During then President Barack Obama’s eight-year term in office from January 2009 to January 2017, the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world had changed significantly in a new security environment following the end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, including a shift in the global balance of power, attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine and the South China Sea, the intensification of the activities of international terrorist organizations, and the development and improved operational capability of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which have reached a new level of threat.

Based on a strategic policy of pursuing four national interests, i.e., security, prosperity, respect for universal values, and international order based on norms, the former Obama administration had demonstrated a commitment to playing a role in the peace and stability of the world by drawing on its world-leading, comprehensive national power, even in the face of a severe financial situation.

As is outlined in its strategy documents, the United States under the former Obama administration had focused on the Asia-Pacific region by promoting a rebalance towards the region, based on the approach of deepening relations with its allies there and enhancing both the quantity and quality of U.S. assets deployed to the region.

Concurrently, the United States had dealt with security issues outside of the Asia-Pacific region. In response to the attacks in Iraq and Syria since 2014 by ISIL and other organizations, the United States, since August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes (see Chapter 3, Section 1-2). With regard to Afghanistan, in October 2015, then President Obama revised the plan to withdraw U.S. troops by the end of 2016, and instead stated that a strength of 8,400 troops would be maintained during his term in office. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the deterrent of the U.S. Forces in Europe facing a large influx of refugees and an increasingly tense situation in Ukraine, the budget related to the European Reassurance Initiative had been increased.

In other efforts, the United States had also promoted the Third Offset Strategy to develop military technologies in new fields to maintain and increase the superiority of the U.S. Forces, deeming that its military superiority is gradually eroding in light of recent trends, including China and other countries’ enhanced “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” (“A2/AD”) capabilities.

Against this backdrop, newly elected President Donald Trump declared a shift to an “America First” policy in his inaugural address made on January 20, 2017, unveiling a new vision for governance in which all future decisions, including on diplomatic issues, would be made to benefit the workers and their families in the
United States. President Trump also stated that he would reinforce old alliances and form new relationships as well as unite the world to completely eradicate Islamic extremist terrorism from the face of the Earth.

In addition, on the same day of its inauguration the Trump administration articulated the issues of six policies including foreign and military policies. The administration’s foreign policy sets forth that peace through strength lies at the center of that policy, and assigns an order of priority to the components of the foreign policy. Greatest priority is placed on defeating ISIL and other Islamic extremist terrorist organizations, followed by the rebuilding of the U.S. Forces by reversing the reduction trend in the Navy and Air Force. Furthermore, the policy outlines that the Trump administration would embrace diplomacy and would welcome old enemies becoming friends and friends becoming allies. In its military policy, the Trump administration touched upon the need to deploy various assets to defend the United States, expressed the view that it cannot allow other countries to surpass U.S. military capability, and stated that it would pursue the highest level of military readiness. The Trump administration also set forth as priority issues the development of a state-of-the-art missile defense system to protect against missile attacks from Iran and North Korea, and the advancement of cyber capabilities.

Based on these policy issues, President Trump conducted a readiness review of the U.S. Forces soon after taking office, and instructed U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis to submit a plan for improving this readiness and to start establishing a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) for rebuilding the U.S. Forces.

With regard to defeating ISIL set as a top priority of the administration, President Trump ordered his cabinet members and others to quickly begin establishing a plan to defeat ISIL, and decided that the U.S. Secretary of Defense would be responsible for presenting the draft proposal of this plan.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has yet to indicate a comprehensive strategy on how it will be involved in regional security in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe. It has, however, made clear that it would continue to emphasize the security of the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, at the instruction of President Trump, the United States reviewed its policy on North Korea and strengthened its military presence against North Korea (see 1-3 of this Section). Also, in the Middle East, in April 2017, President Trump determined that the Assad regime carried out a chemical weapons attack on an area controlled by opposition forces in northwest Syria, and then ordered strikes against the Syrian military (see Chapter 3, Section 1-4), while the United States used the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) in its arsenal.

3 The six policy issues announced by the Trump administration on January 20, 2017 are: (1) America First Energy Plan; (2) America First Foreign Policy; (3) Bringing Back Jobs and Growth; (4) Making Our Military Strong Again; (5) Standing Up for Our Law Enforcement Community; and (6) Trade Deals that Work for All Americans.

4 “The America First Foreign Policy” outlines the following order of priority (in what follows, “we” refers to the United States):

(1) Defeating ISIL and other radical Islamic terror groups will be our highest priority. To defeat and destroy these groups, we will pursue aggressive joint and coalition military operations when necessary.
(2) Next, we will rebuild the American military. Our Navy has shrunk from more than 500 ships in 1991 to 275 in 2016. Our Air Force is roughly one third smaller than in 1991. President Trump is committed to reversing this trend, because he knows that our military dominance must be unquestioned.
(3) Finally, in pursuing a foreign policy based on American interests, we will embrace diplomacy. The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies.

5 The main items of the “Making Our Military Strong Again” issue are as follows (in what follows, “we” refers to the United States):

• Our military needs every asset at its disposal to defend America. We cannot allow other nations to surpass our military capability. The Trump administration will pursue the highest level of military readiness.
• President Trump will end the defense sequester and submit a new budget to Congress outlining a plan to rebuild our military. We will provide our military leaders with the means to plan for our future defense needs.
• We will also develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system to protect against missile-based attacks from states like Iran and North Korea.
• Cyber warfare is an emerging battlefield, and we must take every measure to safeguard our national security secrets and systems. We will make it a priority to develop defensive and offensive cyber capabilities at our U.S. Cyber Command, and recruit the best and brightest Americans to serve in this crucial area.
• We must also ensure that we have the best medical care, education and support for our military service members and their families. We will get our veterans the care they need whenever and whenever they need it.

6 On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum on “Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces” concerning national security for the United States. Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. This memorandum states, “To pursue peace through strength, it shall be the policy of the United States to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces,” and then instructs the review of readiness posture and budget requests related to this review, the establishment of a National Defense Strategy (NDS) based on a new national security strategy, and the start of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).
for the first time in combat against ISIL in Afghanistan.\(^7\) These actions indicate the United States’ posture of continuing to deal with security issues also outside of the Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, along with withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and pursuing trade and economic policies that prioritize domestic employment, in the area of security policy President Trump has thus far expressed the view that certain allies considered to have a small cost burden should make payments proportionate to the security provided to them by the United States. In this connection, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson, who attended the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting held in Brussels in March 2017, requested that NATO members quickly achieve the goal of increasing defense spending to 2% or more of GDP.

Following the inauguration of the new administration and the declaration of its shift to America First policy, attention will focus on specific relationship-building exercises between the United States and its allies and partners in the future. Attention will also be given towards the extent to which such policy changes ushered in by the Trump administration will affect the policies of other countries, when coupled with changes in the situation surrounding the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe.

1 **Understanding of Security**

The National Military Strategy released in July 2015 during the former Obama administration explicitly cites Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as “revisionist states” that are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens U.S. national security interests. It also mentions that violent extremist organizations such as ISIL are becoming imminent threats.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has yet to release a strategy document providing a comprehensive view on its recognition of security threats. Nevertheless, President Trump placed the defeat of ISIL and other Islamic extremist terrorist organizations as a top priority immediately after his inauguration. Additionally, he stated with regard to the attack on Syria executed in April 2017 that inhibiting and deterring the proliferation and the use of chemical weapons is in the indispensable interest of U.S. security. Also, in April 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson explained to the UN Security Council that the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack on the ROK and Japan was real, and that failure to act on the most pressing security issue in the world might bring catastrophic consequences, while also pointing out that it was likely only a matter of time before North Korea had the capability to strike the U.S. mainland. Furthermore, in April 2017, President Trump ordered a review of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue (see Chapter 3, Section 2-5) based on his understanding that Iran is not following the spirit of the agreement. At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in February 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis expressed his concerns towards China’s actions in the East and South China Seas, and during a press conference in Afghanistan in April 2017, he indicated the view that the United States would have to confront Russia, which does not attempt to recognize the sovereignty of other countries in violation of international law.

In light of this understanding, it is believed that based on its America First governance vision, the United States considers states and organizations that attempt to threaten the interests of the United States and its allies as threats to the country, and in particular, the United States identifies North Korea and extremist organizations such as ISIL, along with stopping the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, as issues that should be addressed with priority.

2 **Defense Strategy**

The QDR released in March 2014 states that three pillars, which are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, would be emphasized in order to embody priorities outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance\(^8\) including rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and maintaining a strong commitment to stability in Europe and the Middle East,
namely: protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power and win decisively.9

The QDR states that across the three pillars, the U.S. Forces are capable of simultaneously implementing the following undertakings, and if deterrence fails at any given time, the U.S. Forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.10

1) Defending homeland
2) Conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations
3) Deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement in multiple regions

Furthermore, in order to achieve the three pillars, the DoD seeks innovative approaches to how it fights, how it postures its force, and how it leverages its asymmetric strengths and technological advantages. More specifically, the QDR mentions positioning additional forward deployed naval forces in critical areas, such as the Asia-Pacific region, and deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, and crisis response forces.11

In this context, in February 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis stated, “The ultimate objective is to build a larger, more capable, and more lethal joint force,” with regard to long-term DoD initiatives in response to President Trump’s instructions regarding the rebuilding of the U.S. Forces. In this regard, attention will focus on the details of the new national defense strategy being established by the new administration.

3 Involvement in the Asia-Pacific Region

As indicated by the Defense Strategic Guidance, the QDR, and the National Security Strategy (NSS), the United States places emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and has continued a rebalancing policy to enhance its presence in the region.12 In November 2011, then President Obama delivered a speech to the Australian Parliament, clearly stating, for the first time, that he would give top priority to the U.S. presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific region. The President indicated that the United States would maintain its strong presence in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), while enhancing its presence in Southeast Asia.

On February 4, 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis visited Japan and held a meeting with Minister of Defense Inada at the very early timing of just two weeks after the inauguration of the new Trump administration. During the meeting, he emphasized that the Asia-Pacific region remains a top priority for the United States and that the United States would strengthen its commitment by maintaining the presence of the U.S. Forces in the region. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on February 10, 2017, Prime Minister Abe and President Trump shared their concerns regarding the increasingly severe security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile development which have reached a new level of threat, and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas. The joint statement released on the same day affirms that the United States will strengthen its presence in the region.

9 The three pillars constitute primarily of the following:
(1) Protect the homeland: Maintain the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the United States. Protection of the homeland includes assisting U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to disasters.
(2) Build security globally: Continue a strong commitment to shaping world events in order to deter and prevent conflict and to assure the security of allies and partners.
(3) Project power and win decisively: The U.S. Forces deter acts of aggression in one or more theaters by remaining capable of decisively defeating adversaries, while projecting power to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

10 The 2010 QDR stated that the U.S. Forces possess the capability of countering attacks by two countries while also being able to conduct a wide range of operations. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states that the United States maintains forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’s aggressive objectives in one region while being capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.

11 The QDR states that the Joint Force would rebalance for a broad spectrum of conflict, rebalance and sustain its presence and posture abroad, rebalance capability, capacity, and readiness; and equip itself with advanced capabilities and readiness while scaling back the U.S. Forces. The QDR notes that even as budget and other resource cuts are made, the DoD would give priority to the following capability areas that are in close alignment with the pillars of the defense strategy: (1) missile defense; (2) nuclear deterrence; (3) cyber; (4) space; (5) air/sea; (6) precision strike; (7) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); (8) counter terror and special operations; and (9) resilience.

12 The QDR, etc. state that the centerpiece of the DoD commitment to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region is to update and enhance security initiatives with its allies in the region, including Japan. Additionally, the QDR notes that by 2020, the U.S. Forces would station 60% of the assets of the Navy and overseas Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region.
In particular, the Trump administration conducts a review of policy on North Korea along with ending the former Obama administration’s “strategic patience” policy which he considers to have failed in terms of past efforts to block North Korea’s development and testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and has repeatedly stated that “All options are on the table” including diplomatic, security, and economic measures. Amidst this, in April 2017, it was announced that the aircraft carrier strike group led by the USS Carl Vinson, originally scheduled to depart Singapore for Australia, was headed north for duties in the Western Pacific, while the nuclear submarine USS Michigan docked in the Port of Busan, ROK. In May 2017, B1-B strategic bombers flew over the Korean Peninsula, following a similar flight earlier in March. Furthermore, it is also reported that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system deployed with the U.S. Forces in the ROK reached its initial capability in May 2017.

U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson stated at a UN Security Council ministerial meeting held in April 2017 that more pressure would be placed on North Korea through economic sanctions and diplomatic means so that it would give up development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Yet, while mentioning once again that all options are on the table, he also noted that this pressure will be backed up by a willingness to counteract North Korean aggression with military action, and the United States would continue to defend itself and its allies. Given this policy on North Korea taken by the Trump administration, it is believed that the United States will continue to demonstrate its military presence to North Korea.

4 Third Offset Strategy

In November 2014, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative and expressed his expectation that it would develop into a third offset strategy. Since the 1950s, the United States has invested in the development of military technologies in new fields in which adversaries do not have capabilities. Through a strategy of acquiring asymmetrical means to offset an adversary’s capabilities, the United States has maintained military operational and technological superiority. Today, however, such U.S. superiority is gradually eroding as a result of potential adversaries modernizing their military forces and acquiring advanced military capabilities, and with technologies proliferating. The United States notes that this initiative was established to newly identify innovative ways to sustain and expand U.S. superiority, utilizing limited resources.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, who is leading the work of establishing this initiative, states that the third offset strategy is aimed at gaining technological, organizational, and operational superiority

---

13 The Trump administration’s policy on North Korea of ending “strategic patience” in favor of the view that “all options are on the table” was clearly articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson and Vice President Pence at a press conference during their visits to the ROK in March and April 2017. U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson once again repeated this stance at the UN Security Council’s ministerial meeting on North Korea held on April 28, 2017.

14 A ballistic missile defense system that intercepts short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase from the ground. See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2 for ballistic missile defense systems that track and intercept targets at high altitude in the upper atmosphere or beyond the atmosphere.

15 In addition, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson stated at the UN Security Council ministerial meeting held on April 28, 2017 that the United States will not negotiate a way back to the negotiating table with North Korea, and will only engage in talks with North Korea when it exhibits a good-faith commitment to abiding by the Security Council resolutions and its past promises to end its nuclear programs.

16 Then Secretary Hagel stated that the previous two “offset strategies” were as follows: (1) in the 1950s, the United States offset the conventional capacity of the former Soviet Union by using the nuclear deterrent; and (2) in the 1970s, while the nuclear capabilities of the former Soviet Union achieved parity with those of the United States, the United States gained superiority over the former Soviet Union by acquiring new systems, such as extended-range precision-guided missiles, stealth aircraft, and ISR platforms.
over adversaries, in order to strengthen deterrence using conventional assets against great powers, taking Russia and China into account. He states that to this end, investments would be made with priority on human-machine collaboration and combat teaming. In addition, Deputy Secretary Work explains that the competitive environments have changed significantly due to innovations in commercial technologies, and in order to follow and make use of commercial technologies, the United States must work more closely with the private sector. He further notes that the proliferation of technology could cause loss of superiority in a short timeframe.

5 Nuclear Strategy

While then President Obama aimed to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he noted that this will not be realized in the near future, and that a nuclear deterrent will be maintained as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in April 2010 stated that the nuclear security environment is changing, and that nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat today. Furthermore, it pointed to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.

In June 2013, then President Obama delivered a speech on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Berlin, which was followed by the release of the Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy by the DoD on the same day. In the speech and report, the United States announced that it would negotiate with Russia to pursue up to a one-third reduction in U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, President Trump has instructed U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis to initiate a new NPR to ensure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and to reassure its allies. In April 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis directed the commencement of the NPR and would make a final report to the president by the end of 2017.

6 FY2018 Budget

As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 established a significant cut in government spending by FY2021. In January 2012, the DoD announced that the reduction in defense spending in light of the act would amount to about US$487 billion over the 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021 (about US$259 billion over the five years from FY2013 to FY2017). In March 2013, the mandatory sequestration of government spending including defense spending was started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. Mandatory sequestration for the FY2014 and FY2015 budgets was eased as a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act of the Democratic and Republican parties passed in December 2013. Furthermore, mandatory sequestration for the FY2016 and FY2017 budgets was eased as a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act passed in November 2015.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration announced that it would end the mandatory sequestration of defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military, while the defense budget request in the Statement on Proposed FY2018 Budget submitted to Congress in May 2017 called for a basic budget of US$574.5 billion, representing about a 10% increase over the previous year. At the same time, it also declared the need to lift the defense budget cap in order to protect the security of the United States. For the overseas contingency operations budget, a total of US$64.6 billion would be appropriated per the request, including an increase in the budgeted amount for the OIR and the European Reassurance Initiative. The key principles of the defense budget include: (1) improving warfighting readiness; (2) address evolving national security challenges; and (3) increasing capacity and lethality while preparing for future growth. Objectives for the U.S. Army will be an increase in units, flight training, and ammunition, for the U.S. Navy a total of eight combat ships will be procured, along with 91 aircraft, including 24 F-35(B) fighters and 14 F/A-18E/F fighter attack aircraft, and for the U.S. Air Force a total of 46 F-35 fighters will be procured and personnel increased to address shortages of pilots and maintenance workers. Furthermore, for ballistic missile defense, the
budget request calls for the completion of adding eight new ground launching intercept missiles to the 32 already deployed in Alaska by the end of 2017, along with the 4 in California, in order to reinforce protection from the threat of ICBMs launched by North Korea and Iran.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama administration proceeded with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In April 2017, it announced that its deployed strategic warheads stood at 1,411, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 673. The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.

In regard to Missile Defense (MD), the United States under the former Obama administration announced the BMDR in February 2010. On homeland defense, the review noted that the United States would use ground-based interceptors to respond to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from North Korea and Iran, and that in regard to regional defense, the United States would expand investments in MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the MD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden. However, in January 2012, the United States announced that it would continue investments in MD programs in its homeland and Europe while reducing the spending for deployable regional MD systems with a view to increasing reliance on its allies and partners in the future. Further, in March 2013, the United States announced that it would additionally deploy ground-based interceptors in the U.S. homeland and mobile radars for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Japan in order to bolster homeland security in response to North Korea’s nuclear test and the advancement of its long-range ballistic missile development, while restructuring the program of the standard missile (SM-3) Block IIB scheduled for deployment in Europe. Furthermore, in July 2016, the United States announced it would deploy to the ROK the THAAD system in order to address the growing threat from North Korea’s ballistic missiles. In May 2017, it was reported that the THAAD system reached its initial capability. Additionally, the Trump administration announced that the United States successfully conducted the first intercept test targeting a mock-ICBM in May 2017. After taking office, President Trump has instructed U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis to initiate a new BMDR to identify ways of strengthening missile-defense capabilities, rebalancing homeland and theater defense priorities, and highlighting priority funding areas. In May 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis directed the commencement of the BMDR and would make a final report to the president by the end of 2017.

The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it is operated under the leadership of the Unified

Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on Historical Tables (Outlays), Budget of the United States Government, FY2015. 2. The amount for FY2016 is an estimate.
Combatant Commands, comprising leaders from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of three commands with functional responsibilities and six commands with regional responsibilities.

The U.S. ground forces consist of about 460,000 Army soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. As described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army continues its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct a full range of operations worldwide. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces.

The U.S. maritime forces consist of about 890 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.25 million tons. The 6th Fleet is deployed in the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,580 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK.

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November in the same year.

Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by placing the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, in the region. The Pacific Command is a command with regional responsibilities for the largest geographical area, and its component commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to broaden the perspective of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of the U.S. Forces from allies, the Pacific Command headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region. Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia are currently serving in the Pacific Command as deputy director level-officials.


The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,800 personnel to commands, such as I Corps Forward and the U.S. Army Japan Command in Japan.\(^{24}\)

The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet is centered on a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. The 7th Fleet consists of an aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers and destroyers.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 14,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning

---

\(^{24}\) The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2016), and could change according to unit deployment.
ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

Fig. I-2-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Region</th>
<th>Army: approx. 26,000 personnel</th>
<th>Navy: approx. 8,000 personnel</th>
<th>Total: approx. 34,000 personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Forces</td>
<td>Army: approx. 461,000 personnel</td>
<td>Navy: approx. 319,000 personnel</td>
<td>Total: approx. 1,276,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian-Pacific Region</td>
<td>Army: approx. 35,000 personnel</td>
<td>Navy: approx. 22,000 personnel</td>
<td>Total: approx. 104,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of the end of 2016), etc.
2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

--

In September 2016, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter announced a plan to deploy 60% of the assets of the U.S. Navy and overseas Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as to proceed with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment.