Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, the economy, and society. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security arrangements at its core, also forms the basis for Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations.

Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are extremely difficult for any single country to tackle alone, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable access to the seas, space, and cyberspace, and it is important for countries involved to regularly work together in peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for various forms of international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance measures to further stabilize the global security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.

Background to the Revision of the Guidelines

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulfill in case of an armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, with a view to responding rapidly to such an event. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role-sharing between Japan and the United States. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations.

Background to the Revision

More than 17 years have passed since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines. During these years, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against stable use of global commons such as oceans, space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by antipiracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions.

Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment, Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister...
of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the revision of the Guidelines and other matters. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Summit held in February 2013, Prime Minister Abe stated to U.S. President Obama that, “in response to the changing security environment, Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines through discussions on the two countries’ views of the roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).”

3 Background to the Revision

Against the background described above, at the Japan-U.S. SCC ("2+2" Meeting) in October 2013, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by the end of 2014.

The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting identified the following seven objectives of the review of the 1997 Guidelines:

1) Ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation;
2) Expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, encompassing such areas as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement;
3) Promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and values;
4) Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more flexible, timely, and responsive and to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations;
5) Describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities;
6) Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and
7) Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives.

Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States, Japan and the United States conducted extensive work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines. On October 8, 2014, based on the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held on July 11, 2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” In addition, on December 19, 2014, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the discussions to work toward finalizing the revision of the Guidelines during the first half of 2015, taking into account the progress of Japan’s legislative process.

2 Content of the New Guidelines

As a result of the intensive bilateral work on the revision of the Guidelines, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the new Guidelines recommended by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) at the “2+2” Meeting held on April 27, 2015, thereby accomplishing the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

1 Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

The new Guidelines newly specified the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.

In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.
The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

2 Basic Premises and Principles

The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below:

- The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged.
- All actions and activities undertaken under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law.
- All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
- The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

3 Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

(1) Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination

The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

(3) Bilateral Planning

In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

4 Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

This section presents the direction of achieving seamless cooperation, from peacetime to contingencies, in order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, the core of the Guidelines.

- The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.
- The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism where appropriate for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation of the situation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels.

(1) Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

As described below, this section specifies ways of cooperation from peacetime to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

- The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:
  a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security.
b. Air and Missile Defense
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles, and will also closely coordinate in responding to provocative missile launches.

c. Maritime Security
The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing a bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness.

d. Asset Protection
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

e. Training and Exercises
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence.

f. Logistic Support
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its related arrangements.

g. Use of Facilities
The two governments will enhance joint/shared use of facilities and areas in order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities, including civilian airports and seaports.

(2) Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security
As set forth below, this section describes measures to respond to emerging threats to Japan’s peace and security.

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.

In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

a. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
The two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, including by conducting training and exercises.

b. Maritime Security
The two governments’ cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.

c. Measures to Deal with Refugees
If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security.

d. Search and Rescue
The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

e. Protection of Facilities and Areas
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.

f. Logistic Support
The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

g. Use of Facilities
The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements.
(3) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

The new Guidelines state that bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. While maintaining the basic principles of bilateral responses to an armed attack against Japan described in the 1997 Guidelines, the content of the new Guidelines have been enhanced in view of the expansion and diversification of cooperation between Japan and the United States.

a. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated

The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

b. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

(a) Principles for Coordinated Actions

- Japan and the United States will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks.
- The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces.

(b) Concept of Operations

1) Operations to Defend Airspace

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

2) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, they will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

3) Operations to Defend Maritime Areas

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

4) Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

5) Cross-Domain Operations

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

(c) Operational Support Activities

1) Communications and Electronics

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness.

2) Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

3) Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

4) Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared
use of facilities and areas.
5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection
At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.

(4) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan
When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below.
a. Asset Protection
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.
b. Search and Rescue
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.
c. Maritime Operations
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate.

d. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.
e. Logistics Support
When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

(5) Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan
In light of the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the new Guidelines now include the following.

- When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

- The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

5 Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security
The new Guidelines stipulate specific ways of Japan-U.S. cooperation for regional and global peace and security, based on experiences from previous international activities.

- In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

- When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below.

(1) Cooperation in International Activities
The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.
Common areas for cooperation by the two governments will include the following.

a. Peacekeeping Operations
The two governments will cooperate, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.

b. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
The two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.

c. Maritime Security
The two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counterpiracy and minesweeping; nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities.

d. Partner Capacity Building
The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) or peacekeeping operations.

e. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.

f. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets.

g. Training and Exercises
In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises.

h. Logistic support
When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation.

The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.

6 Space and Cyberspace Cooperation
The new Guidelines now incorporate cooperation in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace.

(1) Cooperation on Space
- The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.
- The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation.
- The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.

(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace
- The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.
- The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to whole-of-government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.
- In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

7 Bilateral Enterprise
The new Guidelines state that the two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.

(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
(2) Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
(3) Educational and Research Exchanges
Processes for Review

The two governments will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary. The new Guidelines newly incorporate the implementation of the regular evaluation while maintaining the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.

Section 3 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance

Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance

Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year, and as part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, at the “2+2” Meeting held in the following year (1997), the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines were approved.

Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, in May 2006.

Furthermore, Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reaffirmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries revalidated and updated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to space and cyberspace, and covered a diverse range of areas regarding the strengthening of alliance security and defense cooperation, including an expansion of information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.