The year 2010 is a milestone in that it is the 50th year since the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty\(^1\) between Japan and the United States on January 19, 1960. For this memorable year, Japan and the United States have resolved to further expand and develop the security cooperation between the two countries, while also promoting a process for deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements at its core.

1. Consultations for the 50th Anniversary of the Conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Since the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty down to the present day, Japan and the United States have resolved to develop cooperative relations on the security front and consolidate the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements which form the core of their alliance.

In marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan and the United States acknowledged the necessity of further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and further improving the effectiveness of their responses to the unclear and uncertain elements confronting both countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This sort of recognition has been shared through the consultations between the two countries.

1. Exchanges at Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meetings
At the Japan-U.S. defense ministers’ meeting\(^2\) in October 2009, Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the foundation for not only the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, but also for responding to global challenges. He also gave voice to the recognition that it will be necessary to carry on with unflagging efforts in order to maintain and elevate such trust and effectiveness in the future. Moreover, he also stated that he would like to promote examinations of specific cooperation items for the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In response to this, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone to the United States’ policy for Northeast Asia. He also said that while Japan and the United States are faced with complex circumstances in this region, cooperation in the fields of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief – areas in which Japan demonstrates leadership – offer a chance to strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation. He also stated that it has been noted that friendly relations and the alliance between Japan and the United States have developed dramatically compared with in the past.
2. Exchanges at Japan-U.S. Summit Meetings
At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting\(^3\) on November 13, 2009, as part of efforts to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed starting a consultation process to deepen this alliance for the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, to which President Barack Obama consented. Furthermore, in relation to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Prime Minister Hatoyama stated his intent to promote cooperation which included not only traditional areas of cooperation such as expanded deterrence, information security, missile defense, and space, but also new challenges, to which President Obama also agreed.

2. Pronouncements for the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
On January 19, 2010, which marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, respective statements were released by then Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama\(^4\). In addition, the “2+2” members released the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Joint Statement).

1. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s Statement
The following recognitions and resolutions were expressed in then Prime Minister Hatoyama’s statement.

- The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements have contributed significantly to Japan’s peace and development under freedom and democracy, as well as to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, since the end of World War II until today.

- Given the severe conditions in the security environment surrounding Japan, the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s Self Defense Forces, continues to serve an essential role to maintain Japan’s peace and security.

- Under a security environment in which there still exist uncertainty and unpredictability, the presence of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will continue to function as a public good by creating a sense of security to the countries in the region.

- For the year commemorating the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan will work jointly with the United States to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements at its core, in order to adapt to the evolving environment of the 21st century.
2. President Obama’s Statement
The following recognitions and resolutions were expressed in President Obama’s statement.

○ Over the 50 years since the two countries signed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the indestructible partnership between Japan and the United States has brought about prosperity and peace for the two countries, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance has ensured unprecedented benefits for the Asia-Pacific region.

○ The United States’ commitment to Japan’s security is unshakable, and the two countries’ cooperation is a critically important part of their engagement with the world.

○ It is time for the two countries to undertake to renew the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the 21st century and enhance the bonds that unite the two nations.

3. “2+2” Joint Statement
The following recognitions and resolutions were expressed in the Joint Statement.

○ The Ministers affirmed that the U.S.-Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of the two countries, as well as regional peace and stability. They also resolved to further develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as well as expand into new areas of cooperation.

○ The impact of bases on local communities such as Okinawa will be reduced while supporting current efforts to maintain deterrence, including the appropriate stationing of U.S. Forces. Doing so will enhance security and ensure that the Japan-U.S. Alliance continues to serve as a cornerstone for stability in the region.

○ Japan and the United States will strengthen regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, while also recognizing the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context. The statement also reaffirmed the commitment to cooperate closely in responding to global threats.

○ For the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to adapt the Japan-U.S. Alliance to the evolving environment of the 21st century. The Ministers will intensify the dialogue which is underway to further promote and deepen Japan-U.S. security cooperation in wide-ranging areas.
3. Process for Deepening the Alliance

1. Historical Background

Japan and the United States have traditionally developed security cooperation based on factors such as the security environment surrounding Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Declaration) in 1996. The Declaration reaffirms the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. It also calls for a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Former Guidelines), and the promotion of cooperative relations between the two countries in fields such as studies concerning ballistic missile defense; the consolidation, realignment, and reduction of U.S. military facilities and areas in Okinawa; and the attainment of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

At next year’s “2+2” meeting in 1997, new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) were approved as part of the promotion of cooperative relations indicated within the Declaration from the previous year. These indicated the general framework and orientation for the roles and modalities for cooperation and coordination between Japan and the United States in everything from periods of normalcy to states of emergency based on the changes in the state of affairs following the Cold War.

Afterwards, in light of the further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Japan and the United States have been enhancing consultations related to security since 2002. Through these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged through three stages. These stages are: confirmation of strategic objectives common to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage), the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage), and the examination of a force posture realignment (third stage). Their contents were finalized at the “2+2” meeting in May 2007.

Concurrent with these bilateral policy consultations, the two countries have also strengthened cooperative relations concerning responses to specific issues. For ballistic missile defense, by way of example, in light of North Korea’s apparent advancement in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles since 1998, Japan and the United States have implemented cooperation in wide-ranging areas that include everything from technical development to the operation of units. Moreover, for their response to North Korea, at the Japan-U.S. defense ministers’ meeting held on May 30, 2009 the two sides affirmed their policy of continuing with close cooperation not only between the three countries of Japan, the United States, and the ROK, but also with China, Russia, and the international community. There is gathering momentum for developing cooperation between Japan and the United States in a manner which incorporates other countries as well. In addition, various measures are taken to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines. Based on the results of the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States, the two countries are promoting examinations of joint operation plans and bilateral cooperation plans, as well as joint operations which
include improving the effectiveness of various mechanisms beneath the Guidelines.

As the above demonstrates, the cooperative relations between Japan and the United States have born numerous results thus far. The process to deepen this alliance which Japan and the United States embarked upon to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will further strengthen initiatives based on these results, and will also strive to further expand the areas in which the two countries cooperate.

2. Future Policy
Japan and the United States have decided to enhance dialogue in order to further promote and deepen Japan-U.S. security cooperation over a broad range of areas in the future. This is grounded in the previously mentioned recognition shared at bilateral consultations, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s statement, and the determinations expressed in the Joint Statement, and is designed to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance even more unshakable. Therefore, for the future Japan will promote specific consultations with the United States at the ministerial-level, and at the working-level under orders from ministers.

At present, consultations are being carried out between Japan and the United States over what sort of specific cooperation is possible in order to advance the process of deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. This includes cooperation for areas such as extended deterrence, information security, missile defense, and space which were also taken up at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting on November 13, 2009, as well as individual security areas including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and cyber issues.

For example, with regard to the security environment in the region centered around East Asia, based on the discussions at the Japan-U.S. consultations held since 2002 which will be described later in Chapter 2, Section 3, Japan and the United States shared a common recognition which forms the foundation for the common strategic objectives incorporated into the Joint Statement from the “2+2” meeting in 2005. Moreover, at the Japan-U.S. foreign ministers’ meeting on January 12, 2010 there was an agreement over the recognition of starting the process of deepening the alliance by jointly performing analyses of the security environment in East Asia and examinations of the capabilities of the United States and Japan. It is conceivable that in the future Japan and the United States will confirm their awareness of circumstances based on the changes in regional circumstances, and exchange opinions regarding areas of cooperation in which they should move forward and what sort of posture they should each promote.

Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense released its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) on February 1, 2010, and its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on April 6. In terms of the process of formulating documents pertaining to these security policies, Japan is also moving forward with the task of reviewing its National Defense Program Guidelines, with close exchanges of opinions being held between Japan and the United States. The two sides will continue to exchange opinions from a strategic perspective. With regard to the United States’ extended deterrence in particular, the “2+2” Joint Statement from May 2007 says that “U.S. extended
deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security,” and states that “The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities – both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities – form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.” Through the process for deepening the alliance as well, both Japan and the United States continue to share an awareness concerning the importance of extended deterrence. Moreover, in light of the formulation of the release of the 2010 QDR and NPR, the conventional debates are being further deepened.

With regard to information security, on March 30, 2010 the establishment of a new consultation framework in the form of the Bilateral Information Security Consultation (BISC) comprising relevant ministries from both Japan and the United States was agreed on at the Japan-U.S. foreign ministers’ meeting. It is conceivable that the sharing of information between Japan and the United States will be further promoted through this consultation, while further enhancing their information security posture. See Section 2 (p.x), and Section 3-2 and 3 (p.x)

4. Projects Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

The period around this important juncture for the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is not just an excellent opportunity to strive to deepen the alliance, as has previously been noted. The Ministry of Defense and SDF also consider it first to be an excellent opportunity to explain to the Japanese people the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the present state of Japan-U.S. security cooperation, and second, an excellent opportunity to further strengthen cooperative relations with U.S. Forces. It has been decided to carry out projects commemorating the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with the cooperation of the United States.

The projects shown in Figure III-2-1-1 have been carried out by mid June. For their part, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will plan and carry out events to make the most of the two opportunities mentioned above. This will be done throughout the year, and extend from the organization of the central government all the way down to field units in each of the Self-Defense Forces. This is oriented toward efforts capable of strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
### Events Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (2010)</th>
<th>Events, etc.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 19</td>
<td>Commemoration celebration at the MSDF Headquarters, Yokosuka District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 19</td>
<td>Commemoration ceremony at U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 19</td>
<td>Opening Ceremony for Alliance Park (Atsugi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 19</td>
<td>Commemoration reception by the Defense Attaché in Tokyo (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 21</td>
<td>Full dress decorations and naval illumination decorations (Yokosuka, Sasebo, Katsuren)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3</td>
<td>Attendance of the GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant of United States Marine Corps in a memorial service on Iwo Jima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14–17</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call (Black Ship Festival, Shimoda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18–22</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call (Katsuren)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29–30</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call and opening of Japanese and U.S. vessels to the general public for first-hand sailing experience (Yokohama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9</td>
<td>MSDF–U.S. Navy Young Superior Officer Symposium in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (Hawaii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint panel discussion by MSDF–U.S. Navy Officer candidates (Stajima)</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 22</td>
<td>Seminar in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty held by the National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24</td>
<td>Joint commemorative tree planting with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman upon the Joint Staff Chief of Staff's visit to the United States (Washington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24</td>
<td>JASDF and U.S. Fifth Air Force: Completion of commemorative logo mark marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26–27</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call (Harumi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5–11</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call (Hakodate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9</td>
<td>Commemorative tree planting at a senior level seminar between the JASDF, U.S. Pacific Army, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (Hawaii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10–26</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call (Kagoshima)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23–26</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call and opening of Japanese and U.S. vessels to the general public for first-hand sailing experience (Sendai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2–7</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. joint port call (Aomori: Nebuta Festival)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the end of the war in August 1945, Japan began its advance from ruin to reconstruction. Although the United Nations was established, the post-war international community edged ever closer toward the Cold War, through the formation of a range of security organizations by both East and West, and the Korean War of June 1950. With this, Japan (which had recently enacted its constitution in May 1947) returned to the international community with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and concluded the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with the United States. The minimum required defense capability for national defense was arranged, and a course selected to rely on the significant military strength of the U.S. and maintain the nation’s peace and independence. In July 1954, the Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces were inaugurated.

Japan subsequently became a member of the United Nations in December 1956, and then in 1960, although the ongoing discussions divided public opinion, a new version of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with more equal contents was concluded. From the late 1950s through the 1960s, diplomatic relations with countries such as those of Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea were successively normalized. As the diplomatic and security bases were gradually stabilized, Japan eventually approached the era of high economic growth.
Chronology of Japan-U.S. Alliance (1970~1990)

Through the era of high economic growth, in the 1970s, Japan became the 2nd largest economy in the Western world. During this period, the domestic government and economy became comparatively stable, and the intense opposition to the SDF and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty which had reached a scale not seen before, gradually began to subside.

Meanwhile, in the international community, the Cold War continued, fluctuating between periods of tension and peace. At the same time, serious setbacks caused by changes in international politics (typified by the Oil Crises), and the Vietnam War led to the might of the United States failing to remain the overwhelming element it was at the close of World War II. As a result, the United States began to vehemently demand of its Western Bloc allies, Japan included, defense efforts corresponding to their economic strength. With the 1972 Nixon visit to China and the ensuing closeness between those two nations, a large change became evident amid interstate relations during the Cold War.

With trends such as these, Japan established National Defense Program Guidelines for the first time in 1976 (1976 Guidelines), and determined to establish objectives for its military capabilities, and strive harder toward their steady improvement.

Meanwhile, with regard to Japan-U.S. relations, the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” were established between the two nations in 1978, and the way ahead paved to further concretize defense cooperation between Japan and the United States (based on the Security Treaty). Consequently, in the same year, Japan-U.S. joint exercises commenced in earnest, while discussions were entered regarding cooperation between the two nations should events in the Far East outside of Japan have a serious effect on the safety of the country. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements therefore came to hold a greater importance, not only for relations between the two nations, but for a much wider region.

In 1978, Japan began cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, within the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement. Then in 1987, with the conclusion of the Special Measures Agreement, it was decided that the range of this cost sharing be enlarged.

As a result of the deepening relations between Japan and the United States, in the 1981 joint U.S.-Japan communiqué, the two nations declared for the first time that they were in an “alliance relationship.”
### Chronology of Japan-U.S. Alliance (1970~ 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Situation</th>
<th>Japan-U.S. Related</th>
<th>Domestic Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End of Vietnam War</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>1970 National Defense Program Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yom Kippur War</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>FY1996-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing of SALT</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>FY1998-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon visit to China</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>FY2000-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon Shock</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>FY2002-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of Vietnam War</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>FY2004-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing of SALT II</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>2005-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing of Special Agreement on Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion of the Agreement to Provide Weapons Technology to the U.S.</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision of Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (old Guidelines)</td>
<td>78.11</td>
<td>2013-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of Japan-U.S. joint exercise</td>
<td>78.11</td>
<td>2015-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification of “alliance relationship” in joint U.S.-Japan communiqué</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet decision on 4th Defense Program</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of Okinawa</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>2021-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>2023-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to floating exchange rate system</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>2025-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Crisis</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>2027-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet decision on 1976 National Defense Program Guidelines</td>
<td>76.10</td>
<td>2029-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong yen at 180 yen / dollar</td>
<td>78.10</td>
<td>2031-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion of the Agreement to Provide Weapons Technology to the U.S.</td>
<td>88.11</td>
<td>2033-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia shooting down of Korean aircraft</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>2035-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing of official documents of exchange between governments of Japan and U.S. regarding joint development of F-3-X</td>
<td>88.11</td>
<td>2037-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1990\text{~}2010)</td>
<td>(1990\text{~}2010)</td>
<td>(1990\text{~}2010)</td>
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### Chronology of Japan-U.S. Alliance (1990~2010)

Due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Cold War ended, and the possibility of a global-scale war breaking out decreased substantially. On the other hand, however, regional conflicts became more complicated and diverse, while incidents arrived in succession which posed a challenge to post-Cold War security, such as the diffusion of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and intensification of international terrorism.

After the end of the Cold War, there were a variety of discussions between Japan and the United States with regard to the modality of their defense arrangements. Meanwhile, there was an increase in calls within Japan, for a reduction in U.S. bases (which for many years had been concentrated in Okinawa), triggered by the incident which occurred in Okinawa in 1995, of a young girl being assaulted. However, the significance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements was affirmed under the complicated and unstable international conditions which existed after the Cold War, and momentum grew regarding their clear necessity.

Consequently, in 1996, the leaders of the two nations announced the “U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security”. As well as reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements after the
Cold War, it indicated the internal and external modality of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the 21st Century approached, by for instance, confirming that the two sides would collaborate not only in the Asia-Pacific Region, but also on a global scale.

After the Joint Declaration, the SACO Final Report was drawn up at the end of 1996. In addition to the move toward rearrangement and integration of the U.S. bases in Okinawa (beginning with Futenma Air Station), a review of the “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” was conducted in 1997. As a result, it was confirmed that work to concretize the cooperation between Japan and the U.S. (in the event of armed attacks against Japan or other nearby incidents) would be advanced. It was also confirmed that under normal circumstances, the two nations would work together closely in other fields, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, PKO, and dealing with large-scale disasters.

At present, the cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States boasts a range which extends across regional and global-scale activities. In particular, as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty marks its 50th anniversary, discussions are underway to deepen the alliance in order to adapt to the evolving environment of the 21st Century.
Section 2 The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute one of the pillars of Japan’s national defense. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements also serve as the foundation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and are indispensable not only to maintaining the peace and security of Japan, but also that of the entire Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States resulting from their alliance is proving to be extremely significant for effective responses to the diverse security challenges occurring throughout the world. Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is playing an increasingly important role by advancing the shared fundamental values in the international community such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy. Japan will further develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and expand cooperation into new areas. (See Fig. III-2-2-1)

This section explains the current significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements for Japan’s security.

Fig. III-2-2-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation between Japan and the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>The era of the former Japan—U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>The former Japan—U.S. Security Treaty is signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>The treaty enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Fujiiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The new Japan—U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Okinawa Islands are returned to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Saotome Talks (agreement on the renewal of the new Japan—U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Establishment of the former guidelines and expanding Japan—U.S. Defense cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for Japan—U.S. Defense Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Establishment of the former Guidelines for Japan—U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Former Guidelines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Japan—U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>SAOR Final Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>End of the Cold War and establishment of the new guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Japan—U.S. Global Alliance (Koizumi-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Japan—U.S. relations since terrorist attacks in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Formulation of the United States—Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Japan—U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>North Korea conducts nuclear tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Japan—U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Irreplaceable Japan—U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>North Korea conducts nuclear tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Japan—U.S. Summit (Abe-Osama summit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan—U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Maintenance of Japan’s Security

In the current international community, a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks, from the use of nuclear weapons to military threats or intimidation, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. In today’s globalized international community, it is impossible even for a superpower like the United States to guarantee its security by acting alone. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security solely through independent efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not be politically appropriate and would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan maintains an alliance with the world’s dominant military superpower, the United States, with whom it shares the aforementioned basic values as well as the goal of maintaining the peace and security of the world. In addition, the United States has strong economic ties with Japan and also has a shared interest in the Asia-Pacific region.

Specifically, Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty designates that Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that an attacker must be prepared to confront not only the military power of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States when planning such an act. As a result, the opposing nation becomes aware that they will suffer grievously if they carry out an invasion and such desires are stopped at the planning stage. In other words, this serves to deter attacks.

Japan intends to effectively utilize the deterrence of the power of the U.S. military in addition to maintaining adequate Japanese defense forces in order to create a seamless posture and secure Japan’s safety.

2. Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides for the use of facilities and regions by the U.S. Forces within Japan for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan, and also for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

Even in the post-Cold War era of today, the region is still facing elements of instability including North Korea’s development and deployment of WMD and missiles, the division of the same race in the Korean peninsula, as well as the Taiwan problem. In such a security environment, the presence of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by unclear and indeterminate regional factors, providing a great sense of security to the nations of the region, and thus fulfill a role as a public resource.

Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements also constitute
the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and security of the region. These arrangements are complemented by the alliances the United States has built with other countries such as South Korea and the Philippines as well as the friendly relations it has developed with other countries in the region, and continue to play an important role in preserving the peace and security of the region in the post-Cold War security environment.

3. Improvement of International Security Environment

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in the defense area but also in a wide range of areas, including political, economic, and social aspects. The friendly relationship between Japan and the United States, founded on their security arrangements, also forms the basis for Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting dialogue and cooperation on multinational security and cooperating with the United Nations in all areas of its operations.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the international community has been increasingly concerned about new kinds of threats and diverse contingencies, such as international terrorist attacks and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and methods for their transportation. In this international environment, the strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are playing an important role in achieving effective cooperative measures that can improve the security of the international community.

In particular, under the auspices of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to improve the levels of coordination. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for every kind of international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and U.S. Forces, and is resulting in the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Peace and prosperity of the international community is closely linked to that of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance its measures to improve the international security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.

2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

1. Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)

The security environment surrounding Japan remains challenging. Given that environment, in order for the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to continue to fulfill the roles described above, it is necessary that U.S. military presence in Japan is secured which functions adequately as a deterrent that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as regional peace and security, and that a posture is maintained in Japan and the surrounding area so that the USFJ can respond swiftly and with mobility to emergencies.
For this purpose, based on the Japan-US Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S. military in Japan. This results in the necessity for opposing nations to be prepared to find themselves in direct confrontation with U.S. Forces in addition to the SDF when attacking Japan as mentioned previously. Thus the USFJ serves as a deterrent against aggression towards Japan. Further, the realization of a stable USFJ presence is necessary for a swift Japan-U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of the USFJ in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and the USFJ forms the foundation for such support.

In order for the USFJ to carry out the above role, it is necessary that all the services of the U.S. Forces, including the USFJ, are functionally integrated. For instance, the U.S. Forces holds a primarily offensive role as a “spear” when responding to armed aggression on Japan in cooperation with the SDF. When the U.S. Forces function in this way, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines stationed in Japan work as one to function adequately.

Note that while Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan-U.S. obligations are kept in balance. This point is in contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty which stipulates only joint defense of contracting nations. (See Fig. III-2-2-2)

2. USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Japanese Communities

In order for USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain the cooperation and understanding of the local communities. Meanwhile, the social environment in the surrounding areas has changed a lot through, for example, their urbanization over the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In light of such changes, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible in order to gain the acceptance and support of the public in the true sense as well as to allow them to perform to the best of their capabilities.

Our national land is narrow with limited plains and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas and the takeoff and landing of U.S. Forces’ aircraft have a considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to reduce the burden according to the real situation of each local area.
3. USFJ in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located close to countries in East Asia. Consequently, when it is necessary for units to respond rapidly in the region, U.S. Forces stationed in Okinawa are able to do so swiftly. In addition, Okinawa has the geographic advantage that it has a certain distance from countries neighboring Japan. Thus the stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa – including the U.S. Marine Corps which is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies and is capable of high mobility and rapid response – with its geographical characteristics, contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.
Meanwhile, many USFJ facilities and areas are located within Okinawa Prefecture, including airfields, maneuver areas, and logistics support facilities. As of January 2010, about 74 percent of the land area of the USFJ facilities and areas nationwide (for their exclusive use) was concentrated in Okinawa. Utmost efforts must therefore be given to ease the burden on Okinawa while keeping in mind the aforementioned security considerations. (See Fig. III-2-2-3, Section 4, p. x)

**Fig. III-2-2-3 Significance and Role of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa**

1. Reasons for stationing U.S. Marines in Okinawa
   - Okinawa is closer to the regions of East Asia than mainland U.S.A., Hawaii, and Guam.
   - The U.S. forces in Okinawa can respond swiftly when an emergency deployment is called for in the region.
   - Further, Okinawa has the geographical advantage of being at a reasonable distance from surrounding countries.

2. Significance and role of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa
   - Due to their high mobility and swift response, the Marines stationed in Okinawa play a diverse role in securing the peace and security of the region, such as in their response to the earthquake in Java, Indonesia in May 2006, in addition to defending Japan.
   - The stationing of U.S. Forces, beginning with the U.S. Marines in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies and capable of high mobility and rapid response, in Okinawa with its geographical characteristics, contributes greatly to the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.

*Note 1: The U.S. Marines make use of all fighting elements (air, ground, and maritime) when training or carrying out operations and are capable of swiftly responding to diverse contingencies.*
Section 3 Basic Frameworks Supporting the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

From the time that the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was concluded to the present day both Japan and the United States have developed their alliance in response to the changing security environment through constant effort to ensure effective cooperation with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the significance of which was described in the previous Section, as the basis. That effort took place in the form of close policy consultations between Japan and the United States, and has borne fruit in the form of a variety of efforts related to defense cooperation by both nations.

This section explains the basic frameworks that support the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, such as the forums of Japan-U.S. consultations and the agreements that have resulted from them, and the Japan-U.S. security cooperation arrangements.

1. Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

1. Major Forums for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). The framework of these consultations is shown in Fig. III-2-3-1.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation.

The results of Japan-U.S. policy consultations (Cabinet level) are shown in Figure III-2-3-2.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has held working-level meetings when necessary and exchanged information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased as Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced in recent years.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, through further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is proactively involved in these activities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (&quot;2+2&quot; Meeting)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Japanese Side</strong>&lt;br&gt;Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense</td>
<td><strong>U.S. Side</strong>&lt;br&gt;U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Subcommittee (SSC)</strong></td>
<td>Participants are not specified&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Participants are not specified&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Exchange of view on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy; Director General of Bureau of Operational Policy; Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan–U.S. Joint Committee (once every two weeks in principle)</strong></td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister and Counselor at the U.S. Embassy, and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.  
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.  
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.  
4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Consultation/Place</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Outline and Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 2006</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (‘2+2’ Meeting)/ Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Foreign Minister Asō Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice</td>
<td>Confirmed the importance of the U.S.–Japan Alliance and the importance of international cooperation regarding the fight against terrorism, and reconstruction and democratization of Iraq. Appreciation expressed by the U.S. for Japan’s support including the dispatch of SDP personnel. Exchanged opinions on Iran’s nuclear issue and the situations in North Korea and China. Final agreement to the realignment of forces, and an announcement of the document titled “United States—Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 2007</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Agreed on steadily implementing the respective realignment initiatives, securing information, enhancing operational cooperation in areas such as information sharing in BMD, and continuing to deliberate on the roles, missions, and capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 2007</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (‘2+2’ Meeting)/ Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Foreign Minister Asō Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice</td>
<td>Confirmed the steady implementation of the U.S. Forces realignment according to the Roadmap of May 2006. Confirmed the enhancement of BMD cooperation and operational cooperation, especially regarding intelligence cooperation. Reconfirmed that the commitment of the United States to Japan’s defense through various U.S. military capacities remained unchanged. Discussed the document titled “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States—Japan Security and Defense Cooperation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8, 2007</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Koike Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Discussed the transformation of the Japan–U.S. Alliance adapting to the future along with specific topics such as replenishment-related activities in the Indian Ocean and the U.S. Forces realignment. Concerning the BMD, both countries confirmed their continuous cooperation; the deliberation of their roles, missions, and capabilities; and the importance of enhancing the effectiveness of their bilateral cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 2008</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Singapore</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Koike Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Agreed on continuous closely knit cooperation for the peace and stability of the international community such as resuming replenishment support in the Indian Ocean. Reconfirmed the steady implementation following the Roadmap of May 2006 and exchanged opinions on future plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 2009</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Confirmed the necessity of continuing consultations at a high level with regard to a number of issues involving the U.S. and Japan, including response to North Korea and China. The commitment of the U.S. to the defense of Japan, continued progress in the realignment of the U.S. Forces, continuing U.S.–Japan dialogue regarding the GDA and the National Defense Program Guidelines. Exchanges of views regarding progress in the Resolute Support Mission, counter-terrorism measures, the U.S. and the forces realignment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 2009</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Defense Minister Kono stated the desire to move forward with specific items of cooperation for the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty while confirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Exchanges of views regarding regional posture, U.S. military restructuring, and HNS. Agreement reached to enhance cooperation in MDA and information security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 2010</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Regarding the issue of the transfer of Futenma Air Station, agreement reached for both countries to continue to work closely together to find a solution. Regarding the sinking incident of the ROK vessel, Minister of Defense Kono announced that Japan also denounced North Korea and intends to work closely with international society including the U.S. and ROK. Regarding the recent activities of Chinese vessels, Minister of Defense Kono explained his desire for wide ranging Japan–U.S. cooperation under the given conditions, and Secretary of Defense Gates shared his opinion regarding the importance of cooperation. Regarding the Japan–U.S. alliance, agreement was reached for steady cooperation across a wide range of areas. Agreement was also reached to strengthen ties between the defense ministries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Background to the Japan-U.S. Consultations

Both Japan and the United States have utilized the consultative framework described above for 50 years since the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed until the present for consultations pertaining to defensive cooperation.

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured Japan’s security as part of the Free World throughout the Cold War, and at the same time contributed to the peace and security of the region. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, as a result of a variety of discussions between Japan and the United States in the face of changes in the international security environment, the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was announced at the April 1996 Japan-U.S. summit meeting in Tokyo. In addition, based on that, both Japan and the United States established new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) in September 1997, and implemented various measures.

As is shown in Figure III-2-3-3, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Japan and the United States have pursued new postures to deal with the changing security environment including emerging new threats such as international terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Since the December 2002 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” meeting) Japan and the United States have held consultations, including at the working level, as part of strategic discussions relating to both countries’ security from the perspective of improving effectiveness in response to the changes occurring in times like these. Based on the basic policy to maintain deterrence and capabilities and to reduce burdens on local communities, as shown in its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), Japan has been actively engaging in these consultations in order to maintain its security.

These Japan-U.S. consultations have confirmed strategic objectives common to both countries (first stage), examined Japan-U.S. roles, missions, and capabilities to achieve the common strategic objectives (second stage) and examined force posture realignment based on the roles, missions, and capabilities of both countries (third stage) and have established the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance gradually and comprehensively. The results of the studies at each stage were released. The first stage results were released in the Joint Statement of the February 2005 “2+2” meeting, the second stage results were summarized in the report titled “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” prepared at the October 2005 “2+2” meeting, and the third stage results were summarized in the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) from the May 2006 “2+2” meeting.

At present, both parties agreed in the summit meeting between then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and President Barack Obama on November 13, 2009, to promote the process of deepening the Japan-U.S. alliance, through continued bilateral cooperation in terms of security issues, but also in various areas such as disaster prevention and the environment, mainly in the Asia-Pacific region. This policy was announced in statements from Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama on January 19 this year, and was confirmed in the “2+2” meeting Joint Statement on the same day. (See Section 1, (p.x), this Section 2-3 (p.x), Section 4 (p.x), Reference 36-40(p.x) and Reference 44-46(p.x))

2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure Their Effectiveness

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fill in case of an armed attack on Japan or other situation in advance in order to respond rapidly in that event. There is a framework pertaining to those roles between Japan and the United States, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring its effectiveness. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously study cooperation plans for the two countries, and hold consultations on them.

Here is an overview of the framework.

1. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In 1996, the reexamination of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation6 was mentioned in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security. Based on this, Japan and the United States both reviewed
the previous guidelines in order to enhance credibility towards Japan-U.S. security, and a new version of the Guidelines was acknowledged at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” meeting) in September 1997. The outline is as follows. (See Reference 37, P○○)

(1) Objectives of the Guidelines
The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and more credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, and in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

(2) Matters for Cooperation Prescribed in the Guidelines

a. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances
Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning, and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing bilateral exercises and training; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

b. Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan
Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations while U.S. forces conduct operations to supplement and support the SDF’s operations. Both parties will respond based on respective concepts of operations in a coordinated manner. (See Reference 51)

c. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan from occurring. (See Reference 52)

(3) Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines
In order to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation, the two countries need to conduct consultative dialogues throughout the spectrum of security conditions mentioned above. In addition, both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to accomplish such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

a. Comprehensive Mechanism
The Comprehensive Mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also the
relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral works based on the Guidelines under normal circumstances. In the comprehensive mechanism, bilateral work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted so as to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-4)

b. Coordination Mechanism

The coordination mechanism, established in 2000, is being set up in normal circumstances so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-5)
2. Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

(1) Measures for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding Japan-U.S. cooperation in case of armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole to collaborate in advancing bilateral work between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning of the Guidelines in peacetime.

Based on this, laws such as the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (1999) and the Ship Inspection Operations Law (2000) are being established in light of Japan-U.S. cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.
Also, measures are being taken to facilitate U.S. force operations as a part of strengthening of security cooperation legislation for situations such as armed attacks. (See Part III, Chapter1, Section1, p.x)

(2) Outline of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law

The Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures (response measures)\(^9\) that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types, measures, and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. Its outline is as follows.

The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and deeming it necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support\(^{10}\), rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations, must request a Cabinet decision on such measures and on a draft basic plan of response measures. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures.

In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations.

Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan\(^{11}\).

The Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved its revision, or when the response measures have been completed.

(3) Rear Area Support

Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to U.S. Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport activities, and base activities.
(4) Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations
Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who engage in combat and are stranded in rear areas (including transporting those rescued). (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan).

If one does not engage in combat but still faces a mishap he/she will be also rescued. In addition, if there is anyone in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the implementation area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in those waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities.

(5) Ship Inspection Operations
Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the flag state in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ) (Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Law).

3 Japan-U.S. Agreements Based on Japan-U.S. Consultations
Japan and the United States have utilized the bilateral consultations described in 1 of this Section in recent years, as shown in Fig. III-2-3-6, to engage in consultations pertaining to security aspects of the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance, including force posture realignment. As a result, various agreements, including the May 2006 agreement on force posture realignment, were concluded to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance in the future. Those agreements are summarized here.
1 Common Strategic Objectives (First Stage)
The common strategic objectives to be pursued by both Japan and the United States were confirmed in the Joint Statement of the February 2005 “2+2” meeting and its overview is described below.

○ Region: maintenance of security in Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the region, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, welcoming China’s responsible and constructive regional role and development of a cooperative relationship with China, peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, improvement of transparency of China’s military affairs, constructive involvement by Russia, and assistance to a peaceful, stable and vibrant Southeast Asia

○ World: promotion of fundamental values such as democracy in the international community, engagement in international peace cooperation activities, reduction and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to transport these weapons, prevention and eradication of terrorism, and improvement in the effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council

At the “2+2” meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reconfirmed their respective
commitments to these common strategic objectives, and highlighted the following strategic objectives (outline) that will advance the interests of both countries.

○ Achieved de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks
○ Further encourage China to act as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and its demonstrated actions;
○ Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum
○ Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia
○ Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense
○ Continuing to build upon partnerships with India
○ Ensuring Afghanistan’s successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization
○ Contributing to the reconstruction of a unified and democratic Iraq
○ Achieving swift and full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747 which are aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements
○ Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation

2 Roles, Missions, and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (Second Stage)

(1) Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities
The basic concepts on such primary areas indicated in the SCC document as “defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies” and “efforts to improve the international security environment” are shown in Figures III-2-3-7 and III-2-3-8. With due consideration to the increasing importance of these two areas, Japan and the United States will develop their respective defense capabilities and maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

(2) Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved
The SCC document reconfirmed the necessity to strengthen the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation. The document pointed out specific examples of key areas for further enhancement in the current security environment, as described in Fig. III-2-3-9.
This list of key areas is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation, and other areas of operation that are not explicitly listed above remain important.
Fig. III-2-3-7 Japan–U.S. Cooperation in Japan’s Defense and Response to Situations in Area Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) Including Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

Bilateral defense cooperation in this field remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to the peace and stability of the Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Japan’s defense and response to SIASJ (including response to new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks and invasion of Japan’s remote islands)</td>
<td>- Maintaining forward-deployed forces and augmenting them as needed for Japan’s defense and the deterrence and response to SIASJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Continuous provision of host nation support, including facilities and areas of U.S. Forces</td>
<td>- Providing all necessary support for Japan’s defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implementation of appropriate measures, such as providing continuous support to U.S. Forces’ activities depending on contingency development</td>
<td>- Striking capabilities and nuclear deterrence are indispensable for supplementing Japan’s defense capability in continuing to ensure Japan’s defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Contribution to regional peace and security</td>
<td>- Contribute to regional peace and security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transformation of U.S. Forces
- Capability-based: Putting more emphasis on capabilities than on numbers
- Mobility-based: Adaptable to missions worldwide

*Operations of Japan and the United States in defending Japan and in responding to SIASJ must be conducted to ensure appropriate response.*

Fig. III-2-3-8 Japan–U.S. Cooperation for Improving the International Security Environment

Bilateral cooperation is an important element in achieving the common strategic objectives and improving the international security environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Challenges in Japan–U.S. Cooperation</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- National Defense Program Guidelines</td>
<td>- Implementation of appropriate contribution based on each nation’s capabilities</td>
<td>- Transformation of U.S. Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proactive efforts on its own initiative in international peace cooperation activities</td>
<td>- Implementation of measures necessary for ensuring effectiveness of efforts</td>
<td>- Capability-based: Emphasis on capabilities rather than numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishment of education and training structure</td>
<td>- Flexible capabilities are necessary for prompt and effective responses. To this end, the following measures are necessary:</td>
<td>- Mobility-based: Ready to respond to missions worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Readiness posture of the defense force units</td>
<td>- Close bilateral cooperation and policy coordination</td>
<td>- Enhancement of partnerships with existing allies and friendly nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transport capability</td>
<td>- Regular military exercises with the participation of third countries</td>
<td>- Consultation with new allies and friendly nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Expansion of international peace cooperation activities by the SDF; lessons and results from these activities</td>
<td>- Enhancement of cooperation with other nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is important for Japan and the United States to intensify their postures of security and defense cooperation so that the two countries are capable of dealing with diverse challenges in the new security environment. For this purpose, the two countries identified essential steps that can be taken in peacetime, which are listed in Fig. III-2-3-10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example of Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Air defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ballistic missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other proliferation prevention activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Anti-terrorism measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Search and rescue activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and improvement of capabilities and effectiveness of such activities by using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Humanitarian relief operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Reconstruction assistance activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Peacekeeping activities and capacity building for other nation's peacekeeping efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Guarding operations for important infrastructure including USFJ facilities and areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Disposal and decontamination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other measures against WMD attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Mutual logistic support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes enhanced or combined efforts of air and maritime transportation (including transportation by high speed vessels (HSV)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Transportation, use of facilities, medical support and other activities for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Use of ports, airports, roads, sea, airspace, and frequency bands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enhancement and Expansion of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

Japan and the United States agreed to enhance and improve the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation indicated in the Guidelines, as well as cooperation in other fields, if necessary, that are not specified in the Guidelines. See Section 2 of this Chapter (p.x).

Japan and the United States emphasized at the “2+2” meeting held in May 2006 that the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation should be strengthened and improved, and that the two countries emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation to ensure a robust relationship and enhance the alliance’s capabilities.

Furthermore, in the joint statement made at the “2+2” meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with the alliance transformation vision indicated in the October 2005 SCC document, and highlighted as follows:

- Redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan.
- Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security conditions.

Notes: 1. Close policy consultations on security are conducted between Japanese and U.S. government officials through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) at the ministerial level (so-called “2+2” meeting), Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meeting, the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), and others. As for operations, there exist a comprehensive mechanism and a bilateral mechanism under the Guidelines. (See this chapter, Section 3, p.000)
2. The term “interoperability” refers to the commonness and duality of tactics, equipment, logistics support in the implementation guidelines for various operations.
environment and to better posture the forces of the two countries to operate together in a regional crisis

○ Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)\textsuperscript{15}

○ Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group

○ Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operations, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations

○ Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities

3 The USFJ and other Force Posture Realignment (Third Stage)

(1) Guiding Precepts for Force Posture Realignment

In the October 2005 “2+2” Joint Statement, the following items were listed as guiding precepts for force posture realignment of the USFJ based on the previously described first and second stages.

○ Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States.

○ Both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.

○ Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces.

○ Dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can reduce burdens of training on local communities.

○ Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.

○ Adequate capacity of facilities and areas is necessary. Capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements, and can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.

○ This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.

○ Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.

○ Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.
(2) Force Posture Realignment Outline
Based on the above precepts, specific force posture realignment proposals were listed in the May 2006 Roadmap. Figures III-2-3-11 and III-2-3-12 show the overview of that realignment. Furthermore, the following items list the concepts relating to each of those realignment proposals.
○ The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package.
○ Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
○ Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
○ The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: 1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and 2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

4. Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises
Bilateral training and exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. Forces are categorized as command post exercises, in which hypothetical situations are set up, with the objectives of improving the decision making abilities of officers and the ability of staff to make adjustments, and field exercises, in which actual units move in training areas or sea and air space with the objective of improving overall coordination between Japan and the United States. These kinds of training are useful for enhancing their respective tactical skills. Bilateral training and exercises are also indispensable as a means of facilitating mutual understanding and close communication under normal circumstances, thereby improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth conduct of Japan-U.S. bilateral actions. In addition, it is important for the SDF to conduct necessary trainings for collaboration and coordination between the SDF and U.S. Forces in normal circumstances so that the SDF may carry out the missions conferred by the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and other laws. Such efforts serve to maintain and enhance the credibility and deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Therefore, the SDF has conducted a variety of bilateral training and exercises with U.S. Forces by now, and maintains a policy to enhance these training and exercises in the future. For example, units from the SDF and U.S. Forces participated in the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Training Exercise (a command post exercise) in January 2010. With the cooperation of relevant ministries, the SDF’s responses and Japan-U.S cooperation were examined and training and exercises were carried out assuming various situations such as a Japan-U.S. bilateral response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The purpose of this was to maintain and enhance integrated joint operation capabilities. Furthermore, Japan-U.S. Joint Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, Japan-U.S. Joint Fighter combat training, and others, continue as efforts to improve interoperability at the military service and unit levels. See Reference 53 (p.x)
Fig. III-2-3-11 The Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the SDF

1. Realignment in Kanto Area

- Establishment of the bilateral and joint operations coordination center (BJODC) at Yokota Air Base
- Return of portions of airspace, and realignment of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers to the Yokota RAPCON facility, etc.
- Civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the United States)

[Reorganization of the Japan Air Defense Command (JASC)]

- Establishment of facilities along with the transformation of headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (support facilities, including a training center)
- Return of some portions of land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (approximately 19ha)
- Return of land for underground rail and road (approximately 20ha)
- Joint use of a specific area (approximately 35ha) of open space in the western side of SDF

2. Realignment in Okinawa

[Shared Use]

- Camp Hansen will be used for JGSDF training
- JASDF will use Marine Corps Air Station for bilateral training with the U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

[Land Return]

- The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Camp Schwab
- A detailed consolidation plan is being planned
- The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Camp Schwab
- A detailed consolidation plan is being planned

- Naha Port (total return, approximately 69ha)
- A replacement facility will be constructed in the area

- Maximiliano Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return, approximately 274ha)

3. Relocation of Aircraft

- Aircraft from three U.S. facilities (Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni) will participate in relocated training conducted from the following JDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Yonabaru

- Relocation of Carrier Air Wing (F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, E-2C, C-2A, total 59 aircraft) to Iwakuni

- Relocation of KC-130 (12 aircraft) to Iwakuni

- Relocation of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Yonabaru

- Deployment of X-Band Transporatble Radar for SBD (AN/TPY-2) — so-called “X-Band Radar System”

- Relocation of JMSDF E/OUP-3, U-36A (17 aircraft) to Atsugi

- Relocation of GH-50 (6 aircraft) to Guam

Legend: Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base (Land area as of January 1, 2009)
5. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)\(^1\) between Japan and the United States is that if one side requests the provision of goods or services, the other side should provide them\(^1\). The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, U.N. peacekeeping operations, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-2-3-13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Implementation Plans for Realignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Summer 2006</td>
<td>Necessary arrangements and facility modifications will be made for deployment of a U.S. X-Band Radar system to JASDF Shikiki Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By October 2006</td>
<td>Portions of Yokota airspace to be returned will be identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2006</td>
<td>Shared use of Camp Hanen, which requires no facility improvements, will start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By March 2007</td>
<td>Consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa will be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From FY2007</td>
<td>Development of annual plan for training relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By U.S. FY2008 (October 2007–September 2008)</td>
<td>U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By September 2008</td>
<td>Portions of Yokota airspace will be returned to Japanese control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009 (or the earliest possible date thereafter)</td>
<td>Permanent site for field-carrier landing practice facility will be selected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2009 (April 2009–)</td>
<td>Comprehensive study, including conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace, will be completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2010</td>
<td>JASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units will relocate to Yokota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By FY2012</td>
<td>The headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force will relocate to Camp Zama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By FY2014</td>
<td>Futema Replacement Facility will be completed. Part of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa (III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their dependents) will relocate to Guam. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Items written in boldface show completed measures.

Fig. III-2-3-12 Major Realignment Schedule shown in the Roadmap

Fig. III-2-3-13 Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services

Scope of application of the ACSA

In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where units of allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations.

Armed attack situations and anticipated situations

Training, communication, coordination, and other daily activities

Disaster relief

Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas

Studied portions were added as a result of the 2004 revision.
6. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in areas of equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of Japan’s technology and production base and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States despite the provisions of the Three Principles on Armed Exports and related regulations. And, in 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America. In June 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America was concluded to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

Under these frameworks, the Government of Japan decided to provide the United States with items of arms and military technology, including portable surface-to-air missile (PSAM) technology and weapon technologies related to joint technological research on BMD.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at the forums. Since 1992, the two countries have concluded the joint project agreement, and conducted 18 joint projects (14 of which have been completed). Japan-U.S. cooperation in military equipment and technology is significant for improving interoperability and reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the future. (See Reference 54)

7. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of the USFJ

The stationing of the USFJ forms the core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the deep commitment of the United States to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The USFJ greatly contributes to the peace and stability of Japan and the region in various ways. In particular, their presence is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan tries to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively taking various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of the USFJ. See 2 Section 2 (P)

1 Japan’s Measures, etc., Based on the Status of Forces Agreement
Matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the position of the USFJ are stipulated in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which has provisions regarding facilities and areas for the use of the USFJ (USFJ facilities and areas), satisfying labor requirements of the USFJ, etc.
(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and Areas
Japan provides facilities and areas for the USFJ under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States, at no cost to the United States.

The Government has concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of necessary USFJ facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of land owners, it will acquire a title to use under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land, after compensating the landowners for any loss they may suffer in the process.

(2) Satisfying Labor requirements of the USFJ
The USFJ requires manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and SOFA stipulates that the labor requirements of the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2009, 25,812 stationed military workers and others (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security units and fire departments on base, and staff of welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of SOFA. The Ministry of Defense supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, healthcare, welfare, etc.

2. Cost Sharing for the Stationing of the USFJ
Japan plays an important role in bearing the burden of costs of stationing U.S. Forces in Japan to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economy, the United States has felt considerable pressure from the burden of stationing of the USFJ. In consideration of such circumstances, and with a view to making efforts to the greatest extent possible with the framework of SOFA, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs (costs for the employee’s welfare) in FY1978. Then in FY1979, due to the suddenly stronger yen against the dollar, Japan began to bear costs for programs that sought to improve facilities.

Furthermore, as the labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, employment stability of the employees was adversely impacted, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the USFJ. Therefore in 1987 the governments of Japan and the United States agreed on a special measure in Article 24 of SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement) as a provisional measure for an exception to the cost principle in SOFA. Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan would bear labor costs such as adjustment allowances (currently replaced by
regional allowance), and as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the Government of Japan’s burden expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utility costs from FY1991, and its financial responsibility further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996.

Still, Japan carefully considered its own difficult financial situation in relation to the burden of costs for stationing of the USFJ in Japan, and they peaked in the FY1999 budget (annual expenditure base) and have since been declining.

Under the new SMA put into effect in May 2008, the sharing of labor costs and training relocation costs will be maintained within the framework of the previous SMA; while costs such as those for utilities will be reduced at a fixed rate. The new agreement also states that the U.S. Government will make further efforts to reduce its expenditures. Furthermore, an agreement was made between the U.S. and Japanese Governments for a comprehensive review of cost sharing for the stationing of the USFJ in order to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness. (See Figure III-2-3-14, 15)

### Fig. III-2-3-14 Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Outline</th>
<th>Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)</td>
<td>barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1997 and provided to the USFJ</td>
<td>Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor costs</td>
<td>Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ Differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance, which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)</td>
<td>Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1995)</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities costs</td>
<td>Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, and fuel costs (for heating, cooking, and hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel etc., equivalent to the FY2007 budget of 25.3 billion yen for FY2008, and those equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training relocation costs</td>
<td>Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the GOJ have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the “Criteria for adopting FIP projects” to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows:

1. Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors.
2. Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others).
Fig. III-2-3-15 Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ (FY2010 Budget)

Utilities costs
¥24.9 billion (13.3%)

Training relocation costs
¥0.5 billion (0.3%)

Costs for Facilities Improvement Program
¥20.6 billion (11%)

Base Employee Measures, etc.
¥27.9 billion (14.8%)

Labor costs
¥114 billion (60.8%)

Grand Total
¥188.1 billion

Notes: 1. The grand total has dropped by 2.4% from the previous year.
2. Numbers in parentheses represent the relative composition within the whole.
In order to ensure the stability of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan (the significance of which is described in Section 2), the Ministry of Defense is maintaining its U.S. Forces-based deterrence through a number of measures – including force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan – and continuing to make efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of communities living near USFJ facilities and areas by reducing the burden on such communities in locations such as Okinawa.

The U.S. Forces realignment outlined in the previous section in particular, is an extremely important effort to maintain deterrence while reducing the burden on local communities, such as Okinawa. The Ministry of Defense will steadily advance the U.S Forces’ realignment operations described in the Roadmap, based both on the perspectives of security and that of reducing the burden on local communities.

This chapter will describe measures to gain genuine acceptance of the USFJ by the Japanese people.

1. Stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa

As of January 2010, approximately 74% of the USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) is concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 10% of the land area of the prefecture, and 18% of the main island. The Cabinet regards the issues associated with the concentration of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa as some of the most important issues, and they are being addressed as such by the whole Government. For some time, the Ministry of Defense has also been implementing a range of measures to facilitate the resolution of problems, and making the maximum possible efforts while striving for harmony between the accomplishment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty objectives and the desires of the local community.

1. Pre-SACO Efforts for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km² for exclusive use by the USFJ under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that stimulation and development of the region, as well as planned growth are restricted and the lives of residents are seriously affected.

In view of these circumstances, both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, focusing on items that are strongly requested by local communities. In light of the items identified by the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan and then President Richard Nixon of the United States in 1972, a plan for the realignment and consolidation of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa was authorized by the SCC held in 1973, 1974, and 1976. In relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Furthermore, regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues strongly emphasized by the residents of the prefecture (the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of
artillery live-fire training over Highway 104), under the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Summit of 1995 it was agreed that efforts would be made to resolve these issues. (See Reference 49, p.x)

2. Outline and Current Situation regarding SACO
Public interest in Okinawa-related issues heightened across the country in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995 as well as the refusal of then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land.

Considering that the burden on the people of Okinawa should be reduced as much as possible and shared by the whole nation, the Government has, for the sake of the future development of Okinawa, decided to put even greater efforts towards the realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas, and to do its utmost to take measures for regional development in Okinawa. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) between Japan and the United States in 1995.

Since then, the issues on Okinawa were intensely discussed for about one year, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land (the total return of six facilities, including MCAS Futenma, and the partial return of five others, such as the Northern Training Area), the adjustment of training and operational procedures (the termination of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 and the dispersion of similar live-fire training into maneuver areas on mainland Japan), the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the Status of Forces Agreement. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km²) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43km².

The facilities and areas relating to the SACO Final Report, as well as major progress, are described in Figures III-2-4-1 and III-2-4-2.
As a result of the above efforts, the number of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa, as well as the land area, have changed, as described in Figure III-2-4-3. (See Reference 50)
### 1. Already Retumed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aha Training Area (Return of total area)</td>
<td>Completed in December 1998 (cancellation of joint use)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area) | April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others to Camp Hansen  
June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m²) was returned  
December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Sobe Communication Site totally returned [approximately 53 ha]) |
| Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area) | October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the return of the Sobe Communication Site  
July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 133 ha)  
December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield totally returned [approximately 191 ha]) |
| Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas) | March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including antennas and others to Torii Communication Station  
September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 81 ha excluding the microwave tower portion)  
October 2008: The microwave power portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station |

### 2. Process for Return in Progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Northern Training Area (Return of more than half the area) | April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones and others  
November 2002–March 2004: Environmental survey (continuous environmental survey)  
February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the change of agreement in April 1999 (Helicopter Landing Zones [HLZ]; from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scales of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter)  
February–March 2007: Environmental impact assessment document was released and examined  
March 2007: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (Phase I: three out of six)  
July 2007: Construction of Helicopter Landing Zones started  
January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of the Helicopter Landing Zones (Phase II: the remaining HLZs) |
| Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area) | June 2007: The mayor of Kin–she announced acceptance of the return conditions for the Gimbaru Training Area  
January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the HLZ was relocated to Kin Beige Beach Training Area, and the other facilities were relocated to Camp Hansen  
December 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of HLZ and Mud Removal Facility and the site development of Fire Fighting Training Facility  
June 2009: Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of Fire Fighting Training Facility in Camp Hansen  
November 2006: HLZ was furnished |

### 3. Specific Measures Stated in the “United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCAS Futenma (Return of total area)</td>
<td>See Fig. III-2-4-4, p. 303 “Background for the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* May 2006: Completion of the FRF (having two runways laid out in a “V”-shape) by 2014 aimed at in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation |
### State of Progress of the SACC Final Report

**Camp Kuwae**
- July 2002: Youth center was furnished
- March 2003: Part of northern site returned (approximately 38 ha)
- January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities
- December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital
- February 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of support facilities (HIL, etc.) of the Naval Hospital
- December 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of support facilities (Utility) of the Naval Hospital
- May 2009: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Navy Hospital (BEC, etc.)
- October 2009: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Navy Hospital (water tank facility)
- May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

**Naha Port Facility**
- May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

**Housing Consolidation**
- Camp Zuiroku
- April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
- July 2002: Two highrises were furnished
- July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II, Suda Area)
- February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
- September 2005: Two highrises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III, Eastern Chatan Area)
- March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
- June 2008: 35 townhouses were furnished (Phase IV, Futenma and Upper Plaza Area)
- March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
- February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished
- May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of Artillery-Live-fire Training over Highway 104</td>
<td>Relocated to five maneuver areas in mainland Japan in FY1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute Drop Training</td>
<td>Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Adjacent Training and Operation Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadina Air Base</td>
<td>Furnished in July 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives

1. Already Implemented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of the U.S. Naval Ramp at Kadina Air Base</td>
<td>September 2006: Rasse Facility was furnished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Implementation Underway

3. Specific Measures Stated in “the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base</td>
<td>May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on rotational bases for training and operations to MSDF Kusama Base and Guam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. History and Current Status of U.S. Forces Realignment in Okinawa
In efforts relating to realignment of U.S. Forces too, measures have been implemented to reduce the burden on the local communities in Okinawa Prefecture. The details of these are as follows.
(1) Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma Replacement Facility
MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aerial capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa (USMC in Okinawa):
1) Transport of Marine ground forces by helicopter, etc.
2) Operation of air refueling aircraft
3) A base for accepting aircraft in emergency

However, since the airbase is situated in an urban area, its prompt relocation has been strongly desired by the local residents, due to problems such as the safety of the community, noise, and traffic. Therefore, arrangements are being made toward the goal of returning the airbase, by implementing each of the following steps, with regard to the functions of MCAS Futenma.

a. Transport of Marine Ground Forces by Helicopter, etc.
(a) Situation Regarding Planning Based on the SACO Final Report
In the SACO Final Report compiled in December 1996, it was agreed that within 5-7 years, once suitable replacement facilities had been completed, MCAS Futenma would be completely returned.

Progress regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) subsequent to the report is described in Figure III-2-4-4. Based on this, as well as the occurrence of a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter crash in Ginowan in August 2004, in order to resolve the unease of the residents living in the vicinity, an investigation was conducted into methods to realize Futenma’s relocation and return as early as possible, through a process of negotiation between Japan and the United States in relation to the realignment of the USFJ.

(b) Basic Concept of Review of FRF in the Roadmap
The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consist of air, ground, logistics, and command elements, and the interaction of those elements in actual operations is necessary. Therefore, it was determined that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be located near the other elements with which they train or operate on a regular basis.

Based on recognition of the above, in the SCC document prepared in October 2005 the initiative to “locate the FRF in an L-shaped configuration that connects the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. Then, based on negotiation and agreement with public organizations in the local communities (beginning with Nago City), it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a configuration that “connects Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” In regard to construction of this replacement facility, “certificates of basic confirmation” were exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and then Director-General of the Defense Agency in May 2006. (See Reference 40)
(c) Review of Destination for MCAS Futenma Relocation

With the change of government in September 2009, it was decided that the details of prior Japan-U.S. agreements relating to the realignment of the USFJ would be studied. In particular, the entire government has carried out intense studies on the FRF, from the perspective of maintaining deterrence, while aiming to eliminate the danger posed to residents near MCAS Futenma and reducing the burden on Okinawa.
After the change of regime, the process whereby the proposal for the Futenma Air Station replacement facility specified in the roadmap was decided has been studied within Government. Then, in a meeting held on November 10 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada and U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos, the establishment of a “cabinet level working group on the FRF” (WG) as a process related to this inspection by the Japanese and U.S. Governments was agreed. The cabinet level WG was held on November 17 and December 4, and based on the fundamental concept pervading the whole of the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan (of maintaining deterrence, while reducing the burden on local communities such as Okinawa), consultation was conducted relating to the study process, including an exchange of explanations into areas such as political conditions within Japan.

Based on the discussions carried out at the WG, on the one hand the Government recognized the weight of past agreements between Japan and the United States, while on the other it was forecasted that the completion of relocation would become ever more distant, when considering the effects exerted on national politics if the relocation was forced (based on the FRF plan described in the Roadmap). Consequently, it was determined that further study of the issue would be performed by the entire Government.

Based on the above, on December 28, 2009 the Committee for Consideration of the Issue of Bases in Okinawa (formed of committee members from the three ruling parties) was established with the Chief Cabinet Secretary as chairman, under the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies. The Committee engaged in active discussion in areas including studies relating to details about the course of decision of the FRF plan as set out in the Roadmap, and wide-ranging review of the various options, on a zero-basis and without any specific premise. Not only had the Committee held meetings eight times by March 8, 2010, but on February 10 and 11, 2010 the Committee visited Guam to inspect the region.

As a result of these studies, in a joint “2+2” announcement made on May 28 2010, the intention to locate the MCAS Futenma replacement facility in the Henoko-saki area of Camp Schwab and the adjacent water areas was confirmed, while it was agreed with the U.S. that a range of concrete measures would be taken to reduce the burden on Okinawa. Details regarding the location, arrangement and construction methods for the MCAS Futenma replacement facility are being studied by experts from the governments of both the United States and Japan until the end of August this year; the subsequent inspection and confirmation will be complete in time for the next “2+2”.

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that from a security perspective, the USFJ deterrence (which includes the Marine Corps) cannot be lessened at this time, while there remains instability and uncertainty in the East Asian security environment. Furthermore, there was concern that the functions of the Marine Corps would be weakened if the helicopter units associated with MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, the conclusion was reached that the MCAS Futenma replacement facility had to be within Okinawa Prefecture.
In addition, the decision to locate the MCAS Futenma replacement facility in the Henoko-saki area of Camp Schwab and the adjacent water areas was one which prioritized the reduction of the burden and the elimination of risk to local communities, due to the fact that Futenma could not be returned unless a decision was made on the replacement.

On the same day as the “2+2” Joint Announcement, Cabinet approval was given for immediate governmental efforts pertaining to the items agreed in the “2+2”. These are outlined as follows.

○ The Government will proceed with inspection and confirmation of the relocation plan for MCAS Futenma, based on the joint announcement.

○ The burden incurred by the concentration of bases in Okinawa Prefecture is to be reduced and the duties of the Alliance accepted by Japan as a whole. Meanwhile, the dispersal of bases outside of Okinawa Prefecture or abroad, and the streamlining and reduction in size of USFJ bases, will continue to be addressed in order to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

○ Furthermore, specific measures are to be implemented swiftly, such as the relocation of training outside Okinawa Prefecture, environmental measures, and the joint use of facilities between the U.S. Forces and SDF.

○ It was clarified that at the same time, further efforts would be made to gain the understanding of concerned local public entities, beginning with Okinawa Prefectural Government,

In the future, the Government will do its utmost to reduce the burden on the local community in Okinawa and eliminate the risk of MCAS Futenma. (See Reference 47, 48)

b. Operation of Air Refueling

Air refueling aircraft KC-130 (12 in total) are to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Prefecture) under the Roadmap as well as the SACO Final Report. They will be regularly deployed on a rotational basis to the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Kanoya Base (in Kagoshima Prefecture) and Guam for training and operations. Consultations are being held between Japan and the United States pertaining to training and operations at Kanoya Base.

c. A Base for Accepting Aircraft in Emergency

Use by U.S Forces of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) Nyutabaru Air Base (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki Air Base (in Fukuoka Prefecture) in case of emergency will be enhanced. When site surveys are completed, facility improvements for this will be made according to necessity before Futenma Air Station is returned. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support bilateral training activities, which should be expanded according to the studies on roles, missions, and capabilities.

Furthermore, the improvement of use of civilian facilities by U.S. Forces in case of emergency will
be examined in the Japan-U.S. efforts of planning-study, and appropriate measures will be taken in order to realize the return of Futenma Air Station.

d. Efforts to Eliminate Danger at Futenma Air Station

In August 2007, the Ministry of Defense announced various measures as part of efforts to remove risks of danger at Futenma Air Station such as 1) improving approach and takeoff routes, and avoiding areas of high residential density as much as possible, 2) expanding clear zones\(^{26}\) and other measures for safe return from the area around the airfield when there is engine trouble\(^ {27}\), 3) improving facilities to increase the visibility of runways at night, and 4) developing automatic flight control systems rather than relying on eyesight. The Ministry of Defense has been steadily implementing these measures, and in May 2009, the efforts were all completed.

Inhabitants near MCAS Futenma have indicated that the Ministry of Defense is not protecting the traffic patterns described in the efforts. It therefore purchased and installed aircraft route observation equipment and cameras, and in January 2010 commenced continuous flight assessment by helicopter.

The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed in February 2008 that of the above-mentioned measures, the Government of Japan would implement the measures to improve facilities to increase the visibility of runways at night and to expand clear zones.

(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, the personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam\(^ {28}\) and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned. Due to this realignment in Okinawa, it is planned that approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. U.S. Marine Corps Forces remaining in Okinawa will consist of Marine Air Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.

As for costs of relocating U.S. Forces to Guam, the Governments of both Japan and the United States held consultations with a view that each side should share an appropriate portion of the costs. At the Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting held in April 2006, both sides agreed on the sharing of costs for providing facilities and infrastructure related to the relocation of U.S. Forces to Guam, as described in Figure III-2-4-5. (See 3 of this Section, p.x)
The relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam is extremely important for advancing the realignment of U.S. Forces and reducing the burden on Okinawa. The Ministry of Defense has held constant consultations on how to implement the Roadmap with the U.S. Government, with the intention of steadily carrying out the realignment of U.S. Forces in accordance with the Roadmap.

Consequently, with regard to projects whereby Japan takes measures in the form of direct cash contributions (so-called Mamizu projects\(^2\)), in order to legally guarantee that actions taken by Japan and the United States such as the provision of funding over multiple years by Japan are on a more solid footing, the Japanese government signed the Guam Agreement (Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration buildings, instruction buildings, barracks, and QOL facilities</td>
<td>(Direct) fiscal spending</td>
<td>$2.8 billion (maximum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family housing</td>
<td>Equity investment</td>
<td>$1.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loan, etc.</td>
<td>$0.63 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost reduction by improved efficiency</td>
<td>$0.42 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities (electricity, water, and waste water, and solid waste disposal)</td>
<td>Loan, etc.</td>
<td>$0.74 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>$6.00 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helidromes, communication facilities, training support facilities, maintenance and refilling facilities, fuel and ammunition warehouses, and other basic facilities</td>
<td>(Direct) fiscal spending</td>
<td>$3.18 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads (high-standard roads)</td>
<td>Loan or (direct) fiscal spending</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.18 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aggregate amount $10.27 billion

Notes: 1. The details of the projects are based on the estimates at the planning stage, and the amount and schemes are subject to change.
2. Japan is committed to sharing cost not according to the ratio to the total amount but based on the amount required for each of the facilities and infrastructures.
3. The cost will be further examined. Under the Agreement, Japanese direct fiscal spending is up to 2.8 billion dollars in U.S. 2008 fiscal year (real value has been converted using the dollar-based purchasing power in the relevant fiscal year).
4. As for family housing, the cost was reduced by $0.42 billion (by improved efficiency) from $2.55 billion to $2.13 billion.
5. As for equity investment and loans, the amount spent will be recovered through rents and fees paid by the United States.
6. The cost of moving the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and the cost for the Corps' activities in Guam are not included in the aggregate amount of $10.27 billion.
7. Direct fiscal spending by both the U.S. and Japan includes infrastructure development projects.
Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam) on February 17, 2009, which was then enacted on May 19 of the same year. (See Fig. III-2-4-6) (See Reference 43)

Note: Areas subject to the projects are conceptual and do not indicate specific sites.
(3) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

a. Return of Significant Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base
USFJ facilities and areas are located in densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base (approximately 1,500ha in total). Following the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam described above, the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

The Roadmap has stipulated the development of a detailed consolidation plan for the six candidate facilities (Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1), and is currently under consultation between Japan and the United States. (See Section3-3, p.x)

b. Steady Implementation of the SACO Final Report
The steady implementation of the SACO Final Report prepared in 1996 is important because it aims to sufficiently maintain the capabilities and readiness of the USFJ and to reduce impacts of operations of U.S. Forces on local residents of Okinawa. In the Roadmap, Japan and the United States agreed to the possibility that the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.

c. Joint Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa
The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urbanized areas with some operational restriction. Therefore, the joint use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the training environment for SDF units in Okinawa, and facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between the SDF and U.S. Forces. It will become possible to improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local residents at a time of disaster.

Based on such concepts, it was decided that Camp Hansen would be used for Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) training, and training commenced in March 2008. The ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces while taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(4) Link among Realignment Initiatives
Within the overall realignment package in the Roadmap, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are linked. Specifically, consolidation and land returns in the south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.

The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: 1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and 2) Japan’s financial contribution to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure in Guam.

4. Efforts for the Use of Returned Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas
Regarding the return of private and public land used for USFJ facilities and areas (land used by the
USFJ), the Ministry of Defense has been taking measures to restore vacated land to its original state by removing buildings, structures, and so on.

Furthermore, benefits are to be provided to the owners of sites in Okinawa Prefecture, under the Special Measures Law for the Return of Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa, and in addition, under the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development, benefits are provided for the owner of large-scale vacated land or designated vacated land.

Pursuant to the Policy toward Tasks in Each Field Related to Promotion and Facilitation of Utilizing Returned Land Used for Futenma Air Station, formulated in December 2001, related municipalities have been making efforts to establish returned land use plans. In February 2006, Okinawa Prefecture and Ginowan City established a basic policy for the use of returned land used for Futenma Air Station. The Ministry of Defense will continue efforts to promote and facilitate the utilization of vacated land in coordination and cooperation with related ministries and prefectural and municipal governments.

2. Stationing of the USFJ in Regions other than Okinawa

While it continues to maintain the USFJ deterrence in regions other than Okinawa, the Ministry of Defense is trying to reduce the burden on local communities, and is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the USFJ. This section will explain the current situation regarding measures of this kind, such as the realignment of U.S. Forces, including the question of how they are being executed in each of the regions, excluding Okinawa.

1. Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

The ideal state of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture has been discussed between Japan and the United States due to the strong desire from local public and other organizations for their return. As a result, the basic concept pertaining to the return of 6 facilities and areas (including Naval Communication Facility Kamiseya in Yokohama), as well as the construction of approximately 700 housing units for U.S. Forces families in the Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex” were agreed in October 2004, in the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee.

The construction of these U.S. Forces family housing units 1) paves the way to the large-scale return of six USFJ facilities and areas in the prefecture, extending to approximately 419 ha; 2) solves the current housing shortage faced by the U.S. Navy in Japan, and is thus vital to attaining the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is continuing to coordinate with the United States and local public entities and others, and striving toward the realization of this goal, through procedures such as environmental impact statement (EIS) process. (See Fig. III-2-4-7)
2. Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the USFJ

(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capacity

To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was activated as the headquarters of the I Corps (Forward)/USARJ in December 2007 and the reorganization took place at the end of September 2008. This reorganization is based on the global realignment of the U.S. Army as part of the overall transformation of U.S. Forces. The reorganized USARJ headquarters in Japan will continue to hold the same core mission of defending Japan and maintaining the peace and security of the Far East.
To enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters that unitarily controls mobile operation units and specialized units will be relocated to Camp Zama by FY2012 so that it can strengthen coordination with the reorganized USARJ headquarters.

In accordance with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD, in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and the SGD, including partial return of facilities and areas. The partial return of land (approx. 17 ha) at SGD facilities and areas was approved by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in June 2008.

(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace

a. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)

Enhancement of coordination between headquarters, combined with the transition to a joint operations structure, is quite important from the perspective of ensuring flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and U.S. Forces. The headquarters of the USFJ located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important role in the various mechanisms under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command as mentioned below, the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) is to be established and it is planned to commence operations at the BJOCC during FY2010.

b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command

The ASDF Air Defense Command located in Fuchu City, Tokyo has an air defense mission as well as a function as a headquarters for ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations. In the case of air defense and BMD, response time is very short. Therefore, it is quite important for the SDF and U.S. Forces to immediately share necessary information. Thus, in FY2010, ASDF Air Defense Command and its relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base, where the headquarters of U.S. 5th Air Force is located, and construction/installation work is being conducted. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC will make it possible to enhance coordination between headquarters of the SDF and U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

c. Yokota Airspace

At Yokota Air Base, U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. To facilitate the operation of civilian airplanes that enter the airspace, however, the following measures are pursued.

(a) Establish a program in FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of procedures for transiting Yokota airspace.
(b) Develop procedures in FY2006 for the temporary transfer of responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, when not required by military purposes.
(c) Return air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities by September 2008 after having identified the returned to be returned by October 2006.

(d) Complete a study of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace by FY2009.

In response, the procedure mentioned in (b) as above started in September 2006. With regard to (c), the themes of 1) identification of the airspace portions to be returned by September 2008 and 2) collocation of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility were mutually agreed by the Governments of Japan and the United States in October of the same year.

With regard to measure 1) above, the area adjacent to the west side of Haneda Airport was reduced by about 40% on September 25, 2008 and the control operation was returned to Japan. With respect to measure 2) above, the collocation of U.S. Forces and Japanese controllers started in May 2007. The lessons learned here are to be taken into account when considering (d), which is at present, being advanced. (See Fig. III-2-4-8)
d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the feasibility of a civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base would be bilaterally studied by both governments. A Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant ministries and agencies (the Cabinet Secretariat; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; the Defense Agency (now reorganized as the Ministry of Defense); and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (then)) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Since then, discussions have been made.

The Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted a study, starting in October 2006, of the specific conditions and modalities in the study group, with the understanding that the dual use will not compromise military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. Based on further coordination and the outcome of the study, both governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions.

(3) Measures relating to U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Base and Iwakuni Air Base

a. Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carriers

The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in maintaining the regional peace and stability, including the safety of maritime traffic, in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. aircraft carriers are the core capability of the Fleet. In order to ensure the long-term forward deployment capabilities of aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft, it is necessary to secure an operational base in Japan. The nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington is currently forward deployed to Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture).

Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have excellent combatant and operational capabilities. Since they are driven by energy generated in a nuclear reactor, there is no need to replenish fuel, and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft. Having a strong U.S. Navy presence continuously maintained in areas surrounding Japan by deploying the nuclear carrier George Washington would contribute to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Furthermore, it would symbolize the deep commitment of the United States to the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The U.S. Navy vows that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered warships (including the nuclear carrier George Washington) adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repair work and fuel changes will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety.

With regard to the nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington, since September 2006, working level talks for disaster prevention and safety measures pertaining to nuclear aircraft carriers have been underway between Japan and the United States. Since 2007, organizations such as government agencies, Yokosuka City, and the U.S. Navy have been participating in joint Japan-U.S. training, and the nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington has been taking part as of 2008.
b. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing

When the U.S. aircraft carrier is in port in Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Base is located in the center of an urban district, noise of carrier jets taking off and landing particularly has been a problem for a long time.

Such problems should be resolved as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the operations of carriers under the arrangements from now into the future.

After the completion of the runway relocation project at MCAS Iwakuni, the safe operations of aircraft will be possible in a less intrusive manner that is more conducive to the living environment of the surrounding communities.

In consideration of these matters, Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Base to Iwakuni Air Base. This relocation, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C and C-2 aircraft (59 aircraft in total), will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.

The relocations will be 1) conducted after the runway is moved offshore to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at Iwakuni Air Base due to this relocation. Related measures will also be taken, including 2) the relocation of JMSDF EP-3 and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to Atsugi Air Base, 3) the regular rotational deployment of KC-130 aircraft (which are to be relocated from Futemna Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base) to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam, and 4) the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from Iwakuni Air Base to Guam.

It is expected that the area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called first category area) will decrease from approximately 1,600ha to 500ha. Thus, the noise around Iwakuni Air Base will be alleviated. Furthermore, safety will be improved as the runway will be relocated offshore and approach and takeoff routes will be established above the water.

As for field-carrier landing practice (FCLP), a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. In addition, the SCC document confirmed that U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identified.

c. Iwakuni Air Base Runway Transfer Project

Due to requests made to the Government by the City of Iwakuni and such parties, a project has recently been advanced to transfer the runway at Iwakuni Air Base roughly 1,000 m to the east (offshore) to resolve problems associated with the operation of the base, safety and noise, and to ensure its stable use. Part of the new runway is already complete, and has commenced operation, while the remaining parts are planned for completion by the end of 2010. This project will facilitate the safe operation of aircraft, in a form which has less impact on the living environment in the surrounding region.
d. Resumption of Commercial Aviation at Iwakuni Air Base

Considering that the local public entities, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, have been working together to request the resumption of commercial aviation operations, the Governments of Japan and the United States have been engaged in discussions to identify such issues as the relations between commercial aviation resumption and the operations of U.S. Forces and to study its feasibility. As a result, in October 2005, it was agreed that commercial aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements.

Since it was then agreed in the Roadmap that portions of the future civilian air facility would be accommodated at Iwakuni Air Base, bilateral coordination has been carried out, and the Ministry of Defense explained the location of commercial aviation facilities to the local public entities in May 2007.

(4) Ballistic Missile Defense

As confirmed in the examination on roles, missions and capabilities, Japan and the United States will continue close coordination on ballistic missile defense (BMD) as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities.

In June 2006 the new U.S. Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar System (AN/TPY-2; hereafter referred to as the “X-Band Radar System”) with the sophisticated capability to search and track ballistic missiles was deployed to ASDF Shariki Air Station (in Aomori Prefecture) and operations commenced. The data obtained by the X-Band Radar System will be shared by the two countries. Thereby, the capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for protecting Japanese nationals and coping with damage will improve.

Also in October 2006 U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 capabilities were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, and in addition, Aegis-equipped cruisers, which are forward-deployed in the Western Pacific region, have been installed with BMD capabilities over some phases since August 2006.

This deployment of U.S. Forces’ BMD capabilities to Japan contributes to the improvement of our country’s defense against missile attacks, the maintenance of deterrence of the USFJ and the safety of Japanese citizens.

(5) Training Relocation

As for training relocation, initially, aircraft from three U.S. military facilities – Kadena Air Base, Misawa Air Base (in Aomori Prefecture), and Iwakuni Air Base –, for the time being participate in bilateral training with the SDF at the following SDF facilities: Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru.

Since March 2007, U.S. Forces have conducted training relocation exercises from Misawa Air Base, Iwakuni Air Base, and Kadena Air Base to ASDF Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and
Nyutabaru Air Bases. The Ministry of Defense, having performed site surveys, is now making improvements to infrastructure to facilitate the training relocation in SDF facilities according to necessity.

Efforts to ensure the smooth implementation of training relocation are presently underway in order to support the U.S Forces (cooperating with the ASDF) and achieve the safety and peace of mind of the local residents during training periods. These efforts include the establishment of local contact headquarters by concerned Regional Defense Bureaus, to communicate with concerned government institutions, and deal with the local residents.

3. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the USFJ based on the Roadmap, the “Law Concerning Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and related SDF Forces” (“USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law”) was enacted in August 2007. The following is a general description of that law.

1. Realignment Grants

During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local towns and villages affected by the relocation, and to stimulate local industry. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress in steps of the USFJ realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specific defense facilities and neighbouring towns and villages affected by realignment.

Based on the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, in October 2007, 14 defense facilities and 33 towns and villages were designated, and by 2008 a further 6 towns and villages had been added. At present, 39 towns and villages receive realignment grants.

2. Exceptional Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc.

Due to the large-scale relocation of forces, some towns and villages must promptly carry out public projects (such as improvement of roads and harbors). Therefore, exceptional subsidy rates have been set for such projects. The public works, as mentioned above, will be implemented by the national government or prefectures and, in some cases, will be beyond the areas of certain municipalities. In these cases, public works may be infeasible with the realignment grant. Therefore, the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law provides such measures as the establishment of a Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces in order to promote industrial development of the areas consisting of municipalities with particularly heavy burdens and surrounding municipalities (Special Area for Development concerning Realignment). (See Figure III-2-4-9)
3 Measures Such as Special Provisions over Operations of the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC)

(1) Share the Cost of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

The relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa outside the prefecture has been strongly desired by the residents of Okinawa Prefecture. It is important to realize at an early date the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, which enables the reduction of burdens on Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the USFJ. Therefore, the Government of Japan has actively and energetically approached the United States to negotiate the relocation. As a result, the two countries agreed to share the costs of the relocation.

If the United States alone undertakes the development of necessary facilities and infrastructure in Guam, the task is expected to take a very long time. Therefore, the Government of Japan decided to support the United States in its development of necessary facilities, including Marine headquarters buildings, barracks and family housing, and infrastructure (electricity, water and wastewater systems, and solid waste disposal) on the occasion. Japan will bear the cost for the relocation on the basis of actual requirement of facilities and infrastructure, and not based on a certain percentage of the total costs, which the United States claimed.

Also, the development of family housing and infrastructure for Marine personnel will introduce private sector initiatives and utilize means such as equity investment and loans so that the Government of Japan’s financial expenditures is reduced as much as possible. The funds for projects will be recovered by rents and service charges paid by the U.S. side in the future.

The agreed amounts of the costs of relocation to Guam to be shared by Japan and the United States are based on the estimates prepared by the U.S. side at the stage of study, and are only approximations. Therefore, it will be necessary for the Government of Japan to actively examine concrete project schemes and the detailed calculation of costs. Therefore, the Government of Japan will take budgetary measures after thorough examinations have been made in cooperation with the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC) and efforts have been made to reduce the amount of costs required. (See Fig. III-2-4-5)
(2) Outline of Special Financial Operations of the JFC
To properly and stably implement long-term overseas projects for which private-sector initiatives are
utilized for a long period, it will be necessary to employ the capability of the JFC which has expertise
and experience in this field. Therefore, a special provision to the JFC’s operations was provided that
adds U.S. Forces Realignment Expenditure Financial Service and authorizes the JFC to conduct
financial services for facilitating the USFJ realignment as exceptional measures so that the JFC can
conduct such operations as equity investments and loans that will be needed for projects to facilitate
the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam, and furthermore, a special provision that the
Government of Japan would take special financial measures for such operations.
(See Fig. III-2-4-10)

4 Measures for USFJ Local Employees
Under the USFJ realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and U.S. Marine Corps
in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since this may affect the employment of USFJ local employees,
the Government of Japan will take measures to maintain their employment, including education and
skill training.
(See Section 3-7, p.x)

5 Validity of the Law
Although the law shall be valid for 10 years, measures including special operations of the JFC shall
remain effective for a considerable length of time even after its term has passed.
4. Measures to Alleviate the Effects Caused by USFJ Facilities and Areas

1. Efforts to Conserve the Environments Around USFJ Facilities and Areas

In the “2+2” meeting of September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make ensuring the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel and their families and other such parties a common objective, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles.” In order to follow up on this announcement, discussions between Japan and the United States were intensified. Specifically, the concerned ministries and agencies have been working together to address the issue of discussions relating to the strengthening of collaboration in periodical reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS), information exchange pertaining to the environment, and dealing with environmental pollution. The “2+2” meeting of May 2006 also confirmed the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation in order to improve application of SOFA, including the appropriate consideration given to the environment.
2. Other Measures
In addition to the measures outlined above, Japan is engaged in steps (see III-4-3) for improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. It also provides towns and villages with base grants\textsuperscript{47} which have alternate features in terms of fixed asset taxes.

In addition, incidents and accidents by U.S. Forces personnel and other such parties, in the regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas have an effect on the region and people. The Government is demanding that the U.S. Forces take effective steps with regard to the recurrence prevention measures of enforcing strict official discipline, and training troops. Together with cooperation on such recurrence prevention measures, steps are being taken to ensure that prompt and appropriate compensation is made for the damage due to incidents and accidents.

\textbf{Column}
[Commentary]
\textbf{Exchange With Local Communities and U.S. Forces Personnel}

In the stationing of the USFJ, understanding and cooperation from the inhabitants living near U.S. bases is vital. Since FY2008, the Ministry of Defense has been holding Japan-U.S. exchange events in the vicinity of U.S. bases in each region, where, through sports and culture, USFJ personnel and their families, and local inhabitants can interact.

In FY2009, the U.S.-Japan Joint Concert was held near Yokota Air Base (Fussa). Junior high and high-school students from the local city and U.S. high-school pupils and U.S. military bands (which usually never have the opportunity to meet) interacted with one another in a mixture of broken English and Japanese, deepening their friendship, while showcasing the results of practice together before a multitude of spectators. Comments by the Japanese and American students which took part included “it was a great experience” and “I’d like to do it again.” The performance was highly regarded by the spectators too. In addition, an English-language musical theatre exchange was held by the elementary, junior high and high-school students from around Misawa Air Base (Misawa), as was a futsal competition by elementary school students from around U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo (Sasebo). Both were praised by the local inhabitants. Exchanges such as these are useful for deepening mutual understanding.

In future, the Ministry of Defense would like to proactively promote Japan-U.S. exchange events such as these, to deepen the interaction between the local residents around U.S. bases and USFJ personnel and their families.
In general, deterrence plays the military role of “deterring the act of attack itself, by taking a stance indicating that a military response will be taken and damage caused, in the event that an enemy should attack.” In order to make deterrence work, the deterring party is required to possess both the intention and ability to execute a military response, and to make the other party recognize this fact. In order to instil confidence in this intention and ability, it is assumed that the various abilities must be improved, corresponding to the level of anticipated attack.

The concept of deterrence is frequently classified into deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment is based on the threat of a strike that cannot be endured, and causes the enemy to abandon its attack by encouraging calculation of costs. Deterrence by denial is based on the ability to physically prevent specific enemy actions, and causes it to abandon attack by encouraging consideration of its ability to achieve objectives. Looking at the methods employed allows further classification into nuclear deterrence via nuclear weapons, and conventional deterrence through conventional weapons.

The U.S. possesses the ability to realize comprehensive deterrence through military capabilities of all types, including nuclear and non-nuclear striking and defense capacities. The Nuclear Posture Review published in 2010 cites a deterrence concept encompassing not only nuclear weapons, but also conventional military forces and missile defense. These capabilities are not solely for the deterrence of attacks toward the United States itself (basic deterrence); they are considered core to deterrence of attacks toward its allies such as Japan as well.

- Deterrence by Punishment
  Deterrence through threat of a strike that cannot be endured (e.g., nuclear deterrence)
- Deterrence by Denial
  Deterrence through the ability to physically prevent objective achievement (e.g., NATO’s conventional military forces during the Cold War)

**U.S. Deterrence Ability**

- Nuclear forces
- Conventional military forces
- Missile defense
- Anti-WMD capabilities
- Integrated command, control and communications system

- Deterrence of attacks toward the U.S. (Basic deterrence)
- Deterrence of attack toward allies and friendly nations (Extended deterrence)
6 The former Guidelines were created in 1978. These guidelines stipulate the cooperation between Japan and the United States to effectively achieve the goals stated in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
7 Operations conducted to interdict an enemy’s offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved. Offensive operations mean aggressive forms of operations to search for and defeat enemies.
8 Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan).
9 Law stipulating ship inspection operations and other necessary measures to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan to implement rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations conducted in relation to situations in surrounding areas (Article 2 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan).
10 The term “rear area” refers to Japan’s territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 km, from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters.
11 If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate suffers a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take necessary fiscal measures for the loss.
12 Warships and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments that are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes.
13 The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
16 The capabilities required to operate a unit of a certain size in addition to the use of individual items of equipment.
17 The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.
18 The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food, water, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oil and lubricant, clothing, communications, medical services, base support, storage, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance, airport and seaport services, and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations). (Provision of weapons is not included.)
19 The Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.
20 The Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.
22 The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.
Those dispatched from Japan included the Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada, Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koichi Takemasa, and Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Kazuya Shimba, while those dispatched from the United States included U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson.

In the tripartite coalition agreement of September 2009, it was stated that “Regarding the measures which require coordination, it is confirmed that discussion will be held at tripartite leader level in the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies, and the results will be consulted in the Cabinet Meeting, and finally the decision will be made.”

Area to ensure safety of takeoff and landing by removing obstacles.
Two elliptical shaped corridors located on both sides (north and south) of the runway are established at Futenma Air Station to regularize the flow of landing helicopters.

Units to relocate include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.

In Japanese Mamizu projects in 2010, continuing from 2009, approximately 46.8 billion yen was budgeted for expenses relating to utilities and site improvement projects, construction projects, and design projects.

According to the United States there were approximately 70 personnel there as of the end of September 2008.

An agreement was reached at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee on March 5, 2009 about the joint use of land, such as the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters building.

Concerning air defense and BMD, the BJOCC will fulfill functions to facilitate bilateral actions for the defense of Japan by making close coordination between headquarters and share information of SDF and U.S. Forces thereby improving interoperability.

In the FY2010 budget, approximately 5.6 billion yen on a contracted basis and approximately 30.9 billion yen on an annual expenditure bases has been appropriated as expenses relating to the construction of buildings including the ASDF Command Headquarters, and acquisition of equipment and materials.

This study will be conducted as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military demand for use of Japanese airspace.

According to the Roadmap, the study will be completed by the Study Group within 12 months of commencement.

The radar was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.

USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at SDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases.


The scope of specific projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, including educational, sports, and cultural projects.

Under the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations in synchronization with USFJ air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the USFJ.

9.3 billion yen in the FY2010 budget.

The Council is chaired by the Defense Minister, and composed of those designated by the Prime Minister from the Chief Cabinet Secretary; the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; Minister of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of Environment; and the Ministers of State.

As for public works projects under the Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment that have been deliberated and approved at the Council, the percentage of costs borne by the Government, or grant rate, will apply to the seven projects concerning road, ports, fishing ports, water supply, sewage system, land reform, and facilities for compulsory education that should be immediately implemented in consideration of the content and degree of adverse influences caused by the realignment of the USFJ on local communities and funding will be higher than those for ordinary cases.

Surrounding municipalities are limited to those for which development measures are considered necessary in conjunction with municipalities with heavy burdens in consideration of natural, economic and social conditions.

The Japan Bank for International Cooperation merged with National Life Finance Corporation, etc., on October 1, 2008, to become the Japan Finance Corporation. The name The Japan Bank for International Cooperation has been retained in an effort to maintain its international credibility and so on.
Consisting of four items, 1) environmental governing standards, 2) information sharing and access, 3) response to environmental contamination, 4) environmental consultation.

The Japan Environmental Governing Standards were drawn up by the USFJ with an objective of guaranteeing that the activities and facilities of the USFJ can protect the health of citizens and the natural environment. It establishes handling and storage methods for environment polluting materials.

Furnished by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.