Giving fundamental direction of foreign and defense policies concerning national security.

Maintenance of the civilian control function of the Security Council.

Strengthening the response to emergencies.

Organization after the Establishment of National Security Council (schematic image)
### Developments in the Upgrading of Defense Capability to Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Basic Policy for National Defense (May 20, 1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1st Defense Program (Three-year Government Plan) (June 14, 1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2nd Defense Program (Five-year Government Plan) (July 18, 1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4th Defense Program (Five-year Government Plan) (February 8, 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1978 Mid-Term Program (Japan Defense Agency internal document)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1980 Mid-Term Program (Japan Defense Agency internal document)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1985 Mid-Term Program (Five-year Government Plan) (September 18, 1985) (1.02% of GNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Concerning the Basic Approach to the Defense Program from FY1991 (December 19, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and Beyond (November 28, 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2004 Mid-Term Program (Five-year Government Plan) (December 15, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Concerning the Upgrading of Defense Capability in 2010 (December 17, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (December 17, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2013 Concerning the Upgrading of Defense Capability in FY2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Changes in the Role of Defense Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaster relief, etc.</td>
<td>Contributing to building a more stable security environment - PKO &amp; international disaster relief activities - Security dialogue &amp; defense exchange, etc.</td>
<td>Independent, proactive initiatives to improve the international security environment - Making international peace cooperation activities a primary mission - Security dialogue &amp; defense exchange</td>
<td>Improving the global security environment - Initiatives focused on international peace cooperation activities - Arms control &amp; disarmament, &amp; support for capacity building - Anti-terrorism measures &amp; security of maritime traffic, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing &amp; dealing with a limited, small-scale invasion independently</td>
<td>Dealing with various contingencies, e.g. major disasters - Large-scale natural disasters &amp; terrorism - Contingencies in the vicinity of Japan</td>
<td>Effective responses to new threats &amp; diverse contingencies - Ballistic missiles - Guerrillas &amp; special operation forces, etc. - Invasion of islands - ISR, territorial invasion, armed spy ships, etc. - Large-scale, special disasters, etc.</td>
<td>Further stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region - Defense exchange &amp; intra-regional cooperation - Support for capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Japan - Prevention of invasion - Dealing with invasion</td>
<td>Preparations against a full-scale invasion (securing the most basic elements)</td>
<td>Effective deterrence &amp; response - Security of surrounding waters &amp; airspace - Attacks on islands - Cyber attacks - Guerrillas &amp; special operation forces - Ballistic missiles - Complex contingencies - Large-scale, special disasters, etc.</td>
<td>Effective deterrence &amp; response - Security of surrounding waters &amp; airspace - Attacks on islands - Cyber attacks - Guerrillas &amp; special operation forces - Ballistic missiles - Complex contingencies - Large-scale, special disasters, etc. - Preparations against a full-scale invasion (maintaining the minimum-necessary level of preparations against as yet unclear future changes in the situation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Concept of basic defense capability**
- Maintaining a balanced posture in terms of organization and deployment, including logistical support systems, equipped with the various functions required for defense
- Effectively dealing with contingencies up to and including limited, small-scale invasions
- Contributing to civil stability for the populace through disaster relief, etc.

**Adherence to same fundamental policy**
- Does not adhere to the realization of measures to deal with a limited, small-scale invasion singlehandedly
- "Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters" and "contributing to building a more stable security environment" added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of "defense of the nation"

**Multifunctional, flexible, effective defense capability**
(Maintenance of the effective aspects of the concept of basic defense capability)
- Being able to work independently and proactively on improving the international security environment, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies

**Dynamic defense force**
(Not bound by the concept of basic defense capability)
- Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner
- Developing multifunctional, flexible, effective defense capability

---

*Fig. II-2-1-1* Changes in the Role of Defense Capability
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>147,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready reserve</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionally deployed units in peacetime</td>
<td>12 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile operation units</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 artillerie brigade (Regional units) 10 units</td>
<td>1 airbone brigade</td>
<td>1 airbone brigade</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 combined training brigade</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td>1 combined training brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-to-air guided missile units</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>7 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>(About 1,200/vehicle)</td>
<td>About 900 (About 900/vehicle)</td>
<td>About 600 (About 600/vehicle)</td>
<td>About 400 (About 400/vehicle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (Main artillery)</td>
<td>(About 1,000/vehicle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer units for mobile operations</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Regional units) 10 units (Land-based) 16 squadrons</td>
<td>(Regional units) 13 squadrons</td>
<td>(Regional units) 9 divisions</td>
<td>(Regional units) 8 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine units</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>9 divisions</td>
<td>9 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping units</td>
<td>2 minesweeper flotillas (Land-based)</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla (Land-based)</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol aircraft units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>About 60 ships</td>
<td>About 50 ships</td>
<td>47 ships</td>
<td>48 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>16 ships</td>
<td>16 ships</td>
<td>16 ships</td>
<td>22 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>About 220 aircraft</td>
<td>About 170 aircraft</td>
<td>About 150 aircraft</td>
<td>About 150 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft control &amp; warning units</td>
<td>28 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
<td>24 warning groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 airbone warning squadron (2 squadrons)</td>
<td>1 airbone warning squadron (2 squadrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter units</td>
<td>10 squadrons</td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
<td>12 squadrons</td>
<td>12 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter-interceptor units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support fighter units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air refueling/transport units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main equipment &amp; major units which can also be used in ballistic missile defense</td>
<td>About 430 aircraft</td>
<td>About 400 aircraft</td>
<td>About 350 aircraft</td>
<td>About 340 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(About 360 aircraft)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegis-equipped destroyers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 ships</td>
<td>6 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft control &amp; warning units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 groups</td>
<td>11 surveillance groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air guided missile units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 squadrons</td>
<td>units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Categorized as main artillery up till 2004 NDPG, but categorized in the 2010 NDPG as artillery except for surface-to-air guided missile units.
2. Although not stated in the 1976 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG table after 1995.
3. “Main equipment and major units that can also be used in defense against ballistic missiles” refers to the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF.
4. According to the 2012 NDPG, additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.
Highened tension on the Korean Peninsula

- Sinking of an ROK naval patrol vessel "Cheonan" (Mar 2010)
- Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea (Nov 2010)
- Launch of a missile over Japan (Apr 2009)
- Launch of a missile which NK called "Satellite" (Apr & Dec 2012)
- Nuclear test and enhancement of ballistic missile capability by North Korea (Oct 2006, May 2009 & Feb 2013)
- Launch of a missile which NK called "Satellite" (Apr & Dec 2012)
- Construction of North Korea’s new regime
  - Kim Jong-il, the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, died and Kim Jong-un has become the de-facto head of military, party and the ‘nation’ (2011-2012)

China’s military modernization

- Increase in new types of surface combatant ships and submarines
- Commission of the first Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" (Sep 2012)
- Steady increase in 4th generation fighters
- Reports of development of next generation fighters

Intensification of activities by China in waters near Japan and other areas

- Chinese government ships intruded into Japanese territorial waters near Senkaku Islands (Dec 2008~)
- Chinese vessels passed the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean (Apr & Jun 2012)
- 10 Chinese vessels including 2 Kilo-class submarines and 2 Sovremenny-class destroyers passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island on their way to the Pacific Ocean. Chinese ship-borne helicopters flew close to MSDF destroyers (Apr 2010)
- 10 Chinese vessels including 2 Kilo-class submarines and 2 Sovremenny-class destroyers passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island on their way to the Pacific Ocean. Chinese ship-borne helicopters flew close to MSDF destroyers (Apr 2010)
- Chinese vessels passed through the Soya Strait (Sept 2011)
- 24 Russian warships passed through the Soya Strait (Sept 2011)
- Russian bombers flew near Japanese airspace, circling Japan (Sept 2011 & Mar 2012)
- Russian bombers flew near Japanese airspace, circling Japan (Sept 2011 & Mar 2012)
- 26 Russian warships passed through the Soya Strait (Sept 2011)

Changes in the military balance between China and Taiwan (in China’s favor)

- Growing friction between China and neighboring countries in the South China Sea
- Chinese government airplane violated the territorial air of Japan around Senkaku Islands (Dec 2012)
- A Jiangwei II-class FFG directed fire-control radar at a MSDF DD in East China Sea (Jan 2013)

Notes: It has been pointed out that parties related to the Chinese military force have concepts of waters for marine combat on the assumption of the Island Chains. (The position of the Island Chains take reference from figures shown in the U.S. Department of Defense “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012” report and other materials.)
### Meetings of the Defense Posture Review Commission (As of May 31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>January 25</td>
<td>Way forward on defense posture review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>January 31</td>
<td>Review of past NDPGs and points of current NDPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>February 7</td>
<td>International environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>February 15</td>
<td>Role of defense forces and capability assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>February 21</td>
<td>U.S. security policy and Japan-U.S. alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>March 4</td>
<td>Significance of NDPG and MTDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>March 7</td>
<td>Current status of SDF operations and issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>March 18</td>
<td>Information and communications (including cyber issues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>March 21</td>
<td>Efforts to improve the international environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>April 3</td>
<td>Domestic and surrounding environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>April 15</td>
<td>Space policy, UAVs, ballistic missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>April 19</td>
<td>Acquisition policy and research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>April 24</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>May 13</td>
<td>Personnel management, training, and health policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>May 15</td>
<td>Role of defense forces and capability assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>Direction of joint operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**[Reference] Defense Posture Review Commission Members**

Commission Chair:  
Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense

Alternate Commission Chair:  
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense

Deputy Commission Chair: Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense  
Commission members:  
Director General, Minister’s Secretariat  
Bureau Director Generals  
Chiefs of Staff  
Director General, Defense Intelligence Headquarters
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Main Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Improved readiness to deal with various contingencies     | (1) In order to ensure intelligence gathering, early warning and surveillance, and security in the southwestern region, the SDF personal shall be increased by a total of 287 personnel, and efforts made to improve the readiness of units.  
(2) Operations of destroyers, patrol helicopters, and airborne early warning and control aircraft shall be expanded by securing adequate funds for maintenance and repair, and the introduction of PBL shall be promoted to improve availability.  
(3) Joint exercises, Regional Army-level field training exercises, MSDF exercise, and Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise shall be conducted, in order to contribute to improvements in the ability to deal with various contingencies. |
| 2. Defense of Japan's land, waters, and airspace             | (1) Endeavors to be undertaken to facilitate intelligence gathering, early warning and surveillance, and security in surrounding waters shall include building destroyers, submarines, and minesweepers, extending the operational life of destroyers and submarines, acquiring fixed-wing patrol aircraft and amphibious search and rescue aircraft, and extending the operational life of fixed-wing patrol aircraft and patrol helicopters.  
(2) Endeavors to be undertaken to improve early warning and surveillance, and air defense capability in the airspace that includes the Ryukyu Islands shall include improving the performance of airborne early warning and control aircraft, upgrading fixed radar installations, putting in place facilities to accommodate the transition to having two fighter squadrons in the fighter unit at Naha Air Base, conducting studies aimed at enhancing and strengthening the operational preparedness of the ASDF on the Ryukyu Islands, acquiring next-generation fighter aircraft, and carrying out refurbishment work to improve the performance of fighter aircraft.  
(3) Endeavors to be undertaken to enhance land defense readiness, including islands such as the southwestern islands, shall include acquiring Type 96 Wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers and light armored vehicles, purchasing amphibious vehicles, acquiring multi-purpose helicopters, and acquiring Type 12 Surface-to-Ship Missiles and middle-range multi-purpose missiles.  
(4) Overseas studies concerning the operation and maintenance of High-Altitude, Long Endurance UAVs shall be undertaken, in order to further research into unmanned aerial vehicles.  
(5) A new cyber defense group (tentative name) will be formed to strengthen the ability to deal with cyber attacks. The cyber operational base will be enhanced and strengthened through projects to bolster network surveillance capability, and human resource development initiatives will be undertaken through graduate school study programs, both within Japan and overseas.  
(6) Upgrade of Aegis ships and Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced capability interceptor missile for BMD will be continued to further enhance preparedness for ballistic missile attacks.  
(7) Promote efforts for space utilization including research for strengthening C4ISR function, and implement a study in anticipation of conducting Space Situational Awareness. Develop sea-based terminals to adapt to next-generation X-band SATCOM, which contributes to the strengthening of information communication functions. |
| 3. Improved ability to deal with major/unconventional disasters, etc. | As well as maintaining and strengthening the functions of facilities including military camps and bases, which serve as bases for disaster response, by seismic retrofitting, training in dealing with major/unconventional disasters shall be carried out. Moreover, amphibious search and rescue aircraft and other equipment and materials that assist with disaster response shall be acquired, in light of the lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake. |
| II Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance                  | Precise measures shall be undertaken to facilitate the steady realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan, such as the project focused on relocating the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam. |
| III Initiatives to Further Stabilize the International Security Environment | In order to further stabilize the international security environment in areas such as the Asia-Pacific region, further efforts shall be made to promote various forms of cooperation in fields including humanitarian aid and disaster relief, as well as bilateral and multilateral dialogue. Moreover, efforts shall be made to strengthen the infrastructure for international activities by the SDF, in order to ensure that they can independently and proactively handle such activities as initiatives to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, initiatives to counter terrorism and piracy, and United Nations peacekeeping operations. |
| 6. Projects relating to organization and troop capacity       | As well as bolstering the functions of the Joint Staff, with the objective of increased integration, units such as the 7th Division shall be reorganized within the scope of SDF troop capacity as of the end of FY2012. |
| 7. Promotion of measures relating to bases                   | In order to ensure harmony between defense facilities and the surrounding community, measures to make the stationing of USFJ smoother and more effective shall be promoted, along with steady implementation of measures focused on areas around SDF bases. |
| 8. Strengthening of education and research systems           | As well as implementing measures to strengthen education and research systems at institutions such as the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, and the National Defense Medical College, an environment shall be put in place that enables those studying and working at these institutions to devote themselves to their duties. |
| V Recovery in the Aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake (Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake) | As well as replacing equipment and materials that became unusable as a result of the tsunami following the Great East Japan Earthquake, SDF facilities affected by the disaster shall be repaired, including buildings and workshops. |
### Comparison Between FY2012 Budget and FY2013 Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY2012 (100 million)</th>
<th>FY2013 (100 million)</th>
<th>Fiscal YOY growth (▲ indicates negative growth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual expenditure (note)</strong></td>
<td>46,453</td>
<td>46,804</td>
<td>351 (0.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and food provisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenses</td>
<td>20,701</td>
<td>19,896</td>
<td>▲806 (▲3.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material expenses</td>
<td>25,751</td>
<td>26,908</td>
<td>1,157 (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future obligation (note)</strong></td>
<td>29,331</td>
<td>31,100</td>
<td>1,769 (6.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New contracts</td>
<td>16,672</td>
<td>16,517</td>
<td>▲155 (▲0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing contracts</td>
<td>12,660</td>
<td>14,583</td>
<td>1,924 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Does not include SACO-related expenses, nor U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community).
- If these are included, the figures are 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012 and 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, and for future obligation, 3,035.9 billion yen for FY2012 and 3,230.8 billion yen for FY2013. In addition, the future obligation budget for new contracts in FY2012 excludes the cost of the maintenance and operation of X-band SATCOM (122.4 billion yen).
Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, or U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community). Total sum of defense expenditures including these are 4,931.9 billion yen for FY1999, 4,935.5 billion yen for FY2000, 4,955.0 billion yen for FY2001, 4,953.7 billion yen for FY2002, 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004, 4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.6 billion yen for FY2012, and 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013.
Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses and material expenses (operating expenses). Material expenses (operating expenses) are further classified into obligatory outlay expenses and general material expenses (activity expenses).

### Amount of future obligation

In the improvement of defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond, based on contracts like this which extend for multiple years.

**Example:** Case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract to run for four years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid in part (1 billion yen)</td>
<td>Paid in part (1 billion yen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General material expenses</td>
<td>Obligatory outlay expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remaining sum paid (6 billion yen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory outlay expenses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Future obligation (9 billion yen)**

**Amount of contract (10 billion yen)**
Defense-related expenditures looked at in terms of budget expenditure, personnel and food provision expenses and obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for approx. 80% of the total. Meanwhile, general material expenses, which are an activity expense, account for around 20% of the total. Of this, mandatory expenses, such as expenses for measures in areas around bases, account for more than 40%.

Thus, defense-related expenses are structured in a way that makes it difficult to change the breakdown substantially within a single fiscal year.
Notes: 1. ( ) is the budget amount, unit: 100 million yen.
2. The above figure shows SACO-related expenses (8.8 billion yen), excluding the portion meant to reduce the burden of local community (64.6 billion yen) out of the U.S. forces realignment expenses.
3. For an example of usage breakdown, see Reference 18.
Notes: 1. Defense budgets are from each country’s public documents.
   The dollar exchange rate is the purchasing power parity rate (OECD publication).
   1 U.S. dollar = 106.765082 yen = 0.678797 pound = 0.803298 euro (Germany) =
   0.865689 euro (France) = 18.102078 ruble = 4.173 yuan
   2. Defense budgets as a proportion of GDP have been estimated based on figures
      published by the governments of each country.
Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country.
2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2003 value as 1 (times) (rounded off two decimal places).
3. The definition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as foreign exchange fluctuations and price levels of each country, it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries.
4. See Reference 19.
Introduction of firewall and virus detection software (Implementation of "Ministry of Defense directives relating to information assurance," and strengthening of the system)

Raising awareness, self-examination and inspection

The Six Pillars of a Comprehensive Defensive Measures against Cyber Attacks

1) Increasing safety of information and communications systems

2) Upgrading of cyber defense system

3) Development of rules

4) Human resource development

5) Enhancement of information sharing

6) Research of cutting-edge technology

Function for system simulations

Environment that enables command system operators to participate in cyber attack countermeasure training

Simulation of command systems

Function for cyber attack response

Function to evaluate cyber attack response

Simulation of command systems

Function for system simulations

Function for cyber attack response

Function to evaluate cyber attack response
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>The era of the former Japan–U.S. Security Treaty</td>
<td>The former Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>The treaty enters into force</td>
<td>The treaty enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)</td>
<td>Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>The new Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force</td>
<td>The new Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan)</td>
<td>(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>(Return of Okinawa to Japan)</td>
<td>(Return of Okinawa to Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>(Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War)</td>
<td>(Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SACO Final Report</td>
<td>SACO Final Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Terrorist attacks in the U.S.</td>
<td>Terrorist attacks in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty</td>
<td>50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (&quot;2+2&quot; Meeting)</strong></td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security</td>
<td>Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960 in accordance with Article IV of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Subcommittee (SSC)</strong></td>
<td>Participants are not specified</td>
<td>Exchange of view on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
<td>Article IV of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)</strong></td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy; Director General of Bureau of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff; Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
<td>Established on July 8, 1976 as a subentry under the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the on June 28, 1996 Japan–U.S. vice-ministerial consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan–U.S. Joint Committee</strong></td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
<td>Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meeting are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.
Fig. II-3-1-3  Framework of Comprehensive Mechanism

[Comprehensive mechanism for bilateral work]

Prime Minister  President

Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC)
- Minister for Foreign affairs
- Minister of Defense
- Responsible for setting committee principle, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary
- Secretary of State
- Secretary of Defense

Meeting of Bureau Directors- General of Relevant Ministers and Agencies
- [Chairman: Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary]
- Deliberation and coordination of items relevant to domestic ministries and agencies

Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)
- Japanese side
  - Representative of the Joint Staff
- U.S. side
  - Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense
  - Representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, the Joint Chief of Staff and the U.S. Pacific Command
- Assists SCC, coordinates among all components of the comprehensive mechanism, and conducts discussions on procedures and means of achieving effective policy consultations

Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)
- Japanese side
  - Vice Chief of Joint Staff, SDF personnel
- U.S. side
  - Vice Commander of USFJ, other military personnel
- Conducts bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, establishes common standards and operating procedures
### Framework of Coordination Mechanism

**Japan–U.S. Joint Committee**
- **Japanese side**
  - Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others
- **U.S. side**
  - Deputy Commander of USFJ and others

**Japan–U.S. Policy Committee**
- **Japanese side**
  - Bureau chief-level representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Defense/SDF
  - *Representative from other relevant ministries, if necessary*
- **U.S. side**
  - Bureau chief-level representatives from the Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Japan, Department of Defense, and U.S. Forces in Japan

**Policy coordination on matters related to the implementation of the Japan–U.S. Status of Forces Agreement**

**Joint Coordination Group**
- **Japanese side**
  - Division chief-level representatives from Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Defense/SDF
  - *Representative from other relevant ministries, if necessary*
- **U.S. side**
  - Division chief-level representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Japan and USFJ

- The Guideline Task Force is set up under the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee, and the Steering Committee under the Japan–U.S. Policy Committee
- The two function as one group, and coordinate the activities of both the SDF and U.S. Forces as well as matters that require the involvement of relevant organizations in Japan or the United States

**Bilateral Coordination Center**
- **Japanese side**
  - Representatives from the Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service
- **U.S. side**
  - Representatives from USFJ Headquarters

**Coordination of activities of both the SDF and USFJ**
Atsugi
U.S. Navy: F/A-18 fighters and others (Carrier-based aircraft)

Iwakuni
U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Air Group 12
F/A-18 fighters
A/V-8 Harriers
EA-6 electronic warfare aircraft
UC-12F and others

Sasebo
U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities
Sasebo
Amphibious assault ships
Minesweeping ships
Transport ships

Torii
U.S. Army: 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)/10th Support Group

Futenma
U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Air Group 36
CH-46 helicopters
CH-53 helicopters
AH-1 helicopters
UH-1 helicopters
KC-130 tankers
MV-22 Osprey aircraft and others

White Beach Area
U.S. Navy: Port facility, POL depot

Hansen
U.S. Marine Corps: 12th Marine Regiment
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

Kadena
U.S. Air Force: 18th Wing
F-15 fighters
KC-135 tankers
HH-60 helicopters
E-3C airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft
U.S. Navy: P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and others
U.S. Army: 1-1 Air Defense Artillery Battalion Patriot missiles (PAC-3)

Yokota
Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan

U.S. Air Force:
Headquarters, Fifth Air Force
374th Airlift Wing
C-130 transport aircraft
C-12 transport aircraft
UH-1 helicopters and others

Zama
Headquarters, I Corps (forward)/U.S. Army, Japan

Yokosuka
Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan

U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Yokosuka
Aircraft carrier
Cruisers
Destroyers
Amphibious command ship

Fig. II-3-1-5 Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan
Adversaries must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States.

Primarily, the SDF is responsible for the defense of Japan.

Japan maintains appropriate defense capabilities.

US Forces in Japan supplement the SDF operations for the defense of Japan.

US provides powerful military capability.

Reinforcement from the U.S. homeland and other places.

Defense of Japan

Peace and stability of the region

Significance and Role of the U.S. Forces in Japan
Okinawa holds a position of great strategic importance. Access from continental Asia to the Pacific is expected to pass through waters surrounding Okinawa. Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, Izu Islands, Adjacent to sea lanes, Okinawa, Izu Islands, Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, Saipan, Guam, Center of the Southwest Islands, Ogasawara Islands, Okinotorishima, Japan's sea lanes, Sea lanes, Marine transportation routes. Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of the total trade volume of its trade.

1. Reasons for Stationing the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa
   - Compared to locations such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii and Guam, Okinawa is closer to various regions in East Asia. In the event of an urgent deployment within this region is required, the U.S. military in Okinawa can respond rapidly.
   - Okinawa has the geographic advantage of being located in a place with certain distance from Japan's neighbors.
   - Okinawa is in a crucial strategic position in terms of the access to the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific Ocean, as it is located more or less in the center of the Nansei Islands, close to Japan's sea lanes.

2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa
   - With their high level of mobility and readiness*, the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa plays various roles, including securing the peace and safety of the region through such endeavors as assisting in the defense of Japan and providing support after the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as dealing with the Java earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006.

   - The stationing of USFJ, including the Marine corps, which have high-level mobility and readiness to carry out a wide range of duties and to deal with various types of emergencies, in Okinawa, a land with unique geographic characteristics, makes a significant contribution to the security of Japan, and to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

* The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations.
Costs for Stationing of USFJ (MOD-Related Budget: ¥362.8 billion (1)+(2))

- Costs for taking measures to improve the living environment in areas surrounding the USFJ facilities ¥56.9 billion
- Rent for facilities ¥95.8 billion
- Relocation ¥0.7 billion
- Other costs (compensation for fishery, etc.) ¥23.4 billion

Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ (¥186.0 billion (1))

- Costs for Facility Improvement Program ¥20.9 billion
- Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.) ¥25.3 billion

Total: ¥46.2 billion

SACO-related costs (¥8.8 billion)

- Projects for land returns ¥3.0 billion
- Projects for training improvement ¥0.2 billion
- Projects for noise reduction ¥1.9 billion
- Projects for facilitating SACO Project ¥2.7 billion

Total: ¥7.7 billion

Realignment-related costs (¥65.6 billion)

- Relocation of U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam ¥0.7 billion
- Projects for realignment in Okinawa ¥6.0 billion
- Projects related to reform of U.S. Army Headquarters ¥8.4 billion
- Projects for relocation of Carrier Air Wing ¥36.9 billion
- Projects for training relocation (local coordination cost) ¥30 million
- Projects for facilitating realignment initiatives ¥9.4 billion

Total: ¥61.4 billion

Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥145.2 billion)

- Labor costs (basic salary, etc.) ¥114.4 billion
- Utilities costs ¥24.9 billion
- Training relocation costs (NLP) ¥0.4 billion
- Training relocation costs (one of the projects aimed at enhancing training) ¥1.1 billion
- Training relocation costs (Aviation training relocation as part of realignment initiatives) ¥4.2 billion
- Parachute training over Highway 104 ¥0.4 billion
- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 ¥0.7 billion
- Projects for facilitating realignment initiatives ¥9.4 billion

Total: ¥139.8 billion

Notes:
1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend into the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs.
2. The SACO-related costs aim for implementation of the SACO Final Report to mitigate the impact on Okinawan people, and the realignment-related costs aim for contribution to mitigating the impact on local communities affected by the realignment initiatives. Since the cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, which are categorized separately.
3. The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy: ¥37.7 billion, FY2012 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥166.0 billion, FY2013 Estimated Costs).
4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
### Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan-U.S. bilateral training</th>
<th>Training, communication and other daily activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PKO, etc.</td>
<td>Disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situations in areas surrounding Japan</td>
<td>Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed attack situations and situations in which armed attack is anticipated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fig. II-3-1-9 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Japan and the United States*

- **Emergency**: Situations in areas surrounding Japan
- **Peacetime**: Japan-U.S. bilateral training, PKO, etc.

- **Added in the 2012 ACSA revision**: Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, Armed attack situations and situations in which armed attack is anticipated.
Support activities by the U.S. military
(U.S. military forces at their maximum period)
Personnel: approx. 16,000
Ships: approx. 15
Aircraft: approx. 140

From March 13
10 U.S. vessels including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (waters off Sendai)
Transport support and search & rescue

From March 16
USS Tortuga dock landing ship (Tomakomai—Ominato)
Transport support (for approx. 300 GSDF troops, etc.)

From March 19
Restoration of Sendai Airport by U.S. Marine Corps & Army
Support for infrastructure reconstruction

From March 16
U.S. Air Force C-130s, etc. commence operations

April 21–25
Japan-U.S. joint operation for removal of rubble around train stations (Operation Soul Train)

From March 16
Transport support for approx. 300 GSDF troops, etc.

April 1–6
Rubble removal (Kesennuma Oshima Island)

From March 25
Transport of fresh water to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant by barge

From March 11
MCAS Futenma (Okinawa)
Airlift using CH-46s, etc.

Establishment of bilateral coordination centers (Ichigaya, Yokota, Sendai)
Provide comprehensive coordination functions to facilitate U.S. aid

March 2011
March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake

Search activities (March 13—)
(Intensive search)

Restoration of Sendai Airport (March 19—31)

Rubble removal on Oshima Island (April 1–6)
Operation Soul Train (April 21–26)

School restoration activities (March 30—April 18)

Sakura Class cultural exchange (April 26–28)

* These are just some of the activities carried out in March & April
From the “Cold War era”, to the “post-Cold War era”, to the “post-911 world”, the Japan–U.S. Alliance has expanded in terms of the scope of defense cooperation in response to the changing environment. (Focused on the defense of Japan ⇒ Response to situations in areas surrounding Japan ⇒ Improvement in international security environment)

### Cold War era (Previous Guidelines (1978))

- **Posture for Deterring Aggression**
  - Japan: Possess defense capability, assure utilization of facilities and areas by U.S. Forces.
  - U.S.: Maintain nuclear deterrent capability, forward deployments of combat-ready forces capable of reinforcing them.
  - Conduct studies on bilateral defense planning for the defense of Japan.

- **Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan**
  - SDF: Repel limited, small-scale aggression. Primarily conduct defensive operations.
  - U.S. Forces: Support SDF. Conduct operations (strike power, etc.) to complement the functions of SDF.

- **Cooperation in the case of a situation in the Far East**
  - Consult when required.
  - Conduct studies on facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces.

### Post-Cold War era (Current Guidelines (1997))

- **Cooperation under normal circumstances**
  - Japan and U.S. maintain the required defense posture.
  - Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities.
    - Security dialogues, armed control and disarmament, PKO, etc.
    - Bilateral defense planning, mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan, establishment of coordination mechanism, etc.

- **Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan**
  - Remain a core of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation.
  - Response to guerrilla-commando type attacks (SDF: have primary responsibility for repelling operations; U.S. Forces: provide appropriate support). Response to ballistic missile attack (SDF/U.S. Forces: Cooperate, coordinate; U.S. Forces: provide intelligence, use strike power).

- **Cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan**
  - Activities initiated by either government.
    - Relief activities, search and rescue, etc.
    - Japan’s support for U.S. Forces’ activities
    - Use of facilities, rear area support
    - Japan–U.S. operational cooperation
    - SDF: Surveillance, minesweeping
    - U.S. Forces: Operations to restore peace and security


- **2005**
  - Examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas.
    - Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan
    - Confirmed important concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation.
  - Improvement of the international security environment remains vital to the alliance.
  - Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and benefits from the Japan–U.S. bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises can improve these capabilities.
  - Strengthen cooperation with other partners.

- **2007**
  - Highlighted the following roles, missions, and capabilities.
    - Redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan.
    - Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group.
    - Strengthening BMD and operational capability, enhancing BMD system capability, etc.

- **2011**
  - Deepen and broaden the following security and defense cooperation.
    - Expand joint training and exercises. Study further joint and shared use of facilities. Expand cooperation in ISR activities, etc.
    - Establishment of a bilateral extended deterrence dialogue on a regular basis.
    - Space ○Cyber ○Trilateral/multilateral cooperation
    - Cooperation on HA/DR, peacekeeping, reconstruction, counterterrorism, maritime security, counter-piracy, etc.
    - Cooperation on environmental challenge.
    - Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group
### Overview of Japan–U.S. Consultations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultation</th>
<th>First stage</th>
<th>Second stage</th>
<th>Third stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
<td>The two countries agreed to further bilateral consultations in the general field of security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>Confirmation of common strategic objectives (at the first stage)</td>
<td>Roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the U.S. (at the second stage)</td>
<td>Force posture realignment (realignment of U.S. Force structure in Japan) (at the third stage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td><strong>Study</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation on realignment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td><strong>Japan–U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td><strong>Study</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation on realignment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td><strong>Japan–U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>Reconfirmation/renewal</td>
<td>Roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the U.S.</td>
<td>Implementation of the realignment roadmap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Common strategic objectives</td>
<td>Strengthening of Alliance Security and Defense Cooperation</td>
<td>Continued progress toward realizing Realignment Roadmap’s Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decision to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Realignment in the Kanto Area

- Establishment of the bilateral and joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
- Partial return of airspace, and relocation of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers to the Yokota RAPCON facility, etc.
- Civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the U.S.)

[Sagami General Depot (SGD)]

- Establishment of facilities along with the transformation of headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (a mission command training center and support facilities)
- Release of a portion of land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (approximately 15 ha)
- Release of land for underground rail and road (approximately 2 ha)
- Joint/shared use of a specific area (approximately 35 ha) of open space in the western side of SGD

[Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command]

- Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant units

2. Realignment in Okinawa

[Joint/shared Use]

- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
- JASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

[Land Returns]

- The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base
- A detailed consolidation plan will be developed

- Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 (total return, approximately 16 ha)
- Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return, approximately 271 ha)
- Naha Port (total return, approximately 56 ha)

A replacement facility will be constructed under the Naha Port and Harbor Plan in the Urasoe Pier district

[Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps]

- III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), approximately 8,000 personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate to Guam
- The affected units will relocate from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.

Legend:

- Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base
- Completed return of Awase Golf Course (approximately 47 ha) on July 31, 2010.
3. Relocation of Aircraft

Relocation of training conducted in Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to each of JASDF bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, or Guam. Relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed upon at the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011.

Relocation of Carrier Air Wing (F/A-18 × 49, EA-6B × 4, E-2C × 4, C-2 × 2: total 59 aircraft) to Iwakuni

Deployment of X-Band Transportable Radar for BMD (AN/TPY-2: so-called “X-Band Radar System”)

Relocation of KC-130 (12 aircraft) to Iwakuni

Relocation of JMSDF E/O/UP-3, U-36A (17 aircraft) to Atsugi

Relocation of CH-53D (8 aircraft) to Guam

Notes: Portion of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni (the airport was opened on December 13, 2012)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 2011</td>
<td>Provided information to relevant local governments and other organizations on the announcement made by the U.S. Department of Defense to replace the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma with the MV-22 in the latter half of 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13-26</td>
<td>Provided safety/noise information that GOJ had been obtained so far to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24</td>
<td>Received a letter of 29 questions from Okinawa Governor and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1</td>
<td>The first written response was handed to Okinawa Governor and others by Administrative Vice-Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2-13</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the first written response to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 20</td>
<td>The second written response was handed to Okinawa Governor by chief of the Okinawa Defense Bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 20-17, 2012</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the second written response above to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>A notice on the accident involving an MV-22 in Morocco was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13-</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, and the content of the third response to the questions to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14</td>
<td>A notice on the accident involving a CV-22 in Florida was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26-</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the information provided from U.S. side regarding the accidents in Morocco and Florida to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29-</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the content of the Host Nation Notification and the press release to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>Provided information from the U.S. side stating that the MV-22 would be offloaded on MCAS Iwakuni on July 23 to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-18</td>
<td>Received four questionnaires regarding the Environment Review and others from the Okinawa Governor and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28-</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the MV-22 Accident in Morocco” to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11-</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the CV-22 Accident in Florida” to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 14</td>
<td>Q&amp;A session on Osprey deployment with members of the Iwakuni City Council full member committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19-</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” to relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21</td>
<td>Provided Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City with the information that function check flights, etc. were commenced at MCAS Iwakuni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27-28</td>
<td>Provided information on the contents of the responses to the questionnaires from Okinawa Prefecture and others received from August 1 to September 18 to Okinawa Prefecture and other relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2</td>
<td>In the nationwide prefectural governors meeting hosted by the Government, Defense Minister explained about the initial training plan with the MV-22 Osprey, and Prime Minister and Defense Minister asked for the governors’ cooperation in relocating the training to outside Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 10</td>
<td>The MOD received another letter of questions from Governor of Okinawa in response to the answers to his initial questions which the MOD submitted to him in September.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12-14</td>
<td>The MOD provided explanations to Okinawa Prefecture and relevant local governments in Okinawa regarding the content of the second set of answers the MOD prepared, since some of these answers did not satisfactorily address the letter of questions from Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on environmental review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 25</td>
<td>The MOD received a request from Governor of Okinawa to investigate the details of the flight operations of MV-22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28, 2013</td>
<td>The Committee for the Okinawa Prefectural Citizens’ Rally and the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly submitted a petition to the Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30</td>
<td>The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding U.S. explanation on the deployment of the second squadron (unloaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effects: more training opportunities, expanded footprint, message delivering, etc.

Joint/Shared use

• More bases for training/surveillance, etc.
• Strengthened logistics functions and survivability of bases

Effects: increased activity, improved efficiency, enhanced intelligence collection capabilities, etc.

Joint training

• Enhances readiness
• Improves interoperability
• Demonstrates deterrent and response capabilities

Joint surveillance, etc.

• Ensures information superiority
• Functions as dynamic deterrence
• Demonstrates the will and capability to defend

The Enhancement of Joint/Shared Use, Joint Training, and Joint Surveillance, etc. (conceptual image)

The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30

The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOP01
Fig. II-3-5-1: Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report

- Iejima Auxiliary Airfield
- Camp Hansen
- Senaha Communication Station
- Sobe Communication Site
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
- Torii Communication Station
- Kadena Air Base
- Camp Kuwae
- Makiminato Service Area
- Naha Port
- Northern Training Area
- Aha Training Area
- Offshore Camp Schwab
- Gimbaru Training Area
- Kin Blue Beach Training Area
- Camp Zukeran
- MCAS Futenma

Legend:
- Facilities and areas involved in land return
- Facilities and areas involved in land return (Cancellation of joint use)
- Potential facility relocation sites
Fig. II-3-5-2

Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa

![Bar chart showing changes in land area (km²) and facilities from various dates.]

- Just before the return of Okinawa (When Okinawa was returned):
  - Land area: 353 km²
  - Facilities: 144

- May 1972:
  - Land area: 278 km²
  - Facilities: 83

- End of FY1980:
  - Land area: 249 km²
  - Facilities: 46

- End of FY1990:
  - Land area: 242 km²
  - Facilities: 43

- As of January 2013:
  - Land area: 228 km²
  - Facilities: 32
## Background for the Futenma Replacement Facility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month &amp; Year</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1996</td>
<td>Prime Minister Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the total return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, after the completion of an adequate replacement facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago city as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago city Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started (abolished in 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>A U.S. Force helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the MCAS Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Establishment of the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>Environmental survey started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Survey based on the EIA scoping document was started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>“The Guam International Agreement” was approved by the Diet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan–U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmation of efforts to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing the impact on local communities, including Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>“2+2” Joint Statement → Intention to locate the Futenma replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters was confirmed “Government Efforts Related to Items Authorized by the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee on May 28, 2010” (Cabinet decision).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td>Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2011 – January 2012</td>
<td>The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>The Japan-U.S. joint study was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns South of Kadena—→ Progress on the FRF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>“2+2” Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>Landfill permit request was sent to Okinawa Prefecture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 1st Kuwae Tank Farm of the Army
FY2022 or later
Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound)
FY2019 or later
Camp Zukeran (industrial corridor, etc.)
FY2024 or later
Makiminato Service Area (the remainder)
FY2024 or later
Makiminato Service Area (areas near Gate 5)
FY2014 or later
Makiminato Service Area (north access road)
FY2022 or later
Makiminato Service Area
FY2014 or later
Naha Port facilities
FY2028 or later
The 1st Kuwae Tank Farm of the Army
FY2022 or later
Camp Kuwae
FY2025 or later
Camp Zukeran (Lower Plaza Housing area)
FY2024 or later
Camp Zukeran (a part of Kishaba Housing area)
FY2024 or later
Camp Zukeran (additional areas)
FY2024 or later
Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area)
FY2014 or later
Futenma Air Base
FY2022 or later
Makiminato Service Area (north access road)
FY2013 or later
Makiminato Service Area
FY2014 or later
Naha Port facilities
FY2028 or later
Note: 1. The times and years are based on the best case scenario concerning the return of specific facilities/areas after the completion of necessary measures and procedures to be taken by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The periods may become delayed due to such factors as the progress of the preparation for relocation in Okinawa by the Government of Japan and the U.S. Government’s efforts for relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Japan. Furthermore, the times and fiscal years in parentheses do not include the time necessary for relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan because, though the conditions for returning the areas include its relocation to outside of Japan, the plan for the relocation is yet to be decided. Consequently, the times of return of these areas may be changed depending on the progress of the relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan.
2. The area of each area is an approximate figure and may be corrected based on the results of future surveys, etc.
3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to check the possibility of additional land returns.

Legend:
- Prompt return (65 ha)
- Returned after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (841 ha)
- Returned after the relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan (142 ha + more)
Total: 1,048 ha + more
As of January 1, 2013

Yokohama City, Kanagawa Prefecture

Asahi-ku
Seya-ku
Izumi-ku
Minami-ku
Naka-ku
Totsuka-ku
Kanazawa-ku
Isogo-ku
Kamiseya Communication Station
Location: Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Yokohama City
Area: approx. 242 ha
- National land: approx. 110 ha
- Private/public land: approx. 133 ha

Fukaya Communication Site
Location: Izumi-ku, Yokohama City
Area: approx. 77 ha (national land)

Negishi Dependent Housing Area
Location: Naka-ku, Minami-ku and Isogo-ku, Yokohama City
Area: approx. 43 ha
- National land: approx. 27 ha
- Private/public land: approx. 16 ha

Tomioka Storage Area
Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City
Area: Approx. 3 ha (national land) Returned in May 2009

Koshiba POL Depot
Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City
Area: approx. 53 ha
- National land: Approx. 51 ha
- Private/public land: Approx. 1 ha
Returned in December 2005

Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex (Yokohama City portion)
Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City
Area: Approx. 36 ha
- National land: Approx. 36 ha
- Private/public land: Approx. 0.3 ha

Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex (non-contiguous)
Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City
Area: approx. 1 ha
- National land: approx. 1 ha
- Private/public land: approx. 0.1 ha

Six facilities and areas on which basic agreements for their return to Japan were made (approx. 419 ha)
Equivalent to approx. 80% of the USFJ property in Yokohama City (approx. 528 ha)

Fig. II-3-5-5 Facilities and Areas Related to the Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture
Prior to reduction

To Kansai (50 flights/day)
• Level flight required at an altitude of 10,000 feet around Yokosuka

To southern Kyushu and Okinawa (70 flights/day)
• Flight altitude at the end of Yokota airspace: 15,000 feet

Arrival route
• Approach avoiding the area used by ascending airplanes

To Chugoku and northern Kyushu (190 flights/day)
• Flight altitude at the east end of Yokota airspace: 13,000 feet

After reduction

To Kansai (70 flights/day)
• Route with higher operational efficiency by continuous ascent

To southern Kyushu and Okinawa (100 flights/day)
• Flight altitude at the east end of Yokota airspace changed from 15,000 to 9,000 feet

Arrival route
• Reduction in distance expected due to efficient operation of departing airplanes

To Chugoku and northern Kyushu (270 flights/day)
• Use of multiple routes
• Flight altitude at the east end of Yokota airspace changed from 13,000 to 9,000 feet