Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1. The United States

1. Security and Defense Policies

The Obama administration was formed in January 2009 and announced its national security policy and defense policy in 2010 by releasing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in April, and the National Security Strategy (NSS) in May. In February 2011, the National Military Strategy (NMS), based on the NSS and QDR, was released.

The NSS points out that national interests which the United States pursues are 1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners, 2) the prosperity through a strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy, 3) respect for universal values at home and around the world, 4) an international order that promotes peace, security and opportunity. The NSS emphasizes the necessity of using and integrating all elements of American power, such as military, diplomacy and development, and of cooperating with allies, international organizations and so on, for the purpose of achieving the above national interests.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) notes that the role of the Department of Defense is to protect the United States and its allies, and to maintain and use its military capabilities in order to promote its national interests. The review goes on to indicate that the United States and its allies have the will and ability to exercise the use of force if necessary, and the United States possesses the capacity to act unilaterally if appropriate. In addition, the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

In his speech given in April 2011, President Obama called for pushing harder to not only review the security spending, but conduct a fundamental review of America’s missions, capabilities, and the role in a changing world amidst the worsening fiscal conditions of the U.S. government.

1. Assessment of the Security Environment

The QDR indicates that the security environment is complex and uncertain due to such factors as wars that the United States is currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of emerging countries such as China and India, the increase in influence of non-state actors, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and infringements on the global commons—sea, air, space, and cyberspace. In addition, conflicts are becoming hybrid in that they are composed of complex characteristics, as the diverse actors
that participate in these conflicts use various different means. Fragile states also face concerns of becoming hotbeds for extremism and radicalism, which are causes of conflict.

### 2. Defense Strategy

In the QDR the United States lists four priority objectives tailored for this security environment and notes the necessity to balance risk and resources among these objectives.

1) Prevail in today’s wars: The greatest priority is prevailing in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan.

2) Prevent and deter conflict: The United States shall defend itself from direct attack, deter potential adversaries, and foster regional stability while assuring access to the global commons. For this purpose, the United States will work to develop the capabilities of partners and develop the necessary level of forces for itself as well. Moreover, the United States will maintain the lowest level of safe and effective nuclear weapons consistent with the interests of the United States and its allies to deter attacks on the United States, its allies, and partners until a world free of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

3) Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies: It is necessary for the United States to prepare to respond to diverse contingencies in the event that deterrence fails and adversaries challenge its national interests.

4) Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force: It is necessary to maintain the All-Volunteer Force over the long-term in order to prevail in the current wars and to prepare for the future.

### 3. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The QDR indicates the need to enhance military potential in the following six key mission areas in order to implement the four strategic priority objectives.

1) Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home: It is necessary to enhance the necessary posture at home to respond to potential attacks on U.S. soil, as well as to strengthen the cooperative relationships between domestic government-related institutions. For this reason, the United States must take measures such as reorganizing and developing consequence management response forces and enhancing its domain awareness capabilities for land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

2) Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations: The United States will enhance the necessary capabilities for prevailing in the wars that it is currently fighting. For this reason, the United States will take measures that include increasing its number of rotary wing aircraft, expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and augmenting major equipment for special operation forces.

3) Build the security capacity of partner states: In order to maintain a peaceful and stable international
order, it is important to support the development of capabilities of security forces in partner countries. For this reason, it is necessary to improve language abilities, deepen knowledge on different regions and cultures, etc.

4) Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: Countries that possess capabilities such as a wide range of sophisticated weaponry are able to demonstrate anti-access capabilities that hinder the deployment of United States forces. It is necessary for the United States to possess the capabilities to protect itself and its allies even amidst these environments. For this reason, the United States must work to improve long-range strike capabilities and to increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture.

5) Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction: The United States will establish a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters in sight of eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the United States will enhance nuclear forensics, while also ensuring the protection of all nuclear materials in order to prevent the transfer of said materials to the hands of terrorists.

6) Operate effectively in cyberspace: The Department of Defense will build an environment in which cyber security is viewed as one of its priority items by developing a comprehensive approach to the cyberspace operations. In addition, the United States will train cyberspace experts and centralize command of the Department of Defense cyberspace operations in the newly established U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

4. Force Planning

Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have been composed based on the idea of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts. However, the QDR indicates that the current security environment is more complex than when these ideas were adopted, and that it is no longer appropriate for the United States to determine its military’s force structure based on these ideas as the United States must address diverse contingencies. The QDR points out that the U.S. military force structure is led by the previously mentioned four strategic priority objectives and six mission areas, and, while the United States must possess the capacity to address two capable nation-state aggressors, it must also have the ability to conduct a wide range of operations. For that reason, the United States must rebalance its forces.


The QDR requires a cooperative and tailored approach to determine the U.S. global defense posture, reflecting regional political and security dynamics. Moreover, the QDR states the need to consider the five following principles when making decisions about the future U.S. defense posture: 1) forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required, 2) the U.S. defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible
ability to respond to contingencies, etc., 3) the United States will balance the need for assured access to support ongoing operations with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication, 4) America’s defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomed by the host nation, and 5) the defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment. Furthermore, the new QDR will emphasize the following four priorities in adapting and developing its global defense posture over the next five-year period.

1) Reaffirm its commitment to Europe and NATO, including through the development of European missile defense capabilities;
2) Work with allies and key partners to ensure a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region;
3) Balance ongoing operations, crisis response, and prevent-and-deter activities in the development of a strategic defense posture in the broader Middle East, Africa, and Central and South Asia; and
4) Support partnership capacity-building efforts in key regions and states.

In Europe, in revising its military posture in this way the United States has constructed a forward military posture that is lighter, more flexible, and more deployable. The QDR states that it will 1) serve to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners, 2) promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions, 3) demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies, 4) build trust and goodwill among host countries, and 5) facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent. Based on this policy, on the European continent the U.S. military will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters, while also beginning the deployment of a missile defense system and enhancement of its forward-deployed naval presence.

In the Asia-Pacific, the new QDR states that the United States will place importance on forward-stationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces as U.S. bases and infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific are sparse. In addition, the United States will sustain and strengthen its Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region. Specifically, the QDR lays down the following policies.

1) The United States will continue to adapt its defense presence as necessary to maintain regional stability and assure allies of their security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States will augment regional deterrence and rapid response capabilities and build the capacity of its Asian partners to respond more effectively to contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters.
2) With Japan, the United States will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a hub for security activities in the region.
3) The United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance’s deterrent and defense capabilities. The United States will also transfer the wartime operational control to the ROK in 2012.
4) The United States will improve the resiliency of U.S. forces and facilities in the region in order to safeguard U.S., allied, and partner interests in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In addition, the United States will explore opportunities for a more forward-deployed presence that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security and assured access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

5) The United States will seek additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security.

In regards to the Middle East, the QDR indicates that while the United States had prioritized a defense posture necessary for the near-term operational capabilities in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is now time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests through the medium to long term. Moreover, the United States will reshape its defense posture to assure partners of a long-term commitment to mutual security relationships and to deter attacks while balancing that requirement against the regional sensitivity to a large, long-term U.S. force presence. The United States will also strengthen defense capabilities and posture networks as efforts related to security in the Middle East for promoting regional stability and security.

In Africa, in October 2008, the United States Africa Command (headquarters: Germany) became an independent unified command. U.S. Africa Command is a joint command that aims to improve the capacity of African countries to deal with conflicts in their own region, through the provision of military assistance in the form of training for peacekeeping, etc. In addition, the QDR indicates that the United States will continue to maintain a limited military presence in Africa to help build partner security capacity.

In the North and South Americas, the QDR states that while the region does not require a robust forward presence, the United States will retain a limited presence and seek to improve relationships with the region’s countries. In addition, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.

It is necessary to continue to pay attention to how the concepts of global posture review, as outlined in the QDR, are implemented in the future.

6. Nuclear Strategy

While President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he admits that it is impossible to abolish nuclear weapons soon, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat of today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing
nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.
The NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment.
1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism: In order to bolster the non-nuclear proliferation regime, the United States will reverse the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran and create an environment that subjects parties not compliant with the NPT to heavy sanctions. In addition, in order to prevent nuclear terrorism, the United States will secure the safety of all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years and take measures such as expanding the budget of the Department of Energy nuclear non-proliferation programs.

Furthermore, in order to promote arms control and disarmament, the United States signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia and seeks the ratification and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy: The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners. In order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons when deterring attacks via non-nuclear means, the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations (negative security assurance). In response to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attacks, the United States will answer with a devastating conventional weapon response, but also reserves the right to make any adjustment to this policy with consideration to advancements in biotechnology. In the case of addressing states that possess nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states that do not comply with the NPT, there remains a narrow range of possibilities in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack. Therefore, the United States is not prepared at present to limit the role of nuclear weapons to deterring a nuclear attack as its sole purpose. The United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of itself, allies, and partners.

3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels: Under the New START, which was signed with Russia, the United States will maintain deterrence via its nuclear Triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers while also reducing accountable deployed strategic warheads and delivery platforms. With regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons, these should be included in any future reduction arrangements between the United States and Russia, but the United States will retain a dual-capable fighter that can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons. Also, the United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) as it is possible to substitute these missiles by other means.

4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners: The United States will enhance bilateral and regional security ties and closely cooperate with its allies and partner countries. The United States will also enhance its regional security architectures, which are composed of missile defense,
counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and others. The United States will reassure its allies and partners that U.S.-extended deterrence is credible and effective.

5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal: The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will not develop new nuclear warheads. In order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of warheads, the United States will implement Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and enhance scientific, technical, and engineering infrastructures needed for implementing LEPs.

7. Space Policy

The United States has come to rely on space-based systems for a great deal of its intelligence gathering and communications. In 2010, the United States announced its “National Space Policy.” The sustainability, stability, free access and use of outer space are considered vital for the interests of the United States, and goals such as increasing the stability of outer space are the objectives of the nation’s space policy.

The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) issued in February 2011 indicates recognition of three trends in both the current and future space environment, namely that 1) space is increasingly congested with man-made objects such as satellites, 2) space is increasingly contested by potential adversaries, and 3) space is increasingly competitive. Based on this understanding, the national security space objectives of the United States are 1) to strengthen safety, stability and security in space, 2) to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space, and 3) to energize the space industrial base that supports the national security of the United States. In order to attain these goals, a number of strategic approaches have been pursued, namely 1) to promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space, 2) to provide partner improved U.S. space capabilities, 3) to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms, 4) to prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports the national security of the United States, and 5) to prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in degraded environment.

8. FY2012 Budget

Although the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening, the budget of the Department of Defense has increased more than two times over the past ten-year period. Against this background, since May 2010, the Department of Defense has been conducting the Defense Efficiencies Initiative in order to make savings in expenditure under the leadership of then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Although the defense budget will be increased in the coming years, a plan was announced in January 2011, which will curtail the rate of increase to below the original plan, by reviewing more than 150 billion dollars of expenditure across the whole of the Department, over the coming five-year period.

The principal objectives of the Defense Department fiscal 2012 budget proposal, announced in the
meantime, are 1) taking care of military personnel, 2) balancing the capabilities to prevail current and future wars, 3) supporting for troops in the field, and 4) reforming the ways Department of Defense does business. Based on efforts in the efficiencies initiative, the budget increased by 4.2 billion dollars from the level requested in FY2011 to 553.1 billion dollars, and based on factors such as the withdrawal of forces from Iraq, the budget for overseas contingency operations decreased by 41.5 billion dollars from the level requested in FY2011 to 117.8 billion dollars. The total therefore fell by 37.3 billion dollars from the level requested in FY2011 to 670.9 billion dollars.

Furthermore, President Obama pointed out the necessity for deeper reductions in security spending in order to reduce the budget deficit in April 2011, although the Department of Defense had already reduced expenditures by 400 billion dollars through efforts made in the past two years. On top of that, he also set out the goal of cutting expenditure by 400 billion dollars by 2023, through holding the growth in base security spending below inflation.

2. Military Posture

In regards to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear weapons, in February 2011, a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace START I came into force. The new treaty indicates that the two countries are to reduce their numbers of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and deployed delivery platforms to 700 in seven years following the entry into force of the treaty. In June the same year, the United States announced that its current deployed strategic warheads stood at 1,800, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 882.

The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. The concept consists of utilizing highly precise non-nuclear weapons to penetrate the anti-access capabilities of adversaries and promptly strike, no matter what and where in the world the target may be.

In regards to missile defense (MD), in September 2009 the Obama administration reviewed the Bush administration’s plan to deploy portions of its MD system to the Czech Republic and Poland, and announced a new plan to improve BMD capabilities in Europe in a step-wise fashion from 2011 to 2020, and ultimately construct a comprehensive MD structure that responds to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well. As reasons for the revision, the Obama administration has voiced that while the threat from Iran’s short- (SRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) is developing more rapidly than previously projected, the development of ICBMs has been slower than estimated and the capabilities and technologies for missile defense, such as interceptor missiles and sensors, have markedly improved.

In February 2010 the United States announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review noted that, while it would be difficult to accurately predict the threat of an ICBM fired at the United States, it is still important to watch the trends in North Korea and Iran. The report also mentioned
that the development of SRBMs and IRBMs that can be used to attack U.S. troops stationed in other regions as well as allied countries is advancing and that these are a clear threat. Furthermore, in defending United States homeland, the review notes that the United States will use ground-based interceptors to respond to ICBMs from North Korea and Iran. In regards to defense in other regions, the United States will expand investments into MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the BMD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden.

The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 570,000 soldiers, and approximately 200,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. The QDR indicates that the U.S. ground forces are to maintain capabilities to respond to all types of contingencies while focusing on counterinsurgency operations, stabilization operations, and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in operations in recent years, improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare.

U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 1,070 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 6.14 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Northwest Atlantic Ocean; the 6th Fleet to the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa; the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet to South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The QDR indicates that U.S. maritime forces will continue to retain a robust forward presence and power projection capabilities. The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,786 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. The QDR indicates that the increase of fifth-generation fighters will further improve the survivability of the U.S. air forces and strengthen support operations for the security forces of partner countries.

Moreover, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to address the increasing threats in cyberspace, by overseeing operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operation Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November of the same year.

3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys such forces as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 3,000 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) and the headquarters, U.S. Army Japan.
The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 17,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys four air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-16, C-130 in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

**Section 2. Korean Peninsula**

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan.

(See Fig. 1-2-2-1)

1. **North Korea**

1. **General Situation**

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a “powerful and prosperous nation” as its basic national policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy—and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The “military-first politics” has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution. Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea’s military
forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and regularly visits military forces. It would appear that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces. Although North Korea faces serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5% of the overall population. It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2011, the proportion of the defense budget in FY2011’s national budget was 15.8%, but it is estimated that this represents only a portion of real defense expenditures. Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by making efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operation forces. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly made military provocations on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s military behavior has increased tension over the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan. Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is not condoned, but at the same time, we should not forget security concerns other than the nuclear problem. It is necessary to continue to pay enough attention to the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea and the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula continue to demand a close watch. Since North Korea still largely maintains its closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of the country’s policies and behavior. However, it is necessary to continue to pay utmost attention to them.

2. WMD and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In particular, North Korea’s nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan’s national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of non-proliferation of WMD. In particular, nuclear tests by North Korea, when considered in conjunction with North Korea’s reinforcement of its ballistic missile capability that could serve as the means of delivery of WMD, simply cannot be tolerated as they constitute a serious threat to the security of Japan and do considerable harm to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and the international community. As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D for deploying existing ballistic missiles, extending the range and putting solid fuel to use. Also, it is pointed out that North Korea’s
proliferation of ballistic missiles continues. Both North Korea’s missile issues as well as its nuclear issue are destabilizing factors for the entire international community and the Asia-Pacific region, and such moves are of great concern.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Issue
With regards to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, the Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003 in pursuit of a peaceful resolution to this problem and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which mentioned the verifiable abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. However, North Korea delayed its participation in the Six-Party Talks, and launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had conducted a nuclear test in 2006. Facing these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. In December 2006, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. After the shutdown of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon based on this agreement, in October 2007, the “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” were announced as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed.

In response to the U.N. Security Council presidential statement condemning North Korea’s missile launch, North Korea suggested that it would boycott the Six-Party Talks and announced the resumption of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods. It also announced that it would take steps including nuclear tests and test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles unless the U.N. Security Council apologized. North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test in May, 2009. In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 in June 2009, condemning North Korea’s nuclear test in the strongest possible terms and imposing additional measures against North Korea. North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized, and the process of uranium enrichment would be commenced, etc. In September 2009, North Korea made an additional announcement that the uranium enrichment experiment had been successfully carried out and had entered the completion stage. In November 2009 it announced that the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods had been successfully completed by the end of August and it had made substantial achievements in weaponizing the extracted plutonium. In November 2010, North Korea showed its uranium enrichment
facilities to U.S. experts visiting the country and announced that a modern facility for uranium enrichment equipped with thousands of centrifuges is operating to supply fuel to them. While some argue that North Korea’s response to its nuclear development problem is a so-called brinkmanship policy by intentionally heightening tension in order to receive some sort of reward, others argue that North Korea’s ultimate objective is to secure deterrence capability by possessing nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal of North Korea is said to be the maintenance of its existing regime. Considering this, these two views are not incompatible.

While it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to maintain close cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, roles played by other countries like China and Russia (the other participants in the Six-Party Talks), as well as such international institutions as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are also important.

b. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Details about the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program still remain largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the series of North Korean announcements and actions including two previous announcements (in October 2006 and May 2009) of nuclear tests, the possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program cannot be dismissed. Furthermore, the fact that in November 2010 North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facilities and announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges indicates that there is the possibility the country is developing nuclear weapons using enriched uranium.

Considering the fact that North Korea is enhancing its ballistic missile capabilities, which can serve as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction, nuclear testing in North Korea is a major threat to the safety of Japan and significantly affects peace and safety of Northeast Asia and the international community. Thus, these tests can by no means be tolerated.

In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires an extremely high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads. It is necessary to remain watchful of all related developments.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

Because North Korea is an extremely closed regime and most materials, equipment, and technology used
for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, facilitating camouflage, details of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has a substantial amount of stock of such agents.

(3) Ballistic Missiles

North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and details of its ballistic missiles are unknown. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities.

a. Scud

It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries.

b. Nodong

North Korea is also thought to have started its development of longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, the deployment of which is believed to be ongoing, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, and may reach almost all parts of Japan.

It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong.

Though details about Nodong’s capability have not been confirmed, as the ballistic missile is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems that it does not have the accuracy to carry out strikes on specific target installations.

c. Taepodong-1

North Korea has also been developing Taepodong-1 which has an estimated range of at least approximately 1,500 km. Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic
missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of Taepodong-2, which has a longer range, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

d. Musudan
It is believed that North Korea is currently developing a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile “Musudan”. It has been pointed out that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that it acquired in early 1990s. It will likely be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), just like its Nodong and Scud counterparts, and then transported. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the new missile boasts a range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, meaning that Guam could fall within its firing range.\(^3\)

Due to the fact that it is extremely difficult to verify the intentions of North Korea’s military activities because of its closed regime, that it is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country, and that Musudan is thought to be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility, it is thought to be difficult to detect individual and concrete signs of launch of missiles with TEL including Musudan, such as its specific launch site and timing.

e. Taepodong-2
Taepodong-2 is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, with a range of approximately 6,000km. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during the flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and have fallen near the launch site. In the launch of April 2009, it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it\(^3\) from the same district again. Since it is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000 km before falling in the Pacific Ocean, it is believed that North Korea had been able to extend the range of its ballistic missiles since its failed launch of Taepodong-2 in 2006. Through the April 2009 launch, it is believed that North Korea may have tested the required technologies, such as increasing the size of propulsion, separation of the multi-staged propulsion devices, and attitude control. Thus, it is highly possible that North Korea will advance the development of ballistic missiles, including longer-range missiles. Moreover, a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and improving the circular error probability (CEP). The April 2009 launch may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea.

(See Figs. 1-2-2-2 )
At present, North Korea appears to be developing not only ballistic missiles mentioned above but also a solid fuel propellant short-range missile. It is also necessary to pay attention to the possibility of North Korea’s efforts to improve existing ballistic missiles such as Scud and Nodong, including an attempt to extend their ranges.

As the background of North Korea’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies including the transfer of Nodong airframes and related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and that North Korea promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation.

In light of this, it is necessary to remain alert to North Korea’s ballistic missiles, particularly in terms of transfer and proliferation, in addition to their development and deployment.

3. Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).

North Korea’s armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.2 million. North Korea’s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, and it seems to have continued infiltration exercises. However, most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare. These forces are believed to reach approximately 100,000 personnel. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple launch rockets and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital.
city of Seoul.
The navy has about 650 ships with total displacement of approximately 107,000 tons and is chiefly made up of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 60 midget submarines, and about 130 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces.
The Air Force has about 620 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2s as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operation forces.
North Korea’s military forces are vigorously conducting various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance as well.

4. Domestic Affairs

(1) Stability of the Regime

Some point out that in recent years North Korea’s regime is not as stable as in previous years due to loosening of social control resulting from both an increasing income disparity and a trend of money worshiping, and declining military morale. However, the fact that national events and diplomatic negotiations have been held in an orderly manner suggests that the regime based around Kim Jong II, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on track. On the other hand, amid speculations about Kim Jong Il’s ailing health and his successor, there have been apparent developments in the construction of a succession structure; in September 2010, Kim Jong Il’s third son, Kim Jong-un, was appointed to the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party at a Korean Workers’ Party convention, the first such convention in 44 years. Though Kim Jong Il is believed to have engaged in public activities such as frequent on-site inspections and visits since the end of 2008, given his age of 69, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the regime will become unstable upon the possible change in power structure in the near future.

(2) Economic Conditions

In terms of their economy, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialistic planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries. It is
also pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and their sense of morale has declined. In response to a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has tried some limited reform measures and changes in its economic management systems. It is believed that in 2009 North Korea tried to raise productivity through mobilization movements called the 150-Day Battle and the 100-Day Battle and conducted so-called redenomination (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of the same year\(^49\). Moreover, in January 2011 the country newly adopted a “State Strategy Plan for Economic Development”, which helps lay a foundation for the country to emerge a thriving nation in 2012 and opens a bright prospect for the country to rank itself among the advanced countries in 2020\(^50\). Meanwhile, there is believed to be little possibility for the country to undergo any structural reforms that would impact its current leadership system, and thus the country faces various challenges before it can fundamentally improve its current economic situation.

5. Artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island

On November 23, 2010, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island as the South Korean military engaged in firing exercises off the coast of the island, causing deaths and injuries on the South Korean side including some civilians\(^51\). The South Korean Government explained that the firing exercises conducted at the time were regular training exercises. North Korea, however, argued that despite repeated warnings South Korea provoked North Korea militarily by firing into its waters and North Korea therefore took responsive measures\(^52\).

In response to the shelling, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and U.S. President Barack Obama held a telephone conference where they agreed to continue the countries’ close defense cooperation, implement joint military exercises, and expand training in the future. Joint military exercises were conducted in the Yellow Sea between November 28 and December 1, 2010. Furthermore, after halting firing exercises on the island in response to the shelling, the South Korean military resumed exercises on December 20, 2010.

(See Fig.1-2-2-3 )

6. External Relations

(1) Relations with the United States

The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has claimed that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the “dying wish” of Kim Il Sung and pledged to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” North Korea,
however, continues to criticize various policies of the United States, insisting that the United States has yet to abandon its “hostile policy” toward North Korea. Thus, there exists a significant gap between the two parties’ stances and the denuclearization process has seen no substantive progress. In addition, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials, and the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

In addition, while the United States pointed out in its country reports on terrorism that the abduction issue of Japanese citizens is yet to be solved and that the hijackers of Yodo are still living in North Korea, in October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on the grounds that North Korea had agreed to a series of verification measures related to a declaration of its nuclear programs submitted in June 2008.

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea

Regarding relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea, after the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak in the ROK, restrictions on inter-Korean traffic were lifted in the summer of 2009, and in late September 2009, projects for the reunion of separated families resumed for the first time in about two years. Later, however, near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea, incidents transpired that heightened North-South military tensions, including the exchange of fire between North Korean and ROK naval vessels in November of that year, the sinking of the South Korean patrol vessel in March 2010, and the shelling incident of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. Meanwhile, however, in a New Year’s joint editorial article in 2011, North Korea called for the abolishment of conflict between the North and South and the promotion of dialogue and cooperation. In February 2011, practical talks were carried out in preparation for the North-South High-Level Military Talks. However, discussions were concluded without agreement. After that, North Korea intensified its confrontational stance with Korea, such as by declaring that it would have nothing further to do with the Lee Myung-bak administration.

(3) Relations with China

With regard to the relationship between North Korea and China, the China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1961 is still in force. Since China and the ROK established diplomatic relations in 1992, the relationship between North Korea and China has changed from the close relationship they had enjoyed during the Cold War period. Since then, however, the leaders of the two countries have made mutual visits, and the relationship is improving. Currently, China is seen as an extremely important country to North Korea, as it is also the country’s biggest trade
partner. In 2010, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il made an unprecedented two visits to China during a single year. And in May 2011, he visited China again. These events among others indicate the close relationship of the two countries. Concerning North Korea’s nuclear problem, China repeatedly expresses its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and has played a proactive role in working towards resolving this problem as the chair of the Six-Party Talks.

(4) Relations with Russia

While relations between North Korea and Russia have become less close since the end of the Cold War, the two countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in February 2000, which lacked articles on military alliance that were included in the previous treaty. After this, relations between North Korea and Russia have improved, with the heads of both countries making mutual visits.

(5) Relations with Other Countries

Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with them and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, the EU and ASEAN have traditionally expressed concerns over North Korea’s nuclear and other issues.

2. The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces in the ROK

1. General Situation

In the ROK, democracy has taken firm root through such means as the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution.

The administration of Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, is showing its intention to promote its policy to pursue “co-existence and co-prosperity” with regard to North Korea, and firmly maintains the principle of giving top priority to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. While it maintains the “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” which aims to offer gradual economic assistance to North Korea in accordance with the progress in the abandonment of its nuclear program, the ROK government showed its renewed emphasis on the abandonment of the nuclear program by North Korea, with President Lee Myung Bak proposing the “grand bargain” in September 2009, a package deal to settle the nuclear issue.
U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, in July 2010, on the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, the first U.S.–ROK foreign and defense ministers’ meeting was held. The two countries confirmed that the U.S.–ROK alliance is promoting peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but in the wider region of Northeast Asia, and that it is developing as a powerful, successful, and consistent alliance. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries have been committed to solving issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of the operational control authority in wartime over U.S.–ROK combined forces to the ROK. As for the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK, the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area, south of Seoul, and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. However, it seems that the relocation to the Pyongtek area is delayed.

As for the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed during their meeting in February 2007 that the two countries would dismantle the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition on April 17, 2012. Later, however, at a U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in June 2010, agreement was made to postpone the transition to December 1, 2015.

In talks between the leaders of the United States and the ROK in April 2008, both countries agreed to develop the ROK–U.S. Alliance into a new strategic alliance conforming to the 21st century, and the summit meeting in June 2009 created an agreement on the “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and Republic of Korea.” Further, the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2010 adopted a joint statement including institutionalizing an Extended Deterrence Policy Committee to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence, confirmation of the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation to embody the future vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, which shows a further strengthening of the bilateral relationship. It is necessary to monitor how the transition to the new joint defense system of “the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting” will be implemented.

2. Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country’s population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: “defending the nation from external military threats
and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK had once designated North Korea as its “main enemy” in the ROK Defense White Paper, but now the white paper indicates that the ROK’s enemy is the North Korean regime and its military. In addition to the defense objectives, the ROK has identified “Advanced Elite Military” as its defense vision and the following eight items have been set as the key defense policy focus to achieve these goals and the vision.

1) Defense posture for comprehensive security
2) The development of the ROK-U.S. military alliance and expansion of defense diplomacy and cooperation
3) Military support to advance inter-Korean relations
4) Establish advanced military capabilities
5) Improving the cultivation, educational, and training systems for defense personnel
6) Enhancement of management efficiency
7) Attractive military, rewarding military
8) The armed forces serving the people

The ROK intends to promote “National Defense Reform 2020” to satisfy its defense needs such as maintenance of its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies; balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Forces; elimination of inefficiency; and build-up of barrack culture in accordance with social trends. The bill on the National Defense Reform incorporating these main ideas was enacted in December 2006. As an amendment reflecting the results of an analysis and assessment of the security situation and defense reform records after the formulation of the Defense Reform 2020, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) was announced in June 2009, defining such matters as a narrowing of the initially planned reduction in the force strength and the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities. Meanwhile, in response to the sinking of ROK patrol ship and the artillery shelling on the Yeonpyeong Island, in March 2011 the ROK Ministry of National Defense released the “Defense Reform 307 Plan,” a new revised national defense reform plan, to accompany troop increases and chain-of-command reforms that would protect against provocations by North Korea. It appears that this will be embodied in the future.

3. Trends in Defense Buildup in the ROK

As for the ROK’s military capacity, the ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 550,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 181,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) of approximately 570 combat aircraft.
In recent years, the ROK has been focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to establish a system of omnidirectional military posture to deal with all types of threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships and domestically-built destroyers. In December 2008, the first KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) was put into service, and the second was commissioned in September 2010. The third was launched in March 2011 and is scheduled for delivery in 2012. In February 2010, a ceremony was held at Busan Base to mark the creation of the Seventh Mobile Unit, the first mobile force in the ROK. The Air Force is proceeding with the introduction of F-15K fighters and plans to promote a next-generation fighter program that includes stealth capabilities. It also plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012 and introduce Global Hawks, a type of high altitude aerial vehicle. In addition, the ROK is believed to be promoting domestic production of missiles.

The FY2011 defense budget amounts to approximately 31,403.1 billion won, an increase of approximately 6.2% over the previous fiscal year, marking the 12th consecutive rise since FY2000.

4. External Relations

(1) Relations with China and Russia

The ROK has been promoting military exchanges with China, including mutual visits of vessels and aircraft. In November 2008, the hotlines were established between the two countries’ Navies and Air Forces. At the May 2008 summit meeting of the top leaders of the ROK and China, they agreed to upgrade the ROK–China relationship from a “full-scale cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” However, the bilateral relations in the security area still remain at the initial level compared with their ties in economic and other areas.

Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high military officials and mutual visits of naval vessels. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry and military supplies. At the ROK–Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to the “strategic cooperative partnership.” Furthermore, in July 2009, then ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang Hee visited Russia for a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, an indication of further progress in security relations between the two countries.

(2) Activities Overseas

The ROK acceded to the United Nations in 1992, and since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia
in 1993, has continuously participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). The ROK says the active participation in PKO activities is a way of returning international assistance the country has received in the past from the international community, as well as securing support from the international community in times of emergency. In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level. In July 2010, the ROK created the International Peace Support Force, a special unit for overseas dispatch.

The ROK dispatched medical support units and engineering units to Afghanistan to support military operations by the United States and other countries, and withdrew them in December 2007 upon completion of their missions. However, in February 2010, the ROK decided to send up to 350 troops to the country again for the purpose of protecting about 140 Korean members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) stationed in Parvan province, and thus resumed activities in Afghanistan in July 2010. Further, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to waters off the coast of Somalia where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK-registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) since April 2009. In November 2010, the ROK announced a plan to dispatch a ROK special forces unit up to 150 troops in size for the purpose of supporting the training of UAE special forces units, joint exercises, and protecting ROK citizens in emergency situations. The unit started on-site operations in January 2011.

Section 3. China

1. General Situation

China has the world’s largest population and a vast landmass surrounded by 14 countries. It has long borderlines and a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization, and pride of its unique history and the experiences of semi-colonization in and after the 19th century is driving a desire for a strong nation as well as fueling their nationalism.

China is a state with a socialist regime, and aims at building a modern socialist state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In recent years, China has significantly increased its international trade attracting considerable foreign investment; the economy has dramatically grown, especially in the coastal and urban areas. It has maintained its economic growth despite the impact from the worldwide financial crisis. China’s nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) converted to dollars has exceeded Japan’s in 2010, and it is regarded that China has become the second largest economy in the world next to the United States. In addition, a great deal of attention has been paid to its movements at international conferences, such as the G20 Summit on
the Financial Market and the World Economy and the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. China increased its international presence by holding the international exhibition, the “Shanghai Expo” in 2010 and the BRICS Leaders Meeting in 2011. Moreover, China has been playing a certain role in the non-traditional security area: it actively sends personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and has been participating in the international anti-piracy activities off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, which have been highly rated by the international community.

In both name and reality, China is growing into a big power and has started playing a major role in the world and the region. Backed by the deepened economical mutual dependence, this movement is welcomed by the international community, including Japan; on the other hand, there have been disputes on issues relating to trade imbalance, currency rate, and human rights. In addition, in regards to the issues on conflicting interest with the surrounding countries, including Japan, China’s response has been criticized as assertive, and there is a concern over its future direction. China is expected to recognize its responsibility as a big power and accept the international norms, as well as play an active and cooperative role in the regional and global issues.

On the other hand, a variety of problems exist within China. Such problems include the great political problem of corruption within central and local communist party leadership, and as a result of rapid economic growth there are emerging problems such as regional disparities between urban-rural and coastal-inland regions, wealth gaps among urban residents, inflation, and the emergence of environmental pollution, and lack of agricultural/industrial water. Moreover, issues associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise in the future. In order to avoid public frustration shifting into criticism of the administration, it is expected that China will continue to tighten its control on the society; however, it has been pointed out that there are unstable aspects in controlling public activities. Moreover, China also has domestic ethnic minority issues, such as the clashes between minorities and the authorities that were started by minority protests in areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It has been reported that some ethnic minorities are undertaking campaigns seeking separation and independence. Under the guiding principle of the “Scientific Outlook on Development,” the Hu Jintao administration aims to build a “Harmonious Society” as its fundamental policy and is committed to giving priority to the solution of the aforementioned domestic problems. China also aims to improve its current economic structure, where it is dependent on exports abroad and domestic demand is weak, in order to maintain stable economic growth.

On the diplomatic field, it is believed that in order to maintain national stability China is aiming to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining favorable relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, to maintain favorable relations with neighboring countries and stable situations in those countries, to promote the multipolarization of the world, and to secure an energy supply and other interests necessary for economic development.
On the military front, China has been modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and constant increase in defense budget. China appears to give particular priority to the Taiwan issue as a core issue of national sovereignty, and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s independence in its military modernization, but in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. The military trends of China draw attention from countries, as the country has been steadily growing as a major political and economic power.

2. Military Affairs

1. National Defense Policy

China positions the buildup of strong defense capabilities and powerful military forces that match national security and interests of development as the strategic mission to modernize the state, while it considers the main goal and mission of national defense policies to be to defend sovereignty, security, and interests of development of the state, to protect the harmony and stability of the society, to promote modernization of national defense and military forces, and to protect the stability and peace of the world.

China has a policy of active promotion of the “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” which mainly consists of the mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy to win a local war under informationized conditions, according to global trends in military developments observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and others.

China appears to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporating the concept of “Three Warfares”—“Psychological Warfare,” “Media Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare”—into the tasks of the political work by military, and declaring a policy of “close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors.”

In China’s military modernization, backed by the stable relations with Russia and other neighboring states that share land borders with China, it is believed that China is giving the top priority to handling of the Taiwan issue, more specifically to improving the capability to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for Taiwan. Furthermore, in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. As regards a long-term plan for China’s military modernization, China proclaims that it will “realize the basic mechanization and achieve a major progress in construction of informatization by 2020” and “by focusing on the capability to win a local war under informationized conditions, it will improve the abilities to accomplish diversified military missions and thoroughly complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century.” China appears
to be aiming to develop a military force according to the development of national strength. China is widely and rapidly modernizing its military forces, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well as navy and air force, and is strengthening its capability for extended-range power projection. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities among services and branches, to conduct practical exercises, to cultivate and acquire highly-capable human resources for administering operations of an informationized force, and to improve the foundation of the domestic defense industry. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still possesses outdated equipment, and the current military modernization efforts are believed to be undertakings that intend wholly to improve the military’s capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not disclose a clear, specific future vision of its military modernization. Furthermore, China has been expanding and intensifying its activities in its surrounding waters. Lack of transparency in its national defense policies, and its military activities are referred to as a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, which should require prudent analysis.

2. Military Transparency

China has not disclosed specific information on its possession of weapons, procurement goals or past procurements, the organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, or a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. China has released defense white papers titled China’s National Defense every two years since 1998, and the nation also conducts a lot of dialogue with national defense authorities of other countries. Furthermore, in August 2007, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted annual reports based on each system. In this manner, China has regularly published compiled documents on its national security while reintegrating itself into and commencing participation in U.N. systems regarding armaments and military expenditures. These and other efforts can be appreciated as a contribution to improving the transparency of its military capabilities.

However, China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the international society. For example, as for a detailed breakdown of national defense spending, China basically announced only the total amount and general purposes for the three categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Slight progress was seen in China’s National Defense in 2008 in terms of information disclosure, but it does not provide a basic breakdown such as procurement costs for major weapons. Moreover, the report for the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures submitted by China in 2009 was not filled out in accordance with the standard format used by Japan and many other nations, whereby a detailed breakdown of military expenditure is required; the information disclosed was almost as simple as that provided in China’s defense white papers.
Details have yet to be disclosed regarding the cause of the breach of international law in November 2004, where a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters. Moreover, in January 2007, when China conducted an anti-satellite weapons test, the Chinese government gave an insufficient explanation of the details and intention of the test to allay Japan’s concerns. In November 2007, China sent notification indicating a refusal for U.S. naval vessels including U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk to pull into Hong Kong on the expected day of arrival, but then later revised their notice and allowed the vessels to port. However, the U.S. naval vessels had already abandoned their port and changed course. In addition, in October 2010, since China sent notification to the Maritime SDF training squadron of its request to postpone their port call to Qingdao just before the expected day of arrival, the squadron had to cancel their visit. These incidents incite concern over China’s decision-making and behavior concerning its military.

China is steadily growing as a major political and economic power, and its military power also attracts attention from other countries. In order to allay concerns over China, it is becoming more and more important for China itself to improve transparency of its national defense policy and military capability. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.

3. National Defense Budget

China announced a national defense budget for FY2011 of approximately 583.6 billion yuan. The initial budget amount announced represented a growth of approximately 12.4% (64.5 billion yuan) compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. China still maintains a high growth rate, with its announced national defense budget continuing to increase at a rapid pace. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has more than doubled in size over the past five years, and has grown 18-fold over the past 20 years. As regards the relationship between defense and the economy, China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development, explaining that it “adheres to the principle of coordinated development of national defense and economy” in China’s National Defense in 2010. Accordingly, it is believed that China will continue to input resources for the improvement of its defense capabilities within the range of not hampering its economic development.

In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses.

(See Fig. 1-2-3-1)

4. Military Posture
China’s military forces are composed of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP) and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission. The PLA is defined as a people’s army created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force (strategic missile force).

(See Fig. I-2-3-2)

(1) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community. With regard to the nuclear strategy, it is recognized that China employs a strategy where it can deter a nuclear attack on its land by maintaining nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks to a small number of targets such as cities in the enemy country.

China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate range ballistic missiles/medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The survivability and readiness of China’s ballistic missile forces are under improvement by updating liquid propellant type to a solid propellant one. Moreover, it is also believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving precision, introducing MIRV and other means.

China has developed the DF-31, which is a new mobile-type ICBM with a solid fuel propellant system mounted onto a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), and the DF-31A, an extended model of the DF-31, which appears to have already begun to be deployed. Regarding SLBMs, the country currently appears to be developing the JL-2, a new SLBM with a range of approximately 8,000 km, and constructing Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to carry the missiles. Now that the DF-31 and the DF-31A have been deployed, once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin.

As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has deployed liquid-propellant DF-3 and DF-4 missiles in addition to the DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is believed that China possesses conventional ballistic missiles with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and is developing conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers. In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China also possesses the DH-10, a cruise missile with a range of 1,500 km or longer, as well as H-6 (Tu-16) medium-range bombers that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and cruise missiles. These missiles might complement ballistic
missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. Concerning short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), China possesses a large number of DF-15 and DF-11, and they are believed to be deployed against Taiwan. China announced that it had conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in January 2010, and attention will be paid to China’s future trends in ballistic missile defense.

(See Fig. 1-2-3-3)

(2) Ground Forces

The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. The country aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifically, China is improving mobility by such measures as switching from the past regional-defense model to a nationwide-mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the air force) and special operations forces. The country is continuing in its efforts of making its military units multi-functional, improving its integrated strategic abilities, and in building a command system for efficient operation and also working on reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. In 2009 China carried out “Stride 2009” exercises which traversed across military regions and were deemed its largest ever exercises of this type, and it also carried out similar “Mission Action 2010” exercises in 2010. These exercises are believed to have been designed to verify and improve capabilities necessary for deploying army units to distant areas, such as the army’s long-range maneuvering capabilities and logistical support capabilities, including the mobilization of militia and public transportation.

(3) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets—the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 950 ships (including approximately 50 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.34 million tons. The navy is in charge of the maritime national defense and protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively constructing new types of domestic submarines to enhance its submarine force. Additionally, the Navy is increasing surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities, and is increasing and improving landing ships and supply ships. Also, a large hospital ship was commissioned in October 2008. In view of these developments in the modernization of the Chinese Navy, it is believed that China is trying to build
capabilities to perform operations in areas more distant from China’s shore.

With regard to the possession of aircraft carriers, Chinese Defense Minster General Liang Guanglie and a number of senior military officials have made positive remarks about possessing aircraft carriers. China also purchased Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, from Ukraine, and has carried out renovations. In addition, it has constructed a structure replicating an aircraft carrier on land and is developing an airfield for training its forces in taking off and landing aircrafts. Based on these facts, it is believed that China is currently advancing research and development on technology necessary for the possession of aircraft carriers.

(4) Air Forces

The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 2,040 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth generation modern fighters is rising steadily. China is domestically mass producing J-10 fighters and carried out import and licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as importing Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities from Russia. Moreover, it is believed that China has continued to develop its next generation fighter domestically. China is importing highly sophisticated long-range surface-to-air missiles from Russia in order to improve air defense capabilities. It is making continuous efforts to improve its in-flight refueling capabilities and early warning and control system, which are essential for the operation of a modern air force. Furthermore, it is reported that China has a plan to import a number of large cargo aircraft from Russia.

China has also begun to enhance the electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capabilities of its aircraft in addition to increased efforts in actual reconnaissance flights against surrounding countries. In recent years in particular, Chinese air activities that appear to be some form of information gathering against Japan have been observed. Also, in September 2007, H-6 medium-range bombers flew into the Japanese air defense identification zone over the East China Sea to advance near to the Japan–China median line. In March 2010 a Y-8 early warning aircraft similarly flew to advance near to the Japan–China median line. Then, in March 2011 a Y-8 patrol aircraft and Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft crossed the Japan-China median line and flew nearly 50 km into the Senkaku Island territorial airspace of Japan. What is more, it has also been reported that Air Force fighters and other aircraft are engaged in training that involves in-flight refueling over the South China Sea.

Judging from this modernization of air forces and the activities by aircraft, it is believed that China is improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, aiming to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in the anterior area, and improving long-range transportation capabilities. Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by Chinese air forces in the area surrounding Japan.
(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities

China continues to put forth efforts for space development. The country has launched various satellites into space using indigenously produced rockets, successfully conducted manned space flights, and launched a lunar orbiter. While there is one view that China’s space development program has been proposed to boost national prestige and develop space resources, it also appears that in China’s space development military and non-military sectors are related, and there is the possibility that China utilizes space for such military purposes as information gathering, communications, and navigation. Recently, several high ranking officials in China’s Air Force expressed the Air Force’s policy of actively working on utilization of space. China is developing anti-satellite weapons, and the country tested the destruction of its own satellite in January 2007, applying ballistic missile technology. It is also pointed out that China is developing a system that uses laser beams to hamper satellite functions.

China is thought to have interest in cyber warfare and they are believed to have organized and be currently training a cyber warfare-specialized unit.

China’s interest in anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare can be attributed to the increasing reliance of information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, on satellites and computer networks.

5. Activities in the Ocean

(1) Situation of Activities in Waters Near Japan

China has been expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in recent years. With regard to its activity in waters near Japan, Chinese naval vessels have been observed conducting what appeared to be training exercises or information gathering activities. Chinese government ships have also been observed engaging in monitoring activities for the protection of maritime rights and interests.

Advancements to the Pacific Ocean by Chinese naval surface vessels have also been confirmed. For example, in October 2008, four Chinese naval vessels, including a Soveremenny-class destroyer, passed through the Tsugaru Strait and sailed south to the Pacific Ocean to circle Japan. In November 2008, four naval vessels, including a top-of-the-line Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean. In June 2009, five naval vessels, including a Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the waters northeast of Okinotori Island before engaging in apparent drills. In March 2010, six naval vessels, including a Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean. These vessels were reported to have advanced to the South China Sea. In April 2010, 10
naval vessels, including Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, passed the channel between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the waters west of Okinotori Island, before engaging in apparent exercises\textsuperscript{19}. At the time, Chinese shipborne helicopters flew very close to the Japanese destroyers monitoring the vessels a couple of times\textsuperscript{120}. In July 2010, two naval vessels including a Luzhou-class destroyer passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacific Ocean. On top of that, in June 2011, 11 vessels including Sovremenny-class destroyers and a Jiangkai II-class frigate passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacific Ocean. Besides carrying out target practices, they also carried out unmanned aircraft and shipborne helicopter flight trainings as well as replenishments at sea. In addition to such military activities, it has been confirmed that China’s law enforcement agency has intensified its monitoring activities in waters near Japan in recent times\textsuperscript{121}. In addition, in September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with a patrol boat of Japan’s Coast Guard within the territorial waters near Senkaku Islands.

In addition, a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, breaching international law. In September 2005, it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Soveremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around the said gas field. In October 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in international waters reportedly near Okinawa. The foreign submarine’s approach to a U.S. aircraft carrier is a militarily noteworthy incident. In December 2008, two Chinese maritime research ships of the State Oceanic Administration conducted navigation operations not permitted to foreign ships under international law such as hovering and cruising within the territorial waters of Japan near the Senkaku Islands. In March and April 2011, there have been multiple instances of Chinese helicopters that appeared to belong to the State Oceanic Administration, flying close to the Japanese destroyers engaged in vigilance monitoring in the East China Sea\textsuperscript{122}.

Besides activities in waters near Japan, China is intensifying its activities in the South China Sea that contains the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, over which it is engaged in territorial disputes with neighbors, including some ASEAN countries. In March 2009, Chinese ships including a naval vessel, a maritime research ship of the State Oceanographic Administration, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries patrol ship, and trawlers approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. Other incidents also occurred in the same month\textsuperscript{122}. In March 2010, exercises were reportedly conducted with the deployment of six vessels to the South China Sea over three weeks, and in July the same year, it was reported that a large-scale, multi-branch joint live-ammunition exercise was conducted and included surface vessels and naval air forces. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been growing friction among China and its neighboring countries over the South China Sea, highlighted through protests by Vietnam and the Philippines against China’s activities in these waters.

(Reference: Chapter 2 Section 5 pxx)
(2) Objectives of Activities in Waters Near Japan

Taking into general consideration relevant factors including China’s geographic location and economic globalization as well as the fact that China explicitly states in its laws and other means that its navy assumes the role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety\(^\text{124}\), maritime activities by the Chinese navy and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives. The first objective is to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from the country in order to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. For example, China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. If China aims to hold back by force foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea.

The third is to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in exploring and drilling oil and gas fields as well as building facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and South China Sea\(^\text{125}\). It is believed that the aims of the naval vessels operating near the drilling facilities of the Kashi oil and gas fields in September 2005 included the demonstration of their naval capabilities of acquiring, maintaining, and protecting maritime rights and interests.

The fourth is to defend the sea lanes of communications for China. The background of this is the fact that the sea lanes of communications, including crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important lifelines for the increasingly globalizing Chinese economy. It depends on future international situations at the time as to how far the Chinese Navy should defend the sea lanes of communications by itself, but given recent modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, the scope of their capabilities is believed to expand beyond waters near China.

Given the objectives and recent trends in such maritime activities implemented by China, it is believed that China plans to expand its sphere of maritime activities, carrying out operations and training as an ordinary routine practice in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean as well as the South China Sea. Therefore, attention needs to be paid to such activities, including the operation of naval vessels and various surveillance operations near Japan, development of facilities that serve as bases for these activities\(^\text{126}\), and the development of own interpretations regarding the legal status of coastal areas in China’s exclusive economic zones.

6. International Military Activities
In recent years, the PLA has begun emphasizing nontraditional missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and anti-piracy. In order to carry out these missions it is becoming more active in dispatching units overseas. The backdrop for this stance on international military activities is believed to be the fact that China’s national interests have expanded beyond its national borders, thereby increasing its need to protect and promote its national interests overseas. It is also seen as being backed by China’s intent to strengthen its stature by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community as a great power.

China states that it consistently supports and actively participates in U.N. peacekeeping operations. According to China’s National Defense in 2010, the country has sent a total of 17,390 military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations. According to the United Nations, as of the end of May 2011, China had deployed a total of 2,036 personnel, police officers, and military observers to 11 U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), thus showing a certain presence in peacekeeping operations. China’s aim in its proactive attitude to U.N. peacekeeping operations is seen to include its intent to strengthen relations with the regions where the peacekeeping operations are conducted, particularly with regard to relations with African nations.

Furthermore, China has also been taking part in international initiatives to deal with piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. As its first mission in distant waters, the Chinese Navy has dispatched vessels to these waters since December 2008 to make them escort Chinese and other ships. This demonstrates that the Chinese Navy is improving its capacity to execute naval operations in increasingly distant waters. It is also thought to be an expression of the fact that China is placing a greater emphasis on protecting its own sea lanes of communication.

In view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China has carried out an evacuation operation for of Chinese nationals from the country from February through March 2011. As part of this operation, China dispatched a naval frigate and military transportation aircraft to Libya in addition to the private chartered aircraft. This is the first participation of the military in an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals living abroad, and it has been pointed out that through such activities China is trying to build a pacifist and humanitarian image of its military forces and demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, its intent to and place priority on military operations other than war, as well as its desire to prove the ability to project its military power to distant locations.

7. Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting practical exercises and large-scale exercises, including cooperative exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises in order to modernize its operational capability. The whole PLA military training conference held in 2006 emphasized promoting a
shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect since 2009, highlights training for military operations other than war (MOOTW), education in the knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint exercises by different services\(^{129}\).

In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, a human resource strategy project was launched to develop human resources capable of directing informatized operations and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards, and it is believed that the objective of this is to secure highly capable human resources. Moreover, in 2000, in order to recruit highly capable and highly educated people, the military started a system where civilian college students are provided with scholarships and then allowed to enter the military as commissioned officers after graduation.

China has been developing a mobilization system with a view to effective use of civilian resources in the case of war and other emergency. In February 2010, China enacted the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization, and in July the same year put the law into effect\(^{130}\).

8. National Defense Industry Sector

While China imports highly sophisticated equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed to place emphasis on indigenous production of military equipment. The country manufactures much of its equipment domestically and is now actively making research and development efforts on new equipment. China’s national defense industry sector appears to be developing due to an improvement of private industry infrastructure accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, and the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector is working as a base for the modernization of China’s military\(^{131}\).

Favorable growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors; however, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. In particular, emphasis has been placed on two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for building the national economy, and in turn civilian technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national defense. Specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, China maintains that it encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries, thus appearing to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries.
3. External Relations

1 General Situation

In its relationships with other countries, China proactively develops military exchanges including reciprocal visits by senior military officials and joint military exercises. In recent years, China has been engaged in vigorous military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin American countries. China is believed to regard military exchange as a strategic means to safeguard national interests, and as such to position it as an element in the overall diplomatic strategy of the country. The objectives of China’s efforts to promote military exchange include alleviation of concerns regarding China through strengthening of relations with other countries, creation of a favorable security environment, and enhancement of China’s influence in the international community. In these efforts, China is also mindful of goals such as securing of energy resources and foreign bases.

2. Relations with Taiwan

China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon efforts for peaceful unification, expressing that it will take policy and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and protect their due authority, while it has also repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force from the standpoint of strong opposition to any intervention in the unification of China by foreign powers as well as any move toward independence of Taiwan. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, stipulates that China will be able to protect its national sovereignty and territories through peaceful means and other necessary measures in the event that Taiwanese separatist forces bring about Taiwan’s separation from China under any pretext or through any means, resulting in the serious situation which may lead to Taiwan’s separation from China, or which may bring about a complete elimination of the possibility of peaceful reunification (Article 8), and clearly lays out the non-renunciation of the use of military force by China. Ma Ying-jeou, who took office in May 2008, advocates a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development through expanding economic exchange with China and the status quo rather than independence. The leaders of both sides’ authorized organizations for cross-strait talks met for the first time in 10 years in June 2008, and direct chartered passenger weekday flights, direct maritime links, and direct mail services between China and Taiwan began in December 2008. In June 2010, an Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which would be equivalent to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two sides, was concluded. As these and other moves show, relations between the two sides move forward centered mainly around the realm of economics. On the security front, while President Hu Jintao made appeals for China and Taiwan to make contact and hold exchanges over military issues at an appropriate time, and explore the creation of mechanisms for building mutual trust over military security, President Ma Ying-jeou has expressed demands including withdrawal of the Chinese missiles which are pointed at Taiwan. Attention will be paid to trends in the future relations between China and Taiwan.

3. Relations with the United States

There are various outstanding problems between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.–China relationship is essential for China in developing its economy, it is believed that China will continue to desire to maintain that stable relationship.

The United States expresses that it welcomes a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the international community over international issues such as the recovery of the world economy and proliferation of WMDs. The United States proclaims that it will monitor the Chinese military’s modernization, and while it recognizes that the two nations do not agree on every issue and makes it clear that it will be candid on human rights and other issues, it also states that disagreement between the two should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest.

On the Chinese side President Hu Jintao stated that China and the United States would work together to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship in the twenty-first century. China thus shows its stance of emphasizing the stable development of U.S.–China relations through pragmatic cooperation over an extensive array of fields.

Military exchanges have also developed between China and the United States. The countries have been conducting various policy dialogues. China has dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits by naval vessels. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. But while China wants to develop relations between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, it asserts that there are a number of issues that must be resolved in order to realize sound development in said relations. These include arms sales to Taiwan, the activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft within China’s exclusive economic zones, legal hurdles in mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in China on the part of the United States. Some unstable facets have been observed in the military exchanges of the two countries, such as the notification of suspensions of the major military exchanges with the United States when the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and
January 2010. On the other hand, the United States maintains that China’s military development, lack of transparency, and other issues raise questions about its future conduct and intentions. It asserts that U.S.–China relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust. For that reason, with regard to military exchanges, it is believed that the aim of the United States is to improve the current situation, wherein such exchanges are frequently suspended once problems arise, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining more stable channels for mutual understanding. In recent years, for instance, Strategic Security Dialogues have been established (May 2011) in U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues, among other efforts.

4. Relations with Russia

Since the China–Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, both countries have continuously maintained a stance of placing importance on their bilateral relationship. The deepening of the “strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which was established in the mid-1990s, has been emphasized. In 2001, the China–Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation139 was concluded. Subsequently in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once evolved into a military clash, came to a settlement. The two countries share a common idea that they will promote the multipolarization of the world and building of a new international order. In addition, economic motives have been driving the good relationship between them in recent years.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China; however, some point out that their trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China. It is also pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying such sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia itself.

China–Russia military exchanges include regular visits by high-ranking army officials and joint military exercises. They conducted their first joint exercise in the Shandong Peninsula and other areas in China in August 2005. In August 2007, a joint anti-terrorism exercise was conducted by the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)140. In addition, Russia and China held “Peace Mission 2010,” a joint military exercise consisting of antiterrorism operations, in October 2010141. It is believed that through these joint military exercises with Russia, the two countries can deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between their military forces and show the presence of China and Russia as one pole in the multipolarizing world, and China can learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines.

5. Relations with North Korea
North Korea and China have a “traditional friendship,” and North Korea seems to rely heavily on China for a great portion of its food assistance and energy supply. Accordingly, China is believed to have a stronger influence on North Korea than other countries. China agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1695, which condemned the launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea in 2006, UNSCR 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea in relation to the nuclear tests, the Security Council presidential statement in April 2009 condemning North Korea’s missile launch, and UNSCR 1874, which settled additional measures against North Korea in response to the nuclear test in May 2009. In addition, China has played an active role chairing the Six-Party Talks that have been held in Beijing since 2003, and the international community expects that China will continue its proactive efforts to resolve the nuclear issue. On the other hand, China was cautious in adopting a tougher stance against North Korea regarding the sinking of Cheonan in March 2010, and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, thus demonstrating a difference of opinion with other countries regarding North Korea. It is pointed out that such an attitude stems from concerns for a possibility that the instability on the Korean Peninsula may have a negative impact on China itself, but at the same time is intended to secure China’s influence on North Korea.

6. Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been continuously developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means. In particular, China has had good relations with Myanmar and has assisted in developing Myanmar’s domestic infrastructure such as pipelines for petroleum or natural gas, ports, and railroads. It is also believed that Myanmar has become one of the major importers of weapons from China. Some pundits point out that it provides China the shortest access to the Indian Ocean behind this close relationship lies Myanmar’s location.

China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While China has been deepening economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries through diplomatic forums, more recently, it has been proactively advancing cooperation in the area of national security by enhancing the exchange of its military personnel through mutual visits of their high-ranking military officers and exchanges and cooperation between military departments.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Thus China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states, which might be influenced by terrorism caused by Islamic extremists and other factors. Chinese engagement in SCO, which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of China’s concerns in such areas. Moreover, China is also believed to be interested in the energy resources of Central Asia and is promoting cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

While China has continued to be at odds with India due to issues such as border conflicts, it has traditionally maintained an extremely close relationship with Pakistan, which has been at odds with India as well, through various projects including the joint development of JF-17 fighter jets. Cooperation in the military sector, such as exporting weapons and transferring military technologies, has also been reported. On the other hand, in recent years China has been committed to improving its relationship with India while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Actively conducting mutual visits by top leaders with India, China states that relations with India are strategic and that the issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once culminated in military clashes, is progressing. It is believed that the development of relations with India can be attributed to the two states’ placing of importance on economic growth as well as responses to progressing U.S.–India relations. Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted joint naval search and rescue exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003. In December 2007, “Hand-in-Hand 2007,” the first anti-terrorism joint exercise since the 1962 China–India border conflict, was conducted between both countries’ armies, and the anti-terrorism joint exercise “Hand-in-Hand 2008” was conducted in December 2008.

(4) Relations with EU Countries

Trade between China and EU countries has grown remarkably in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, at diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

Regarding information technology, avionics, and air-independent propulsion systems for submarines and
other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than those of China or Russia, which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, it is possible that the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China, and that they would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. Japan has expressed to the EU its objection to lifting the arms embargo on China, and it is necessary to pay continuous attention to future discussions within the EU.

(5) Relations with Middle Eastern Countries, African Countries, Pacific Islands, and Central and South American Countries

China reportedly conducted its first joint navy drills with Turkey from September to October in 2010. In October 2010, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Turkey to meet with Prime Minister Erdogan to upgrade the relationship between the two countries to one based on strategic collaboration. These events seem to suggest the two nations are getting closer.

China has been enhancing its economic relations with African nations by actively assisting in their infrastructure development and investing in their resource development. Interactions among top-levels of states and high-ranking military officials are also common. Chinese navy ships frequently visit these countries and China actively export arms to them, through which China is exerting its clout to African nations in many ways.

China’s relations with the Pacific islands are also on the rise. It has been implementing the development of oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea and has signed an agreement on military cooperation with the country. Vigorous and continual economic assistance has also been implemented towards other islands. Furthermore, China tries to engage in military exchanges with Fiji and Tonga.

In addition to these moves, Chinese military officials visit countries including Argentina and Brazil on a regular basis to enhance relations with Central and South American countries. China has reportedly been working on the improvement of its relations with these countries through such events as the first joint military exercise in November 2010 with Peru, called the “Peace Angel 2010.”

7. International Transfer of Weapons

China has provided developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas with weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft, and it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Iran, and Bangladesh, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Namibia, Egypt, Algeria, and Sudan as well as Central and South American countries including Venezuela and Peru. Some experts claim that China transfers weapons to enhance its influence in the international community and secure energy resources. It is pointed out that China is supplying weapons to countries that have problems in terms of
democracy and human rights, and attention is paid as to whether China will improve the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community.

4. Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Taiwan, under the guidance of building the “hard rock” defense advocated by President Ma Jeou Ying, identifies prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conflict, and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and takes the military strategy of “resolute defense and credible deterrence.”

Taiwan, for improved expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to transform its armed forces currently consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to introducing advanced technologies and improving joint operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August 2009, the Taiwanese armed forces have resolved to strengthen its disaster prevention and disaster relief capabilities.

In August 2005, then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian announced a policy to increase the ratio of the defense budget to its GDP, which was approximately 2.4% in FY2005, up to 3% within three years, in order to meet increasing demands for national defense. Taiwan states that it reached a ratio of 3% in 2008. The Ma administration also sets out the policy that the defense budget will not go below 3% of the GDP, in principle.

With regard to Taiwan’s military power at present, ground forces include 41 Army brigades and three Navy Marine Corps brigades with a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that the total of 1.65 million reserve personnel of air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Jing Guo fighters, etc.

In view of the fact that China is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military believes it still needs to modernize the equipment. In October 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of the possible sale of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and AH-64D attack helicopters, and other equipment to Taiwan. In January 2010, it also notified Congress of the possible sales of PAC-3 missiles, UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and others. Taiwan also wishes to purchase F-16C/D fighter aircraft and other arms from the United States, and the issue is to be observed. Taiwan is also promoting the independent development of equipment. Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles are deployed and it is believed that Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities, while Kung III surface-to-air...
missiles are being developed to ensure the capability to deal with ballistic missiles.
In addition, Taiwan conducted a field training exercise “Han Kuang 27” in April 2011, during which their
air force fighters conducted highway takeoff and landing trainings for the first time since 2007.
The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:
1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming number of troops; however, their
capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making
efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities in recent years, such as building large landing
ships.
2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, as well as overwhelming Taiwan in terms of quantity, has been
steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years in the qualitative sphere, where Taiwan had
superiority.
3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles with a
range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.
In addition to sizes of forces and performance and quantity of equipment, a comparison of military
capabilities should take into account various factors such as objectives and characteristics of envisioned
military operations, operational posture, proficiency of military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as
China is rapidly modernizing its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is
shifting in favor of China. Attention should be paid to the modernization of both the Chinese and
Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan.

Section 4. Russia

1. General Situation

Russia claims that it has restored the level of social and economic development that was lost in the 1990s.
It asserts that under President Dmitry Medvedev it will continue to pursue its national interests as a state
with global influence while aiming to further the multipolarization of the international community.
One of the contributing factors to Russia recovering its national power to such an extent was the
economic recovery propelled by price hikes of crude oil, its major export product. Russia takes the stance,
in pursuing military modernization, that the country will not be drawn into the arms race and jeopardize
its economic development.
However, it is considered that there are various sorts of problems that might restrain Russia’s further
social and economic development, such as excessive dependence on the energy resource sector. Russia
itself realizes that it must undertake a number of sweeping modernizations for the further development of
the country. These include breaking free of its conventional resource-dependent economy, refashioning its
economy and society on a fundamentally new foundation backed up by technical innovation, establishing
2. Security and Defense Policies

1. Basic Posture

Approved in May 2009, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation through to 2020 sets out national and international objectives and strategic priorities for national security and for solid national development.

The National Security Strategy views that Russia’s influence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the creation of a multipolar world and using the potential of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations are listed as having a negative impact on the interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the United States’ plan to deploy a missile defense system in Europe as well as the approach of NATO’s military infrastructure to the Russian border. Furthermore, it does not rule out the possibility that the conflicts over resources will be resolved by force. In order to ensure strategic security, Russia claims it will, under the central role of the United Nations in the international security, enhance cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States. Russia says it will use political, legal, economic, military, and other instruments in order to uphold national sovereignty and interests.

As for the field of national defense, viewing as a threat the series of policies of some developed nations that pursue superiority in the military field, particularly in the area of strategy by developing high-tech weapons, non-nuclear strategic weapons, and global missile defense systems, Russia exemplifies, as challenges for strengthening defense capabilities, a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent readiness units and improving organizational and military alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its strategic nuclear forces.

In February 2010, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was formulated as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere. This doctrine demonstrates the recognition that, while the probability of a large-scale war breaking out is on the decline, the military dangers facing Russia are increasing, which is evidenced by the approach of NATO’s military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, as well as the construction and deployment of a strategic missile defense system. Furthermore, it also states that Russia will maintain permanent combat-readiness to deter and prevent conflict, and that in the event of war it will repel aggression and forcibly put a stop to military actions.
The doctrine regards nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It also claims that in addition to maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capacity\textsuperscript{160}, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction were to be used against it or its allies or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons have been used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled\textsuperscript{161}.

Furthermore, concerning the use of its army, it claims that Russia may use its armed forces outside of its territory for the purposes of peacekeeping operations pursuant to resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, etc., and of the protection of Russian citizens overseas.

2. Military Reform

Having gone through the chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with the difficulty in maintaining its military posture of the same level as during the Cold War era because of the severe economic situation and the decline in population in the 1990s, Russia began a full-scale process for military reform in 1997 by heeding the three pillars of reform: downsizing, modernization, and professionalization.

Moreover, against the backdrop of the changes to the army’s operating environment and the decline in its combat capabilities due to a shortage of personnel\textsuperscript{162}, based on the Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation policy statement that was approved by President Medvedev in September 2008\textsuperscript{163}, Russia is currently advancing measures to modernize its army, including troop reductions, structural reforms, combat-readiness reviews, and the development and introduction of new equipment.

The country’s troop reduction goal, set in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel, is scheduled to be achieved by 2016\textsuperscript{164}. In terms of structural reforms, thus far Russia has shifted to three services and three independent corps and has integrated military districts. In order to improve combat readiness for the high probability of a small-scale conflict, it is currently promoting a reorganization from its previous division-based command structure to a brigade-based command structure, while also moving forward with reorganizing all of its combat forces to permanent readiness units\textsuperscript{165}. Up until December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts, established joint strategic commands (OSK) corresponding to each of these new military districts, and set out to control all of its services—Ground, Navy, and Air forces—in an integrated manner under the supervision of a Military District Commander\textsuperscript{166}.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, Russia has been developed and procured its equipment based on the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015, which was formulated in October 2006. But it appears that by the end of 2010 the President newly approved a state policy on military equipment for the period of 2011 to 2020. Based on this policy, Russia intends by 2020
to further modernize its equipment and invest approximately 20 trillion rubles (about 59 trillion yen) to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70%\(^{167}\).

Furthermore, in order to make effective the combat readiness of permanent readiness units, Russia is promoting the introduction of a contract service system which secures personnel with high combat readiness capabilities by selecting them through contract from among the conscripted military personnel. However, further review has been under way to address difficulties in securing personnel due to such problems as high turnover rate and financial restraints\(^{168}\).

It is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years.

(See Fig. I-2-4-1)

3. Military Posture

Russia’s military strength is derived not only from the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but also from forces such as the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) border troops and the Department of the Interior troops. The Russian Federation Armed Forces has three services (forces) and three independent corps (units): a ground force, naval force, and air force; and strategic-rocket units, space units, and airborne units.

(See Fig. I-2-4-2)

1. Nuclear Forces

The Russian military emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure a global position in the trend toward forming a multipolar world, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States as well as to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit.

Russia is gradually reducing the number of its strategic nuclear missiles due to issues such as aging. However, it still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long range bombers (Tu-95MS Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) following the United States in scale.

Regarding the update of nuclear missiles, Russia began to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, beginning with the deployment of new Topol-M ICBM (SS-27) units in 2005. In addition, it is thought that the deployment of units for the RS-24, which appear to be a multi-warhead version of the Topol-M, started in March 2011\(^{169}\).

In April 2007, Russia launched a Borey-class ballistic missile submarine (nuclear powered) (SSBN);
however, it is believed that construction of the new SSBN is behind its initial schedule\(^\text{170}\). Russia also
started a flight test in September 2005 for the new-type SLBM Bulava, which will appear to be mounted
on Borey-class SSBNs. However, it has been pointed out that all flight tests as of 2009 have been
unsuccessful, and they have not yet reached the stage of deployment\(^\text{171}\).

In April 2010 Russia and the U.S. signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms which stipulates
reducing both side’s deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700
within seven years after entry into force of the treaty\(^\text{172}\). In February 2011, after the treaty was approved
by both countries’ legislatures, instruments of ratification were exchanged, and the treaty came into
effect\(^\text{173}\).

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range
missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels
and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad
array of nuclear forces.

2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia recognizes the need to outfit its conventional forces with new equipment\(^\text{174}\), and it is assumed that
Russia implements the development and procurement of such equipment based on its state policy on
military equipment for the period of 2011 to 2020 which is thought to have been formulated by the end of
2010. There is a need to pay close attention to the direction Russia will take in its development,
procurement, and deployment of new equipment, which includes the so-called fifth generation fighter\(^\text{175}\),
which carried out its first flight in January 2010, and the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship\(^\text{176}\), which
Russia agreed to procure by jointly manufacturing with France in December 2010.

Furthermore, the Russian armed forces have been striving to maintain their combat readiness by
promoting the reorganization of all of their combat forces to permanent readiness units and have been
carrying out a range of exercises\(^\text{177}\) using its conventional forces in Europe and Asia. In addition, Russia
is intensifying its military activities, including joint naval exercises for its vessels on voyages of long
duration, while in 2008 it took part in counter-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf
of Aden.

However, it faces issues such as difficulties in securing personnel and lax military discipline due to the
decrease in the youth population as well as poor living conditions for military personnel. There is a need
to keep a close watch on how these factors will affect Russia’s ability to manage its military forces.

As for the future Russian armed forces, since there are opaque elements which may influence Russia’s
future economic and social development, it is necessary to continue to observe their future trends.
4. Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

1. General Situation

As part of its reorganization of its military districts in 2010, Russia transferred to the Far Eastern Military District the area of the Siberian Military District east of Lake Baikal. It then newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command\(^{178}\). In addition to ground forces, the Pacific Fleet, air force, and air defense units\(^{179}\) have also been placed under the control of the Military District Commander, who will have unified control over each of these services.

The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian military operations in the vicinity of Japan appear to be increasingly active, including exercises and drills.

Russia has conducted military exercises in the Far East region, including “Vostok”, which is a large-scale anti-terrorism exercise that has been held almost biennially, and “Mobility 2004”, which was an exercise for the country’s permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region.

A large-scale military exercise, “Vostok-2010”; was conducted from June to July 2010 aiming to verify the results of the military reforms through restructuring its command structure. In these exercises, it is thought that Russia verified its ability to respond to conflicts under its new command structure and also its ability to manage in an integrated manner units from different services. In addition, by deploying troops in the Far East exercises that are not stationed in this region, it is considered that it verified its ability to deploy forces in regions far from where they are stationed\(^{180}\).

Given that the overall Russian armed forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts with the inter-theater mobility of its permanent readiness units\(^{181}\), it is necessary to continue paying attention to the positioning and trends of the Russian armed forces in the Far East region with the movement of units in other regions also in mind.

(See Fig. 1-2-4-3)

(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s, and approximately 30 Tu-95MS Bear long-range bombers are mainly deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In addition, SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and
around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, a variety of weapons are deployed in the Far East region, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and (under)sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 20 Tu-22Ms are deployed in the area across from Sakhalin in the Eastern Military District.

(2) Ground Forces

Ground forces in the Far East region have continued to shrink. As part of its military reforms, it is believed that Russia is promoting a reorganization from a division-based command structure to a brigade-based one, while also reorganizing all of its combat forces to permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of ten divisions and brigades and has a naval infantry brigade with an amphibious capability.

(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet comprises approximately 250 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 550,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. The forces have been scaled down.

(4) Air Forces

In terms of air forces in the Far East region, in the Eastern Military District Russia deploys approximately 400 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. This number continues to shrink, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities.

2. Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan’s Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory. However, the numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times. Nevertheless, one division with mainly defensive duties is stationed in this region and there are deployed tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles.

After President Medvedev visited the Kunashiri Island to become the first head of the state in November
2010, cabinet members including Minister of Defense Serdyukov made a series of visits to the Northern Territories. The President stated that equipment is needed to be modernized to ensure the security of the “Kuril” Islands, while the Minister of Defense conducted review regarding the updating of equipment and reconstructing military infrastructure on the Kunashiri Island and the Etorofu Island. In February 2011, the Defense Minister indicated his intention to keep the division stationed on both islands and stated that Russia would strengthen the units there through supplying them with the latest communication systems, electronic warfare systems, and radar, suggesting a possible reduction in units.

The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Defense Ministrial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to maintain the status quo.

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from peak numbers; however, some activities seem to be on the rise again.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities seem to be on the rise in recent years. For example, joint exercises and counter-piracy operations have been carried out, in extended voyages by vessels deployed in the Pacific Fleet, and nuclear submarines carry out patrols.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long distance bombers and carrying out flights of Tu-95MS and Tu-160 long-range bombers which are refueled in mid-flight. Moreover, due to an upturn in its fuel situation, etc., pilot training time is on an upward trend, and there also seems to be an increase in activities such as flights approaching Japan and exercises and training.

(See Fig. I-2-4-4)

5. External Relations

(1) General Situation

Amid the trend toward multi-polarity, recognizing that Russia’s international position as one of the poles of influence is being strengthened, Russia sets out its basic national policy to achieve its national
Moreover, recognizing that the objective of diplomacy is to protect the national interests of its citizens, Russia aims at a practical diplomacy which contributes to solving issues in modernizing the country such as modernization of economy, establishing a democratic political system, and eradicating corruption. Toward this, Russia is tackling strengthening of its ties with the U.S. and European countries to achieve modernization, launching to build a partnership with the European Union (EU). Also from the perspective of its own modernization, it is considered that it needs to strengthen its relationships with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. While Russia’s conventional position of prioritizing its relationship with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remains unchanged, a cooperative diplomatic stance to maintain relations with each country is seen, by which Russia places importance on the benefits of achieving its own modernization and keeps good relations with each country. Close attention should be paid to how Russia develops its relations with other countries in the future, including in the area of security.

2. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States

(1) General Situation

Russia has positioned as the highest priority of its diplomatic policy the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS. It maintains relationships with the CIS states including multinational frameworks such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Russia has promoted military integration with the CIS member states, stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS; Russia has dispatched its troops to be stationed in Ukraine, Moldova (Transdniester), Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzs and Georgia, which left the CIS in August 2009 (South Ossetia, Abkhazia); it has also concluded agreements to form a joint air defense system and joint border security treaties with the CIS member states.

With increasing activities by Islamic armed forces in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent Joint Rapid Reaction Force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.

(2) Georgia Conflict

The Georgia conflict is the incident that broke out in August 2008, touched off by the armed conflict.
between Georgia and South Ossetia and introduced a large-scale armed intervention by Russia. Subsequently, the relationship between Russia and Europe-U.S., which had been appealing for a peaceful resolution based on the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity, deteriorated as Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, Russia has also strengthened military cooperation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

3. Relations with the United States

The U.S.-Russia relationship, which had been stalled due to the Russo-Georgian War and the deployment plan by the United States of a missile defense (MD) system to the Eastern Europe, turned toward improvement under the Obama administration inaugurated in January 2009. Having agreed in April 2009 to begin intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), Russia and the United States signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010 and in February 2011, after the treaty was approved by both countries’ legislatures, instruments of ratification were exchanged, and the treaty came into effect.

Russia was strongly opposed to the deployment plan of the MD system in Europe by the United States, as it believed that it would have a negative impact on its nuclear deterrent capabilities. But in September 2009, the United States announced that it was reviewing the proposed deployment of the MD system in Europe, which was cautiously welcomed by Russia. Regarding the MD System, in addition to stating that the interrelationship exists between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons in the preamble, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty prohibits the diversion of launchers of ICBM, etc. for an MD system and the use of MD launchers for ICBM, etc. However, Russia’s understanding is that the treaty would be invalidated in the event that the United States developed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, its MD capabilities and threatened its potential strategic nuclear strength. Russia also intimates that it withdraws from the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in response to the United States’ advancement of its MD plan such as the May 2011 agreement between the U.S. and Romania that lays out the deployment of the U.S.’s MD system in Romania, thus restraining the U.S.

Besides this, in June 2010 President Medvedev visited the United States and attended a U.S.-Russia summit, where steps were taken toward improving economic relationships, including strengthening cooperation in the field of innovation, as well as on security arena.

4. Relations with Europe and NATO
While the relationship between Russia and NATO temporarily deteriorated due to factors such as the Russo-Georgia war, through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia now participates to a certain extent in NATO decision making and acts as an equal partner in areas of mutual interest. A NATO summit was held in November 2010 in Lisbon, and the new NATO Strategic Concept adopted in the summit expressed a hope that NATO wants to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. Moreover, at the NRC summit held simultaneously with the NATO summit, Russia and NATO issued a joint statement, by which both will work toward building a true and modernized strategic partnership and will take concrete measures in the fields of missile defense, Afghanistan, cooperation to fight terrorism, and anti-piracy measures.

On the other hand, there remains the unsolved problem between Russia and NATO about the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.

5. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and the region is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East, anti-terrorist measures, and security. It is currently implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing resources in Sakhalin. In order to develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, which moreover will help to modernize its economy, Russia attaches great importance to enhancing its economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries, including Japan and China. For this reason, Russia has been prioritizing relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region in its foreign policy and has joined various regional frameworks.

President Medvedev visited China in September 2010, and following talks with President Hu Jintao they announced the strengthening of the strategic partnership between Russia and China and released a joint declaration on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the end of World War II. President Medvedev also visited India in December 2010 and concluded design and supply contracts for the joint development of fifth generation fighters and a supersonic cruise missile.

6. Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its on-going efforts to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the
nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev. Russia has exported its jet fighters and warships to countries including India, Algeria, ASEAN member countries, China, and Venezuela\(^2\). In addition, Russia signed agreements with North Korea and Iran on military technology cooperation in 2001.

**Section 5. Southeast Asia**

**1. General Situation**

Southeast Asia holds key positions for traffic linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and is an important region for Japan. The countries in this region are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened the relationships of interdependence within and outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed\(^2\). In order to cope with these problems, the countries in the region are working to build sufficient military forces not only for traditional national defense but also to address new security issues such as anti-terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, they have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their navy and air forces.

In this region, the United States is developing relationships of confidence with Southeast Asian countries and working to strengthen their readiness through numerous joint military exercises such as the multinational military exercise Cobra Gold and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)\(^2\) and the provision of military technology and military assistance.

(See Fig. I-2-5-1)

**2. Defense Policy of Each Country**

**1. Singapore**

Given the concentration of people and their property in limited national land space and deepening economic interdependence with other countries, Singapore identifies diplomacy and deterrence as the twin pillars of national defense for maintaining peace and stability, and gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-quarter of its national budget\(^2\). As its national
defense policy, Singapore declares that it will strengthen dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation with armed forces of countries within and outside Southeast Asia and promoting Total Defense\(^{216}\). Faced with the need to appropriately and flexibly respond to war, terrorism, peacekeeping activities, and humanitarian crises, Singapore is working on the transformation of the 3rd Generation Singapore Forces to implement effective responses with limited resources, and is striving to modernize equipment and enhance operational capabilities\(^{217}\).

Singapore is making aggressive efforts to modernize military equipment, including the earliest introduction in Southeast Asia of early-warning aircraft, air refueling tankers and a submarine rescue mother ship\(^{218}\). Regarding enhancement of operational capability, it conducts training by stationing its troops overseas on an ongoing basis to overcome constraints on training areas due to limited land space\(^{219}\).

Singapore makes efforts for regional cooperation based on friendly cooperative relations with other Southeast Asian countries, including the conclusion of defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region\(^{220}\). Also, aiming to contribute to the stability and development in the region, Singapore supports the United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 1990 permitting the United States to use military facilities in Singapore. This allows U.S. forces to promptly respond to emergencies in the Middle East and Africa. The United States ranks Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two countries signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security to further strengthen cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogues. In addition, in June 2011, at the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a policy to deploy U.S. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to Singapore.

Singapore has been actively participating in international peace cooperation activities as well. Though on a limited scale, in addition to U.N. peacekeeping operations, it has dispatched personnel, aircraft, and naval vessels to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden\(^{221}\).

2. Malaysia

Malaysia, surrounded by other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), considers that its strategic interests have close ties with those of countries in the region and that any threat to ASEAN or an ASEAN country is a threat to Malaysia\(^{222}\).

For this reason, Malaysia regards the strengthening of bilateral relations with neighboring countries, strengthening of ASEAN, cooperation with Islamic countries, South-South cooperation, and the upholding of the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.
Malaysia’s defense policy revolves around the fundamental principles of Self-Reliance, Regional Cooperation and Foreign Aid. Malaysia sets forth deterrence and Total Defense as their defense concepts and regards a strategy to repel aggression and the buildup of highly reliable military force as important and the involvement of not only the military but also all the people as necessary. Malaysia conducts bilateral military exercises and promotes military cooperation with other countries, including the United States, Australia, and India, but does not take part in multilateral exercises other than those under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), and maintains the national security system based on the FPDA.

Furthermore, like other Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia or the Philippines, Malaysia actively participates in U.N. peacekeeping activities, and has also sent its troops for antipiracy measures in the Gulf of Aden.

3. Indonesia

While there is a perception that within the next several years there is yet to be any indication of a conventional military threat from outside, the intensity of trans-national security threats has actually significantly increased in the past few years. Indonesia states that it treats non-military security issues as a part of national defense issues. To that end, Indonesia is promoting Total Defense through both military defense and non-military defense activities under the idea that all people utilizing all resources available, maintaining Indonesia’s independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unification. Furthermore, Indonesia is implementing military reform, which includes the prohibition of the involvement of military officers in politics and business activities, and the separation of military and police roles.

In foreign policy, Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other ASEAN states and pursues independent and proactive diplomacy as its basic idea.

In its diplomatic policy, Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries, and lays out as its basic principle the development of an independent and active foreign policy. In its national defense policy, Indonesia makes it clear that it does not leave the safety of the nation to another nation. However, Indonesia regards defense and military cooperation with the United States as significant for the development of the country’s defense force, not only for the interest of Indonesia but also for its regional security interest, and has strengthened cooperative relations with the United States in such fields as military education and training, and military equipment procurement in recent years.

Though International Military Education and Training (IMET) with the United States was temporarily suspended due to disputes over the activities of Indonesian forces in Timor-Leste, the United States in November 2005 decided to resume IMET and also decided to resume arms exports to Indonesia.

In January 2009, the Indonesia Navy Special Forces conducted a joint exercise with the United States,
and in June 2010, the two countries concluded the Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defense\textsuperscript{228}. In July the same year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Indonesia and held talks with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Minister of Defence Purnomo Yusgiantoro, where they agreed to strengthen military cooperation, including commencing cooperative initiatives with Indonesian army special force command (KOPASSUS). Indonesia believes that participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations promote Indonesia’s presence in the realm of international relations and is actively dispatching personnel to such activities\textsuperscript{229}.

4. Thailand

Under its flexible omnidirectional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States and China. Thailand’s national defense policy consists of the two elements of 1) enhancement of the defense capabilities of the armed forces, and coordination and integration with other government institutions; and 2) strengthening of security cooperation relationships with neighboring countries, the regional community, and the international community. On this basis, it has adopted the national defense strategy that revolves around the three pillars of Security Cooperation, United Defense, and Active Defense\textsuperscript{230}. Thailand is promoting close security cooperation with neighboring countries, the buildup of defense capabilities, and reform of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. Thailand believes that while risks of traditional threats such as a large-scale invasion have decreased, the risk of non-traditional threats such as international terrorism are on the rise, and in particular the insurgency in southern Thailand by separatists poses a national challenge going forward\textsuperscript{231}. Thailand also has border disputes with neighboring Myanmar and Cambodia, and the disputes occasionally heighten tensions between Thailand and Cambodia\textsuperscript{232}. The insurgency in the south is raising realistic concerns for Thailand, but in the area of build-up of defense capabilities, it is modernizing the armed forces centering on the naval and air forces and is the sole owner of an aircraft carrier in Southeast Asia\textsuperscript{233}.

With respect to relations with the United States, which serves as the core of security cooperation, Thailand believes the presence of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region provides security assurances for many countries as well as security concerns for some states\textsuperscript{234}. Thailand has established a good relationship with the United States by maintaining cooperation with the United States since the Cold War era. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and the United States maintained the cooperative relationship, and they have been conducting the joint military exercise Cobra Gold since 1982. Cobra Gold became a multinational exercise in 2000 and includes noncombat missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief\textsuperscript{235}.

In addition to U.N. peacekeeping operations, Thailand has been actively engaged in international peace cooperation activities, dispatching its troops to Iraq and Afghanistan\textsuperscript{236}. In 2003, the United States
designated Thailand as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)\textsuperscript{237} in appreciation of its proactive participation in the U.S.-led war on terror. In October 2010, Thailand also dispatched two naval vessels, for the first time, to the Coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden as part of counter-piracy measures\textsuperscript{238}.

5. Vietnam

In the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was the largest donor of assistance for Vietnam, and Russia owned a naval base in the Bay of Cam Ranh. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations, and established diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and states that it will actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries under its foreign policy principles of multilateral participation and respect for diversity. Based on its experiences with the independence war, Vietnam emphasizes that other countries must strictly respect its independence, national sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity, and declares that it will neither join any military alliance nor give any foreign country permission to have military bases in Vietnam. Vietnam advocates a posture of all-people national defense\textsuperscript{239}, and states that maintaining a peaceful and stable environment for socioeconomic development, achieving industrialization and modernization, and building a socialism-based market economy are its vital national interests and the objectives of its national defense policy.

Vietnam believes that a state of tension which may lead to armed conflict remains unsettled in Southeast Asia and that territorial disputes are becoming complicated; in particular, those relating to sovereignty and national interests in the South China Sea have been on the rise\textsuperscript{240}. Vietnam highly appreciates the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities, and insists that international cooperation in such areas as counterterrorism and the war against terror should be carried out within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

Vietnam has maintained close ties with Russia, particularly in the area of national defense since the Cold War era, and depends almost totally on Russia for its military equipment. In 2001, Vietnam and Russia signed the Joint Statement for a Strategic Partnership, and agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense.

Regarding relations with the United States, the two countries concluded an agreement on International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program in June 2005, and major progress was witnessed in bilateral military cooperation. After 2006, many U.S. defense-related personnel, including the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, frequently visited Vietnam, and in April 2007, the United States partially lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam\textsuperscript{241}. In August 2010, in commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the U.S. guided missile destroyer USS John S. McCain made a port call at Vietnam, and the first vice-ministerial
level defense dialogue was also held. Furthermore, in October the same year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates visited Vietnam for the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus, and met with Minister of Defense Phung Quang Thanh.

6. The Philippines

The Philippines perceives terrorism by domestic anti-government armed groups as the most serious threat to national security. Since 2004, the country has been implementing reform programs in the areas of defense planning, improvement of operational and training capabilities, reform of military structures and modernization of forces in accordance with a defense reform program called the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR).

The Philippines and the United States have a history of a close relationship and maintain a long-standing, tight military cooperation relationship. The two countries maintain the cooperative relationship, with the continuation of the mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the eviction of U.S. forces in 1992. The two countries have been conducting the large-scale annual joint military exercise Balikatan since 2000 with the aim of improving combat readiness and interoperability. The Philippines and the United States have also conducted other joint exercises, including Balance Piston and Talon Vision. The United States designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). In January 2011, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell visited the Philippines and held the first Bilateral Strategic Dialogues. At the Foreign Ministerial Meeting held between two countries in June 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton urged all involved countries to exercise self-restraint on the basis of recent incidents in the South China Sea, and underscored U.S. commitment to Philippines’ defense.

3. Military Modernization in the Region

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have been modernizing their militaries against a backdrop of economic development and other factors.

In May 2009, Singapore took the first delivery of four U.S.-made F-15 fighters for the detachments in Idaho, United States. Singapore plans to have a total of 24 F-15 fighter jets, all of which are scheduled to be delivered by 2012. Singapore has also participated in the joint development program of the F-35 fighter, the first Asian country to do so.

As for the naval strength of Singapore, all six French-made Formidable-class frigates with stealth capability were commissioned in 2009. Singapore also purchased two secondhand Swedish-made submarines in 2005; the first submarine was launched in 2009, while the second submarine was launched in 2010.
Malaysia started introducing Russian-made Su-30 fighters from 2007, and the delivery of all 18 of them was completed in 2009. As for naval strength, Malaysia’s first submarine (the Scorpene-class submarine jointly developed by France and Spain) was commissioned in January 2009, and a second one in November 2009. The six German-made Kedah-class corvettes ordered in 2000 were all commissioned in 2010.

Indonesia introduced five each of Russian-made Su-27 and Su-30 fighters by 2000. Regarding naval strength, in 2009, Indonesia completed the commissioning of four Dutch-made Sigma-class corvettes. In addition, in September 2007, Indonesia agreed with Russia to strengthen military technological and defense cooperation, and signed an agreement to purchase $1 billion worth of Russian-made weapons with government loans. The agreement reportedly covers such weapons as two Kilo-class submarines.

Thailand in 2007 decided to purchase Swedish-made JAS-39 fighters as well as two aircraft with early-warning systems. Of these, the initial six JAS-39 fighters were delivered in February 2011. Thailand does not own any submarines at present, but it is reported to have started considering the purchase of a submarine.

Vietnam purchased four Su-30 fighters in 2004, and there are reports that the country is making an additional purchase of the fighter jet. In December 2009, Vietnam was reported to have concluded a contract to purchase six Kilo-class submarines from Russia. In March 2011, it was reported that one of the two Gepard-class frigates, under the building agreement concluded with Russia in 2006, was commissioned.

Many Southeast Asian countries have expanded the growth of their defense spending in recent years, and this is considered one of factors that make the modernization of military equipment possible. Aside from this factor, there are views that sensitive relations among Southeast Asian countries to the military buildup, the growing influence of China, and the limited effectiveness of the regional security institutions as a confidence-building measure, are behind the ongoing military modernization in Southeast Asia.

4. Trends concerning the South China Sea

In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries and China over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands. In addition, there has been growing concern among the international community in recent years over issues such as the freedom of navigation in the Sea.

Although China had initially pressed for bilateral negotiations on the abovementioned issues, signs emerged to suggest that the related countries were taking steps toward the peaceful resolution of these issues. In November 2002, at the Summit Meeting between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, participants signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”, which aims for a peaceful resolution of the territorial issues. At the ASEAN-China Summit held in October 2010, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to fully and effectively implement the Declaration.
and work towards the eventual adoption, on the basis of consensus, of the “Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.” China has also actively pushed the related countries to give priority to the resource development in the waters surrounding the islands, setting aside the territorial issue.

On the other hand, with regard to the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, there is an increase in activities by the surrounding countries aimed at territorial claims, as well as movements in protest of these territorial issues. In 2010, it was reported that China had positioned the South China Sea as its “core national interest,” and it was also pointed out that conflicts with surrounding countries arising from tightened monitoring activities by China’s law enforcement agencies. The respective countries have also stated their views on the South China Sea issue; for instance, at the press conference held after the ARF ministerial meetings in July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke about the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. In addition, at the First ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting - Plus (ADMM-Plus) held in October the same year, the respective countries spoke about their wishes for a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue. In the joint declaration of the 5th ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting held in May 2011, the South China Sea issue was brought up for the first time, and the full execution of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the promotion of formulation processes for the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, as well as the importance of the freedom of navigation, were incorporated. The South China Sea issue is considered to have a potential impact on the peace and stability of the regional and international community, and attention will continue to be paid to trends in the countries concerned as well as the direction of dialogues aimed at resolution of the issue.

5. Regional Cooperation

Southeast Asian nations utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework for the region. In addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a dialogue forum on the political and security sectors in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) has been held annually since 2006. Furthermore, at the 13th ASEAN Summit in 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted, containing the basic principles for establishing the ASEAN Community by 2015, and entered into force in December 2008 after the completion of the ratification procedures of all member states. At the 15th ASEAN Summit held in October 2009, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was formally established, underscoring steady progress toward the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015. ASEAN places importance on developing relations with non-ASEAN member states. Besides holding leaders summits with the United States and Russia in 2010, it also held the First ADMM Plus in October the same year. This was an expanded version of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, comprising ADMM members, Japan, and eight new non-ASEAN countries. ASEAN is keeping up its efforts to strengthen relation with countries outside the region.
In the Southeast Asian region, multilateral cooperation is being promoted in frameworks other than ASEAN as well, in order to deal with a wide variety of security issues such as transnational problems including terrorism and piracy. The main counter-piracy measures taken in this region includes the “Malacca Straits Patrols” carried out by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand\(^{261}\). In addition, the “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia” (ReCAAP) proposed and led by Japan took effect in 2006, and advancements are being made toward the sharing of information related to piracy and the establishment of cooperative systems\(^{262}\).

Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have conducted joint exercises including maritime interdiction training within the framework of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA).

6. Regional issues

Even amidst the developing cooperative relations among countries in the region, the South China Sea remains an unstable element in the region.

The situation continues to be tense in the area near the Preah Vihear Temple, the world heritage site located between Cambodia and Thailand, where national boundaries are undefined. In response to gunfights that occurred in the area in February 2011, the two countries agreed to the deployment of observers led by Indonesia, the chair of ASEAN. However, large-scale clashes broke out again in April, and negotiations aimed at conflict resolution continued to be fraught with difficulties. Thereafter, although the problem between the two countries was discussed at the ASEAN Summit held in May 2011, the issue was scheduled to be judged at the International Court of Justice as the two countries failed to reach an agreement on their claims.

In the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an anti-government Islamic group that has been fighting over a span of 40 years, agreed to a ceasefire in 2003. In 2004, through the efforts of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), a peace process was set in motion. However, after August 2008, military clashes once again intensified over the resolution of territorial issues, and IMT’s activities were suspended in November the same year. Thereafter, peace negotiations began afresh in December 2009, and at the end of February 2010, IMT\(^{263}\) activities resumed in Mindanao. Nevertheless, a peace agreement was never realized under the previous Arroyo administration. Under the Aquino administration as well, after March 2011, peace negotiations have been under way, and it is hoped that a final Mindanao peace agreement will be achieved at an early date\(^{264}\).

Section 6. South Asia

1. India
1. General Situation

India is surrounded by many countries and has long coastlines totaling 7,600km. The country has the world’s second largest population of more than 1.2 billion following China and has great influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographic position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. India is expected to play an important role in maritime security.

India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, languages and cultures within it, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world’s largest democratic country. Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and systems, such as liberalism, democracy and a market economy.


India, as its national security policies, lists the possession of military capabilities to protect national interests and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism and low-intensity conflicts to conventional wars and nuclear wars; and enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

In fact, India actively participates in peace-building assistance, including U.N. peacekeeping operations. As of May 2011, about 8,500 personnel are involved in nine peacekeeping operations. India has been sending naval vessels off the coast of Somalia to conduct coast guard surveillance operations against piracy since October 2008.

India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use on nuclear weapons and maintaining the unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test conducted in 1998. In addition, in its nuclear doctrine released in January 2003, India expressed its commitment to continuing export controls of nuclear weapons and missile-related materials and technologies, and participating in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, as well as to creating a nuclear-free world. However, the doctrine declares that India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India by biological or chemical weapons.

The Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 13 corps with approximately 1.13 million personnel; naval forces of two fleets of about 160 warships, totaling approximately 360,000 tons, and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 810 combat aircraft.

India is expanding the procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development.
with them as the Russian and former Soviet equipment which comprises 70% of its arsenal becomes obsolete. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier and plans to introduce one aircraft carrier from Russia, which is currently being repaired at the end of 2012, while it also plans to deploy in 2014 one domestic aircraft carrier, currently under construction. In July 2009, India’s first domestic nuclear submarine was launched. Further, it is reported that one Russian Akula-class nuclear submarine would be supplied to India. In addition, in conjunction with the retirement of the now-degraded MiG-21 fighter-interceptors, India is planning to procure 126 multipurpose fighter-interceptors through bidding and is currently working on the selection of an appropriate model. As the first step to jointly develop and produce fifth-generation fighter jets with Russia, the country also signed an agreement on their prototype design in December 2010.

India is currently building up a ballistic missile that could load a nuclear warhead. In September 2003, India announced that it would operationally deploy the Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile with the army. In February 2010, it succeeded in the fourth test launch of the Agni-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile and it is reported that India had begun development of the Agni-5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

India is working toward the practical use of ballistic missile defense as a defensive measure to threats against the homeland. In November 2006, it tested its capability to intercept ballistic missiles for the first time, and in March 2011, another ballistic missile interceptor test was conducted, which is reported to be a success. The country has started negotiations with the United States on its ballistic missile defense system.

(See Fig. 1-2-6-1)

3. Foreign Policies

(1) Basic Posture

India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s, and is actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy, thereby steadily increasing its presence in the international community. India’s rapid expansion of military cooperation with friendly nations not only strengthens the security environment of the South Asia region, but also is expected to enhance security worldwide. In recent years, India has been making efforts to expand military exchanges, such as by conducting joint exercises with various other countries and acquiring related technologies through the military cooperation with various countries supported by its recent economic growth.
(2) Relations with the United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, while the United States is also promoting the expansion of involvement in India in line with the economic growth of India, thus leading to increasingly stronger mutual relationships in various fields.

In March 2006, then President Bush visited India for the first time in six years as an American president and agreed with Indian Prime Minister Singh to enhance its strategic relations with India. In July 2009, Secretary of State Clinton visited India to meet Foreign Minister Krishna and start U.S.-India strategic dialogues covering such broad areas as the prevention of nuclear proliferation and global warming initiatives. In November 2009, Prime Minister Singh made an official visit to the United States, announcing with President Obama a joint statement reconfirming the global strategic partnership between the two countries and promoting security and anti-terrorism measures on a global scale. In July 2010, Foreign Minister Krishna visited the United States, making the first India-U.S. strategic dialogue with Secretary of State Clinton and agreeing to enhance antiterrorism collaboration. President Obama also made an official visit to India in November 2010 to meet with Prime Minister Singh.

As for cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, in October 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

In the security field, in June 2005, then Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee and then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year military agreement called the New Framework for the U.S.–India Defense Relationship, based on the recognition that the U.S.–India defense relationship is an important pillar in the mutually beneficial relations between the two countries, which are changing over time. In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its intention to enhance cooperation with India on security issues, including maritime security. Secretary of Defense Gates visited India in January 2010, following his visit to the country in February 2008, for talks with Prime Minister Singh and Defense Minister Antony to discuss antiterrorism measures, India–Pakistan relations, the problem of Afghanistan, and overall regional security.

India and the United States have carried out active military exchanges, including joint military exercises. “Yudh Abhyas 2009” joint training exercises were carried out in India in October 2009 with participation by Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers from the United States to train soldiers for anti-terrorism operations. “Habu Nag” joint amphibious exercises were conducted in the East China Sea from September to October in 2010, and “Malabar 11” joint navy exercises were held in April 2011.

India has expressed an interest in U.S. weapons. India has already purchased a used amphibious ship and C-130 transport aircraft from the United States and signed an agreement to purchase P-8 patrol aircraft and C-17 transport aircraft in 2009 and in November 2010, respectively.
(3) Relations with China

India has been trying to improve relations with China through mutual visits by leaders despite the Tibet issue and unresolved national border issues between the two countries, as well as concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and the modernization of its military force, including naval forces. When then Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited India in March 2004, the two countries agreed on the expansion of military exchanges. Subsequently in December 2004, based on this agreement, a visit to China by an Indian Chief of Army Staff was made for the first time in 10 years. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two countries reached an agreement on establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity. In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India, the first time in 10 years that a Chinese president had done so, and met with Indian Prime Minister Singh. Both agreed that the development of a strategic and cooperative partnership between China and India is commonly recognized as an important issue and announced a joint declaration that includes holding regular summit meetings. In April 2010, Indian Prime Minister Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao met through the BRICs Summit Meeting and confirmed their efforts to resolve pending issues related to their borders. In December 2010, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited India to meet Prime Minister Singh, reaching an agreement on creating a mechanism for periodical mutual visiting of top-ranking government official for establishment of a strategic and collaborative partnership. In January 2010, the third China-India Defense and Security Consultation, a vice ministerial meeting, was held in Beijing, which celebrated the 60th anniversary of their bilateral relations and led to an agreement to further promote mutual trust and collaboration.

The two countries conducted joint anti-terrorism exercises in December 2007 and December 2008 as a military exchange. Meanwhile, some pundits point out that their relations have been soiled and less active since then, based on such incidents as the Chinese government rejecting the issuance of a visa to an Indian general and India implementing joint military exercises with the United States from September to October in 2010.

(4) Relations with Russia

India has maintained a close relationship with Russia through mutual visits made annually by both leaders and the signing of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership. In December 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Russia for talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In addition to a joint statement by the leaders of both countries, agreements were signed including an intergovernmental agreement regarding cooperation in military technology.
Russia is the main supplier of weapons to India, and the two countries have worked together on the introduction of T-90 tanks and the joint development of supersonic cruise missiles. In January 2004, then Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov visited India, and concluded a sales contract for a retired Russian aircraft carrier, “Admiral Gorshkov.” In January 2007 as well, then Minister of Defense Ivanov visited India and held talks on topics such as military technological cooperation and joint exercises. In March 2010, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited India. During the visit, he concluded a purchase contract for 29 MiG-29K field-carriers, and held talks on the joint development of multi-role transport aircraft. In December the same year, President Dmitry Medvedev visited India and signed a preliminary design contract for fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

The two countries also have conducted joint military exercises since 2003.

(5) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

Since the latter half of the 1990s, India has been emphasizing relations with East Asian countries, including the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In October 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in Southeast Asia.

2. Pakistan

1. General Situation

Pakistan, with approximately 170 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Since Pakistan borders Afghanistan and in the past the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, Pakistan’s attitude towards the international fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting increasing international attention.

The military government established by General Pervez Musharraf (then Chief of Army Staff) who effected a military coup d’état in October 1999 came to an end after nine years and Asif Ali Zardari was elected President in September 2008. However, soon after his inauguration, President Zardari faced difficulties controlling the government, being stuck between the war on terror led by the United States and the acts of retaliatory terrorism stemming from anti-U.S. sentiment being carried out by armed groups in the country. A major cleanup operation was launched in October 2009 against Islamist insurgents in the South Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the northwest of the country and it has been reported that several insurgent bases have been neutralized. Furthermore, in the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Orakzai as well, it was announced that a large-scale cleanup operation was
launched in March 2010, and the military campaign was declared a success in June the same year. On the other hand, there has also been an increase in the incidence of terrorism deemed as retaliatory attacks, and many citizens have been sacrificed as a result. In May 2011, the U.S. forces killed Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda hiding in Abbottabad near the Pakistani capital Islamabad. There have been reports that this has put Pakistan in a predicament; between the U.S. which alleges a supporting network inside Pakistan, the citizens who react sharply against the U.S. operation as the infringement of their sovereignty, and terrorist attacks in retaliation for Bin Laden’s killing.

2. National Defense Policy

Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. The Pakistan Armed Forces include ground forces of nine corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 40 warships, totaling approximately 86,000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 470 combat aircraft.

In recent years, Pakistan has been actively proceeding with development of a ballistic missile capable of mating with a nuclear warhead and cruise missiles. Pakistan first test-launched the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile in August 2005. From January to February 2008, in exercises of the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Strategic Missile Group (SMG), following actions in 2006, it consecutively conducted test launches of various intermediate-range ballistic missiles it owns, including the “Ghauri (Hatf-V)” and the “Shaheen 1 (Hatf-IV)”. And in March 2004, the test launch of the intermediate-range ballistic missile “Shaheen 2 (Hatf-VI)” was conducted. This seems to demonstrate that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic missiles to its forces.

(See Fig. 1-2-6-1)

3. Foreign Policies

(1) Relations with India

India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India after World War II, have had three large armed conflicts over the Kashmir territorial issue and others. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has continued, with dialogues repeatedly resumed and suspended, and it constitutes one of the root causes of confrontation between India and Pakistan.

However, in February 2004, “multiple dialogues” for the normalization of relations between the two countries, including on the Kashmir issue, were initiated. Although definite progress had been seen in the bilateral relationship before this time, no fundamental solutions to the issues were in place and relations
between the two countries had become tense again after the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Later efforts of the international community, led by the United States, served to put a hold on any further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India and Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gillani of Pakistan met for talks in Egypt while attending the Non-Aligned Movement summit in July 2009, where they issued a joint statement and agreed in principle to restart the multiple dialogues to discuss the outstanding issues which had been stopped since the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Following this, in February 2010, a vice-ministerial meeting was held for the first time in one and a half year in New Delhi, where it was agreed to continue contact. Following that, in April the same year a summit meeting was held, in July a foreign ministerial meeting, and in February 2011 a vice-ministerial meeting of foreign affairs, and both countries agreed to restart dialogues toward all the outstanding issues.

(2) Relations with other countries

Pakistan, while attaching importance to friendship and cooperation with Islamic countries, maintains close relations with China as a countermeasure against India. In October 2008, President Zardari visited China and held talks with President Hu Jintao, allowing both leaders to reach a consensus to raise the strategic partnership to a new level. In December 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan and held talks with Prime Minister Gilani, during which they concurred on deepening and strengthening the strategic partnership. In July 2009, Pakistan commenced production of the JF-17 fighters jointly developed by the two countries; in November the same year, the first fighter was delivered to the Pakistan Air Force. In November 2010, it was reported that the first Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) had been delivered from China to the Pakistan Air Force.

After the 9/11 terrorist incident, Pakistan declared that it would cooperate with the United States and other countries on counterterrorism efforts. Its cooperative stance was accorded with international regard, and sanctions imposed by the United States as a result of the 1998 nuclear tests were lifted. Military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has been strengthened against the backdrop of counterterrorism efforts. In March 2005, the United States decided on the sale of F-16 fighters to Pakistan, which it had blocked for more than 20 years. In June 2010, the first three units of the 18 fighters under the sale contract were delivered. In March 2007, then President George W. Bush visited Pakistan. He expressed his appreciation for Pakistan’s support on counter-terrorism efforts, and affirmed its intentions to promote sharing of terrorism-related information between the two countries in the future. In January 2010, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Pakistan and held talks with President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, and Chief of Army Staff Kayani. They reviewed the United States’ strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and discussed Pakistan’s role in the strategy. In March the same year, Minister of Foreign Affairs Qureshi held a first Strategic Dialogue with U.S. Secretary of State Clinton in
Washington. The second Strategic Dialogue held in Islamabad in July while the third was held in Washington in October the same year. During these dialogues, the United States affirmed its continued support for Pakistan, while Pakistan affirmed its continued commitment toward counterterrorism efforts. However, in relation to the U.S. Forces’ killing of Osama bin Laden, there have also been reports of a deepening mutual distrust between the United States and the Pakistan because the United States had failed to inform the Pakistan of the implementation of the operation before hand, while the United States pointed out that a support network had existed in Pakistan\(^{312}\).

With regard to Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation issues, in February 2004, then President Musharraf announced the involvement of some Pakistani scientists, including Dr. A.Q. Khan, in nuclear proliferation activities. However, the Pakistan Government denied any involvement on this issue\(^{313}\).

Section 7. Australia

1. General Situation

Australia shares basic values with Japan such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy, and is allied with the United States as are Japan and the Republic of Korea. Although the main focus is on neighboring regions such as Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, Australia has been broadly and actively involved in resolving international security issues such as the problem in Afghanistan.

2. Security and National Defense Policy

In May 2009, Australia released the defense white paper titled “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030\(^{114}\)” for the first time in the nine years since 2000, which presented national defense policies for the period through to 2030, based on a strategic outlook for the future. The white paper states that Australia has strategic interests in (1) the defense of Australia against direct armed attack; (2) the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood, which Australia shares with Indonesia, New Zealand, and other countries; (3) the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean; and (4) preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.

It is stated that the defense policy should be founded on the principle of self-reliance in direct defense and in relation to the country’s unique strategic interests, but with a capacity to do more when required, consistent with those strategic interests that Australia might share with others, and within the limits of its resources. This defense policy means that Australia must have the military capacity to 1) act
independently where Australia has unique strategic interests at stake, and in relation to which it would not wish to be reliant on the combat forces of any foreign power; 2) lead military coalitions where Australia has shared strategic interests at stake with others, and in relation to which it would be willing to accept a leadership role; and 3) make tailored contributions to military coalitions where Australia shares wider strategic interests with others and is willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests.

It then gives priorities to the tasks of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as follows: 1) to deter and defeat attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries; 2) to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; 3) to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region; and 4) to contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world.

In order to carry out these tasks, the ADF will need to be more potent in certain areas, particularly undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surface maritime warfare, air superiority, strategic strike, special forces, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and cyber warfare. Specifically, Australia intends to acquire 12 new future submarines, three new air warfare destroyers (AWD), around 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) and maritime-based land-attack cruise missiles. The Government is committed to providing 1) an average of 3% real growth per year in underlying defense funding to 2017–2018 and 2) 2.2% real growth in underlying funding from 2018–2019 to 2029–2030. In June 2011, Minister for Defence Stephen Smith announced that the Government will undertake a Force Posture Review to assess whether the Australian Defence Force is correctly geographically positioned to meet Australia’s modern and future strategic and security challenges.

3. Relationship with Other Countries

Australia attaches importance to its alliance with the United States and intends to strengthen cooperation through security policies with neighboring countries in order to maintain the stability of the region.

1. Relations with the United States

Australia recognizes that the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region relies significantly on the presence of the United States, and emphasizes the importance of its alliance with the United States based on the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS Treaty). Australia stresses the importance of the alliance as a reason for the Australian military’s activities in Afghanistan. The close alliance is being maintained by taking part in the review of U.S. strategy regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a series of discussions for the preparation of the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), a cabinet-level meeting of foreign and defense ministers, have been held annually. In the AUSMIN held in November
2010, the both countries reaffirmed the importance of the Australia-U.S. alliance and shared challenges such as in Afghanistan. The two countries also agreed to strengthen cooperation concerning the new security challenges such as space surveillance and cyber security. It was also agreed to establish a new force posture working group to discuss issues regarding the force posture of both countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As well as carrying out joint training exercises including “Talismen Saber” both nations are making efforts to improve interoperability for cooperation on humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions. In addition to participating in the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project, Australia intends to cooperate in missile defense. Furthermore, they are promoting cooperation in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), military satellite communications and intelligence.

2. Relations with China

Australia understands that China possesses strategic influence that extends beyond East Asia, and that U.S.–China relations are the most important factor for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia understands that China’s increased defense spending due to economic growth, if not explained, has the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern, and China is facing pressure for transparency. With this understanding, Australia is carrying out Australia–China Strategic Defense Dialogues regularly to further mutual understanding and cooperation in common areas of interest. Further, exchanges are being carried out to develop Australia–China defense relations including mutual port visits by naval vessels. In September 2010, joint training exercises were performed between warships of the Royal Australian Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy, including live-fire training, helicopter operations and search and rescue training.

3. Relations with Southeast Asian countries

Australia emphasizes cooperation with the various countries of Southeast Asia to fight terrorism and crime in the region, and engages in security related cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Australia sees Indonesia as having the most important defense relations in neighboring regions. Given the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005 and the terrorist bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, Australia has deepened counterterrorism cooperation and the two countries concluded a framework agreement regarding security cooperation which described cooperation across a wide range of defense relationships in November 2006. Also, in January 2009, the two countries signed the Australia Indonesia Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation which focuses on counterterrorism, maritime security, intelligence, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping. Australia is also carrying out combined and joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore regarding
non-traditional security challenges such as maritime security, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief, as well as working to expand the ability to cope with traditional threats, under the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) framework.\[^{335}\]

**4. Relations with other countries**

In January 2011, Australia held the third Australia-United Kingdom Ministerial Dialogue (AUKMIN), a cabinet-level meeting of foreign and defense ministers, following the previous meetings in 2006 and 2008. In the AUKMIN 2011 Joint Communiqué, the two countries reaffirmed the necessity, from the perspective of counterterrorism, of continued support for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in which both are involved, and agreed to develop their cooperative relationship in regard to cyber security. They are also strengthening their traditional bilateral relationship making the cabinet-level meeting a regular basis.

**4. Overseas Activities**

Australia identifies the security, stability, and cohesion of the neighboring region as one of its strategic interests; fragile states in the neighboring region are potential havens for criminals and terrorists, and domestic conflicts would inflict considerable damage on the regional community, including Australia. Thus, Australia is committed to contributing to regional stability by providing active support, including the deployment of military forces.\[^{336}\]

If the Australian government decides that it is in Australia’s wider strategic interests to undertake operations in the Middle East or other remote regions, Australia would do so only after the Government has satisfied itself that its forces have the necessary environment to ensure the success of the operations with minimum risk to the deployed forces.\[^{337}\]

Based on this policy, Australia is deploying about 3,000 personnel abroad out of its 57,000-strong force\[^{338}\] mainly in the following areas.\[^{339}\]

**1. Timor-Leste**

Australia has actively supported the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the independence movement gained momentum there. The ADF leads the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), and about 400 troops are working with about 80 New Zealand troops.\[^{340}\]

**2. Solomon Islands**

Australia has actively supported the stability and development of the Solomon Islands since ethnic
disputes intensified there in the late 1990s. The operation has been led by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since July 2003. About 80 ADF troops comprise the military component of RAMSI together with the forces of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, and engage in providing security for RAMSI’s multinational Participation Police Force.

3. Afghanistan

Australia announced its support for the United States immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 under the U.S.–Australia alliance, and dispatched its troops to Afghanistan in October 2001. Australia is participating as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the aim to prevent the proliferation of terrorism and to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists by providing support to enable Afghanistan to become a peaceful and stable country. Additional units were deployed in July 2009, and currently an approximate 1,550 troops are engaged in reconstruction support activities in Uruzgan Province and the training of Afghan security forces. Further, approximately an additional 830 troops are operating around the region in support of the Afghanistan mission. The Gillard administration has expressed a commitment to maintain the Australian military presence in Afghanistan.

Section 8. Europe

1. General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared and regard an outbreak of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), increasing threats in the cyberspace, and other developments as new security challenges. To adapt to new and emerging threats, Europe has sought to stabilize the security environment primarily by strengthening and expanding the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 28 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). Moreover, many European countries are proceeding with the development of their own capacity to cope with these new challenges, taking into consideration their increasingly tough financial limitations.

2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks

1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions
(1) Development of a system necessary for a new role

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has been shifting the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. This shift requires forces that can be quickly deployed to distant areas to perform a wide range of missions and fight new threats such as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. For this purpose, NATO has transformed its military capabilities through the organizational reform and the development of the NRF.

In the NATO Summit Meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept for the first time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next 10 years for a reform towards a more effective and flexible alliance. The document created by NATO lists the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles, terrorism, instability or conflict beyond NATO borders, and cyber attacks as examples of major threats, defining three items as core tasks of NATO: 1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which forms the basis for NATO, 2) management of developing crises before they escalate into conflicts and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations 3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

In the area of collective defense, NATO has emphasized the importance of deterrence, based on an approximate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, defined the so-called territorial missile defense capability as the core element of collective defense to protect NATO citizens and territories from ballistic missile attacks, and clarified its intention to further develop its ability to defend against cyber-attacks and international terrorism with more consultations with its partners. In the area of crisis management, lessons learned from NATO operations in particular in Afghanistan and the West Balkans make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. NATO will enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum, and will develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones. As for nuclear policies by NATO, it has shown its strong stance for nuclear disarmament to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in the context of collaborative security. On the other hand, the organization states that as long as nuclear weapons exist from the perspective of traditional collective defense, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. This stance shows that NATO has balanced between the maintenance of a strong alliance and the requirement for nuclear disarmament.

The Lisbon Declaration adopted at the same time as the new Strategic Concept states that NATO will conduct further work on multinational approaches and other innovative ways of cost effective capability development and has tasked the Secretary General to take forward the reform process. It is necessary to continue to watch how the reform will develop in the future.

On the other hand, the EU tries to enhance its initiatives in security under the strategy of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)\textsuperscript{353}. The first security document adopted in 2003, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” says that the EU will enhance its capabilities to deal with new threats, and will make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighborhood, and will build an international order based on effective multilateralism by working with the United States and other partner countries as well as international organizations including the United Nations, NATO, and the African Union (AU)\textsuperscript{354}.

Furthermore, unlike NATO, the EU does not assume the mission of defending its member states; however, it has been strengthening cooperation with NATO and working on the development of a system necessary in order to conduct military activities of its own, such as peacekeeping, in cases where NATO does not interfere\textsuperscript{355}. In January 2007, the EU established its own operations center in Brussels and a posture was prepared to have two battle groups in a permanent state of readiness. In November 2009, the EU adopted the “Ministerial Declaration: ESDP Ten Years—Challenges and Opportunities” and demonstrated a policy of improving effectiveness, and flexibility for the operation of the battle group limited to emergency operations was expressed to strengthen EU defensive capability while working to improve operational planning and direction capability.

With the Lisbon Treaty, the new fundamental EU treaty, coming into force in December 2009, the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy\textsuperscript{356} was established. In December 2010, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created to assist this position\textsuperscript{357}. The EU leverages the new external policy organization to keep consistency between the policies of the EU and its member states and to create more integrated approaches enabling synergy effects.

(See Fig. I-2-8-1)

(2) Commitment to a New Role

NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003, which marked its first operation outside Europe, and the NATO-led ISAF mission expanded its presence in October 2006 to cover the whole country. In November 2009, the ISAF was reformed, with the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in charge of daily maintenance of security and reconstruction assistance and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) training and assisting Afghanistan national forces and police. The NATO Summit Meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010 enabled the heads of states from 48 countries contributing to the ISAF to agree to continue their support in line with the schedule to start the transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership and to complete the process by the end of 2014, based on the result of the Kabul conference on Afghanistan held in July 2010\textsuperscript{358}. NATO acknowledged that the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan have a strategic importance to the North Atlantic region and declared that the organization will keep its long-term partnership with Afghanistan.

Based on the agreement reached at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the NATO Training
Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) is training the Iraqi security forces in Iraq, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been implementing its missions since June 1999, by maintaining security in Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008.

NATO has been implementing Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) since October 2001 based on its determination to maintain its solidarity for the war on terror and to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activities in the Mediterranean area. For this purpose, the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG), composed of navy forces of member states, has been delivering on its responsibilities activities such as, monitoring shipping, providing escorts to non-military ships and boarding any suspect ships. In addition, various European countries have actively been engaged in anti-piracy activities off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

Since October 2008, NATO has deployed SNMG ships for anti-piracy activities off the Coast of Somalia, dispatching two fleets, SNMG1 and SNMG2, one after another to the area off the Coast of Somalia. It has also shoulder the responsibility to assist in the development of capacity to combat piracy activities for requesting countries since August 2009, based on Operation Ocean Shield. The EU has been engaged in Operation Atlanta against pirates off the Coast of Somalia, its first maritime mission, since December 2008, deploying vessels and aircraft. The dispatched vessels and aircraft are engaged in escorting ships on which the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) transport assistance materials such as food, etc. and surveillance activities in the waters.

The EU led peacekeeping operations in Macedonia in 2003 for the first time using NATO’s equipment and capabilities. The EU also conducted its first peacekeeping operations outside Europe without utilizing NATO’s equipment and capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. In December 2004, the EU took over the mission of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), which had been operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and sent troops to Chad and Central Africa in January 2008. These operations represent the EU’s proactive involvement in risk management/maintenance of security.

(See Fig. I-2-8-2)

2. Geographical Expansion of Security Frameworks and Partnership

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework.

NATO states in the new Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010, that the door to NATO membership is fully open to all European nations, which share its values. It has also deployed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) targeted for improved trust and interoperability with non-NATO states, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) oriented for the stability in the Mediterranean area, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) allowing for better security cooperation with Middle Eastern nations. The organization has gone beyond these existing initiatives and started to enhance its partnership with nations.
inside and outside its area and with international organizations including the UN and the EU by establishing relations similar to the ones established with the so-called contact countries\(^\text{369}\), which includes Australia, Japan, and the ROK.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia have sought to improve relations, and established the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 in light of the need to deal with common issues concerning security. NATO and Russia have continued to pursue dialogue and cooperation in areas such as anti-terrorism efforts, arms control, and theater missile defense. While the NATO–Russia dialogue was temporarily suspended after the Georgia conflict in August 2008, at the NATO summit in April 2009 it was agreed to resume the official NRC to include the cabinet level talks, and the foreign minister level NRC was resumed in June of the same year. The NRC Summit Meeting\(^\text{370}\) held in Lisbon in November 2010 announced a joint statement to establish a true strategic and modernised partnership, based on the agreement on the pursuit of cooperation in missile defense\(^\text{371}\), the expansion of assistance to Afghanistan, and the resumption of assistance to Operation Active Endeavor (OAE).

The number of EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is also expanding, with the accession of 10 countries in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007.

(See Fig. I-2-8-3)

3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Situations

Many countries in Europe are making efforts to reduce their defense budget with their financial situations becoming increasingly difficult. They work on the modernization of their military capabilities and reduce their quantity, and implement their rationalization, and aggressively trying to cooperate with other countries in the areas of defense and security, especially through joint research/development/procurement of weapons and joint operations\(^\text{372}\). The United Kingdom and France signed a bilateral treaty on defense and security cooperation and another treaty relating to a joint nuclear facility based on the summit meeting held in London in November 2010\(^\text{373}\), reaching an agreement on jointly developing a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) as a non-standing bilateral capability, deploying a UK-French integrated carrier group incorporating assets owned by both countries, and creating joint assistance plans based on A400M transport aircraft and related joint exercises, and promoting joint research and development of equipment including unmanned aircraft and next-generation nuclear submarines. These initiatives implemented by each country to reform defense and military organizations, combined with bilateral and multilateral approaches, are going to be what is needed for further study in the future.

1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has maintained the perception that it is not subject to any direct military threats after the end of the Cold War. In particular, the country regards international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as major threats and has reformed its military organization to improve its overseas deployment capability and readiness. The first whole of government approach “National Security Strategy (NSS)” of the United Kingdom, announced in March 2008, has highlighted the importance of a holistic approach to work on transnational crimes, pandemics, flooding, and other multiple interrelated risks and threats along with terrorism and the spread of WMD at an early stage, through the collaboration with military and police organizations as well as the private sector, local governments, and multinational organizations including the UN, EU and NATO.

The Cameron administration, formed in May 2010, has aimed to develop coherent defense capability and a sustainable defense programme for the future, as it has been faced with the fatigue of its military organizations due to prolonged operations in Afghanistan and an increasing demand for reducing its defense budget due to worsening financial status. It implemented the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) under the newly-established National Security Council (NSC) and announced the results of its operations together with the new NSS in October 2010.

The new British NSS identified the full range of potential risks which might materialize over a 5 and 20 years horizon, based on their likelihood and impact and defined four items, including international terrorism, attacks upon UK cyberspace, major accident or natural hazard, and international crisis as risks to be of highest priority. The SDSR has studied the restrictions related to its missions in Afghanistan and the British national defense budget, proposing what should be an ideal status of the British forces in 2020, reducing the workload of its soldiers based on mobile and flexible troop formation and deployment schemes, decreasing military capabilities and major equipment, and revisiting its procurement plan.

The UK, though it has continued to maintain its minimum deterrence through nuclear capability based on its nuclear submarines in the area of nuclear strategy, it has announced its intention not to use nuclear weapons toward non-nuclear-weapon states adhering to the NPT while reducing the maximum level of its nuclear arsenal, based on its long-term objective to create a world without nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence has put into effect the Defence Reform Review since August 2010 with the aims of creating a more simpler and more effective Defense organization, and to significantly reduce the running costs of the Defense. The focus is put on the three areas, policy and strategy, the Armed Forces, acquisition and estates, and on streamlining the Ministry of Defence and enhancing accountability and transparency. The review was carried out under the Defence Reform Steering Group comprised of public and private sector experts, and the Review was released in June 2011.

2. Germany
Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction in its military personnel since the end of the Cold War and has been aggressively dispatching its federal forces outside the NATO areas, through the reform of its forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations including NATO, the EU, and the United Nations.381

The “Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien” (VPR, meaning the guideline for national defense policy), defined for the first time in 11 years in 2003, stated that national defense no longer only means traditional defensive operations on border lines, predicting that Germany’s national defense policy will be determined by such factors as the integration of its federal forces into the multilateral context and increasing international responsibilities based on the assumption that no country can ensure its own peace, stability, and prosperity on its own.382 The White Paper on National Defense, published for the first time in 12 years in 2006, concluded that while the core responsibility of the federal forces will remain national defense and collective defense in their traditional sense, conflict prevention and risk management including the fight against international terrorism are most likely to emerge as a responsibility. It also stated that the federal forces will develop into three integrated functional units, including intervention, stabilization, and support units, to be compatible with the above responsibility and that the country will mainly allocate its resources to enhance its efficient and interoperable command capability.383

In addition, the second Merkel administration, formed in October 2009, has started a discussion to further reform the German federal forces including the abolition of the draft system. It plans to reduce its national defense budget based on the report submitted by the Organizational Committee, increase the military personnel it can dispatch overseas, and establish highly specialized forces that can quickly deal with multiple missions. In April 2011, the move has led to the establishment of the Federal Forces Reform Act, abolishing the draft system and reducing total personnel from the current 250,000 to 185,000387.

3. France

Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence in its defense policies and led efforts to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military power by reducing military personnel and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, and also enhancing its intelligence capabilities, and modernizing equipment required in the future.

France, in its White Paper on Defense and National Security, issued in June 2008, identified risks ranging from cyber attacks to environmental crises, in addition to the direct threats of mass terrorism and ballistic missiles, stating that these threats and risks are interconnected due to globalization and that the continuity between domestic and foreign security has taken on strategic significance. In the midst of current
uncertainty and insecurity, it leverages the precise awareness and prediction of situations to enhance its capabilities in five pillars of its national security strategy, including prevention, nuclear deterrence\textsuperscript{389}, protection, and overseas intervention\textsuperscript{390}, to combine them in a flexible manner, and to deal with changing strategic environments during the next 15 years.

In July 2009, the “2009-2014 Military Program Law” was approved by the parliament as the first midterm plan to take into account the national defense and security strategies laid out in the White Paper on Defense and National Security. It includes the establishment of the Council for National Defense and Security and the Council for National Intelligence\textsuperscript{391}, an increase in the equipment-related budget, and a force reduction of 54,000 including military and civilian personnel, mainly engaged in administrative and logistical responsibilities.

Regarding France’s foreign relations, France calls for strengthening of EU security and renovation of transatlantic relations, and restored its full participation in NATO integrated military structure in April 2009 in view of the changes in the situation since France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military structure and, in particular, the complementary relationship between the EU and NATO.

\footnote{U.S. Code, Title 50 404a stipulates that the President must submit a national security strategy to Congress every year, but this responsibility has not necessarily been fulfilled every year. For example, the former Bush administration only released said strategic report in September 2002 and March 2006. The Obama administration released the strategy in May of this year for the first time.}

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the United States’ policy for implementing its national security strategy and indicates a framework for strategic documents of the Department of Defense, including the NMS. The NDS was released in March 2005 and then again in July 2008. The 2008 NDS stipulated that the United States’ national interests were to protect itself and allied countries from attack or coercion, promote international security in order to contain conflicts and stimulate economic growth, and to secure access to the global commons, global markets that are born from the global commons, as well as to resources. The strategy indicates that, in order to pursue these objectives, military capabilities will be developed along with other efforts, including diplomatic and economic means, and said capabilities will be invoked if necessary. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates points out in the foreword of the NDS that, “The United States will soon have a new President and Commander-in-Chief, but the complex issues the United States faces will remain. This strategy is a blueprint to succeed in the years to come.”

The QDR is a document that the Secretary of Defense must submit to Congress every four years according to US Code, Title 10 118. The document clarifies policies for national defense strategy, military composition, plans to modernize forces, national defense infrastructure, budget plans, etc., in view of the security environment over the ensuing 20 years. The Department of Defense reported it to Congress in February 2010. The QDR of February 2010 was based on the 2008 NDS.

The NPR is required to comprehensively review the nuclear posture of the United States over the ensuing five to ten years and submit a report to Congress. Reports were previously submitted in 1994 and 2002, making this the third report.

The NMS is a document in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicates the guiding elements of military strategy which should be adopted by the U.S. forces based on US Code Title 10 Article 153 and which is obligated to be submitted to Congress on even-numbered years. In actuality, it is not necessarily submitted that frequently. Based on the NSS and QDR, the national military objectives of the present NMS are 1) counter violent extremism, 2) deter and defeat aggression, 3) strengthen international and regional security, and 4) shape the future force.

2) Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, at a press conference held in May 2011, that the comprehensive review directed by President will be guided by the NSS, the NDS, the NMS, the
Chairman’s Risk Assessment, and the QDR to ensure appropriate focus on strategic policy choices first and corresponding changes in the budget of the Department of Defense second.

The QDR indicates that the rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will continue to reshape the international system. In addition, the rise of China is one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that engages in greater cooperation.

The QDR points out that North Korea and Iraq are developing and deploying new ballistic missile systems, and that these systems pose a threat to United States forces deployed forward. China, also, is developing and fielding large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (CM), new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. However, China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization program, raising a number of questions regarding its long-term intentions. Therefore, U.S.–China relations must be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. Both countries should sustain open channels of communication to discuss disagreements.

In order to defeat adversaries possessing sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, the Air Force and Navy are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept. According to the QDR, this concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains. It will help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. In an address given in December 2010, General Norton Schwartz, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, pointed out the necessity of establishing a more permanent, more strategic relationships between the Air Force and Navy across the following three dimensions: system, strategic concept and equipment, in order to contribute to the development of this concept.

At a press conference on February 1, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the following statement, voicing that the current way of thinking for handling two major regional conflicts was insufficient, “one of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some time, the two-major theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex that when the two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s.”

In April 2011, the Department of Defense reviewed its plan, and announced that it would retain three brigade combat teams (BCTs). By maintaining a flexible and rapidly deployable ground force, the United States can fulfill its commitment to NATO, engage effectively with its allies and partners, and meet the broad range of the 21st century challenges.

In a talk he gave on June 3, 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates spoke on the relationship with Australia, saying that the U.S. and Australia established a force posture working group tasked with expanding opportunities for two militaries to train and operate together, and are evaluating a range of options including: 1) increasing combined naval presence and capabilities to respond more readily to humanitarian disasters; 2) improving Indian Ocean facilities, a region of growing international importance; and 3) expanding training exercises for amphibious and land operations, activities that could involve other partners in the region.

With regard to relations with Singapore, in addition to strengthening the bi-lateral defense relationship within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement, the two nations are pursuing more operational engagement by deploying U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. In addition, both nations are examining other ways to increase opportunities for the two militaries to train and operate together, to include: 1) pre-positioning supplies to improve disaster response; 2) improving command and control capabilities; and 3) expanding training opportunities to help prepare the forces for the challenges both militaries face operating in the Pacific.

The Department of Defense is, at present, conducting its Global Posture Review (GPR). In an address given on June 5, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates observed in relation to the GPR, that the defense posture of the United States in Asia must be more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable, and he considered of the build-up on Guam, and the agreement reached with Japan is part of this shift. Furthermore, in a press conference on November 7, 2010, Defense Secretary Gates stated that the United States is not looking at adding any new bases in Asia,
but that it is looking at how it enhances the relationship that it already has, and that by so doing, the
U.S. forces would make more robust presence in Asia.

In the coming five-year period, there is a planned saving of 29.0 billion dollars for the Army, 35.0
billion dollars for the Navy, and 34.0 billion dollars for the Air Force, and a total saving of 54.0 billion
dollars across the Department and agencies. The saving of approximately 100.0 billion dollars in total
across all the military forces will be allocated to investment in high-priority military capabilities. The
proposed budget plan will reduce real growth in the department’s top line in FY2013 and FY2014, and
then provide zero real growth in FY2015 and FY2016. In all, this budget proposal anticipates a total
reduction of roughly 78 billion dollars to the original plan. Efforts announced for this reduction in
expenditure include a reduction of the number of personnel in the Army and Marine Corps starting in
FY2015 (a reduction of 27,000 in the Army and between 15,000 and 20,000 in the Marine Corps), a
reduction in the number of high-ranking officer posts, disestablishment of the Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM), two years of probation of the F-35B used by the U.S. Marine Corps experiencing significant
testing problems (if the problems are not fixed during this time frame, it should be canceled), and
cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) which is a marine amphibious assault
vehicle.

This corresponds to expenses associated with the War on Terror during the Bush administration and
includes the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads equipped in
heavy bombers.

The figure as of February 5, 2011.

Conventional Strike Missiles (CSMs) are the leading part of the developmental plan guiding this
initiative. While retired ballistic missile rockets and others will be diverted for use, confusion with
nuclear weapons will be avoided as CSMs move along a depressed trajectory that is clearly different
from ballistic missiles. Weapons from that concept would count against the new START treaty’s limit
of delivery vehicles and warheads.

Briefing by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James
Cartwright (September 17, 2009).

While there is the possibility for changes in specifics and timing, this is a plan to improve BMD
capabilities over four phases by deploying SM-3 Block IA by 2011, SM-3 Block IB by 2015, SM-3
Block IIA by 2018, and SM-3 Block IIB by 2020. Based on this plan, the United States will deploy a
ground-based missile defense system in Romania by 2015 and in Poland by 2018. In July 2010, the
United States and Poland revised the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement concluded during the times
of the Bush administration, and the two nations agreed to deploy U.S. missile defense systems to the
north of Poland. In addition, in May 2011, the United States and Romania agreed to deploy U.S.
missile defense systems to the southern part of Romania.

The 2nd Fleet headquarters are planned to be abolished under efforts aimed at streamlining annual
expenditure.

The defense budget proposal for FY2012 includes a budget to start development of next-generation
long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The option exists to have the next-generation
long-range bombers unmanned.

As cyber-related units, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command
(FLT CYBERCOM), 24th Air Force/Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Corps
Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed.

The figures of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded
on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2009), and it could
change according to unit deployment.

North Korea says it will open the door to the “powerful and prosperous nation” in 2012, which falls on
the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il Sung.

Joint editorial of the Korean Workers’ Party’s journals Rodong Shinmun and Workers (June 16, 1999).

Constitutionally, the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, “commands and takes the reins
of all armed forces” as the “Supreme Leader” of North Korea. The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces,
the equivalent of the Ministry of Defense in other countries, appears to be placed under the National
Defense Commission, not under the Cabinet.

The approximate percentage of active service members in total population is 0.2% in Japan, 0.5% in
the United States, 0.7% in Russia, and 1.4% in the ROK.
Then White House Press Secretary Dana Perino announced in a statement on April 24, 2008 that North Korea had assisted Syria’s covert nuclear activities. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI)’s Worldwide Threat Assessment released in February 2011 pointed out, “Despite October 2007 Six-Party agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology.”

Generally, missiles propelled by liquid fuel can only be fueled right before the launch. On the other hand, missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system are considered to be militarily superior to those based on a liquid fuel propellant system because they are capable of immediate launches with their propellant stored in airframes beforehand, signs of their launches are unlikely to be detected in advance, and they are easy to store and handle.

The second and third rounds of the Six-Party Talks were held in February and June 2004 respectively, the fourth round from July to August and in September 2005, and the fifth round in November 2005, December 2006, and February 2007. The sixth round was held in March and September 2007.

In June 2008, North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program. However, as of June 2011 no agreement has been made concerning a specific framework for verification.

Plutonium and uranium are well-known fissile materials necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. Plutonium is synthetically produced in the reactor by bombarding uranium with neutrons. The used fuel is then chemically processed at a reprocessing facility, allowing for the extraction of the plutonium. The plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).

In 2002, the United States announced that North Korea admitted the existence of a uranium enrichment plan for nuclear weapons. Moreover, in February 2011, the DNI Worldwide Threat Assessment indicated that, “Based on the scale of the facility and the progress the DPRK has made in construction, it is likely that North Korea has been pursuing enrichment for an extended period of time. If so, there is clear prospect that DPRK has built other uranium enrichment related facilities in its territory, including likely R&D and centrifuge fabrication facilities, and other enrichment facilities. Analysts differ on the likelihood that other production-scale facilities may exist elsewhere in North Korea.”

In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated that “North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.” Further, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out that “we must assume… if there are no major changes in its (North Korea’s) national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system.”

In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, then Director of the DIA, stated that “North Korea has had a long-standing chemical warfare program,” and “We believe that Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents.” He also stated that “North Korea is believed to have a long-standing biological warfare program that could support the production of biological warfare agents.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2010 pointed out that, “It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons remain stored in the facilities scattered across the country. The North is also suspected of being able to independently cultivate and produce such biological weapons as anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.”

North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the
The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively.

Of a total of seven ballistic missiles North Korea launched in July 2006 after completely abandoning the freeze on ballistic missile launches announced in 1999, the third one is believed to have been a Taepodong-2 fired from the Taepodong district in the northeastern coastal area. The launch of other Scud and Nodong missiles had more practical characteristics, based on the indication that the missiles were launched before dawn, a number of different types of ballistic missiles were launched in succession over a short period of time, the launch was carried out using a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), and ballistic missiles with different ranges were landed within a certain area. This leads to the assumption that North Korea has improved the operability of ballistic missiles.

All seven ballistic missiles launched were assumed to have landed in the military target practice area (the area surrounded by the points at 1) 39 degrees 9 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 37 minutes east longitude; 2) 41 degrees 12 minutes north latitude and 129 degrees 50 minutes east longitude; 3) 41 degrees 30 minutes north latitude and 131 degrees 59 minutes east longitude; 4) 41 degrees 15 minutes north latitude and 132 degrees 6 minutes east longitude; and 5) 38 degrees 55 minutes north latitude and 128 degrees 2 minutes east longitude), for which the navigation warning was issued by the Japan Coast Guard upon notification by North Korea on June 22, 2009.

In his statement for the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated that preparations are currently under way in North Korea to field a new intermediate range ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. The BMDR Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 noted, “[North Korea] is developing new mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).” Furthermore, the ROK’s 2010 Defense White Paper notes that, “In 2007, it began to develop new intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) called the Musudan with a range that extended beyond 3,000 km and which were capable of direct strikes on neighboring countries, including South Korea, Japan and Guam.”

For instance, making a three-stage missile by installing a booster at the warhead of a two-stage missile.

In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period.” The BMDR Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out, “North Korea has developed an advanced solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).”

The DNI Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 noted that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Pakistan… illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities.” Some point out that North Korea conducts tests in importing countries such as Iran and Pakistan and is making good use of the test results.

Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962.

Covert operations to infiltrate enemy territories by dispersed small units.

It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers’ Party. However, it has been reported that these organizations merged in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the armed forces. Moreover, General Walter L. Sharp, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009 that “North Korea still keeps the world’s largest Special Forces with more than 80,000 troops.” Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2010 points out “The North has been strengthening its special warfare capabilities by deploying light infantry divisions to the frontline corps and adding an infantry regiment to the frontline. The number of special force troops is estimated to reach approximately 200,000.”

Kim Jong Il was re-elected as Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2009. Also, at the Korean Workers’ Party convention in September 2010, Kim Jong Il was reappointed as General Secretary of the Party. Moreover, in October 2010, a large-scale military parade including the march of missile units was held to celebrate the 65th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party with Kim Jong Il’s attendance.

In 2009, North Korea is believed to have increased the number of members of the National Defense
Commission and took measures to strengthen or clarify the functions of the National Defense Commission, centering on the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, by positioning the Chairman of the National Defense Commission as the “supreme leader” of North Korea under constitution and specifying the mission of the Commission as “making decisions on important national policies in order to carry through the military-first revolution.”

In addition, at the Korean Workers’ Party convention, Kim Jong Il was reappointed as General Secretary of the party, the party’s constitution was amended (The Korean Workers’ Party was prescribed to be “The Party of Kim Il-sung,” and a stipulation was made concerning the double post of General Secretary and Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC)), and an election was held for the central leading institution of the party, all of which evolved the structure of the party. Furthermore, since the convention, Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Kim Jong-un has engaged in various different activities, including attending official functions such as the military parade to commemorate 65th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party and accompanying Chairman Kim Jong Il to on-site training.

There were no official reports on public activities by Kim Jong Il, for 50 days since mid-August 2008 (the longest period of such “disappearance” since he assumed the post of the General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party in 1997). Since November 2008, however, he has been appearing in the public scene more frequently than ever, including a meeting with former U.S. President Bill Clinton in August 2009 and two visits to China in 2010.

In March 2011, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) forecasted the country’s production of principal foods to be approximately 4.25 million tons between November 2010 and October 2011, and estimated that the necessary imported amount of grains to be at approximately 1.09 million tons.

New currency was issued for the first time in 17 years, since 1992, and currency exchange was conducted at the rate of 100 former notes to 1 new note. However, it is pointed out that prices skyrocketed due to supply shortages and other reasons, pushing the economy into turmoil and causing an accompanying increase in social restlessness.

North Korea says the plan set a state strategic goal for economic development, which puts main emphasis on building infrastructure and developing agriculture and basic industries including electric power, coal, oil and metal industries and regional development.

According to South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, North Korea fired a total of approximately 170 shells at Yeonpyeong Island on two occasions, of which approximately 80 shells landed. Furthermore, the South Korean Armed Forces fired shots in response to the two North Korean shellings using its K-9 self-propelled howitzers.

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI)’s Worldwide Threat Assessment released in February 2011 pointed out, “We assess that North Korea’s artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November was meant in part to continue burnishing successor-designate Kim Jong Un’s leadership and military credibility among regime elites, although other strategic goals were also factors in the attack.”

The Country Report on Terrorism 2008 published in April 2009 states that “the United States rescinded the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the North Korean government had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the government of assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” In February 2010, President Obama submitted a letter to the President of the Senate and the Chairman of the House of Congress stating that as a result of the careful examination of North Korea’s behavior up to November 2009, North Korea “does not meet the statutory criteria to again be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.”

On 26 March 2010, ROK’s naval patrol ship “Cheonan” sank around the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea. In May 2010, a joint military-civilian survey group comprising experts from the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, and Sweden released survey results indicating that the ROK naval ship had split and sank as a result of a shock wave and bubble effect created by the underwater blast of a torpedo fired by a small North Korean submarine.

It has been pointed out that China accounted for more than 50% of total North Korean trade in 2010, and according to trade statistics released by the Chinese Government, total trade between China and North Korea in 2010 was the highest in history at approximately 3.47 billion dollars. Some have voiced
their opinion that North Korea increasingly relies on China in the economic sector.

56 Besides, in June 2011, a strategic dialogue was held between the delegates from Koren Workers’ Party and the delegates from Chinese Communist Party.

57 The previous treaty contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means available. This provision, however, was dropped from the new treaty.

58 For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively. In October 2009 French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed a special presidential envoy for an analysis of the situation for the consideration of the establishment of diplomatic ties with North Korea, and the special envoy visited North Korea in November 2009. In December 2009, North Korea agreed to the establishment of a French diplomatic office in Pyongyang. After the ARF ministerial meeting in July 2008, North Korea acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).

59 According to a remark by the spokesman of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in September 2009, the “grand bargain” package deal proposal seeks a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by putting a complete set of denuclearization steps by North Korea and the corresponding measures that North Korea wants from the five countries of Japan, the United States, the ROK, China, and Russia.

60 The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.–ROK joint defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective joint operations in case of emergency. Under the U.S.–ROK joint defense system, the operational control authority over ROK forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in wartime.

61 The United States is advancing the realignment of its forces stationed in the ROK in line with the June 2003 agreement to relocate its forces to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the October 2004 agreement to cut the number of its forces stationed in the ROK by 12,500 from approximately 37,500. The two countries agreed at the summit meeting in April 2008 to maintain the current strength of 28,500 as the appropriate level.

62 As reasons of the postponement of the transition, the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of National Defense mentioned several factors, such as: 1) the change of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula, including an increase in military threats from North Korea; 2) a time of leadership change in and around the Korean Peninsula, including the presidential election of the Republic of Korea; and 3) public demand, noting the necessity to adjust the period of the transfer, and the reflection of financial conditions necessary to fulfill future military capabilities.

63 The Joint Vision states, “Over that time, our security Alliance has strengthened and our partnership has widened to encompass political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. Together, on this solid foundation, we will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust,” and “The Alliance is adapting to changes in the 21st Century security environment. We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ security interests.”

64 The SCM joint statement reemphasized the non-acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state as well as U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK using both capabilities postured in the Korean Peninsula and globally available U.S. forces and capabilities in case of crisis. The statement also indicated that “both countries are prepared to effectively respond to any provocation, instability or aggression,” mentioning the instability of North Korea for the first time ever. In addition, the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015, which provides the framework for the transition of OPCON, was signed along with the Strategic Planning Guidance, which provides the U.S.-ROK Military Committee with the strategic guidance and authorization necessary to direct the development of operational planning.

65 The ROK Defense White Paper 2010 described North Korea as follows: “The North has posed serious threats to the South’s security with its large-scale conventional military forces, development and enhancement of WMDs, including nuclear weapons and missiles, and constant armed provocations as shown by the attack on the ROK Ship Cheonan and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island. As long as such threats continue, the main agents of the provocative acts, which are the North Korean regime and its military, will remain enemies of the South.” Furthermore, concerning the reason behind this
form of expression, the ROK Ministry of National Defense explains that, “This is the strongest form of expression that the ROK can use. This usage mirrors our resolve to exclude North Korean citizens from the category of ‘enemy’. The term ‘main enemy’ leaves room to invite unnecessary misunderstanding by neighboring nations.”

67 The reform plan has four pillars: 1) expansion of a civilian base for national defense, 2) buildup of military structure and system of the forces in conformity with characteristics of modern wars, 3) reorganization of the national defense management system into a low cost, high efficiency system, and 4) improvement of barrack culture in accordance with the trends of the time.

68 The Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) revised the force strength from 500,000 to 517,000.

69 The Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) prioritizes the following measures in order to prepare for North Korean threats: 1) organize frontline troops in a manner that allows them to exercise their combat strength immediately after the outbreak of war to secure the security of the metropolitan region; 2) boost surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, and interception capabilities in order to block and eliminate North Korea’s asymmetric threats in enemy areas to the utmost extent; 3) secure strong reserve mobile power for each unit in order to counter enemies with a numerical advantage; and 4) secure combat sustainability by stabilizing noncombat zones and nurturing elite reserve forces.

70 The ROK Ministry of National Defense positions the following three areas as priority areas: 1) strengthening the integrity of the ROK armed forces, 2) securing active deterrence capabilities, and 3) maximizing efficiency of national defense administration. Based on these priority areas, the ROK states that it is to promote reform with the following eight issues as its priority issues: 1) reorganization of the armed forces’ chain-of-command, 2) establishment of an island defense command for the northwest (Yellow Sea), 3) improvement of the national defense training structure, 4) organization of a priority order for strengthening military power, 5) response to North Korea’s special forces and cyber threats, 6) enhancement of mental strength and assistance for educating national citizens about security, 7) improvement of the national defense personnel management system, and 8)bettering the efficiency of the national defense budget.


72 The primary missions of the Seventh Mobile Corps are described as the protection of sea lanes, deterrence against North Korea and support for the government’s external policies. The Seventh Mobile Corps has one Aegis-equipped vessel and six destroyers under its command, and more Aegis vessels and destroyers to be put in service in the future are expected to be deployed to the corps.

73 At a press conference, then ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang Hee referred to an agreement reached at the ROK–Russia summit meeting in 2008, and said his meeting with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov provided a momentum to elevate the bilateral military relationship a notch higher.


75 The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK armed forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, a bill concerning the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations passed parliament.

76 It is reported that there are 55 ethnic minorities living in China, besides the Han Chinese ethnic group.

77 “Scientific Development Concept” chiefly consists of “adhering to standardized plans and consideration for all perspectives, maintaining a people-oriented position of establishing comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development concept and the need to promote complete economic, social, and human development.” (As commented by President Hu Jintao at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in October 2003) The construction of a “Harmonious Society” is defined as a process to continue dissolving social inconsistencies. The “Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society” (adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2006).

78 China’s National Defense in 2010.

79 China traditionally adopted the strategy of a “People’s War” based on the recognition that a world-scale war was possible. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla warfare using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, China has come to place importance on local wars such as conflicts that occur over its territorial land and waters since the first half of the 1980s based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place
on a long-term basis. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the country started to implement measures to improve its military operation abilities in order to win a local war under highly technological conditions. Recently, it has been stated that the core of military modernization is to strengthen capabilities to win a local war under informationized conditions.

China amended Regulations on the Political Work of the People’s Liberation Army in 2003 to add the practices of Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfare to its political work. The Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) of the U.S. Department of Defense explains Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfare as follows:

- Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests.
- Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.
- Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (February 2010) states that it will be necessary to retain the capacity to protect the United States and its allies in an environment wherein states with a wide range of sophisticated weapons exercise anti-access capability to impede the deployment of U.S. forces. It points out that “China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems.” The U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) (February 2011) also points out that “We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea,” and states that the U.S. is prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nations that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of its allies.

China’s National Defense in 2008 explains that “with the focus of attention on performing the historical missions of the armed forces for the new stage in the new century and with raising the capability to win local wars in conditions of informationization at the core, it works to increase the country’s capabilities to maintain maritime, space and electro-magnetic space security and to carry out the tasks of counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, emergency rescue and international peacekeeping.” In addition, China’s National Defense in 2010 describes the diversified military missions by the following seven topics: “Safeguarding Border, Coastal and Territorial Air Security,” “Maintaining Social Stability,” “Participating in National Construction, Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief,” “Participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” “Conduction Escort Operations in the Gulf of Aden and Waters off Somalia,” “Holding Joint Military Exercises and Training with Other Countries,” and “Participating in International Disaster Relief Operations.”

China’s National Defense in 2010 and China’s National Defense in 2008 also mentions a target to “by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century.”

China’s National Defense in 2010 states that “in the last two years, senior PLA delegations have visited more than 40 countries, and defense ministers and chiefs of general staff from more than 60 countries have visited China.”

China disclosed some fighter aircraft and submarines which had previously been generally undisclosed to foreign delegates, including delegates from Japan, at the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Navy (in April) and of its Air Force (in November), which were held in 2009. This is thought to be a sign of its posture of working to improve transparency with regard to the military. Furthermore, the Chinese Ministry of Defense expressed that it would hold monthly regular press conferences from April in 2011, as well as press conference with regard to specific topics such as a publication of its white paper.

For example, China’s National Defense in 2008 provides details of personnel expenses, operation maintenance costs, and equipment costs only for the defense budget for FY2007 each by active force, reserve force, and militia.
National defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. The national defense budget amount for FY2011 within nationwide fiscal expenditures is said to be 601.2 billion yuan. This budget amount represents growth of approximately 13.0% (69 billion yuan) compared to the national defense budget (initial budget) within the nationwide fiscal expenditures for the previous fiscal year.

Simply applying rates of foreign exchange to the national defense budgets of foreign countries to convert them into another currency does not necessarily reflect the accurate value as revealed in the country’s price level. But hypothetically speaking, if China’s national defense budget for FY2011 were converted at a rate of 13 yen per yuan, then this would result in approximately 7.5868 trillion yen. The 2010 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI; June 2010) estimated that China’s military expenditures for 2009 were approximately $100 billion, ranking it second place in the world behind the United States.

China announced that the rate of growth for its FY2011 national defense budget is “an increase of approximately 12.7% (67.6 billion yuan) compared to the previous year,” but this is the growth rate by comparing the spending of FY2010 with the initial budget of FY2011.

China’s announced national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures achieved double-digit-percent growth on the initial-budget basis for 21 successive years up through FY2009, and the growth in FY2010 was approximately 9.8%.

U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) estimates China’s defense spending on military-related expenditures as more than $150 billion in FY2009. The same report indicates that China’s official defense budget does not include major categories of expenditure.

Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. According to China’s National Defense in 2002, it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.

The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistical support for combat operations in wartime. China’s National Defense in 2002 explains, “Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.”

Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions—one for the CCP and one for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the military forces.

China’s National Defense in 2010 states that “China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, adheres to a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.” On the other hand the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (August 2010) of the U.S. Department of Defense points out that there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s “no first use” policy would or would not apply.

Generally, liquid-propellant missiles require a long time for liquid fuel to be injected immediately prior to launch, whereas with solid-propellant missiles the propellant is loaded in advance and they can be launched immediately. Therefore, compared to liquid-propellant missiles, it is more difficult to detect signs of the launch of solid propellant-missiles in advance, and the risk of suffering a preemptive attack is believed to be lower with solid-propellant missiles.

The Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2010) of the U.S. Department of Defense indicates that China may also be developing a new road mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

The Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence of the United States published in February 2009 states that China is developing conventionally armed short- and long-range ballistic missiles with maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV) that could be used to attack U.S. naval forces and airbases. Moreover, in January 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed concerns about the development of the anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles ever since he took his job, and stated that the development has proceeded fairly. In addition, in February of the same year, a Chinese newspaper reported military experts saying that China has already started the deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles Dong Feng (DF)-21D mainly to strike marine targets.
In its Annual Report of November 2010, the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Committee pointed out that China could attack five out of the six main U.S. Air Force bases in East Asia with its normal missiles (ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles), and also have the ability to target air bases in Guam by enhancing the capability of its bombers.

U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) states that by December 2009 China had deployed 1,050 to 1,150 SRBMs on the shore opposing Taiwan, and it is engaged in efforts to increase offensive capability, including the introduction of derived models with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads.

Besides this, in March 2011, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau Director Tsai Der-sheng said that China has developed and deployed new “DF-16” missiles. These are highly powerful long-range missiles and will mainly be used against Taiwan and U.S. military intervention operations, he said.

At the press conference on the day after it was announced that the test had been carried out, a spokesperson from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “The test would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft. The test was defensive in nature and targeted at no country. It is consistent with the defensive national defense policies that China has consistently pursued.” On the other hand, China’s National Defense in 2010 explains that “China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to international strategic balance and stability, will undermine international and regional security, and will have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament. China holds that no state should deploy overseas missile defense systems that have strategic missile defense capabilities or potential, or engage in any such international collaboration.”

China’s National Defense in 2010, etc.

In the “Stride 2009” exercises, it was reported that the four individual army divisions, belonging to each of the military regions of Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, and Guangzhou, traveled long distances from their own military region to a different one, after which they engaged in exercises with simulated enemy forces. In order to transport personnel and equipment, they are reported to have used civilian cargo aircraft, passenger airplanes, and the “Hexie” high-speed train, as well as air force cargo aircraft and freight trains. In the Mission Action 2010 exercises, it was reported that a total of 30,000 forces from individual army divisions belonging to Beijing, Lanzhou, and Chengdu as well as from the Air Force and 2nd artillery division participated with the aim of improving the long-range maneuvering capabilities and integrated operation abilities.

This hospital ship, “Daishandao” (commonly known as the “Peace Ark”), is reported to have toured around the coast of the Chinese continent and the islands and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel Islands for the span of roughly a month beginning in October 2009, delivering medical services to the stationed military personnel and inhabitants there. Moreover, this ship was also commissioned for medical services duty “Mission Harmony-2010” from August 2010 to November 2010 and provided medical support to the Chinese naval warships in action in the Gulf of Aden. Besides these, this ship is also reported to have visited the five countries of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles and Bangladesh for providing medical services.

Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie remarked during the Sino-Japanese Defence Dialogues held in March and November 2009 that China cannot remain “without an aircraft carrier indefinitely,” and that “the possession of aircraft carriers should be determined in comprehensive consideration of various factors including economic development, the level of shipbuilding, and security factors.” In addition, positive remarks by several government and military officers about possessing and constructing an aircraft carrier have been reported. Recently, in November 2008, Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Defense Ministry’s Foreign Affairs Office, reportedly said that the navy of any great power had dreams to have one or more aircraft carriers. In December 2008, a Ministry of Defense spokesman commented on building Chinese aircraft carriers, “The Chinese government will incorporate all aspects of factors, and carefully examine and consider related matters.” Moreover, China’s Ocean Development Report (2010) (compiled by China’s National Institute for Marine Development Strategy of the State Oceanic Administration), published in May 2010, states that “China has raised the conception and plan for constructing aircraft carriers in 2009.” Furthermore, in June 2011, it was reported that Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde announced that China was currently building aircraft carriers.

Since the 1980s, in addition to Varyag, China has purchased Melbourne, a decommissioned
Majestic-class aircraft carrier made in the United Kingdom, and Minsk and Kiev, Kiev-class aircraft carriers made in the former Soviet Union, nominally for recycling for scraps of iron or leisure facilities. In 2006, it was reported that China was negotiating the purchase of Russian made Su-33 carrier-based fighter aircraft, which can be operated with a Kuznetsov-class carrier. It was also reported in 2007 that China had plans to purchase arresting wires that are used on aircraft carriers from Russia. In September 2008, it was reported that China was planning cooperation with Ukraine, which has a simulation training facility for carrier-based aircraft, with respect to the education and training of navy pilots. Moreover, China is reported to have developed its own fighter aircraft based on the Su-33 fighter jet in 2010. The U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) highlighted the fact that “China has an active aircraft carrier research and development program. The PRC shipbuilding industry could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this year. China is interested in building multiple operational aircraft carriers with support ships in the 2020s.”

In a television interview broadcast in November 2009, Air Force Deputy Commander He Weirong said with regard to China’s next generation fighters that they could be deployed to units in 8 to 10 years. In addition, in the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated his view that China had the potential to deploy 50 next generation fighters equipped with stealth capability by 2020 and 200 fighters by 2025. It was reported that China had successfully conducted the first flight test of its stealth fighters “J-20” in January 2011.

China’s National Defense in 2008 explains that China’s Air force is “working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force.” The U.S. Department of Defense’s Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (May 2006) points out that the goal of the PLA Air Force is “to develop a mobile, all-weather, day-night, low altitude, and over-water force that is capable and flexible enough to quickly perform multiple operational tasks and to project power beyond the “first island chain.” The Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) of the U.S. Department of Defense explains that China’s air force has continued its conversion from a force for limited territorial defense to a more flexible and agile force able to operate off-shore in both offensive and defensive roles, using the U.S. and Russian air forces as models. In the joint military exercise “Peace Mission 2010” (October 2010) that China and Russia participated in, among other countries, China’s battle group comprised of two H-6 bombers and two J-10 fighters, supported by early warning aircraft and air refueling tankers, made a round-trip flight of a route that spanned 1,000km each way without landing, and conducted air-to-ground exercises.

In September 2008, China launched the manned spacecraft “Shenzhou-7” and its astronauts successfully carried out extra-vehicular activities for the first time. China also launched a lunar orbiting satellite “Chang’e-2” in October 2010 and has scheduled the launch of space laboratory “Tiangong 1” in 2011. This shows that China is looking to further push the program for constructing space stations, etc.

China’s National Defense in 2006 notes that, regarding science, technology and industry for national defense, “Major scientific and technological projects such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises and to bring about overall improvement in defense-related science and technology.” Also, the entire manned space project is said to be commanded by the Director of the PLA’s General Armaments Department.

Concerning the Chinese military forces, there is a view that believes that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, they intend to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international society tolerate and
accept changes in the situation. (Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report).

116 China’s National Defense in 2006 states “The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations.” Additionally, with regard to Chinese Navy training, Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli is reported to have stated in April 2009 that, “Open sea training has been normalized.” What is more, China’s National Defense in 2010 states that, in line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy, the PLA Navy, “By organizing naval vessels for drills in distant waters, develops training models for MOOTW (military operations other than war) missions.”

117 This was the first identified passage by Chinese surface combatants through the Tsugaru Strait.

118 These vessels are reported to have passed through the Bashi Channel and advanced to the South China Sea, cruised in the waters adjacent to the Spratly Islands, and conducted military drills in the waters of the Paracel Islands.

119 In April 2010, PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA, reported that a multi-branch joint force of the East Sea Fleet, which consists of submarines, destroyers, frigates, supply ships, and ship-borne helicopters, had begun an open sea deployment training to conduct training for “Three Warfares” (“Psychological Warfare,” “Media Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare”), counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy as well as actual match-style exercises.

120 Some of these ten vessels conducted exercises in the middle of the East China Sea before advancing to the Pacific Ocean. At the time, a Chinese shipborne helicopter conducted to a proximate flight towards the Japanese destroyer Suzunami, which was monitoring the Chinese vessels. At its nearest it came at a distance of approximately 90 m horizontally and the altitude was approximately 30 m. Since it was recognized that flying in this manner posed a danger to the safe navigation of the Japanese vessel, the recognition was conveyed to the Chinese government to inquire after the fact via diplomatic routes. Later, another Chinese shipborne helicopter approached destroyer Asayuki, which was monitoring the vessels in the Pacific Ocean and flew in a circle around it. At its nearest it came at a distance of approximately 90 m horizontally and the altitude was approximately 50 m, constituting an act that posed a danger to the safe navigation of the Japanese vessel. Since similar incidents occurred in succession, remonstrance was made to the Chinese government via diplomatic routes.

121 For instance, after the incident in which a Chinese trawler collided with Japan Coast Guard patrol boats off the coast of the Senkaku Islands in September 2010, a fisheries surveillance ship, the Yuzheng 201, belonging to the Bureau of Fisheries at the Ministry of Agriculture of China entered the waters near the Senkaku Islands on several occasions. In October the same year, China has reportedly formulated plans to build 30 marine administration ships within the next five years in order to improve its law enforcement capacity to protect Chinese maritime interests, and the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) of China reportedly deployed Marine Surveillance Ship 75 to the waters near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

122 On March 7, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to SOA flew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above the water around the Japanese destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On March 26, a Z-9 helicopter flew again as close as approximately 90 m and as low as approximately 60 m above the water around the destroyer Isoyuki. On April 1, a Y-12 aircraft believed to belong to SOA flew as close as approximately 90 m and as low as approximately 60 m above the water around Isoyuki. The official website of the SOA East Sea Branch published an article titled “Marine surveillance helicopter accomplish first successful refueling operation on offshore platform during mission.” Judging from a photograph accompanying the article, it is clear that the marine surveillance helicopter belonging to SOA is based at the Pinghu Gas Field located in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the article states that China will continue to track and monitor vessels that encroach on national interests in China’s territorial waters in the East China Sea.

123 Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that “in the past several years, they [Chinese] have become more aggressive in asserting claims for the EEZ.” The U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China released in August 2010 notes that “the United States and China continue to have differences over the rights of coastal states in their exclusive economic zones, and the appropriate response to such differences.”

124 For instance, China’s National Defense in 2010 defines safeguarding of national maritime rights and interests as one of the major goals and tasks of China’s national defense policy, and notes that China practices an administration system of sharing responsibilities between the military and the local
authorities, including organs of maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, etc., in border and coastal defense.

125 In March 2011, it was reported that the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a state-owned oil company, has launched development and production at the Shirakaba gas field (Chunxiao in Chinese). The Chinese Government has denied such reports, but continues to insist that China has full rights and jurisdiction over the said gas field and that any activities implemented by China in the field are legal.

126 It is reported that China is constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point out that for China such a base would have a strategic location that secures access to the South China Sea, as well as the West Pacific, and that China is advancing construction work to establish the base as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, where aircraft carriers will be deployed.

127 China actively participates in international disaster relief activities, and China’s National Defense in 2010 states that the People’s Liberation Army has carried out 28 international humanitarian aid missions, and provided 22 disaster-stricken countries with relief materials with a total value exceeding 950 million yuan. When Haiti was struck by a major earthquake in January 2010, the China International Search and Rescue Team (CISAR), which includes military personnel such as engineers, departed for the scene on the day the earthquake struck (Beijing time). When flooding occurred in Pakistan in August the same year, China dispatched military transportation helicopters for the first time in an overseas mission.

128 China’s National Defense in 2010 notes that the Chinese Navy has developed its capabilities of conducting operations in distant waters and in countering nontraditional security threats. Chinese Navy Admiral Wu Shengli states the following with regard to Mission Harmony-2010, a medical service operation implemented by the “Daishandao” hospital ship (commonly known as the “Peace Ark”) of the People’s Liberation Army Navy: “The mission embodies the Chinese Navy’s capacity to accomplish diversified military missions, and thus improves our comprehensive support abilities. At the same time, it showcases our image as a responsible major power that proactively pursues its international obligations.”

129 China’s National Defense in 2010 states that the People’s Liberation Army accelerates the transition to military training in conditions of informatization, and notes that in the future the army will, in addition to building joint operation systems, carry out MOOTW training and organize training exercises in complex electromagnetic environments.

130 China’s National Defense in 2010 states the following: “China pursues the principles of combining peacetime needs with wartime needs, integrating military with civilian purposes and combining military efforts with civilian support. It strengthens national defense mobilization and reserve force building, enhances national defense mobilization capabilities, and reinforces its defense strength.”

131 The U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China released in August 2010 notes about China’s defense industry that the shipbuilding and defense electronics sectors have witnessed the greatest progress, coupled with technological development in the sectors of missile and space systems. In contrast, the sectors of guidance and control systems and engines and advanced applications and software have experienced slower progress, and China still heavily depends on foreign enterprises for technologies in these sectors.

132 China’s National Defense in 2010 states that “China develops its military relations with foreign countries in a comprehensive manner, continues to strengthen its practical exchanges and cooperation with the armed forces of other countries, and strives to foster a military security environment featuring mutual trust and benefit.” Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Defense Ministry’s Foreign Affairs Office, stated that military diplomacy, including various forms of exchange with foreign countries, serves as a strategic means for safeguarding state sovereignty, security, and interests of development, and also performs a specific role in the fostering of a positive external environment for the development of China.

133 The organizations authorized to deal with cross-strait talks are the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the Chinese side and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwanese side.

134 Discourse at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. China’s National Defense in 2010 stresses that
the two sides “can hold contacts and exchanges on military issues at an appropriate time and talk about a military security mechanism of mutual trust.”

The U.S. National Security Strategy (May 2010).

Remarks by Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Caihou in a conference with then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009). Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department Ma Xiaotian stated at the 11th round of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks held in December 2010 that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. laws that impose restrictions on contacts between the military forces of the two countries, and the frequent military reconnaissance operations conducted by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in coastal areas of China’s exclusive economic zones constituted key obstacles to developing stable military-to-military ties.

In January 2011, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates paid his second visit to China since November 2007 and held talks with Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie. The two leaders reached a consensus for full-fledged resumption of contacts between the military forces of the United States and China, including reciprocal visits by high-level officials, an activity which had been put on hold since January 2010.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR; February 2010).

Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.

The organization was established in June 2001 and the original members are China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). The missions of the organization include promoting cooperation between member countries in a vast range of sectors, including security, politics, culture, and energy. Since the organization’s establishment, it has developed organizationally and functionally, such as in holding regular summit-level meetings, and establishing the organization’s head office and the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS).

“Peace Mission 2010” is the fourth joint military exercise of the “Peace Mission” initiative launched in 2005, which was carried out with the participation of Kazakhstan and other countries in addition to Russia and China.

North Korea seems to emphasize negotiations with the United States over the nuclear issue, and it is believed that China, apprehensive that the destabilization of situations in surrounding countries would lead to repercussions within China, hesitate to employ firm measures. In light of this, there is a view that China’s wieldable influence on North Korea is limited.

China held the ASEAN-China Summit Meeting for the first time in 1997 and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stated at the 11th ASEAN Summit Meeting held in 2007 that China was ready to enhance cooperation with ASEAN nations in the area of nontraditional security by showing the country’s intention to provide funds to such projects as maritime investigation trainings in the Strait of Malacca.

Recent military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian countries include China’s first joint drills for search and rescue operations with a Southeast Asian nation (i.e. Thailand in 2004), the China-Singapore joint army counter-terrorism exercises in June 2009 and November 2010, the China-Thailand joint army counter-terrorism exercises in July 2007, September 2008, and October 2010, and China–Vietnam naval joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin held every year since 2006. In 2007, China provided Cambodia with patrol ships and other equipment as an assistance package. It is also reported that China signed a purchase agreement with Timor-Leste in 2008 to sell two patrol ships. With regard to relations with Indonesia, Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Head of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department, visited the country in March 2011, to meet Defense Minister Purnomo and signed a memorandum of understanding on military technology cooperation including the joint production of Chinese anti-ship missiles. In June the same year, the two armies conducted their first joint counter-terrorism exercise “Sharp Knife 2011.”

“Yearbook 2010” (June 2010) of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) points out that Pakistan accounts for about 45% of the total Chinese export value of weapons from 2005 to 2009, becoming the largest importer of Chinese weapons.

In November 2010 Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, where China and France announced a joint statement including the support for lifting the arms embargoes against China. Some point out that several EU countries are positive about lifting the arms embargoes against China.

For example, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping picked up South Africa, Angola, and Botswana as his first overseas visit destinations in November 2010, since he took on the position of Vice-Chairman of
More recently, in April 2011, Chinese navy ships dispatched to the area off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden stopped by Tanzania, Seychelles, and South Africa after the completion of their mission.

The exercise was reported as a medical relief drill based on the assumption that a gas leak took place at a chemical factory in Lima, the capital of Peru, when it is hit by an earthquake, causing many poisoned patients.

Taiwanese National Defense Report 2009. However, the defense budget for FY2010 is estimated to be less than 3% of the GDP.
Taiwanese National Defense Report 2009. With regard to China’s and Taiwan’s military strength, the Taiwanese National Defense Report 2009 assessed that, “Military superiority between the two sides has already clearly tilted toward the Chinese side.”

In the speech of then President Putin titled “Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020,” he said that Russia’s military spending will be in keeping with the national capability and will not be to the detriment of their social and economic development priorities.

According to the speech by President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and the Annual State of the Nation Address (November 2010).

With the impact from the slump in crude oil prices and the financial crisis in recent years, negative economic growth was recorded in 2009 (-7.9%; against 5.6% in 1998) for the first time since the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. The economic growth rate in 2010 was 4.0%.

Troops were reorganized, in the midst of a military forces reduction after the launch of the Russian Federation’s armed forces, to strengthen combat readiness through concentrating personnel. It is hoped that this will enable them to promptly respond during the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a minor conflict. In the meantime, in September 2008 the President approved the “Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” and it was decided that all the combat forces would be transformed into combat-ready troops.

In the Doctrine, the general notion pertaining to threats is split into two categories: military dangers (a state of interstate or intrastate relations that may, in certain conditions, cause the emergence of a military threat) and military threats (a state of interstate or intrastate relations where there is the real possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict). It lists for the former’s example the approach of NATO’s military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, the construction and deployment of a strategic missile defense system, as well as the territorial claims and the intervention against Russia and its allies. For the latter it lists the radicalization of military and political situations, and ostentatious displays of military strength designed to provoke through exercises in its adjacent territories.

Russia supposes that it will use precision guidance weapons as part of its strategic deterrence.

The doctrine of April 2000 states that, “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” The current doctrine deletes the wording on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, it does not touch on the use of nuclear weapons as a “response” to a “large-scale” aggression in the event where conventional weapons have been used, and the description of the non-preemptive use of nuclear weapons has become less clear.

The changes to the army’s operating environment indicates that large-scale military strength is no longer required; cooperative operation has become necessary between each service of the military under a unified command structure; the ability to carry out a wide range of tasks has also become necessary, including non-combat duties; and threats Russia faces have changed.

The President approved the document titled “Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” in September 2008, which resolved that the command structure be reorganized (from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command–brigade), that all combat forces be converted to permanent readiness
units, and that the class structure of commissioned officers be revised, etc. It claimed to have completed the structural reorganization to a three-tiered structure in December 2009, but hereafter there remains the challenge of setting in place a system to operate the structure.

164 It was decided that the total military force would be limited to 1 million people as of 2016 by a presidential order in December 2008 (approximately 1.13 million people as of 2008).

165 The reorganization from a four-tiered structure (military district–army–division–regiment) to a three-tiered structure (military district–operational command–brigade) is believed to have been completed by December 2009. But for the future, the challenge remains of putting in place a system to operate this structure.

166 By the September 2010 presidential order, by December of the same year four military districts were newly established; the Western, the Southern, the Central and the Eastern military districts. Prior to this, in July 2010 the President signed another presidential order for the establishment of the four military districts and the four operational-strategic commands (OSK) corresponding to these four districts (Red Star; July 15, 2010). In conjunction with the establishment of the four new military districts, it is also assumed that by December 2010 the four OSK had also been established. It is assumed that troops that belong to other ministries and government bodies, such as the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) border troops and Department of the Interior troops come under the control of a Military District Commander. It also seems that the military districts are positioned from the perspectives of administrative management and the operational-strategic command (OSK) from that of operation of unit.

167 On March 5, 2010 at the Extended Defense Ministry Collegium, President Medvedev commented that by 2020 it was possible to increase to 70% the percentage of new equipment by updating it by an average of 9 to 11% per year. Also, the Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov, in commenting on the scale of spending set out by the new state policy on military equipment, stated that spending was to increase to about 20 trillion rubles (about 59 trillion yen) and of this about 19 trillion rubles (about 56 trillion yen) was to be allocated to the Ministry of Defense (Ria-Novosti; December 13, 2010). Furthermore, the First Deputy Minister of Defense Popovkin (at that time) remarked that the 19 trillion rubles, about 80% would be allocated to the procurement of new equipment, approximately 10% to R&D, while modernizing its nuclear triad would be made a priority (Ria-Novosti, February 24, 2011). The Russian Presidential Executive Office on its website (May 10, 2011) released a statement from President Medvedev stating that at the end of the previous year, a new state policy on military equipment had been adopted. Also, the Russian Ministry of Defense on its website (March 18, 2011) released a statement from Minister of Defense Serdyukov stating that this policy had been approved by the President in 2010, but no specific date was given as to when the policy was actually approved.

168 By the end of 2007, Russia had made steady progress toward establishing a completely professional army, such as allotting contract NCOs to permanent readiness units. But Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov commented that contract NCOs “leave the army after two years of duties,” and that “while the best method is to have a completely contract-based system for the military,” “we cannot bear such a heavy financial burden.” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta; March 23, 2010), The number of contract NCOs is to be greatly decreased; they will be allotted important duties, while other duties will be given only to conscript servicepersons (land.ru; June 9, 2010). From January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months. In order to alleviate the adverse effects that these kinds of difficulties in securing personnel and the shortening of the conscription period would have on its combat strength, the Russian army has been aiming to make military work more appealing, to improve its management of potential conscripts, to allocate the appropriate personnel to the position best suited to them, and to raise the abilities of its servicepersons through education and training. On the other hand, Chief of the General Staff Makarov has stated that the number of contract NCOs are to be increased and so attention should be paid to future developments.

169 According to the website of the Ministry of Defense, on March 4, 2011, the first regiment of RS-24 missiles had been operationally deployed in a division in Teykovo, in the Ivanovo district northeast of Moscow.

170 It is considered that construction of four Borey-class SSBNs is currently progressing.

171 Between September 2005 and October 2010, out of 14 test launches 7 were successful. Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov stated that Bulava would be introduced into service after six test launches (Lenta.ru; October 29, 2010). Also, it is reported that the 15th launch took place successfully in June 2011.
countries were obligated to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012 (excluding nuclear warheads in storage) (the Treaty of Moscow) has been invalidated.

173 The United States announced in June 2011 that Russia’s deployed strategic warheads numbered 1,537, and that its deployed delivery platforms numbered 521 as of May 2, 2011.

174 The need for new equipment is touched on in the annual speech by President Medvedev in November 2009, and in the military doctrine that was formulated in February 2010. On March, 2010 at the Extended Defense Ministry Collegium, President Medvedev commented that by 2020 it was possible to increase to 70% the ratio of new equipment by updating equipment by an average of 9 to 11% per year. Also, Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov, in comments about the scale of the new state policy on military equipment, stated that spending would increase to 20 trillion rubles (about 59 trillion yen), of which about 19 trillion rubles (about 56 trillion yen) was to be allocated to the Ministry of Defence (Ria-Novosti; December 13, 2010)

175 While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, a fifth generation fighter is considered to have more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth. According to various news reports, Russia aims to mass-produce and equip its fifth generation fighter PAK FA (Future Frontline Aircraft System) by 2015. The commander of the Russian Air force, General Alexandre Zeline, stated that the initial batch of mass produced fifth generation fighters would be installed with the engines not for the fifth-generation fighters (Ria-Novosti; July 13, 2010), and there is a possibility that the development of the engine has been delayed. Also, Sukhoi’s General Director Pogosyan stated that 40 test flights have been completed up to the present time (Ria-Novosti; November 22, 2010).

176 From the lessons learned during the conflict with Georgia that Russia took longer time to transport military forces by naval vessels, it was pointed out that Russia needed to strengthen its amphibious capabilities. Based on this review, from 2008 Russia is said to have studied the procurement of amphibious assault ships from a number of countries, including France. And since March 2010, it has begun exclusive negotiations with France. In December 2010 it decided to purchase two ships from a consortium with France and in January 2011 an agreement was reached that two of the ships would be constructed in France and a further two would be constructed in Russia. Reports have suggested that the ships will be deployed to the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, but Chief of the General Staff Makarov stated that the ships were particularly needed in the Far East region and that for the defense of the Kuril Islands Russia needs a means of maneuver to deploy units swiftly when necessary (Interfax; June 8, 2010).

177 From June to September 2009, the Caucasus-2009 large-scale military exercise was carried out in the Northern Caucasus Military District; Ladoga-2009 in the Leningrad Military District and the Siberian Military District, and Zapad-2009 in the Moscow Military District and the Volga-Urals Military District. In addition, between June and July 2010 Vostok-2010 was conducted in the Far Eastern Military District and Siberian Military District (each of the military district names were the names at that time).

178 Eastern Military District’s headquarters is in Khabarovsk

179 As part of its series of military reforms, Russia has reorganized its air force and air defense force into the Air Defense Command.

180 Vostok-2010 was carried out in June and July 2010 in the Far Eastern Military District and the Siberian Military District. In addition to the units from these military districts, permanent readiness units from the Volga-Urals Military District (at that time), Northern Fleet and Black Sea Fleet naval vessels and air force fighters stationed in Eurasia deployed within the (former) Far Eastern Military District,.. Also, units from the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Security Service, and ministries responsible for dealing with national emergencies also participated. Moreover, as part of Vostok-2010, related exercises were conducted on the Etorofu Island. As an exercise to verify its military reforms, the Central 2011 military exercises are slated to be held in the Central Asia in 2011.

181 During the conflict with Georgia in August 2008, the Russian military not only put in troops from the North Caucasus region, but also those from other regions as well.

182 Estimated number of military personnel within the former Far Eastern Military District and the former Siberian Military District is approximately 80,000.

183 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division comprised of two regiments are stationed on the Etorofu Island and the Kunashiri Island. It is a defensive division whose purpose is the defense of
landing and, following the military’s progress in reforming divisions into brigades, it is Russia’s only
machine gun and artillery division.

After President Medvedev became the first head of the state to visit the Kunashiri Island in November
2010, in December 2010 the Kunashiri Island and the Etorofu Island were each visited by First Deputy
Prime Minister Shuvalov, in January to February 2011 by Regional Development Minister Basargin,
and in May 2011 by Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov. Further, in January 2011 Deputy Defense Minister
Dmitry Bulgakov and in February 2011 Minister of Defense Serdyukov visited the Kunashiri Island
and the Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there.

Russia calls the four islands of the Northern Territories and the Kuril Islands “Kuril” Islands.

President Medvedev stated that “the additional equipment to be deployed there (on the Kunashiri
Island and the Etorofu Island) must be necessary and sufficient and modern enough to ensure the safety
of these islands (“Kuril Islands”), which are an integral part of Russia’s federal territories. The Minister
of Defense commented that (regarding updating the equipment and reconstructing the military
infrastructure on the Kunashiri Island and the Etorofu Island), “All proposals to be submitted will be
made ready by the end of February” (Presidential Executive Office website; February 9, 2011). In
addition, the maintenance of infrastructure, such as the airport and the port, are being carried out in
accordance with the “Kuril” Islands Social and Economic Development Plan. Moreover, according to
reports in March 2011, the General Staff submitted a detailed report to the Minister of Defense on plans
for updating equipment, including the deployment of the Bastion coast defense missile system and the
Tor M2 ground-to-air missile system (Rossiyskaya Gazeta; March 2, 2011). In addition, the Minister of
Defense stated in May 2011 that the Ministry of Defense had formulated a plan to strengthen its
strategic presence on the “Kuril” Islands and that it would submit the document for the approval of the
state governing body in the near future (Ria-Novosti; May 11, 2011).

During the 1998 visit to Russia by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Sergeev (at that time), he
commented that the number of Russian troops stationed in the northern territories would be steadily
decreased. Also, a senior official of the General Staff stated that troops on the “Kuril” Islands would be
maintained at around 3,500, within the process of reorganizing the division into a brigade (Interfax;
February 15, 2011).

The large-scale military exercise Vostok-2010 was enacted in the Far Eastern and Siberian Military
Districts (at that time) in June and July 2010, while in September 2010 the Darhan 3 joint exercises
with Mongolia were carried out in the Siberian Military District (name at that time). Also, Eastern
Military District Commander Sidenko has stated that during 2011, units from the Eastern Military
District would take part in international joint exercises with troops from foreign countries
(Ria-Novosti; December 14, 2010).

The number of cases of the Russian fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru,
and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and disclosed is as follows: seven cases in the Soya
Strait in FY2010 (three in 2008, three in 2009), two cases in the Tsugaru Strait (two in 2008, none in
2009), and seven cases in the Tsushima Strait (one in 2008, ten in 2009), showing an increase in the last
few years.

Long-range flights in the vicinity around Japan were carried out in areas surrounding Japan by Tu-95
long range bombers in September, October, November, and December 2010 and February 2011 (as of
May 2011).

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008).

According to the speech by President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and
Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and Annual State of the Nation
Address (November 2010).

Following the Russia-European Union (EU) summit held in May and June of 2010, Russia and the EU
released a Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernization, launching a partnership for
modernization in fields that would help promote growth and innovation; they included, increasing
investment, strengthening trade and economic relationships, and integrating and regulating
technologies. Moreover, after the U.S.-Russia summit in June 2010, both countries released a Joint
Statement by the Presidents on a Strategic Partnership in Innovation, by which they determined to
cooperate on innovations and other fields.

According to the speech by President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and
Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and Annual State of the Nation
Address (November 2010).
After the conflict with Georgia in August 2008, President Medvedev indicated that Russia recognized as one of its five principles of diplomacy the area of privileged interests for Russia. The SCO aims to maintain peace and security in the region and to deal jointly with terrorism. The SCO is carrying out the Peace Mission anti-terror joint exercises and is working toward restoring stability in Afghanistan.

In April 2004, the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments approved the ratification of an agreement to extend the stationing period for the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed in the Ukrainian territory of Crimea for a further 25 years from 2017. Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia continues to have troops stationed in Georgian territory in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others are attempting to maintain a distance from Russia. Each member state of GUAM, a regional structure formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (the acronym “GUAM” is composed of the initial letters of the member states) has been taking mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. On the other hand, some points out that the deterioration of Georgia’s relationship with Russia may have invited severe economic consequences, and there have been attempts by Georgia to urge dialogue with Russia. In Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych was appointed as the new President in February 2010, its relations with Russia are improving, as indicated by the agreement on the extension of the stationing period for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which had been a pressing issue.

In 1999, a major terrorist incident occurred in the Republic of Chechnya with the involvement of insurgents. Many prominent terrorists have been killed or captured in the Russian government’s sweep operations against pro-independence opposition groups. In January 2010, Russia newly established the North Caucasian Federal District and initiated economic and social measures in an attempt to stabilize the situation in the region in addition to the anti-terrorism measures it has carried out up to the present time. But in recent years, a number of attacks have occurred against important persons and the police officers in Ingush and Dagestan, which border Chechnya. In addition, there have also been terrorist attacks in regions other than the North Caucasus against infrastructure facilities, such as transport-related facilities and power plants.

In August 2001, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs, and Tajikistan supplied one unit troop (units below the level of a battalion) from each country to form a unit of about 1,000 to 1,300 troops. Its headquarters is in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzs. In May 2004, Tajikistan contributed an additional two units and Russia and Kazakhstan both one unit to expand it to a nine-unit battalion of about 4,500 troops. Russia concluded a border security agreement with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in April 2009 and signed agreements over the establishment of Russian military bases within both South Ossetian and Abkhazian territories, in April 2010 with South Ossetia and in February 2010 with Abkhazia, respectively.

Both countries are obligated by the treaty to reduce to 1,550 their deployed strategic warheads and to 700 their deployed delivery platforms within seven years of the treaty coming into effect. The United States announced in June 2011 that Russia’s deployed strategic warheads numbered 1,537 and that its deployed platforms numbered 521 as of May 2, 2011.

The United States plans to set in place MD systems by 2011, which include sea-based missiles and mobile radar, and land-based missiles in a phased manner from then until 2020, on the grounds that the threat to Europe from Iran’s medium- and short-range missiles to which the United States needs to respond has developed more rapidly than predicted.

Statement by the Russian Federation concerning missile defense (April 8, 2010).

At the NRC summit, it was agreed to discuss pursuing cooperation on missile defense. They agreed to jointly work on a threat assessment of missile defense, and decided to resume Theater Missile Defense cooperation. In addition, they determined to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation, the results of which were to be assessed at the NRC Defense Minister-level meeting held in June 2010. In addition, the joint statement contained facilitating railway transit of non-lethal items of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through Russian territory in support of Afghanistan, and others.

Russia claims that Russia’s participation in cooperation with NATO on missile defense need to be on a completely equal footing. Russia also claims that it will face the following alternative in the next 10
years; either an agreement is reached on missile defense and create a complete mechanism of cooperation, or failing to do so, a new stage of the arms race will start. (Press conference held after the NRC summit (November 20, 2010) and the Annual State of the Nation Address (November 30, 2010))

At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), an agreement was reached; on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and; on complying with the current CFE Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty came into effect. Dissatisfied with NATO members having refused to ratify the adopted CFE Treaty due to Russian forces not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova, although Russia ratified it, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this treaty. At the time of writing, only four countries ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has yet to come into effect. Besides this, Russia has proposed dissolving the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008).

To strengthen the Russian economy, Russia considers utilizing the potential of the Asia-Pacific region an important issue(according to the speech by President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010)).

Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). In addition, at the 5th East Asian Summit in October 2010, Russia’s participation in this conference from 2011 onwards was confirmed, while at Russia’s proposal, the 2012 APEC Summit is scheduled to be held in Vladivostok.

According to the website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the value of Russia’s arms exports in 2010 was approximately 6.04 billion dollars, making it the world's second largest exporter after the United States (about 8.64 billion dollars).

Russia concluded sales contract with Indonesia for the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003 and 2007, and with Malaysia and Vietnam for the Su-30 in 2003, and has delivered the fighters to these countries. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam in 2009 for Su-30 fighters and a Kilo-class submarine. In March 2010, Russia agreed to deliver an aircraft carrier to India by the end of 2012, and concluded a sales contract for the MiG-29K fighter. Moreover, in 2006 Russia concluded sales contracts with Algeria and Venezuela for arms, including the Su-30 fighter, and has delivered some of these arms. Russia’s exports to China have included the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. But against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some points out that the value of its exports to China has been declining.

According to a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), although the number of incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia had been declining every year, from 170 cases in 2003 to 158 cases in 2004, 102 cases in 2005, 83 cases in 2006, 70 cases in 2007, 54 cases in 2008, and 45 cases in 2009, it increased to 70 cases in 2010.

CARAT is a general term for a series of the bilateral exercises held between the United States and seven Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Cambodia (joined for the first time in 2010), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). In 2010, Bangladesh also participated in CARAT. A similar exercise known as the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) is also conducted between the United States and six Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).

The ratio of defense budget to the national budget has stood at 24–32% from 2000 to 2011. Singapore has the policy of keeping its defense budget to less than 6% of its GDP, and this ratio was about 3~5% from 2000 to 2010.

Based on the perception that national defense cannot be achieved by conventional military force alone, being faced with limited human resources and changes in the nature of modern warfare, Total Defense is promoted whereby people are organized in five components: Psychological, Social, Economic, Civil, and Military Defense.

The Third Generation Singapore Forces place emphasis on three aspects: integration/networking, holistic advancements, and technological advancement.

219 Singapore conducts flight training by establishing detachments in the United States, the F-15SG in Idaho and the F-16 in Arizona, and also carries out training by dispatching its troops for a long period of time to France, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, and other countries.

220 Singapore concluded a Defence Cooperation Agreement with India in 2003; as well as other similar agreements with Germany in 2005; with China and Australia in 2008; and with New Zealand, Vietnam and South Korea in 2009. In December 2009, Japan and Singapore signed a Memorandum on Defence Exchanges.

221 Singapore dispatched landing ships, transport planes and air tankers to Iraq for a total of 11 times between November 2003 and December 2008, while it sent dental officers and construction engineering corps to Afghanistan between May 2007 and January 2010, and deployed an unmanned aerial vehicle task group in August 2010 on a surveillance mission. Furthermore, after April 2009, the Singapore Armed Forces twice dispatched landing craft task forces for counter-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; after April 2011, it dispatched one Air Force F-50 maritime patrol aircraft, which operates under the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151).

222 Based on the website of the Malaysian Ministry of Defense.

223 The Malaysian Ministry of Defense explains Self-Reliance, Regional Cooperation and Foreign Aid as follows:
- The pursuit of self-reliance involves not only combat forces but also a logistical support network and the defense industry.
- Regional Cooperation involves the promotion of strong bilateral defense cooperation among ASEAN countries.
- Foreign Aid involves seeking assistance from outside the region when the level of threat is beyond the country’s capability as well as the utilization of the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

224 As of the end of May 2011, Malaysia has dispatched a total of 1,098 personnel on U.N. peacekeeping operations, including 781 to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and 232 to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).


227 IMET provides the military personnel of U.S. allies and friendly nations with opportunities for studying and training at U.S. military educational institutions. In action against Indonesia’s suppression of independence movements in Timor-Leste, the United States in 1992 suspended IMET for Indonesia. Though sanctions against Indonesia were partially lifted in 1995, the United States suspended IMET again in 1999.

228 Specifically, this agreement integrates existing cooperative activities in such areas as security dialogues, education and training, defense industries, procurement of military equipment, maritime security, and other mutually agreed areas of cooperation.

229 As of the end of May 2011, Indonesia has dispatched a total of 1,799 personnel on U.N. peacekeeping operations, including 1,434 to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and 192 to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

230 According to Defence of Thailand 2008, United Defence means the consolidation of national power by the armed forces in every dimension including military, political, economic, socio-psychological, and scientific and technological aspects, for national defense. Active Defence means that the armed forces prepare, reinforce, develop, and administer all military resources so that they are self-sufficient and ready to be used as a deterrent to solve problems and to settle disputes.

231 Based on Defence of Thailand 2008.

In southern Thailand, there have been frequent attacks and explosions reportedly caused by Islamic armed groups calling for separation and independence from Thailand.

232 In February 2011 and from April to May of the same year, the Thai and Cambodian armies clashed at the Preah Vihear Temple and surrounding areas, resulting in injuries and casualties on both sides.

233 The aircraft carrier Chakri Naruebet was built in Spain and commissioned in 1997. The flattop has a full displacement of some 11,500 tons, and is some 180 m long and some 30 m wide. Its main tasks are search and rescue operations and EEZ surveillance; however, some point out that the aircraft carrier rarely goes to sea due to funding shortages.
Based on Defence of Thailand 2008.

234 Thailand, the United States, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, the ROK, and Malaysia participated in the Cobra Gold exercise in February 2011, with some 60 personnel taking part from Japan’s Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces.

235 As of the end of May 2011, Thailand has dispatched a total of 866 personnel for UN peacekeeping activities, including 821 for the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and 18 for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

236 Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), which was a status established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nunn Amendment of 1987, allows designated countries to receive benefits in military areas such as eligibility to have military equipment. A status of MNNA also strongly represents a designated country’s close military cooperation with the United States. Apart from Thailand, the 13 other countries of Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, ROK, Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan have been designated as MNNA.

237 In light of the fact that the number of Thai commercial and fishing vessels that were attacked by pirates off the Coast of Somalia in 2009 totaled six, Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched navy vessels and special forces from September 2010 to January 2011 to protect Thai ships and crew using sea routes in that area, and to share responsibility as a member of the international community and contribute toward resolving this international security problems.

238 The all-people national defense is described as efforts to build up defense capabilities by combining the unity of people and the political system under the guidance of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

239 The United States amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, opening the way for exports of non-lethal defense articles to Vietnam on the condition of case-by-case licenses or approvals.

240 The Philippine Constitution states that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines,” unless the Senate formally approves a treaty and furthermore, if Congress requires it, that the people of the Philippines vote for the treaty, since the end of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991. However, in addition to the mutual defense treaty and the military assistance agreement, the Philippines concluded the Philippines–United States Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998 and the Mutual Logistics Supply Agreement in 2002, maintaining close military relations with the United States.

241 When the 1947 Philippine–U.S. agreement on military bases was revised in 1966, the time limit for the presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Negotiations regarding the Military Bases Agreement began in 1992 but were difficult, and furthermore Clark Air Base was rendered unusable due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. Although the two nations signed a U.S.–Philippines friendship cooperation treaty the same year, the Philippines Senate rejected it, and since they could not agree on an alternate treaty, in December 1991 the Philippine government announced, with U.S. agreement, that the Military Bases Agreement would be terminated. Clark Air Base Field was returned in November 1991, followed by the return of the Subic Naval Base in November 1991. U.S. forces stationed at the two bases were moved to Guam, Okinawa, and other locations. Subsequently, the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, providing for the legal status of U.S. military personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.

242 Balikatan has been conducted since 1991, but it was suspended between 1995 and 1999 due to the domestic conditions of the Philippines. It was resumed in 2000.

243 Along with the commissioning of the JAS-39, all the F-5 fighters owned by Thailand are scheduled to be decommissioned in 2011.

244 Defence of Thailand 2008 states that “Major equipment of the Navy must be modernized to meet these needs and must also be balanced with our neighboring states so that the Royal Thailand Navy can jointly engage in regional security cooperation” and “submarines will be efficient deterrent weapons and offensive defence to enhance capability of underwater operation for naval force in the Gulf of Thailand and the Coast of Andaman Sea.” In January 2010, Commander of the Royal Thai Navy Admiral Khamthorn Pumhiran reportedly remarked that “The reason for acquiring submarines is to fulfill our military strategy. The submarines can serve many purposes and is a necessity. We want to make sure that once we are able to afford submarines, we’ll be ready for them.”

245 The vice president of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-run weapons exporter, reportedly said in August 2009 that the company will supply Vietnam with eight Su-30 fighters by the end of 2010.
It was reported in December 2009 that Vietnam has agreed to purchase six Kilo-class submarines for a total of some $2 billion, and Russia will build them at the pace of one submarine a year.

Based on the Military Balance (2010), published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), etc.

The areas surrounding the Spratly Islands are promising treasure troves of offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. In addition, the area is a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fishing resources.

Currently, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are claiming territorial rights over the Spratly Islands. With regard to the Paracel Islands, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam are claiming territorial rights.

The “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” is a political declaration that clarifies general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea.

The draft “Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” was proposed by the Philippines at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 1999. The Code of Conduct would provide more concrete behavior than those stipulated in the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” and possess legally binding force.

In September 2004, following up on the agreement with the Philippines on joint oil field exploration in the waters of the Spratly Islands, in March 2005, an agreement was concluded with the Philippines and Vietnam to commence joint exploration for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. However, the Philippines did not renew or extend the agreement, and withdrew from it in July 2008.

In 1988, an armed conflict arose between the Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces over the Spratly Islands, and although the situation remained tense for some time, no major military conflicts arose after that. However, many countries went up against China in opposition of the “Law on the Territorial Sea” in 1992 as well as the construction of a building on Mischief Reef in 1995 and the expansion of the same building later. Even after that, for instance, China conducted military exercises on the Paracel Islands in November 2007, and it was reported in December that the Chinese government approved the establishment of “Sansha city” including the Spratly Islands, resulting in civil demonstrations in Vietnam against China. In 2008, Vietnam and the Philippines criticized and expressed concern about the inspection visit to Itu Aba Island of the Spratly Islands by then Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian. In February 2009, China protested against the Philippines’ legislation of the “Philippines Archipelagic Law,” while Taiwan and Vietnam declared that the Spratly Islands was part of their respective territories, and that they would not acknowledge any actions that infringed upon their territorial rights. In November the same year, the Hainan Provincial government of China decided to establish a villagers’ committee on a part of the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam condemned as an “act of infringement of sovereignty.” During the same month, China dispatched fisheries enforcement vessels to the Paracel Islands, and Vietnam protested to China, calling it a serious infringement of sovereignty. In February 2011, the Chinese navy conducted a military exercise on the Paracel Islands. The Vietnamese government protested to China, claiming that the exercise was an “infringement of Vietnam’s sovereignty,” and that it “violated the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” In May the same year, China condemned Vietnam’s elections on the Spratly Islands as unilateral actions that were illegal, invalid, and infringements of China’s sovereignty, while Vietnam claimed that they were matters of internal affairs. At the end of May, the Philippines expressed serious concern against China because China seemed to construct new buildings such as station poles in the west of waters around the Spratly Islands.

For instance, after 2009, in the waters surrounding the Paracel Islands, the Chinese authorities captured Vietnamese fishing boats several times, and in 2010 as well. In May 2011, it was reported that a surveillance vessel of China’s State Oceanic Administration cut an investigation cable towed by a Vietnamese resource exploration vessel. Vietnam protested to China on this case, calling it a serious infringement of Vietnam’s sovereignty and rights of jurisdiction in its Exclusive Economic Zone. However, China claimed that it was just a normal maritime law enforcement activity in the waters under China’s jurisdiction. Vietnam also claimed that it faced similar obstructive activities from China in June 2011, and civilian anti-Chinese demonstrations occurred in Vietnam as a consequence of these incidents.

In the waters around the Spratly Islands, for instance, in March 2011, a research vessel of the Philippines conducting investigations into fuel resources near the Reed Bank was ordered to withdraw by a Chinese vessel. The Philippines protested to China against its obstruction of the Philippines’
activities in its own Exclusive Economic Zone. In May the same year, it was reported that Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the same waters had received threatening shots from vessels under the Chinese authorities.

On the other hand, there were also cases whereby Chinese fishing vessels were captured. For instance, in April 2010, it was reported that Malaysian naval vessels and aircrafts had been tracking a Chinese fishery surveillance vessel.

China has, for instance, deployed its government vessels to the respective departments in charge to these waters, including the Yuzheng 310 responsible for fisheries management under the Bureau of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture (September 2010), Haijian 75 (October 2010) and Haijian 84 (May 2011) responsible for maritime surveillance under the State Oceanic Administration, showing its efforts to strengthen law enforcement activities in the South China Sea.

Based on the principles of the consensus system and of non-interference in internal affairs, ASEAN failed to take effective measures against Myanmar, etc., and thus the direction of organizational reform attracted much attention. The ASEAN Charter has adopted the principle of unanimity as before; thus, when a consensus cannot be reached, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision is to be made. Furthermore, the Charter prescribed that in the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision and that ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. The ASEAN Charter strives for the enhancement of its organization and institutions as mentioned above.

At the Fourth ADMM held in May 2010, a consensus was reached for the establishment of the ADMM Plus.

At the 5th East Asia Summit (EAS) that was held in conjunction with the 17th ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in October 2010, an official consensus was reached for the participation of the United States and Russia in the EAS from 2011.

The patrol is made up of the “Malacca Strait Sea Patrol” (formed in 2004 by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to guard the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from pirates, and in cooperation among the navies of each country, they commenced patrols in their own territories under the “Trilateral Coordinated Patrol.” Thailand was added to the latter in 2008.), “Eyes in the Sky” launched in 2005, a joint patrol undertaken by aircraft, and the “Intelligence Exchange Group” started in 2006.

Aimed at strengthening cooperation among the maritime security agencies through the establishment of systems for sharing information relating to piracy and cooperative networks among the respective countries. As of the end of March 2011, 17 countries are party to the agreement—Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, the ROK, Laos, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.

As at the end of March 2011, IMT member countries comprise Malaysia, Japan, Brunei, Libya, the EU, and Norway; NGOs are also members.

As at the end of March 2011, IMT member countries comprise Malaysia, Japan, Brunei, Libya, the EU, and Norway; NGOs are also members.

Japan decided to join the International Contact Group (ICG) in December 2009. The group comprises Japan, U.K., Turkey, and four NGOs, and provides advice to Mindanao peace authorities as well as participates as an observer in peace negotiations.

The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million.

The annual report on national defense’, published in May 2010, pointed out that the Indian national defense is linked to other neighboring countries through the emergence of terrorism aligned with ideologies, the spread of small arms, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the globalization of the economy. It is based on the assumption that security issues and challenges have become international concerns because of the 9/11 attacks and other terrorism taking place around the world after the end of the Cold War.

The number of personnel from the Indian forces engaged in U.N. peacekeeping operations has been ranked either third or fourth in the world since 2001.

In October 2008, the Indian government approved the dispatch of Navy vessels on a patrol mission to the Gulf of Aden, and in November 2008, a frigate of the Indian Navy sank a fishing vessel which had been hijacked by pirates.

Regarding the procurement of multipurpose fighters, Defense Minister Antony has cited the provision of the contract which calls for the introduction of technology created through joint development. And it is reported that the contract was planned be closed by March 2012.

India and Russia signed an agreement to jointly develop and produce fifth-generation fighter jets in October 2007. They also signed another agreement in December 2010 to develop and produce 200 to
250 fighter jets, specifying two-seat models and enhanced thrust engines for the aircraft to be
developed and produced. It is the largest military procurement in India’s history.

India also conducted a test launch of the “upgraded Agni-2” in December 2010; however, it was
reported that the test had failed.

In December 2007, Dr. V. K. Saraswat, Chief Controller at the Defence Research & Development
Organization (DRDO) of India’s Ministry of Defence said that the “Agni-4” is still in the design stage
and so we cannot give a date for the trials and several tests remain before we operationalize it.
However, in February 2010, he stated to reporters that the “Agni-5” is categorized as an ICBM with a
range of over 5,000 km and that there are plans for a test launch to take place within a year.

In March 2011, in Wheeler Island in eastern Orissa Province, India conducted tests of intercepting
ballistic missiles, and it was reported that it succeeded in shooting them down five times in a row. India
has also announced that it successfully conducted similar tests in November 2006, December 2007,
March 2009, and July 2010

Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters at the press conference during his visit to
India in February 2008, “Missile defense talks with India are in the very initial stages. We have just
started to talk about conducting a joint analysis about what India’s needs would be in the realm of
missile defense and where cooperation between us might help advance that.”

From April to May 2009, the Indian Navy dispatched a fleet and held joint exercises with the U.S.

Then U.S. President Bush called India a “natural partner” of the United States.

The two countries agreed to enhance and strengthen the “global strategic partnership”. The occasion
prompted the United States to show its support for the first time to the move allowing India to become
a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. They also agreed to abolish embargoes against
India of advanced technologies for various fields including national defense.

In cooperation with India, the United States intends to provide India with capabilities and
technologies required for the country to improve its defense capabilities to an appropriate level,
including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighters.

Seventeen Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers participated from the United States.

Indian solders got on board a U.S. amphibious ship for special operations and conducted a military
simulation to offer humanitarian assistance and disaster relief during an amphibious operation.

Originally, the “Malabar” exercise was a bilateral exercise between the United States and India, but
five countries including Japan, Australia, and Singapore participated in “Malabar 07-2”, and three
countries including Japan participated in “Malabar 09”. In addition, “Malabar 10” and “Malabar 11”
were conducted as a bilateral exercise.

India purchased an Austin-class Amphibious Transport Dock from the U.S. Navy in 2007, and the
vessel was commissioned as INS Jalashwa in June 2007. This vessel is the first former U.S. vessel
possessed by Indian Navy.

The first aircraft was delivered to India in December 2010, with a total of six aircraft scheduled to be
delivered.

P-8 is a new type of U.S. Navy patrol aircraft. The United States had not exported the aircraft overseas
before it did to India. A total of eight aircraft are scheduled to be delivered to India.

India requested the United States to sell 10 C-17 transport aircraft to India in January 2010. The
purchase agreement was announced when U.S. President Obama visited India in November 2010.

In the agreement, China recognized that Sikkim belongs to India. Also, the two countries agreed to
continue efforts for the early settlement of the pending border issue.

The two countries agreed to hold regular summit meetings and established the target of doubling the
bilateral trade amount to $40 billion by 2010. They also signed an agreement on such issues as
investment protection and mutual establishment of new Consulates General.

At the talks, both countries agreed to continue talks in order to reach an equitable accord acceptable to
both countries. They also verified that efforts would be made to protect the peace and security of border
regions.

The first China-India defense and security consultations was held in Beijing in November 2007,
followed by the second round held in Delhi in December 2008.

The objective of this exercise is reported to be the strengthening of mutual understanding/trust and the
promotion of relationships between Chinese and Indian military forces. Hand-in-Hand 2007 in
December 2007 and Hand-in-Hand 2008 in December 2008 saw the participation of about 100 military
personnel from both sides.

291 The joint statement included deepening of the strategic partnership.
292 Both countries signed agreements including an agreement regarding a military technology cooperation program to run from 2011 through 2020, an agreement regarding maintenance for equipment and weapons sold by Russia to India, the November 12, 2007 agreement protocol regarding cooperation in the development and manufacturing of military transports, and an agreement regarding cooperation in nuclear energy use for peaceful purposes.

293 In March and December 2010, India announced the successful test launch of the same missile “Brahmos.”
294 The two countries signed a document concerning a joint development project for mid-size, multi-purpose transport aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. In addition, study was made of a proposal to provide India with additional T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighters, and Mi-17 helicopters within the framework of the agreement already concluded. It was confirmed to enhance the production capabilities of the Brahmos cruise missiles now under joint nuclear development by the two countries as well as to aim to develop the air launch version of the missile. An intergovernmental agreement was concluded concerning the contract for licensed production of engines for MiG-29 fighters.
295 The two countries signed an agreement on the joint development of multi-role transport aircraft in September 2010.
296 In addition to the joint design of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the two countries also concluded an agreement for the supply of the cruise missile “Brahmos,” that was being jointly developed, to the Indian Army, and issued a joint statement on contents including the expansion of trade, strengthening cooperation in the nuclear energy sector, and Russia’s support for India as a strong candidate for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.
297 The joint exercise “Indra” has been conducted since 2003, and has been held a total of five times up until “Indra 2010.”
298 At the same time, India signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN and the ASEAN–India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.
299 Although the cleanup operations in the respective areas were declared successful, others have pointed out that it did not constitute a complete cleanup as the armed insurgents had fled to various parts of the country.
300 President Zardari delivered the first address to the Parliament in September 2008. He said that his administration would continue the three-pronged strategy of the previous administration but that the use of force would only be used as a last resort against terrorism, advocating the necessity of renouncing violence and making peace with those who are willing to make peace as well as of investing in the development and social improvement of the local people. He also stressed the need of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) reform to root out terrorism. While he asked the government to stay firm in its resolve to not allow its soil to be used for terrorist activities against foreign countries, he also stated that Pakistan would not tolerate the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity by any power in the name of combating terrorism.
301 Pakistan also conducted a test launch of the “Babur (Hatf-VII)” cruise missile in February 2011.
302 From November to December 2006 Pakistan conducted a series of initial test launches of the “Ghauri (Hatf-V)” and “Shaheen (Hatf-IV)” intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
303 The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir territorial issue. India’s territorial claim over Kashmir is based on a document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through referendum in accordance with the 1948 U.N. Resolution.
304 In August 2005, the two countries agreed on the prior notification of ballistic missile testing and on the establishment of a hotline between their Vice Foreign Ministers.
305 In December 2008, General Kayani, Chief of Army Staff, released a statement after a meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, He Yafei, who visited Pakistan to ease tensions. He demonstrated Pakistan’s stance of avoiding armed conflict, highlighting the need to de-escalate and avoid conflict in the interests of peace and security.
306 While both Prime Ministers agreed that talks were the only method to move forward (with relations between the two countries) and to separate (Pakistani) antiterrorism measures from (the restarting of) the multiple dialogues (between India and Pakistan), a specific date for the restart of talks was not
According to the website of the Pakistan Air Force, an agreement was concluded in 2008 on the joint development of four AWACS with China.

Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out operations to sweep up terrorists in the border regions of Afghanistan. Also, Pakistan started dispatching warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. In appreciation of this support from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Further, in March 2011 the navies of Australia, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated in the multinational joint military training exercise “Aman 2011” hosted by Pakistan.

At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India’s nuclear test were lifted.

Regarding the possibility of extending nuclear energy cooperation to Pakistan, then President Bush only referred to the differences between Pakistan and India in terms of energy needs and history. In response, Pakistan said that it was important for the United States to treat Pakistan and India equally in order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.

The United States has expressed the intention to provide 12 RQ-7 “Shadow” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to Pakistan.

On May 3, 2011, then Director of the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Leon E. Panetta acknowledged in an interview that the United States had not informed Pakistan of the operation beforehand due to fears that Pakistan would tip off the target. On May 6, it was reported that Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani had stated his concerns that the U.S. Forces’ operations in Pakistan may have been an infringement of Pakistan’s sovereign rights. On the other hand, on May 27, Secretary of State Clinton and Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mullen visited Pakistan and met with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani in apparent efforts at improving relations.

In September 2005, then President Musharraf reportedly demonstrated his recognition that the Khan network had probably exported a dozen ultracentrifuges to North Korea. In May 2008, BBC News reported that the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan said allegations that he passed on nuclear secrets were false. In the interview, he said that there was pressure put on him to accept the charges “in the national interest.”


It has been decided that the destroyer combat system will be a U.S.-made Aegis system equipped with SM-6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles.

In addition to the two principles above, the government was committed to the funding principle that provided 2.5% annual fixed price indexation from 2009-2010 to 2029-2030. However, in the defense budget published in May 2009, application of this was postponed until after 2013-2014. In the defense budget issued in May 2011, this year’s defense funding was decreased by approximately 0.9% from the previous year’s total funding. The Australian Department of Defence has been promoting to improve efficiency and reorganize the budget to accord with current circumstances, due to factors such as delayed delivery of newly developed equipments.

This review will address issues including the rise of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean rim as a region of global strategic significance, the growth of military power projection capabilities of countries in the Asia Pacific, and energy security issues associated with expanding offshore resource exploitation in the North West region. The review will complement the work currently underway with the United States on the ongoing United States Global Force Posture Review, and is scheduled to be reflected in Australia’s next Defence White Paper to be released in 2014.

A trilateral security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. The United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand’s non-nuclear policy.

The AUSMIN 2010 Joint Communiqué gave guidelines for 1) the global challenges of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, 2) the 21st Century security challenges in areas of space and cyberspace, 3) the global economy and international development, 4) regional challenges and opportunities including regional architecture such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), territorial disputes, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and China, and 5) defense cooperation-related
issues including force posture, missile defense, the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, and the joint use of bases.

321 Talisman Saber is a biennial joint exercise between the United States and Australia, first carried out in 2005, and aims to improve readiness and interoperability in operations ranging from traditional wars to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. In 2009, it included more than 24,000 troops participating from the United States and Australia in amphibious assault training, urban combat training, and airborne training.

322 The Joint Combined Training Capability Memorandum of Understanding was concluded in 2009 to improve the quality of joint training and reduce cost.

323 Australia announced its participation in the U.S. missile defense program in December 2003. At the AUSMIN in 2004, the United States and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a 25-year framework for missile defense system development and testing (details of the MOU have not been disclosed). In August 2004, Australia selected the Aegis air warfare system as the combat system for new air warfare destroyers (AWD). It is suggested that the AWD would support the ballistic missile defense system.


325 The 2009 Defence White Paper states that “China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin…. But the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans. China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernization appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan.” In its regularly scheduled press conference of May 5, 2008, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense stated that “the modernization of China’s military strength is not a threat to any nation. Related nations should view this objectively and without bias.”

326 From a speech given by then Minister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon at the Australian Defence Force Academy on March 10, 2009.

327 The 13th Australia–China Strategic Defense Dialogue was held in December 2010. Note that these talks were raised to the chief of staff/secretary of defense minister level in 2008.

328 The 2009 Defence White Paper states, “Developing our defence relationship with China is therefore a priority. Greater engagement is essential to encourage transparency about Chinese military capabilities and intentions, understand each other’s approaches and secure greater cooperation in areas of shared interest.”

329 In addition to carrying out joint search and rescue exercises, the first such exercises between the navies of Australia and China off the coast of Qingdao in October 2004, a trilateral search and rescue exercise with the addition of New Zealand was carried out in the Tasmanian Sea in October 2007. It is reported that in September 2009, the Chief of the Australian Defence Force and the U.S. Commander, Pacific Command, agreed to approach China with the possibility of military training exercises between the three countries.

330 In July 2004, the ASEAN–Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was signed between Australia and ASEAN. Australia signed a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism with the Philippines in March 2003 and a status of forces agreement in May 2007 regarding visiting units. Further, approximately 130 Philippine soldiers are being trained in Australia.

Regarding Vietnam, Vietnamese officers are being trained in Australia based on a bilateral defense cooperation program, and regional defense dialogues have been carried out since 1998. Australia concluded a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism with Thailand in October 2002. Australia also signed a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism with Brunei in February 2002.


332 In addition to signing a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism in February 2002, Australia and Indonesia jointly held a regional summit regarding counterterrorism in March 2007.

333 The agreement regarding a framework for security cooperation, called the Lombok Agreement, was signed in November 2006 and took effect in February 2008. Its goals include the cooperation in the war on terror and transnational crimes, defense, law enforcement, counterterrorism, intelligence, maritime
and aviation security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and response to contingencies.

334 This took effect in 1971. The framework stipulated that in the event of an attack on or threat to Malaysia or Singapore, the nations of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom would discuss the response. In recent years focus has been expanded to include non-traditional threats such as terrorism and maritime security as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

335 In addition to the joint army, navy, and air force exercise called “Bersama” Shield carried out annually around Malaysia and the South China Sea, , training exercise called “Bersama Padu” was also held in 2006 and 2010. Australia signed a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism with Malaysia in August 2002. Further, in addition to a permanent Australian Air Force presence in Malaysia’s Butterworth air base, the Malaysian military receives training in Australia based on the Australia Malaysia joint defense program drafted in 1994, and joint exercises are carried out every year. Australia signed a memorandum of understanding regarding defense cooperation with Singapore in August 2008.


338 The breakdown of the military forces is as follows: Army: approx. 28,200 personnel, Navy: approx. 14,300 personnel, Air Force: approx. 14,100 personnel.

339 In addition to the fore mentioned activities, as a part of the support activities resulting from the huge earthquake in Haiti, for the period from February to March 2010, the government of Australia dispatched five air force Air Traffic Control Officers to Haiti, to provide Air Traffic Control services and mentoring of Haitian Air Traffic Control personnel. Then, when the flooding occurred in Pakistan in July 2010, medical support was provided to victims in Multan, Punjab Province, while transport and other activities were performed by C-17A transport aircrafts.

340 In April 2006 demonstrations by rebels in Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, turned into riots, and the ADF was dispatched in response to a request from the Government of Timor-Leste. In December 2009, stating that the security conditions of Timor-Leste had improved, the Australian Department of Defence announced that the Australian military presence be reduced from 650 to 400 troops, and the ISF announced it would shift its focus to improving the capability of the Timor-Leste military.

341 The activities began with participation of South Pacific nations, led by Australia, in response to a request for assistance from the Government of the Solomon Islands, where a deteriorating security situation triggered by tribal conflict was out of control. The 15 participating countries include Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga.

342 The government announced on April 29, 2009 that it would deploy approximately 450 additional personnel to Afghanistan. The additional units include approximately 330 personnel engaged in training and support of the Afghanistan military in Uruzgan Province and approximately 120 troops deployed temporarily to maintain security during the elections in August of the same year.

343 Two sea patrol aircraft, three transports, and one frigate are operating in the Middle East. It was announced in May 2009 that in addition to their anti-terrorism mission, the patrol aircraft and frigate would also take on the mission of responding to piracy.

344 Remarks made in a speech by Prime Minister Julia Gillard at the Australian Parliament on November 8, 2010. The ADF is, among non-NATO member countries, the biggest contributor to ISAF.

345 In contrast to the mission of collective defense (collective defense within the region) provided in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mission of conflict prevention and crisis management is called a non-Article 5 mission.

346 The NATO defense ministers council held in June 2003 decided to transform its traditional military structure set for each strategy based on geographical areas, and divided it into Allied Command Operation (ACO) responsible for overall execution of its operations and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in charge of the transformation of its military capabilities and improved synergy effects by giving training and education, and studying and creating doctrines. In addition, its civilian structure started in August 2010 to be in charge of new risks and challenges, including terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, cyber attacks, and energy security, and to work on the forecast and prediction of international situations, based on the Emerging Security Challenges Division established and operative within the International Secretariat.

347 The NATO Response Force (NRF) is responsible for immediately dealing with any events taking place around the globe. The force started to be developed in November 2002 and declared its
possession of full mission capabilities in November 2006. It is operated through rotated management every six months by multinational high-readiness troops including the Eurocorps and the German/Dutch Corps.

348 The Strategic Concept is an official document defining the objectives, characteristics, and basic security-related responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been published seven times (1949, 1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010).

349 NATO has been developing its unique Theater Missile Defense system, called Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) since 2005 to protect deployed NATO forces from threats caused by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. The Lisbon Declaration, adopted at the same time as the new Strategic Concept has expanded the area protected by this system to all the populations and territory covered by NATO.

350 Decisions to be made on NATO’s nuclear policy and posture are agreed by defense ministers of both nuclear and non-nuclear states in the alliance (except for France, which tries to keep its independence of nuclear deterrence) and should be agreed upon by unanimous approval of the Nuclear Planning Group chaired by the Secretary General.

351 At the Munich Security Conference held in February 2011, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen gave a speech entitled “Building security in an age of austerity,” warning that the reduction of defense budgets in European states could lead to a divided and weaker Europe and Europe increasingly adrift from the United States, and pointed out the need for “Smart Defense”, a new approach ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility.

352 The Lisbon Declaration referred to the reduction in the number of headquarters and the readjustment of geographical footprint, and a manpower saving of 35% as well as the consolidation and rationalization of the current 14 NATO agencies into three.

353 The EU, although it was non-binding multilateral cooperation in its characteristics, introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to offer peace keeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP.

354 In December 2008, the EU announced the “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World”, which examines the implementation of the European Security Strategy and the “Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities” which requests the enhancement of personnel, resources, and facilities necessary to deal with threats.

355 The Treaty of Lisbon defines that “if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” and there should be no contradiction between activities based on this treaty and actions taken under the NATO name.

356 Through the Treaty of Amsterdam, made effective in 1999, the EU established the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to assist the chairman of the Council that represents the EU externally. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, established by the Treaty of Lisbon, basically succeeded the roles and responsibilities of the post, integrated separate contact points used for diplomatic purposes, and was given the position to represent the EU externally.

357 The EEAS is composed of geographical agencies covering Asia, Africa, and other regions and agencies working on such specific agenda as development cooperation, human rights, and democratization. Headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the organization coordinates and keeps the consistency of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as creates and executes policy proposals based on recommendations by the European Council.

358 The declaration made by the heads of state supporting the ISAF stated that the transition to greater Afghan security responsibility should not be calendar-driven but conditions-based. It also clarified its intention to keep strengthening and improve in quality the Afghani National Security Forces through the NTM-A, increasing the size of the forces to around 300,000, and filling the requirements for trainers and so on, for 2011 and beyond.

In June 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointed out in his speech, especially referring to the missions in Afghanistan and Libya, that NATO is turning into a two-tiered alliance, between
members who specialize in “soft” humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and
those conducting the “hard” combat missions, and required the NATO countries to share the risks and
costs.

359 In October 2010, NATO announced that it will make a stepwise reduction in the size of the current
10,000-strong KFOR to around 5,000, based on the improvement of security situation in Kosovo and
better security control capabilities of the Kosovar authorities.

360 The operation was implemented as one of the first NATO missions based on Article 5 initiated by the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011, basically allowing participation only by its member states.
However since 2004, it has aggressively accepted the support from its partner countries, with Russian
and Ukrainian deploying vessels in the operation by the end of 2010. In addition, Morocco and Israel
have shown their willingness to offer some assistance within 2011.

361 As of April 2011, units from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Luxembourg, and Estonia are participating in Operation Atalanta. There has also been
participation from non-EU member states such as Norway.

362 The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 made a decision enabling access to NATO’s
assets and capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union (WEU). Most of the roles and
missions of the WEU were transferred to the EU. As a result, it was decided, at the NATO Washington
Summit Meeting held in April 1999, to once again permit the use of NATO’s assets and capacities by
the EU. This decision was called the Berlin Plus. In December 2002, NATO and the EU made a
permanent arrangement concerning the above decision.

363 They are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of combat unit missions in crisis management,
including 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations, 2) peacekeeping, and 3) peacebuilding.

364 As for the new members in NATO, four Central/Eastern European countries and three Baltic States
(Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovakia) joined in March 2004 and
Albania and Croatia joined in April 2009. Also, through the foreign ministers council held in April
2010, Bosnia-Herzegovina was allowed to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) with certain
conditions attached. The Lisbon Declaration of November 2010 welcomed the smooth implementation
of the MAP by Bosnia – Herzegovin along with Macedonia and Montenegro, which are also
functioning as members of the plan.

365 The Lisbon Declaration showed the intention to integrate Macedonia, Montenegro, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, existing members of the MAP, as well as Serbia into the Europe-Atlantic region.
Furthermore, it also stated its support to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the Europe-Atlantic region
through existing frameworks (the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Georgia Commission).

366 This programme was established in 1994. Through this programme NATO and non NATO countries of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), mainly from Central and Eastern
Europe, establishes a bilateral cooperation agreement.

367 Established in 1994, currently joined by seven countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania,
Morocco, and Tunisia). It aims to stabilize the Mediterranean region through political dialogues and the
participation of Mediterranean nations in NATO-related activities.

368 Established in 2004, currently joined by four countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE). It
promotes practical bilateral security cooperation between Middle Eastern nations and NATO, with the
objective to serve long-term global security and regional security.

369 The term “Contact Country” has been used since the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting in 2004. NATO
pursues partnerships on a case-by-case basis with countries which share common interests and
concerns with NATO.

370 The NRC meets twice yearly at the level of foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of staff since its
establishment in 2002. The summit level meeting was held for the third time, following the meetings
held in Rome in May 2002 and in Bucharest in April 2008.

371 NATO and Russia initiated joint research to assess the possible levels of interoperability among the
theatre missile defense systems of NATO Allies and Russia, under the framework of the NRC in 2003,
implementing four joint command post exercises from 2004 to 2008. The cooperative relations were
disrupted based on the conflict in Georgia in August 2008, but were scheduled to be resumed through
the last NRC Summit Meeting. In the last summit meeting, development of a comprehensive Joint
Analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation was decided. The progress of this
Analysis will be assessed at the June 2011 meeting of the NRC Defense Ministers.

In September 2010, four European countries, namely the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France,
established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to jointly operate aircraft owned by each
country, including C-130s and A-310s, and their 200 aerial tankers. In addition, new frameworks have
been created, including the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) Initiative to promote joint
procurement/management/operation of 3 C-17 transport aircraft mainly targeted for NATO states and
the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) to jointly charter the two AN-124 large-scale transport
aircraft owned by Russia and Ukraine.
373 The agreements were reached to jointly establish and operate an experimental facility in radioactive
imaging and fluid dynamics in France and a technology development center in the United Kingdom.
374 The Council will be chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by major ministers related to national
security and, if required, by the Chief of the Defense Staff, Heads of Intelligence Agencies and other
Senior Officials. The newly-created National Security Adviser (NSA) coordinates the whole
proceedings. The Council will coordinate responses to dangers we face, integrating at the highest level
the work of the foreign, defense, energy, and international development departments, and all other arms
of government contributing to national security.
375 The Cameron administration leveraged the new NSS to analyze the strategic background surrounding
the United Kingdom and to define the strategic objectives of the country. Based on the SDSR, it
defined policies and measures required to achieve the goals specified by the NSS so that the holistic
national strategy related to defense and security could be formed. It also aims to produce new NSS and
SDSR every five years based on periodical readjustments to be done by the NSC.
376 Analyzing the strategic background this way, the new NSS defined two strategic objectives
comprising of 1) ensuring a secure and resilient United Kingdom 2) shaping a stable world, and
specified eight cross-cutting National Security Tasks including, tackling at root the causes of instability,
and working in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger responses.
377 “Spending Review 2010,” published by the U.K. Treasury Department in October 2010 following the
NSS and SDSR, plans to reduce the defense budget by 8% in real terms by 2014-2015, by reducing at
least 4.3 billion pounds for the country’s non-frontline activities costs except for what is required for
operations in Afghanistan.
378 The SDSR has decided to reduce the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force personnel by
5,000, 7,000, and 5,000 respectively by 2015. It also plans to reduce the Ministry of Defence Civil
Service by more than 25,000; decommission the aircraft carrier, Ark Royal immediately; reduce the
holdings of main tanks by 40%; retire ship-based aircraft, Harrier Jump Jet; reduce the planned number
of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft; and cancel Nimrod MR4 maritime patrol aircraft programme. In
addition, the United Kingdom plans to withdraw half of the British forces stationed in Germany,
currently estimated to number 20,000, by 2015 before they are completely withdrawn by 2020. As for
the Land force, on the other hand, it further deploys multi-role brigades enabling more flexible
operations and further enhances the capabilities of specialist forces. With regard to new-type aircraft
carriers, it will build two carriers but will only use one carrier, the one which installs catapult, to enable
complete interoperability with its major allies including the United States and France. Based on this
decision, the deployment of the new aircraft carrier is scheduled to be delayed from 2016 to 2020.
Furthermore, the JSF to be used with the new aircraft carrier will be ship-based aircraft, instead of short
takeoff and vertical landing aircraft.
379 The United Kingdom plans to delay the detailed procurement plan for the successors of Vanguard
class nuclear-powered submarines, which are expected to be retired in late 2020, until 2016.
380 The United Kingdom stated that it will decrease the requirement for operationally available nuclear
warheads to below 160 based on its White Paper on National Defense published in December 2006,
“The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent.” In May 2010, Foreign Secretary Hague
declared in the House of Commons that he will decrease the number of nuclear warheads to below 225.
The SDSR further stated that the United Kingdom will decrease the number of nuclear warheads to
below 120 and the number of overall nuclear weapon stockpile to below 180.
10) It proposed the establishment of a new and smaller Defence Board chaired by the Defence Secretary,
and to clarify the responsibilities of senior leaders, including the Permanent Secretary and the Chief of
the Defence Staff, and to make the Head Office smaller and more strategic, and so on.
381 Based on the treaty signed at the time of German reunification, Germany decreased its military
personnel, numbering 500,000 at the time of its reunification, to less than 370,000 by the end of 1994,
with the downward trend continuing incrementally until the structure turned into the 250,000-strong
organization by 2010. In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal
forces to international missions implemented under the framework of the United Nations or NATO is constitutional, which has further prompted them to actively participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia.

The VPR of 2003 states that in case the federal forces work with other allies and partner countries in any military operations, they only do so under the framework of the United Nations, NATO, or the EU, except for missions related to disaster relief.

The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well-organized military formations in intensive multilateral operations, such as those executed by NATO combat readiness troops or EU battle groups, with the goal of providing the foundation for peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that have a certain level of military formations and performs peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the target areas, through activities including the management of command, educational, and training organizations.

Specifically, the deployment of A-400M transport aircraft is under way, and five satellites equipped with synthetic-aperture radar (SAR-LUPE) were launched by July 2008.

In April 2010, the alliance agreement for the second Merkel administration established the “Organizational Committee,” which was intended to create a more efficient organization out of the German federal forces. In October 2010, the committee published a report to reform the forces, stating that the draft system was not required for the country’s defense policy during the foreseeable future and proposing the abolishment of the system. It also suggested that the country double its military personnel that can participate in long-term overseas operations from the current 7,000, reduce the total size of the federal forces and civilian officers from the current 250,000 to 180,000 and from 75,000 to 50,000 respectively, and enhance the authorities of the Inspectors General of the federal forces.

In June 2010, the Merkel administration announced that it will secure in total 80 billion euros by cutting expenditures and increasing revenues by 2014 through a financial reform, requesting the Ministry of Defense and the federal forces to cut their national defense budget by 8.3 billion euros by 2014.

The bill for this act defines that the draft system will cease as of July 1, 2011 and will be replaced by a new voluntary serviceman system recruiting 15,000 soldiers. However, the stipulation related to the draft system will continue to stay in the basic law.

Based on the 2009-2014 Military Program Law, France plans to increase intelligence personnel dealing with terrorism and organized crimes and the non-proliferation of WMD and other weapons and to focus its investments in space-related projects, intending to double the budget for space initiatives and launch new optical satellites by 2020. In February 2009, it succeeded in launching “Spirale,” the first satellite in Europe verifying the technology for an early warning system. In July 2010, the country established the Integrated Space Command directly reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

At the launching ceremony of the ship submersible ballistic nuclear-powered (SSBN) submarine, Le Terrible, in March 2008, French President Sarkozy expressed his view of the country’s nuclear capability: given the existing risk of nuclear proliferation and other threats, nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee to protect France from any state’s aggression against vital national interests and it is essential to maintain its missile capabilities, both submarine-launched and air-launched. He also announced his decision to reduce France’s air-launched nuclear missile capability by one-third, which means its arsenal would become no more than 300 warheads.

France has defined as its priority area the whole region including the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean based on the White Paper on Defense and National Security and plans to intensively deploy its conflict prevention and intervention capabilities in the region. The 2009-2014 Military Program Law states that the country can deploy 30,000 ground forces, 70 fighter jets, and one aircraft carrier unit within 8,000 kilometers from the country as its military deployment targets. In May 2009, the country established an overseas military base for the first time in almost 50 years in the UAE.

The Council for National Defense and Security is chaired by the President and attended by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Defense, and Minister of the Budget as well as other ministers as required. It handles all issues related to national security, including military
planning, nuclear deterrence, public order, and war on terror, based on the coordination provided by Secretary General of the Council for National Defense and Security. The Council for National Intelligence covers only intelligence issues within the framework of the Council for National Defense and Security, integrating various information from all intelligence agencies and defining strategic guidelines and priority areas for each agency under the leadership of the National Intelligence Coordinator.