Part III Initiatives of Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People and Secure the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

In order to respond to a variety of situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is important to ensure intelligence superiority through continuous surveillance over a wide region in peacetime encompassing the surroundings of Japan, and thereby both routinely ascertain the military trends in other countries, and detect any signs at an early stage. By engaging in such activities, Japan can make clear its intention not to tolerate attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and prevent the occurrence of a variety of situations before they arise.

If a situation does arise, then responding efficiently and minimizing damage, by ensuring an appropriate and timely response based on the defensive strategic position of our exclusively defense oriented policy, and ensuring sea and air superiority in our sea\(^1\) and airspace\(^2\), is important in the effort to protect the lives and property of the people as well as our territorial land, water and airspace.

Section 1 Efficient Deterrence and Response

This section will explain the seamless and agile response of the SDF to a variety of situations in peacetime, including routinely conducted information gathering, warning and surveillance in peacetime and incidents in the “gray-zone.”

Moreover, in addition to recent increase and intensification of activity in the surrounding waters and airspace of the Senkaku Islands by China in recent years, and the missile launches, nuclear tests and such actions by North Korea as well as concerns for large-scale natural disasters such as the Nankai Trough Mega quake, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in serious study in order to ensure an efficient response even in complex situations wherein various contingencies arise

\(^1\) See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, footnote 4
\(^2\) See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, footnote 2
consecutively or simultaneously.

I Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

Japan is composed of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by a wide region of sea, which includes the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF are engaged in around-the-clock intelligence gathering, and warning and surveillance in Japan’s territorial waters and airspace in peacetime, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace, so that it can respond in a timely and appropriate manner to a variety of situations. It also maintains a posture which enables it to respond seamlessly to changes in conditions.

I Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan

(1) Basic Concept

The SDF routinely and continuously engages in surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various emergencies promptly and seamlessly.

(2) Response by the MOD, the SDF and Others

The MSDF patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea in peacetime, using P-3C and other patrol aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters.

The ASDF uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance over Japan and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. It also conducts surveillance in major channels, to monitor MSDF guard posts, GSDF coastal surveillance units, and so forth. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, a state of readiness is maintained to enable a quick response to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan)

In 2013, for example, there were eight incidents of activity by Chinese Navy vessels involving the passage through the southwestern region and four incidents of such activity were also confirmed in waters south of Okinawa. Moreover, since the Japanese government’s acquisition of the ownership of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, Chinese governmental ships have intermittently intruded into Japanese territorial waters. In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy vessels or Chinese government ships are promptly being expanded and activated.
Due to this state of affairs, the Japan Coast Guard has strengthened its warning and surveillance operations through the use of patrol ships and aircraft, and demanded that the Chinese ships that intruded into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands leave; the MOD and the SDF are routinely sharing information obtained through warning and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard in peacetime, including that gained on the front line. Through these initiatives, all means necessary have been taken to ensure that no gap can be opened in our defense and protection.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands Performed by Chinese Government Ships)

2 Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

(1) Basic Concept
Under international law, nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling against intruding aircraft is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or in the seas, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting actions against intruding aircraft based on Article 84 of the SDF Act.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF
The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in the Japanese territorial and adjacent airspace using warning and surveillance, or E-767 airborne early warning and control system, E-2C airborne early warning aircraft. If any aircraft suspected of violating Japan’s territorial airspace is detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that a territorial airspace violation does occur responses such as warning to withdraw will be issued.

On December 13, 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsuri-jima in the Senkaku Islands. The ASDF urgently scrambled fighters in response to these incidents.
In FY2012, the ASDF scrambled 810 times\(^3\), the first time the number has risen past 800 in 24 years in the Heisei era. The number of scrambles in FY2013 increased by a wide margin of 243 over the previous year, and like that year, the number of times these takeoffs were in response to Chinese aircraft exceeded those of Russian origin. In these instances, the E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft were used effectively, while through the reassignment of one air squadron comprised of E-2Cs to Naha Air Base, the warning and surveillance operations in the southwest region have been strengthened.

See ➤ Fig. III-1-1-3 (Number of Scrambles in the Last Decade and Its Breakdown); Fig.III-1-1-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded)

Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November of that year, the MOD and the SDF have been implementing surveillance activities as before, in the East China Sea, including the zone in question, and have continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in surveillance in the sea and airspace around Japan. They have also decided to engage in strict anti-territory intrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Act.

See ➤ Fig. III-1-1-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for Japan and Neighboring Countries)

See ➤ Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Defense Policies of Other Countries and Regions: China)

3 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s Territorial Waters

(1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters\(^4\), an order for maritime security operations\(^5\) will be issued promptly. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave Japanese territorial waters.

See ➤ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives

The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, as well as expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law, and

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\(^3\) See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, Footnote 3

\(^4\) Break down by country of aircraft subject to scrambles: China, approximately 51%; Russia, approximately 44%; and others, approximately 5%

\(^5\) Including territorial waters and inland waters.
responding to them in shallow water areas. In November 2004, the MSDF P-3C observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating underwater in Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this, an order for maritime security operations was issued, while MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the submarine until it entered the high seas.

In May 2013 and March 2014 although there was no intrusion into the territorial waters of Japan, the MSDF P-3C observed submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone in succession. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal nations, Japan maintains a stance of properly dealing with such activities.

4 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued promptly in a timely manner and the SDF will respond to the situation in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

In light of the lessons learned from the incident involving an unidentified vessel off Noto Peninsula in 1999 and the incident involving an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, the Japanese government has been taking all necessary precautionary measures while the MOD and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies.

(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives

The MSDF is taking the following steps: (1) deployment of missile boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells); and (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel.

6 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of onboard inspections under maritime security operations.

7 The flat front edge of the destroyer prevents a non-bursting shell from scattering when launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on the ship.
In addition, the MOD and the Japan Coast Guard carry out regular mutual training, information exchange, joint exercises, etc. Based on the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels,” which was prepared jointly by the Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard carry out joint exercises involving pursuit and capture guidelines for unidentified vessels and communications, etc., strengthening cooperation between the two organizations.

2 Defense of Japan’s Offshore Islands
Given Japan’s geographical characteristics – that the country is surrounded by seas on all sides and has numerous islands – invasion of offshore islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack against Japan.

1 Basic Concept
In order to respond to attacks on islands, it is important to both position units and so forth on the basis of the security environment, and to detect signs at an early stage through activities routinely conducted by the SDF in peacetime including continuous intelligence gathering, warning and surveillance activities. If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be expeditiously deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment of enemy units and try, through the integrated application involving the ground, sea and air, to deter and remove enemy attacks. If, by some chance, islands are captured without any signs detected in advance, then the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, after which tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and other initiatives.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

Of particular importance in the defense of Japan’s offshore islands are superiority over the enemy in terms of sea and air potential in the surrounding sea and airspace, and a situation wherein strategic operations can be accomplished without sustaining substantial losses from the enemy.

A clear response will be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and so forth.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-6 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan's Offshore Islands)

2 Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF
Since there are many islands in the southwest region that are vacuum regions for SDF deployment, the GSDF will deploy coast observation units and introduce area security units in charge of initial responses. At the same time, the ASDF will strengthen its defense bases, through initiatives such as increasing one squadron of its fighting units at Naha Air Base. Through these initiatives, Japan will continue a routine posture for around-the-clock intelligence gathering and surveillance posture, and develop a structure which enables an immediate response in the case of contingencies.

In order to swiftly and gradually deploy units responding to changes in the situation, and to prevent or remove an invasion, in the new National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium-Term Defense Program, the GSDF will reorganize its rapid deployment divisions and brigades by newly introducing rapidly deployable basic operational units possessing mobile combat vehicles transportable by the ASDF’s C-2 transport aircraft, and thereby strengthen its air operation capacity.

Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance the maneuver deployment capabilities, through the improvement of transport vessels and introduction of tilt-rotor aircraft.

In order to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, the GSDF will possess amphibious vehicles, and would introduce amphibious rapid deployment brigades (provisional name) with sufficient amphibious operational capabilities. As well as increasing the capacity to direct precision-guided bombs and improving surface-to-surface missiles, the GSDF will advance its initiatives in development to increase the capabilities of surface-to-ship missiles, in areas such as increasing their range.

In addition, in the southwest and other regions, the SDF conducts various training and exercises with the objective of improving the joint operation capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and of deterring and dealing with attacks aimed at the island region, and is also actively involved in field training exercises with U.S. Forces aimed at developing the capability to efficiently execute operations and establishing mutual coordination procedures. The GSDF began implementing this in 2006. In February 2014, in California, the GSDF and US Marines conducted a field training exercise (Iron Fist) and have been working to improve amphibious operational capability. From May through June 2013, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF participated for the first time in a joint exercise that has been held for some time on the western coast of the United States, called “Dawn Blitz.” As a part of the first joint U.S.-Japan training overseas
(Dawn Blitz 13), they practiced a series of tactical activities relating to working with the U.S. Forces, and responding to island invasions. In particular, they performed a series of exercises, from planning to landing, in dual ocean and land operations under joint Ground, Maritime and Air command, as well as implemented firing practice using live rounds, including mortars, and strengthened cooperation with the U.S. Forces.

Furthermore, in May 2014, in the Amami Islands, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces took part in field training, during which there was a demonstration of an overview of joint operations by the SDF regarding landing tactics.

3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan began establishing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to effectively respond to ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Act in 2005, and in the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor.

Japan is steadily building up its own multi-tiered defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-7 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)

1 Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) Basic Concept

Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE), an indigenous command, control battle management, and communication system. To establish this multi-tier defense structure, the MOD and the SDF have upgraded the capability of existing Aegis-equipped destroyers and Patriot systems and further promoting BMD system development. See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-8 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD)

(2) Development Status of the BMD System

Going forward, the MOD and the SDF plan to maintain initiatives to install BMD capability to

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8 See Part II, Chapter 4, footnote 5
9 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
two “Atago” class Aegis destroyers, and increase the number of Aegis BMD destroyers by 2, to a total of 8. All 6 air defense missile groups will be equipped with PATRIOT PAC-3 by FY2015. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and training capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control system (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) \(^{10}\) systems. The SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE {Missile Segment Enhancement}) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-9 (Enhanced PAC-3 Missile (PAC-3 MSE))

2 Improvement in Legislation and Operations
(1) Legal Measures regarding Response to Ballistic Missiles
In case ballistic missiles or other objects\(^ {11}\) are launched toward Japan and if the situation is recognized as an armed attack, a defense operation order for armed attack situations will be issued to respond.

On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan and if the situation is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the following measures will be taken with sufficient consideration to (1) carrying out prompt and appropriate response and (2) ensuring civilian control:

a. When the Minister of Defense determines that there is a possibility that ballistic missiles or other objects will fly toward Japan, the Minister of Defense orders SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles upon approval of the Prime Minister\(^ {12}\).

b. In addition to the case above, there may be cases where almost no information is available concerning missile launch, or that suddenly the situation changes due to accidents or failure in launch, allowing no time for the Minister of Defense to obtain the approval of the Prime Minister in peacetime. In case of such contingencies, the Minister of Defense may prepare

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\(^{10}\) Improved as of FY2014 as fixed warning and control radars capable of responding to both conventional threats such as aircraft and ballistic missiles.

\(^{11}\) Objects other than aircraft such as ballistic missiles which could cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to the ground.

\(^{12}\) A specific example of SDF activity is deploying PAC-3 units by the ASDF and Aegis destroyers by the MSDF, upon receipt of an appropriate order from the Minister of Defense in preparation for incoming ballistic missiles and other objects. In the case where missiles actually fly toward Japan, based on the aforementioned order, SDF units would destroy them.
emergency response procedures in advance that are to be preapproved by the Prime Minister. Subsequently, in accordance with these emergency response procedures, the Minister of Defense may issue an order in advance to SDF units with a specified period of validity to take the necessary measures to destroy ballistic missiles and other objects when they actually fly toward Japan.

See ◀ Fig. III-1-1-10 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles)
See ◀ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of the Military
Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies.

See ◀ Fig. III-1-1-10 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles)

In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet.

(3) Operational Initiatives
a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations
Responding to ballistic missiles flying toward Japan, when the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, the Commander of the Air Defense Command is to serve as the Commander of the task force, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE.

Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

b. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
Further cooperation with the U.S. Forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is
required for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures, such as constant real-time sharing of information on BMD operation and relevant information, were agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Also, at the 2+2 meeting in October 2013, the two countries confirmed that BMD cooperation will further be expanded.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 Japan-U.S. (“2+2” Meeting)

Furthermore, Japan has developed close cooperation with the United States, by means such as receiving early warning information\(^\text{13}\) (Shared Early Warning; SEW), and sharing intelligence gathered by forward deployed assets including Aegis-equipped destroyers and transportable BMD radar (AN/TPY-2).

In addition, maintenance, development and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capability have been conducted actively through training and other activities. In February 2014, following on from the previous year, a special BMD exercise was held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination.

3 Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system consisting of mutually complementary defense systems suited for each of (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight path.

Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner.

Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site\(^\text{14}\). Also, BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in

\(^{13}\) This is information conveyed by the United States to the SDF after the U.S. Forces analyze data relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan; the analysis takes place within a short period immediately after the launch and the information provided to the SDF includes the area where the launch took place, the time of the launch, the area where debris is expected to fall and the anticipated time when it is likely to fall. Under the security arrangements between Japan and the United States, the SDF has exchanged various kinds of information with the U.S. Forces, and the SEW is one example of such information (since in April 1996). It cannot be denied that there are limits to the accuracy of this kind of information due to its nature, but it is valuable enough as an “initial report” of any ballistic missile launches in the direction of Japan.

\(^{14}\) The radar was installed at the ASDF “Shariki” Sub Base, but was later transferred to the U.S. Shariki
Japan and surrounding areas since December 2006. Furthermore, in October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)\(^{15}\) was deployed at Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, ASDF Kyogamisaki sub-base was designated as the deployment site for the 2nd TPY-2 radar in Japan, and necessary facilities and areas were furnished to the U.S. in December 2013.

(2) Japan–U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor and Other Initiatives

In 1998, the government decided to commence a Japan–U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999.

The purpose of the Japan-U.S. cooperative research project was to improve future interceptor missile capability, and it conducted design, prototype production and necessary testing for four main components\(^{16}\).

In December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis, because the results showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles and is planned to be completed by around 2017.

See \(\Rightarrow\) Fig. III-1-1-11 (Outline of the Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor)

(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports

With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, which is aimed at improved future BMD capability, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States as part of development. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, third party transfer was discussed, and it was decided that transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA could be approved in advance in accordance with the Exchange of Notes concerning transfer of arms and military technologies to the United States, in the case

\(^{15}\) One of the information processing systems for ballistic missiles.

\(^{16}\) The four components are the nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, and infrared seeker.
where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the future transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) on June 21, 2011.

Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles), which received Cabinet approval on April 1, 2014, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided upon, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles (decided upon by the National Security Council on the same day) as allowable under the Three Principles.

See► Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology);
See► Reference 62 (The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.); Reference 63(Three Principles on Transfer of defense Equipment and technology(April 1, 2014))

4 Response to North Korea’s Missile Launch

On March 12, 2009, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) informed member countries that it had received warning in advance from North Korea of an intended test launch of an “experimental communication satellite.” In response to this, based on Article 82 Section 2 of the SDF Act (currently Article 82 Section 3), the Minister of Defense issued the “Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles.” The SDF organized the Joint Task Force BMD and deployed two Aegis Destroyers equipped with SM-3 to the central area of the Sea of Japan as well as Patriot PAC-3 units to SDF bases in the Tohoku region and the Tokyo metropolitan area. On April 5, one missile was launched from North Korea toward the east, and the MOD and the SDF swiftly transmitted information to the Prime Minister’s Office and other agencies, collected from Shared Early Warning (SEW) and the various SDF radar Units17. Further, aerial reconnaissance was carried out to confirm whether any harm was caused in the Tohoku region. On April 6, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate the destruction measures against ballistic missiles.

On March 19, 2012, a notification was sent from the IMO that it had received warning in advance from North Korea concerning a launch of an “earth observation satellite.” In response to this notification, on March 27, in accordance with an order for preparations for destruction measures against ballistic missiles (preparation order), the MOD and the SDF started preparations. Moreover, on March 30, the Minister of Defense issued an order for the

17 On the day before the actual launch, false information related to the launch was distributed due to mishandling of information by the MOD and the SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information was properly collected and transmitted.
implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles (implementation order) based on Article 82-3, Paragraph 3 of the SDF Act, and the SDF deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units on the islands of Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area. Also in case of missiles falling, the requisite GSDF units were dispatched to the Southwestern Islands to protect Japanese territory. Around 07:40 on April 13, the MOD (the SDF) confirmed receiving information from SEW concerning a launch of a flying object from the west coast of North Korea. Since the missile flew for over a minute and then broke up into several pieces which fell into the Yellow Sea, the same evening, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate the destruction measures against ballistic missiles (termination order).

Furthermore, on December 1, 2012, North Korea announced it would launch a “satellite” during the period between December 10 and 22 (later extended to December 29). In light of these circumstances, the Minister of Defense issued a preparation order on December 1, and the MOD and the SDF deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units to Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area. Additionally, in case of missiles falling in Japan’s territory, GSDF units were dispatched to the Southwestern Islands. On December 7, the Minister of Defense issued an implementation order. At 9:49 am on the same day, a so-called “satellite” was launched from the west coast of North Korea, and it passed through the airspace of Okinawa Prefecture toward the Pacific. Upon this occurrence, the Minister of Defense issued a termination order in the evening of the same day.

Similarly, in the first half of 2013, North Korea repeatedly engaged in a variety of provocative acts, including the implication of missile launch toward Japan, while on March 3 and 26, and June 29, 2014, it launched ballistic missiles. Due to this stance, the MOD and the SDF took every necessary measure including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese people in any potential situation, closely cooperating with related agencies and the U.S.

See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 (North Korea)

4 Responses in Airspace

As Japan maintains an exclusively defense-oriented policy, it is extremely important to use outer space, which does not belong to any nation’s territories and which is not constrained by conditions such as surface topography, in order to strengthen information gathering to detect any
indications of various situations in advance, and enforce warning and surveillance functions in Japan’s surrounding sea areas and airspace, as well as ensuring means of communication in activities such as the international peace cooperation activities of the SDF.

In July 2012, the Space Strategy Office was established by the Cabinet Office, to engage in the planning, drafting, coordination and other policy matters relating to the use of space development. Furthermore, the Basic Plan for Space Policy for the five years from the current year, was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development established by the Cabinet based on the Basic Space Law in January 2013. One of the important challenges it addresses is “national security and disaster management.”

The new National Defense Program Guidelines have determined that Japan will strengthen intelligence gathering capacity, command, control, and information communication capacity, and increase the resilience of satellites, as well as ensure the effective and stable use of outer space. On this basis, in FY2014, initiatives will be made in (1) investigation into successors for the currently-used x-band communications satellites, (2) increase x-band satellite communication functions, (3) research into countermeasures to the jamming of satellite communications systems, (4) dispatch of personnel to U.S. Air Force foundation courses on space, (5) investigation into the introduction of surveillance systems for the situation in outer space, (6) research into the best format of satellite protection, and other such operations.

5 Response to Cyber Attacks

1 Whole-of-Government Approach

Information and communications technology has developed and been widely adopted at great speed and, as a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for socioeconomic activity. On the other hand, there is a possibility that people’s lives and economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks fail.

This is the same for both the MOD and the SDF. If the critical functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, then it is possible that problems may arise at the core of Japan’s defense.

In Japan, various initiatives have been undertaken by public and private sector entities, with the National Information Security Center (NISC) playing the leading role.
In June 2013, at the Information Security Policy Council\(^\text{18}\), decisions were made on the “Cyber Security Strategy” to focus on the period until 2015, and the plan for the subsequent year “Cyber Security 2013” which was based on the above strategy. The strategy and plan incorporate many initiatives concerning the security of Japan, including the advancement of information security measures by businesses and other bodies which deal with important national information, implementation of exercises for the purpose of an initial response at the government level, and new assignment of a “Cyber Defense Group” in the SDF to defend cyberspace, and other such measures. In addition, because it is vital to press ahead with initiatives in the international community in order to ensure the stable use of cyberspace, which continues to grow on a global scale, in October 2013, the “International Strategy on Cybersecurity Cooperation –j-initiative for Cybersecurity” was formulated at the Information Security Policy Council. Clearly specified within the “j-initiative” were important efforts including proactive participation in the development of international standards, strengthened cooperation with other relevant nations, such as Japan’s ally, the United States, and support in building the capabilities of developing countries.

Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD is designated as one of the five government agencies which must cooperate particularly closely with the NISC. Therefore, the Ministry contributes to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC by providing it with the knowledge and skills of the MOD and the SDF. For example, the Ministry participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. In light of such incidents as the cyber attacks on defense industry companies reported in 2011, the NISC established the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT) to provide agile support, forming cross-cutting partnerships among ministries and agencies. The MOD sends personnel to CYMAT, thereby actively contributing to improving the security of the government as a whole.

2 Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF
Based on this situation and government initiatives, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in the following efforts in order to deal with cyber attacks.

(1) Basic Concept

\(^{18}\) Established in May 2005, under the chairmanship of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, this serves as a parent body for deciding on matters associated with the fundamental problems faced in information security in Japan.
For the MOD and the SDF to execute missions, it is necessary to maximize its opportunities for the use of cyberspace while limiting any risks. For that purpose, the MOD and the SDF must secure the stable use of cyberspace as their “infrastructure” and strengthen the capabilities to better operate in cyberspace as a new “domain” that is equivalent to land, sea, airspace and outer space. In such initiatives, the MOD and the SDF will accomplish necessary programs based on the following policy directions:

1. Enhancement of capabilities and systems of the MOD and the SDF.
2. Contribution to nationwide initiatives including the private sector.
3. Cooperation with the international community, including allied nations.

(2) Specific Initiatives
As for response to cyber attacks, the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is continuously monitoring SDF communications networks. Along with introduction of intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and communications systems, and development of defense systems such as the security and analysis device for cyber defense, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in holistic measures including enactment of regulations\(^\text{19}\), stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, and improving the human resources and technological bases, as well as conducting research on cutting-edge technology.

\(\text{See } \triangleright \text{ Fig. III-1-1-12 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks)}\)

The Cyber Policy Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, was established in February 2013. The committee is conducting integrated deliberations regarding cooperation with other countries and relevant organizations, the programs to train and acquire personnel capable of responding to cyber attacks, cooperation with the defense industry and response to supply chain risks\(^\text{20}\).

In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command, in order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks which are growing increasingly sophisticated and complicated, and the relevant systems were enhanced and strengthened. In addition, going forward, efforts will also be made to enhance and strengthen the operation platform, through the early detection of cyber attacks signals, improvement in the cyber information gathering equipment that aids in

\(^{19}\) There are directives relating to information assurance of the MOD (MOD Directive No. 160, 2007).

\(^{20}\) Supply chain risks refers to the risks that malicious software, including computer viruses, may be inserted in the components of equipment during the design, manufacturing, procuring or installation of equipment.
the prevention of attacks before they occur, and development of a practical training environment so that it can verify the capacity to deal with such attacks.

See Fig. III-1-1-13 "Conceptual Image of a Cyber Defense Group"

The MOD and the SDF also continue to implement initiatives for the development of human resources with sophisticated knowledge, including establishing education and research in the field of network security at the National Defense Academy, and dispatching officials to study at graduate schools in Japan and abroad.

At the same time, it is difficult for the MOD and the SDF alone to achieve the stable use of cyberspace. In particular, since comprehensive defense cooperation between Japan and its ally the United States, including joint response, is vital, in October 2013, under the direction of Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense Hagel, the “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group” (CDPWG) was set up with the objective of deepening comprehensive cooperation between the defense authorities of the U.S. and Japan in terms of security. They aim under this framework are (1) promotion of policy discussions, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) discussion about matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts; in February 2014, the first working group meeting was held in the Ministry of Defense. Going forward, there will be efforts toward further defense cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in the field of cyber activity. In addition, through participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialog,” which is a whole-of-government approach by both nations, and the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” which is a framework between the defense authorities that has been discussed repeatedly since 2002, Japan’s cooperation with the United States will be strengthened further still. Furthermore, the IT Forum will also be implemented with the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia, while cyber conferences are being held between the authorities of the U.K., NATO, Republic of Korea and others, in order to exchange views on threat awareness and each of the relevant initiatives.

In addition, a framework for discussion with each country on entire policies, and the dispatch of employees to meetings by government experts relating to international standards in the U.N. are being proactively implemented, and going forward, collaboration and cooperation with the international community will be further advanced.

In July 2013 as well, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, having around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cyber security as its core members.
Efforts are being made to improve the capacity to counter cyber attacks by both the MOD and the SDF and the defense industry.

6 Response to Various Disasters
When disasters such as natural disasters occur in any part of the country, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. In particular, over 100,000 SDF personnel were dispatched at a peak time for relief operations for the large-scale earthquake and nuclear disaster experienced during the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011.

1 Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches
(1) Types and Frameworks of Disaster Relief Dispatches
In principle, disaster dispatch is carried out at the request of prefectural governors and other officials when there has been a freak weather incident or other natural disaster; in cases where it is deemed necessary to protect the lives or property of citizens, or where a request has been made to the Minister of Defense or other designated officer, who then determines that the situation warrants such action. This is because prefectural governors and other officials grasp the overall conditions of the disaster, and it is considered most appropriate for dispatches to be made upon their request in consideration of disaster relief capabilities within the prefecture or municipality including police and firefighting.

Municipal mayors can ask prefectural governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF. In the event that mayors are unable to make such a request, they can inform the Minister of Defense. After receiving such requests from governors, the Minister of Defense or other personnel designated by the Minister can immediately dispatch units as necessary according to the disaster situation.

When a freak weather incident or other disaster occurs, under circumstances of particular urgency when there is no time to wait for a request, the Minister of Defense or those designated

21 The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of Airport Administrative Office may request disaster dispatch. With regard to disaster dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, nuclear disaster relief dispatches, (1) SDF personnel requested dispatch may exercise authority based on the SDF Act; (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary.
by the Minister may authorize an exceptional dispatch without waiting.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-14 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal)

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

When an alert is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures\(^\text{22}\), the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster relief dispatch based on the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

Based on the lessons learned after the incident of criticality which occurred at a uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture, the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness was enacted, according to which, the SDF Law was amended and nuclear disaster dispatch established. the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

(2) Initial Response to Disasters
The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response, as shown in Fig. III-1-1-15, to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-15 (State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard))

2 Response to Disasters
(1) Transportation of Emergency Patients
The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2013, out of a total of 555 cases of disaster relief operations, 401 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Goto Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture), the Izu Islands, and the Ogasawara Islands representing the majority of such cases.

Furthermore, in addition to aiding in the transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range, in the event that urgent action is

\(^{22}\) The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.
required due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing, the SDF carries out sea rescues when requested to do so by the Japan Coast Guard.

Furthermore, it conducts wide-ranging medical transport operations, using the Mobile Medical Unit to move serious-case patients by C-130H transport aircraft.

(2) Firefighting Support
In FY2013, there were 93 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after transportation of emergency patients. Within this category, responses to fires in areas near SDF facilities were the largest in number, with 85 cases in FY2013. Furthermore, upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF also conducts aerial firefighting activities in locations where mountain and forest firefighting conditions are difficult, such as mountain and forest areas.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-16 (Performance in disaster dispatch (2013); Reference 23 (Performance in disaster dispatch (past five years))

(3) Response to Natural Disasters
From the rainy season through summer of 2013, weather conditions were unstable due to the fact that the seasonal rain front was stationary, leading to a succession of record-breaking downpours of heavy rain in all regions. Due to the unprecedented rain in Yamaguchi and Shimane Prefectures from July 26 until August 2, the SDF received requests for disaster dispatch from the governors of both prefectures on July 28, and conducted searches for people whose whereabouts were unknown and rescues of individuals who became isolated. Then on the 29th, a request was received from the Governor of Ishikawa Prefecture, to which the SDF responded by implementing activities to prevent flooding caused by the increase in river levels. The large-scale dispatch involved in these activities amounted to a total of around 600 personnel, 180 vehicles and four aircraft. Furthermore, in August 9 of the same year, record-breaking heavy rain focused in Akita and Iwate Prefectures resulted in mudslides in locations such as Semboku City in Akita. The SDF received a request for disaster dispatch from the governors of these two prefectures on the 9th of the month, and responded with rescue and various other operations in Shizukuishi-cho in Iwate Prefecture and Semboku City in Akita Prefecture. The scale of this dispatch operation amounted to a total of around 900 personnel, 280 vehicles and 7 aircraft.

Furthermore, as the large, powerful Typhoon No. 26 drew close on October 16, 2013, a large-scale landslide occurred on Oshima-machi, Tokyo (Izu Oshima). On the same day, the
SDF received a request for disaster dispatch from the Governor of Tokyo, and started disaster relief activities. Then on the 20th of the month, a joint task force composed of units from all three SDF, commanded by the Headquarters of the Eastern Army, was organized, which carried out activities such as searching for lost individuals on the island, air transportation of patients and support for the transport of personnel and goods until November 8 of that year. The scale of this disaster dispatch operation amounted to a total of 64,000 personnel, 5,120 vehicles, 50 ships and 340 aircraft.

Due to the heavy snow in February 2014, roads were seriously damaged from the Kanto-Koshin through Tohoku regions, and there were regions where families became isolated. Requests were therefore received from the governors of the stricken prefectures, to which the GSDF and the ASDF responded by rescuing individuals, transporting goods, airlifting patients, checking safety and removing snow to help in relief initiatives for the period from February 15 to 23 of that year. The scale of this disaster dispatch operation amounted to a total of around 12,000 personnel, 1,300 vehicles and 220 aircraft.

(4) Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and other Disasters
The Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011, caused destructive damage, mainly in coastal areas in the Tohoku region. Since immediately after the earthquake, the MOD and the SDF have done their utmost to rescue disaster victims. The SDF’s disaster relief activity ended on December 26, 2011, when the dispatch for nuclear disaster relief expired. During the period, a total of around 10,660,000 SDF personnel engaged in such activities as supporting disaster victims’ everyday life, searching for missing people and dealing with the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The MOD and the SDF worked together in responding to this unprecedented emergency.

Furthermore, based on the lessons learned in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster which occurred on March 11, 2011, the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority was enacted, and the Nuclear Regulation Authority was established, while the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and other matters were amended. The MOD and the SDF assigned two GSDF regular personnel to the Nuclear Regulation Authority in September 2012, in addition to which, after a review of the related plans and participation in nuclear disaster prevention exercises, they have engaged in support for transportation, resident evacuation, radiation measurement (monitoring) and other measures, and are working to increase efficiency by considering the format of collaboration with the relevant organizations, and so forth.
Furthermore, initiatives are being made to improve capabilities for responding to nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons in order to deal not only with nuclear disasters, but also with other special disasters.

(5) Other
On April 12, 2014, there was an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza at a chicken meat farm in Kumamoto Prefecture, which resulted in the culling and disposal (by burial) of birds by the local government. On the 14th of the month, after a request for disaster relief was made by the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, the Self-Defense Forces commenced activities such as the transportation of hydrated lime (to prevent dispersal of the virus) and culling of birds on the farm, which it continued until the 16th. The scale of the disaster relief effort was approximately 880 personnel, and a total of around 180 vehicles.

3 Initiatives for Preparation for Disaster Relief in Peacetime
(1) SDF Plans for Responding to Various Disasters and Operational Plans
The SDF has formulated various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council.

In May 2013, the Central Disaster Management Council Working Group to Examine Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Mega Earthquakes compiled its final report on countermeasures to a mega earthquake in the Nankai Trough. Then in December, the Central Disaster Management Council Working Group to Examine Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Mega Earthquakes compiles its final report on countermeasures to earthquakes directly below the capital. Based on these, the MOD and the SDF established the “Self-Defense Forces Plan for Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Earthquakes” in December of that year.

See Fig. III-1-1-17 (Outline of Self-Defense Forces Plan for Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Earthquakes)

(2) Exercises Involving SDF
In order to respond to various disasters large-scale earthquakes – with speed and accuracy, the

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23 Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorist or armed attacks using weapons of mass destruction.
24 This is an ocean-trench mega quake expected to occur in the Nankai Trough formed at the border between the Philippine Sea Plate in a Pacific Ocean area off a region extending from the Bay of Suruga to Kyushu and the Eurasia Plate on the Japanese Archipelago side. Once the plates are strained to the breaking point due to the Philippine Sea Plate sliding under the Eurasia Plate and causing the edge of the continental plate to be dragged, they will return to their original positions. Such movement will cause an ocean-trench mega quake.
SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills including joint exercises for rescue in peacetime, in addition to formulating disaster relief plans. The SDF also actively participates in local government disaster prevention drills and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments.

In FY2013, the SDF organized and participated in various emergency drills with the objective of maintaining and improving the ability to carry out disaster relief missions swiftly and accurately in times of disaster, such as major earthquakes, and many of the issues relating to the response in the event of a disaster that arose due to the Great East Japan Earthquake were actively incorporated into disaster prevention exercises.

See ▶ Reference25 (Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning disaster dispatch (FY2013))

In July 2013 and June 2014, with the assistance of concerned organizations, “SDF joint disaster-prevention exercises” were implemented which envisioned Nankai Trough earthquakes, to verify the response at command posts and operation of the MOD Disaster Operations Headquarters.

On August 31, 2013, the SDF participated in wide-ranging medical transport exercises organized by the Cabinet Office, and tested a wide-range of transport using SDF aircraft, bases and so forth. In addition, the GSDF’s Field Medical Surgery System was installed in the MSDF transport vessel “Shimokita” which participated in drills for verifying the installation of medical bases on the ocean. On “Disaster Drill Day,” September 1 of that year, as well as participating in operational exercises by the Government’s Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, the operational exercises were also implemented for the MOD Disaster Operations Headquarters.

As the first comprehensive Government nuclear disaster prevention exercise after the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, in October of that year, a field exercise was implemented which envisioned an incident at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant in Kagoshima Prefecture. The MOD and the SDF practiced coordinating initiatives from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Nuclear Regulation Authority and offsite centers. They also implemented a response through the transport of Nuclear Regulation Authority personnel to the site by aircraft, resident evacuation support in areas surrounding the nuclear facility and so forth, and verified the system for responding to nuclear disasters, while working to improve efficiency overall. In addition to all this, the SDF have been holding a range of training exercises and participating in various exercises such as drills by local governments and striving to ensure the efficiency of disaster countermeasure capacity.
(3) Coordination with Local Governments

It is also important for the SDF to strengthen coordination with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations smoothly.

For this reason, the SDF participates in a number of disaster prevention drills and is proceeding with the strengthening of cooperation with local governments including enhancing information liaison systems and consistency with disaster control plans.

Specifically, (1) the post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures was created at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Headquarters to work at ensuring coordination with local governments in peacetime.

When personnel were dispatched in the event of the disaster resulting from heavy snow from the Tohoku through Tokai regions in February 2014, coordination with the relevant prefectural offices was.

Also, (2) in addition to assigning an SDF officer to the department in charge of disaster prevention for Tokyo, mutual exchange is being carried out between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefectural Government. Furthermore, (3) in response to requests from local governments, retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention are being sought. As of the end of April 2014, the total number of retired SDF personnel working in disaster prevention in local governments was 304 individuals in 46 prefectures and 196 municipalities throughout the country. Personnel-related cooperation with local governments and the MOD and the SDF is a very effective method of improving cooperation with those governments, and its efficacy was confirmed during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

See ▶ Reference 26 (Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of April 30.))

At the same time, the MOD and the SDF believe that carrying out initiatives such as the following are important in order to carry out operations more effectively during disaster dispatch in local governments as well.
Securing Staging Areas and Heliports

Securing the staging areas which serve as bases for command posts for various disaster agencies, sites for the accumulation of equipment, and other activities, as well as helipads for transport, etc.

Marking to Identify Buildings

Marking of names and numbers on roofs, so that public facilities like schools and prefectural offices that are important in disaster prevention can be identified easily from mid air.

Securing Facilities for Liaison and Coordination

Securing areas and parking sites at local government and other official buildings, in order that communications personnel can liaise and coordinate matters smoothly.

Arrangements for Materials and Equipment

Ensuring that disaster prevention maps for communal use are up to date, equipment and materials are maintained for use in aerial firefighting, and water sources are available.

Furthermore, they have concluded agreements relating to collaboration at times of disaster with private-sector organizations such as various power companies, and are striving for smooth mutual cooperation when various disaster dispatch is implemented, through disaster prevention drills.

7 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others

In the urbanized Japan, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks in the form of covert action by guerrillas or special forces and illegal acts by armed agents which have infiltrated the country can pose a serious threat to peace and security.

1 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of an armed attack on Japan by guerilla or special forces, such as destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks on people and assassinations, Japan will respond under a defense operations order.

See Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

25 Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc.
In operations, an intelligence gathering posture is established to detect the attacks at the earliest possible time and to respond in a swift and flexible manner. Particular importance is given to warning and surveillance to prevent invasion in coastal areas, safeguarding of key facilities, and search and defeat of invading units. It is important at this time to quickly gain control of the situation to minimize damage.

a. Warning and Surveillance
Initiatives toward early detection will be made through surveillance in surrounding waters by escort ships or aircraft, and warning and surveillance by GSDF reconnaissance units in coastal areas. When the possibility of infiltration into Japanese territory by guerillas and special operations forces is suspected, GSDF patrol units will engage in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas.

b. Protection of Significant Facilities
Furthermore, as required, a guarding posture will be established for the prompt deployment of guarding units to secure key facilities, such as a nuclear power plant.

c. Search and Destruction of Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces
In the event of an infiltration of our territorial land by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and found by reconnaissance units, aviation units or others.

In case of detecting guerillas or special operation forces, combat units will rapidly deploy, develop and defeat.

See Fig. III-1-1-18 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces)

2 Response to Armed Agents
(1) Basic Concept
While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments.

(2) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police Organizations, etc.
For the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the JDA and the National Public Safety Commission with regard to cooperation procedures in the case of public
security operations was revised to enable its application to illegal activities by armed agents\textsuperscript{26}. In addition, local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.

Furthermore, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency in 2004 for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns.

Also the GSDF continues to implement combined field exercises at each area nationwide with the police of each prefecture, and intends to strengthen collaboration. It conducted exercises at the Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at the Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and the Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, and at the site of the Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014. Furthermore, combined exercises in dealing with unidentified vessels continued to be implemented between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

3 Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and scattered rogue states. In the event that such weapons of mass destruction are used, it is likely there will be indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area. The sarin gas attack\textsuperscript{27} on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the incidents of mail in the United States containing anthrax\textsuperscript{28} in 2001 are evidence of the fact that these weapons have already been used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to abate the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and assist victims in

\textsuperscript{26} The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.

\textsuperscript{27} An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (the number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.

\textsuperscript{28} Since September 2001, postal mail containing anthrax was delivered to individuals including members of the U.S. Senate and those related to the mass media.
cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relative organizations in intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transport of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection dispatches.

(2) Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF in Response to NBC Weapons
The MOD and the SDF have improved the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Specifically, the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, GSDF and NBC protection units or NBC counter medical units in each division or brigade were formed under the Central Readiness Force, and each division and brigade has. In addition, there has been an increase of chemical protection unit personnel, improvement of NBC reconnaissance vehicles, chemical surveillance devices, decontamination vehicles, personnel protection equipment, portable automatic biological sensors, chemical protection clothing, and research and development for decontamination kits is ongoing. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. Furthermore the SDF is working to strengthen collaboration for NBC weapon attacks, including through establishing partnerships with relevant external institutions, such as local authorities, the police, and fire departments through combined exercises.

8 Security of the Oceans
Consisting of a multitude of islands, numbering more than 6,800, Japan is a maritime nation whose territorial waters and EEZ covers, in total, approximately 4.47 million km$^2$ about 12 times its 380,000 km$^2$ land area, which places it sixth in the world in terms of the oceanic area that it controls. As is stipulated in the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, the Government promotes policies concerning the oceans intensively and comprehensively based on the view that it is critical for Japan to establish itself anew as a maritime nation that achieves a balance between peaceful and proactive development and use of the ocean, and the preservation of the marine environment.

Based on changes in the situation regarding the ocean, the new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy given Cabinet approval on April 26, 2013 specified the following targets for Japan as an Oceanic State: (1) international cooperation and contribution to the international community, (2)
wealth and prosperity through ocean development and use, (3) shift from a country protected by
the ocean to a country that protects the ocean, and (4) challenge unexplored frontiers, and has
set out initiatives to pursue intensively in the next 5 years or so. Among these initiatives are the
following for ensuring the safety at sea: reinforcement of the wide-range routine system of
surveillance, systematic improvement of warships, aircraft and other vehicles, strengthening of
the system of collaboration between the SDF and Japan Coast Guard, and development of a
system of collaboration to ensure order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands.

In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that in order to contribute to the creation and
development of order on the ocean, it will ensure international collaboration and promote
international cooperation and will make use of fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean
conferences to contribute to international rules and consensus-building. As a result, the SDF is
making initiatives to cooperate for the purpose of ocean security within the framework of the
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus regional security dialog known as the
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS).

Moreover, within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the SDF
has been engaged in initiatives such as cooperation in the establishment of the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) which was adopted at the 14th meeting in April 2014.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2 (“Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through
Dialogue”)

9 Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.

In the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense
is authorized to transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Foreign Minister, on the
basis of Article 84 (3) of the SDF Law (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.). In such
cases, the SDF will protect the Japanese nationals or other parties in the country in question, and
safely guide them to transport by aircraft, ships and vehicles. To this end, the SDF maintains
operational readiness, with the GSDF designating helicopter unit and leading transport unit.

29 This specifies the procedures for ensuring safety, communications methods and other factors when
there is an unexpected encounter at sea by the naval vessels and aircraft of the participating nations in the
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). (It is not legal binding force, and does not supersede
international aviation rules, international treaties and so forth.)

30 Units temporarily organized and dispatched together with transport units (SDF aircraft or ships) in
personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including boarded aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel.

The revision of the SDF Law in November 1994, positioned the transport of Japanese nationals overseas as the duty of the SDF. At the time of the Terrorist Incident involving Japanese Nationals in Algeria in January 2013, a dedicated Government aircraft from the Special Airlift Group (belonging to Chitose Air Base) was dispatched to Algeria, from where it transported seven Japanese nationals and the bodies of nine deceased Japanese nationals back to Japan. Based on the lessons learned from this incident, a reform bill for the SDF Act was approved by the Diet on November 15 of that year, containing matters such as the addition of vehicles as a means of ground transport; this was put into force on the 22nd of the month. As a result, it was decided that transport protection vehicles with superior performance against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) would be introduced from the perspective of further enhancing the protective capabilities against unforeseen contingencies when engaging in ground transport, and expanding the range of incidents with which the SDF can cope.

See ▶Fig.III-1-1-19 (Ordering Procedure and Image Regarding Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.), Fig.III-1-1-20(Main Details of Revision of the SDF Act)
See ▶Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

Since the transport of Japanese nationals overseas requires close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, collaborated exercises are carried out in peacetime. The MOD participates in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand in cooperation with the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, with local Japanese Embassy staff, and their family members. C-130H transport aircraft was dispatched from the ASDF for the first time. Such exercises improve our coordination procedures with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SDF’s skills in operations overseas.

10 Readiness against Invasions

The new National Defense Program Guidelines indicate the recognition that the potential for a large-scale conflict between major nations, of the kind that was feared during the Cold War era, remains low. It also details that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces (as was expected primarily during the Cold War) will be retained to maintain and pass on the minimum specialist knowledge and skill required to respond to uncertain future changes in the situation.

order to guide and protect Japanese nationals and other people onsite.
In case Japan faces a full-scale invasion, the SDF will respond to the situation in an aligned and systematic manner based on their integrated operations. Their operations are categorized into (1) air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.

The following explains how the SDF will typically implement operations.

See ▶ Chapter 2, Section 1 (Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations)
See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

1 Air Defense Operations
Based on the geographic features of Japan in that it is surrounded by the sea and the features of modern wars\(^{31}\), it is expected that Japan will be hit by repeated rapid aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs.

Operations for aerial defense are characterized by the importance of initial response influencing the whole operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for quick initial response on an ongoing basis in peacetime, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the onset of operations.

Operations for aerial defense can be categorized into comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops. Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-21 (Example of Air Defense Operations)

2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan
As the islands of Japan are attacked with arms, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could

\(^{31}\) Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.
be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory.

Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining the results of these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-22 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan)

3 Operations Protecting the Land
As enemies try to invade the islands of Japan, they are expected to obtain sea and air superiority by attacking our country head on, following the move by landing ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

Invading ground and airborne troops find it difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to take note of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-23 (Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces)

4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation
Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the existence of our country and the foundation of our prosperity. Furthermore, in case our country comes under armed attacked, maritime transportation routes set the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. As such, operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation are important.

Our operations ensuring security in maritime transportation can be done in waters several hundred nautical miles around Japan or in sea lanes.³²

In the case where we implement operations in several hundred nautical mile waters around our

³² Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.
country, we combine anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol\textsuperscript{33} and defend our ships and protect our straits and ports for the security of our maritime transportation.

In the case where we implement our operations based on sea lanes, we define them in waters covering around 1,000 nautical miles, periodically patrol the defined areas, detect and address attacks by emery vessels or submarines at an early stage, and directly defend Japanese ships as required. Escort vessels engage in aerial defense for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes (anti-air warfare), with support provided by fighter jets and other aircraft as required.

11 Response to Other Events

1 Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities
(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities
When there is a danger of a terrorist attack within Japan on facilities and areas of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan and in the event that it is deemed particularly necessary to prevent damage, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard facilities and areas (guarding operations).

Part of the authority given to police officials under the Act Concerning Execution of Duties of Police Officials is applied correspondingly to SDF personnel dispatched for guarding operations\textsuperscript{34}. Further, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel have authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this Act.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

The MOD and the SDF conducted exchanges of views concerning guarding operations with the police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of such operations, in addition to conducting exercises for guarding operations throughout Japan at the facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan since 2003.

(2) Use of Arms to Protect SDF Facilities in Peacetime
Rules have been defined\textsuperscript{35} for SDF personnel to use arms for the protection of domestic SDF

\textsuperscript{33} See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, footnote 6
\textsuperscript{34} Limited to cases where there are no police officers at the scene, SDF personnel on duty are authorized to make enquiries, undertake evacuation measures and enter property in addition to their authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes and usage of weapons.
\textsuperscript{35} SDF personnel may use weapons to the extent deemed to be reasonably necessary in situations within
facilities based on their specified purposes.

2 Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the MOD and the SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Act.

See Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

3 Military Intelligence Collection
For the effective operation of defense force to respond to various situations, it is necessary to detect the signs of such situations at an early stage and comprehensively strengthen the intelligence capabilities at all stages, that is, prompt and appropriate collecting, processing, analyzing and sharing of intelligence.

In doing so, the MOD and the SDF will strengthen their information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, ensuring the advanced application of geospatial information by means such as the fusion of various information and its visualization.

In addition to the strengthening of human intelligence collection capabilities, including the new posting of Defense Attachés, they will enhance comprehensive information collection and analysis-capabilities, through such efforts as the recruitment of intelligence analysts and integration of the curriculum for them, so that the intelligence sides can respond to complex and diverse needs in a timely and accurate manner.

Some examples of intelligence collection activities include
(1) collecting, processing and analyzing signals detected from military communications and electronic weapons, up in the air over Japanese territory; (2) collecting and analyzing high resolution commercial satellite imagery data; (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships and aircraft and so on; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5)

applicable facilities in the event that it is considered that the use of such weapons is required to execute duties or to protect themselves or others. Weapons must not be used to cause harm to other people except in cases of self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation.

36 In order to enhance Japan’s capabilities for gathering image intelligence, four intelligence-gathering satellites are currently operated at the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD has properly utilized the information provided by these satellites.
information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence activities conducted by Defense Attachés and other officials.

Moreover, it was decided newly to post Defense Attachés to Africa, Central and South America and other regions in FY2014.