Section 2 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance

1 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance

Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology and also contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines\(^1\) and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War.

Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006.

Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009.

At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint ISR activities.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

The major accomplishments at the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 are as follows:

1. Agreed to complete work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines before the end of 2014.

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\(^1\) The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner.
Agreed to further expand and deepen bilateral cooperation in security and defense, including cyberspace and outer space, and strengthen cooperation in the region, including trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia as well as among Japan, the United States and the ROK.

Regarding USFJ realignment, Japan and the United States renewed their strong determination to complete the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, and agreed to continue to consult on other possible measures while implementing the previous agreements as early as possible and steadily from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

The “2+2” Meeting, held in the milestone year marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, took place ahead of the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. The major accomplishments of the “2+2” Meeting are as follows:

(1) Under the U.S. policy of rebalance and Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” the Ministers reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to maintaining the security of Japan as well as the peace and security of the international community and also reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Senkaku Islands under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

(2) The Ministers approved the new Guidelines, and confirmed their intent to enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities under the new Guidelines.

(3) The Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress in initiatives for bilateral security and defense cooperation to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities.

(4) The Ministers underscored the recent progress in regional and international cooperation.

(5) The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to USFJ realignment.

See Fig. II-4-2-1 (Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States)

**Fig. II-4-2-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>The treaty enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Okinawa is returned to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>SACO Final Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2007

Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines


Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)

SACO Final Report


9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)

Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)

Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)

50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks)


The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks)

Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks)


Japan-U.S. Joint Statement (Abe-Trump)
It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulfill in case of an armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, with a view to responding rapidly to such an event.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role-sharing between Japan and the United States. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States have continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations.

1 Background to the Revision of the Guidelines

Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities.

As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions.

Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment, Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the revision of the Guidelines and other matters. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in February 2013, Prime Minister Abe stated to then U.S. President Obama that, “in response to the changing security environment, Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines through discussions on the two countries’ views of the roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).”

Against the background described above, at the Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by the end of 2014.

The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting identified the following seven objectives of the review of the 1997 Guidelines:

1. Ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation;
2. Expanding the scope of cooperation to reflect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement;
3. Promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and values;
4. Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more flexible, timely, and responsive to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations;
5. Describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities;
6. Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and
7. Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives.

Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States, Japan and the United States conducted extensive work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines.

In October 2014, based on the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held in July 2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” In addition, in December 2014, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the discussions to work towards finalizing the revision of the Guidelines during the first half of 2015, taking into account the progress of Japan’s legislative process.

As a result of the intensive bilateral work on the revision of the Guidelines, the Japan-U.S. SCC approved...
the new Guidelines recommended by the SDC at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, thereby accomplishing the objective of revising the Guidelines as outlined by the Ministers in October 2013.

Reference 20 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015))

2 Content of the Guidelines

The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

(1) Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

The Guidelines newly specified the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.

● In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:
  • seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
  • synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
  • a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
  • cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
  • the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

● The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

● The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination.

● The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

(2) Basic Premises and Principles

The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below:

● The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged.

● All actions and activities undertaken under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law.

● All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.

● The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

Fig. II-4-2-2 (Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation)
Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

### III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

#### A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

#### B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

#### C. Bilateral Planning

In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

### IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

#### A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

- The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

- The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels.

#### B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security

- The Alliance will respond to situations that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.

- In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and Exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.

#### C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

1. **When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated**

   - The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

2. **When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs**

   - **Principles for Coordinated Actions**

     The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF.

   - **Concept of Operations**

     - **Self-Defense Forces (SDF)**
       - Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace over and surrounding Japan
       - Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations

     - **United States Armed Forces**
       - Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations

     - **Operations to Defend Airspace**
       - Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace over and surrounding Japan
     - **Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks**
       - Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan
       - Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations
       - Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority

     - **Operations to Defend Maritime Areas**
       - Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication
       - Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations
       - Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations

     - **Operations to Counter Ground Attacks**
       - Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces
       - Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations
       - Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority
## Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

### Part II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

#### Chapter 4  Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Outline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security</strong></td>
<td><strong>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Domain Operations</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space / cyberspace</td>
<td>Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations</td>
<td>Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike operations</td>
<td>May provide support, as necessary, for the strike operations of the United States Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Operational Support Activities**
  - The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection.
  - When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks.
  - The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.
  - Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support.

- **E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan**
  - In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
  - When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below.

- **A. Cooperation in International Activities**
  - The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.
  - Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistic support.

- **B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation**
  - The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.

#### V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

- **A. Cooperation on Space**
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.

- **B. Cooperation on Cyberspace**
  - The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner.
  - The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.
  - The SDF will participate effectively in the United States’ cyber defense and cyber attacks. Japan will participate in the United States Army Cyber Protection Brigade.

- **C. Bilateral Enterprise**
  - The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:
    - A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
    - B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
    - C. Educational and Research Exchanges

#### VIII. Processes for Review

Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.
3 Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance

The Guidelines define that the two countries will work on a variety of measures, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, and joint training and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to cooperate for Space and Cyberspace Cooperation which are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense equipment and technology cooperation for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. Many of these items are incorporated into the NDPG to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas.”

1 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance

(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the ACM in order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.

Based on the framework shown in Fig. II-4-2-4, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

Since the establishment of the ACM, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the mechanism to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches...
by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security.

In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism.

2 Cooperative Measures to Seamlessly Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security

(1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

With regard to joint ISR activities, from the perspective that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries, the two countries set up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013 consisting of director-level defense officials from Japan and the United States, which is further deepening the cooperation between the two countries.

The expansion of these ISR activities will function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the
establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

(2) Missile Defense

Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities have been enhanced by sharing operation information and establishing response procedures. For the repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea, Japan and the United States have conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress.

(3) Maritime Security

The Guidelines allow Japan and the United States to develop and enhance the sharing of maritime surveillance information from peacetime and to cooperate where appropriate for the maintenance and enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United States through ISR as well as training and exercises. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the United States Navy plan to maintain and enhance both countries’ presence in the Western Pacific through multiple joint training and exercises.

(4) Joint Training and Exercises

Joint training and exercises in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities by improving interoperability through the deepening of mutual understanding of tactics and other aspects and the enhancement of mutual communication, but also are useful in improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.

In addition, holding bilateral exercises at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its
Joint training and exercises have been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units there. Ongoing efforts are being made to enhance interoperability and Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training.

Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise. Most recently, field training exercises (Keen Sword 17) were carried out in October-November 2016 in the waters and airspace around Japan, bases of the SDF and USFJ, and Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

In March 2017, the MSDF conducted a Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise in the waters around the East China Sea with the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and other vessels of the U.S. Navy. In April of the same year, the MSDF also conducted a Japan-U.S. joint cruising drill in the West Pacific to coincide with the navigation of the USS Carl Vinson and other vessels, while the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) conducted various tactical drills in the airspace to the east of Okinawa with the F/A-18 fighters on USS Carl Vinson. These simultaneous drills by the MSDF and ASDF with the U.S. aircraft carrier sought to further enhance SDF tactical skills and bolster collaboration with the U.S. Navy.

Furthermore, in June of the same year, the MSDF conducted various tactical exercises with the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, USS Ronald Reagan and other U.S. Navy vessels in the Sea of Japan and the ASDF conducted various tactical exercises with the F/A-18 fighters on the USS Carl Vinson and others in the airspace.
over the Sea of Japan.

With the U.S. Air Force, the ASDF also conducted various tactical exercises with U.S. Air Force B-1B bombers in the airspace around Kyushu in September 2016 and March and May 2017.

The Japan-U.S. joint exercises were conducted with the aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It is believed that bolstering Japan-U.S. collaboration and demonstrating bilateral ties as an outcome of implementing these Japan-U.S. joint exercises have the effect of further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall Japan-U.S. Alliance and demonstrating Japan’s determination and high capacity towards stabilizing the region in an increasingly severe security environment for Japan.

In recent years, USFJ have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments.

See Reference 24 (Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2016)

(5) Logistics Support
Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations.

Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, UN peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.

In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, the two countries confirmed that they would expeditiously work on the negotiations on the ACSA to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. Subsequently, following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into force on April 15. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA such as settlement procedures to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security.

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services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security.

(6) Joint/Shared Use

The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of USFJ in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training and exercises and interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in the case of a disaster.

Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, in December 2013 and between June and July 2014, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.

3 Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan

In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their
high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong
ties they had developed. The success of the joint response
between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through Operation
Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training
and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the
Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation
Tomodachi involved the deployment of a large-scale force
at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000
personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft,
resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in
scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and
reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous
Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of
appreciation and trust for USFJ.

On the other hand, some issues have emerged,
such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities
of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster
within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint
guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S.
Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining
mechanisms for the sharing of information and more
effective coordination mechanism.

In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response
Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed
the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries
conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster
prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014
based on the scenario of an earthquake occurring in the
Nankai Trough. USFJ also participated in the Wakayama
Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training
(October 2014) and Michinoku ALERT 2014 (November
2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Northeastern
Army. In this manner, the SDF and USFJ have been
enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness.

In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016,
Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the
transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22)
of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF
personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was
utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint
Coordination Office locally established by the joint task
force organized for the earthquake response.

4 Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and
Security

(1) Cooperation in International Activities
The SDF has conducted activities in close cooperation
with the United States and other participating countries
through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism
Special Measures Act, international disaster relief
activities and international peacekeeping operations
in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan
and the United States worked closely together at local
multilateral coordination centers to respond to the
typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November
2013. To respond to the outbreak of the Ebola virus
disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison officers to the
U.S. Africa Command in October 2014, coordinating
efforts and collecting information with relevant countries
including the United States, for close cooperation.

As for maritime security, both Japan and the
United States are making efforts as maritime nations to
maintain and develop “the open and stable seas” based on
fundamental rules such as securing the freedom and safety
of navigation, and the rule of law (e.g., peaceful dispute
resolution based on international law). The two countries
have been working closely together on various multilateral
maritime security cooperation initiatives supported
by such countries as those around sea lanes, including
participation in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 for
countering piracy since December 2013, the International
Minesweeping Exercise in the Persian Gulf hosted by
the United States in April 2016, the Multilateral Naval
Exercise KOMODO 16 (MNEK) hosted by the Indonesian
Navy in the same month, the ADMM-Plus Maritime
Security Field Training Exercises in May and November
2016, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime
Interdiction Training hosted by Singapore in September
2016, and the International Maritime Exercise hosted by
the United States in May 2017.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security)
Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (International Initiatives Aimed at
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction)

(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises
The Guidelines will enable Japan and the Unites States to
promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security
and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating
in trilateral (e.g., Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-
India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States.

5 Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

(1) Cooperation on Space

With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in areas of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of-government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis.

Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG held its first meeting in October 2015, second meeting in February 2016, and third meeting in February 2017. Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to develop and secure experts, and (4) implementing tabletop exercises.

(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace

Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the Department of Defense (DoD) to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation.

The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate development of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. Governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited. Going forward, Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement.

6 Initiatives to Further Improve the Effectiveness of Bilateral Cooperation

(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and production bases and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America. In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums.

At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in

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The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.
June 2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU). The MOU promotes measures concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.).

Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains initiatives for the common maintenance infrastructure for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the Osprey planned to be deployed by the GSDF as well as initiatives for the

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**Commentary**

**Ties that Support Steadfast Japan-U.S. Alliance**

— JMSDF-USN Junior Officers Buddy Program

JMSDF-USN Junior Officers Buddy Program was launched in FY2016 with the purpose to further strengthen the relationship between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy. This program supports the development of more personal relationships between junior naval officers stationed in Japan and junior MSDF officers and encourages activities that nurture individual connections. Programs such as regular get-togethers and workshops at historic sites are organized to promote understanding between our two services. Social media and other tools are used to maintain ties that will continue even after the junior officers are transferred to other assignments.

We would like to introduce the comments received from two junior officers from the U.S Navy.

The MSDF will remain actively engaged in this program in order to build the human foundation that undergirds the strengthening and development of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

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**Voice**

**Michael Madrid, Lieutenant Junior Grade, U.S. Navy**

**USS Donald Cook (Previous assignment: U.S. naval destroyer USS Mustin, Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka)**

**Henry Lu, Ensign, U.S. Navy**

**USS Bonhomme Richard, Sasebo Naval Base**

“"The ties and mutual understanding that is generated from U.S.-Japan exchanges and shared experiences are useful for enhancing interoperability between the U.S. Navy and the MSDF. I want to deepen U.S.-Japan ties and mutual understanding through this undertaking." (Lieutenant Junior Grade Michael)

“"This program was a very good opportunity for me since I hadn’t had many chances to meet Japanese officers of the same rank as me. I was able to further deepen my understanding of the Japanese people by having conversations with them through SNS. I want to maintain the relationships that I built through this program." (Ensign Henry)
onsite maintenance locations (regional depots) in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35 fighter aircraft.

See Reference 25 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)

(2) Education and Research Exchange

The Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual cooperation relating to security and defense, and the two governments will deepen exchanges between members of relevant organizations, and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions.

See Reference 26 (Japan-U.S. Minister-Level Consultations (Since 2014))

Fig. II-4-2-7 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues)

4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

1 Various Policy Consultations

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Asia-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the SDC. As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

In addition, the MOD organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. DoD and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

To this end, the MOD/SDF has been working on education and research exchanges by accepting students from abroad and holding Japan-U.S. bilateral or multilateral seminars that include the United States so that security and defense personnel can share knowledge and enhance cooperation.

See Reference 27 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2014))

Fig. II-4-2-7 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues)

2 Recent Major Policy Consultations, etc.

(1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on September 16, 2016 at the U.S. Department of Defense and on December 7, 2016 at the Ministry of Defense

Minister of Defense Inada and then U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter held Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meetings.

a. Overview and Regional Situation

The two ministers shared an understanding of the situation in the region and confirmed that the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of the Government of Japan and fall within the scope of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. They also confirmed once again that they will oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. They shared the view that the building of outposts and the use of those outposts for military purposes in the South China Sea pose concerns to the international community as unilateral actions that increase tensions in the region. At the meeting in September 2016, the Ministers reaffirmed that the ruling issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in July 2016 is final and legally binding on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (<em>2+2</em> Meeting)</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security</td>
<td>Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Subcommittee (SSC)</td>
<td>Participants are not specified</td>
<td>Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
<td>Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
<td>Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. Joint Committee</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
<td>Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others</td>
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</table>

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.

all countries that are parties to the dispute, and that it is important to conduct activities on the sea in accordance with international law. The Ministers also agreed that the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by North Korea is a major security threat to both Japan and the United States.

Furthermore, the Ministers reaffirmed the ironclad commitment of the United States to Japan regarding the extended deterrence, and also agreed to enhance the Japan-U.S.-ROK and other trilateral defense cooperation as well as cooperation within multilateral frameworks.

b. Reinforcement of the Deterrence and Response

Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Ministers welcomed the efforts underway based on the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security, such as the signing of the Japan-U.S. ACSA, and confirmed that they would make further use of the ACM, which has functioned effectively in responding to the series of provocations by North Korea.

The Ministers also affirmed that efforts such as the overall enhancement in Japan’s ballistic missile response capabilities would contribute to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, and they agreed to accelerate cooperation in this regard.

c. Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Others

The Ministers confirmed to continue consultations at the working-level based on the Japan-U.S. joint statement released in July 2016 concerning the revision of the treatment of the civilian component under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The Ministers shared the position that the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko is the only solution and agreed to continue to cooperate in mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

At the meeting in December 2016, they confirmed that Japan and the United States would cooperate to achieve the return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area to the Government of Japan on the 22nd of that month.

(2) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (December 27, 2016) (Security Field)

Prime Minister Abe visited Pearl Harbor on the Island of Oahu in Hawaii in the United States to pay his respects to the war dead. There, he held his final Summit Meeting with then U.S. President Obama. Looking back on the past four years of cooperation, the leaders agreed that the value and significance of the “Alliance of Hope” shall remain unchanged and shared the understanding that it is important to further bolster the Japan-U.S. Alliance going forward.

At the meeting, they exchanged views regarding the situation in the Asia-Pacific region such as North Korea and the situation in East Asia and shared their understanding. The leaders welcomed the achievement of the return of a major portion of the Northern Training...
Area, which marks the biggest return since the reversion of Okinawa, and the agreement in principle achieved on the supplementary agreement on the civilian component of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and agreed to cooperate in mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

(3) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting
(February 4, 2017)
Minister of Defense Inada and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in the MOD.9

a. Regional Situations
The Ministers shared the awareness that China’s activities in the East and South China Seas are security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the Ministers agreed that advancements in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development pose a security threat to the stability of both countries as well as the region.

U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis stated that the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of the Government of Japan and fall within the scope of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and that the United States opposes any unilateral attempt that undermines Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands. Defense Minister Inada stated that the actions of the U.S. Forces in the South China Sea contribute to maintaining the maritime order based on international law and conveyed support for the initiatives by the U.S. Forces. The Ministers agreed to strengthen their engagement in the South China Sea through capacity building assistance and other measures. Furthermore, they agreed to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation as well as cooperation involving multilateral frameworks.

b. Reinforcement of Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Defense Minister Inada explained that Japan will proactively work towards peace and stability in the region and will expand its role within the alliance and reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities to meet this goal. U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis stated that the United States remains committed to Japan’s defense. He also emphasized that the Asia-Pacific region is a priority for the United States and that the United States will reinforce its commitment to the region. They reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the ironclad commitment of the United States towards extended deterrence. They also agreed on the need to further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, taking into account the Guidelines.

c. Okinawa and the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers agreed on Japan-U.S. collaboration towards steady progress on the realignment of USFJ. They shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that allows the return of MCAS Futenma and agreed to continue close cooperation. Additionally, Defense Minister Inada requested cooperation in mitigating the impact on Okinawa and both Ministers agreed to cooperate in order to ensure the stable stationing of USFJ.

9 At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ joint press conference after the meeting, U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis stated with regard to host nation support for USFJ that Japan has been a model for cost sharing and that the Japan-U.S. approach to cost sharing is a model for other nations to follow.
Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump in Washington D.C. The two leaders agreed to further strengthen the bonds of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and affirmed that Japan and the United States will play a leading role in ensuring peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The leaders discussed the increasingly severe security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, including the issues of North Korea's nuclear and missile development and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas, and shared these concerns. Furthermore, the leaders shared the recognition that the presence of USFJ is important and that it is necessary to continually strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance under these circumstances. Moreover, both leaders recognized the importance of strengthening multi-layered cooperation with allies and like-minded countries, and building a network with allies, centered on the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

In the joint statement issued on the same day, the two leaders affirmed the strong determination of Japan and the United States, under an increasingly severe security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, to further strengthen their efforts in the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is the cornerstone of peace, prosperity and freedom in the region. In particular, the joint statement: 1) made specific reference to a commitment to extended deterrence; and 2) affirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is the cornerstone of peace, prosperity and freedom in the region. In particular, the joint statement: 1) made specific reference to a commitment to extended deterrence; and 2) affirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covers the Senkaku Islands and 3) that the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko is the only solution that allows the return of MCAS Futenma.

Moreover, on February 11, 2017, the two leaders made a Japan-U.S. joint press announcement in Palm Beach, Florida in light of North Korea’s ballistic missile launch, during which Prime Minister Abe stated, “During the summit meeting that I had with President Trump, he assured me that the United States will always be with Japan 100%. And to demonstrate his determination as well as commitment, he is now here with me at this joint press conference. President Trump and I, myself, completely share the view that we are going to promote further collaboration between the two nations and also we are going to further reinforce our alliance.” President Trump stated, “I just want everybody to understand and fully know that the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%.”

Prime Minister Abe received a courtesy call from U.S. Vice President Pence. Prime Minister Abe and U.S. Vice President Pence exchanged views on various issues in the region, mainly North Korea, which continues its provocations, and shared the understanding that it is essential for both Japan and the United States to collaborate closely on security and the economy and bolster the Japan-U.S. Alliance towards peace and stability in the region.

Regarding the issues of North Korea, they shared the understanding that North Korea has reached a new level of threat and agreed that in dealing with the North Korea issue, close collaboration between Japan and the United States is essential and the role of China is important and it is necessary to urge China to play a larger role. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe stated that the abductions issue is a top priority for the Abe administration, and they agreed that Japan and the United States would continue to collaborate towards its swift resolution.

Concerning the Japan-U.S. security relationship, they agreed to hold an early Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting and to undertake joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump in Taormina, Italy. Concerning the issues of North Korea, the two leaders affirmed that it is necessary to put pressure on North Korea rather than to have dialogue with it at this juncture, and that the role of China was important. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of coordinating with countries concerned such as the ROK in order to enhance pressure on North Korea through further sanctions and close coordination at the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the leaders shared the view that Japan and the United States would take concrete actions to enhance their defense postures and capabilities in order to deter North Korea’s threat. Prime Minister Abe also stated that the
powerful presence of the U.S. Forces in this region is important from the perspective of regional security, and that he expected U.S. cooperation.

Regarding the regional situation other than North Korea, Prime Minister Abe stated that the U.S. deterrent was the key to regional stability including Southeast Asia, and with regard to the South China Sea, stated that he valued the increased presence of the U.S. Navy and strongly supported the U.S. Freedom of Navigation operations by the U.S. Navy. The two leaders also reaffirmed the close coordination between Japan and the United States regarding the East China Sea.

(7) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on June 3, 2017
Defense Minister Inada and Defense Secretary Mattis held a Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue.

a. Regional Situations
The Ministers shared the recognition that the successive ballistic missile launches, etc. by North Korea are a flagrant provocation against Japan and the United States as well as the regional peace and stability, and these are utterly unacceptable. Defense Minister Inada expressed her high regard for the visible commitment of the United States to peace and stability in the region including the dispatch of carrier strike groups, and stated that it is important to intensify pressure on North Korea. The Ministers reached the common understanding that it is essential to continue to collaborate closely among Japan, the United States and the ROK as well as between Japan and the United States.

The Ministers reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and confirmed that Japan and the United States would deepen their cooperation with regard to securing peace and stability in the East China Sea and engaging in the South China Sea.

b. Enhancement of Deterrence and Response
   Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
The Ministers shared the recognition that it is necessary to further enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and welcomed the joint exercises being conducted by the SDF and the carrier strike group in the Sea of Japan as a contribution to this. The Ministers agreed to continue to coordinate towards the early convocation of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC).

c. Okinawa and the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis expressed his commitment to continue the close cooperation between Japan and the United States.

The Ministers shared the common position that relocation to Henoko is the only solution to achieve the earliest possible relocation and return of MCAS Futenma and agreed to continue to cooperate closely. Defense Minister Inada requested cooperation for mitigating the impact on Okinawa, and the Ministers agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of USFJ.

(8) Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talks (January 28, March 7, and April 6 and 24, 2017)
Prime Minister Abe and President Trump have held several telephone talks on multiple occasions in addition to face-to-face meetings concerning North Korea and other important issues. Regarding the North Korea issue, President Trump conveyed that all options are on the table and that the United States stands behind Japan, its ally, 100%. The two leaders also agreed that China’s role is important and that Japan, the United States, and the ROK would collaborate closely. Through such telephone talks, the leaders work together closely and maintain communications.