Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology and also contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War.

Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, (third stage) in May 2006.

Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009.

At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint ISR activities.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

The major accomplishments at the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 are as follows:

(1) Agreed to complete work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines before the end of 2014

(2) Agreed to further expand and deepen bilateral cooperation in security and defense, including cyberspace and outer space, and strengthen cooperation in the region, including trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia as well as among Japan, the United States and the ROK.

(3) Regarding the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, Japan and the United States renewed their strong determination to complete the relocation
**Fig. II-4-3-1** Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>The treaty enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Okinawa is returned to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Okinawa is returned to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>SACO Final Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. joint consultation (after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>New security environment and the establishment of the new guidelines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. II-4-3-2** Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultation</th>
<th>Stages of Japan-U.S. Consultations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>First stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>Second stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Third stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 4** Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, and agreed to continue to consult on other possible measures while implementing the previous agreements as early as possible and steadily from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

The “2+2” Meeting, held in the milestone year marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, took place ahead of the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. The major accomplishments of the “2+2” Meeting are as follows:

1. Under the U.S. policy of rebalance and Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” the Ministers reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to maintaining the security of Japan as well as the peace and security of the international community and also reconfirmed the U.S. commitment to the Senkaku Islands under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

2. The Ministers approved the new Guidelines, and confirmed their intent to enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities under the new Guidelines.

3. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress in initiatives for bilateral security and defense cooperation to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities.

4. The Ministers underscored the recent progress in regional and international cooperation.

5. The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

For the content of the new Guidelines, see Part III, Chapter 4, Section 2-2 (Content of the New Guidelines).

See>> Reference 29 (United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation); Reference 30 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)); Reference 27 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015)); Reference 28 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)); Fig. II-4-3-1 (Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States); Fig. II-4-3-2 (Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations)

2 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

Various Policy Consultations

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit-level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Asia-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

In addition, the MOD organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives.
Fig. II-4-3-3 Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (<em>2+2 Meeting</em>)</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security</td>
<td>Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Subcommittee (SSC)</td>
<td>Participants are not specified</td>
<td>Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
<td>Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)*</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
<td>Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. Joint Committee</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
<td>Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.

See>> Reference 31 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2013); Fig. II-4-3-3 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues)

Recent Major Policy Consultations, etc


Minister of Defense Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter took the opportunity of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

a. Overview and Regional Situation

The Ministers exchanged views on the increasingly severe security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers agreed that they oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea and also confirmed that Japan and the United States will conduct maritime activities in accordance with international law. Defense Minister Nakatani expressed his support for the operations of the U.S. Forces in the South China Sea, and the Ministers agreed to explore joint exercises and efforts to further strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian nations in areas such as capacity building and maritime security. In light of North Korea’s stance of continuing with activities to launch extended range ballistic missiles, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate on the matter. Furthermore, the Ministers agreed to enhance trilateral defense cooperation with countries including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, India, and the Philippines in the future.

b. Legislation for Peace and Security and Efforts to Ensure the Effectiveness of the New Guidelines

Defense Minister Nakatani explained that the Legislation for Peace and Security was enacted recently and stated that Japan intends to further enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities under this legislation. Secretary Carter, for his part, stated that the United States supports and welcomes the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security.

The Ministers welcomed the establishment of the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) as an important step in efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. The Ministers confirmed that they would continue to steadily undertake efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, including the enhancement of cooperation in outer space and cyberspace.

c. Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

Defense Minister Nakatani explained that Japan has been making utmost efforts to realize the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab as soon as possible. The Ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of
MCAS Futenma. Defense Minister Nakatani explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa, including the implementation of such measures as the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of training to locations outside of Okinawa, and sought cooperation from the United States. Secretary Carter stated that the United States would continue to cooperate.

In addition, Defense Minister Nakatani requested U.S. cooperation in minimizing the impact of the operations of the U.S. Forces on the local community and the U.S. Forces’ extra consideration for safety. In response, Secretary Carter stated that the United States would constantly seek to ensure the maximum safety of the local community and U.S. Forces personnel.

d. Host Nation Support (HNS)
The Ministers agreed that both the Japanese and U.S. governments would continue to hold consultations and to make efforts to reach an early agreement.

e. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
In light of the establishment of the Acquisition Technology & Logistics Agency, the Ministers agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology. The Ministers also confirmed that the recent decision of the U.S. Government concerning maintenance of U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys would lead to the reinforcement of the basis for repair and maintenance of common equipment, which is set forth in the new Guidelines.

(2) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (November 19, 2015)
Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Obama during his visit to Manila. An outline of their discussions on security issues is as follows:

a. Opening Remarks
Prime Minister Abe stated that he affirmed the robust Japan-U.S. relations during his visit to the United States in April. Prime Minister Abe also mentioned the collaboration of Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace and the United States’ rebalance policy, and stated that he intends to make this meeting a prelude to a new phase of Japan-U.S. cooperation that utilizes the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance to realize peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the international community.

President Obama, for his part, stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of the security of the United States. President Obama offered his congratulations on the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, stating that the Legislation would help enhance Japan’s defense capabilities and enabled Japan and the United States to further broaden their collaboration in the Asia-Pacific region as well as in the world.

b. Japan-U.S. relations
(a) Overview
Prime Minister Abe stated that in further advancing Japan-U.S. cooperation, collaboration with countries that share the fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, is essential, and he intends, together with the United States, to build a network to realize peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the linchpin.

President Obama responded by pointing out that the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security is a historic achievement, and that Japan and the United States need to work together in order to establish the rule of law and international norm—including the Law of the Sea—in the region. President Obama then stated that he supports Prime Minister Abe’s idea of building the network.

(b) Japan-U.S. Security
Prime Minister Abe stated that he intends to crystallize Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the new Guidelines, advance with strong determination the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, which he described as the only solution, and work together on mitigating the impact on Okinawa for the purpose of the stable presence of the U.S. Forces.

In response, President Obama expressed his gratitude to Prime Minister Abe for his efforts on the relocation of MCAS Futenma, and stated that the United States will also cooperate to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. President Obama also commented on the revision of the Agreement on Host Nation Support (HNS), and Prime Minister Abe responded by stating that Japan intends to continue discussions in order to make the new HNS agreement appropriate.

c. Situations in East Asia
President Obama stated that he was encouraged by the discussions between Japan and China and the ROK, and the United States extends its support. In response, Prime Minister Abe expressed his gratitude.

(a) China
Prime Minister Abe stated that he will continue to promote the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” and mentioned that in the East China Sea, intrusions into Japan’s territorial sea by Chinese vessels and unilateral resource development are continuing, and incidents have occurred in which Chinese naval vessels approached the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, adding that he is concerned about further escalation.

President Obama stated that regarding cyber issues, the United States and China agreed not to engage in cyber theft in commercial relationships, but added that implementation is important.
(b) South China Sea
Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan supports the “Freedom of Navigation” operations by the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea, and he explained Japan’s existing stance regarding the activities of the Self-Defense Forces in the South China Sea, stating that such activities will be examined while taking into consideration the impact the situation in the South China Sea will have on the security of Japan. Prime Minister Abe added that Japan will provide support to relevant countries through a combination of ODA, capacity-building support by the Self-Defense Forces, and defense equipment cooperation. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe stated that he opposes any unilateral action that would change the status quo and heighten tensions. In response, President Obama commented that the United States will continue implementing the “Freedom of Navigation” operations routinely.

(c) Republic of Korea
Prime Minister Abe explained that in the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting, he engaged in a frank and constructive exchange of opinions with President Park Geun-hye, and commented that the ROK is Japan’s most important partner in building cooperative relationships in the region, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the linchpin. President Obama responded that he strongly supports Prime Minister Abe’s dialogues with President Park Geun-hye.

(d) North Korea
Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan-U.S. and Japan-ROK security cooperation is important given North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues, and it is also important for the security of Japan. Prime Minister Abe also mentioned that he would strengthen Japan-U.S. and Japan-ROK cooperation, and strongly urge North Korea to refrain from acts of provocation, and that Japan hopes to receive continued understanding and cooperation from the United States regarding the abductions issue. President Obama stated that Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation is essential in the context of addressing the issues regarding North Korea.

d. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in the Region
Prime Minister Abe stated that collaboration with ASEAN is essential and relations with Australia and India are strategically important, adding that he intends to further deepen Japan-U.S.-India collaboration. Prime Minister Abe also commented that Japan intends to collaborate with the United States in order to strengthen the mechanisms of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and to make the EAS the region’s premier forum in both name and reality.

President Obama stated that he supports and will cooperate with Prime Minister Abe’s idea of building networks in the region with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the linchpin, in order to realize peace and prosperity, and that he intends to advance discussions regarding cooperation with ASEAN as well. President Obama added that he also supports the idea of moving forward with strategic dialogues with India and Australia.

e. Syria
Prime Minister Abe commented that resolving the crisis in Syria is important from the viewpoint of counterterrorism as well and that he has a strong interest in the political process for peace and would like to actively contribute to it, including in the field of humanitarian assistance. In response, President Obama stated that the process has developed regarding Syria, but more efforts are still needed in order to resolve the crisis.

f. Cooperation in the International Arena

(a) Cyberspace
President Obama stated that cyber issues were included in the G20 Leaders’ Communique and he intends to continue promoting cyber norms. In response, Prime Minister Abe commented that addressing cyber attacks is an important issue in terms of national security and crisis management, and he intends to continue cooperating closely with the United States and deliver strong messages through various opportunities.

(b) Nuclear Security Summit
President Obama stated that 2016 will be the last year of the Nuclear Security Summit, that Japan has continued to be an excellent partner throughout the summit, and that he intends to cooperate with Prime Minister Abe in order to achieve results. In response, Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan intends to cooperate closely with the United States.

(3) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 1, 2016)
Prime Minister Abe held the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Obama during his visit to Washington, D.C.

In connection with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, concerning the lawsuits on the Henoko landfill permit, Prime Minister Abe explained that Japan’s position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and he has decided to accept a court-suggested settlement under the philosophy of “haste makes waste.” Prime Minister Abe also stated that he would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and would like to continue joint efforts with the United States to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

In response, President Obama stated that he understands the court-suggested settlement on the
relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe’s strategic decision, and said that the United States would like to continue its own efforts through close cooperation with Japan.

(4) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (May 25, 2016)
Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Obama, who was visiting Japan for the G7 Ise-Shima Summit. An outline of their discussions on security issues is as follows:

a. Small Group Meeting
(a) At the small meeting, the entire time was spent discussing the incident that occurred in Okinawa in April 2016. Prime Minister Abe stated to President Obama that: (1) he felt strong indignation over the incident, which was a self-centered and absolutely despicable crime, and lodged a strong protest as Prime Minister of Japan; (2) the incident caused a huge shock not only to Okinawa but to the entire nation, and he hoped President Obama would take these feelings of Japanese citizens seriously; (3) he has a responsibility to protect the lives and property of Japanese citizens; and (4) he seeks strict actions, including the full implementation of effective measures to prevent recurrences.
(b) In response, President Obama stated that: (1) he expresses his sincerest condolences and deepest regrets and profoundly understands his responsibility concerning the crime committed by a person related to the U.S. Forces; and (2) the United States will cooperate fully with Japan’s investigation, and will spare no effort to cooperate in every way to achieve justice.
(c) The two leaders shared the view that Japan and the United States would hold thorough consultations in order to pursue effective measures to prevent recurrence, and Japan and the United States would work together to regain the lost confidence and would make every effort to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

b. Expanded Meeting
(a) Opening Remarks
At the beginning of the expanded meeting, Prime Minister Abe expressed his sincere gratitude for the heartfelt sympathy from the United States and prompt and powerful assistance in response to the Kumamoto Earthquake. Prime Minister Abe also sincerely welcomed President Obama’s historic decision to visit Hiroshima, and the two leaders shared their intention to deliver a powerful message on a world free of nuclear weapons.
(b) North Korea
Prime Minister Abe stated that it was important for the G7 to issue a clear message that it could not tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea becoming established as a fait accompli, and the two leaders once again shared the recognition that coordination between Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea was important. With regard to the abduction issue, Prime Minister Abe expressed his gratitude for U.S. cooperation, and stated that Japan would like to seek the continued understanding and cooperation of the United States.

(c) East Asia Situation
Prime Minister Abe stated that he hoped to further strengthen the network of peace and prosperity that was founded on the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and expressed the view that strengthening cooperation with ASEAN members such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which President Obama just visited, was a pressing issue. Regarding the importance of the rule of law at sea, the two leaders confirmed that Japan and the United States will solidly fulfill their roles within the international community.

(5) U.S. President Obama’s Visit to Hiroshima (May 27, 2016)
President Obama, who visited Japan to attend the G7 Ise-Shima Summit, paid a visit to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, the first such visit by an incumbent U.S. President, together with Prime Minister Abe. The two leaders also visited Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, laid wreaths at the Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims and delivered their respective statements, and President Obama then exchanged words with atomic bomb survivors. Later, the two leaders visited the Atomic Bomb Dome.

President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was an extremely important historical event in terms of commemorating the war dead and revitalizing international momentum for realizing a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the visit symbolized the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, an “Alliance of Hope,” which has been built up over the more than 70 years since the war.

(6) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (June 4, 2016)
Minister of Defense Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter took the opportunity of the Shangri-La Dialogue to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore.

a. Arrest of a member of the civilian component in Okinawa
Prime Minister Abe and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter confirmed their intent to continue to work closely together to devise a set of effective prevention measures against similar incidents and accidents. The Ministers shared an understanding that these measures would include: (1) review SOFA implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component; (2) strengthen monitoring of U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component; and (3) enhance education and training of
U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component. Sharing a sense of urgency, Minister Nakatani and Secretary Carter confirmed their intent to accelerate work at the highest levels of the defense and foreign policy authorities of both countries and to develop these measures at the earliest possible occasion.

b. Regional Situations

The Ministers agreed that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They also agreed that the building of outposts and the use of these outposts for military purposes in the South China Sea in particular are unilateral actions that increase tensions in the region and are a source of concern for the international community. The Ministers pledged to continue to conduct joint exercises in the South China Sea as well as to further strengthen bilateral coordination in cooperating with Southeast Asian nations in areas such as support for capacity building and maritime security, increasing the presence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in this maritime area. In light of North Korea’s stance of continuing its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, the Ministers agreed to maintain close cooperation, including the utilization of the ACM. Furthermore, Minister Nakatani and Secretary Carter affirmed their intention to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea, among Japan, the United States and Australia, and among Japan, the United States and India.

c. Peace and Security Legislation and the Initiatives to Ensure the Effectiveness of New Guidelines

Minister Nakatani explained that the Legislation for Peace and Security was recently enforced and that the Government of Japan is proceeding with the preparations to carry out the new missions. Secretary Carter welcomed these efforts by Japan and expressed his support for them. The Ministers also confirmed that the ACM is functioning effectively in dealing with a spate of provocative acts by North Korea and the earthquakes in Kumamoto Prefecture, and agreed to further enhance the ACM. Furthermore, the Ministers affirmed their intent to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security and to continue efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines.

d. Defense Equipment and Technical Cooperation

The Ministers welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP-MOU), and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology based on the RDP-MOU. Minister Nakatani explained Japan’s plan to realize concrete cooperative efforts, such as the transfer of MSDF trainer aircraft TC-90s to the Philippines to enhance the capabilities for maritime security. Secretary Carter welcomed those initiatives, and stated his hope for close bilateral coordination between Japan and the United States in capacity building support and defense equipment cooperation with the Philippines.

In addition, the Ministers confirmed that the MOD and the DOD will discuss defense and technical strategies, including the DOD’s Third Offset Strategy, looking towards the future security environment.

e. USFJ Realignment, etc.

Minister Nakatani explained the recent court-mediated settlement of lawsuits over the landfill approval off Henoko, and stated that the Government of Japan’s position remains unchanged that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko is the only solution that allows the return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Secretary Carter stated that he appreciates the Government of Japan’s position and that the United States will maintain close cooperation with Japan in implementing the shared plans for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan. Minister Nakatani asked for U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including training relocation to locations outside of Okinawa Prefecture. Secretary Carter stated that the United States will continue to cooperate with Japan. The Ministers agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as over a half of the Northern Training Area.

---

1 The official title is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement. The Memorandum is designed to promote measures based on the principle of reciprocity (the provision of information to companies of the partner country necessary for making bids, safeguarding of corporate information submitted and exemption of companies of the partner country from restrictions on entry, etc.) with regard to the procurement of defense equipment by the defense authorities of Japan and the United States.
3 Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance

The new Guidelines define that the two countries will work on a variety of measures, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, and joint training and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to cooperate for Space and Cyberspace Cooperation which are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense equipment and technology cooperation for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. Many of these items are incorporated into the National Defense Program Guidelines to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas.” For the content of the new Guidelines, see Part II, Chapter 4, Section 2-2 (Content of the New Guidelines).


Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance

(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism
In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. governments established the ACM in order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.

Based on the framework shown in Fig. II-4-3-5, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for regional and global cooperation; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

See>> Fig. II-4-3-4 (The Situation Where the Alliance Coordination Mechanism Is Utilized (Image)); Fig. II-4-3-5 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM))

(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination
Based on the new Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism
Based on the new Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the new Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies related to Japan’s peace and security.

Fig. II-4-3-4 The Situation Where the Alliance Coordination Mechanism Is Utilized (Image)
The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)

Joint Committee (JC)
- Japan Side: Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Representative)
- U.S. Side: Deputy Commander of USFJ (Representative)

Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)
- Director General-level: Japan Side: Representatives from Cabinet Secretariat (including National Security Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies*
  *Representatives may participate as needed

- Director-level: Japan Side: Representatives from Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces, and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies
  U.S. Side: Representatives from National Security Council, Department of State, American Embassy in Japan, Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies

- Action Officer level: Japan Side: Representatives from Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces, and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies
  U.S. Side: Representatives from National Security Council, Department of State, American Embassy in Japan, Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies

- Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces
- To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.

Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)
- Japan Side: Representatives from each component of SDF
- U.S. Side: Representatives from each component of U.S. Armed Forces

Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)
- Japan Side: Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service
- U.S. Side: Representatives from USPACOM and USFJ

Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces

The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)

Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2”
- Foreign Minister
- Defense Minister
- State Secretary
- Defense Secretary

Sub Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)
- Japan: DG, North American Affairs Bureau, MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD, Joint Staff
- U.S.: Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, PACOM

Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC, advise SCC throughout the bilateral planning, coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters

Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)
- Japan: Representatives of JSDF
- U.S.: Representatives of PACOM, USFJ

Conduct Bilateral Planning

Interagency Coordination as necessary

Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF)
- Japan: Representatives of Cabinet Secretariat, NSS, MOFA, MOD
- U.S.: Representatives of U.S. Embassy JP, PACOM, USFJ

Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by RMAs, provision of additional information etc.
In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism.

See Fig. II-4-3-6 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM))

Cooperative Measures to Seamlessly Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security

1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

With regard to joint ISR activities, from the perspective that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries, the two countries set up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013 consisting of director-level defense officials from Japan and the United States, which is further deepening the cooperation between the two countries.

The expansion of these ISR activities will function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

(2) Missile Defense

Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, bilateral response capabilities have improved, through such measures as operational information sharing and the establishment of the guidelines for responding to an attack. Accordingly, Japan and the United States closely cooperated and coordinated in responding to the missile launches carried out by North Korea respectively in April 2009, and April and December 2012, and also coordinated their responses to the launch of a ballistic missile, which was purported to be an “artificial satellite,” by North Korea in February 2016 by utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress.

(3) Maritime Security

The new Guidelines will allow Japan and the United States to develop and enhance the sharing of maritime surveillance information from peacetime and to cooperate where appropriate for the maintenance and enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United States through ISR as well as training and exercises. The Maritime Self-Defense Force and the United States Navy plan to maintain and enhance both countries’ presence in the Western Pacific through multiple joint training and exercises.

(4) Joint Training and Exercises

Joint training and exercises in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities by improving interoperability through the deepening of mutual understanding of tactics and other aspects and the enhancement of mutual communication, but also are useful in improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities. In addition, holding bilateral exercises at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises.

Joint training and exercises have been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units, including field training exercises.
with the U.S. Army (Arctic Aurora) conducted in the U.S. State of Alaska from August 2015, and continuous efforts are being made to improve interoperability and bilateral response capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including participation in such exercises as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training.

Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise, and command post exercises were carried out in January 2016. In recent years, U.S. Forces Japan have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments.

See>> Reference 32 (Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2015)

(5) Logistics support

Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistical support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, U.N. peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.

In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, the two countries confirmed that they will expeditiously work on negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. The negotiations are currently underway between the two countries.

See>> Fig. II-4-3-7 (Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA))

(6) Joint/Shared Use

The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number

---

2 The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America

3 The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations) (Provision of weapons is not included).
of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint exercises and interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in the case of a disaster.

Thus, while taking the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities into account, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, in December 2013 and between June and July 2014, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.

Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through “Operation Tomodachi” was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. “Operation Tomodachi” involved the deployment of a large-scale force at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft, resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for the U.S. Forces in Japan.

On the other hand, some issues have emerged, such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism.

In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan and the two countries conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster
prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014 based on the scenario of the occurrence of an earthquake in the Nankai Trough. The U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) also participated in the Wakayama Prefecture Japan Disaster Readiness Practical Training (October 2014) and “Michinoku ALERT 2014” (November 2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Northeastern Army. This shows how the SDF and USFJ have been enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness at home and abroad.

In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in April 2016, cases of Japan-U.S. cooperation included the transportation of daily necessities by the MV-22 Osprey aircraft and the transportation of SDF personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. In this instance, the ACM was utilized, including the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Office locally established by the joint task force organized for the earthquake response.

Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

(1) Cooperation in International Activities

The SDF is conducting activities in close cooperation with the United States and other participating countries through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, international disaster relief activities and international peacekeeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan and the United States worked closely together at local multilateral coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond to the outbreak of Ebola virus disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison officers to the U.S. Africa Command in October 2014 for close cooperation, coordinating efforts and collecting information with related countries including the United States.

As for maritime security, both Japan and the United States are making efforts as maritime nations to maintain and develop “the open and stable ocean” based on fundamental rules such as the freedom of navigation, ensured safety, and the rule of law (e.g. peaceful dispute resolution based on international laws). The two countries have been working closely together on various multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives supported by such countries as those around sea lanes, including participation in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 for responding to pirates since July 2013, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Training hosted by the United States in August 2014, the International Minesweeping Exercise in the Persian Gulf hosted by the United States from October 2014, and the PSI Maritime Interdiction Training hosted by New Zealand in November 2015.

(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises

The new Guidelines will enable Japan and the United States to promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating in trilateral (e.g. Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States.

Cooperation on Space and Cyberspace

(1) Cooperation on Space

With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in areas of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of-government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis.

Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG held its first meeting in October 2015 and its second meeting in February 2016. Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to develop and secure experts, and (4) implementing tabletop exercises.

(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace

Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the
MOD and DoD to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation.

The new Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate development of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the United States Armed Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited. Going forward, Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the new Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement.

### 6. Initiatives for Further Enhancing the Effectiveness of Cooperation

#### (1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and production bases and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America. In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums.

#### (2) Education and Research Exchange

The new Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual cooperation relating to security and defense, and the two governments will deepen exchanges between members of relevant organizations, and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. To this end, the MOD/SDF has been working on education and research exchanges by accepting students from abroad and holding Japan-U.S. bilateral or multilateral seminars that include the United States so that security and defense personnel can share knowledge and enhance cooperation.

---

4 The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

5 The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

6 The GSDF plans to deploy 17 tiltrotors (V-22 Osprey), which are expected to supplement and enhance the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA), in order to respond to attacks on islands.