Section 1 The United States

1 ■ Security and Defense Policies

It has been pointed out that the Trump administration, which was inaugurated in January 2017, has significantly changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world amidst the formation of a new security environment, including a shift in the global balance of power, attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine and the South China Sea, the development and improved operational capability of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which have become an unprecedentedly serious and urgent threat, and the intensification of the activities of international terrorist organizations. On the other hand, it can be considered that while the United States is focusing on global competition, the United States has been continuing to play a role for world peace and stability with its comprehensive national power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the values and influence of the United States, bolstered by its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more prosperous.

The Trump administration, under the “America First” vision for governance, has set forth a policy for rebuilding the U.S. Forces and placing importance on allies under the banner of peace through strength. In addition, in less than a year since the inauguration, the Trump administration unveiled its policies on security and national defense by publishing the National Security Strategy (NSS), followed by the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Posture Review (NPR).

Regarding regional security, the United States has clarified its stance that it will emphasize the security of the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, under the recognition that North Korea’s nuclear capacity is an urgent, unpredictable threat to the United States and its allies, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea. In addition, taking into account China’s current movements in the South China Sea, the United States has expressed its stance that it will continue “Freedom of Navigation Operations,” and during his November 2017 trip to Asia, President Trump emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation when he revealed the vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (see 1-3 of this Section).

The United States has also been dealing with security issues outside of the Indo-Pacific region. In response to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led

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1 The NSS comprehensively indicates political, economic, military and diplomatic policies aimed at protecting and achieving goals.
2 The NDS affords the president and secretary of defense the utmost strategic flexibility, decides the force structure to meet needs, and supports the latest national security strategy.
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes. In addition, following its assessment that the Assad administration of Syria had used chemical weapons in April 2018, together with the United Kingdom and France, the United States carried out missile strikes against Syria’s chemical weapons-related facilities, and clarified its stance of developing powerful deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction. In August 2017, the United States announced its strategy on Afghanistan and South Asia which made clear its continuous involvement with Afghanistan, and in September 2017, Defense Secretary Mattis disclosed that reinforcements of over 3,000 U.S. military personnel would be sent to Afghanistan. In light of Russian actions concerning Ukraine, in order to strengthen involvement in NATO security and deterrence, the investment for the European Deterrence Initiative is being increased from US$4.8 billion in the previous fiscal year to US$6.5 billion in the FY2019 Department of Defense budget request. On the other hand, in its security policies, the United States considers that certain allies which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility. Under such a perception, the United States has requested NATO member states to swiftly meet their commitments to increase their national defense spending to 2% of GDP.

One year has passed since the inauguration of the Trump administration, and amidst the indicated direction of security and defense policies in strategies such as the NSS, specific security and defense policy trends advanced under the aforementioned strategy will draw attention. In addition, it should also be noted how the changing situations in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and the EU, as well as the November 2018 mid-term election, will affect the U.S. security and defense policies.

1 Perception about security environment

The National Military Strategy (NMS) released in July 2015 during the former Obama administration explicitly cites Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as “revisionist states” that are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens U.S. national security interests. It also mentions that violent extremist organizations such as ISIL are becoming imminent threats.

On the other hand, the NSS released in December 2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests. It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the United States and its allies and partners, which are the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of these, China and Russia are said to challenge American power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States and its allies.

In addition, the NDS published in January 2018 points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia are undermining the free and open international order constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.

Furthermore, regarding the military actions carried out in Syria in April 2018, President Trump stated that establishing strong deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important interest for the national security of the United States.

In consideration of this recognition, the United States deems as security threats nations and organizations that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its allies and threaten the international order. While the Trump administration has fundamentally accepted the threat perception of the previous Obama administration, it is addressing threats posed by China and Russia with particular emphasis as priority issues and appears to be continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.
2 Security and National Defense Strategy

The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the America First policy and realism in which power plays a central role in international politics, and stresses the need to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in the international community would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests in this competitive world: 1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life, 2. Promote American prosperity, 3. Preserve peace through strength, and 4. Advance American influence.

Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S. military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening capabilities in many areas including space and cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies and partners are a great strength of the United States and close cooperation is necessary, the United States has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate the will to confront shared threats and contribute the capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United States is responding to the growing political, economic, and military competition throughout the world, by ensuring American military power is second to none and fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power, the United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength.

The NDS drawn up by Secretary of Defense Mattis based on the NSS considers the long-term competitions with China and Russia as the principal priorities of the Department of Defense because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity and the potential for the threats to increase. Moreover, to expand the competitive space, the following three lines of effort are raised: 1. Building a more lethal Joint Force, 2. Strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, 3. Reforming the Department of Defense for greater performance and affordability.

Among these, 1. Building military power prioritizes preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, it advances building flexible theater postures and force deployment that have mobility, resilience, and modernize key capabilities such as nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, C4ISR, missile defense, advanced autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the stance that dynamic military force employment, military posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers. For 2. Strengthening alliances, the following three matters are emphasized: i. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability, ii. Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning, and iii. Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there are expectations that allies and partners contribute an equitable share to mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities.

3 Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region

While the Trump administration has stopped using the key phrase “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region” set forth by the Obama administration, it has shown a stance of placing importance on the region through the United States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its presence since the inauguration of the administration. In particular, under the policy to continue sustaining maximum pressure on North Korea, which is continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile development, the Trump...
administration is exhibiting its recognition that a military option plays an important role in backing up diplomatic efforts, and also is clearly showing its readiness to respond with overwhelming power in retaliation to any attack by North Korea.

To show military presence against North Korea, following on from the deployment in the Sea of Japan of two carrier strike groups, the Carl Vinson Strike Group and the USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group in June 2017, three carrier strike groups, the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz strike groups were deployed in the Sea of Japan in November 2017. The nuclear submarines USS Tucson and USS Michigan also made port calls in the ROK in October 2017. In addition, during the joint U.S.-ROK regularly-held aviation exercise Vigilant Ace in December 2017, F-22 and F-35 aircraft participated for the first time ever in the exercise. Furthermore, between May and December 2017, B-1B strategic bombers flew over the Korean Peninsula every month. In addition, following the deployment of 62 launchers of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system\(^6\) by the U.S. Forces in the ROK in April 2017, in September 2017 four launchers were added and a total of six sites commenced operation.

In March 2018, responding to North Korea’s statement of intent for denuclearization and other developments, President Trump indicated his forward-looking intent to hold a U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, which resulted in the holding of the first-ever historic summit on June 12, 2018. Both leaders clearly indicated willingness for jointly making efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and based on the reaffirmed commitment expressed by Chairman Kim toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both leaders confirmed that follow-on negotiations would continue. Responding to this discussion, on June 18 and 22, 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the suspension of all planning for the U.S.-ROK command and control exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian scheduled for August, and two the Korean Marine Exchange Program\(^7\) training exercises scheduled to occur in the following three months. Regarding this point, at the joint press conference following the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting held on June 29, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that the decision was taken to create space for their diplomats to negotiate strongly, and increasing the prospects for a peaceful solution on the Korean Peninsula, and that the United States maintains a strong, collaborative defensive stance to ensure its diplomats continue to negotiate from a position of unquestioned strength. On the other hand, the United States showed a clear stance that it would maintain sanctions until North Korea took concrete, verifiable measures for ending its nuclear development, and that it would keep the U.S. Forces in the ROK. (See 1-5 of Section 2.)

During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in consonance with Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” President Trump expressed his intention to emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he would promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, as well as strengthen alliances in the region.

In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacific region strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law, the United States will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop a strong defense networks with its allies and partners. In the same way, the NDS points out that China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage and is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free and open Indo-Pacific provides prosperity and security, and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.

Furthermore, regarding China’s maritime expansion, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that the scope and effect of China’s

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\(^6\) A ballistic missile defense system that intercepts short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase from the ground. It tracks and intercepts targets at high altitude in the upper atmosphere or beyond the atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 for ballistic missile defense systems.

\(^7\) The Korean Marine Exchange Program (KMEP) is an annually-held joint exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa and the ROK Marine Corps. 19 exercises were planned under the KMEP in 2018, and 11 exercises had been carried out as of June 22, 2018.
construction activities in the South China Sea differ from those in other countries in several key ways, including the nature of its militarization, China’s disregard for international law, its contempt for other nations’ interests, and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of issues; and that the United States cannot and will not accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo. Moreover, while committing to protecting the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea, and the ability of all countries to exercise those rights in the strategically important East and South China Sea, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that the United States would continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and demonstrate resolve through operational presence in the South China Sea and beyond. It is reported that in May, July, August, and October 2017, as well as January, March, and May 2018, the U.S. Forces conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations within 12 nautical miles of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea that are claimed by China. Also, in May 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense stated that China had deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out that the placement of these weapon system was only military use. As an initial response to China’s continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018.

Based on such a perception of China and regional strategy, it can be considered that the United States is advancing efforts rooted in the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific region.

In addition, as part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, in January 2017, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps specification F-35B fighters to MCAS Iwakuni. In October 2017, 12 Air Force specified F-35A fighters were deployed at Kadena Air Force Base for the first time ever in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, in January 2018, nuclear-capable B-2 bombers and B-52 bombers were deployed to Guam, and in place of the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp that is capable of carrying F-35B fighters arrived in Sasebo. Furthermore, in March 2018 the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam.

4 Innovation Initiatives in the National Defense Field

In November 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) that aimed to achieve military superiority through innovation, and stated the expectation that this would develop into the Third Offset Strategy. Also, in 2015 as a part of DII, then-Secretary of Defense Carter established Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in Silicon Valley to be a bridge between the Department of Defense and civilian groups, in order to introduce innovative civilian technologies into military fields.

The Trump administration stopped using the names DII and Third Offset Strategy, but in August 2017 Secretary of Defense Mattis visited DIUx and IT companies and discussed utilization methods of new technologies for the Department of Defense. To the accompanying press corps, he stated that Department of Defense innovation initiatives are a matter of maximum priority and pointed out the importance of DIUx. Also, the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must harness innovative technologies that are being developed outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The NDS also states that the Department of Defense needs innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for extensive investment in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages. In view of these circumstances, it can be considered that the United States will continue to place emphasis on innovation in the national defense field.

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8 It is regarded that the Trump administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Dewey in May 2016, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Lassen in October 2015, within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Decatur in October 2016, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS John S. McCain in August 2017, surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Chafee in October 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal by the destroyer USS Hopper in January 2018, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef by the destroyer USS Mustin in March 2018, within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Higgins and the cruiser USS Antietam in May 2018.

The Obama administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Lassen in October 2015, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur in January 2016, within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS William P. Lawrence in May 2016, and surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Decatur in October 2016.

9 The United States’ Third Offset Strategy is based on the concept of offsetting the capacity of the adversary by acquiring asymmetrical means that differ from the capacity of the adversary. There were two previous offset strategies as follows: (1) the nuclear deterrent of the 1950s; and (2) precision-guided missiles and stealth aircraft technologies of the 1970s.
The NPR released in February 2018 stated that, although the United States had reduced the role and number of nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other states would follow, the global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent NPR released in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of U.S. nuclear forces: 1. Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, 2. Assurance of allies and partners, 3. Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and 4. Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

Also, while the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states that extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, and a “no first use” policy is not justified today. It also indicates that the United States remains the policy to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United States would apply a tailored approach to deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in addition to that, it would ensure effective deterrence by enhancing the flexibility and range of its nuclear capabilities through nuclear modernization and the development and deployment of new capabilities. Specifically, in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad, as new capabilities, in the near-term, the United States would modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability onto the forward-deployable, nuclear-capable F-35 as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside Europe, including Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, there has not yet been an official announcement on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that President Trump had directed to be formulated alongside the NPR. Regarding this, in March 2018, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood testified in Congress regarding missile defense that while the review work was still being advanced, the new review would be decided on as the Missile Defense Review (MDR) based on the existing threats of missile strikes by cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, other than ballistic missiles. Moreover, in order to deal with threats to the U.S. mainland by rogue nation missiles, he set forth strengthening the mainland’s missile defense through additional deployment of 20 ground-based interceptor missiles, strengthening the capability of ground-based interceptor missiles by Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV), and deployment of new missile tracking and identification sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific. Regarding missile defense in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region, he mentioned strengthening readiness through additional deployment of Patriot missiles, THAAD, and SM-3. Also, together with ensuring the missile defense capabilities of allies and partners, he also indicated a policy to strengthen cooperation for improving interoperability with the U.S. missile defense system. Furthermore, regarding advanced technologies, he stressed commitment in such areas as improving identification capability of missile defense system sensors, boost phase missile interception lasers, new sensors deployed in space, and Multi-Object Kill Vehicles (MOKV).
As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 stipulated a significant cut in government spending by FY2021.\(^\text{14}\) Also, in March 2013, the sequestration of government spending including defense expenditure was started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However, after this, sequestration was eased for the budgets from FY2014-FY2017 due to the bipartisan acts passed twice.\(^\text{15}\) Furthermore, amid the Trump administration’s policy to end the sequestration of defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military, the Bipartisan Budget Act was passed in February 2018, and a defense budget framework was approved that drastically raised the limit set by the sequestration for FY2018 and 2019.\(^\text{16}\)

In these circumstances, the defense budget request in the Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in February 2018 allocated US$617.0 billion for the base budget,\(^\text{17}\) representing about a 7% increase over the previous year. For the overseas contingency operations budget, a total of US$69.0 billion would be appropriated per the request, including budget escalation in the OIR and the European Deterrence Initiative.\(^\text{18}\) Also, the goals for military end strength and procurement were represented in the FY2019 budget request, such as securing 1,338,100 personnel, adding 24,100 more troops to the services’ end strength, and procuring 135 upgraded M-1 tanks (56 tanks in the previous year), 10 battleships (8 in the previous year), and 77 F-35 fighters (70 in the previous year). In addition, regarding ballistic missile defense, additional deployment of 20 ground-based interceptor missiles in Alaska, other than 40 missiles in Alaska and 4 missiles in California, are to be completed by the end of 2023, in light of the threat of the ICBMs posed by North Korea and Iran.

In January 2018, Secretary of Defense Mattis pointed out that the U.S. military competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare and that the defense expenditure cap was causing a negative effect. He stated that there was a need for a stable, predictable budget, and that while both capability and capacity are important for building the military, currently, building the capacity is being emphasized. For this, the Trump administration can be considered to be pursuing ensuring a sufficient and stable defense budget, emphasizing keeping a force of sufficient size in the short-term, and aiming for a budgetary measures to expand capability in the mid- and long-term.

See Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget)

\(^\text{14}\) In January 2012, the Department of Defense announced that the specific national defense annual expenditure reduction based on the enacted act would amount to roughly US$487 billion over the 10 year period between FY2012 and FY2021 (roughly US$259 billion during the five year period between FY2013 and FY2017).

\(^\text{15}\) Through the passing of the 2013 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was lowered by US$22 billion and US$9 billion in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively. Through the passing of the 2015 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$25 billion and US$15 billion in FY2016 and FY2017 respectively.

\(^\text{16}\) Through the passing of the 2018 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$80 billion and US$85 billion in FY2018 and FY2019 respectively.

\(^\text{17}\) An increase of about US$35 billion from the FY2018 enacted budget level.

\(^\text{18}\) The total sum of the FY2019 national defense budget request was roughly US$716.0 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$30 billion (such as the Department of Energy’s nuclear-related programs) and the roughly US$686 billion of Department of Defense budget request.
The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of three commands with functional responsibilities and six commands with regional responsibilities. Of these, Secretary of Defense Mattis announced that the name of the Pacific Command would be changed to the Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018.

The U.S. ground forces have about 470,000 Army soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. Along with a shift from the Obama administration’s policy reducing soldiers to a policy of increasing them, in order to deter enemies and achieve battle victories when necessary, the Army has been making efforts to maintain the world’s leading ground force capability through necessary investment in ensuring readiness. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces.

The U.S. maritime forces have about 940 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.36 million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,570 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama administration proceeded with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In February 2018, it announced that its deployed strategic warheads stood at 1,350, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 652. The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November in the same year. Furthermore, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command.

Also, in June 2018, President Trump instructed the Department of Defense to immediately start the necessary processes to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch of the Armed Forces.
Fig. I-2-1-3
U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region

Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of the end of 2017), etc.
2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

European Region
Army: approx. 26,000 personnel
Navy: approx. 8,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel
Marines: approx. 4,000 personnel
Total: approx. 66,000 personnel
(Total in 1987: approx. 354,000 personnel)

Asia-Pacific Region
Army: approx. 35,000 personnel
Navy: approx. 22,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 27,000 personnel
Marines: approx. 26,000 personnel
Total: approx. 110,000 personnel
(Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel)

In June 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that 60% of Navy vessels, 55% of the Army, and approximately 2/3 of the Fleet Marine Force are deployed in the area for which the Pacific Command is responsible and that 60% of overseas tactical air assets will be deployed there.
The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by placing the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to broaden the perspective of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of the U.S. Forces from allies, the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region. Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia are currently serving in the Indo-Pacific Command as deputy director level-officials.

The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii.

The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,600 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Head quarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.\(^\text{23}\)

The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers and destroyers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 18,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific.\(^\text{25}\) The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

\(^\text{23}\) As of June 2018, it is unknown whether the names of the subordinate Component Commands changed along with the name change from Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command.
\(^\text{24}\) The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2017), and could change according to unit deployment.
\(^\text{25}\) See footnote 19.