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### Defense Chronology

#### July-December 2014

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<th>Cabinet decision on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People”</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>Jun 1</td>
<td>Commencement of construction of the airfield and the Futenma Replacement Facility in the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project</td>
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<td>Jul.</td>
<td>Jun 7</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Auckland)</td>
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<td>Japan-Australia summit meeting (Canberra)</td>
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<td>Jul 29</td>
<td>Japan-France Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Aug 1</td>
<td>Entry into force of the partial revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (the authorized number of posts for uniformed SDF personnel in internal subdivisions fixed, organization of the Tactical Fighter Training Group, etc.)</td>
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<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Aug 14</td>
<td>Commencement of offshore work (boring survey) for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project</td>
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<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>Dispatch of disaster relief units on a lifesaving mission in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11)</td>
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<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Aug 26</td>
<td>Completion of the relocation of KC-130 of the U.S. Armed Forces from Futenma to Iwakuni</td>
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<td>Sep.</td>
<td>Sep 1</td>
<td>Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Sep 27</td>
<td>Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to the volcanic eruption of Mount Ontake (through October 16)</td>
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<td>Return of part of the land of Sagami General Depot (Approximately 17ha)</td>
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<td>Oct.</td>
<td>Oct 7</td>
<td>Sixth Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Forum (Nikohama)</td>
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<td>Oct.</td>
<td>Oct 28</td>
<td>Japan-Finland Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Oct 29</td>
<td>Japan-RDK Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Seoul)</td>
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<td>Nov 4</td>
<td>Japan-Spain Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Nov.</td>
<td>Nov 19</td>
<td>First Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable (Bagan)</td>
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<td>Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to an earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture</td>
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<td>Transportation of supplies necessary for international disaster relief activities to respond to the Ebola hemorrhagic fever epidemic in Western Africa (Republic of Ghana, through Dec. 11)</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
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<td>First dispatch of SDF personnel to NATO</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
<td>Dec 6</td>
<td>Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to heavy snow in Takushima Prefecture (through December 11)</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
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<td>Joint announcement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2)</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
<td>Dec 26</td>
<td>Completion of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces TPY-2 Radar (so-called X-band Radar) at Kiyosaki</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
<td>Dec 31</td>
<td>International disaster relief activities for the missing AirAsia plane (through January 11, 2015)</td>
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#### January-May 2015

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<th>Jan.</th>
<th>Jan 12</th>
<th>Fourth joint working group talks between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities on “Marine and Air Communications Mechanism” (Tokyo)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>Jan 15</td>
<td>Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to avian influenza (Okayama Prefecture; January 15 through January 19, Saga Prefecture; January 18 through January 20)</td>
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<td>Jan.</td>
<td>Jan 18</td>
<td>Visit by Defense Minister Nakatani to Djibouti</td>
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<td>Jan.</td>
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<td>Visit by Defense Minister Nakatani to South Sudan</td>
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<td>Jan.</td>
<td>Jan 29</td>
<td>Japan-Philippines Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Feb.</td>
<td>Feb 3</td>
<td>Acceptance of Australian Defense Ministry personnel by the Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>Feb.</td>
<td>Feb 10</td>
<td>Cabinet decision on the “revision of the Implementation Plans for International Peace Cooperation Assignments in South Sudan” (extension of the dispatch period to the end of August 2015)</td>
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<td>Feb.</td>
<td>Feb 20</td>
<td>Japan-Qatar summit meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
<td>Mar 13</td>
<td>Second Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
<td>Mar 19</td>
<td>Japan-China security dialogue (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
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<td>Japan-Timer-Leste Defense Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
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<td>Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
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<td>Japan-India Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
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<td>Return of West Futenma residential area (approximately 51ha)</td>
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<td>Apr.</td>
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<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>Apr.</td>
<td>Apr 27</td>
<td>International disaster relief activities in response to an earthquake in Nepal (through May 25)</td>
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<td>Apr.</td>
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<td>Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (New York)</td>
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<td>Apr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>Apr 28</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Washington)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>Apr 30</td>
<td>Promulgation and enforcement of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Years of Expenditures with Treasury Obligations Related to Specified Defense Procurement (so-called the Long-Term Contract Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>May 14</td>
<td>Cabinet decision on “Legislation for Peace and Security” and the “International Peace Cooperation Bill”</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>May 29</td>
<td>Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to a volcanic eruption on Kuchinoerabujima Island (through June 1)</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>May 30</td>
<td>Participation by Defense Minister Nakatani in the 14th Asia Security Summit (ISS Shangri-La Dialogue) (Singapore) (through May 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>May 31</td>
<td>Appointment of MSGF personnel as the commander of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for counter-piracy operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: The information is based on the Defense Chronology document which provides a summary of significant events in the defense sector from January to May 2015.
The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. In the periphery of Japan, there has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests. In addition, there has been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. In this regard, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region are becoming more serious.

In a global security environment, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The activities of international terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), are gaining momentum and expanding. Russia has attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine (so-called “hybrid warfare”). Cyber attacks have become more sophisticated and complicated. As these examples exemplify, the security challenges and destabilizing factors are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own.

Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. In the Asia-Pacific region, China’s activities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea are increasing. Activities related to nuclear weapons and missiles have become more prominent. In these cases, China is tending to push regional agenda to its advantage.

As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq draw to a close, the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world are changing. While faced with a severe financial situation, the United States is anticipated to continue to play a role in the peace and stability of the world by drawing on its world-leading, comprehensive national power. The National Security Strategy (NSS) released in February 2015 underscores that the United States would continue to play a leading role in tackling a variety of challenges, such as the threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and cyber attacks, as well as take collective action with its allies and others, while promoting a rules-based international order. Furthermore, the NSS maintains that the United States would continue to advance its rebalance to Asia and the Pacific. Focus will be on how the changes in the situations in the Middle East and Ukraine impact these U.S. policies.

Meanwhile, the government budget mandatory sequestration, including defense spending, that was initiated in 2013 brought various impacts on the U.S. Forces. The QDR also emphasizes the significant risks of sequestration to the U.S. Forces. Much attention will be paid to how the mandatory sequestration cuts in defense spending will impact the defense strategies and security policies.

In November 2014, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative aimed at identifying innovative ways to offset potential adversaries’ capabilities in order to sustain and expand U.S. military advantages, utilizing limited resources. He expressed his expectation that the initiative would develop into a third offset strategy.

The United States

In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a plan to deploy 60% of the assets of the U.S. Navy and Air Forces in the Asia-Pacific region as well as proceeding with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment.

The Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region

- **Republic of Korea**: Maintaining around 38,000 U.S. troops stationed in the Republic of Korea.
- **Taiwan**: A plan to upgrade the F-16s Taiwan currently owns, etc. (announced in September 2011)
- **Singapore**: Rotational deployment of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) (announced in June 2011); broad agreement reached with the government of Singapore in June 2012; the first ship started rotation in April 2013 and the second ship in December 2014.
- **Philippines**: Transfer of 24 F-16s (announced in November 2011) and 2017
- **Japan**: Deployment of F-22, MV-22 Ospreys (deployment of CV-22 to Yokota in 2017), P-8, and of Global Hawk
- **Vietnam**: Deployment of second TPP 2 radar
- **Korea**: Relocation of II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) and ground troops from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii, etc.
- **Indonesia**: Additional one missile cruiser has been deployed (June 2015)
- **Australia**: Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft

**References**:
- Number of Marine Corps troops in the Asia-Pacific Region
  - Total: 24,049 (U.S. Navy website)
- Number of U.S. Troops in the Asia-Pacific Region
  - Total: approx. 66,000 personnel
    - Marines: approx. 1,000 personnel
    - Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel
    - Army: approx. 29,000 personnel


**Sea lanes leading to Japan**
- China’s advancements into the Pacific Ocean routinely conducted
- Strategies in the China-Taiwan military balance (increasingly favorable to the Chinese side)
- Rapid expansion/intensification of China’s activities in the East China Sea
- Rapid expansion/intensification of China’s activities in the South China Sea
- Changes in the China-Taiwan military balance
- Russian military activities intensifying
- Russian military activities intensifying
- Russian military activities intensifying
- Extensive and rapid strengthening of China’s military power
- North Korea’s military provocations and rhetoric
- North Korea’s progress with the development of nuclear weapons and missiles
- Recent Security Related Issues around Japan

**Recent Security Related Issues around Japan**

- Rapid expansion/intensification of China’s activities in the East China Sea
- Rapid expansion/intensification of China’s activities in the South China Sea
- Russian military activities intensifying
- Extensive and rapid strengthening of China’s military power
- North Korea’s military provocations and rhetoric
- North Korea’s progress with the development of nuclear weapons and missiles
- Changes in the China-Taiwan military balance
- China’s advancements into the Pacific Ocean routinely conducted
- Gray zone situations tend to be increased and prolonged

**Using ETOP030(USGS) and ETOP01(NOAA)**
General Situation

- North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities and repeatedly uses militarily provocative words and actions. Such military trend in North Korea heightens tension in the Korean Peninsula and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but also of the entire region and the international community. Accordingly, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them.

Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles

- In March 2013, North Korea adopted the so-called “new strategic line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development.
- With regard to North Korea’s nuclear development, some have argued that it is a so-called brinkmanship policy designed to receive a reward of some sort. However, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime.
- North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests since 2006 and has repeatedly hinted at further nuclear tests since March 2014, raising international concerns.
- Taking into account that North Korea has not changed its stance of continuing its nuclear weapons program, it is believed that with the passage of time, there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead that includes Japan in its range. In this regard, related developments need to be monitored carefully.
- It has been suggested that North Korea is developing a Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and an SLBM-carrying submarine. In May 2015, North Korea announced that it conducted a successful test launch of the SLBM. It is deemed that North Korea intends to diversify its attack capabilities and improve survivability. Furthermore, it has been suggested that North Korea is carrying out significant modification of its rocket launch tower in Tongchang-ri district. In the future, North Korea could launch long-range ballistic missiles which are larger compared to the past.
- Should North Korea acquire longer-range ballistic missile capability and achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads, and in turn have a false sense of confidence and recognition that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States, this could lead to increases in and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan.
- The ballistic missile launches since 2014 have demonstrated improvements in the operational capabilities of North Korea’s ballistic missile units, including surprise attack capabilities, with several ballistic missiles launched from locations and at timings as North Korea chooses. The North Korean ballistic missile threat is increasing further.
- The development of WMDs and missiles by North Korea constitutes, coupled with its provocative words and actions, including missile attacks against Japan, a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.

Domestic Affairs

- Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, and individuals selected by First Chairman Kim Jong-un have been assigned to the key party, military, and cabinet posts. It is believed that the First Chairman endeavors to strengthen and consolidate his regime as its sole leader.
- In 2014, the North Korean media stopped reporting the activities of Kim Kyong-hui, Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party and First Chairman Kim Jong-un’s aunt. Meanwhile, the North Korean media began to report the activities of the First Chairman’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior member of the Korean Workers’ Party. It is suggested that a generational change in the leadership may be taking place among the Kim family.
- The Kim Jong-un regime appears to be moving on track to a certain degree. However, the chilling effect resulting from the frequent personnel reshuffles, including dismissals, could propel North Korea to turn to military provocative actions without making sufficient diplomatic considerations. In addition, some point to the concern over social control such as the increasing inequality between the rich and the poor and the inflow of information from abroad – a concern which needs to be monitored from the perspective of regime stability.

Relations with Other Countries

- China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. However, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions which are in line with the position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues, and mutual visits of senior officials have decreased. In this light, relations between China and North Korea may be cooling on the political and diplomatic domains. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations will continue to be followed.
- On the other hand, in 2014, North Korea intensified its diplomacy with Russia. The year saw mutual visits by many senior officials as well as advances in economic cooperation.

Military Affairs

- China has strengthened its military forces broadly and rapidly. Furthermore, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities at sea and in airspace, including the East China Sea and South China Sea. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese military activities, etc., together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, and needs to pay utmost attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns for the region and the international community.
- China has not disclosed specific information on possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.
- China’s announced national defense budget continues to increase at a rapid pace, recording double-digit annual growth nearly consistently from FY1988 to the present. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has grown approximately 41-fold in 27 years since FY1988 and nearly 3.6-fold in 10 years since FY2005.
- In order to acquire striking force that will enable penetration of the missile defense shield, China is considered to be developing a hypersonic glide vehicle which is launched by mounting to a ballistic missile. Some analysts point out that China may also be constructing its first domestic aircraft carrier. Additionally, China is developing the J-20 and J-31, which are said to be among next-generation fighters.
- China is deemed to have established the “East China Sea Joint Operational Command Center” to jointly operate the Navy and Air Force. In addition, some analysts have stated that the CCP established the “Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center” to carry out decision-making at the highest strategic level. Furthermore, China has recently conducted drills aimed at the development of a joint operational posture.

Change in China’s Announced Defense Budget

- China’s announced national defense budget in the last 27 years has been increasing at a rapid pace, recording double-digit annual growth almost consistently from FY1988 to the present. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has grown from 1.2 billion yuan to 141 billion yuan in 2014.

Note: The total defense budget for FY2002 was not disclosed. Discrepancies arise if the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. Therefore, for FY2002, 118.4 billion yuan was used as a calculation benchmark in the assumption that the disclosed rate and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001.
Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace

In recent years, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly expanded its maritime activities based on sea power and air power, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Such activities by China include dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences and are extremely regrettable. China is urged to act on the basis of the principle of the "rule of law.

The Chinese government announced that it established the "East China Sea ADIZ" including the Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were a part of China’s "territory," and that the Chinese Armed Forces would take "defensive emergency measures" in the case where aircraft does not follow the relevant rules set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. These measures unduly infringe the freedom of overflight over the high seas, which is the general principle of international law. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that go against the principle of the freedom of overflight over the high seas.

The number of Chinese naval surface vessels advancing to the Pacific Ocean has increased in recent years, and such advancements are currently conducted routinely. It is understood that China seeks to improve its deployment capabilities to the open ocean.

With regard to the activities of Chinese government vessels, since October 2013, the operations of government vessels intended to intrude into territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands have become routinized. In this light, an operations manual or other codes may have been developed. Furthermore, China has striven to develop larger government vessels and is proceeding with the construction of the world’s largest 10,000-ton class patrol vessel.

China has engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying for the drilling in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The Japanese government has confirmed that in addition to its existing platforms, China has been building new offshore platforms and other facilities on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such works etc.

It is thought that one of the objectives of China’s maritime activities is to weaken the control of other countries over the islands to which China claims territorial sovereignty, while strengthening the claim of its territorial sovereignty, through various surveillance activities and use of force at sea and in airspace surrounding the islands.

In recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea. In April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, signed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). Additionally, in January 2015, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities resorted to consultations to swiftly begin the implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism. In November 2014, the United States and China announced their agreement on two confidence-building measures.

Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean

In August 2014, a Chinese fighter allegedly flew abnormally close to and intercepted a U.S. Navy aircraft in the South China Sea.

China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation work in seven features in the Spratly Islands. On some of them, it is considered that China is building infrastructure including runways and ports, which has raised concerns among the international community, including the United States.

A Song-class submarine conducted activities in the Indian Ocean from September to October 2014, and is deemed to have called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice in the same year. As such examples demonstrate, the Chinese Navy has improved its capacity to execute operations in more distant waters, including the Indian Ocean.

Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan

In August 2014, a Chinese fighter allegedly flew abnormally close to and intercepted a U.S. Navy aircraft in the South China Sea.

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Russia

Russia has made clear its adversarial stance against the West and other countries over Ukraine, which Russia considers is under its sphere of influence. Even in the face of a severe economic situation, Russia has continued to increase its defense budget and modernize the Russian Armed Forces. Recently, Russia has intensified the activities of the Russian Armed Forces not only in the Asia-Pacific, but also in the Arctic, Europe, and areas near the U.S. mainland, and there has been a trend to expand their area of activity.

In the Eastern Military District, including the Far East, the large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” participated by over 155,000 personnel was conducted in September 2014, in which the combat readiness of units was assessed. In addition, an exercise was conducted in the “Kuril Islands” that include the Northern Territories.

In Ukrainian territory, Russia has attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” in which acts of aggression are carried out through methods that cannot be clearly labeled an “armed attack” based on their outward form. Russia’s action is recognized as a global issue that could impact the entire international community, including Asia.

Southeast Asia

In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes with China, and recently, there has been growing friction with China. Since May 2014, the Philippines and Vietnam have lodged protests over China’s alleged activities, including land reclamation and construction of runways at the reefs of the Spratly islands.

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces focusing on inducting major equipment of their naval and air forces, such as fourth-generation modern fighters and submarines.

Trends in Regional Conflict and International Terrorism

An array of problems is at the root of conflicts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources. In many cases, areas where civil wars or regional conflicts have created or expanded a governance vacuum have become a hotbed of the activities of terrorist organizations. Among them are organizations which operate across national borders and regions, which continue to pose imminent security challenges to the international community. The presence of states with weak governance has made it difficult to tackle risks such as the pandemic and spread of infectious diseases.

As a general trend, with the advancement of globalization, transnational terrorist organizations are using social media and other cyber space tools to share information and conspire within their own organizations or with other groups, as well as to acquire weapons and funds and recruit fighters. These organizations carry out propaganda using tactical public relations strategies. ISIL has gained strength by seizing the opportunity of the confusion in Syria and Iraq. ISIL has an exceptionally substantial funding source, a powerful military force which can stand face-to-face with a nation, and the de facto control of some territory, making ISIL a particularly striking presence. Under these circumstances, organizations that pledge allegiance to ISIL have emerged worldwide.

In developed countries, such as the United States and European countries, there has been a rise in young people who sympathize with the extremism of international terrorist organizations, including ISIL, against the backdrop of dissatisfaction towards estrangement from society, discrimination, poverty, and disparities. In an increasing number of cases, these people have joined the

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Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean

- In August 2014, a Chinese fighter allegedly flew abnormally close to and intercepted a U.S. Navy aircraft in the South China Sea.
- China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation work in seven features in the Spratly Islands. On some of them, it is considered that China is building infrastructure including runways and ports, which has raised concerns among the international community, including the United States.
- A Song-class submarine conducted activities in the Indian Ocean from September to October 2014, and is deemed to have called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice in the same year. As such examples demonstrate, the Chinese Navy has improved its capacity to execute operations in more distant waters, including the Indian Ocean.

Russia

- Russia has made clear its adversarial stance against the West and other countries over Ukraine, which Russia considers is under its sphere of influence. Even in the face of a severe economic situation, Russia has continued to increase its defense budget and modernize the Russian Armed Forces. Recently, Russia has intensified the activities of the Russian Armed Forces not only in the Asia-Pacific, but also in the Arctic, Europe, and areas near the U.S. mainland, and there has been a trend to expand their area of activity.

Southeast Asia

- In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes with China, and recently, there has been growing friction with China. Since May 2014, the Philippines and Vietnam have lodged protests over China’s alleged activities, including land reclamation and construction of runways at the reefs of the Spratly islands.

Trends in Regional Conflict and International Terrorism

- An array of problems is at the root of conflicts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources. In many cases, areas where civil wars or regional conflicts have created or expanded a governance vacuum have become a hotbed of the activities of terrorist organizations. Among them are organizations which operate across national borders and regions, which continue to pose imminent security challenges to the international community. The presence of states with weak governance has made it difficult to tackle risks such as the pandemic and spread of infectious diseases.

As a general trend, with the advancement of globalization, transnational terrorist organizations are using social media and other cyber space tools to share information and conspire within their own organizations or with other groups, as well as to acquire weapons and funds and recruit fighters. These organizations carry out propaganda using tactical public relations strategies. ISIL has gained strength by seizing the opportunity of the confusion in Syria and Iraq. ISIL has an exceptionally substantial funding source, a powerful military force which can stand face-to-face with a nation, and the de facto control of some territory, making ISIL a particularly striking presence. Under these circumstances, organizations that pledge allegiance to ISIL have emerged worldwide.

In developed countries, such as the United States and European countries, there has been a rise in young people who sympathize with the extremism of international terrorist organizations, including ISIL, against the backdrop of dissatisfaction towards estrangement from society, discrimination, poverty, and disparities. In an increasing number of cases, these people have joined the
activities of international terrorist organizations as fighters and conduct "home-grown" and "lone-wolf" terrorist activities in their countries. Such developments have heightened the risk of terrorism in developed countries, and Japan is not in any way immune from it.

• The proliferation of the threat of terrorism has gained momentum. The diversification of its perpetrators, coupled with the growing complexity of regional conflicts, has made it far more difficult to prevent their occurrence. For this reason, international cooperation on counter-terrorism measures has become even more important.

Maritime Trends

• In the East China Sea and the South China Sea, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international law and order. This has caused situations of undue infringement upon the principles of "freedom of navigation in the high seas" and "freedom of overflight over the high seas."

• The Arctic states have been more proactively promoting efforts to acquire their interest in resource development and use of the sea route. The strategic importance of the Arctic Region is thus increasing. "Open and Stable Seas" constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication.

Outer Space Security

• Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR functions. Such satellites include image reconnaissance satellites reconstituting military facilities and targets, satellites gathering radar wave information for military communications, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft enhancing the precision of weapons systems.

• Meanwhile, as illustrated by China’s Anti-Satellite Test, the development of anti-satellite weapons and the spread of space debris have been noted as a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by countries. In this regard, the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges countries face.

Trends concerning Cyberspace

• For armed forces, information and communications form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, information and communications technology (ICT) advancements are further enhancing the dependence of units on information and communication networks.

• For this reason, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of adversaries by exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace.

• Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against the information and communication networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries. It has been suggested that government organizations of China, Russia, North Korea, and other countries have been involved. In addition, cyber attacks have been growing more sophisticated and complicated day by day. Cyber security has become one of the most important security issues for countries.

• There has been a movement to establish codes of conduct in cyberspace. It has been suggested, however, that there is disagreement between the countries’ assertions, with countries such as the United States, European countries, and Japan calling for maintaining free and unrestricted cyberspace, while many countries such as Russia, China, and emerging countries call for strengthening the national control of cyberspace.

Currently, the international community as a whole is taking various steps, including military actions as well as cutting off the funding sources of terrorist organizations and preventing the international movement of terrorist fighters.

• The rapid and vast outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa threatens the stability of the affected countries, which have weak governance and poor crisis management capabilities, and spread the disease to other countries in the West, shedding light on the risk posed by the spread of infectious diseases seriously.

Part II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Outline of the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security

Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security

- Definition of "Act of Force" (Article 8 of the "Three New Conditions")
- "Use of Force" permitted under the "Three New Conditions"
- Authorization of "Use of Force" under the "Three New Conditions"
- Revisions to the Self-Defense Forces Law (Use of Weapons to Protect Weapons, etc. of the U.S. Armed Forces, etc.)
- Authorization for the SDF to use force under the "Three New Conditions"
Outline of the Bill for the Development of Peace and Security in Areas Surrounding Japan

**Purpose**
The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan, strengthening cooperation with foreign countries responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, with the contribution to the effective operation of the United Nations Security Council, thereby to its role, by conducting logistics support, etc. for the U.S. forces, etc.

**Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security (example) Situations that could lead to a direct armed attack against Japan if not improved**

1. Dispatching of uniformed SDF personnel (commanding officers, etc.) to the United Nations
2. Waiver of right to claim
3. Provision of supplies
   * The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type
   * Implementation of operations in foreign territories is allowed (only when the foreign country consents) (Not allowed before the revision)
4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline (3)  The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any parties to armed conflicts.

**Support Targets**
- Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by the SDF)
  - Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, alarms, use of facilities, training services
- Other similar organizations

**Response Measures**
- (1) Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by the SDF)
  - Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, alarms, use of facilities, training services
- Other similar organizations

**Response Measures**
- (1) Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by the SDF)
  - Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, alarms, use of facilities, training services
- Other similar organizations

**Outline of the Bill for the Establishment of the Peace and Security System in Areas Surrounding Japan**

**Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act**

**Purpose**
The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan and the security of Japan and its people, to develop the operations assigned to the SDF in response to armed attack situations, etc., by setting such basic matters as the principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, and provisions.

**Situations that are expected to be a threat to the peace and security of Japan and its people**

1. A situation where an armed attack occurs, or an imminent danger of an armed attack occurs is clearly recognized
2. Anticipated armed attack situation
3. Anticipated armed attack situation

**Revision of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act**

**Outline of the International Peace Support Bill**

**International Peace Support Law**

**Purpose**

**Conditions**

1. Resolutions that the United Nations Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopt
2. Resolutions that the United Nations Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopt
3. Resolutions that the United Nations Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopt
4. Resolutions that the United Nations Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopt

**Response Measures**

1. Cooperation and support activities
2. Provision of supplies and transportation to armed forces of foreign countries, etc.
3. Logistics support activities, etc.
4. Resumption of services not included in the Ship Inspection Operations Law

**Outline of the Revision of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act**

1. In order to ensure the peace and security of Japan and the security of Japan and its people, to develop the operations assigned to the SDF in response to armed attack situations, etc., by setting such basic matters as the principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, and provisions.
2. Anticipated armed attack situations
3. Anticipated armed attack situations
4. Anticipated armed attack situations
5. Anticipated armed attack situations

**Revision of the Law Concerning Peace Cooperation Act**

1. The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan, strengthening cooperation with foreign countries responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, with the contribution to the effective operation of the United Nations Security Council, thereby to its role, by conducting logistics support, etc. for the U.S. forces, etc.

2. Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security (example) Situations that could lead to a direct armed attack against Japan if not improved

3. Dispatching of uniformed SDF personnel (commanding officers, etc.) to the United Nations
4. Waiver of right to claim
5. Provision of supplies
   * The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type
   * Implementation of operations in foreign territories is allowed (only when the foreign country consents) (Not allowed before the revision)
6. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline
   3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any parties to armed conflicts.

**Support Targets**

1. Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by the SDF)
2. Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, alarms, use of facilities, training services
3. Other similar organizations

**Response Measures**

1. Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by the SDF)
2. Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, alarms, use of facilities, training services
3. Other similar organizations

**Outline of the Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan**

1. Dispatching of uniformed SDF personnel (commanding officers, etc.) to the United Nations
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3. Provision of supplies
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3. Other similar organizations

**Outline of the Revision of the Law Concerning Peace Cooperation Act**

1. Draft Approval
2. When the order is given to the SDF for defense operations to respond to a "surviving-threatening situation," prior Diet approval is required without exception

**Outline of the Revision of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act**

1. In order to ensure the peace and security of Japan and the security of Japan and its people, to develop the operations assigned to the SDF in response to armed attack situations, etc., by setting such basic matters as the principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, and provisions.
2. Anticipated armed attack situations
3. Anticipated armed attack situations
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**Outline of the Revision of the Law Concerning Peace Cooperation Act**

1. The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan, strengthening cooperation with foreign countries responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, with the contribution to the effective operation of the United Nations Security Council, thereby to its role, by conducting logistics support, etc. for the U.S. forces, etc.

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**Outline of the Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan**

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3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any parties to armed conflicts.
### Outline of the National Security Strategy

- The National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly defines the following as Japan's national interests and national security objectives to achieve its fundamental principle of continuing the path it has followed as a peace-loving nation, and proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation: maintaining sovereignty and independence; defending territorial integrity; ensuring the lives, property and safety of citizens; economic development; and maintaining and protecting the international order based on rules and universal values.
- The NSS clearly defines the security environment surrounding Japan and national security challenges on a global level as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.
- The NSS specifies the strategic approach centering on diplomatic and defense policy that Japan should implement, such as the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture to protect Japan.
- Based on the NSS, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) specify basic policies for Japan's future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF equipment.

### Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines

- Based on the NSS, the basic policy consists of the following:
  1. Japan's own efforts; (2) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) active promotion of security cooperation.
- The NDPG states that Japan will build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force by conducting capability assessments based on joint operations to enhance deterrence and response capabilities by pursuing further joint operations, improving the operational standards of defense equipment, and further increasing defense activities, as well as ensuring the necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capabilities underpinning various activities.
- As an effective means of deterrence and response to various situations, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities over an extensive area around Japan. In addition, Japan will ensure a posture that emphasizes the following points:
  1. ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyber/space; and (5) responses to major disasters.
- As part of Japan's efforts towards the stabilization of the Asia-Pacific region and improvement of the global security environment, Japan will conduct persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and implement activities such as training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner. Moreover, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance. Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy measures, and capacity building assistance, among other activities.
- To ensure that the defense force can function as effectively as possible, Japan will strengthen the foundations underpinning the defense force.

### Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) stipulates the following points: reorganization of the Major SDF Units; major programs regarding the SDF’s capabilities; measures for the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; quantities of major procurement; and expenditures.

Reorganization of the Major SDF Units
- Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF): establishing the Ground Central Command; transforming two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades; establishing a coast observation unit and area security units; and establishing an amphibious rapid deployment brigade.
- Maritime Self-Defense Force (MDSF): retaining four escort vessels mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDG) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and five escort divisions consisting of other destroyers; increasing the number of submarines.
- Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF): relocating one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base; newly organizing one airborne early warning squadron; integrating ASDF units equipped with training support functions.

### National Defense Program Guidelines Annex Table

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
<td>153,600</td>
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<td>Reserve (Active Only)</td>
<td>6,800</td>
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<td>Regional Deployment Units</td>
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Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.

Outline of the New Guidelines

Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines
- The new Guidelines specify the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with those of the 1997 Guidelines.

Strengthened Alliance Coordination
- The two governments will establish a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and develop and update bilateral plans.

Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security
- This section presents the direction to achieve seamless cooperation, including cooperation in gray zone situations, while enhancing the Japanese and U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. Japan and the United States will continue to promote joint training and exercises, and the expansion of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, as well as the expansion of joint share of use of Japanese and U.S. facilities and areas that serve as the bases for these activities.

Bilateral Enterprise
- The new Guidelines added the following areas as a foundation for defense cooperation to further improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:
  A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
  B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
  C. Educational and Research Exchanges

Processes for Review
- The new Guidelines added regular evaluation while maintaining previous activities in this area.

Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance
- "2+2" Meeting (April 27, 2015)
  1. The Ministers announced the approval of “the new guidelines,” which update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peace time to contingencies.
  2. Both Ministers noted with satisfaction the ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities.
  3. The Ministers highlighted the recent progress in regional and international cooperation.
  4. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces on local communities.

- The Ministers agreed to oppose any attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They also confirmed that Japan’s legislation for peace and security will help ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and welcomed that the discussion at the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) thus far was put together. Furthermore, the Ministers reaffirmed cooperation to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter stated that the United States would provide necessary information on the accident involving an Osprey transport aircraft in Hawaii and reiterated efforts to thoroughly ensure the safe operation of the Osprey.

Direction of Strengthening the Alliance
- Japan and the United States will build the posture for seamless cooperation, including peace and various other situations, including cooperation in gray zone situations, while enhancing the Japanese and U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. Japan and the United States will continue to promote joint training and exercises, and the expansion of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, as well as the expansion of joint shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities and areas that serve as the bases for these activities.

Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Obama at the Japan-U.S. Summit in Washington in April 2015 (Cabinet Public Relations Office)
Stationing of the U.S. Forces

- The United States is proceeding with the force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. In Okinawa, the United States is taking such measures as the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the transfer of Marines in Okinawa to Guam and the return of land south of Kadena.
- The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. This is believed to be a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the Futenma Replacement facility in the Camp-Schwab Henoko area and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. Japan plans to make further efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the burden on Okinawa in a timely manner.
- The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. As such, the government will work as one to implement this initiative.
- Regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project, in addition to complying with the relevant laws and regulations, including completing the environmental impact assessment and the application for approval of the reclamation of publicly-owned waters, the Government of Japan has devoted ample time to completing all necessary procedures, including soliciting the opinions of the people of Okinawa Prefecture. On that basis, the Government of Japan commenced offshore boring survey work on August 14, 2014.

### Specific Ministry of Defense Reform Initiatives

- Conduct the following reorganization based on the “Direction of the Ministry of Defense Reform” (August 2013) for the purpose of overall optimization of defense capability, strengthening of functions for integrated operations, policy planning, etc. in continuation from FY2014.
- Strengthening integrated operational functions
  - Unification of work relating to actual operations into the Joint Staff Office
  - Unity work relating to actual operations of the SDF into the Joint Staff
  - Discontinue the Operational Policy Bureau, and newly establish the Director General for Operational Policy (Deputy Chief of Joint Staff-level) and the Director for Operation Policy (department director general / division director-level) for civilian officials to conduct coordination with related ministries and agencies, and external communication.
- Reorganization of the Internal Bureau
  - Strengthen the policy planning function and defense capability build-up function
  - Transfer functions such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to operations and the training of units to the Bureau of Defense Policy.
  - Newly establish the Strategic Planning Division in the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to strengthen the policy planning function.
  - Newly establish the Bureau of Build-up Planning in order to strengthen the defense capability build-up function.
- The new establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency
  - Establish a new extra-ministerial organization that brings together and consolidates departments in MOD related to the procurement of equipment (namely the Internal Bureau, the respective Staff Offices, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office).
  - Main functions of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency
    - Project management function, international equipment and technology cooperation, weapons technology control function, research and development function and equipment acquisition function
Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Effective Deterrence and Response

Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

- The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.
- In FY2014, the ASDF aircraft scrambled 943 times, a significant increase by 133 in comparison with the previous fiscal year. This is the second largest number since 1958 when the ASDF started taking strict anti-territory intrusion measures.
- In 2014, there were seven incidents of activity by Chinese Navy vessels involving the passage through the southwestern islands, and also another incident of such activities confirmed in waters south of Okinawa.
- In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsuri-jima, which is part of Senkaku Islands. In addition, on August 22, 2013, a Tu-95 bomber of the Russian Air Force intruded into Japanese airspace in the vicinity of Okinoshima, Fukuoka Prefecture. Moreover, September 9 of the same year, an incident where a presumably unmanned aircraft of unidentified nationality flew over the East China Sea. The ASDF urgently scrambled fighters in response to these incidents.
- Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD and the SDF have also been implementing warning and surveillance activities, in addition to other existing activities, in the East China Sea. The MOD and the SDF have also decided to continue engaging in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures.

Number of Scrambles since the Period of the Cold War and Its Breakdown

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Note: The peak of the cold war

Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands

- Japan possesses a number of remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, the SDF will position units and so forth in the area, and will detect signs at an early stage through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF in peacetime. By conducting a joint operation involving the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF, troops will be expeditiously deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked, and will deter and remove enemy attacks. If, by any chance, islands are captured without any signs detected in advance, the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and taking other initiatives.
- The MOD and SDF will strengthen the country’s defense foundation from peacetime, by newly forming a coast observation unit in Yonaguni Island and establishing an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (provisional name)” equipped with a full function for amphibious operations, and will establish the 9th Air Wing at Naha Air Base.
- For the purpose of developing a persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) posture and an immediate response system, acquisition of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and aegis equipped destroyers (DDG) will be implemented.
- In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, the Improvement of Osumi class transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank) and overseas research to review the role of multipurpose vessels will be conducted, and at the same time, V-22 Ospreys will be introduced to enhance rapid deployment capabilities.
- In January through March of 2015, the GSDF and US Marine Corps conducted a field training exercise (Iron Fist) in California to improve amphibious operational capabilities.
**Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks**
- Japan’s BMD is based on an effective multi-tier defense system using Aegis-equipped destroyers and Patriot PAC-3, interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).
- The additional TPY-2 radar was deployed to the U.S. Kyoigamiaki Communication Site in December 2014.
- North Korea repeatedly engaged in a variety of provocative acts, including an implication of missile launches in both 2014 and 2015. Under such circumstances, the MOD and the SDF continue to be ready to take every necessary measure to protect the lives and properties of the nation in any potential situation.

**Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security**
- In order to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the MOD and the SDF promote various kinds of initiatives such as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing joint exercises and practices using a variety of opportunities.

**Responses in Space**
- From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities in Japan and the U.S., the “Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” was established based on the instruction given in the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Talk in April 2015. Making use of this working group, reviews will be further promoted in broader fields such as: 1. promotion of policy-related consultation regarding space, 2. closer information sharing, 3. cooperation for nurturing and securing experts, 4. implementation of tabletop exercises.

**The Whole-of-Government approach**
- In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command.
- The “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group” (CDPWG) has been set up as a framework between the defense authorities of the U.S. and Japan, under which opinion exchange is conducted by experts regarding various cooperation fields on Japan-U.S. information-sharing, human resources exchanges, and other themes. In May 2015, the Japan-U.S. joint declaration was issued, indicating the specific direction for future Japan-U.S. cooperation.
- In 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, having around ten companies in the defense industry as its core members, and efforts are being made to improve capacities to counter cyber attacks through joint exercise and other initiatives.

**Response to Large-Scale Disasters**
- When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in various activities such as the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods.
- In August 2014, a landslide occurred in Hiroshina City in Hiroshina Prefecture due to heavy rain. The SDF conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons deploying approximately 14,970 personnel. In September of the same year, a volcanic eruption occurred on Mount Ontake. In order for the SDF to conduct lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons in cooperation with the municipality, police, fire department, and other relevant organizations, approximately 7,150 personnel were dispatched for disaster relief.

**Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2015**
- Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during FY2015, which serves as the second fiscal year under the NDPS and new MDTF, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, based on these programs.
- Japan will improve its defense capabilities in order to seamlessly

**Defense-Related Expenditures**
- In FY2015, in light of the increasingly harsh security environment, defense-related expenditures were increased for the second consecutive year in a row in order to reinforce preparedness aimed at protecting the lives and property of the people and the nation’s land, sea, and airspace.

**Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.**
- The SDF will protect the Japanese nationals and other parties in the destination country of a dispatch operation, and safely guide and transport them to aircraft, ships or vehicles. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designing helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including boarded aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch.
- The MOD and the SDF participated in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” and conducted the first ever overseas ground transport exercises.

**Human Foundations and Organization that Supports the Defense Force**
- In order to exert their defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is necessary that the MOD and the SDF enhance and reinforce their human foundation. Since the various activities of the MOD and the SDF are only feasible if understanding and cooperation is received from the Japanese people, as well as local authorities, it is necessary to further deepen the mutual trust between the SDF and local communities and the people.
- In January 2015, the MOD formulated the “Action Plan for promoting the Active Participation of the Female Employees and Work-Life Balance,” which incorporated three reforms – “Working style reform,” “ Reform to realize a successful career with a balanced life between child-rearing and nursing, etc.,” and “Reform for promoting successful female personnel” – in order to promote the work-life balance of the personnel in a unified manner whilst promoting further recruitment and promotion of female personnel.

**Measures on Defense Equipment**
- In light of the current severe financial situation and the reorganization of European and American enterprises, as well as progress in international joint development, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was formulated in June 2014. The Strategy included various measures for maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production and technological bases, and indicated the current situation and future direction of each defense equipment field.

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Research and Development

As part of these initiatives, the MOD’s own funding program called “Innovation Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (competitive funding) was newly established in FY2015 to discover creative research conducted by the universities, research institutes and companies etc. that are noted for their application of defense equipment, and to nurture emerging research that is deemed promising.

Defense Cooperation and Technology Cooperation

Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of peace and international cooperation.

Since 1992, Japan has implemented 19 joint research projects and 1 joint development project with the U.S. In addition, the Japanese government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese companies in the manufacturing process of the production of F-35A and to establish upgrading facilities.

In July 2013, Japan launched a joint research project with the U.K., the first country other than the United States in this regard.

Japan and France signed the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015.

In May 2015, Japan decided to commence consultations with Australia, together with the participation of companies from the private sector to examine what kind of cooperation Japan can provide for the Australian Future Submarine Program.

With India, three Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings have been held to facilitate bilateral cooperation for the US-2 aircraft.

Between the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) and Japan, exchanges of views are taking place regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors.

In July 2013, Japan launched a joint research project with the U.K., the first country other than the United States in this regard.

Japan and France signed the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015.

In July 2014, Japan decided on a policy of dispatching CTF 151 commanders and CTF 151 HQ officers from the SDF, of Japan, including participation in the international minesweeping training hosted by the United States.

With regard to counter-piracy measures, from December 2013, for the purpose of conducting more flexible and effective unit operations, the SDF surface force has been participating in CTF 151 and has carried out zone defense, in addition to the escort missions that it had already been conducting in the past. The ASSF has also been participating in CTF 151 since February 2014. Furthermore, in July 2014, Japan decided on a policy of dispatching CTF 151 commanders and CTF 151 HQ officers from the SDF.
Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

• United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
  Deployed Engineer Unit (approx. 350 personnel) and Headquarter Staff (four personnel) are conducting various activities in the Republic of South Sudan.

• International Disaster Relief Operations for the Outbreak of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in West Africa
  At the request from the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the SDF transported 20,000 pieces of personal protective equipment by KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft.

• International Disaster Relief Operations for the Missing AirAsia Airplane
  Deployment Surface Force Counter Piracy Enforcement, which was returning to Japan following a counter-piracy activity, was dispatched to conduct search and rescue activities for approximately one week.

• International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal (Earthquake)
  At the request of the Government of Nepal, the MGD swiftly dispatched a medical assistance unit that conducted medical activities for approximately three weeks.

The SDF Marching Festival held at the Nippon Budokan in FY2014

An air review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF was also held at Hyakuri Base.

Collaboration with Local Communities

• The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fields. Such activities help to further deepen the mutual trust between the SDF, and local communities and the people, and contribute significantly to the maintenance and revitalization of the local community.

• The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. For example, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In FY2014, an air review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF was also held at Hyakuri Base.

The website provides information on the policies and activities of the MOD and SDF. It also gives you access to a range of other resources, including the English-language public relations pamphlet JDF (Japan Defense Focus) and transcripts of the press conference of the Minister of Defense.

The website introduces the functions, the status of the domestic and international activities of the MSDF, as well as its equipment. It also features a collection of many related photographs.

An introduction is provided on the duties, organization, and equipment of the AGDF. The website also offers a feature on the Blue Impulse as well as a range of wallpapers, videos, photos, a smartphone app, and more.

The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) is the MOD’s think tank, conducting research and studies with a policy orientation primarily on security and military history, while also training senior SDF officers and others.