Section 4 Russia

Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries

1 General Situation

Under President Vladimir Putin who reassumed office in May 2012, Russia, having already completed the phase of reconstruction and strengthening, sets an agenda of building a rich and prosperous Russia, and at the same time, attaches importance to becoming an influential power amid a new balance of economic, civilizational, and military forces.¹

“The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.”² President Putin, who made this remark, aims to realize the concept of the Eurasian Union³ encompassing the areas of the former Soviet Union. The President has made clear Russia’s confrontational stance against the West, noting that the West is responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, and that the West exercises influence directly or indirectly on the former Soviet Union countries that Russia considers are under its sphere of influence.⁴

With regard to the situation in Ukraine, even since the efforts to implement the ceasefire agreement (Minsk Protocol)⁵ in the destabilized region of eastern Ukraine, sporadic skirmishes have been continuing between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces. No major progress has been made in the political process either, such as holding local elections in the areas controlled by separatists or expanding the local self-government, as were set out in the Minsk Protocol. The West has alleged that Russia has attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” but Russia has continued to assert the legitimacy of its unilateral actions. The outcomes of these changes have taken on an aspect of being entrenched, and it is expected that the international community will make further efforts to improve the situation.⁶ These have led to increased awareness of the threat posed by Russia through “hybrid warfare,” especially in Europe.⁷

In addition, Russia has been conducting military intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has indicated that it has the ability to continually and swiftly deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring bases in Syria. At the same time, it is thought that Russia considers the intervention as an opportunity to test and demonstrate its equipment. In December 2016, Syrian government troops controlled Aleppo, which is a strategic location in Syria, and at the end of the month a ceasefire agreement entered into force between the Assad Government and opposition forces led by Russia and Turkey. Since January 2017, Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East, including the hosting of Syrian peace talks brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, while continuing the fighting with ISIL and Al-Nusra Front. Furthermore, Russia concluded an agreement with the Government of Syria for its continued use of bases in Syria in the future. Attention will focus on the extent to which Russia will expand its influence in the Middle East as well as Syria.⁸

In addition, while Russia faces severe economic conditions, forecasts indicate that following the recovery in oil prices, a major export, the country will head

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¹ Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (December 2012).
² Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (April 2005).
³ In an article in the Izvestia dated October 4, 2011, then Prime Minister Putin proposed the creation of a “Eurasian Union” that would strengthen intraregional economic partnerships based on a customs union and a common economic space.
⁴ Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (December 2014).
⁵ The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.
⁶ During a press conference on December 17, 2015, President Putin stated, “We’ve never said there are no people there [in Ukraine] who deal with certain matters, including in the military area, but this does not mean that regular Russian troops are present there.” Russia has taken actions which, some suggest, were aimed at maintaining the status quo, such as the announcement of the de facto “completion of the annexation” through the dissolution of the Ministry of Crimean Affairs in July 2015, a ministry that was established for the economic integration of the Crimean Peninsula, along with the repeated visits to Crimea by President Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.
⁷ Due to the complex nature of hybrid warfare that combines economic, intelligence operation, and diplomatic aspects, some suggest that the rising threat of hybrid warfare will drive closer cooperation between NATO, which is a military alliance, and the EU, which has functions other than military.
towards positive economic growth in 2017. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is believed to have cooperated on the development of Russia’s ICBM. It is suggested that the suspension of Ukraine’s technical support following the deterioration of the bilateral relation could impair the operations of Russian equipment that rely highly on Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, attention is being paid on how President Putin, while maintaining his power base,

will deal with Russia’s diplomatic isolation from Europe and the United States and economic situation, as well as promote economic structural reforms and measures aimed at the modernization of Russia’s military forces and its effort to expand international influence. Furthermore, although attention was focused on the improvement of Russia-U.S. relations immediately after the inauguration of the Trump administration, anti-Russia sentiment in the United States remains strong and the outlook is unclear.

2 Security and Defense Policies

1 Basic Posture

Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” revised in December 2015.

The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region for undermining global and regional stability.

In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and the RAF.

The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); inauguration of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia.

The doctrine continues to regard nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It states that Russia will maintain a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other WMDs are used against it or its allies, or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons are used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime.

As for Russia’s defense budget, the initial FY2017 budget registered a year-on-year decrease of around 25% compared to the amount spent in the previous year, while the amounts executed in the FY2011-FY2016 continued to record year-on-year double-digit growth. So far, Russia has given priority to securing its defense budget amid a severe financial situation. The negative growth rate shows Russia’s severe economic situation, which is anticipated to have implications including delays in equipment procurement.

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8 According to the Russian news agency TASS, the IMF predicted that Russia’s GDP growth rate for 2016 would be minus 0.6% but would increase to 1.1% in 2017 and 1.2% in 2018.
9 In his campaign platform papers published after January 2012, then Prime Minister Putin listed his policies: to expand the public’s participation in politics; to prevent corruption; to exit the resource-dependent economy and strengthen domestic industries to modernize the economy; and to develop a middle class that plays a leading role in the society.
10 According to the Russian Federal Treasury, the initial FY2017 defense budget dropped 10% from the initial budget of the previous fiscal year to 2.8358 trillion rubles, marking a 24.9% decrease compared to the budget spent in the previous fiscal year.
Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” that was approved by then President Dmitry Medvedev in September 2008, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one), strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the RAF such as the development and introduction of new equipment.

Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that RAF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, based on the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2011-2020 that appeared to have been approved by the President by the end of 2010, Russia intends to further modernize its equipment and invest approximately 20 trillion rubles (approximately 42 trillion yen) to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70% by 2020.

Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system (for non-commissioned officers and soldiers) which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage of contract servicemen is set to increase further.

In the context of the gradual increase in difficulties in securing the defense budget due to the recent severe economic situation, attention will be paid to the trends related to Russian efforts to improve the capacity of conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence capability provided by nuclear weapons.

Russia’s military force is comprised of forces such as the RAF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The

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11 The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district—army—division—regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district—operational command—brigade. Although this was said to be completed in December 2009, in May 2013 the Guards Tamanskaia Motorized Rifle Division and the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, which had been reorganized into brigades under then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov, were reactivated and participated in a victory parade. Furthermore, in the January 25, 2016 edition of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), a newspaper of the military, Gen. Oleg Salyukov, Ground Forces Commander, stated that four divisions were scheduled to be established in 2016 based on the existing brigades.

12 It was decided that the total military force would be one million personnel as of 2016 by an executive order of December 2008 (the strength was approximately 1.13 million as of 2008). According to TASS, an Executive Order issued by the President of Russia in July 2016 calls for the number of military personnel to be kept at one million.

13 The Northern Joint Strategic Command is a unified force led by the Northern Fleet and consists of fleets, ground forces, and air forces. Its area of operation covers the seas and remote islands extending from the Barents Sea to the East Siberian Sea, and the Arctic coast.

14 In his campaign platform paper on national defense policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin indicated that he would strengthen military power, including nuclear force, aerospace defense, and naval power by spending approximately 23 trillion rubles (approximately 48 trillion yen) in ten years.

15 Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease in the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (since January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2016, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel strength adequacy was around 93% and contracted soldiers totaled approximately 384,000.

16 In April 2016, President Putin signed an executive order that directed the establishment of the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation to ensure national and public security and to protect human rights and freedoms, setting forth that the Federal National Guard Service would be formed on the basis of the internal troops of the Interior Ministry.
RAF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Force; Navy; Aerospace Force; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.

See Fig. I-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>Ground troops</th>
<th>Approx. 320,000 troops</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td>T-90, T-80, T-72, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Not including mothballed tanks.)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 20,200 including mothballed tanks)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime forces</th>
<th>Warships</th>
<th>Approx. 1,050 vessels</th>
<th>Approx. 2,052,000 tons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>4 vessels</td>
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<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>14 vessels</td>
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<td>Frigates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>Approx. 35,000 troops</td>
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<tr>
<th>Air forces</th>
<th>Modern fighter aircraft</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135 MiG-29 aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>112 MiG-31 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200 Su-25 aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139 Su-27 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 Tu-160 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 Tu-95 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63 Tu-22M aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Approx. 142.40 million</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Term of service</td>
<td>1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "The Military Balance 2017," etc. Ground troops include 270,000 ground force personnel and 45,000 airborne unit personnel.

17 Formed on August 1, 2015 by merging the previous Air Force and Aerospace Defense Forces. Minister of Defence Shoigu explained that the realignment was implemented because of "the increasing importance of the aerospace theater," and perceives that "this organizational realignment is the best method for streamlining Russia’s aerospace defense system."
1 Nuclear Forces

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness of its nuclear forces unit.

Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) following only the United States in scale.

Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States. Russia is working on accelerating the development and introducing new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its GPV.

In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of RS-24, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM. SSDN building and deployment are in progress. For example, in January 2013, Yuri Dolgoruky, the first of the Borey-class SSBN, which is believed to carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” was delivered to the Northern Fleet. Additionally, Alexander Nevsky, the second of the SSBNs, and Vladimir Monomakh, the third of the SSBNs, were incorporated to the Pacific Fleet in December 2013 and December 2014, respectively.

In October 2016, firing training took place using SLBM from a Delta III-class SSBN in the Okhotsk Sea and Delta IV-class SSBN from the Barents Sea as well as an ICBM “Topol” from Plesetsk Cosmodrome. President Putin, at the Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, noted that the share of modern weapons in Russia’s nuclear forces nearly reached 60% of total armaments and one of the important issues for the following year would be to enhance the combat capability of strategic nuclear forces, primarily by strengthening missile complexes that will be guaranteed to penetrate missile defense systems.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces. Under such circumstances, in July 2014, the U.S. Government concluded that Russia possesses ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in violation of the INF Treaty and notified the Russian Government. The Russian side denies this. U.S. Government officials refer to this missile as SSC-8 which is allegedly owned by two battalions and deployed at Kapustin Yar and other locations in Astrakhan Oblast located in southeast Russia.

2 Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia is considered to be developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. Close attention will need to be paid to Russia’s development,
procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the “PAK FA” currently under development as the so-called “fifth generation fighter”\(^{22}\) and the T-14 Armata tank,\(^{23}\) in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fighter and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.”

Along with carrying out a range of exercises,\(^{24}\) since February 2013, the RAF have been conducting surprise inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union.\(^{25}\) These inspections are contributing to the improvement of long-distance mobilization capability of the RAF.\(^{26}\) Outside of Russia, the RAF has maintained deployment of vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.\(^{27}\) A plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfields in the Arctic, and in August and September 2016, a flotilla mainly comprising Northern Fleet Udaloy-class destroyers took part in a training exercise in the Arctic Ocean while navigating the long distance from Severomorsk on the Kola peninsula to the Novosibirsk islands.\(^{28}\) The RAF has been intensifying its activities in the Arctic, which include not only such deployment and exercises of naval vessels and resumption of military facility operation, but also strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol flights by long-range bombers.

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### KeyWord

**Fifth generation fighter**

While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, it is pointed out that a fifth generation fighter has more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth.

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In April 2015, Russian aircraft including the **Tu-95 long-range bomber** conducted patrol flights over the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Furthermore, in July and November 2015, the Tu-95 long-range bomber approached the airspaces of U.S. mainland and Guam.

As for military intervention into Syria, the missile cruiser Varyag belonging to the Pacific Fleet and the **aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov** belonging to the Northern Fleet were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Syria in January 2016 and November 2016, respectively.

The current presence of the RAF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the deployment of new units and trends related to military facility development.

Given that the RAF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the inter-theater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units,
it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the RAF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

(1) Nuclear Forces
As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s and approximately 20 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed mainly along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Additionally, the Delta III-class SSBNs carrying SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. By and large strategic nuclear units are believed to be maintaining readiness posture. In a surprise inspection conducted in October 2013 and a field training exercise conducted in May 2014 for the strategic nuclear unit, the Delta III-class SSBNs launched SLBMs in the Sea of Okhotsk. The second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky was incorporated to the Pacific Fleet in December 2013 and the third of the SSBNs Vladimir Monomakh in December 2014. Subsequently, Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh were brought to the Pacific in September 2015 and September 2016, respectively.

Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying four Borey-class SSBN to the Pacific Fleet by 2020.

(2) Ground Forces
As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be reorganizing the command structure from a division-based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of eleven brigades and one division with approximately 80,000 personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system.

(3) Naval Forces
The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 630,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 320,000 tons. Additionally, it plans on deploying four multipurpose Steregushchiy-class frigates (the first of these, the Sovershennyy, plans to be deployed in 2017).

(4) Air Forces
In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 390 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. Existing models are being refurbished and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters, are being introduced to improve their capabilities.

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34 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky and the third SSBN Vladimir Monomakh joined the formation of the permanent readiness units in 2015.
35 According to Military Balance 2017, in addition to 34 Su-35 fighters, 12 Su-34 fighter-bombers have been deployed to the Eastern Military District (11th Army of Air and Air Defence Force).
Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories

Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed.\(^{36}\)

After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island for the first time as head of state in November 2010, Russian ministers and others have made repeated visits to the Northern Territories.\(^{37}\) Between July and September 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev and six minister-level dignitaries also visited Etorofu Island, among other areas. Also, Russia is proceeding with the development of military facilities in the Northern Territories.\(^{38}\) In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands.\(^{39}\) In February 2017, Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu stated at a meeting of the State Duma (lower house) that the deployment of a division to the Northern Territories or the Chishima Islands would be completed before the end of the year. In April 2016, Russia carried out an anti-landing exercise in the Northern Territories or Chishima Islands involving around 1,500 troops belonging to the Eastern Military District.

As described above, Russia continues to station RAF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the RAF’s activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.\(^{40}\)

During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense

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36 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which is comprised of two regiments, is one of the few division units making up the RAF since most divisions were transformed into brigades due to military reform, and is stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted in the Eastern Military District and elsewhere in July 2013. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500. At the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov revealed that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo. In February 2011, a senior official of the General Staff was said to have stated that troops on the Northern Territories would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel in the process of reorganizing divisions into brigades. In May 2014, Commander Sergey Surkovkin of the Eastern Military District announced the buildup of military facilities on the Northern Territories. In August 2014, Russia opened a new airport in Etorofu Island. Through such measures, Russia has stepped up its activities in the Northern Territories under de facto occupation.

37 After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin in January to February 2011, followed by then Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov in May 2011. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island of the Habomai Islands in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, Deputy Minister of Defence Dmitry Rogozin, and in February 2011, then Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there. Furthermore, Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers visited Kunashiri Island in July 2012. In July 2015, Minister of Healthcare Veronika Skvortsova visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island, and in August 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev, Minister for the Development of Russian Far East Galushka, and Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livnov visited Etorofu Island. In September 2015, Minister of Agriculture Alexander Tkachev visited Etorofu Island, and Minister of Transport Maxim Sokolov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island.

38 At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence of Russia in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that a total of 392 buildings and facilities are actively being built in the military facility areas on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Subsequently, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence in January 2016, the Minister noted that completing infrastructure construction in the areas was one of the priorities for 2016.

39 In March 2016, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that it planned to deploy surface-to-ships missiles “Bastion” and “Bal” to the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands before the end of the year. In November 2016, Boyevaya Vakhta, a newsletter published by the Pacific Fleet, mentioned that a “Bastion” coastal missile unit is being rotated to Etorofu Island and a “Bal” coastal missile unit to Kunashiri Island using an artillery squadron.

40 In Soviet Military Power 1989, the U.S. DoD refers to “Bastion” as the activity area of SSBN to be protected by land, sea, and air assets while utilizing topography in the territorial waters of the former Soviet Union. It was assumed that in the Pacific region, the former Soviet Union had set up a “Bastion” mainly in Okhotsk Sea. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy stated that regular long-term patrols of SSBN, which were greatly curtailed since the former Soviet Union, would be restarted in 2012.

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Surface-to-ship missile Bal
<Specifications, performance>
Maximum firing range: 130 km
<Description>
Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2016.

Surface-to-ship missile Bastion
<Specifications, performance>
Maximum firing range: 300 km
<Description>
Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2014.
Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in March 2017, Japan expressed it was regrettable that Russia had deployed surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories and that Russia may deploy a new division to the islands including the Four Northern Islands. Closer attention must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories.

3 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

In the vicinity of Japan, the RAF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform.

In September 2014, the large-scale exercise Vostok 2014, considered the largest and the most important of the RAF exercises and drills conducted that year, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. Over 155,000 personnel, over 4,000 combat vehicles, approximately 80 vessels, and approximately 630 aircraft participated in the exercise. It is regarded that its purpose was to verify the combat readiness and mobilization postures of the units in the Far East strategic front, including the Arctic. The exercise included units from not only the Eastern Military District, but also the Western and Central Military Districts. The various units conducted long-distance maneuvers covering a distance of 12,000 km at most. Furthermore, the exercise trained coordination among the Ministry of Defence and other ministries, agencies, and local governments.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, joint exercises have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels involving long distance voyages, along with field activities involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In September 2011, 24 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait in succession. This was the first time since the end of the Cold War that such a major transit of this strait by Russian naval vessels was confirmed. In recent years, ten or more Russian naval vessels have passed through the Soya Strait one to three times a year. Additionally, survey activities took place from May to September 2016 on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands. The objective was to study the feasibility of deploying the Pacific Fleet’s forces there in the future. Furthermore, a secondary survey is set to take place from June to September 2017.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers and carrying out flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers and Tu-160 long-range bombers which are refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft and Su-27 fighters.

Russian aircraft were particularly active in FY2014.

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41 The large-scale exercise Vostok 2014 was conducted over a vast area extending from the Arctic to the coastal area. In the Kamchatka Peninsula, ALCM launches were carried out from long-range bombers, as well as launches of SLCMs from Oscar II-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN). In Wrangel Island in the Arctic, night-time parachute landings and survival drills were conducted. In the Sakhalin, the Naval Infantry conducted landing drills as well as drills to prevent the landings of opposing forces. In the coastal and inland areas, drills including the launches of short-range ballistic missiles and GLCMs using the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, as well as drills that made use of private infrastructure, such as takeoff and landing drills of the Su-25 attack aircraft using roads for motor vehicles were conducted.

42 The number of cases of the Russian naval fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and released in FY2016 is as follows: 18 cases in the Soya Strait (22 in FY2015, 10 in FY2014); 1 case in the Tsugaru Strait (0 in FY2015, 1 in FY2014); and 7 cases in the Tsushima Strait (4 in FY2015, 8 in FY2014).

43 Some of the 24 naval vessels participated in the exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places.

44 In May 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that under the command of Vice Admiral Andrei Ryabukhin, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet that arrived in Matsuwa Island, an expedition comprised of approximately 200 personnel including representatives from the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Russian Geographical Society, the Eastern Military District, and the Pacific Fleet began conducting survey activities. Colonel-general Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Eastern Military District, stated at a military meeting of the district that six Pacific Fleet vessels and over 200 personnel participated in an expedition by the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Geographical Society to Chishima, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands, and that its primary objective was to study the feasibility of establishing a Pacific Fleet base in the future. Furthermore, Russia’s Minister of Defence announced that three ships of the Pacific Fleet and around 100 personnel arrived on Matsuwa Island in June 2017 in order to conduct a secondary survey.

45 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in January 2014 that surveillance flights of two Tu-95 long-range bombers took place with the assistance of Su-27 fighters and A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft.

Satellite photo of Matsuwa Island (June 2010) [NASA Earth Observatory]
during the height of tensions in Ukraine, and in April the same year when eastern Ukraine began to destabilize, unusual flights took place with Tu-95 long-range bombers conducting flights around Japan on four occasions in one month. On two of these occasions, a total of six Tu-95 flew on the same day.\textsuperscript{46}

Russian aircraft activities in FY2016 generally took place at the same level as the previous year. Yet, Russian aircraft continue to be active around Japan, as indicated by the flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers in January 2017 and flights in the vicinity of Japan conducted by Tu-95 long-range bombers as well as patrol aircraft and surveillance aircraft in April 2017.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig.I-2-4-3.png}
\caption{Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft}
\end{figure}

5 Relations with Other Countries

1 General Situation

Russia considers the realization of its national interests as a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the multipolarization of international relations, the shift of global power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing importance of force in international relations.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world.\textsuperscript{48}

For this reason, Russia has been working on deepening its economic partnerships with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).\textsuperscript{49} Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the global economy,\textsuperscript{50} and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India as countries with which to strengthen bilateral relations.

Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the possibility of cooperation with other countries towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL.

Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture and develop its relations with other countries in terms of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy, and Russia’s politics and diplomacy which include the security domain.

2 Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East,\textsuperscript{51} and security.\textsuperscript{52} In the executive order concerning foreign policy issued in May 2012, President Putin upheld his policy to participate in the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region in order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia would make efforts to develop relationships with Japan.

\textsuperscript{46} The number of times Russian military aircraft flew around Japan since FY2012 was: one time in FY2012; one time in FY2013; six times in FY2014; two times in FY2015; and one time in FY2016.
\textsuperscript{47} The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (November 2016).
\textsuperscript{48} The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “With a view to protecting its national interests Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy ruling out futile confrontation (including a new arms race). (Abridged) The Russian Federation’s objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world.”
\textsuperscript{49} In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement.
\textsuperscript{50} Press conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov following the Russia-China-India foreign ministers’ meeting (April 2016).
\textsuperscript{51} Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin.
\textsuperscript{52} The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in November 2016). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed his recognition that the importance of the entire Asia-Pacific region was rising.
the ROK, and other countries, along with China, India, and Vietnam. To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and in assigning an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India.

Under this policy, Russia has participated in various frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region. In September 2016, the Eastern Economic Forum for accelerating the economic development of Eastern Russia and expanding international cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region was held in Vladivostok, following on from 2015.

Among these different countries, Russia and India maintain a close relationship under a strategic partnership, with the leaders of both countries paying mutual visits. During President Putin’s visit to India in October 2016 an agreement was reached on defense equipment contracts for S-400 surface-to-air missiles and Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate, among other equipment, valued at approximately US$10 billion. Both countries are strengthening their military technology cooperation, including the joint development of the fifth generation PAK FA fighter and the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile. Additionally, since 2003 Russia and India have been conducting INDR A antiterrorism exercises involving the Armies and Navies of both countries. Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security.

3 Situation in Ukraine

In Ukraine, sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces continued in the east even after the ceasefire agreement of February 2015 (package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements). In October 2016, a summit meeting was held among Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine for the first time in about one year, and agreement was reached on the creation of a roadmap for executing the ceasefire agreement of February 2015. However, subsequent coordination has proven difficult and the ceasefire continues to be broken in the eastern region. Also, no major developments have been seen in the political process for elections in the separatist controlled areas. As can be seen from the above, the outcomes of the changes to the status quo in the Crimean Peninsula and eastern Ukraine via Russia’s “hybrid warfare” have taken on an aspect of being entrenched. Additionally, Ukraine President Poroshenko has indicated that he would like to carry out a national referendum on whether the country should join NATO. This could lead to opposition from Russia and potentially affect the situation in Ukraine.

4 Situation in Syria

In September 2015, Russia began airstrikes in Syria as per the assistance requested by President Assad of Syria. The West condemned Russia for attacking not only terrorist organizations including ISIL, but also Syrian dissidents that are opposed to the Assad regime, while on the other hand ISIL declared it would retaliate against Russia.

In October 2015, a Russian passenger aircraft crashed after departing from Egypt, killing 224 passengers and crew. Russia concluded that this incident was a terrorist attack conducted by ISIL, declared retaliation against ISIL, and strengthened its airstrikes by mobilizing strategic bombers and other assets.
Also, in November 2015, a Turkish military aircraft shot down a RAF aircraft flying near the Syrian-Turkish border on the grounds that the Russian aircraft intruded into Turkish airspace, following which Russian-Turkish relations deteriorated. However, in June 2016, Turkish President Erdogan expressed his deepest regret over the incident in a written letter, and at a summit meeting held in August the same year both leaders affirmed measures aimed at improving bilateral relations, paving the way for both countries to work together on the Syrian ceasefire agreement and other matters.

To date, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as fired cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced in November 2016 that the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov deployed to the eastern part of the Mediterranean launched aircraft and conducted airstrikes on land-based targets for the first time in Russia’s naval history. These aircraft from the aircraft carrier are reported to have flown 420 sorties over a two-month period, bombing a total of 1,252 terrorist facilities. It has been pointed out, though, that most of these sorties were flown from Khmeimim Air Base since the aircraft was moved from the aircraft carrier to the Air Base soon after the airstrike began. It is therefore open to question whether this should be assessed as the operational capability of the aircraft carrier.

In December 2016, Syrian government troops gained control of strategically located Aleppo, where fighting has continued involving Syrian government troops, opposition forces, Kurdistan troops, and ISIL fighters. At the end of the same month, a nationwide ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect between the Assad administration and opposition forces. Since January 2017, Russia has increased its presence in the Middle East. It has continued fighting ISIL and Al-Nusra Front, while also holding Syrian peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan together with Syria and Iran, where establishment of a ceasefire monitoring organization and de-escalation areas were announced.

Furthermore, Russia has concluded an agreement with the Syrian Government to continue using Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base. As such, attention will be paid to Russia’s moves to expand its influence in Syria and the Middle East.

The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, the use of cruise missiles and strategic bombers in the attacks has, in turn, demonstrated Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of Russia’s military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on anti-ISIL military operations cannot be neglected.
5 Relations with Commonwealth of Independent States

Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the top foreign policy priority. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS, and has dispatched troops to be stationed in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009. In November 2014, Russia and Abkhazia concluded an alliance and strategic partnership treaty. In such ways, Russia has been working on ensuring its military influence.

Due to increasing actions in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the Russian Federation concerning MD (April 8, 2010)

2013, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that if the Geneva agreement on Iran’s nuclear issues was implemented, the U.S. MD system in Europe would not be needed.

2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving Georgia-

66 In August 2008, following the conflict with Georgia, then President Medvedev indicated that one of the five principles of Russia’s foreign policy was that there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.

67 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but it was never recognized as such by the international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria.

68 After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving Georgia-

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63 Russia’s “Military Doctrine” revised in December 2014 states that Russia would promote cooperation with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia aimed at shared defense and security.

64 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 21st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time.

65 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the CST, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization.

66 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, Zvamidostnie (cooperative operation), were implemented in Kazakhstan in October 2009 and October 2010, in Armenia in September 2012, and in Belarus in September 2013.

67 At the Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board in December 2013, President Putin said that the withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014 would be a destabilizing element not only in Afghanistan but also to Central Asia and could pose a threat to the national interests and security of Russia.

68 See Chapter 2, Section 1-2 for the U.S. deployment plan of the MD system in Europe.

69 Statement by the Russian Federation concerning MD (April 8, 2010)

70 Russia has demanded a legal guarantee that the MD plan of the United States is not targeted at Russia, and claimed that the United States is not considering Russia’s concerns. Russia issued an executive statement in November 2011, mentioning countermeasures such as deployment of operational early-warning radars and the possibility of its withdrawal from the New START. In November 2013, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that if the Geneva agreement on Iran’s nuclear issues was implemented, the U.S. MD system in Europe would not be needed.
United States announced suspension of the military exchanges with Russia in March 2014. In addition, the United States dispatched a missile destroyer to the Black Sea and provided non-lethal weapons to the Ukrainian Government. In February 2015, as the tense situation in eastern Ukraine continued, the United States stepped up its activities to keep Russia in check, including suggesting to provide lethal weapons to the Ukrainian Government.

In regard to the situation in Syria, the ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and Russia took effect in February and September 2016, but in either case the agreement de facto broke down within a short period of time. During a telephone talk between President Putin and President Trump shortly after he took office (January 2017), both parties stated they would cooperate with each other regarding various issues including the fight against terrorism and would work to improve bilateral relations. However, in April 2017, following the United States’ missile strike on Syria in response to its chemical weapons attack, the United States and Russia criticized each other, clouding the outlook for improved bilateral relations.

**Relations with Europe and NATO**

Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of mutual interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings. Additionally, NATO and European countries have maintained a severe diplomatic stance towards Russia while working with the Ukrainian Government.

At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010 prior to the suspension of working level cooperation, Russia and NATO stated that both sides would work towards building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They have continued searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in fields such as MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation, no progress was made on Russia-NATO relations. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and the position of Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each country’s responsibility under a unified MD system of NATO and Russia.

Meanwhile, there remains an unsolved issue between Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has presented a threat to NATO’s eastern border for the first time since the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s member states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor national security concerns. For this and other reasons, NATO continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of its collective defense.

Meanwhile, Russia has actively conducted air activity...
that can be deemed provocative in Europe, especially near the Baltic countries. It has also made known that Russia is deploying two divisions near the border with Ukraine and one division near the border with Belarus.

Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced in November 2016 states that containment policies of the United States and its allies undermine regional and global stability, and Russia would maintain its negative perspective towards NATO expansion.

8 Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian Government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia exports equipment such as fighters and vessels to countries including India, China, Algeria, ASEAN member states, and Venezuela. Russia concluded an agreement with China to sell new Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Deliveries of the Su-35 fighters have already begun at the end of 2016, and plans call for a total of 24 of these aircraft to be delivered to China by 2018. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profit through arms exports.

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77 In October 2014, NATO announced that the Russian Air Force conducted significant military maneuvers over the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Atlantic Ocean, and Black Sea on October 28 and 29. NATO criticized that this air activity represents an unusual level of activity over European airspace.

78 According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2011 and 2015 increased by 29% compared to that of the period between 2006 and 2010. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports in the world (25%) after the United States.

79 Russia has delivered to Indonesia 5 Su-27 fighters and 11 Su-30 fighters. Furthermore, it was reported in 2016 that Russia plans to sell 10 Su-35 fighters to Indonesia. To date, Russia has delivered 18 Su-30 fighters to Malaysia and 12 Su-27 fighters and 36 Su-30 fighters to Vietnam. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam for Kilo-class submarines. All six of these submarines were delivered to Vietnam by January 2017. With regard to India, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya in November 2013, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, to date, Russia has delivered to Algeria 52 Su-30 fighters and to Venezuela 24 Su-30 fighters. Russia’s exports to China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. With regard to Iran, Russia started exporting the “S-300” surface-to-air missile system in April 2016.

80 According to news reports, a contract was signed to export 24 Su-35 fighters for approximately US$2 billion and 32 S-400 launchers for approximately US$3 billion. The first four Su-35 fighters were delivered by the end of 2016.

81 In September 2015, President Putin responded in an interview with news agencies that, “Russian-Chinese ties have now probably reached a peak in their entire history and continue developing.”