operational needs of the units to the equipment to be procured; (3) Active engagement in new areas (such as further internationalization of defense equipment, investment in cutting edge technology research, etc.); and (4) Simultaneously achieving procurement reform while also maintaining and strengthening the foundations of defense production and technology.

Section 2 Effective Deterrence and Response

In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense architecture. If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold.

Therefore, it is important to ensure information superiority\(^1\) through continuous surveillance over a wide region around Japan during peacetime. If a contingency does arise, ensuring maritime superiority\(^2\) and air superiority\(^3\) in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is important to respond effectively and minimize the damage.

1 To have an advantage over the opponent in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing, and conveying information.
2 Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force.
3 Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of obstruction by the opposing force.

1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The Self-Defense Force (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace during peacetime, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace.

Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan

(1) Basic Concept
The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

(2) Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea during peacetime, using P-3C patrol aircraft and other aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and so forth. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, the SDF maintains a defense and security posture so that it can respond quickly to various contingencies in areas surrounding Japan.

GSDF personnel conducting coast observation  MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance  ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control system aircraft conducting warning and surveillance
Following September 2012 when the Government of Japan acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands, Chinese government vessels have carried out intermittent intrusion into Japan’s territorial water surrounding the Senkaku Islands. In 2015, there were eight confirmed incidents of activities by Chinese Navy vessels including passing through the southwestern islands. In addition to these, a Chinese Navy vessel, which participated in a China-Russia joint exercise, navigated into the Bering Sea for the first time after circling around Japanese archipelago in September 2015. Not only that, a Chinese Navy reconnaissance vessel sailed near the contiguous zone to the south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015 as well as the contiguous zone

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4 Since December 26, 2015, Chinese government vessels equipped with weapons, which appear to be machine guns, have intruded into the territorial waters of Japan.
which is to the south-east of the Bousou Peninsula in December 2015 and February 2016. Furthermore, in June 2016, a Chinese Navy vessel entered the Japan’s contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands. In the same month, a Chinese Navy reconnaissance vessel also sailed within Japan’s territorial water west of Kuchinoerabujima Island (Kagoshima Prefecture) and then entered the Kitadaitojima Island contiguous zone as well as further carried out a round trip in waters south of the Senkaku Islands. It is anticipated that the areas of activity by Chinese government vessels and Navy vessels will continue to further expand and their activities will become more active.

Due to such circumstances, the MOD/SDF is working to strengthen the collaboration with relevant government ministries and agencies, for example by routinely sharing information obtained through warning and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard from peacetime. See>> Fig. III-1-2-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-1-2-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Government Ships)

2 Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

(1) Basic Concept
Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Act. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Response by the MOD/SDF
The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in the Japanese territorial airspace using warning and control radars, the E-767 early-warning and control aircraft, and E-2C early-warning aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them to confirm...
the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that a territorial airspace intrusion occurs, responses such as warning to withdraw will be conducted.

In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsuri-jima, which is part of the Senkaku Islands. In September 2015, an incident occurred in which a Russian aircraft (assumed) intruded into Japanese airspace off the coast of the Nemuro peninsula in Hokkaido. Moreover, during the same year, peculiar incidents occurred such as long-range flights passing through between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima by Chinese military aircraft and long-range flights in Japan’s surrounding airspace. These cases indicate that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China and the Russian Armed Forces have become more active in the area surrounding Japan. In response to these incidents, the ASDF scrambled its fighters, and in FY2015 the ASDF aircraft scrambled 873 times.5

Among these, the number of scrambles against Chinese aircraft counted for 571 times, which was an increase by 107 times in comparison with the previous fiscal year, and marked the highest since 2001, when the breakdown number of scrambles according to the opponents’ nationality and region was published for the first time.

Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD/SDF has been implementing warning and surveillance activities and the like as before in the

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5 Breakdown by nationality and region of aircraft subject to scrambles: Chinese aircraft, approximately 65%; Russian aircraft, approximately 33%; and others, approximately 2%.
East China Sea, including the zone in question, and have continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan. The MOD/SDF also engages in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Act.

See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War); Fig. III-1-2-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded); Fig. III-1-2-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries)

◆ 3 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s Territorial Waters

(1) Basic Concept
With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters, an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters.

See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Response by the MOD/SDF
The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the submarine until it entered the high seas.

In May 2013, March 2014, and February 2016, although there was no intrusion into the territorial waters of Japan, the MSDF P-3C etc. observed submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous water zone. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a posture to appropriately deal with such activities.

◆ 4 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept
The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Response by the MOD/SDF
In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF has strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies by conducting joint exercises with the Japan Coast Guard on a regular basis.

In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following steps: (1) deployment of guided-missile patrol boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells); (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. Furthermore, based on the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels” jointly prepared by the Japan Defense Agency (then) and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF also makes an effort to strengthen cooperation between these two organizations.

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6 The term “territorial waters” also includes inland waters.
7 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations.
8 A non-bursting shell launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on destroyer, the flat front nose of which keeps it from bouncing.
Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands

Basic Concept

Japan has a number of remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, it is important to position units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to detect signs at an early stage through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF in peacetime as well as obtaining and securing maritime and air superiority.

If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and, through the joint operation involving all the SDF forces (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF), deter and remove enemy attacks. If there is an invasion of the islands, the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and other initiatives. Furthermore, a precise response will be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other weapons.

See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-6 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands)

Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, in January 2016, the ASDF newly establish the 9th Air Wing following the completion of the relocation of one fighter squadron at Naha Air Base so that they have two fighter squadrons. The GSDF newly formed the Yonaguni coast observation unit on Yonaguni in March of the same year. Going forward, the GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial responses within the remote islands area in the southwestern region, as well as establishing an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (provisional name)” equipped with a full function for amphibious operations. In addition, the MSDF will acquire helicopters (SH-60K) and other equipment. Through these initiatives, the MOD/SDF will continue persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and develop an immediate response posture in the case of contingencies.

Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Osumi class transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank); overseas research

Fig. III-1-2-6 Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands

| Secure and maintain marine superiority and air superiority |
| Overall air defense |
| Aerial refueling |
| Strategy to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion |
| Landing by air |
| Landing by ship |
| Landing by amphibious vehicle |
| Anti-surface warfare |
| Anti-submarine warfare |
| Close Air Support |
| Aerial refueling |
| Enemy submarines |
| Surface vessels |
| Response to the water |
| Anti-submarine warfare |
| Submarines |
| Strategy to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion |

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to review the role of multipurpose vessels; and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys.

In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT was the best airfield to be used as the deployment site for V-22 Ospreys due to positional relationships with relevant units in joint operations, the length of the runway, and the geographic environment that can reduce burdens borne by the local community. The MOD/SDF hopes to gain understanding from the local community through providing in-depth explanations.\(^9\)

In addition, the SDF conducts various training exercises to improve the joint operation capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also training exercises with the U.S. Forces aimed at establishing mutual coordination procedures. In August 2015, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF participated in a joint exercise held on the western coast of the United States called “Dawn Blitz.” As Japan-U.S. bilateral training exercises overseas (Dawn Blitz 15), they conducted a series of tactical activities related to collaboration with the U.S. Forces, and response to island invasions. The GSDF also annually conducts a field training exercise (Iron Fist) in California with the U.S. Marine Corps. In addition, in July 2015, the GSDF, for the first time, participated in the U.S.-Australia joint exercise (Exercise Talisman Sabre) held in Australia and strives to strengthen amphibious operational capabilities by, for example, carrying out a field training exercise with the U.S. Marines.

### 3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Act in 2005, and in the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).\(^10\) In light of the situation that the North Korea has made further progress in overall ballistic missile development, Japan will accelerate its efforts and review concerning the overall enhancement of its capacity to respond to ballistic missiles, while it

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\(^9\) At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport by FY2019. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from Camp Metabaru are expected to be deployed.

\(^10\) The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
will continue to conduct studies on the United States’ advanced initiatives and equipments.

See>> Reference 44 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)

◆ Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) Basic Concept

Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).\(^\text{11}\)

In case ballistic missiles or other objects\(^\text{12}\) are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan, and the situation is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles with sufficient consideration taken to carrying out prompt and appropriate response and ensuring civilian control.

As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense
are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

See>> Fig. III-1-2-7 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD)

(2) Response by the MOD/SDF

In March 2009, in response to North Korea’s advance notification for an intended launch of an “experimental communication satellite” received through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Minister of Defense issued the “Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles” in accordance with Article 82-3, Paragraph 3 of the SDF Act and deployed destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles to the Sea of Japan and Patriot PAC-3 units in the Tohoku region and the Tokyo Metropolitan area. In addition, in March and December 2012, responding to North Korea’s advance notification for an intended launch of a “satellite,” received through the IMO, the Minister of Defense issued the “Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles” in accordance with Article 82-3, Paragraph 3 of the SDF Act and the MOD/SDF deployed destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles to the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units on the islands of Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area, while simultaneously dispatching the GSDF units to the Southwestern Islands in case any debris were to fall from the sky.

In response to North Korea’s advance notification for an intended launch of an “earth observation satellite” received on February 2, 2016, through the IMO and the International Civil Aeronautics Organization (ICAO), on February 3 the MOD issued the “Order for Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles” in preparation for any unforeseen contingencies. Through this order, the MOD deployed destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles in both the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and the PAC-3 units on Ishigaki Island and Miyakojima as well as within the Tokyo Metropolitan area, while the PAC-3 units deployed on the Okinawa main island maintained their readiness at their own bases. The MOD/SDF also took every necessary measure including dispatching the GSDF units to the Southwestern Islands for collecting damage...
information and consequence management in case any debris were to fall from the sky. With respect to the ballistic missile launch, which was purported to be a “satellite,” on the 7th of the same month, the MOD/SDF transmitted launch information collected from Shared Early Warning (SEW),\(^\text{13}\) the various SDF radar units, and other systems to the Prime Minister’s Office and other agencies, while simultaneously carrying out information gathering to identify any damage caused by this incident. On February 8, the Minister of Defense issued the order to terminate “destruction measures against ballistic measures” in order to promptly withdraw the units. North Korea has conducted ballistic missile launches repeatedly since March of the same year as well. The MOD/SDF continues to conduct thoroughgoing intelligence collection as well as warning and surveillance activities while being alert in order to be able to respond to any situations, whilst closely cooperating with the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Further cooperation with the U.S. government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is necessary for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).

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**Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation**

(1) **Missile Defense of the United States**

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner. Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006, and BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)\(^\text{14}\) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014.

(2) **Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.**

The government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces. Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. Since 2010, BMD exercise has been held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination. In addition, the Japan-U.S.-ROK joint missile defense drill, PACIFIC DRAGON 2016, was conducted in waters off Hawaii in June 2016.

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13 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch. (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996.)

14 One of the U.S. information processing systems for ballistic missiles.
protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks, and it is aimed to be completed by around 2017.

With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011.

The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles.

See>> Reference 68 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

4 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others

In Japan where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. These cases refer to various modes and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated foreign armed agents etc., and sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces, which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan.

Basic Concept

In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can be dealt with by the general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

See>> Fig. III-1-2-8 (Responses to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others)

Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Typical forms of attacks by guerillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries. In the event that an armed attack is carried

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15 This refers to the case where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the further transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA.

16 Refers to persons committing illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant wounding and killing power.
out against Japan by guerrillas or special forces, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF responds with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destroy of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants and necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them.

See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-9 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Forces)

◆ Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assumes primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded. 17

(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives

The GSDF continues to conduct exercises nationwide with the prefectural police of each prefecture and has been strengthening such collaboration by, for example, conducting field exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012. 18 Furthermore, combined exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels are also continuously conducted between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

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17 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000).
18 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents.
19 The GSDF also conducted exercises at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tamari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mirima Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, and at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015.
Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief dispatches and civil protection dispatches.

(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives

The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as well as increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour.

The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security

Basic Approach by the Government

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” and will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including counter-piracy operations, ensuring safe maritime transport and promoting cooperation with other countries by conducting bilateral/multilateral joint exercises related to maritime security. In addition, it is stated that Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities.

The new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was given Cabinet approval in April 2013, states the following:

20 An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.

21 Based on changes in the situation regarding the ocean, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy specifies the following targets for Japan as an oceanic state and has set out initiatives to be pursued intensively: (1) international cooperation and contribution to the international community, (2) wealth and prosperity through ocean development and use, (3) shift from a country protected by the ocean to a country that protects the ocean, and (4) challenge toward unexplored frontiers.
Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Chapter 1 Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan and Effective Deterrence and Handling

The SDF Defends a Remote Island Near the National Border

GSDF Camp Tsushima (Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture),
Colonel Katsuya Mitsuzuka, Commanding Officer of Tsushima Area Security Force and Commander of GSDF Camp Tsushima

Tsushima is an island with its population of approximately 32,000 people located in the area north of Kyushu, which spreads about 80km from north to south, and about 20km from east to west. It can also be described as an island near the national borders in that on a day of clear air we can overlook Busan of the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is located approximately 50km north of the north end of the island.

In Tsushima, three SDF forces are deployed, which are the GSDF Tsushima Area Security Force, the MSDF Tsushima Coastal Defense Group, and the ASDF 19th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron. These three SDF forces carry out their defense missions in Tsushima and its surrounding area such as warning and surveillance in the surrounding waters and airspace on a round-the-clock basis and in responses to frequently occurring disasters, as they mutually and closely collaborate as well as cooperate by regularly conducting trilateral SDF forces meetings and joint exercises.

Partly due to the historical background that the “Sakimori” in ancient Japan (soldiers garrisoned at the border areas), the medieval samurai and the military personnel in the early modern period have been protecting Tsushima together with the islanders, the understanding of the Tsushima islanders including cooperation groups about the SDF activities is high. We also strive to maintain good relationships with them through actively supporting local events and participating in various meetings and competitions. In addition, we deepen exchanges with relevant organizations such as the police and coast guard offices on a regular basis to share information related to the security and safety of the area. In this sense, it is no exaggeration to say that the entire island functions as a “Sakimori of the border.”

We, the three SDF forces, will continue to be aware of our great responsibility of working at the forefront of the border, and will make out best effort in conducting day-to-day training and performing our missions whilst cooperating with the islanders and other relevant organizations.

MOD/SDF promotes various kinds of initiatives such as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing joint training and exercises using a variety of opportunities.

Within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the MSDF has been actively engaged in and cooperating with initiatives such as the establishment of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which was adopted at the 14th meeting in April 2014.

In October of the same year, the sixth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum hosted by the MOD took place and participants agreed to further strengthen cooperation in each field such as discussion of the establishment of a hotline in preparation for unforeseen...
consequences and the promotion of capacity building assistance by the MSDF.

In addition, in relation to China, consultation meetings have been held between the defense authorities of both countries towards the commencement of early implementation of the maritime and air communication mechanism in order to avoid and prevent unexpected situations.

See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-4 (Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security)

6 Responses in Space

For Japan whose defense force is built in line with the basic principles of maintaining and exclusively defense oriented policy, the use of space, which does not belong to any territories of any nations and which is not subject to the constraints of conditions such as the surface of the terrain, is extremely important when: collecting information to perceive signs of various incidents in advance and strengthening the surveillance activities in its surrounding seas and airspace; ensuring means of communication by the SDF in their international peace cooperation activities and other activities.

◆ The Whole-of-Government Approach

The Office of National Space Policy23 established in the Cabinet Office in July 2012 engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to the government’s development and use of space. In light of the environmental changes surrounding space policy and the new security policies stated in the NSS that was approved by the Cabinet in 2013, the Basic Plan on Space Policy was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development established within the Cabinet in January 2015. This Basic Plan was prepared as a 10-year development plan focusing on the next approximately 20 years to improve predictability of industries’ investments, and strengthen the industrial base, and has the following goals: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Promoting the use of space in the civilian sector; and (3) Maintaining and strengthening of space industry and scientific/technological bases.

◆ Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The use of space is extremely important for the MOD/SDF to conduct a range of tasks effectively and efficiently. Thus, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) stipulates that the MOD/SDF ensures the effective and stable use of space by strengthening information collection capabilities using satellites, reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, and enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as Space Situational Awareness (SSA).

In August 2014, the MOD revised the “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space,” which was formulated in 2008, reflecting to the formulation of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and NDPG in 2013. Also, from the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities in Japan and the United States, the two countries established the “Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 and held the first and the second meetings in October 2015 and February 2016, respectively. The SCWG will continue to further promote reviews in broader fields such as: (1) promotion of policy-related consultation regarding space, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation for nurturing and securing experts, (4) implementation of tabletop exercises.

7 Response to Cyber Attacks

Information and communications technology has developed and been rapidly and widely adopted. As a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for socioeconomic activities. On the other hand, there is a possibility that people’s life and

23 In April 2016, the Office of National Space Policy was reorganized to form the National Space Policy Secretariat.
economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks fail. The same is true of both the MOD/SDF. If the critical functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, there is a possibility that problems that threaten the core of Japan’s defense may arise.

With regard to cyber attacks, the number of cases recognized as threats to Japanese governmental organizations and agencies in FY2014 reached approximately 3,990,000, and these threats have become increasingly serious.  

◆ The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other Initiatives

In light of such incidents as the cyber attacks on defense industry companies reported in 2011, the National Information Security Center (NISC) has established the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) to provide agile support, forming partnerships among ministries and agencies.

In order to deal with the increasing threat to cyber security, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic Act was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by clarifying the basic principles of Japan’s cyber security measures and the responsibilities of local governments, as well as by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cyber security.

In response to this, in January 2015, the Cyber Security Strategic Headquarters was established in the Cabinet and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cyber Security (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cyber security-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cyber security incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. Furthermore, in September 2015, the Cyber Security Strategy was formulated for the comprehensive and effective promotion of measures pertaining to cyber security, with the aims: to create and develop free, fair and safe cyber space; to enhance the vitality of the economy and society and realize their sustainable development; to realize society in which citizens can live safely and with peace of mind; to contribute to peace and stability of the international communities as well as the security of Japan.

◆ Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

(1) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach

Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the five government agencies that cooperate particularly closely with the NISC, participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC as well as sending personnel to the CYMAT.

(2) Unique Initiatives by the MOD/SDF

As unique initiatives by the MOD/SDF, the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is monitoring MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock. In addition, the MOD/SDF is engaged in holistic measures including the introduction of intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and communication systems, development of defense systems such as the security and analysis device for cyber defense, enactment of regulations, stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, and improving the human resources and technological bases, as well as conducting research on cutting-edge technology.

The Cyber Policy Review Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, was established in February 2013. The committee is conducting integrated deliberations regarding cooperation with other countries and relevant organizations, training and securing personnel capable of responding to cyber attacks, cooperation with the defense industry, and personnel working at the Cyber Defense Group

25 With the enactment of the Cyber Security Basic Act in January 2015, the name of the organization was changed from the National Information Security Center (NISC) to the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC).
26 There are directives relating to the information assurance of the MOD (MOD Directive No. 160, 2007).
responses to supply chain risks.27

In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command, in order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, and the relevant systems were enhanced and strengthened. In addition, in March 2015, cyber information gathering devices were installed to aid the prevention of attacks by the early detection of cyber attack indications. Going forward, the necessary systems are also scheduled to be developed, such as the development of a cyber training environment in which the SDF units can conduct more practical trainings.

See>> Fig. III-1-2-10 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks)

(3) Cooperation with the United States
Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including joint response, between Japan and its ally the United States is vital, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was set up as a framework between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States. Under this framework, meetings have been held four times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts. In May 2015, a joint declaration on the specific future direction of the cooperation between the two countries was announced.

In addition, through participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding of the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the defense authorities that has been discussed repeatedly since 2002, and dispatching liaison officers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened.

(4) Cooperation with Other Countries etc.
In addition to the IT Forum held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, cyber dialogues are also being held between the authorities of the United Kingdom, NATO, Estonia, the Republic of Korea and others, in order to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country. In April 2015, Japan participated in a cyber defense
exercises and other similar opportunities.

In July 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cyber security. Efforts are being made to improve capacities to counter cyber attacks by the MOD/SDF, and the defense industry, through joint exercise and other initiatives.

8 Response to Large-Scale Disasters

When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods.

Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches

In principle, disaster relief dispatch is conducted as follows; prefectural governors or other officials ask the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc. in the event of natural disaster; and then the minister or the designated officer will conduct the dispatch if it is deemed to be necessary for responding to the disaster. This is because the course of action considered to be most appropriate is that prefectural governors and other officials grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. However, when a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon the request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”

See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-11 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal); Fig. III-1-2-12 (State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard))

Response of the MOD/SDF

(1) Response to Natural Disasters

a. Disaster Dispatch relating to the Support to Re-Searches for Missing Persons on Mount Ontake

With respect to the volcanic eruption occurred on Mount Ontake on September 27, 2014, the SDF, in response to the request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Nagano Prefecture, conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons. On July 3, 2015, responding to the request for disaster relief dispatch relating to support for re-searches from the Governor of Nagano who decided to conduct re-searches for missing persons, the SDF assisted the re-searches of missing persons by airlifting personnel from the police and fire department as well as goods. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 1,160 personnel, 210 vehicles, and 48 aircraft.

b. Disaster Relief Dispatch to the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in September 2015

On September 10, 2015, a heavy rain emergency warning was issued in Ibaraki Prefecture and the overflowing from the Kinugawa River occurred, and flood occurrence information was also issued. Responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Ibaraki Prefecture, the SDF conducted rescue operations of isolated individuals, evacuation assistance using boats, flood control activities using sandbags, water supply activity, bathing assistance, and epidemic control operations. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 7,540 personnel, 2,150 vehicles, 180 boats, and 105 aircraft.

On the same day, a heavy rain emergency warning was issued also in Tochigi Prefecture. Although the warning was withdrawn on the following day, the SDF carried out rescue operations of isolated individuals in
response to the request from the Governor of Tochigi Prefecture for disaster relief dispatch received on the 11th since some areas in Nikko City were isolated by the heavy rain. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 70 personnel, 15 vehicles, and 5 aircraft. Furthermore, another heavy rain emergency warning was issued on the 11th in Miyagi Prefecture. As the heavy rain caused overflowing from part of the Yoshida River and flood occurrence information was also issued. Due to the floodwater, some areas became isolated, and the SDF conducted rescue operations of the isolated individuals responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Miyagi Prefecture. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 190 personnel, 40 vehicles, 7 aircraft, and 37 boats.

c. Disaster Relief Dispatch to Water Supply Assistance in Heavy Snow Conditions

Due to the impact of the record cold wave from January 23 to 25, 2016, water outage occurred throughout Japan. In response to the requests for disaster relief dispatch from the Governors of Shimane, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Saga,
Nagasaki, Oita, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Prefectures, the SDF conducted water supply assistance in 29 cities within the eight prefectures to provide approximately 1,280 tons of water in eight days from January 25 to February 1 of the same year. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 1,860 personnel and 340 vehicles including water trailers.

d. Disaster Relief Dispatch to the Kumamoto Earthquake Disaster in 2016

On April 14, 2016, an earthquake with an epicenter in the Kumamoto region in Kumamoto Prefecture (M6.5) occurred. Responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, the SDF conducted lifesaving operations and livelihood support for the victims (transportation of goods, provision of food and water, bathing assistance, etc.). Moreover, on April 16 of the same year, another earthquake with an epicenter in the Kumamoto region in Kumamoto Prefecture (M7.3) occurred. The SDF, responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Oita Prefecture in addition to that from the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, formed a joint task force with the Commanding General of the Western Army Headquarters as its commander on the same day and carried out lifesaving operations and livelihood support activities by deploying the maximum of nearly 26,000 personnel.

This disaster relief dispatch ended on May 30, 2016, and its scale came to be approximately 814,000 personnel, 2,600 aircraft, and 300 vessels. The SDF carried out in full force the following livelihood support activities for the victims: (1) transportation of goods – 227 places; (2) meal providing assistance – 49 places; (3) water supply assistance – 147 places; (4) bathing assistance – 25 places; (5) medical assistance – 9 places at the maximum.

Considering the fact that the Kumamoto Earthquake caused an enormous damage to the affected areas, Ready Reserve Personnel were gathered for the second time since the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and the maximum of approximately 160 of them engaged in the livelihood assistance activities from April 23 through to May 2. Also from April 23 to May 29, as part of the initiative taken by the government’s Team in Charge of Assisting the Lives of Disaster Victims the private ship, Hakuo, which is on contract to make use of the PFI Act, was used as a refreshment facility for the victims at the Yatsushiro Port in Kumamoto Prefecture, and the services including its use as an accommodation for one night/two days, meals, and bathing were provided for 17 times in total for approximately 2,600 people.

Furthermore, the U.S. Forces in Japan provided the following assistance: (1) transportation of SDF personnel and SDF vehicles to Kumamoto Airport using C-130, (2) transportation of SDF personnel to Kumamoto Airport using UC-35, and (3) transportation of aid goods to the disaster affected areas using the MV-22 Osprey, while the ROK Forces provided instant rice packs, drinking water, blankets and tents using two C-130 aircraft.

### (2) Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2015, out of a total of 541 cases of disaster relief operation dispatch, 419 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases.

In addition, the SDF carries out sea rescues upon requests by the Japan Coast Guard in such occasions as transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range; emergencies of vessels due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing. Furthermore, the SDF conducts wide-area medical transport operations for serious-case patients, by C-130H transport aircraft, utilizing its mobile medical units in certain occasions.

Furthermore, in FY2015, the SDF carried out 61 dispatches of firefighting support, with 55 cases responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities.

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30 See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters)
Additionally, the SDF also conducts aerial firefighting activities in locations such as mountain and forest areas where firefighting conditions are severe.

(3) The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster
In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments, and nuclear operators, and strengthens cooperation with relevant agencies in confirming the effectiveness of local governments’ evacuation plan and in the condition of nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October 2014, five personnel from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet Office as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear disaster response capabilities.

(4) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters
In the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized units in their initial response. By establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD/SDF will ensure that they are able to sustain a well-prepared condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

The MOD/SDF is in the process of formulating various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention plan to respond to such earthquakes.

(5) Exercises Involving the SDF
In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner, the SDF

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**VOICE**

**Disaster Relief Dispatch related to the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in September 2015**

**GSDF Camp Kitausunomiya (Utsunomiya City, Tochigi Prefecture)**

Major (GSDF) Yasunari Matsushita, Leader of the 1st Aviation, 12th Helicopter Unit

I joined the disaster relief dispatch for the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster as an aviation pilot of UH-60JA. On September 10, the day when the disaster occurred, I was given a reconnaissance mission and was heading to the affected area. On the way to the destination, I received an order, “Perform a rescue operation, not a reconnaissance mission,” from our leader who perceived the need for rescue activities.

Actually, when I arrived at the outburst site of the Kinugawa River, there was an unimaginable severe scene unfolding in the area. A man clinging to an electric pole and calling for help was the first thing I saw, followed by a boy waving a yellow towel from the balcony of the first floor of a house with a brown roof. After that, I also confirmed a couple holding a dog on the top of a building, and parents and children who were desperately seeking help from a white two-story house. Each of these cases was an emergency but we had to prioritize them for a rescue operation. So, we focused on one house, which was a brown house and the ground floor part had pillars, which were bent and jiggling, and without hesitation, we decided to rescue the people in that house first. While considering the possibility that the house might be washed away whilst rescuing and shouldering the pressure that we should never cause an aviation accident, we managed to successfully rescue a family of four including the boy above from the house immediately before it was swept up by the water, based on the sense of responsibility that “we the SDF is the last resort” as the driving force. Following this, we rescued the remaining people who required our help.

I believe that our success in protecting the lives of the people in this country resulted from the right judgment at the scene of the disaster and also from the fact that all of the crews bravely made efforts to perform the rescue mission working together. This made me realize that the steady training in our daily life would inevitably pay off. At the same time, this came as a fresh reminder of the necessity of readiness and training in preparation for various events and situations.
carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese government or local government and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments.

a. Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)
From June to July 2015, the SDF conducted a command post exercise and a field training exercise in preparation for the predicted Tokyo Inland Earthquake to enhance the SDF’s earthquake response capability. At the same time, the exercise aimed to strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation through the participation of all the military services of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

b. Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces (TREX – Tomodachi Rescue Exercise)
In June, 2015, the SDF conducted a field training exercise in preparation for the predicted earthquake along the Nankai trough, and worked to enhance their earthquake response capability by practicing cooperation procedures among the SDF, the U.S. Forces in Japan and organizations relevant to disaster prevention, etc. This exercise was implemented in conjunction with a general disaster prevention training hosted by Kochi Prefecture, while it was also intended to strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation through the first ever participation of the U.S. Army Japan in the training.

c. Other
The SDF worked to enhance their earthquake response capability, for example, by conducting the Nankai Rescue 27, an exercise in preparation for the predicted earthquake along the Nankai trough earthquake along the Japan and Chishima Trench implemented by the GSDF Middle Army in July 2015, and the Northern Rescue 2015, an exercise in preparation for the predicted implemented by the GSDF Northern Army in August of the same year.

(6) Coordination with Local Governments
It is also important for the SDF to strengthen coordination with local governments form peacetime for the purpose of smooth disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including:
(1) Establishment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices;
(2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and
(3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments. As of the end of March 2016, as many as 372 retired SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and other sections in 249 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening coordination between the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was confirmed through the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake. In particular, each GSDF regional Army
The SDF regulates the transport of Japanese nationals overseas and other people overseas on request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article 84 (4) of the SDF Law (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.). In such cases, the transport of Japanese nationals and other parties in the country concerned, and safely guide them to aircraft, ships, or vehicles, and safely transport them. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating a helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch.

Since the transport of Japanese nationals overseas establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other officials from local governments and exchange information and opinions to strengthen coordination with those local governments.

See Reference 22 (Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government)

In the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order SDF units to transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article 84 (4) of the SDF Law (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.). In such cases, the SDF will protect the Japanese nationals and other parties in the country concerned, and safely guide them to aircraft, ships, or vehicles, and safely transport them. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating a helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch.

Since the transport of Japanese nationals overseas
requires close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, joint exercises are carried out under normal circumstances. In the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand, in February 2015, the MOD participated in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, and others, together with the staff of the embassy and their family members, and conducted the first ever overseas ground transport exercise. In addition, in February 2016, a destroyer (including a ship-based aircraft) participated in this joint exercise for the first time, while an SD vehicle (a high mobility vehicle) was brought in and used in the training of land transport by vehicles.

With respect to the Terrorist Attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, a government aircraft was sent from the ASDF Special Aircraft Group (belong to the Chitose Air Base) to Dhaka in Bangladesh for the purpose of transporting Japanese victims and others involved based on Article 84-4 of the SDF Act (Transportation of Japanese nationals staying abroad) and the bodies of Japanese victims (seven nationals) and their families were transported to Japan. In relation to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft (C-130H) were sent to transport the embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti.

With regard to the protection of Japanese nationals in emergency situation in foreign countries, a provision pertaining to the protection measures of Japanese nationals overseas was added to the Legislation for Peace and Security enacted in September 2015.

The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained.

In case Japan faces a full-scale invasion, the SDF will respond to the situation in an aligned and systematic manner based on their integrated operations. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

Operations for aerial defense can be categorized into comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops. Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult.

If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is island country aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory.

Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the
Fig. III-1-2-14 Example of Air Defense Operations

Notes: 1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments
2. Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft

Fig. III-1-2-15 Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan
invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

See>> Fig. III-1-2-15 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan)

3 Operations Protecting the Land

In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

See>> Fig. III-1-2-16 (Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces)

4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan.

As such, in operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF combines various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol, defend SDF ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes to directly defend Japanese ships etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is provided as required.

33 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

34 Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.
11 Response to Other Events

◆ Response to Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security

In the event of situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, the MOD/SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support activities and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Law Concerning the Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and the Ship Inspection Operations Law.

See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Outline of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security)

◆ Military Intelligence Collection

For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for effective operation of defense capabilities in dealing with various contingencies, it is necessary to grasp the long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the signs of those situations at an early stage. For this reason, the MOD/SDF always makes efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately using various methods.

Some examples of intelligence collection methods used by the MOD/SDF includes: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing signals detected from military communications and electronic weapons, in the air over Japanese territory; (2) collecting, interpreting, and analyzing data from various imaging satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite); (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other vehicles; (4) collecting and organizing intelligence data from other sources.

35 Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) is operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the image intelligence provided by the IGS.

Commentary

GSDF Joint Exercises and Training for Effective Deterrence and Responses

The first joint exercise conducted by the GSDF was the joint communication training joint command and post exercise with the U.S. Armed Forces at the Higashifuji Training Area (Shizuoka Prefecture) in 1981. Since then, with the aim to maintain and enhance the Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities in the event of an invasion of Japan, both “field training exercises with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army” and “the Japan-U.S. joint army corps command and post exercise” have been continuously conducted. In recent years, considering the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, landing drills for remote island defense, such as Iron Fist and Dawn Blitz, and air borne operation exercises such as Arctic Aurora have been conducted to enrich the Japan-U.S. joint exercises in order to improve the interoperability with the U.S. Armed Forces as well as the tactical skills of Japan and the United States respectively in any circumstances. In addition, the JGSDF also participates in the Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise Southern Jackaroo for enhancing the tactical skills of their personnel and forces, the multinational joint exercise Cobra Gold for enhancing capabilities such as non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), and other joint exercises. This way, in addition to bilateral exercises between Japan and the United States, the GSDF aims to enhance and expand the contents with respect to multilateral exercises involving Australia and ASEAN countries.

In combination with multilateral joint exercises such as the Pacific Partnership and Kahn Quest, which focus on the non-traditional security areas such as international peacekeeping activities and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief activities, we believe that these exercises and training will enhance our deterrence and response capabilities, which will eventually contribute to the peace and stability of Japan, its surrounding areas and the international community.

Opening ceremony of the Japan-U.S. joint exercise, Yama Sakura 69 (YS-69)

Combat shooting training in the exercise Southern Jackaroo.
a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by Defense Attachés and other officials.

As the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, the strengthening of information capabilities is considered to be an increasingly important issue. For this reason, the MOD is currently promoting comprehensive enhancement of its information capabilities at all stages, including gathering, analyzing, sharing, and securing intelligence. Specifically, the MOD is going to implement the high-level use of geospatial data such as by integrating various information to visualize the situation, securing highly competent analysts by integrating and strengthening educational curricula, and strengthening the dispatch system of Defense Attachés through their dispatch to the Middle East.

Three Personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Accredited as Defense Attachés to India

Colonel (GSDF) Yoshifumi Inoue, Defense Attaché to the Japanese Embassy in India

The Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges have achieved a remarkable development, and are still growing through high-level mutual visits such as defense ministerial meetings; defense policy dialogues; regular participation of the MSDF in the bilateral naval exercise Malabar; Japan-India bilateral naval joint exercises; mutual dispatch of vessels to naval reviews; cooperation and exchanges between the GSDF and the Indian Army in United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. During the previous fiscal year, both countries started to exchange test pilots and airlift units between the ASDF and the Indian Air Force, and their defense cooperation and exchanges are progressively moving forward even at both unit and personnel levels.

There used to be only one defense attaché, who was from the GSDF, but responding to the expansion of defense cooperation and exchanges, another two defense attachés were dispatched from the MSDF and the ASDF in 2014 and 2015 respectively to make it a three defense attachés formation involving personnel from all of the SDF branches.

As a defense attaché at a site of defense cooperation and exchanges, I feel on a day-to-day basis the excellence of the Indian Armed Forces, which are proud to be defending their democratic country, and a further possibility of the Japan-India defense cooperation. In December 2015, the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Agreement and the General Security of Military Information Agreement were signed between Japan and India. Currently, the two countries are engaging in an ongoing consultation to realize the relocation of US-2 rescue aircraft to India. If this relocation is realized, it will open up a new horizon to the Japan-India relationship. Three defense attachés from each SDF service are going to cooperate with each other and strive to further strengthen the Japan-India defense cooperation relationship.