorofu Island and a “Bal” coastal missile unit to Kunashiri Island using an artillery squadron.
of the State Duma (lower house) that the deployment of a division to the Northern Territories or the Chishima Islands would be completed before the end of the year, details such as location of the deployment and the type of service are unknown. In January 2018, a government decree was issued to allow for joint military and civilian use of the new airport built in 2014 in Etorofu Island besides Tennei military airfield. Concerning military exercises and trainings, in February 2018, over 2,000 military personnel participated in an anti-terrorism exercise in the Northern Territories and the Chishima Islands, and it was announced in March of that same year that a new Su-35 fighters jet would be redeployed to Etorofu Island from its home base as part of a training exercise.

As described above, Russia continues to station RAF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the RAF’s activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.

During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in March 2017, Japan expressed it was regrettable that Russia had deployed surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories and that Russia may deploy a new division to the islands including the Four Northern Islands. Closer attention must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories.

3 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

In the vicinity of Japan, the RAF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform.

In September 2014, the strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2014, considered the largest and the most important of the RAF exercises and drills conducted that year, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. Over 155,000 personnel, over 4,000 combat vehicles, approximately 80 vessels, and approximately 630 aircraft participated in the exercise. It is regarded that its purpose was to verify the combat readiness and mobilization postures of the units in the Far East strategic front, including the Arctic. The exercise included units from not only the Eastern Military District, but also the Western and Central Military Districts. The various units conducted long-distance maneuvers covering a distance of 12,000 km at most. For Vostok 2018, which will be held in Siberia and the Arctic sometime in August and September 2018, there are plans for participation of units not only in the Eastern Military District, but also the Central Military District and the Northern Fleet.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and long distance voyages have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with assigned missions involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In September 2011, 24 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait in succession. This was the first time since the end of the Cold War that such a major transit of this strait by Russian naval vessels was confirmed. In recent years, ten or more Russian naval vessels have passed through the Soya Strait one to three times a year. Additionally, survey activities have taken place on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands, with the objective of studying the feasibility of deploying Pacific Fleet’s forces there.

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26 In Soviet Military Power 1989, the U.S. DoD refers to “Bastion” as the activity area of SSBN to be protected by land, sea, and air assets while utilizing topography in the territorial waters of the former Soviet Union. It was assumed that in the Pacific region, the former Soviet Union had set up a “Bastion” mainly in Okhotsk Sea. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy stated that regular long-term patrols of SSBN, which were greatly curtailed since the former Soviet Union, would be restarted in 2012.

27 The large-scale exercise Vostok 2014 was conducted over a vast area extending from the Arctic to the coastal area. In the Kamchatka Peninsula, ALCM launches were carried out from long-range bombers, as well as launches of SLCMs from Oscar II-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN). In Wrangel Island in the Arctic, night-time parachute landings and survival drills were conducted. In the Sakhalin, the Naval Infantry conducted landing drills as well as drills to prevent the landings of opposing forces. In the coastal and inland areas, drills including the launches of short-range ballistic missiles and GLCMs using the “skander” surface-to-surface missile system, as well as drills that made use of private infrastructure, such as takeoff and landing drills of the Su-25 attack aircraft using roads for motor vehicles were conducted.

28 The number of cases of the Russian naval fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and released in FY2017 is as follows: 12 cases in the Soya Strait (18 in FY2016, 22 in FY2015, 10 in FY2014); 1 case in the Tsugaru Strait (1 in FY2016, 0 in FY2015, 1 in FY2014); and 3 cases in the Tsushima Strait (7 in FY2016, 4 in FY2015, 8 in FY2014).

29 Some of the 24 naval vessels participated in the exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places.
in the future, and it is said that a new runway has been completed on that island as well. 30 There are also reports that bases will be constructed on Matsuwa Island as well as Paramushir Island, located in the north of Chishima Islands, and that there are plans to deploy Bal and Bastion surface-to-air missiles there. Attention must be paid to movement towards the construction of a coastal defense system covering the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers. Also, there were flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. 31

Russian aircraft were particularly active in FY2014 during the height of tensions in Ukraine, and in April the same year when eastern Ukraine began to destabilize, unusual flights took place with Tu-95 long-range bombers conducting flights around Japan on four occasions in one month. On two of these occasions, a total of six Tu-95 flew on the same day. 32

Russian aircraft activities continue to be active, as shown by the higher number of scrambles against Russian aircraft compared to the previous year, and the flights by Tu-95 long-range bombers around Japan in August 2017. 33

Russia considers the realization of its national interests as a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the multipolarization of international relations, the shift of global power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing importance of force in international relations. 33 Moreover, based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world. 34

Figure I-2-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft)

![Surface-to-ship missile Bal](image)

<Specifications, performance>
Maximum firing range: 130 km

<Description>
Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2016. An improved missile with a maximum range of 260 km also exists (the 3M-24U), but it is unclear if it has been deployed.

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30 In May 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that under the command of Vice Admiral Andrei Ryabukhin, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet that arrived in Matsuwa Island, an expedition comprised of approximately 200 personnel including representatives from the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Russian Geographical Society, the Eastern Military District, and the Pacific Fleet began conducting survey activities. Colonel-general Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Eastern Military District, stated at a military meeting of the district that six Pacific Fleet vessels and over 200 personnel participated in an expedition by the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Geographical Society to Chishima, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands, and that its primary objective was to study the feasibility of establishing a Pacific Fleet base in the future. Furthermore, Russia’s Ministry of Defense announced that three ships of the Pacific Fleet and around 100 personnel arrived on Matsuwa Island in June 2017 in order to conduct a secondary survey. Sakhalin.info reported in October 2017 that a new runway had been completed on Matsuwa Island, and that it was accepting aircraft landings around the clock. The Russian military newspaper Red Star reported that Russia’s Pacific Fleet is currently developing a military airport on the island that has the capacity to receive military light transport aircraft and rotorcraft.

31 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in January 2014 that surveillance flights of two Tu-95 long-range bombers took place with the assistance of Su-27 fighters and A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft.

32 The number of times Russian military aircraft flew around Japan since FY2013 was: one time in FY2013; six times in FY2014; two times in FY2015; one time in FY2016; and one time in FY2017.

33 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (November 2016).

34 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “With a view to protecting its national interests Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy ruling out futile confrontation (including a new arms race). (Abridged) The Russian Federation’s objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world.”
For this reason, Russia has been working on deepening its economic partnerships with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).\(^{35}\) Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the global economy,\(^ {36}\) and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India as countries with which to strengthen bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the possibility of cooperation with other countries towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL.

Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture of economy-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy with Russia’s politics and diplomacy including security, and develop its relations with other countries.

### Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East,\(^ {37}\) and security.\(^ {38}\) In the executive order concerning foreign policy issued in May 2012, President Putin upheld his policy to participate in the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region in order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia would make efforts to develop relationships with Japan, the ROK, and other countries, along with China,\(^ {39}\) India, and Vietnam. To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and also intends to assign an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India.\(^ {40}\)

Under this policy, Russia has participated in various frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.\(^ {41}\) Since 2015, the Eastern Economic Forum has been held in Vladivostok for accelerating the economic development of Eastern Russia and expanding international cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia continues to advance close military cooperation with China. Export agreements on new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile and Su-35 fighter jets were concluded in 2015, and since 2012, China and Russia have been conducting joint naval exercise “Joint Sea.” Russia also continues broad military cooperation with India. Export agreements were concluded in 2016 for new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missiles and Grigorovich-class frigates, and both countries have been conducting joint development of the fifth generation fighter and the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile. Additionally, both Russia and India continue to conduct the joint exercise “INDRA” involving the armies and navies of both countries.\(^ {42}\) Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security.

\(^{35}\) In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement.

\(^{36}\) Press conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov following the Russia-China-India foreign ministers’ meeting (April 2016).

\(^{37}\) Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin.

\(^{38}\) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in November 2016). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed his recognition that the importance of the entire Asia-Pacific region was rising.

\(^{39}\) See Chapter 2, Section 3-3 for the relationship with China.

\(^{40}\) The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “The Russian Federation will develop its comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with the People’s Republic of China as a key factor for maintaining global and regional stability. The Russian Federation will assign an important role to the privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India.”

\(^{41}\) Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the APEC, the ARF, the SCO, and the East Asia Summit (EAS; since 2011).

\(^{42}\) Aside from this cooperation, it has been reported that in March 2015, India requested Russia to lease another Akula-class nuclear-powered submarine in addition to the one already on lease.
3 Situation in Ukraine

As antagonism between Ukraine and Russia has continued since 2014, Ukraine has shifted away from non-alignment policy that Ukraine once held and is pursuing efforts to join NATO. In March 2018, President Poroshenko stated that Ukraine would participate in a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). Sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces continue in the eastern part of the country, with over 10,000 people reported to have died since April 2014. Furthermore, the political processes set out in the Minsk agreements seem to have stalled, including the holding of local elections and allowing more autonomy in the areas controlled by separatists. The unstable situation in eastern Ukraine and the Russian “annexation” of Crimea have taken on aspects of being entrenched. A proposal has been put forth to establish a United Nations mission with peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine. Russia asserts that this force should only work along the contact line, while the United States and others argue that the forces work within the entire occupied territory, including along national border between Ukraine and Russia. Developments related to this issue will be paid attention in the future.

4 Situation in Syria

Since September 2015, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as fired cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced in November 2016 that the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov deployed to the eastern part of the Mediterranean launched aircraft and conducted airstrikes on land-based targets for the first time in Russia’s naval history. These aircraft from the aircraft carrier are reported to have flown 420 sorties over a two-month period, bombing a total of 1,252 terrorist facilities. It has been pointed out, though, that most of these sorties were flown from Khmeimim Air Base since the aircraft was moved from the aircraft carrier to the Air Base soon after the airstrike began. It is therefore open to question whether this should be assessed as the operational capability of the aircraft carrier.

In December 2016, Syrian government troops gained control of strategically located Aleppo, where fighting has continued involving Syrian government troops, opposition forces, Kurdistan troops, and ISIL fighters. At the end of the same month, a nationwide ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect between the Assad administration and opposition forces. While Russia has continued to fight ISIL and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly the “al-Nusra Front”) since January 2017, it has also held Syrian peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan together with Syria and Iran. Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East by promoting initiatives that aim for political resolutions in the future, such as the establishment of a ceasefire monitoring organization and de-escalation areas.

In December 2017, President Putin visited a base in Syria, where he announced that the fight against terrorism in the country had been largely resolved, that Russia would continue to operate two permanent bases within Syria, and that he had decided that most of the Russian forces in Syria would be redeployed back to Russia. It is expected that Russia will prioritize a process towards political resolution while reducing its military campaign in Syria. Attention will continue to be paid to movement
to enhance the influence of Russia in the Middle East, including Syria.

The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIS; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, the use of cruise missiles and strategic bombers in the attacks has demonstrated Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of Russia’s military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on the political settlement process cannot be neglected.

Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the top foreign policy priority. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS, and deploys its troops in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009. Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence.

Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.

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45 In August 2008, following the conflict with Georgia, then President Medvedev indicated that one of the five principles of Russia’s foreign policy was that there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.

46 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but it was never recognized as such by the international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and then President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria.

47 After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the region. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving Georgia’s relations, defeated the ruling “United National Movement” that adopts an anti-Russian policy. In the presidential election of October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili, backed by “Georgian Dream,” was elected and became president in November of the same year. In his inauguration speech, President Margvelashvili stated that he was ready to deepen the dialogue with Russia, expressing his intention to continue with pro-Euro, pro-U.S. lines while pursuing improvement of the relationship with Russia.

48 Russia’s “Military Doctrine” revised in December 2014 states that Russia would promote cooperation with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia at shared defense and security.

49 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. In addition to Georgia which has already withdrawn from CIS and Ukraine which is announcing plans to withdraw, countries such as Azerbaijan and Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time.

50 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization.

51 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, Vzaimodeistvie (cooperative operation), has been implemented every year since 2009.
In addition, out of concern that the worsening security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries support Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen the security of the Afghan border.\(^{52}\)

### Relations with the United States

President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.”

Russia strongly opposed the deployment plan of the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating that it would have a negative impact on Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. Following the start of operations of a U.S. MD system in Romania in May 2016, President Putin noted that the deployment of MD systems in Europe was continuing despite the end of the threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons and missiles, and stated that Russia would do everything necessary to maintain strategic military force parity.

Russia feels that the deployment of the U.S. MD system in Europe and the Asia-Pacific undermines global and regional security. While expressing its concerns over the U.S. MD system, Russia is also seeking the enhancement of its strategic nuclear forces, including missiles that can reliably breakthrough MD systems.

However, following Russia’s actions in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the United States announced suspension of the military exchanges with Russia in March 2014.\(^{53}\) In addition, the United States dispatched a missile destroyer to the Black Sea and provided non-lethal weapons to the Ukrainian Government.\(^{54}\) In March 2018, the U.S. Department of State approved the sale of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized this move, stating that it would not help to bring an end to the conflict in Ukraine.

In regard to the situation in Syria, there were some positive developments, including the recognition of the importance of U.S.-Russia cooperation to eliminate ISIL, a U.N.-led political resolution to the conflict, and provisional safe zones as shown in a joint statement released at the U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting held in November 2017. However, antagonism between the two countries is ongoing, with both the U.S. and Russia criticizing each other over the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in April 2017, and also the missile strikes against Syria by the U.S., the U.K., and France in April 2018. At the U.S.-Russia summit meeting held in July 2018, disarmament issues as well as international affairs including North Korea and Syria were discussed with the recognition to improve the deteriorated U.S.-Russia relations; however, its outlook on improvement remains unclear.

### Relations with Europe and NATO

Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings.\(^{55}\) Additionally, NATO and European countries have maintained a severe diplomatic stance towards Russia while working together with the Ukrainian Government.

At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010 prior to the suspension of working level cooperation, Russia and NATO would work towards building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They have continued searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in

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\(^{52}\) At the Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board in December 2013, President Putin said that the withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014 would be a destabilizing element not only to Afghanistan but also to Central Asia and could pose a threat to the national interests and security of Russia.

\(^{53}\) Following the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, then U.S. DoD Spokesperson Kirby announced in March 2014 that the United States would cease all military exchange with Russia, including joint exercises with the RAF, consultations, and port calls.

\(^{54}\) The United States provided non-lethal weapons such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter mortar radars, uniforms, first aid equipment, and other related items to Ukraine.

\(^{55}\) NATO issued a statement condemning Russia over the situation in Ukraine, and has deployed additional military forces to countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. However, there are discrepancies among NATO’s member states in their responses to Russia.
fields such as MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation, no progress was made on Russia-NATO relations. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each country’s responsibility under a unified MD system of NATO and Russia.

Meanwhile, there remains an unsolved issue between Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.  

Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has represented existing threat to NATO’s eastern border for the first time since the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s member states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor national security concerns. For this and other reasons, NATO continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of its collective defense.

Russia revealed that it has deployed two army divisions near the border with Ukraine, and one army division near its border with Belarus, and Russia conducted the strategic command and staff exercise Zapad 2017 in its Western Military District and Belarus in September 2017. That exercise was brought up at the NATO-Russia Council meeting held in October of that same year, where it was pointed out that the number of actually participating soldiers and the area used for the exercise were larger than indicated in the announcement made by Russia prior to the exercise. However, there were no invasions into other countries by Russia, and no Russian units stayed in Belarus following the exercise, which were points of concern.

Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced in November 2016 states that containment policies of the United States and its allies undermine regional and global stability, and Russia would maintain its negative perspective towards NATO expansion.

**8 Exportation of Arms**

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian Government granted the exclusive authority to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft.
companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia exports equipment such as fighters and vessels to countries including India, China, Algeria, ASEAN member states, and Venezuela. Russia concluded an agreement with China to sell new Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Deliveries of the Su-35 fighters have already begun at the end of 2016, and plans call for a total of 24 of these aircraft to be delivered to China by 2018. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profit through arms exports.

Russia has delivered to Indonesia 5 Su-27 fighters and 11 Su-30 fighters. Furthermore, it was reported in 2016 that Russia signed an agreement to sell 11 Su-35 fighters to Indonesia. To date, Russia has delivered 18 Su-30 fighters to Malaysia and 12 Su-27 fighters and 36 Su-30 fighters to Vietnam. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam for Kilo-class submarines. All six of these submarines were delivered to Vietnam by January 2017. With regard to India, the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya in November 2013, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, to date, Russia has delivered to Algeria 52 Su-30 fighters and to Venezuela 24 Su-30 fighters. Russia’s exports to China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. With regard to Iran, Russia started exporting the “S-300” surface-to-air missile system in April 2016.

In September 2015, President Putin responded in an interview with news agencies that, “Russian-Chinese ties have now probably reached a peak in their entire history and continue developing.”