7 Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia has exported its fighters and warships to countries including India, ASEAN member countries, China, Algeria, and Venezuela.

Section 5 Australia

1 General Situation

Australia shares universal values with Japan, such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy; and is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Based on the awareness that Australia’s security environment will be significantly influenced by how the Indo-Pacific, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia, and its security framework evolve, Australia is adjusting its main strategic focus to the region.

In Australia, a federal election was held in September 2013. Tony Abbott, the head of the Liberal Party of the conservative coalition which won control of the lower house, took office as Prime Minister, resulting in a change of government from the Labor Party to the conservative coalition. No significant differences are thought to exist between the security and defense policies of the Abbott administration and the policies of previous Australian administrations. However, on the budget front, the Abbott administration has criticized the defense spending cuts of the previous administration, and has signaled its intention to actively make investments which are deemed necessary for building a stronger defense force. With regard to Australia’s relations with other countries, the administration continues to work to deepen relations with the countries in the Indo-Pacific region and proactively contribute to global peace and stability through the overseas deployment of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), among other activities.

2 Security and Defense Policies

The Australian government launched its first National Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013. The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy defines four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment. On this basis, the Strategy outlines the following priorities for the next five years: (1) enhanced engagement in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) integrated cyber policy and operations; and (3) effective partnerships.

In May 2013, the Australian government released...
In April 2014, the Abbott administration approved the additional acquisition of 58 F-35 JSFs. This brings the total number to be acquired to 72 JSFs, combining the 14 JSFs that have already been procured.

In November 2014, the first ship HMAS Canberra (displacement: 27,000 tons) was commissioned. The ship is capable of embarking 1,000 amphibious troops, as well as landing craft and helicopters.

In May 2014, the Abbott administration disclosed the FY2014-FY2015 federal budget, the first budget that was established under the administration. Of this amount, the defense budget disclosed by Australia’s Department of Defence was 29.3 billion AUD, about 15.2% more than the initial budget of the previous fiscal year. The Abbott administration intends to increase the defense budget’s share from about 1.6% of GDP as of 2013, to 2% within the coming decade.

In September 2013, the Abbott administration was formed. No major differences are believed to exist between the administration’s overall defense policies and the policies of the previous Labor Party administration. However, on the financial front, the Abbott administration strongly criticizes the defense budget cuts of the previous administration, and has indicated its intention to contrive funds through the streamlining of bloated government defense organizations and other means to actively invest in areas deemed necessary for building a strong defense force. Under this policy, the administration has significantly increased the defense budget in 2014 and 2015, and continues to pursue the acquisition of high-priced equipment, such as a new submarine, air warfare destroyer, amphibious assault ship, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The concrete defense policies of the Abbott administration are expected to be outlined in the administration’s first Defence White Paper to be published in 2015.

6 The Defence White Paper of Australia presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 ( Hawke Labor Party administration), 1994 ( Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 ( Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 ( Rudd Labor Party administration), and 2013 ( Gillard Labor Party administration), a total of six times.

7 (1) Economic, strategic, and military shift to the Indo-Pacific; (2) The ADF’s operational drawdown from Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands; (3) The U.S. re-balance to the Asia-Pacific; (4) Australia’s substantially enhanced practical cooperation with the United States pursuant to Australia’s Alliance relationship; and (5) The ongoing Global Financial Crisis, which have seen a significant deleterious impact on the global economy, domestic fiscal circumstances, and defense funding.

8 The White Paper identifies tasks for the ADF in priority order as follows: (1) deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia; (2) contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; (3) contribute to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, with priority given to Southeast Asia; and (4) contribute to military contingencies in support of global security. With regard to ADF asset build-up, the White Paper states that maintaining an appropriate mix of high-end ADF capabilities is essential to defend Australia and its strategic interests, and that maintaining credible high-end ADF capabilities enables Australia to act decisively when required, deter would-be adversaries, and strengthen its regional influence. The White Paper notes that accordingly, Australia will continue to seek the acquisition of key equipment.

9 In the campaign policy prior to its inauguration, the Abbott administration made clear its position to support the defense policy objectives that the Howard administration of the same conservative coalition presented in 2000 in the Defence White Paper published at the time. These defense policy objectives are: (1) Ensure the defense of Australia and its direct approaches; (2) Foster the security and stability of its immediate neighborhood; (3) Support strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region; and (4) Support global security. The administration maintains that these must remain the basic defense policy objectives of Australia. These defense policy objectives are considered to be generally in alignment with the concept of “strategic interests” that constituted the core of the defense policies of the previous Labor Party administration.

10 In May 2014, the Abbott administration disclosed the FY2014-FY2015 federal budget, the first budget that was established under the administration. Of this amount, the defense budget disclosed by Australia’s Department of Defence was 29.3 billion AUD, about 15.2% more than the initial budget of the previous fiscal year. The Abbott administration intends to increase the defense budget’s share from about 1.6% of GDP as of 2013, to 2% within the coming decade.

11 In November 2014, the first ship HMAS Canberra (displacement: 27,000 tons) was commissioned. The ship is capable of embarking 1,000 amphibious troops, as well as landing craft and helicopters to transport the troops. The Royal Australian Navy aims to induct two amphibious assault ships. The second ship is expected to be commissioned in 2016.

12 In April 2014, the Abbott administration approved the additional acquisition of 58 F-35 JSFs. This brings the total number to be acquired to 72 JSFs, combining the 14 JSFs that have already been approved in 2009. In January 2015, training by Royal Australian Air Force pilots began in the United States. The aircraft is expected to be relocated to Australia sequentially from 2018 and start partial operations in 2019.
3 Relations with Other Countries

Australia outlines in its Defence White Paper that as regional countries strengthen their military capabilities, Australia would build deeper strategic partnerships and contribute positively to the region’s security and stability – while at the same time managing strategic uncertainty. Specifically, it states that recognizing the importance of seizing opportunities to build deeper partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, Australia would enhance its relationships with other countries on the defense front for the time being. In addition, the White Paper states that Australia would attach importance to building effective mechanisms to manage security issues and risks arising from rivalries and the possibilities of miscalculation. It notes that Australia’s contribution to regional security is not restricted to deploying forces in a conflict or crisis, and that its efforts would be focused on reducing the risk of conflict through building trust and partnerships through regular interaction with other nations. It is deemed that the Abbott administration will continue to generally uphold this policy. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges)

1 Relations with the United States

The Australia-U.S. Alliance based on the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS) is Australia’s most important defense relationship, and Australia attaches great importance to this alliance as a pillar of its national strategy and security arrangements. The Defence White Paper states that the United States would continue to be the world’s strongest military power and the most influential strategic actor in Australia’s region for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it asserts that a U.S. presence in the region would continue to be important amidst the Indo-Pacific’s rapidly changing strategic environment, and that Australia welcomes the shift in U.S. strategic focus towards the region and the U.S. commitment to maintain its strong diplomatic, economic, and security presence.

Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. On the operational front, the two countries have made efforts to increase interoperability through joint exercises, including Exercise Talisman Saber. Since April 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps have conducted rotational deployments to northern Australia. On the equipment front, the two countries have been simplifying the export procedures associated with equipment deals pursuant to the Australia-U.S. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty that entered into force in May 2013. In addition, the two countries are examining the joint development of the F-35 JSF and missile defense cooperation. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is being advanced in areas, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), space, and cyber. Since the Abbott administration came into power, Australia has continued to pursue the further deepening of bilateral relations. At the 29th AUSMIN held in August 2014, the two sides signed the Force Posture Agreement which provides a legal framework for the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps. From October 2014, the ADF has been participating in the combat mission of the U.S.-led operation against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

2 Relations with China

Australia’s Defence White Paper states that China’s economic growth is a major contributor to global strategic weight shifting to the Indo-Pacific. In addition, it asserts that Australia welcomes China’s rise and does not approach China as an adversary; rather, its policy is aimed at encouraging China’s peaceful rise and ensuring that strategic competition in the region does not lead to conflict. It also states that the growth of China’s defense capabilities and the modernization of its military is a natural and legitimate outcome of its economic growth.

Moreover, Australia sees China as an important partner in the region, and is committed to developing strong and positive defense relations with China through dialogue and practical activities. Under these policies,
Australia continuously carries out dialogues between defense authorities with China\(^{20}\) and conducts exchanges to develop cooperative relations between Australian and Chinese forces, through joint exercises, mutual visits of military ships, among other activities\(^{21}\). In October 2014, northern Australia hosted KOWARI 2014, the first survival exercise conducted by the land forces of the United States, China, and Australia\(^{22}\).

Meanwhile, the Abbott administration has been intent on clearly communicating its concerns about China. In a joint statement of the ministerial strategic dialogue by ministers of defense of Japan, the United States, and Australia in October 2013, and a Joint Communiqué of AUSMIN in November 2013, the administration expressed its stance that it opposes any coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea, and that it thinks it is necessary for ASEAN and China to agree on a Code of Conduct regarding the South China Sea\(^{23}\). In addition, on China’s announcement of the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea in November 2013, Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop released a statement stating that Australia makes clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea.

\[\text{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft KOWARI 2014,\textquoteright\textquoteright, the first trilateral environmental survival training exercise conducted by the United States Army, China’s People’s Liberation Army, and the Australian Army} \]

[Australian Department of Defence]

3 \textbf{Relations with India}

Australia states in its Defence White Paper that it prioritizes the Indo-Pacific region against the backdrop of India’s emergence as an important strategic, diplomatic, and economic actor and greater engagement in regional frameworks. On this basis, Australia notes that it would deepen its relations with India, with which it has a shared interest in helping to address the strategic changes that are occurring in the region.

The Australia-India relationship was elevated to strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. More recently, in September 2014, Prime Minister Abbott visited India, and a nuclear cooperation agreement that enables uranium exports to India was signed\(^{24}\). In November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia also for the purpose of attending the G20 Summit, marking the first visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises\(^{25}\), and to convene talks between each of their military services.

Part I, Chapter 1, Section 7-1-2 (Military Affairs)

\(^{20}\) In July 2014, Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China visited Australia, and held talks with Prime Minister Abbott, Minister for Defence David Johnston, and others. The two sides agreed to hold a U.S.-China-Australia trilateral joint exercise. In addition, Australia and China have regularly convened the Defence Strategic Dialogue since 1997. At the 17th Dialogue held in China in December 2014, discussion took place on the plan for service engagement between the ADF and China’s People’s Liberation Army, among other matters.

\(^{21}\) In August 2013, Australia, the United States, China, and New Zealand conducted their first humanitarian assistance and disaster relief joint exercise in Christchurch, New Zealand. In October 2013, a Chinese naval vessel participated in the International Fleet Review held in Sydney.

\(^{22}\) In October 2014, KOWARI 2014 was held in northern Australia with the participation of ten U.S. Forces personnel, ten China’s People’s Liberation Army personnel, ten ADF personnel, and about 100 Australian support personnel. The exercise is said to have included activities for deepening understanding of the basic principles, procedures, techniques, and equipment that can enhance survival prospects in a harsh natural environment.

\(^{23}\) The AUSMIN Joint Communiqué of August 2014 expresses opposition to unilateral attempts to change facts on the ground or water through the threat or use of force or coercion.

\(^{24}\) Australia restricts uranium exports to countries with which it has concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement in order to prevent the diversion of uranium for military purposes. Given that India conducted nuclear tests and was not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Australia had not allowed the export of its uranium to India.

\(^{25}\) The Royal Australian Navy deployed one of its patrol boats to Milan 2014, a multinational naval exercise that the Indian Navy conducted in Andaman and Nicobar Islands in February 2014. The two navies plan to jointly hold their first maritime exercise in 2015.
4 Relations with Southeast Asia and South Pacific Countries

The Defence White Paper notes that Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the Indo-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia and the maritime environment. Given that major sea lanes that are critical to Australian trade pass through Southeast Asia, which sit astride the northern approaches to the country, there would be cause for concern if potentially hostile powers established a presence in Southeast Asia that could be used to project military power against Australia. From this perspective, Australia perceives the stability and security of Indonesia, its largest neighbor, to be of singular importance, and believes that it benefits from having a strong and cohesive Indonesia as a partner.

Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to strategic partnership in March 2010, and the conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement in September 2012\(^\text{26}\). Since the beginning of his administration, Prime Minister Abbott had prioritized Australia-Indonesia relations, selecting Indonesia as the destination of his first overseas visit in September 2013. However, issues emerged, including differences in their responses to stowaways from Indonesia and the case of wiretapping of the Indonesian President and others by Australia’s intelligence agency\(^\text{27}\). Consequently, cooperative relations in the security and defense fields were temporarily stalled between the two countries.

Subsequently, in 2014, their leaders made mutual visits, and in August, their foreign ministers signed a code of conduct on intelligence cooperation\(^\text{28}\). By November, their relations had recovered to the point of resuming high-level exchanges between their military forces\(^\text{29}\).

With Malaysia and Singapore, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas\(^\text{30}\) under the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements\(^\text{31}\). Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean.

Australia plays a leading role in assisting Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the South Pacific countries in fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural disasters, and maritime patrol\(^\text{32}\). In particular, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. In addition, in June 2014, Australia unveiled a plan to replace the 22 patrol vessels it provided to these countries in the past.

With New Zealand, Australia has an alliance pursuant to the ANZUS Treaty. The two countries hold regular meetings by their leaders and defense ministers, and have maintained close cooperative relations in the security and defense fields through joint exercises and joint activities in the region.

\(^{26}\) The Lombok Treaty is a security cooperation framework that espouses wide-ranging cooperation in the defense field. It entered into force in February 2008. The Defense Cooperation Arrangement covers strengthened cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security.

\(^{27}\) To deal with the increasing number of stowaways from Indonesia, the Abbott administration has taken responses, such as turning them away at sea prior to their landing in Australia. This has prompted backlash from the Indonesian government. In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and others. The Indonesian government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian government. The government also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia.

\(^{28}\) Provisions were incorporated into the code of conduct, such as prohibition of intelligence activities that would harm the interests of the other party and promotion of intelligence exchanges.

\(^{29}\) The Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces visited Australia and held the Second Australia-Indonesia High Level Committee Meeting with the Chief of the Australian Defence Force. The First Committee Meeting was held in April 2013.

\(^{30}\) In November 2013, Exercise Bersama Lima was held in the South China Sea and the Malay Peninsula, in which approximately 400 personnel, vessels, F/A-18 and other aircraft of the ADF participated. In Exercise Bersama Lima held in the South China Sea, Malaysia, and Singapore in October 2014, about 500 personnel, vessels, and AP-3C and other aircraft of the ADF participated.

\(^{31}\) See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-2 (Security and Defense Policies of Each Country)

\(^{32}\) Australia has extended proactive assistance for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the momentum for independence heightened in Timor-Leste. The ADF led the International Stabilization Force (ISF) since 2006, and with the stabilization of the security situation in Timor-Leste, the withdrawal of the ADF was completed in March 2013. In the Solomon Islands, the ADF extended assistance for their stabilization since July 2003 through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ADF withdrew from the country in August 2013, when the military activities of RAMSI were completed.
Australia identifies in the Defence White Paper “a stable, rules-based global order” as its fourth strategic interest. Accordingly, on occasion, Australia will utilize the ADF to assist the international community in dealing with risks and threats. Based on this policy, as of late May, about 2,250 of Australia’s approximately 56,750 force strength are deployed and are conducting activities overseas.

In Iraq, to support the airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq, Australia began air-dropping humanitarian supplies in August 2014 and participating in combat missions such as airstrikes from October 2014. In addition, Australia’s Special Operations Task Group is advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front. As of late May, about 900 personnel (of which approximately 400 personnel are engaged in assistance in the United Arab Emirates), six F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft, one E-7A early warning and control aircraft, one KC-30A refueling aircraft, among other assets are executing this mission.

In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately 1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually in reconstruction assistance activities and the trainings of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about 400 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist ANSF and other units.

In addition, for the search of the Malaysian airliner that vanished in March 2014, the ADF led the search activities by hosting search units of various countries in Perth, western Australia. The ADF also deployed a search unit in the wake of an AirAsia crash in December 2014.

Section 6 Southeast Asia

1 General Situation

Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. The countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. Furthermore, in recent years, there is a concern about nationals embarking to Iraq and Syria for the purpose of joining the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and engaging in terrorism after returning to their countries. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities.

See Fig. I-1-6-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2015)