Since it was first developed in 1976, the National Defense Program Guidelines has been established five times, and the new National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (NDPG) was introduced in 2013. The NDPG sets out the future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve, taking into consideration the security situation of the times.

### Section 1 Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines

The NDPG is the first of its kind to be developed based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), and it calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and

#### 1 Basic Approach – Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

The NDPG is the first of its kind to be developed based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), and it calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and
security in light of Japan’s geographical characteristics under the new security environment.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations (see Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1), that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, which require the SDF’s commitment are both increasing. Therefore, it is essential to regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further escalation. In dealing with such situations, it is also essential to minimize the damage by dealing with situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy and air superiority. Among these situations, the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of the defense force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily sufficient.

The NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities. To this end, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to the SDF’s total functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized. The NDPG carries great significance as it has made it possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability build-up, based on the results of these capability assessments.

Additionally, it requires the build-up of the most effective operational posture, by further strengthening a wide-ranging logistics support foundation. Specifically, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of various fields as the basic foundations for the SDF such as training and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and education, medical, defense production and technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancement of the intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense.

Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the United States is indispensable. Japan will closely cooperate with the United States, and take appropriate responses through its own efforts. In addition, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

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situations, Japan will appropriately and promptly make decisions and seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

Furthermore, Japan will continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an emergency situation.

In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training, and exercises.

Furthermore, Japan will make efforts to build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as mentioned above, in addition to the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture.

3 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security. Also, the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. From this perspective, Japan will place emphasis on: strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; strengthening and expanding of cooperation in a broad range of fields; and steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

4 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region
Japan will promote a variety of cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity towards one another in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, with regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia and India, Japan will make efforts to improve cooperation and interoperability. Japan will also endeavor to promote dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia.

Additionally, with regard to capacity building assistance, Japan will promote and carry it out in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Official Development Assistance (ODA), and Japan will expand the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.

Furthermore, in multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, Japan, in cooperation with the United States and Australia, will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region, and Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises.

(2) Cooperation with the International Community
It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, such forces play an important role in building peace and promoting confidence-building. Therefore, Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and capacity building assistance on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community. Specifically Japan will strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), along with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries. Furthermore, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular, will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities.

3 Future Defense Forces

1 Role of the Defense Forces

(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations
Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate any change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations from an early stage, including gray-zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover,
Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

In particular, the following points will be emphasized:
1. ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan;
2. response to an attack on remote islands;
3. response to ballistic missile attacks;
4. responses in outer space and cyberspace; and
5. responses to major disasters.

(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the region. Moreover, by working in partnership with its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance.

In order to respond appropriately to global security issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance. Japan will attach importance to the following in particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions and Capabilities Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISR capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, and adopt a flexible approach for boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Japan will strengthen its system for collecting intelligence, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations and take other actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will seek to enhance its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the securing and nurturing of personnel in information gathering and analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with the civilian transport sector on a regular basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control, and information and communication capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), among other measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services, along with other capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to an attack on remote islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will strengthen its engagement capability for the ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for an effective response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will strengthen the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands, and newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will enhance its logistics support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to ballistic missile attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will comprehensively improve its response capability against ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response in outer space and cyberspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will improve the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses to major disasters, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately sized units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SDF will enhance transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and logistics and medical service structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Furthermore, the SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF

(1) Basic Approach

Based on the results of the capability assessments conducted based on the standpoint of joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime superiority and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistics support foundation.

At the same time, in terms of preparation for an
invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized
The SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. Forces.
- ISR capabilities
- Intelligence capabilities
- Transport capability
- Command and control, and information and communication capabilities
- Response to an attack on remote islands
- Response to ballistic missile attacks
- Response in outer space and cyberspace
- Responses to major disasters, etc.
- Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities

See Fig. II-2-1-2 (Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized and Their Content)

3 Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense Forces

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
In order to respond swiftly to an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain

Fig. II-2-1-3 Key Changes in the Structure of the GSDF

Rapid Deployment Divisions/Brigades
- Approximately half of the divisions and brigades will be reorganized into rapid deployment divisions and rapid deployment brigades comprised of units, including rapid deployment regiments furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities.
- Type-16 Mobile Combat Vehicles suitable for transportation on aircraft will be introduced.

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Regionally deployed units in peacetime

8 divisions 6 brigades

Regionally deployed units

5 divisions 2 brigades

Rapid Deployment Units

1 armored division Central Readiness Force

Rapid Deployment Units

3 rapid deployment divisions
4 rapid deployment brigades
1 armored division
1 airborne brigade
1 helicopter brigade
1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade

Establishment of Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade
- In order to enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade will be established.

Greater Efficiency and Streamlining
- Only the minimum necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained to promote greater efficiency and streamlining.

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Tank (approx. 700) (approx. 300)

Artillery (approx. 600/vehicle) (approx. 300/vehicle)

* Major reduction from the objective specified in the NDPG FY2010 (approx. 400 tanks and approx. 400 artillery)

Establishment of the Ground Component Command
- The Ground Component Command will be established in order to allow swift and flexible operations of each unit of the GSDF under the joint operations.
- (Introduced in the Mid-Term Defense Program) [Refer to Column “Establishment of the Ground Component Command”]
mobile operating units capable of effectively performing amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment.

The GSDF will implement rationalization and streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets, and review the organization and equipment of units.

The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel availability to respond to major disasters or other situations.

The GSDF will implement rationalization and streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets, and review the organization and equipment of units.

(2) Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers to 54 (14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response capabilities for various missions and have more compact designs, and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Aegis destroyers will be added, bringing the fleet to eight.

Furthermore, in order to effectively carry out regular information gathering and warning and surveillance activities, as well as patrolling of surrounding waters and defense operations, the MSDF will maintain an augmented submarine fleet and patrol aircraft units.

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**Aegis destroyer**

Destroyers equipped with the Aegis Weapon System that uses high performance computers to automatically process series of operations such as target search, detection, identification and attack.

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7 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.
The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as establish one new squadron in the air warning unit.

As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a two-squadron architecture.

Furthermore, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF.

Fig. II-2-1-5 (Key Changes in the Structure of the ASDF)
Fig. II-2-1-6 (NDPG Comparison Tables)
### NDPG Comparison Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Number of personnel</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
<td>12 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve-Ready Personnel</td>
<td>2 combined brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>2 brigades</td>
<td>2 brigades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GSDF**

**Major units**

- Rapid Deployment Units
  - 1 armored division
  - 1 artillery brigade
  - 1 airborne brigade
  - 1 training group
  - 1 helicopter brigade

- Central Readiness Force
  - 1 armored division

**Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile units**

- 5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments

**Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units**

- 7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments

**Major equipment**

- Tanks
  - (approx. 1,200) (approx. 900) (approx. 600) (approx. 400) (approx. 300)

**MSDF**

**Major units**

- Destroyer units for mobile operations regional deployment
  - 4 flotillas (Regional units) 10 units
  - 6 divisions (Regional units) 7 units
  - 2 flotillas (Land-based) 16 squadrons

- Submarine units
  - 1 flotilla
  - 1 flotilla

- Minesweeper Units
  - Patrol aircraft units
    - (Land-based) 13 squadrons

**Major equipment**

- Destroyers
  - approx. 60
  - approx. 50
  - 47

- Submarines
  - approx. 16
  - approx. 16

- Combat aircraft
  - approx. 220
  - approx. 150

**AsDF**

**Major units**

- Air Warning & Control Units
  - 28 warning groups
  - 8 warning groups
  - 8 warning groups
  - 8 warning groups

- Fighter Aircraft Units
  - 10 squadrons
  - 9 squadrons
  - 12 squadrons
  - 12 squadrons

- Air Reconnaissance Units
  - 1 squadron
  - 1 squadron
  - 1 squadron
  - 1 squadron

- Aerial refueling/transport units
  - 3 squadrons
  - 3 squadrons
  - 1 squadron

- Support fighter units
  - 3 squadrons
  - 3 squadrons
  - 2 squadrons

- Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units
  - 6 groups
  - 6 groups
  - 6 groups
  - 6 groups

**Major equipment**

- Combat aircraft
  - approx. 430
  - approx. 400
  - approx. 360

- Aegis-equipped destroyers
  - 4 ships
  - 6 ships

- Air Warning & Control Units
  - 7 warning groups
  - 4 warning squadrons
  - 11 warning groups

- Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units
  - 3 groups
  - 6 groups

**Notes:**

1. Units referred to as Regional Deployment Units in the 2013 NDPG.
2. Although not stated in the Attached Tables of 1976 NDPG and the 2013 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG Attached Table from 1995 to 2010.
3. “Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions” are included in the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF in the 2004 NDPG and the 2010 NDPG, but their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of destroyers (Aegis-equipped destroyers), air warning & control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units in the 2013 NDPG.
4. Additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.
Part II  Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

4 Basic Foundation for SDF

To ensure that the defense force can function as effectively as possible, it is also imperative to strengthen the foundations underpinning the defense force.

See Fig. II-2-1-7 (Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability)

5 Additional Points

The NDPG sets out the form of Japan’s defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination considering the security environment at that time will be implemented and these guidelines will be revised adequately. In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup while ensuring harmony with other national initiatives.

### Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Main measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Training and Exercises                | • Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido; enhance and strengthen training and exercises that also involve relevant agencies and the civilian sector.  
                                         • Promote the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities in the southwestern region with the SDF for the purpose of securing a good training environment while paying close attention to the relationship with local communities. |
| Operations Infrastructure             | • Enhance resiliency, including the ability of camps and bases to recover so as to respond effectively to various situations, as well as to ensure the expeditious deployment of units etc.; improve facilities and dormitories of each branch of the service to ensure readiness.  
                                         • Discuss ways to enable the immediate use of civilian airports and ports by the SDF as the foundation of its operations in response to situations that arise.  
                                         • Implement various family support measures for personnel engaged in duties and for their families.  
                                         • Secure and store necessary ammunition; maintain equipment. |
| Personnel Education                   | • Take measures to ensure an appropriate rank and age distribution given the duties and characteristics of respective branches of the service.  
                                         • Make use of female uniformed SDF personnel more effectively; facilitate measures to make good use of human resources including reemployment and measures related to honors and privileges; expand training and exercise opportunities, and secure personnel who can instantly cope with various situations with flexibility based on a broad view and experience gained through working in other relevant ministries and agencies in order to enhance the joint operations structure.  
                                         • Facilitate various recruitment programs; promote support for the reemployment of SDF personnel through measures such as enhancing coordination with local governments and relevant agencies.  
                                         • Promote the use of Reserve SDF personnel in a wide range of areas and implement measures to boost the staffing rate of Reserve SDF personnel etc. in order to support the continued operation of troops. |
| Medicine                              | • Establish an efficient and high-quality medical system, including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital.  
                                         • Secure and train such medical staff as medical officers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. Improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation. |
| Defense Production and Technological Bases | • Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole; promote the adaptation of equipment to civilian use.  
                                         • Formulate clear principles that comply with the new security environment about the overseas transfer of weapons, etc. |
| Efficient Acquisition of Equipment    | • In order to carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system; enhance project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment; study the possibility of employing more long-term contracts.  
                                         • Improve readiness and response capabilities by reforming the supply system through the effective utilization of civilian capabilities; make the acquisition process transparent and optimize the contract system. |
| Research and Development (R&D)        | • Under the constrained budget, ensure there is consistency between research and development and priority of defense buildup, while considering needs that arise in operations of the SDF.  
                                         • In order to respond to new threats and ensure technological advantage in strategically important areas, promote research and development based on a mid-to-long-term perspective.  
                                         • Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancing coordination with universities and research institutions, and transfer military technologies into civilian activities. |
| Collaboration with Local Communities  | • Advance measures aimed at the areas around defense facilities; continuously engage in proactive public relations activities aimed at local governments and residents.  
                                         • Give consideration to the attributes of each area when reorganizing units; give consideration to the impact that the operation of camps and so on have on local economies. |
| Boosting Communication Capabilities   | • Enhance strategic publicity; utilize a wide range of media networks. |
| Enhancing the Intellectual Base       | • Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions.  
                                         • Strengthen the research environment of the MOD and the SDF including the National Institute of Defense Studies; promote various forms of coordination with other national research institutes as well as universities and think tanks at home and abroad. |
| Promoting Reform of the MOD           | • Foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel; optimize the build-up of defense as a whole; enhance SDF joint operation functions; enhance policy-making and communication functions. |