Outline of the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security (1)

Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security

Enable the units of the SDF to take measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas whose lives or bodies could be harmed in emergency situations (Article 84-3).

- Rescue measures: Guarding, rescue and other measures to protect the lives or bodies of those Japanese nationals, including transportation.

[Procedure] Order by the Minister of Defense
- Request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
- Consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense
- Approval by the Prime Minister

[Requirements for implementation] When all of the following are met:
1. It is recognized that in places where rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are currently maintaining public safety and order, and no act of combat is being conducted.
2. The country concerned consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures; and
3. It is anticipated that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to expected dangers.

[Authority to Use Weapons]
- So-called “use of weapons for the defense of mandate” are permitted
- SDF personnel shall not inflict injury upon any person except in a case of self-defense or averting of present danger.

*It is possible to also rescue non-Japanese nationals under certain conditions.

Enable uniformed SDF personnel to use weapons to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (Article 95-2).

- Equipment: Weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces, etc.

[Coverage]
- Weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations’ units
- That are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (*)
  - Including joint exercises but excluding activities where the act of combat is currently being conducted.

[Procedures, etc.]
- When the request is made by the U.S. Forces, etc.
- Only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary
- Uniformed SDF personnel provide guarding
- Apart from procedures prescribed in SDF Law provisions, the National Security Council plans to deliberate on the operational approach.

[Authority to Use Weapons]
- When there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to use weapons to protect people or weapons, etc., the use of weapons is permitted to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation.
- Causing harm to persons is only allowed for self-defense and averting of present danger.

Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council]

(Note) Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby (Development of no new legislation)

Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Overseas)

- Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed Forces (in peacetime [Self-Defense Forces Law] [Expansion]
  - Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan.

- Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security [Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework]
- International Peace Cooperation Activities [International Peace Cooperation Law]
  - U.N. PKO (Addition)
  - Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (e.g. security of specified areas including protection of local population)

- Ship Inspection Operations [Ship Inspection Operations Law] (Expansion)
  - Ship Inspection Operations
    - Enable operations for peace and security of the international community

Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Use of Weapons to Protect Weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces, etc.)

- International Peace Support Law (New)
  - Support activities (including logistics support) to armed forces of foreign countries in situations that the international community is collectively addressing for international peace and security (New)
    - [International Peace Support Law (New)]

Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

- Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed Forces in peacetime [Self-Defense Forces Law] [Expansion]
  - Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan.

- Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security [Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework]

- International Peace Cooperation Activities [International Peace Cooperation Law]
  - U.N. PKO (Addition)
  - Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (e.g. security of specified areas including protection of local population)

- Ship Inspection Operations [Ship Inspection Operations Law] (Expansion)
  - Ship Inspection Operations
    - Enable operations for peace and security of the international community

- Support activities (including logistics support) to armed forces of foreign countries in situations that the international community is collectively addressing for international peace and security (New)
  - [International Peace Support Law (New)]

- The “Three New Conditions”
  1. An armed attack against Japan occurs
  2. An armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs
  3. The international community is collectively addressing the situation

- So-called “use of weapons for the defense of mandate” are permitted under the “Three New Conditions”
Outline of the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security (2)

### Purpose

The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan, strengthening cooperation with foreign countries responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, with the contribution to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty at its core, by conducting logistics support, etc. for the U.S. Forces, etc.

### Support Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The following armed forces etc. responding to the situations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) The U.S. Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the U.N. Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Other similar organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Response Measures

| (1) Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF) |
| Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, and base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services |

  - Provision of weapons is not included. Provision of ammunition and refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations are now allowed.
  - Search and rescue activities
  - Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Act)
  - Other measures necessary to respond to the situations

### Avoidance of "Ittaka"

- SDF does not conduct activities in "the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted".
- When the personnel having been lost already been found and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured.
- The commanding officers etc. of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities etc. if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.
- The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

### Diet Approval

- Prior Diet approval, in principle
- Ex-post facto approval allowed in emergency
- The same as the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security

### Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act

**United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Addition)**

- Five Principles for Participation (underlined portions added)
  1. Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.
  2. Consent for the undertaking of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.
  3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.
  4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments.
  5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary for the protection of the lives of the personnel dispatched, in principle. When the consent of acceptance is deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons for the defense or mandate missions is allowed.

**Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (Not under the control of the U.N.)**

- Requirement: When any of the following is met, in addition to the satisfaction of the Five Principles for Participation
  1. Based on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
  2. At the request by
    - The United Nations
    - Organizations established by the U.N. Generally Assembly or U.N. specialized agencies, such as the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order
    - Regional organizations as prescribed in Article 52 of the U.N. Charter or organizations established by multilateral treaties, having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities of Internationally coordinated operation for peace and security such as the European Union or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order
  3. At the requests of countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs (limited to only those supported by any of principal U.N. organizations as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the U.N. Charter

**Addition of Tasks**

- Security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc., protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request and tasks at Mission Headquarters have been added, in addition to ceasefires monitoring and relief activities for afflicted people, tasks assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of systems of governance have been expanded.

- Review of the authority to use weapons
  - In implementing protection of local population, etc. as well as security of specified areas and protection of individuals related to operations in response to their urgent request, the use of weapons for the defense of mandate is allowed.
- Diet approval
  - Prior Diet approval is necessary for ceasefire monitoring and security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc. conducted by SDF units, in principle (Ex-post facto approval permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved).
- Ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Cooperation Corps of Japan
- Provide for the development of operational guidelines that set forth provisions for the consideration of safety, the cessation of operations, the temporary suspension of operations to avoid danger and other measures for ensuring the safety of the personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps

**Other revised matters**

- (1) Dispatching of uniformed SDF personnel (commanding officers, etc.) to the United Nations
- Waiver of right to claim
- Provision of supplies or services to the U.S. Forces, etc. for their operation to cope with large-scale disasters
- Expansion of the scope for cooperation with international election observation operations
Outline of the International Peace Support Bill

International Peace Support Law

**Purpose**

- Situations threatening international peace and security that international community is collectively addressing:
  - (1) Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community; and
  - (2) The international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the threat, and
  - (3) Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities.

- Implement cooperation and support activities, etc. for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in the activities above

- Contribute to ensuring the peace and security of the international community

**Conditions**

- The following U.N. resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council) are required:
  - (1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize foreign countries subject to Japan’s support conduct operations to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community
  - (2) In addition to (1), resolutions that regard the situations as a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and call on U.N. member states to respond to the situations concerned

**Avoidance of “Ittaika”**

- Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted.
  - (*) When the personnel having been lost have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured.
  - The commanding officers of the SDF units order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.
  - The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

**Response Measures**

- (1) Cooperation and support activities
  - Provision of goods and services to armed forces of foreign countries
  - Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and construction
  - (*) Provision of weapons is not included
- (2) Search and rescue activities
- (3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law)

**Diet Approval**

- Prior Diet approval required without exception
- Each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts toward decisions within 7 days
- Re-appraisal required in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of the response measures. In the case of re-appraisal, ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved

* The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type
The National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly defines the following as Japan's national interests and national security objectives to achieve its fundamental principle of continuing the path it has followed as a peace-loving nation, and proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation: maintaining sovereignty and independence; defending territorial integrity; ensuring the lives, property and safety of citizens; economic development; and maintaining and protecting the international order based on rules and universal values.

The NSS clearly defines the security environment surrounding Japan and national security challenges on a global level as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.

The NSS specifies the strategic approach centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy that Japan should implement, such as the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture to protect Japan.

Based on the NSS, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) specify basic policies for Japan's future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF equipment.

**Outline of the National Security Strategy**

- The National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly defines the following as Japan's national interests and national security objectives to achieve its fundamental principle of continuing the path it has followed as a peace-loving nation, and proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation: maintaining sovereignty and independence; defending territorial integrity; ensuring the lives, property and safety of citizens; economic development; and maintaining and protecting the international order based on rules and universal values.

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- The NSS specifies the strategic approach centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy that Japan should implement, such as the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture to protect Japan.

- Based on the NSS, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) specify basic policies for Japan's future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF equipment.

**Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines**

- Based on the NSS, the basic policy consists of the following: (1) Japan's own efforts; (2) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) active promotion of security cooperation.

- The NDPG states that Japan will build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force by conducting capability assessments based on joint operations to enhance deterrence and response capabilities by pursuing further joint operations, improving the operational standards of defense equipment, and further increasing defense activities, as well as ensuring the necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capabilities underpinning various activities.

- As an effective means of deterrence and response to various situations, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities over an extensive area around Japan. In addition, Japan will ensure a posture that emphasizes the following points: (1) ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters.

- As part of Japan's efforts towards the stabilization of the Asia-Pacific region and improvement of the global security environment, Japan will conduct persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and implement activities such as training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner. Moreover, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance. Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy measures, and capacity building assistance, among other activities.

- To ensure that the defense force can function as effectively as possible, Japan will strengthen the foundations underpinning the defense force.

**The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specifies a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent five-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defined in the NDPG.**

**Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP and Annual Budget**

**National Defense Program Guidelines Annex Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Number of personnel</td>
<td>approx. 159,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
<td>approx. 151,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve-Ready Personnel</td>
<td>approx. 8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Deployment Units</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
<td>3 rapid deployment divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>4 rapid deployment brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Deployment Units</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments</td>
<td>5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments</td>
<td>7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Units</td>
<td>4 flotillas (5 divisions)</td>
<td>4 flotillas (8 divisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Units</td>
<td>approx. 340</td>
<td>approx. 6 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeper Units</td>
<td>approx. 260</td>
<td>approx. 1 flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriot Aircraft Units</td>
<td>approx. 159,000</td>
<td>approx. 1 helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Warning &amp; Control Units</td>
<td>approx. 230</td>
<td>approx. 28 warning squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>approx. 1 flotilla</td>
<td>approx. 8 warning groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>approx. 12 squadrons</td>
<td>approx. 20 warning squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>approx. 1 squadron</td>
<td>approx. 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Refueling/Transport Units</td>
<td>approx. 1 squadron</td>
<td>approx. 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transporter &amp; reapter</td>
<td>approx. 1 squadron</td>
<td>approx. 1 AEW group (1 squadron)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Units</td>
<td>approx. 3 squadrons</td>
<td>approx. 2 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>approx. 6 groups</td>
<td>approx. 5 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>approx. 159,000</td>
<td>approx. 1 helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>approx. 360</td>
<td>approx. 1 flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Launchers</td>
<td>approx. 720</td>
<td>approx. 1 flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>approx. 800</td>
<td>approx. 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>approx. 800</td>
<td>approx. 800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.
2. Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specified above.
The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) stipulates the following points: reorganization of the Major SDF Units; major programs regarding the SDF’s capabilities; measures for the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; quantities of major procurement; and expenditures.

- **Reorganization of the Major SDF Units**
  - Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF): establishing the Ground Central Command; transforming two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades; establishing a coast observation unit and area security units; and establishing an amphibious rapid deployment brigade.
  - Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF): retaining four escort flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and five escort divisions consisting of other destroyers; increasing the number of submarines.
  - Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF): relocating one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base; newly organizing one airborne early warning squadron; integrating ASDF units equipped with training support functions.

### Annex Table from the Medium Term Defense Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Mobile Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amphibious Vehicles</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tilt-Rotor Aircraft</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles</td>
<td>9 companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles</td>
<td>5 companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Howitzers (excluding mortars)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ships</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Tonnage)</td>
<td>15 (approx. 52,000 t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighters (F-35A)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter Modernization (F-15)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Aircraft (C-2)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)</td>
<td>2 groups &amp; education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above.

### Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

- (1) Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited; (2) limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure; and (3) ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties.
- The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology clarify the concrete standards, procedures and limitation better than ever and state them clearly and transparently both internally and externally.
- Japan will actively cooperate with the United States and other countries in the area of defense equipment and technologies, and more proactively advance the required measures.

Four ministers signing the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology.
The Ministers announced the approval of “the new Guidelines,” which update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Both Ministers noted with satisfaction the ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities.

The Ministers highlighted the recent progress in regional and international cooperation.

The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future challenges.

Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Outline of the New Guidelines

Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

- The new Guidelines specify the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with those of the 1997 Guidelines.

Strengthened Alliance Coordination

- The two governments will establish a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and develop and update bilateral plans.

Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

- This section presents the direction to achieve seamless cooperation, from peacetime to contingencies, in order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, the core of the Guidelines.

- Cooperative Measures from Peacetime
  - This section specifies ways of cooperation from peacetime to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

- Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security
  - This section describes measures to respond to emerging threats to Japan’s peace and security.

- Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan
  - The new Guidelines maintain the basic idea on roles of Japan and U.S. in response to an armed attack against Japan described in the 1997 Guidelines while enhancing the content in view of the expansion and diversification of defense cooperation between Japan and the United States.

Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

- The new Guidelines stipulate specific ways of bilateral cooperation for regional and global peace and security, based on experiences from previous activities in this area.

Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

- The new Guidelines added bilateral cooperation in new strategic domains, such as space and cyberspace.

Bilateral Enterprise

- The new Guidelines added the following areas as a foundation for defense cooperation to further improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:
  - Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
  - Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
  - Educational and Research Exchanges

Processes for Review

- The new Guidelines added regular evaluation while maintaining the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.

Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance

“2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2015)

1. The Ministers announced the approval of “the new Guidelines,” which update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

2. Both Ministers noted with satisfaction the ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities.

3. The Ministers highlighted the recent progress in regional and international cooperation.

4. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future threats.

Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Obama at the Japan-U.S. Summit in Washington in April 2015 (Cabinet Public Relations Office)
challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces on local communities.


- The Ministers agreed to oppose any attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They also confirmed that Japan’s legislation for peace and security will help ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and welcomed that the discussion at the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) thus far was put together. Furthermore, the Ministers reaffirmed cooperation to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter stated that the United States would provide Japan with necessary information on the accident involving an Osprey transport aircraft in Hawaii and reiterated efforts to thoroughly ensure the safe operation of the Osprey.

Direction of Strengthening the Alliance

- Japan and the United States will build the posture for seamless cooperation, including peacetime and various other situations, including cooperation in gray zone situations, while enhancing the Japanese and U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. Japan and the United States will continue to promote joint training and exercises, and the expansion of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, as well as the expansion of joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities and areas that serve as the bases for these activities.

Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan

- Koga
  - U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called X-Band Radar System)
- Iwakuni
  - U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Aircraft Group 36
  - CH-53 helicopters
  - AH-1 helicopters
  - MV-22 Osprey
- Yokosuka
  - U.S. Navy: 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force HQ
  - U.S. Navy: 4th Marine Regiment (infantry)
  - U.S. Marine Corps: 4th Marine Expeditionary Unit
  - U.S. Marine Corps: 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force HQ
  - U.S. Air Force: 17th Wing
  - F-15 fighters
  - KC-135 tankers
  - HH-60 helicopters
  - E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft
  - U.S. Navy: P-3C, P-8A patrol aircraft and others
- Misawa
  - U.S. Air Force: 35th Fighter Wing, F-16 fighters
  - U.S. Navy: P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and others
- Yokota
  - U.S. Air Force: 18th Wing
  - F-15 fighters
  - KC-135 tankers
  - HH-60 helicopters
  - E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft
  - U.S. Navy: P-3C, P-8A patrol aircraft and others
  - U.S. Army: 1-1 Air Defense Artillery
  - Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
The United States is proceeding with the force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. In Okinawa, the United States is taking such measures as the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the transfer of Marines in Okinawa to Guam and the return of land south of Kadena.

The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. This is believed to be a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the Futenma Replacement facility in the Camp-Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. Japan plans to make further efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the burden on Okinawa in a timely manner.

The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. As such, the government will work as one to implement this initiative.

Regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project, in addition to complying with the relevant laws and regulations, including completing the environmental impact assessment and the application for approval of the reclamation of publicly-owned waters, the Government of Japan has devoted ample time to completing all necessary procedures, including soliciting the opinions of the people of Okinawa Prefecture. On that basis, the Government of Japan commenced offshore boring survey work on August 14, 2014.

The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa

1. Reasons for Stationing the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa
- Compared to locations such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii and Guam, Okinawa is closer to various regions in East Asia.
  ⇒ In the event where urgent deployment within this region is required, the U.S. military in Okinawa can respond rapidly.
- Okinawa has the geographic advantage of being located in a place with certain distance from Japan’s neighbors.
- Okinawa is in a crucial strategic position in terms of the access to the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific Ocean, as it is located more or less in the center of the Nansei Islands and is close to Japan’s sea lanes.

2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa
- With their high level of mobility and readiness,* the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa plays various roles, including securing the peace and safety of the region through such endeavors as assisting in the defense of Japan and providing support after the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as dealing with the Java earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006.
  ⇒ The stationing of USFJ in Okinawa, an area with unique geographic characteristics, including the Marine corps, which has high-level mobility and readiness to carry out a wide range of duties and to deal with various types of emergencies, makes a significant contribution to the security of Japan, and to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

* The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations.
• Conduct the following reorganization based on the “Direction of the Ministry of Defense Reform” (August 2013) for the purpose of overall optimization of defense capability, strengthening of functions for integrated operations, policy planning, etc. in continuation from FY2014.
• Strengthening integrated operational functions
  <Unification of work relating to actual operations into the Joint Staff Office>
  • Unify work relating to actual operations of the SDF into the Joint Staff
  • Discontinue the Operational Policy Bureau, and newly establish the Director General for Operational Policy (Deputy Chief of Joint Staff-level) and the Director for Operation Policy (department director general / division director-level) for civilian officials to conduct coordination with related ministries and agencies, and external communication.
• Reorganization of the Internal Bureau
  <Strengthen the policy planning function and defense capability build-up function>
  • Transfer functions such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to operations and the training of units to the Bureau of Defense Policy.
  • Newly establish the Strategic Planning Division in the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to strengthen the policy planning function.
  • Newly establish the Bureau of Build-up Planning in order to strengthen the defense capability build-up function.
• The new establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency
  <Establish a new extra-ministerial organization that brings together and consolidates departments in MOD related to the procurement of equipment (namely the Internal Bureau, the respective Staff Offices, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office)>
  <Main functions of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency>
  - Project management function, international equipment and technology cooperation, weapons technology control function, research and development function and equipment acquisition function

Vision of the organization of the new Joint Staff Office

Vision of the organization after the reorganization of the Internal Bureau

Vision of the organization of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency