On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan.

See Fig. I-1-2-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>U.S. Forces in Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces</td>
<td>Approx. 1.19 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 660,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 29,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>Approx. 1.02 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 520,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 19,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>T-62, T-54/-55, etc.</td>
<td>M-48, K-1, T-80 etc.</td>
<td>M-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval vessels</td>
<td>Approx. 650; 101,000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 190; 195,000 tons</td>
<td>Supporting corps only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>Approx. 3,500</td>
<td>Approx. 2,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>Approx. 27,000 personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 600</td>
<td>Approx. 620</td>
<td>Approx. 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd and 4th generation fighter aircraft</td>
<td>Mig-23 x 56</td>
<td>F-4 x 70</td>
<td>F-16 x 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-25 x 34</td>
<td>F-16 x 164</td>
<td>F-15 x 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Approx. 24.7 million</td>
<td>Approx. 49 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term of service</td>
<td>Army: 5–12 years</td>
<td>Army: 21 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy: 5–10 years</td>
<td>Navy: 23 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force: 3–4 years</td>
<td>Air Force: 24 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Military Balance 2014, etc.
North Korea has been advocating the construction of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy—and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The “military-first politics” has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military-first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution. In fact, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-un, who is in a position to control the military, mentioned the importance of military power in his New Year Address in January 2014: “Strengthening defense capabilities is the most important of all state affairs, and the country’s dignity, people’s happiness and peace rest on powerful arms” and regularly visits military organizations. This indicates that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces.

Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international community for food and other resources, it seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2014, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2014 national budget was 15.9%, but it is believed that this represents only a fraction of real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operations forces. In addition, North Korea repeatedly uses provocative words and actions against relevant countries, including Japan. In particular, from March to April 2013, North Korea underscored that it would exercise its right to preemptive nuclear attack against the United States and other countries, and that the strike zone of its ballistic missiles included Japan, naming specific cities.

Such military trend in North Korea constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. Sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them.
the capital city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as main battle tanks and multiple launch rockets.\(^6\)

The Navy has about 650 ships with a total displacement of approximately 101,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 70 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces.

The Air Force has approximately 600 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces.

In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations forces whose size is estimated at 100,000 soldiers.\(^7\) In recent years, observers indicate North Korea is placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces.\(^8\)

North Korea’s military forces actively conduct various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation and other underlying circumstances, it is believed that military personnel are mobilized for agricultural activities as well as for large-scale construction projects, including the construction of the Masikryong Ski Resort promoted by First Chairman Kim Jong-un.\(^9\)

### 3 WMD and Ballistic Missiles

While North Korea continues to maintain large-scale military capabilities, its conventional forces are considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S. forces in the ROK. This is the result of a variety of factors, including decreases in military assistance from the former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War structure, limitations placed on North Korea’s national defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the rapid modernization of the ROK’s defense capabilities. It is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to compensate for this shortfall.

The development of WMDs and missiles by North Korea constitutes, coupled with provocative words and actions, including missile attacks against Japan, a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.

**(1) Nuclear Weapons**

*a. Recent major developments regarding the issue of North Korea’s nuclear development*

With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003, aimed to take peaceful measures to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, the Joint Statement was adopted, which focused on the abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. In 2006, the Talks was suspended as North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test\(^10\) and the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 in response. Later, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and the agreement of the sixth round of the Talks in October 2007 included completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea’s) nuclear programs by the end of the year.” However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed\(^11\) and the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since December 2008.

In 2009, North Korea again conducted a missile launch and...
a nuclear test\textsuperscript{12}. In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 in June 2009, imposing additional sanctions on North Korea. Later, meetings of head negotiators of the Six-Party Talks from North and South and U.S.-North Korea high-level talks have been held, but the Six-Party Talks has not yet resumed. In response to North Korea’s launch of a missile, which it called a “Satellite,” in December 2012, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 in January 2013 to expand and strengthen the sanctions of the past resolutions. Furthermore, in response to a nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2094 in March 2013 that includes additional and strengthened sanctions against North Korea.

North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state” in 2012 in its revised constitution. In 2013, North Korea continued to take steps to boost its standing in the international community as a “nuclear weapons state.” In March 2013, it adopted the so-called “new strategic line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development and reiterated that nuclear weapons were neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings, alleging that North Korea would be able to concentrate on economic development and on improving the lives of the people as long as nuclear deterrence was solid. In April of the same year, North Korea adopted a law “On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense.” In this way, it is showing no signs of changing or softening its stance of proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons.

With regard to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, some have argued that it is a so-called brinkmanship policy designed to establish North Korea’s standing as a de facto nuclear weapons state, and thereby, gain an advantage in negotiations with the United States and other countries and receive some sort of reward. On the other hand, taking into account that North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime\textsuperscript{13} that North Korea considers its own nuclear deterrence is needed to counter the nuclear threat of the United States\textsuperscript{14} and is in no position at least in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK, that North Korea asserts Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed due to their lack of nuclear deterrence\textsuperscript{15}, and that North Korea reiterates nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime.

**b. The current status of the nuclear weapons program**

Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments and in view of the implementation of nuclear tests conducted in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013, the possibility cannot be dismissed that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program\textsuperscript{16}.

With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons\textsuperscript{17}, North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances\textsuperscript{18}. Moreover, in June 2009, North Korea announced that it would weaponize all of its newly extracted plutonium\textsuperscript{19}. In April 2013, North Korea announced its policy to readjust and restart all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor, the disablement of which was agreed upon in the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in October 2007. In November 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opined that while lack of inspection makes it impossible to conclusively determine, multiple activities were observed from satellite imagery suggesting that the nuclear reactor was restarted\textsuperscript{20}. Because

\textsuperscript{12} Given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, and in light of the fact that the Japan Meteorological Agency detected a seismic wave with a waveform that differed from usual, which could possibly have resulted from a North Korean nuclear test, the government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on that day.


\textsuperscript{14} For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014 alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, a comment in the Rodong Shinmun dated December 2, 2013 contends, “The situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability.”

\textsuperscript{16} The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2012 pointed out that “these tests (in 2006 and 2009) strengthen our assessment that North Korea has produced nuclear weapons.”

\textsuperscript{17} Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).

\textsuperscript{18} In October 2003, North Korea announced that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium and then in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods.

\textsuperscript{19} Then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Armed Services Committee in April 2011 that “we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2012 estimates that North Korea has approximately 40kg of plutonium.

\textsuperscript{20} The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 noted, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that if the reactor is restarted, North Korea would have the capability to produce enough plutonium (approximately 6kg) to manufacture approximately one nuclear bomb in one year.
the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, such developments are of great concern.

As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in 2002 the United States announced that North Korea acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. North Korea insists that the enriched uranium is used as fuel for light water reactors and that therefore the uranium enrichment program is a peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, a series of North Korean behaviors concerning uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.

After the adoption of Resolution 2087 by the U.N. Security Council in January 2013, North Korea announced statements suggesting implementation of a nuclear test. Notwithstanding the fact that the international community including Japan strongly urged North Korea not to conduct a nuclear test, North Korea carried out a test in February 2013. It is likely that North Korea has further developed its nuclear weapons program by gathering necessary data through the test.

It is believed that North Korea is working to develop a nuclear weapon to mount on a ballistic missile as part of its nuclear weapons program. In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s and that North Korea conducted a nuclear test in February 2013, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads. All related developments will need to be carefully monitored.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that could become the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses a grave threat to Japan’s security and significantly impairs peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community. Therefore, they can never be tolerated.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to biological weapons, it is believed that North Korea has some infrastructure for their production despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents as well as a substantial stockpile of such agents.

(3) Ballistic Missiles

As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. As was observed in March, June, and July 2014, North Korea often launches ballistic missiles

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21 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2012 pointed out that “the North’s disclosure (of a uranium enrichment facility) supports the United States’ longstanding assessment that North Korea has pursued uranium enrichment capability.” Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2012 notes that, “It is likely that North Korea is operating a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program, considering that a Foreign Ministry spokesman mentioned the term ‘uranium enrichment’ in 2009, and the revelation of a uranium enrichment facility in November 2010.”

22 At around 11:59 am on February 12, 2013, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected a seismic wave centered in the vicinity of North Korea with a waveform that differed from usual, which was unlikely to be a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a nuclear test. On this basis, the government of Japan verified the facts in coordination with other relevant parties, including the United States and the ROK. As a result of taking into consideration the aforementioned information holistically, the Japanese government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. North Korea announced that it had “succeeded in the third underground nuclear test.” “The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and lighter A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power,” and “physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.”

23 The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out that “we must assume if there are no major changes in its (North Korea’s) national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system.”

24 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2012 pointed out, “Following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500–5,000 tons of various chemical weapons stored in multiple facilities throughout the country. Moreover, North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, pest, Francisella tularensis, and hemorrhagic fever virus.” Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of May 2013 pointed out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.”

25 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002)
to conduct military provocations against relevant countries, including Japan.\footnote{26}

\textbf{a. Toksa}

North Korea is thought to be developing a short-range ballistic missile, Toksa, with its range estimated to be approximately 120km\footnote{27}. It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile owned or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant\footnote{28}.

\textbf{b. Scud}

It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C\footnote{29}, a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries. At present, North Korea is considered to deploy Scud ER (Extended Range) which has an extended range due to the extension of the scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach 1,000 km\footnote{30}, and it is possible that a part of Japan falls within this range.

\textbf{c. Nodong}

North Korea is also thought to have started its development of longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, which is believed to be already deployed, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, and may reach almost all of Japan.

It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong\footnote{31}. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong missiles\footnote{32}. Furthermore, in March 2014, North Korea launched ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud and Nodong missiles towards the Sea of Japan. In these launches, North Korea launched multiple missiles in the early morning and late evening hours from locations which had never been used in the past, utilizing a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). This suggests North Korea has the capacity to launch ballistic missiles from locations and at timings as it chooses. Also, the Nodong missiles were launched from the western coast of North Korea in the eastern direction to fly across the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, it is deemed that North Korea is building up its confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.

Although details about Nodong’s capability have not been confirmed, as the ballistic missile is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it is deemed that it does not have the accuracy to carry out strikes on specific target installations.

\textbf{d. Taepodong-1}

Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range of at least approximately 1,500 km. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of a longer range missile, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

\textbf{e. Musudan}

It is believed that North Korea is currently developing a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) “Musudan.” It has been pointed out that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) SS-N-6 that it acquired in the early 1990s. It will likely be loaded onto a TEL, just like its Scud and Nodong counterparts, and then operated. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the new missile boasts a range of be-
tween 2,500 and 4,000km, meaning that Guam in addition to all parts of Japan could fall within its firing range.

It is very difficult to verify the intention of North Korea’s military activities because of its closed regime. In addition, it is believed that North Korea has constructed underground military facilities across the country, and the ballistic missiles such as Toksa, Scud, Nodong and Musudan, would be loaded onto TELs. These make it difficult to detect in advance individual and specific signs of the launch of missiles with TELs, such as detailed launch sites and timings.

f. Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 is believed to be a missile with four engines, each of which is developed based on technologies of Nodong, in a cluster in its first stage and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000km for the two-stage type while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately one ton. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and fell near the launch site. In the launch of a missile in April 2009, which it called a “Satellite,” it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it from the same district again. It is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000 km before falling in the Pacific Ocean. In April 2012, North Korea conducted a launch believed to be using a Taepodong-2 or its variant from the Tongch’ang-ri district again. The missile flew over a minute and then fell into the Yellow Sea by breaking into several pieces. The launch is believed to have been a failure.

In December of the same year, North Korea again conducted a launch using a Taepodong-2 variant, which it called a “Satellite” launch, from the Tongch’ang-ri district. In this launch, all falling objects are estimated to have fallen in the danger areas which were set beforehand by North Korea, while an object including the possible third stage propelling device is estimated to have continued flight while changing its trajectory and put an object into orbit around the earth.

The launch showed that North Korea has developed technologies to extend the range such as those to separate multi-stage propulsion devices and technologies to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles such as those to control posture and guidance. It is thus believed that North Korea’s ballistic missile development has entered a new phase. As for the technology to extend the range, in particular, it is believed that significant advancements have been made assuming from the technologies verified through the launches this time and in the past that if North Korea develops long-range ballistic missiles, they may potentially reach the central, western and other areas of the U.S. mainland, while some details regarding a few of the related technologies are still unclear.

g. KN08

The details of the new missile KN08 which was showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Whereas the Taepodong-2 is launched from a fixed launch pad, the KN08 is carried by a TEL, making it difficult to detect signs of its launch in advance, and is likely intended to increase survivability.

h. Trends in and outlook of ballistic missile development

An underlying factor that allowed for North Korea’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches is believed to be North Korea’s imports of various materials and technologies from outside of the country. It is also pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates...
ballistic missile airframes and related technologies, and that it promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation. It is further pointed out that North Korea is conducting tests at transfer destinations and using the results. Moreover, because a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and improving the circular error probability (CEP), the launch of long-range ballistic missiles such as Taepodong-2, including the launch in December 2012, may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea.

North Korea continues to claim that it will continue to conduct “satellite launches” and will develop and launch more capable satellite launch vehicles. It is highly possible that North Korea will further develop its long-range ballistic missiles by continuing to repeat similar launches under the name of “satellite” launches to carry out further technical tests towards bringing its long-range ballistic missiles to the stage of practical use. Should North Korea make further progress in its longer-range ballistic missile capability and simultaneously achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads, North Korea may come to have a one-sided understanding that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea have a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases in and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan.

In this light, coupled with its nuclear issue, North Korea’s ballistic missile issue has become more realistic and imminent for Northeast Asia and the international community from the perspective of both the improvement of the capability and transfer and proliferation, and such developments are profoundly worrisome.

38 For example, because Nodong is similar in shape to Shahab-3 of Iran and Gauri of Pakistan, analysts point out that Nodong airframes or related technologies may have been transferred. In addition, concerning the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities.” Moreover, in the report entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was published by the U.S. Department of Defense in May 2013, it was pointed out that North Korea uses various techniques to circumvent measures taken by each country on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including sending cargo through multiple front companies and intermediaries.

39 Going forward, it is possible that North Korea will seek out increased reliability of long-range ballistic missiles as well as such technologies as those for protecting a payload from high temperature when it reenters into the atmosphere from higher altitude with high velocity, those for precision guidance, and those for building underground launch sites and sites, which enhance survivability of missiles.
Fig. I-1-2-2  Launch of a Missile, which North Korea Called a “Satellite” on December 12, 2012

Approx. 0949i

Missile launch

Possible 1st Stage Propelling Device

Possible Fairing

Approx. 0959i – 1001i

Object including possible 3rd Stage Propelling Device

Approx. 0958i

Approx. 1003i

Possible 2nd Stage Propelling Device

Approx. 1009i

It is estimated that North Korea put an object (*) into orbit with an inclination of approx. 97 degrees

* It is assessed that the object does not function as a satellite

It is estimated that North Korea put an object (*) into orbit with an inclination of approx. 97 degrees

* It is assessed that the object does not function as a satellite

The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1
Domestic Affairs

(1) Developments concerning the Kim Jong-un Regime

After the death in 2011 of Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Mr. Kim Jong-un became the de facto head of the military, party and the “state” by assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, First Secretary of the Korea Workers’ Party and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in a short period of time. Since the transition to the new regime, there have been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions. Some analysts point out the “state” is run under the leadership of the party. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, underscores the importance of military strength and makes frequent visits to military organizations. On such bases, it is anticipated that the First Chairman will continue to attach importance to military strength.

The post-transition years have seen many changes in personnel, especially at high levels of the military and the cabinet, reportedly aimed at strengthening the power base of First Chairman Kim Jong-un. Following on from 2012, many personnel reshuffles were observed from 2013 to June 2014 with the three key military posts, namely, the Director of General Political Department being replaced once, the Chief of the General Staff being replaced twice, and the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces being replaced twice. As a result of such reshuffles, all of the three key military posts have come to be held by individuals selected by First Chairman Kim Jong-un.

In December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission and First Chairman Kim Jong-un’s uncle, was executed for “plotting to overthrow the state.” It is believed that by executing Vice-Chairman Jang Song-thaek who was considered to be the guardian of First Chairman Kim Jong-un, the First Chairman endeavored to strengthen and consolidate his regime as its sole leader.

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To date, no disruptions have been caused by such personnel changes, and various “national” events and Field Guidance by First Chairman Kim Jong-un have been carried out in an orderly manner. The regime thus appears to be on track to a certain degree. However, the intensification of competition for...
loyalty in the wake of the execution of Vice-Chairman Jang Song-thaek, among other factors, could propel North Korea to turn to military provocative actions without careful consideration, and uncertainty may have risen. Some also point to the concern over social control such as the increasing inequality between the rich and the poor and the inflow of information from abroad – a concern which needs to be monitored from the perspective of regime stability.

(2) Economic Conditions
In terms of the economy, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and shrunken economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to rely on food assistance from foreign countries. To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has attempted limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems, and seems to be implementing economic cooperation projects with other countries, including China. First Chairman Kim Jong-un continues to frequently emphasize the need to improve the economic situation and announced the establishment of economic development zones. In addition, according to reports, a new economic policy is under way to enlarge the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans. These all suggest North Korea is placing importance on the rebuilding of the economy. Nonetheless, it is seen unlikely that North Korea would carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current governance system, and thus various challenges confront the fundamental improvement of its current economic situation.

Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with the United States
The United States has indicated it would work to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. The United States consistently makes its position clear that it is necessary for North Korea to comply with the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and take specific measures to improve North-South relations before resuming the Six-Party Talks.

In response, North Korea has been criticizing the United States, claiming that its “hostile policy” towards North Korea and lack of trust between them stand in the way of the peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and argues that the conclusion of a U.S.-North Korea peace agreement is necessary to build a relationship of trust. As such, a significant gap has been observed between the two parties’ stances. Since the U.N. Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2087 in January 2013, North Korea, claiming that the “hostile policy” of the United States has entered a dangerous state, contends that there can be no denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before the denuclearization of the world, and therefore, there will be no more talks for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while leaving room for dialogue for ensuring peace and security in the region. The divide between the two parties’ positions has still not been bridged. In June 2013, North Korea, in the form of an important statement by the spokesperson of the National Defense Commission, proposed to hold U.S.-North Korea senior-level talks. However, the United States remained firm on its stance that North Korea must first take concrete steps to show it is headed towards denuclearization, and the talks have yet to materialize.

North Korea, further still, reacted sharply to the U.S.-ROK
combined exercise, alleging that such activities were a manifestation of the U.S. “hostile policy” towards North Korea. On the occasion of the U.S.-ROK combined exercise carried out from March to April 2013, coupled with the protests against UN security Council Resolutions, North Korea repeatedly made hard-line arguments including nullification of the Korean War Armistice Agreement and suggestion of pre-emptive nuclear attack on the United States. Similarly, during a period of U.S.-ROK combined exercise from February to April 2014, North Korea launched several ballistic missiles and multiple launch rockets, while criticizing the United States. Furthermore, North Korea reiterated that it would continue to launch missiles and strengthen its nuclear deterrent as a right of self-defense.

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea

Relations between the ROK and North Korea worsened under the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, spurred by the outbreak of incidents that heightened North-South military tensions, including the sinking of an ROK patrol vessel in March 2010 and the shelling incident of Yeonpyeong Island in November of the same year. Even after the administration of President Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013, North Korea lodged protests against the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087 in January 2013 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 in March 2013, as well as to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise conducted in March to April. North Korea adopted a hardline rhetoric, including abrogation of all agreements on North-South non-aggression. Following the U.S.-ROK combined exercise that was conducted until the end of April 2013, North Korea gradually softened its provocative words and actions against the ROK. By August, North Korea agreed to the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex which had de facto suspended its operations. In addition, North Korea has held dialogues with the ROK, including the North-South separated family reunion meeting which was held for the first time in three years and four months in February 2014. However, when the U.S.-ROK combined exercise commenced at the end of February 2014, North Korea engaged in military provocations, including intrusion into the ROK’s airspace using small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a large-scale maritime live-fire drill in an area near the north-west islands of the ROK covering Baengnyeong Island and Yeonpyeong Island.

Meanwhile, there have been developments in recent years towards ROK-China cooperation not only in the economic realm but also in the political and diplomatic realms. Under such circumstances, Japan needs to pay attention to what policies are adopted for the ROK by North Korea, which has heretofore repeated dialogue and provocations.

(3) Relations with China

The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force. Currently, China is North Korea’s biggest trade partner, and the bilateral trade volume set a record again in 2013. In 2013, trade with China accounted for approximately 80% of North Korea’s total trade, and observers point out North Korea’s increasing dependence on China. Furthermore, it appears the two countries are undertaking port and commercial facility construction projects, as demonstrated by the promotion of joint development and joint management projects in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone and the Hwanggumpyong-Wihwado Economic Zone since June 2011.

With regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In addition, China endorsed U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2087 and 2094. Following the adoption of the two resolutions, China issued notices in February and April 2013, stating that China would thoroughly enforce the embargo of items set forth in both resolutions. In September 2013, China released a list of supplies and technologies banned for export to North Korea that could be diverted to WMD programs. Through such measures, China has demonstrated commitment to executing...
the sanctions resolutions against North Korea.

Meanwhile, China seems intent on maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with North Korea, holding a China-North Korea strategic dialogue among diplomatic authorities in June 2013 and dispatching Li Yuanchao, Vice President, to a North Korean event commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Korean War armistice.

China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions which are in line with the position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues. Furthermore, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, who played a key role in economic cooperation with China was executed. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations and China’s influence on North Korea must continue to be monitored.

(4) Relations with Russia
While North Korea and Russia became estranged with the end of the Cold War, they signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in 2000. In August 2011, Kim Jong-il, then Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia. A Russia-North Korea summit was held for the first time in nine years, and the two sides agreed to cooperate on a gas-pipeline project, among other matters. In September 2012, after the transition to the Kim Jong-un regime, the two countries signed an agreement that writes off 90% of the debt owed to Russia by North Korea, and in such ways, friendly relations have been maintained between the two countries. Furthermore, in September 2013, a railway opened for service connecting Khasan, a coastal area in the Russian Far East, and Rajin Port in northeastern North Korea.

Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. After the nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013, Russia issued a statement that condemned the test but expressed that it was against sanctions that could influence normal trade and economic relations with North Korea.

(5) Relations with the Other Countries
Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries and participation in the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer. In April 2013, North Korea’s attempt to export gas masks and other items to Syria was intercepted by Turkish authorities. In July of the same year, the North Korean vessel Chong Chon Gang sailing from Cuba to North Korea was seized by Panamanian authorities near the Panama Canal. As a result, contents of cargo that violated U.N. sanctions resolutions were confiscated, including MiG-21 fighters and a surface-to-air missile system.

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52 The previous treaty (Soviet-North Korea Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty) had contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means available. This provision, however, was dropped from the new treaty.
53 For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively.
2 The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces in the ROK

General Situation

In the ROK, the administration of Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013. The Park administration maintains that forging trust through dialogue is most critical for improving the North-South relations. With regard to the nuclear issue, the administration sets out that North Korea’s nuclear development can never be tolerated and that the ROK will address this issue in concert with the international community. In August 2013, the ROK unveiled a policy called the “Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” which aims to realize denuclearization by building trust through efforts, including humanitarian initiatives and North-South exchanges. The ROK states that it would make a decisive response to military provocations by North Korea and emphasizes the importance of building a solid posture to deter and address the threat of North Korea.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. forces stationed in the ROK have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. The two countries are now making a shift to a new joint defense system of “the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting” through the transition of the wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK. The way in which this system will be developed based on the present-day situation in the Korean Peninsula will need to be monitored.

Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country’s population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy.” However, the ROK presently uses the expression, “the North Korean regime and its armed forces...are our enemies.”

In 2005, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced the “National Defense Reform Basic Plan 2006-2020” for “the restructuring of the military from its current quantitative, conventional form centered on troops to a qualitative, high-tech military force structure that is information and technology-intensive.” In 2009, in light of the changes in the situation, such as the missile launches and nuclear test by North Korea, the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2009-2020 was announced. The Basic Plan identified, among other measures, the scaling down of the initially planned reduction in the force strength and the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities. Meanwhile, in response to the sinking of the ROK patrol ship and the artillery shelling on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, in August 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense released the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-2030, incorporating the enhancement of deterrence against North Korea and further streamlining of the military. In March 2014, the Park Geun-hye administration unveiled the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2014-2030, which envisions long-term defense force enhancements for dealing with potential threats following the unification of the Korean Peninsula, while maintaining a readiness posture against North Korean threats.

Military Posture of the ROK

The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 550,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 195,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 620 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to establish a sys-
tem of omnidirectional military posture to deal with all types of threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships and domestically built destroyers. In February 2010, the first mobile force in the ROK was created. In April 2012, the Air Force completed the introduction of F-15K fighters which had been implemented since 2002. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35 as a next-generation fighter with stealth capabilities.

In October 2012, the ROK government announced a revision of its missile guidelines stipulating the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision includes the extension of their maximum range from 300km to 800km to enhance the deterrence against military provocation by North Korea. In addition, in response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the ROK intends to work on expansion of its missile capabilities, construction of systems to execute its missile capabilities, promotion of the development of a missile-defense system, etc.

In recent years, the ROK is actively promoting equipment export, which reached 3.4 billion dollars in 2013. It is reported that export items have become diverse to include communication electronics and naval vessels.

The FY2014 defense budget (main budget) amounts to approximately 35.7057 trillion won, an increase of approximately 3.5% over the previous fiscal year, marking the 15th consecutive rise since FY2000.

The United States and the ROK have implemented various efforts to deepen the U.S.-ROK alliance in recent years. At the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in June 2009, an agreement was reached on the “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea” that includes an evolution into “a comprehensive strategic alliance” to expand the scope of the alliance globally beyond the Korean Peninsula and widen the partnership of the two countries to non-military areas. Furthermore, the 42nd ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2010 announced a joint communiqué incorporating the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation to embody the future vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, which shows a further strengthening of the bilateral relationship. In March 2013, the two countries signed the ROK-U.S.

59 The primary missions of the Seventh Mobile Corps, which is the first mobile force established in the ROK, are described as the protection of sea lanes, deterrence against North Korea and support for the government’s external policies.
60 In April 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the country has developed and already fielded missiles that include cruise missiles able to strike throughout North Korea. In February 2013, the ministry indicated that it would accelerate the development of 800km-range ballistic missiles, possession of which was made possible by the revision of the missile guidelines in October 2012, and announced that it has fielded cruise missiles to be launched from vessels or submarines and capable of attacking the entire area of North Korea. Also in October, during an event commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the armed forces, the ROK armed forces displayed to the public for the first time the Hyeonmu 2 ballistic missile, which is said to have a 300km range, and the Hyeonmu 3 surface-to-surface cruise missile, which is said to have a 1,000km range. In April 2014, the ROK conducted a successful test launch of a new ballistic missile with a range of 500km.
61 The ROK Ministry of National Defense calls the system “Kill Chain” and explains that the system is capable of detecting and identifying signs of missile launch, determining attack, and actual attacking instantaneously.
62 In December 2006, the ROK indicated promotion of its own missile defense system (Korea Air and Missile Defense: KAMD). It is reported that the ROK is advancing the construction of the system to be completed by around 2015. Meanwhile, the ROK Ministry of National Defense denies the participation in the U.S. missile defense system and stresses that it would build its own system, reportedly because the United States and the ROK understand threats differently.
Chapter 1
Defense Policies of Countries

In 2007, the United States and the ROK agreed to dismantle the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition of the wartime OPCON in April 2012. Later in June 2010, the United States is proceeding with the realignment of its forces stationed in the ROK in line with the June 2003 agreement to relocate its forces to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages. According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK. However, the details have not been made public.

In addition, the two countries have been working to solve issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK. However, as for the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK, although the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area, south of Seoul, and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river had been agreed upon in 2003, there seems to be delays in the relocation to the Pyongtek area. For the transition of the wartime OPCON to the ROK scheduled on December 1, 2015, the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015, which provides the framework for the transition of the wartime OPCON, was signed in October 2010. Nevertheless, given the increasing seriousness of North Korean nuclear and missile threats, among other factors, the two sides have decided to continue talks on the conditions and timing of the transition. After the completion of the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK and the transition of the wartime OPCON, defense of the ROK will change from “the U.S.-ROK joint defense system” to a new joint defense system of “the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting,” which could have a significant impact on the nature of the U.S. forces in the ROK. As such, these developments will need to be followed.

5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with China
China and the ROK have been working to strengthen their relations. At the May 2008 China-ROK Summit Meeting, the two countries agreed to upgrade the China-ROK relationship from a “full-scale cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” Following the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye government, in June 2013, President Park held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping during her visit to China, and the two sides announced the Joint Statement on the Korea-China Future Vision. At the working-level, also in June, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff visited China for the first time in six years. Further, in December 2013, the first China-ROK Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security was held between the directors-general of the foreign and defense ministries of the two countries, and the two sides agreed to hold the dialogue regularly. In July 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the ROK and released a joint statement in which agreement was reached on items, including promoting bilateral dialogue in the areas of politics and security and realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile, the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ, and furthermore, included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the exclusive economic zone. Against this backdrop, the ROK government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month.

(2) Relations with Russia
Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high-ranking military officials. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry and military supplies. At the ROK-Russia Summit in

63 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint responses in the event of a North Korean provocation. However, the details of the plan have not been made public.

64 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK. However, the details have not been made public.

65 The United States is proceeding with the realignment of its forces stationed in the ROK in line with the June 2003 agreement to relocate its forces to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the October 2004 agreement to cut the number of its forces stationed in the ROK by 12,500 from approximately 37,500. However, the two countries agreed at the summit meeting in April 2008 to maintain the current strength of 26,500 as the appropriate level.

66 In 2007, the United States and the ROK agreed to dismantle the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition of the wartime OPCON in April 2012. Later in June 2010, however, agreement was reached to postpone the transition to December 1, 2015 for various reasons, including the increasing military threat posed by North Korea.
September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In March 2012, the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security.

(3) Overseas Activities
Since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia in 1993, the ROK has participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level. In July 2010, the ROK created the “International Peace Support Force,” a special unit for overseas dispatch. Since March 2013, the ROK has dispatched troops composed primarily of engineering units to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

The ROK has sent troops to Afghanistan for the purpose of protecting Korean members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Further, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK-registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Since January 2011, the ROK has dispatched a ROK special forces unit for the purpose of supporting the training of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) special forces units, joint exercises, and protecting ROK citizens in emergency situations. Additionally, in December 2013, the ROK dispatched a disaster recovery support unit consisting of approximately 500 personnel, including engineering unit and medical personnel, to the Philippines in the wake of its typhoon disaster.

67 The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK armed forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, an act concerning the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations was enacted.