Section 2 Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

1 North Korea used to vow that it would open the door to a “powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)” in 2012, which marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il-sung. Recently, however, North Korea has been using mainly the expression, “powerful and prosperous country (Kangseong Kukka).”

2 Joint editorial of the Korean Workers’ Party’s newspaper “Rodong Shinmun” and its journal “Workers” (June 16, 1999).

3 Until 1994, the late President Kim Il-sung gave a “New Year Address” every year on January 1. From after his death in 1995 to 2012, the Korean Workers’ Party’s newspaper “Rodong Shinmun,” the Korean People’s Army’s newspaper “Korean People’s Army,” and the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League’s newspaper “Youth Vanguard” jointly published a joint New Year Editorial.

4 For example, a comment in the Rodong Shinmun dated March 31, 2013 states that U.S. mainland is located within the range of our attacks along with Yokosuka, Misawa, Okinawa and Guam. In this context, the article listed the Japanese cities of Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kyoto.


1 General Situation

North Korea has been advocating the building of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy—and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The “military-first politics” has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction, based on the principle of military-first, and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution. First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-un, who is in a position to control the military, noted the principle of military-first, and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution in January 2015: “We were just in our efforts to firmly consolidate our self-reliant defense capability with the nuclear deterrent as its backbone and safeguard our national sovereignty, the lifeblood of the country, under the unfurled banner of Songun (military-first).” In addition, he regularly visits military organizations. In this light, it is conceivable that the First Chairman will continue to attach importance to and rely on the military forces.

Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international community for food and other resources, it seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its military forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2015, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2015 national budget was 15.9%. However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction of the real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operations forces. In addition, North Korea repeatedly uses provocative words and actions against relevant countries, including Japan. In particular, from March to April 2013, North Korea underscored that it would exercise its right to preemptive nuclear attack against the United States and other countries, and that the strike zone of its ballistic missiles included Japan, naming specific cities. In November 2014, the North Korean National Defense Commission released a statement protesting the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of a resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation. The statement noted that like the United States and the ROK, Japan will have to be hit hard and sent to the bottom of the sea.

Such military trend in North Korea constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but also of the entire region and the international community. Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. Sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them.
### Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula

![Map of the Korean Peninsula showing military locations and forces.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>U.S. Forces in Korea</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total armed forces</strong></td>
<td><strong>Approx. 1.19 million personnel</strong></td>
<td><strong>Approx. 1.02 million personnel</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ground troops</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Approx. 660,000 personnel</strong></td>
<td><strong>T-62, T-54/-55, etc.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Approx. 780; 103,000 tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>Approx. 210; 197,000 tons</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Destroyers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Frigates</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mig-23 x 56</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mig-29 x 18</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>F-4 x 70</strong></td>
<td><strong>F-16 x 164</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>Combat aircraft</strong></td>
<td><strong>3rd and 4th generation fighter aircraft</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Approx. 560</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mig-23 x 56</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Mig-29 x 18</strong></td>
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Source: The Military Balance 2015, etc.
2 Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country)\(^6\).

North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly 1.19 million. While North Korea’s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has forces such as large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

2 Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as main battle tanks and multiple launch rockets\(^7\).

The Navy has about 780 ships with a total displacement of approximately 103,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 70 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces.

The Air Force has approximately 560 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces.

In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations forces whose size is estimated at 100,000 personnel\(^8\). In recent years, observers indicate North Korea is placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces\(^9\).

North Korea’s military forces actively conduct various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation and other underlying circumstances, it is believed that military personnel are mobilized for agricultural activities as well as for construction projects\(^10\).

3 WMD and Ballistic Missiles

While North Korea continues to maintain large-scale military capabilities, its conventional forces are considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea. This is the result of a variety of factors, including decreases in military assistance from the former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War structure, limitations placed on North Korea’s national defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the rapid modernization of the ROK’s defense capabilities. It is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to compensate for this shortfall.

The development of WMDs and missiles by North Korea constitutes, coupled with its provocative words and actions, including missile attacks against Japan, a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.

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\(^6\) The Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962.

\(^7\) According to “The Military Balance 2014,” North Korea is replacing Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks with the Ch’onma-ho that North Korea independently produced based on the T-62. Furthermore, the Defense White Paper 2014 that the ROK Ministry of National Defense released in January 2015 refers to North Korea’s development of a new 300 mm multiple rocket launcher, as well as the significant increase in the number of tanks, armored cars, and multiple rocket launchers in North Korea’s possession.

\(^8\) It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers’ Party. However, it has been reported that these organizations were consolidated in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the military forces. The existence of the bureau was officially confirmed in March 2013 when Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported General Kim Yong-chol as the Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Moreover, James Thurman, then-Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White Paper 2014 notes, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 50,000” in its report at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in March 2014.

\(^9\) In his speech at the Association of the U.S. Army in October 2012, James Thurman, then-Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea said, “The North Koreans possess a significant cyber warfare capability which they continue to improve,” explaining his understanding that North Korea has stepped up its efforts to enhance cyber attack capabilities in recent years. According to the ROK Defense White Paper 2014, North Korea has mobilized over 6,000 cyber warfare personnel and carries out cyber attacks which interfere with the ROK’s military operations and national infrastructure. Regarding North Korean cyber attacks, see Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 5.

\(^10\) For example, in 2014, military personnel were mobilized for projects to build Mirae (Future) Scientists Street (university staff housing area) in Pyongyang, to expand the Pyongyang International Airport, and to construct the Songdowon International Children’s Camp in Wonsan.
(1) Nuclear Weapons
a. Recent major developments related to North Korea’s nuclear development

With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003, aimed at taking peaceful measures to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, the Joint Statement was adopted, which focused on the abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. In 2006, the Talks were suspended with North Korea launching seven ballistic missiles and conducting a nuclear test11, along with the U.N. Security Council adopting Resolutions 1695 and 1718 in response. Later, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks. At the sixth round of the Talks in September 2007, the parties reached an agreement, which included completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by the end of the year. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed12, and the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since December 2008.

In 2009, North Korea again conducted a missile launch and a nuclear test13. In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 in June 2009, imposing additional sanctions on North Korea. Since then, while the meetings of the head negotiators of the Six-Party Talks from North and South as well as the U.S.-North Korea high-level talks have been held, the Six-Party Talks have not yet resumed. In response to North Korea’s launch of a missile, which it called a “Satellite,” in December 2012, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 in January 2013 to expand and strengthen the sanctions of the past resolutions. Furthermore, in response to a nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2094 in March 2013 that includes additional and strengthened sanctions against North Korea.

North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a nuclear weapons state in 2012 in its revised constitution. In 2013, North Korea continued to take steps to boost its standing in the international community as a “nuclear weapons state.” In March 2013, it adopted the so-called “new strategic line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development. North Korea reiterated that nuclear weapons were neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings, alleging that North Korea would be able to concentrate on economic development and on improving the lives of the people as long as there was solid nuclear deterrence. In April of the same year, North Korea adopted a law “On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense”14.” As illustrated above, North Korea has not changed or softened its stance of proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons.

With regard to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, some have argued that it is a so-called brinkmanship policy designed to establish North Korea’s standing as a de facto nuclear weapons state, and thereby, gain an advantage in negotiations with the United States and other countries and receive a reward of some sort. On the other hand, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime in light of the following: North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime15; North Korea considers that it needs its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear threat of the United States16 and is in no position at least in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK; North Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed due to their lack of nuclear deterrence17; and North Korea reiterates nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations.

b. The current status of the nuclear weapons program

Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the nuclear status of past nuclear developments and in view of the implementation of nuclear tests conducted in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013, the possibility

11 On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as Japan’s own careful examination of the United States and the ROK analyses, the Japanese government judged that there was an extremely high probability that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test.
12 In June 2008, North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program. However, as of the end of May 2015, no agreement has been made concerning a specific framework for verification.
13 Given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, the government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on that day.
14 According to a Korean Central News Agency report dated April 1, 2013, this law establishes that North Korea is a “nuclear weapons state,” and in order to further consolidate North Korea’s “position of nuclear weapons state,” it provides for bolstering the nuclear deterrence and nuclear retaliatory strike power both in quality and quantity, safeguarding and management of nuclear weapons and other assets, cooperation towards the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the provision of proactive supports for nuclear disarmament.
16 For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014 alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people.
17 For example, a comment in the Rodong Shinmun dated December 2, 2013 contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability.
Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, a series of North Korean activities were observed from satellite imagery suggesting that the nuclear reactor was restarted. Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, such developments are causes of great concern.

As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in 2002 the United States announced that North Korea acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of enrichment. Furthermore, in November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. Analysts have suggested the expansion of this uranium enrichment plant in August 2013. It follows that North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. North Korea insists that the enriched uranium is used as fuel for light water reactors and that therefore the uranium enrichment program falls under peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, a series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.

With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013. It is highly likely that North Korea collects the necessary data by conducting these nuclear tests, and thereby, has proceeded with its nuclear weapons program. Since March 2014, North Korea has repeatedly hinted at further nuclear tests, raising international concerns.

It is believed that North Korea is working to develop a nuclear weapon to mount on a ballistic missile as part of its nuclear weapons program. In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s and that North Korea conducted a nuclear test in February 2013, among other factors, the possibility that North Korea has the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon to Japan must be considered cautiously.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korea’s efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that could become the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses a grave threat to Japan’s security and significantly impairs peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community. Therefore, they can never be tolerated.
(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons
North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to biological weapons, it is believed that North Korea has some infrastructure for their production despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents as well as a substantial stockpile of such agents26.

(3) Ballistic Missiles
As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency27, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. As was observed in March, June, and July 2014 and March 2015, North Korea often launches ballistic missiles to conduct military provocations against relevant countries, including Japan28.

a. Toksa
North Korea is thought to be developing a short-range ballistic missile, Toksa, with its range estimated to be approximately 120 km29. It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile owned or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant30.

b. Scud
It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C31, a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries. At present, North Korea is considered to deploy Scud ER (Extended Range) which has an extended range due to the extension of the scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach 1,000 km32, and it is possible that a part of Japan falls within this range.

c. Nodong
North Korea is thought to have started developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, which is believed to be already deployed, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, and may reach almost all of Japan.

26 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2014 points out that, following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500-5,000 tons of various chemical weapons stored. It also notes that North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, and pest. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of May 2013 points out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.”

27 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002)

28 An overview of North Korea’s ballistic missile launches in 2014 and 2015 is as follows. (1) On March 3, 2014, at around 6:20 am and around 6:30 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the east-northeastern direction from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (2) On the 26th of the same month, from around 2:30 am to 2:40 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Nodong missiles in the eastern direction from the vicinity of Sukchon in the western coast of the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 650 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (3) On June 29, 2014, at around 5 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the eastern direction from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that both missiles launched flew a maximum of approximately 500 km and all fell into the Sea of Japan. (4) On July 9 of the same year, from around 4 am to around 4:20 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the northeast direction from the southwestern area of North Korea (approximately 100 km south of Pyongyang). It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (5) On July 13, from around 1:20 am to around 1:30 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the northeastern direction from the vicinity of Kaesong in the southern area of North Korea. It is estimated that both of the ballistic missiles launched flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (6) On June 26, at around 9:35 pm, North Korea launched one ballistic missile presumed to be a Scud missile in the eastern direction from the western coast of North Korea (approximately 100 km west of Hajeju). It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (7) On July 23, 2015, at around 6:30 am and around 6:40 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the east-northeastern direction from the vicinity of Nampo on the western coast of North Korea. It is estimated that both of the ballistic missiles launched flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan.

29 In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period.”

30 Generally, solid fuel propellant missiles are considered to be militarily superior because they are filled with a propellant in solid form in airframes and are capable of immediate launches compared with liquid fuel propellant missiles, making signs of their launches unlikely to be detected in advance. Furthermore, they are relatively easy to store and handle.

31 The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively.

It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong missiles. Furthermore, in March 2014, North Korea launched ballistic missiles presumed to be Nodong missiles towards the Sea of Japan. On this occasion, North Korea launched ballistic missiles presumed to be Nodong missiles for the first time from the western coast of North Korea in the eastern direction, across the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, it is deemed that North Korea is building up its confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.

Although the details of Nodong’s performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy.

d. Taepodong-1

Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range of at least approximately 1,500 km. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of a longer range missile, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

e. Musudan

It is believed that North Korea is currently developing a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) “Musudan.” It has been pointed out that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) SS-N-6 that it acquired in the early 1990s. It will likely be loaded onto a TEL, similar to its Scud and Nodong counterparts, and then operated. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the new missile boasts a range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km. Guam in addition to all parts of Japan may fall within its firing range.

It is very difficult to verify the intention of North Korea’s military activities because of its closed regime. In addition, it is believed that North Korea has constructed underground military facilities across the country, and the ballistic missiles such as Toksa, Scud, Nodong and Musudan, would be loaded onto TELs. These make it difficult to detect in advance individual and specific signs of the launch of missiles with TELs, such as detailed launch sites and timings.

f. Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 is believed to be a missile which uses in its first stage, four engines, each of which is developed based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately one ton. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and fell near the launch site. In the launch of a missile in April 2009, which it called a “Satellite,” it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it from the same district. It is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000 km before falling into the Pacific Ocean. In April 2012, North Korea conducted a launch using what is believed to be a Taepodong-2 or its variant from the Tongch'ang-ri district on the northwestern coast of North Korea, which it called a “Satellite.” The missile flew over a minute and then fell into the Yellow Sea by breaking into several pieces. The launch is thought to
have been a failure.  

In December of the same year, North Korea again conducted a launch using a Taepodong-2 variant, which it called a “Satellite,” from the Tongch’ang-ri district. In this launch, all falling objects are presumed to have fallen in the danger areas which were set beforehand by North Korea. An object including the possible third stage propelling device is presumed to have continued flight while changing its trajectory, and to have put an object into orbit around the earth. These moves showed that North Korea has developed technologies to extend the range such as those to separate multi-stage propulsion devices and technologies to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles such as those to control posture and guidance. It is thus believed that North Korea’s ballistic missile development has entered a new phase. In particular, if North Korea develops long-range ballistic missiles using the technologies that were verified through the launches, the missiles could have ranges that potentially reach the central, western, and other areas of the U.S. mainland, while some details regarding a few of the related technologies are still unclear. In this regard, the technology to extend the range is considered to have made significant advancements.

**g. KN08**

The details of the new missile KN08 which was showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Whereas the Taepodong-2 is launched from a fixed launch pad, the KN08 is carried by a TEL, making it difficult to detect signs of its launch in advance, and is likely intended to increase survivability.

**h. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)**

It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry the SLBM. In May 2015, North Korea, along with photos, announced through its media that it conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM. While their development status is unclear, it is deemed that North Korea intends to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and improve survivability.

**i. Trends in and outlook of ballistic missile development**

An underlying factor that allowed for North Korea’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches is believed to be North Korea’s imports of various materials and technologies from outside of the country. As discussed earlier, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out that “North Korea’s rapid development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation.” It is further pointed out that North Korea conducts tests at transfer destinations and uses the results. Moreover, because a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and...
improving the circular error probability (CEP), the launch of long-range ballistic missiles such as Taepodong-2, including the launch in December 2012, may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea.

North Korea continues to claim that it would keep conducting “satellite launches” and would develop and launch more capable satellite launch vehicles. It is highly possible that North Korea will further develop its long-range ballistic missiles by repeating similar launches under the name of “satellite” launches to carry out further technical tests to bring its long-range ballistic missiles to the stage of practical use. It has been suggested that North Korea is carrying out significant modification of its launch tower in Tongch’ang-ri district. In the future, North Korea could launch long-range ballistic missiles which are larger than the Taepodong-2 variant used in December 2012. Should North Korea make further progress in its longer-range ballistic missile capability and simultaneously achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads, North Korea may come to have a one-sided understanding that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea have a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases in and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan.

Additionally, North Korea has intensified not only its research and development of ballistic missiles, but also activities intended to increase their operational capabilities. Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has repeatedly instructed military units to conduct realistic military training that does away with formalistic practices. In the case of the ballistic missile launches in 2014 and 2015, multiple ballistic missiles were launched using TEL in the early morning and late evening hours from locations which had never been used in the past. The launches revealed that North Korea has the capacity to launch ballistic missiles from locations and at timings as it chooses. The improvements in the operational capabilities of North Korea’s ballistic missile units, including surprise attack capabilities, demonstrate that the North Korean ballistic missile threat is increasing further.

In this light, coupled with its nuclear issue, North

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42 It is possible that North Korea will seek out increased reliability of long-range ballistic missiles as well as such technologies as those for protecting a payload from high temperature when it reenters into the atmosphere from higher altitude with high velocity, those for precision guidance, and those for building underground launch sites and silos, which enhance survivability of missiles.

43 Articles dated October 1 and July 29, 2014 published on the website (38North) of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University in the United States point out that analyses of satellite images of the Tongch’ang-ri district show that the launch tower was raised to 55 m, enabling launches of rockets up to 50 m in height, larger than the Taepodong-2 variant (total height approx. 30 m) which was used in December 2012.
Launch of a Missile, which North Korea Called a “Satellite” on December 12, 2012

It is estimated that North Korea put an object (*) into orbit with an inclination of approx. 97 degrees.

* It is assessed that the object does not function as a satellite.

Korea’s ballistic missile issue has become more realistic and imminent for Northeast Asia, including Japan, and for the international community from the perspective of both the improvement of the capability and transfer and proliferation, and such developments are profoundly worrisome.

See Fig. I-1-2-3 (Launch of a Missile, which North Korea Called a “Satellite” on December 12, 2012)

4 Domestic Affairs

(1) Developments related to the Kim Jong-un Regime

After the death in 2011 of Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-un became the de facto head of the military, party, and the “state” by assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, First Secretary of the Korea Workers’ Party, and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in a short period of time. Since the transition to the new regime, there have been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions, leading analysts to note that the “state” is run under the leadership of the party. Meanwhile, First Chairman Kim Jong-un underscores the importance of military strength and makes frequent visits to military organizations. In this light, the First Chairman is anticipated to continue to attach importance to military strength.

Following the change in regime, Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, including reshuffles of the top three military posts of the Director of the General Political Department, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. In turn, individuals whom First Chairman Kim Jong-un selected were assigned to the key party, military, and cabinet posts. In addition, in December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission and First Chairman Kim Jong-un’s uncle, was executed for “plotting to overthrow the state.” It is believed that through such measures, the First Chairman endeavors to strengthen and consolidate his regime as its sole leader. In 2014, the North Korean media stopped reporting the activities of Kim Kyong-hui, Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party and First Chairman Kim Jong-un’s aunt. Meanwhile, the North Korean media began to report the activities of First Chairman Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior member of the Korean Workers’ Party. These developments suggest that a generational change in the leadership may be taking place among the Kim family.

To date, no disruptions have been caused by such personnel changes, and various “national” events and field guidance by First Chairman Kim Jong-un have been carried out in an orderly manner. The regime thus appears to be moving on track to a certain degree. However, due to the chilling effect resulting from the execution of Vice-Chairman Jang Song-thaek and from the frequent personnel reshuffles including demotions and dismissals, senior officials have become unable to object to the decisions made by First Chairman Kim Jong-un. This in turn could propel North Korea to turn to military provocative actions without making sufficient diplomatic considerations. Accordingly, uncertainty is deemed to be rising. Some also point to the concern over social control such as the increasing inequality between the rich and the poor and the inflow of information from abroad – a concern which needs to be monitored from the perspective of regime stability.

44 Following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, the North Korean media repeatedly calls for the strengthening of the “monolithic leadership system” and “single-minded unity.” For example, an editorial in the Rodong Shinmun dated January 10, 2014 urged the people to stay cautious even of trivial phenomena and elements which erode North Korea’s single-minded unity. In May 2015, it was suggested that Hyon Yong-chol, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, may have been executed on charges of treason. However, his execution has not been confirmed from North Korean media reports and other North Korean sources as of late May 2015.
In terms of the economy, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to rely on food assistance from overseas.\(^{45}\)

To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has attempted at limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems, and seems to be implementing economic cooperation projects with other countries, including China. First Chairman Kim Jong-un continues to frequently emphasize the need to improve the economic situation and announced the establishment of economic development zones.\(^{47}\) In addition, according to reports, a new economic policy is under way to enlarge the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans.\(^{48}\) These all suggest North Korea is placing importance on the rebuilding of the economy. Nonetheless, North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current governance system, and thus, various challenges confront the fundamental improvement of its current economic situation.

\section{Relations with Other Countries}

\subsection{Relations with the United States}

The United States has indicated it would work to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. The United States consistently makes its position clear that it is necessary for North Korea to comply with the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and take specific measures to improve North-South relations before resuming the Six-Party Talks. In response, North Korea has criticized the United States, claiming that its “hostile policy” towards North Korea and lack of trust between them stand in the way of the peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and asserts that the conclusion of a U.S.-North Korea peace agreement is necessary to build a relationship of trust.\(^{49}\) As such, a significant gap has been observed between the two parties’ stances. Since the U.N. Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2087 in January 2013, North Korea, claiming that the “hostile policy” of the United States has entered a dangerous state, contends that there can be no denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before the denuclearization of the world, and therefore, there will be no more talks for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while leaving room for dialogue for ensuring peace and security in the region. The divide between the two parties’ positions has still not been bridged. In June 2013, North Korea, in the form of an important statement by the spokesperson of the National Defense Commission, proposed to hold U.S.-North Korea senior-level talks. However, the United States remained firm on its stance that North Korea must first take concrete steps to show it is headed towards denuclearization, and the talks have yet to materialize.

North Korea, further still, reacted sharply to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise, alleging that such activities were a manifestation of the U.S. “hostile policy” towards North Korea. On the occasion of the U.S.-ROK combined exercise carried out from March to April 2013, coupled with the protests against U.N. Security Council Resolutions, North Korea repeatedly made hardline arguments including nullification of the Korean War Armistice Agreement and suggestion of pre-emptive nuclear attack on the United States. Similarly, during a period of U.S.-ROK combined exercise from February to April 2014, North Korea launched several ballistic missiles and multiple rockets, while criticizing the United States. Furthermore, North Korea reiterated that it would continue to launch missiles and strengthen its nuclear deterrent as a right of self-defense. On the occasion of the U.S.-ROK combined exercise held from March to April 2015, North Korea launched ballistic missiles in the direction of the Sea of Japan on March 2, the first day of the exercise, and reiterated its criticism of the United States.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{In February 2015, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) forecasted North Korea’s production of principal foods to be 5.94 million tons between November 2014 and October 2015, and estimated the necessary imported amount of grains to be 0.407 million tons.}
\footnote{For example, North Korea conducted a so-called redenomination (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009. The redenomination is said to have led to economic disorder, such as price escalation due to shortfall of supply, which in turn increased social unrest.}
\footnote{During the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Korea Workers’ Party on March 31, 2013, First Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the establishment of economic development zones in each province. Pursuant to these instructions, the Economic Development Zone Law was enacted in May of that year. In November 2013, the establishment of 1 special economic zone and 13 economic development zones was announced. In January 2015, it was reported that development plans for 13 economic development zones were established.}
\footnote{While the details of the policy are not necessarily clear, it is understood that in the industrial sector, entities would be able to independently make production decisions and conduct sales outside the scope of the national plan, as well as determine employee remuneration and benefits based on the situation of the entities. In the agriculture sector, an autonomous business system would be introduced at the household level. It has been said that 1,000 pyeong (1 pyeong = approx. 3.3 m\(^2\)) of land would be allocated per person, with 40% of the agricultural products going to the state and 60% going to individuals.}
\footnote{For example, during the 20th Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) held on July 2, 2013, Pak Ui-chun, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, delivered an address, stating, “The United States drop of its hostile policy should start from the conclusion of a peace treaty between the United States and the DPRK on the basis of the respect for the latter’s sovereignty and halt to all sanctions and military provocations against it.”}
\end{footnotes}
Chapter 1  Defense Policies of Countries

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea

Relations between the ROK and North Korea worsened under the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, spurred by the outbreak of incidents that heightened North-South military tensions, including the sinking of an ROK patrol vessel in March 2010 and the shelling incident of Yeonpyeong Island in November of the same year. Even after the administration of President Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013, North Korea lodged protests against the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087 in January 2013 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 in March 2013, as well as to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise conducted in March to April. North Korea adopted a hardline rhetoric, including abrogation of all agreements on North-South non-aggression. Following the U.S.-ROK combined exercise that was conducted until the end of April 2013, North Korea gradually softened its provocative words and actions against the ROK. By August, North Korea agreed to the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex which had de facto suspended its operations. In addition, North Korea has held dialogues with the ROK, including the North-South separated family reunion meeting which was held for the first time in three years and four months in February 2014. However, when the U.S.-ROK combined exercise commenced at the end of February 2014, North Korea engaged in military provocations, including intrusion into the ROK’s airspace using small drones and a large-scale maritime live-fire drill in an area near the northwest islands of the ROK covering Baengnyeong Island and Yeonpyeong Island. Since then, Hwang Pyong-so, the Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army, and others visited the ROK in October 2014 and agreed to hold high-level talks. However, the high-level talks have not taken place actually, and no significant improvement has been seen in inter-Korean relations.

Meanwhile, there have been developments in recent years towards ROK-China cooperation not only in the economic realm but also in the political and diplomatic realms. Under such circumstances, Japan needs to pay attention to what policies are adopted for the ROK by North Korea, which has heretofore repeated dialogue and provocations.

(3) Relations with China

The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force. Currently, China is North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2014, trade volume between China and North Korea was very high, accounting for approximately 70% of North Korea’s total trade, leading observers to point to North Korea’s dependence on China. Furthermore, the two countries have undertaken port and commercial facility construction projects, as demonstrated by the promotion of joint development and joint management projects in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone and the Hwanggumphyong-Wihwado Economic Zone since June 2011.

Meanwhile, with regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In addition, China endorsed U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2087 and 2094. Following the adoption of the two resolutions, China issued notices in February and April 2013, stating that China would thoroughly enforce the embargo of items set forth in both resolutions. In September 2013, China released a list of supplies and technologies banned for export to North Korea that could be diverted to WMD programs. Through such measures, China has demonstrated commitment to executing the Security Council resolutions against North Korea.

China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. However, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions which are in line with the position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues. Furthermore, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, who played a key role in economic cooperation with China was executed. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations and China’s influence on North Korea will continue to be followed. At the same time, although China and North Korea had traditionally displayed friendly relations, the Asian regional security environment and economic development have been significantly affected by the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear and missile issues.
and cooperative relations through mutual visits of many senior officials, few visits took place in 2014 – only the visit to North Korea by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Zhenmin in February of that year and the visit to North Korea by Special Representative of the Chinese Government for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei in March of that year. Moreover, it is deemed that the agenda included only items related to the easing of tensions in the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization. In addition, while the Chinese President had customarily visited North Korea before the ROK after taking office, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the ROK in July 2014 without having visited North Korea. In this light, relations between China and North Korea may be cooling on the political and diplomatic domains.

(4) Relations with Russia
While North Korea and Russia became estranged with the end of the Cold War, they signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in 2000\(^57\). In August 2011, Kim Jong-il, then-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia. A Russia-North Korea summit was held for the first time in nine years, and the two sides agreed to cooperate on a gas-pipeline project, among other matters. In September 2012, after the transition to the Kim Jong-un regime, the two countries signed an agreement that wrote off 90% of the debt owed to Russia by North Korea, and in such ways, friendly relations have been maintained between the two countries. Furthermore, in September 2013, a railway opened for service connecting Khasan, a coastal area in the Russian Far East, and Rajin Port in northeastern North Korea. In 2014, North Korea further intensified its diplomacy with Russia. The year saw mutual visits by many senior officials as well as advances in economic cooperation\(^58\).

Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. After the nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013, Russia issued a statement that condemned the test but expressed that it was against sanctions that could influence normal trade and economic relations with North Korea.

(5) Relations with Other Countries
Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries\(^59\) and participation in the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer. In April 2013, North Korea’s attempt to export gas masks and other items to Syria was intercepted by Turkish authorities. In July of the same year, the North Korean vessel Chong Chon Gang sailing from Cuba to North Korea was seized by Panamanian authorities near the Panama Canal. As a result, contents of cargo that violated U.N. Security Council resolutions were confiscated, including MiG-21 fighters and a surface-to-air missile system.

In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be strengthening its relations with African countries, with North Korean senior officials paying visits to African

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57 The previous treaty (Soviet-North Korea Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty) contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means available. This provision, however, was dropped from the new treaty.

58 For example, in February 2014, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam visited Russia. In March 2014, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East Alexander Galushka visited North Korea, and the two sides signed minutes of talks (protocol) on cooperation in trade, economy, and science and technology. In April 2014, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev visited North Korea, and the two sides signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Trade of North Korea and the government of the Amur Oblast of the Russian Federation. In May 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed a law which ratified an agreement to write off North Korea’s debts. In September 2014, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Su-yong visited Russia. In November 2014, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Hyon Yong-chol and Secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party Cho Rae Ryong have visited Russia.

59 For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively.
countries. The underlying purposes for enhancing relationships with these countries include the usual objective of deepening political and economic cooperation. In addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military cooperation with African countries—activities which are becoming increasingly difficult due to sanctions based on U.N. Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in the Middle East. The possibility that North Korea’s illegal activities would provide a funding source for nuclear and ballistic missile development is a cause for concern.

2 The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea

1 General Situation

In the ROK, the administration of Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013. The Park administration maintains that forging trust through dialogue is most critical for improving the North-South relations. With regard to the nuclear issue, the administration sets out that North Korea’s nuclear development can never be tolerated and that the ROK would address this issue in concert with the international community. In August 2013, the ROK unveiled a policy called the “Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” which aims to realize denuclearization by building trust through efforts, including humanitarian initiatives and North-South exchanges. The ROK states that it would make a decisive response to military provocations by North Korea and emphasizes the importance of building a solid posture to deter and address the threat of North Korea.

The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces stationed in the ROK have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula.

2 Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK,

in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy.” However, the ROK presently uses the expression, “the North Korean regime and its armed forces… will remain as our enemies.”

In 2005, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced the “National Defense Reform Basic Plan 2006-2020” for “the restructuring of the military from its current quantitative, conventional form centered on troops to a qualitative, high-tech military force structure that is information and technology intensive.” In 2009, in light of the changes in the situation, such as the missile launches and nuclear test by North Korea, the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2009-2020 was announced. The Basic Plan identified, among other measures, the scaling down of the initially planned reduction in the force strength and the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korea and further streamlining of the military. In March 2014, the Park Geun-hye administration unveiled the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2014-2030, which envisions long-term defense force enhancements for dealing with potential threats following the unification of the Korean Peninsula, while maintaining a readiness posture against North Korean threats.

3 Military Posture of the ROK

The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and 2 marine divisions, totaling 550,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of 210

60 For example, from May to June 2014, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Su-yong visited Algeria, Gambia, Mozambique, among other countries. From October to November 2014, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam visited Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Uganda, among other countries.
61 The final report of the U.N. Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee released in February 2015 makes references to possible transactions with an Ethiopian ammunition producer, possible export of arms-related equipment to Eritrea, and possible violation of the arms embargo in providing training support to the Ugandan Police Force.
62 The ROK Defense White Paper 2014 describes North Korea as follows: “North Korea poses a serious threat to our security by developing and increasing its large-scale conventional arsenal, nuclear program, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, and by continually perpetrating acts of armed provocation such as the attack on the ROK Ship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. As long as these threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces, which are the entities who pose these threats, will remain as our enemies.”
63 An act on national defense passed in 2006 oblique the revision and supplementation of the National Defense Reform Basic Plan based on an analysis and assessment of the changes in conditions and the performance of national defense reform.
64 In order to reorganize the ROK Forces into a structure tailored to the operational environment of the Korean Peninsula, the ROK Ministry of National Defense intends to greatly enhance its operational capability in the northeastern offshore island region, reorganize the upper command structure in preparation for the transition of the wartime OPCON, gradually promote troop reduction and reorganization, and significantly expand capabilities to handle missile and cyber warfare. Moreover, in order to build a highly efficient and advanced defense structure, it will promote streamlining, reorganize the human resource management system, and improve the military’s welfare and service environment.
65 In order to secure capabilities for responding to existing and potential threats, the ROK Ministry of National Defense plans to install three additional Aegis destroyers, develop and install next-generation destroyers and submarines, and install mid- and high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and multi-functional satellites.
vessels with a total displacement of approximately 197,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 620 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to establish an omnidirectional defense posture to deal with future potential threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers. In February 2010, the first mobile force in the ROK was created. In February 2015, a submarine command was created. In April 2012, the Air Force completed the introduction of F-15K fighters which had been implemented since 2002. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35 as a next-generation fighter with stealth capabilities.

In October 2012, the ROK government announced a revision of its missile guidelines stipulating the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision includes the extension of their maximum range from 300 km to 800 km to enhance the deterrence against military provocation by North Korea. In addition, to address North Korean nuclear and missile threats, the ROK intends to expand the missile capabilities of the ROK Forces, establish a system known as “Kill Chain” to conduct swift preemptive strikes using missiles and other assets, and develop an indigenous missile defense system (Korea Air and Missile Defense [KAMD]).

In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted equipment export, which reached approximately US$3.4 billion on a contract value basis in 2013. Since 2006, the amount has increased by nearly 14-fold in eight years. It is reported that export items have diversified to include communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels.

Defense spending in FY2015 (regular budget) increased by about 4.9% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 37.456 trillion, marking the 16th consecutive year of increases since 2000.

The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK alliance in recent years. At the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in June 2009, the two sides agreed on the Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. The vision includes reference to building “a comprehensive strategic alliance,” which would expand the scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance from the Korean Peninsula to global and would widen the partnership of the two countries to encompass non-military areas. Furthermore, at the 42nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2010, a joint communiqué was released, which included the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation for

Fig. I-1-2-4 Change in the ROK’s Defense Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year-on-year growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Defense Budget (in 100 million won)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

realizing the future vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. At the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in May 2013, the two sides, in a joint declaration commemorating the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, affirmed to continue to strengthen their alliance in order to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. Through such measures, the two countries have striven to deepen their relations. In addition to agreements at the political and strategic levels, in March 2013, the two countries signed the ROK-U.S. Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s provocations. At the 45th SCM in October 2013, the two countries approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats. At the 46th SCM in October 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats.

At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal with such issues as the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK and the realignment of the U.S. Forces in the ROK. Despite these efforts, however, the two countries are pressed to revise their plans. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when the ROK Forces meet conditions such as enhanced capabilities. Although this new approach does not present a specific deadline for the transition, the transition of OPCON could be delayed considerably given that the central challenges to enhancing the capabilities of the ROK Forces are deemed to be Kill Chain and KAMD, and that these systems have mid-2020s as the target completion date.

With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontae area, south of Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. However, the relocation to the Pyeontae area had been delayed due to logistical reasons, including increases in relocation costs. The decision to postpone the transition of OPCON that was made at the 46th SCM has in turn necessitated some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison. In addition, the two countries decided that the counter-fires forces of the U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. These decisions have given rise to new factors that force the two countries to partially revise the plans. Accordingly, while the plans themselves would be maintained, their completion date was revised to “strive for completion in a timely manner.” These challenges are perceived to have significant impact on the U.S.-ROK defense postures in the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, relevant developments need to be followed closely.

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71 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint responses in the event of a North Korean provocation. However, the details of the plan have not been made public.
72 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK to maximize their deterrent effects. However, the details have not been made public.
73 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 46th SCM, the “Concepts and Principles” are designed to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy missile threats including nuclear and biochemical warheads. However, the details have not been made public.
74 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency. In 2007, the two countries decided to dissolve the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command in April 2012 and to transition OPCON to the ROK. However, in June 2010, they agreed to postpone the transition timing to December 1, 2015 due to reasons, including North Korea’s increased military threat.
75 The United States intends to consolidate and relocate the bases of the U.S. Forces Korea which are scattered across the ROK, in order to ensure stable stationing conditions for U.S. Forces Korea and a balanced development of ROK land. The agreement between the United States and the ROK include: (1) an agreement to conduct the relocation to south of the Han River in two stages (June 2003); and (2) the withdrawal of 12,500 of the nearly 37,500 personnel out of the ROK (October 2004). The United States has thus been transforming its posture in accordance with these agreements. However, at the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in April 2009, the two countries agreed to maintain the current 28,500 as the appropriate troop level. Since then, the two countries have continued to affirm that maintaining this troop level would be appropriate.
5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with China

China and the ROK have been working to strengthen their relations. At the May 2008 China-ROK Summit Meeting, the two countries agreed to upgrade the China-ROK relationship from a “full-scale cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” Following the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye government, in June 2013, President Park held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping during her visit to China, and the two sides announced the Joint Statement on the Korea-China Future Vision. At the working-level, also in June, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff visited China for the first time in six years. Further, in December 2013, the first China-ROK Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security was held between the directors-general of the foreign and defense ministries of the two countries, and the two sides agreed to hold the dialogue regularly. In July 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the ROK and released a joint statement in which agreement was reached on items, including promoting bilateral dialogue in the areas of politics and security and realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In February 2015, the Minister of National Defense of China visited the ROK for the first time in nine years. As illustrated above, government leaders and senior officials have intensified their efforts to deepen their bilateral relations.

Meanwhile, outstanding issues have emerged between China and the ROK. The “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ. Furthermore, it included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the exclusive economic zone. Against this backdrop, the ROK government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month.

(2) Relations with Russia

Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high-ranking military officials. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. At the ROK-Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In March 2012, the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security.

(3) Overseas Activities

Since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia in 1993, the ROK has participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level. In July 2010, the ROK created the “International Peace Support Force,” a special unit for overseas dispatch. Since March 2013, the ROK has dispatched troops composed primarily of engineering units to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

Furthermore, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK-registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Since January 2011, the ROK has dispatched a ROK special forces unit for the purpose of supporting the training of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) special forces units, joint exercises, and protecting ROK nationals in emergency situations. Additionally, in December 2013, the ROK dispatched a disaster recovery support unit consisting of approximately 500 personnel, including an engineering unit and medical personnel, to the Philippines in the wake of its typhoon disaster.

76 The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK Forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, an act concerning participation in U.N. PKO was enacted.