1. Security and Defense Policies
The Obama administration was formed in January 2009 and announced its national security policy and defense policy in 2010 by releasing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in April, and the National Security Strategy (NSS) in May. The NSS points out that national interests which the United States pursues are 1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners, 2) the prosperity through a strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy, 3) respect for universal values at home and around the world, 4) an international order that promotes peace, security and opportunity. The NSS emphasizes the necessity of using and integrating all elements of American power, such as military, diplomacy and development, and of cooperating with allies, international organizations and so on, for the purpose of achieving the above national interests.

In addition, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was released in February of this year, notes that the role of the Department of Defense is to protect the United States and its allies, and to maintain and use its military capabilities in order to promote its national interests. The review goes on to indicate that the United States and its allies have the will and ability to exercise the use of force if necessary, and the United States possesses the capacity to act unilaterally if appropriate. In addition, the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

1. Assessment of Security Environment
The current QDR indicates that the security environment is complex and uncertain due to such factors as wars that the United States is currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of emerging countries such as China and India, the increase in influence of non-state actors, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and infringements on the global commons – sea, air, space, and cyber space. In addition, conflicts are becoming hybrid in that they are composed of complex characteristics, as the diverse actors that participate in these conflicts use various different means. Fragile states also face concerns of becoming hotbeds for extremism and radicalism, which are causes of conflict.

2. Defense Strategy
In the new QDR the United States lists four priority objectives tailored for this security environment and notes the necessity to balance risk and resources among these objectives. 1) Prevail in today’s wars: The greatest priority is prevailing in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan.
2) Prevent and deter conflict: The United States shall defend itself from direct attack, deter potential adversaries, and foster regional stability while assuring access to the global commons. For this purpose, the United States will work to develop the capabilities of partners and develop the necessary level of forces for itself as well. Moreover, the United States will maintain the lowest level of safe and effective nuclear weapons consistent with the interests of the United States and its allies to deter attacks on the United States, its allies, and partners until a world free of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

3) Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies: It is necessary for the United States to prepare to respond to diverse contingencies in the event that deterrence fails and adversaries challenge its national interests.

4) Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force: It is necessary to maintain the All-Volunteer Force over the long-term in order to prevail in the current wars and to prepare for the future.

3. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The current QDR indicates the need to enhance military potential in the following six key mission areas in order to implement the four strategic priority objectives.

1) Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home: It is necessary to enhance the necessary posture at home to respond to potential attacks on U.S. soil, as well as to strengthen the cooperative relationships between domestic government-related institutions. For this reason, the United States must take measures such as reorganizing and developing consequence management response forces and enhancing its domain awareness capabilities for land, sea, air, space, and cyber space.

2) Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations: The United States will enhance the necessary capabilities for prevailing in the wars that it is currently fighting. For this reason, the United States will take measures that include increasing its number of rotary wing aircraft, expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and augmenting major equipment for special operation forces.

3) Build the security capacity of partner states: In order to maintain a peaceful and stable international order it is important to support the development of capabilities of security forces in partner countries. For this reason, it is necessary to improve language abilities, deepen knowledge on different regions and cultures, etc.

4) Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: Countries that possess capabilities such as a wide range of sophisticated weaponry are able to demonstrate anti-access capabilities that hinder the deployment of United States forces. It is necessary for the United States to possess the capabilities to protect itself and its allies even amidst these environments. For this reason, the United States must work to improve long-range strike capabilities and to increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture.

5) Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction: The United States will establish a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters in sight of eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the United States will enhance nuclear forensics, while also ensuring...
the protection of all nuclear materials in order to prevent the transfer of said materials to the hands of terrorists.

6) Operate effectively in cyberspace: The Department of Defense will build an environment in which cyber security is viewed as one of its priority items by developing a comprehensive approach to the cyber space operations. In addition, the United States will train cyberspace experts and centralize command of the Department of Defense cyberspace operations in the newly established U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

4. Force Planning
Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have been composed based on the idea of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts. However, the new QDR indicates that the current security environment is more complex than when these ideas were adopted, and that it is no longer appropriate for the United States to determine its military’s force structure based on these ideas as the United States must address diverse contingencies. The current QDR points out that the U.S. military force structure is led by the previously mentioned four strategic priority objectives and six mission areas, and, while the United States must possess the capacity to address two capable nation-state aggressors, it must also have the ability to conduct a wide range of operations. For that reason, the United States must rebalance its forces.

The current QDR requires a cooperative and tailored approach to determine the U.S. global defense posture, reflecting regional political and security dynamics. Moreover, the QDR states the need to consider the five following principles when making decisions about the future U.S. defense posture: 1) forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required, 2) the U.S. defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible ability to respond to contingencies, etc., 3) the United States will balance the need for assured access to support ongoing operations with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication, 4) America’s defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomed by the host nation, and 5) the defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

Furthermore, the new QDR will emphasize the following four priorities in adapting and developing its global defense posture over the next five-year period.
1) Reaffirm its commitment to Europe and NATO, including through the development of European missile defense capabilities;
2) Work with allies and key partners to ensure a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region;
3) Balance ongoing operations, crisis response, and prevent-and-deter activities in the development of a strategic defense posture in the broader Middle East, Africa, and Central and South Asia; and
4) Support partnership capacity-building efforts in key regions and states.
In Europe, in revising its military posture in this way the United States has constructed a forward
military posture that is lighter, more flexible, and more deployable. The new QDR states that it will 1) serve to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners, 2) promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions, 3) demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies, 4) build trust and goodwill among host nations, and 5) facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent. Based on this policy, on the European continent the U.S. military will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters, while also beginning the deployment of a missile defense system and enhancement of its forward-deployed naval presence.

In the Asia-Pacific, the new QDR states that the United States will place importance on forward-stationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces as U.S. bases and infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific are sparse. In addition, the United States will sustain and strengthen its Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region. Specifically, the QDR lays down the following policies.

1) The United States will continue to adapt its defense presence as necessary to maintain regional stability and assure allies of their security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States will augment regional deterrence and rapid response capabilities and build the capacity of its Asian partners to respond more effectively to contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters.

2) With Japan, the United States will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a hub for security activities in the region.

3) The United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance’s deterrent and defense capabilities. The United States will also transfer the wartime operational control to the ROK in 2012.

4) The United States will improve the resiliency of U.S. forces and facilities in the region in order to safeguard U.S., allied, and partner interests in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In addition, the United States will explore opportunities for a more forward-deployed presence that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security and assured access to the sea, air, space, and cyber space.

5) The United States will seek additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security.

In regards to the Middle East, the new QDR indicates that while the United States had prioritized a defense posture necessary for the near-term operational capabilities in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is now time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests through the medium to long term. Moreover, the United States will reshape its defense posture to assure partners of a long-term commitment to mutual security relationships and to deter attacks while balancing that requirement against the regional sensitivity to a large, long-term U.S. force presence. The United States will also strengthen defense capabilities and posture networks as efforts related to security in the Middle East for promoting regional stability and security.
In Africa, in October 2008, the United States Africa Command (command: Germany) with the area of responsibility covering Africa, which had been previously covered by three Commands – the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command became an independent unified command. U.S. Africa Command is a joint command that aims to improve the capacity of African nations to deal with conflicts in their own region, through the provision of military assistance in the form of training for peacekeeping, etc., and the purpose of its establishment is to help African leaders deal with Africa’s problems. In addition, the new QDR indicates that the United States will continue to maintain a limited military presence in Africa to help build partner security capacity.

In the North and South Americas, the new QDR states that while the region does not require a robust forward presence, the United States will retain a limited presence and seek to improve relationships with the region’s countries. In addition, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.

We must continue to pay attention to how the concepts of global posture review, as outlined in the new QDR, are implemented in the future. (See Fig. I-2-1-1)
6. Nuclear Strategy

While President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he admits that it is impossible to abolish nuclear weapons soon, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat of today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.

The current NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment.

1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism: In order to bolster the non-nuclear proliferation regime, the United States will reverse the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran and create an environment that subjects parties not compliant with the NPT to heavy sanctions. In addition, in order to prevent nuclear terrorism, the United States will secure the safety of all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years and take measures such as expanding the budget of the Department of Energy nuclear non-proliferation programs. Furthermore, in order to promote arms control and disarmament, the United States signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia and seeks the ratification and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy: The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners. In order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons when deterring attacks via non-nuclear means, the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations (negative security assurance). In response to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attacks, the United States will answer with a devastating conventional weapon response, but also reserves the right to make any adjustment to this policy with consideration to advancements in biotechnology. In the case of addressing states that possess nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states that do not comply with the NPT, there remains a narrow range of possibilities in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack. Therefore, the United States is not prepared at present to limit the role of nuclear weapons to deterring a nuclear attack as its sole purpose. The United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of itself, allies, and partners.

3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels: Under the New START, which was signed with Russia, the United States will maintain deterrence via its nuclear Triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers while also reducing accountable deployed strategic warheads and delivery platforms. With regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons, these should be included in any future reduction arrangements between the United States and Russia, but the United States will retain a dual-capable fighter that can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons. Also, the United States will
retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) as it is possible to substitute these missiles by other means.

4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners: The United States will enhance bilateral and regional security ties and closely cooperate with its allies and partner nations. The United States will also enhance its regional security architectures, which are composed of missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and others. The United States will reassure its allies and partners that U.S. extended deterrence is credible and effective.

5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal: The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will not develop new nuclear warheads. In order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of warheads, the United States will implement Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and enhance scientific, technical, and engineering infrastructures needed for implementing LEPs.

7. FY2011 Budget

The United States faces the challenge of how to distribute limited resources between the dual requirements of resolving the current issues and securing its military advantage into the future. The key objectives laid out for the fiscal year 2011 budget are: 1) taking care of people, 2) rebalancing the forces, 3) reforming how DoD does business, and 4) supporting our troops in the field. The 2011 budget shows a nearly 3% increase, or $548.9 billion, on the approved 2010 budget as well as a budget for some $159.3 billion for overseas contingency operations. The budget totals $708.2 billion. (See Fig. I-2-1-2)
2. Military Posture

In regards to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear weapons, in April 2010 U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace START I. The new treaty indicates that the two countries are to reduce their numbers of deployed strategic warheads\(^9\) to 1,550 and deployed delivery platforms to 700 in seven years following the entry into force of the treaty. Furthermore, in May 2010 the United States announced that it currently possessed 5,113 nuclear warheads\(^10\), noting the necessity to increase the transparency of nuclear stockpiles in order to promote nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms reduction.

In September and December of 2008, a report was released by a special committee on nuclear arms control\(^11\). Related to this, the United States took such measures as newly organizing the Global Strike Command (AFGSC) in August 2009 to oversee nuclear bombers and all ICBMs based on Revitalizing Nuclear Missions by the Air Force, which was released by the Air Force in October 2008.

The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 550,000 soldiers, and approximately 200,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. In order to prepare for prolonged overseas contingency operations, U.S. ground forces are reorganizing their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units\(^12\). The new QDR indicates that the U.S. ground forces are to maintain capabilities to respond to all types of contingencies while focusing on counterinsurgency operations, stabilization operations, and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the overseas contingency operations, improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare.

U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 1,010 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 6.03 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean; the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea; the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet to South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The new QDR indicates that U.S. maritime forces will continue to retain a robust forward presence and power projection capabilities.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,820 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps\(^13\). In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. The new QDR indicates that the increase of fifth-generation fighters will further improve the survivability of the U.S. air forces and strengthen support operations for the security forces of partner countries.

As for mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is modernizing C-5 transport aircraft to improve the transport capabilities of the forces, and tries to preposition equipment at various theaters\(^14\).

In regards to missile defense (MD), in September 2009 the Obama administration reviewed the Bush administration’s plan to deploy portions of its MD system to the Czech Republic and Poland, and announced a new plan to improve BMD capabilities in a step-wise fashion from 2011 to 2020, and ultimately construct a comprehensive MD structure that responds to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)\(^15\) as well. As reasons for the revision, the Obama administration has voiced that while the
threat from Iran’s short- (SRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) is developing more rapidly than previously projected, the development of ICBMs has been slower than estimated and the capabilities and technologies for missile defense, such as interceptor missiles and sensors, have markedly improved\(^\text{16}\).

In February 2010 the United States announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review noted that, while it would be difficult to accurately predict the threat of an ICBM fired at the United States, it is still important to watch the trends in North Korea and Iran. The report also mentioned that the development of SRBMs and IRBMs that can be used to attack U.S. troops stationed in other regions as well as allied countries is advancing and that these are a clear threat. Furthermore, in defending United States homeland, the review notes that the United States will use ground-based interceptors to respond to ICBMs from North Korea and Iran. In regards to defense in other regions, the United States will expand investments into MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the BMD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden.

In addition, the U.S. military relies on space systems for much of its information gathering and communications. In 2006, the United States announced its National Space Policy, indicating its awareness that space capabilities have become a vital interest. The United States will secure the free use of space, deter obstructions to its space systems, and implement necessary measures for their defense, while also declining the hostile use of space as necessary.

Moreover, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates decided on the creation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in June 2009 in order to address the increasing threats in cyber space. It is to oversee operations in cyber space. It attained Initial Operation Capability (IOC) in May of this year and its full capability is set for October of this year\(^\text{17}\).

3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys such forces as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 3,000 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) and the headquarters, U.S. Army Japan\(^\text{18}\).

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.
The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 17,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys four air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-15, F-16, and C-130 aircraft in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

**Column: Trends in Military Science and Technology (Conventional Prompt Global Strike)**

Advanced nations continue to focus on research and development in such fields as precision guidance technologies, information-related technologies such as C4ISR, and automation technologies. In addition, these nations now emphasize the research and development of equipment adapted from response to regional conflict and energy countermeasures closely linked to climate change.

In February 2010 U.S. Vice President Joe Biden commented that, “We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective.” indicating an example that seems to point to the concept of Conventional Prompt Global Strike. This concept consists of utilizing highly accurate non-nuclear weapons to breakthrough the anti-access capabilities of adversaries and promptly strike, no matter what and where in the world the target may be. According to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the concept is currently studied as a part of long-range strike capabilities. According to the United States, weapons from that concept would count against the new START treaty’s limits of delivery vehicles and warheads.

Conventional strike missiles (CSMs) are the development plan that leads this concept. While retired ballistic missile rockets and others will be diverted for use, confusion with nuclear weapons will be avoided as CSMs move along a low trajectory that is clearly different from ballistic missiles.
Section 2 Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two – north and south – for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan. (See Fig. I-2-2-1)

1. North Korea

1. General Situation

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a “powerful and prosperous nation” as its basic national policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas – ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy – and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The “military-first politics” has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution. Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea’s military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and regularly visits military forces. It would appear that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces.

Although North Korea faces serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5% of the overall population. It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement made at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2009, the proportion of the defense budget in FY2009’s national budget was 15.8%, but it is estimated that this represents only a portion of real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by making efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operation forces.

North Korea’s military behavior has increased tension over the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan.

Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is not condoned, but at the same time, we should not forget security concerns other than the nuclear problem. It is necessary to continue to pay enough attention to the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea and the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula continue to demand a close watch.

Since North Korea still largely maintains its closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the
details and intentions of the country’s policies and behavior. However, it is necessary to continue to pay utmost attention to them.

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**Fig. 1-2-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>U.S. Forces in ROK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total armed forces</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 1.1 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 690,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 25,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>Approx. 1 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 560,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 17,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle tanks</td>
<td>T-50, T-54/55, etc. Approx. 3,500</td>
<td>85, M-47, M-48, etc. Approx. 2,750</td>
<td>M-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>Approx. 650; 106,000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 190; 181,000 tons</td>
<td>Supporting corps only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 620</td>
<td>Approx. 490</td>
<td>Approx. 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd and 4th generation fighters</td>
<td>Mig-23×36, Mig-29×35, Su-25×34</td>
<td>F-4×70, F-16×164, F-15×39</td>
<td>F-16×40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 22.7 million</td>
<td>Approx. 48.5 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military service</strong></td>
<td>Army: 5–12 years</td>
<td>Army: 18–24 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy: 5–10 years</td>
<td>Navy: 20–26 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force: 3–4 years</td>
<td>Air Force: 21–27 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Military Balance 2010, etc.
2. WMD and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In particular, North Korea’s nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan’s national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of nonproliferation of WMD. In particular, nuclear tests by North Korea, when considered in conjunction with North Korea’s reinforcement of its ballistic missile capability that could serve as the means of delivery of WMD, simply cannot be tolerated as they constitute a serious threat to the security of Japan and do considerable harm to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and the international community.

As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D for deploying existing ballistic missiles, extending the range and putting solid fuel to use. Also, it is pointed out that North Korea’s proliferation of ballistic missiles continues. Both North Korea’s missile issue as well as its nuclear issue are destabilizing factors for the entire international community and the Asia-Pacific region, and such moves are of great concern.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

With regards to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, the Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003 in pursuit of a peaceful resolution to this problem and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which mentioned the verifiable abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. However, North Korea delayed its participation in the Six-Party Talks, and launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had conducted a nuclear test in 2006. Facing these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. In December 2006, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. After the shutdown of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon based on this agreement, in October 2007, the “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” were announced as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed.

In response to the U.N. Security Council presidential statement condemning North Korea’s missile launch, North Korea suggested that it would boycott the Six-Party Talks and announced the resumption of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods. It also announced that it would take steps including nuclear tests and test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles unless the U.N. Security Council apologized. North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test in May, 2009.
In response, the international community adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 in June 2009, condemning North Korea’s nuclear test in the strongest possible terms and imposing additional measures against North Korea. North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized, and the process of uranium enrichment would be commenced, etc. An additional announcement was made by North Korea that the uranium enrichment experiment had been successfully carried out in September 2009 and had entered the completion stage. In November 2009 it announced that the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods had been successfully completed by the end of August and it had made substantial achievements in weaponizing the extracted plutonium. While emphasizing the progress in its nuclear development in this manner, North Korea also hinted at the possibility of holding multilateral consultations, including the Six-Party Talks, depending on the progress in talks with the United States. Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, visited North Korea as the first Obama administration official to discuss the issue.

While some argue that North Korea’s response to its nuclear development problem is a so-called brinkmanship policy by intentionally heightening tension in order to receive some sort of reward, others argue that North Korea’s ultimate objective is to secure deterrence capability by possessing nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal of North Korea is said to be the maintenance of its existing regime. Considering this, these two views are not incompatible.

While it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to maintain close cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, roles played by other countries like China and Russia (the other participants in the Six-Party Talks), as well as such international institutions as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are also important.

b. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Details about the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program still remains largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the series of North Korean announcements and actions as well as the fact that the status of North Korea’s nuclear development so far is not yet elucidated, the possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program cannot be dismissed. In addition, the fact that North Korea announced in May 2009 that it had conducted a nuclear test following the one in 2006 suggests that there is a high possibility that North Korea has further advanced its nuclear weapons program. When taken together with North Korea’s enhancement of its ballistic missile capability, which could serve as a means of delivering WMD, nuclear tests by North Korea are totally unacceptable as they are a significant threat to Japan’s security and seriously undermine the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the international community.

In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires an extremely high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads. It is necessary
to remain watchful of all related developments.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons
Because North Korea is an extremely closed regime and most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, facilitating camouflage, details of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has a substantial amount of stock of such agents.

(3) Ballistic Missiles
North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and details of its ballistic missiles are unknown. It appears however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities.

a. Scud
It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries.

b. Nodong
North Korea is also thought to have started its development of longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, the deployment of which is believed to be ongoing, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300km, and may reach almost all parts of Japan.

It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong.

Though details about Nodong’s capability have not been confirmed, as the ballistic missile is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems that it does not have the accuracy to carry out strikes on specific target installations.

Due to the fact that it is extremely difficult to verify the intentions of North Korea’s military activities because of its closed regime, that it is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country, and that Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded onto
a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility, it is thought to be difficult to detect individual and concrete signs of a Nodong launch in advance, such as its specific launch site and timing.

c. Taepodong-1
North Korea has also been developing Taepodong-1 which has an estimated range of at least approximately 1,500km. Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of Taepodong-2, which has a longer range, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

d. Taepodong-2
Taepodong-2 is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, with a range of approximately 6,000km. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during the flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and have fallen near the launch site. In the launch of April 2009, it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it from the same district again. Since it is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000km before falling in the Pacific Ocean, it is believed that North Korea had been able to extend the range of its ballistic missiles since its failed launch of Taepodong-2 in 2006. Through the April 2009 launch, it is believed that North Korea may have tested the required technologies, such as increasing the size of propulsion, separation of the multi-staged propulsion devices, and attitude control. Thus, it is highly possible that North Korea will advance the development of ballistic missiles, including longer-range missiles. Moreover, a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and improving the circular error probability (CEP). The April 2009 launch may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea. (See Fig. I-2-2-2/3)

At present, North Korea appears to be developing not only ballistic missiles but also an intermediate-range ballistic missile and a solid fuel propellant short-range missile. It is also necessary to pay attention to the possibility of North Korea’s efforts to improve existing ballistic missiles such as Scud and Nodong, including an attempt to extend their ranges.

As the background of North Korea’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies including the transfer of Nodong airframes and related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and that North Korea promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation.
In light of this, it is necessary to remain alert to North Korea’s ballistic missiles, particularly in terms of transfer and proliferation, in addition to their development and deployment.

3. Military Posture
(1) General Situation
North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).

North Korea’s armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. North Korea’s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, and it seems to have continued infiltration exercises. However, most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare. These forces are believed to reach approximately 100,000 personnel. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities
The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240mm multiple launch rockets and...
170mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul.

The navy has about 650 ships with total displacement of approximately 107,000 tons and is chiefly made up of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 60 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces.

The Air Force has about 590 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2s as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operation forces.

North Korea’s military forces are vigorously conducting various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance as well.
4. Domestic Affairs

(1) Stability of the Regime
Some point out that in recent years North Korea’s regime is not as stable as in previous years due to loosening of social control resulting from both an increasing income disparity and a trend of money-worshipping, and declining military morale. However, the fact that national events\(^1\) and diplomatic negotiations have been held in an orderly manner suggests that the regime based around Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on track\(^2\). On the other hand, there have been persistent rumors of his ailing health\(^3\) since he failed to appear at the military parade of the Worker/Peasant Red Guard celebrating North Korea’s 60th anniversary. Though Kim Jong Il is believed to have engaged in public activities such as frequent on-site inspections and visits\(^4\), given his age of 68, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the regime will become unstable upon the possible change in power structure in the near future.

(2) Economic Conditions
In terms of their economy, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialistic planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries\(^5\). It is also pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and their sense of morale has declined.

In response to a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has tried some limited reform measures and changes in its economic management systems. It is believed that, since around July 2002, North Korea has raised wages and commodity prices and devalued exchange rates\(^6\), and in 2009, tried to raise productivity through mobilization movements called the 150-Day Battle and the 100-Day Battle\(^7\). However, as North Korea is not likely to undertake a structural reform that could damage its current regime, North Korea would still face various difficulties in fundamentally improving its current economic situation. At the end of 2009, North Korea is believed to have carried out redenomination of its currency. It remains to be seen how this action will affect the North Korean economy and the stability of the current regime.

5. The Sinking of an ROK Military Patrol Vessel
On March 26, 2010, the ROK military patrol vessel *Cheonan* sank near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea. Following the sinking, the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, made up of experts from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, conducted investigations in four teams, scientific investigation, explosive analysis, ship structure, and intelligence analysis. On May 20, the Joint Investigation Group announced that the vessel had been split and sunk by a shockwave and bubble effect created by an underwater explosion generated by the detonation of a torpedo launched by a North Korean midget submarine\(^8\). Following this
announcement, President Lee Myung-bak of the ROK issued a statement that the sinking of the Cheonan was an act of military provocation. He furthermore stated that the ROK would prohibit North Korean vessels from using sea lanes in the territorial waters of the ROK and all trade and exchanges between the South and the North would be suspended. Finally, he stated that the ROK would take firm measures such as the immediate exercise of the right of self-defense should North Korea invade the ROK’s territorial waters, land, or air space, and refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council. On May 20, North Korea proclaimed that the findings of the joint investigation group were fabricated and that it would take forceful actions, possibly including an all-out war, against any sanctions imposed. On May 25, North Korea announced that it was severing all ties with the ROK.

In response to these actions, a leaders’ declaration was adopted by the international community on June 26 of the same year at the G8 Muskoka Summit, as was a Chairman’s statement in the U.N. Security Council on July 9. The statements issued criticized the attack which caused the sinking of the Cheonan. In talks between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense, the two countries agreed to engage in a series of joint military exercises over the following months in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. During the period from 25th until the 28th of July, joint exercises, including anti-submarine training, were carried out in the Sea of Japan. Four MSDF officials were dispatched to the scene as observers.

6. External Relations
(1) Relations with the United States
The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has claimed that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the “dying wish” of Kim Il Sung and pledged to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” North Korea, however, continues to criticize various policies of the United States, insisting that the United States has yet to abandon its “hostile policy” toward North Korea. Thus, there exists a significant gap between the two parties’ stances and the denuclearization process has seen no substantive progress. In addition, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials, and the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

In addition, while the United States pointed out in its country reports on terrorism that the abduction issue of Japanese citizens is yet to be solved and that the hijackers of Yodo are still living in North Korea, in October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on the grounds that North Korea had agreed to a series of verification measures related to a declaration of its nuclear programs submitted in June 2008.

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea
Regarding relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea, there had not been much progress in North-South dialogue or exchanges, including in the military area, after the inauguration of
President Lee Myung Bak in the ROK. Meanwhile, restrictions on inter-Korean traffic were lifted in the summer of 2009, and in late September 2009, projects for the reunion of separated families resumed for the first time in about two years. On the other hand, near the NLL in the Yellow Sea, incidents transpired that heightened North-South military tensions, including the exchange of fire between North Korean and ROK naval vessels in November of that year, and the sinking of the South Korean patrol vessel which occurred in March 2010.

(3) Relations with China
With regard to the relationship between North Korea and China, the China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1961 is still in force. Since China and the ROK established diplomatic relations in 1992, the relationship between North Korea and China has changed from the close relationship they had enjoyed during the Cold War period. Since then, however, the leaders of the two countries have made mutual visits and the relationship has improved. In October 2009, the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and North Korea, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited North Korea and held talks with Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission. China has repeatedly expressed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula regarding North Korea’s nuclear issue, and has been playing an active role in resolving the issue by, for example, asking North Korea to return to the Six-Party talks, as its chairman. Some, however, point out that the relationship between China and North Korea seems not to be as close as it used to be.

(4) Relations with Russia
While relations between North Korea and Russia have become less close since the end of the Cold War, the two countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in February 2000, which lacked articles on military alliance that were included in the previous treaty. After this, relations between North Korea and Russia have improved, with the heads of both countries making mutual visits.

(5) Relations with Other Countries
Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with them and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, the EU and ASEAN have traditionally expressed concerns over North Korea’s nuclear and other issues.

2. The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces in the ROK
1. General Situation
In the ROK, democracy has taken firm root through such means as the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution.
The administration of Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, is showing its intention to promote its policy to pursue “co-existence and co-prosperity” with regard to North Korea, and firmly maintains the principle of giving top priority to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. While it maintains the “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” which aims to offer gradual economic assistance to North Korea in accordance with the progress in the abandonment of its nuclear program, the ROK government showed its renewed emphasis on the abandonment of the nuclear program by North Korea, with President Lee Myung Bak proposing the “grand bargain,”59 a package deal to settle the nuclear issue.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, in July 2010, on the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, the first talks involving the top diplomats and defense chiefs of the United States and the ROK were held. The two nations confirmed that the U.S.-ROK alliance is promoting peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but in the wider region of Northeast Asia, and that it is developing as a powerful, successful and consistent alliance. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries have been committed to solving issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of the operational control authority in wartime60 over U.S.-ROK combined forces to the ROK.

As for the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK, the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area, south of Seoul, and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. However, it seems that the relocation to the Pyongtek area is delayed61.

As for the transition of the operational control authority in wartime to the ROK, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense determined during their meeting in February 2007 that the two countries would dismantle the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition on April 17, 2012. In talks between the leaders of the United States and the ROK in April 2008, both countries agreed to develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a new strategic alliance conforming to the 21st century, and the summit meeting in June 2009 created an agreement on the “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and Republic of Korea”62. Further, the 41st Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2009 adopted a joint statement containing specific details of “extended deterrence” and strong U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK, showing a further strengthening of the bilateral relationship63. It is necessary to monitor how the transition to the new joint defense system of “the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting” will be implemented. (See Fig. I-2-2-4)
2. Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country’s population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: “defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK had designated North Korea as its “main enemy,” but, North Korea has no longer been described as such since the publication of the ROK Defense White Paper 2004. In addition to the defense objectives, the ROK has identified “fostering an elite, advanced, robust military” as its defense vision and the following eight items have been set as the defense policy focus to achieve these goals and the vision.

1. Establish defense posture to realize comprehensive security
2. Creative development of the ROK-U.S. alliance
3. Strengthen advanced defense capability
4. Military support for creating a peaceful structure on the Korean Peninsula
5. Specialized military development that plays its role in a given position
6. Establish pragmatic, advanced defense management system
7. Improve barracks and environment and welfare in accordance with national development
8. A military of the people

The ROK intends to promote “National Defense Reform 2020” to satisfy its defense needs such as maintenance of its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies; balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Forces; elimination of inefficiency; and build-up of barrack culture in accordance with social trends. The bill on the National Defense
Reform incorporating these main ideas was enacted in December 2006.

As an amendment reflecting the results of an analysis and assessment of the security situation and defense reform records after the formulation of the Defense Reform 2020, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009-2020) in June 2009, defining such matters as a narrowing of the initially planned reduction in the force strength and the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities.

3. Trends in Defense Buildup in the ROK

As for the ROK’s military capacity, the ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 590,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 181,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) of approximately 500 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to develop the capability to deal with a full spectrum of threats, not least threats from North Korea, as well as omnidirectional military posture. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships and domestically-built destroyers. In December 2008, the first KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) was put into service, and the second is scheduled to be commissioned by the end of 2010. The third is now under construction for delivery in 2012. In February 20, a ceremony was held at Busan Base to mark the creation of the Seventh Mobile Unit, the first mobile force in the ROK. The Air Force is proceeding with the introduction of F-15K fighters, and also plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012. In addition, the ROK is believed to be promoting domestic production of missiles.

The FY2010 defense budget amounts to approximately 29,562.7 billion won, an increase of approximately 3.6% over the previous fiscal year, marking the 11th consecutive rise since FY2000.

(See Fig. 1-2-2-5)
4. External Relations

(1) Relations with China and Russia
The ROK has been promoting military exchanges with China, including mutual visits of vessels and aircraft. In November 2008, the hot lines were established between the two countries’ Navies and Air Forces. At the May 2008 summit meeting of the top leaders of the ROK and China, they agreed to upgrade the ROK-China relationship from a “full-scale cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” However, the bilateral relations in the security area still remain at the initial level compared with their ties in economic and other areas.

Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high military officials and mutual visits of naval vessels. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry and military supplies. At the ROK-Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to the “strategic cooperative partnership.” Furthermore, in July 2009, then ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang Hee visited Russia for a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, an indication of further progress in security relations between the two countries.

(2) Activities Overseas
The ROK acceded to the United Nations in 1992, and since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia in 1993, has continuously participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). The ROK says the active participation in PKO activities is a way of returning international assistance the country has received in the past from the international community, as well as securing support from the international community in times of emergency. In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level.

The ROK dispatched medical support units and engineering units to Afghanistan to support military operations by the United States and other countries, and withdrew them in December 2007 upon completion of their missions. However, in February 2010, the ROK decided to send up to 350 troops to the country again for the purpose of protecting about 140 Korean members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) stationed in Parvan province, and thus resumed activities in Afghanistan in July 2010. The ROK also dispatched troops to Iraq at the request of the United States, but withdrew from the country in December 2008 upon completion of the mission. Further, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to waters off the coast of Somalia where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK-registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).
Section 3 China

1. General Situation

China has the world’s largest population and a vast landmass surrounded by 14 countries. It has long borderlines and a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization, and pride of its unique history and the experiences of semi-colonization in and after the 19th century is driving a desire for a strong nation as well as fueling their nationalism.

China is a state with a socialist regime, and aims at building a modern socialist state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In recent years, China has significantly increased its international trade, attracting considerable foreign investment; the economy has dramatically grown, especially in the coastal and urban areas. It has maintained its economic growth despite the impact from the worldwide financial crisis. China’s international presence is rising, as evidenced by the great deal of attention that was paid to its movements at the G20 Summit on the Financial Market and the World Economy that has been held since 2008 and the Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP15) that was held in 2009. The fact that China’s economy promptly broke free of the impact from the financial crisis is believed to form the backdrop for why the country has been becoming more self-confident and displaying a more assertive posture in the international community. On the other hand, however, a variety of problems exist within China. Such problems include the great political problem of corruption within central and local communist party leadership, and as a result of rapid economic growth there are regional disparities between urban-rural and coastal-inland regions, wealth gaps among urban residents, and the emergence of environmental pollution. Moreover, issues associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise in the future. China also has domestic ethnic minority issues, such as the clashes between minorities and the authorities that were started by minority protests in areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It has been reported that some ethnic minorities are undertaking campaigns seeking separation and independence. Under the guiding principle of the “Scientific Outlook on Development,” the Hu Jintao administration aims to build a “Harmonious Society” as its fundamental policy and is committed to giving priority to the solution of the aforementioned domestic problems. China also aims to improve its current economic structure, where it is dependent on exports abroad and domestic demand is weak, in order to maintain stable economic growth.

On the diplomatic field, it is believed that in order to maintain national stability China is aiming to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining favorable relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, to maintain favorable relations with neighboring countries and stable situations in those countries, to promote the multipolarization of the world, and to secure an energy supply and other interests necessary for economic development.

On the military front, China has been modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and
constant increase in defense budget. In its military modernization China appears to give particular priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s independence and others, but in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. The military trends of China draw attention from countries in the region, as the country has been steadily growing as a major political and economic power in the region.

2. Military Affairs

1. National Defense Policy

China states that it prioritizes the defense of national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else. China proclaims that it endeavors to build a fortified national defense and strong military forces compatible with national security and development interests and realize the enrichment of the country and reinforcement of the military while building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects.

China has a policy of the active promotion of the “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” which mainly consists of the mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy to win a local war under informatized conditions, according to global trends in military developments observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and others. Compared to the military parades carried out in 1999, the military parades celebrating the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC in October 2009 showed a decrease in the formations of marching foot soldiers. Conversely, mobile missile, combat vehicle, and aircraft formations increased, while advanced equipment such as early warning and control systems and unmanned aerial vehicles were displayed, thereby demonstrating China’s military mechanization and informatization to Chinese people and overseas. Moreover, China appears to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporating the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Psychological Warfare,” “Media Warfare” and “Legal Warfare” — into the tasks of the political work by military, and declaring a policy of “close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors.”

In China’s military modernization, backed by the stable relations with Russia and other neighboring states that share land borders with China, it is believed that China is giving the top priority to handling of the Taiwan issue, more specifically to improving the capability to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for Taiwan. Furthermore, in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. As regards a long-term plan for China’s military modernization, China proclaims that “according to the requirements of national security and the level of economic and social development, […] it will lay a solid foundation by 2010, basically accomplish mechanization and make major progress in informatization by 2020, and by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century.” In the long term, China appears to be aiming to develop a military force according to the development
of national strength, as this is compliant with the development plan for the country as a whole.\(^83\)

China has reduced the number of its military personnel, mainly in the army, and has been modernizing equipment of its entire armed forces, especially its naval and air forces, and nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities among services and branches, to conduct practical exercises, to cultivate and acquire highly-capable human resources for administering operations of an informatized force, and to improve the foundation of the domestic defense industry. Much of the equipment used in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still outdated, and the current military modernization efforts are believed to be undertakings that intend wholly to improve the military’s capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not show a clear, specific future vision of its military modernization. China has been rather intensifying its activities in waters near Japan. The lack of transparency of its national defense policies, and the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, which should require prudent analysis.

2. Military Transparency

China has not disclosed specific information on its possession of weapons, procurement goals or past procurements, the organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, or a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget.

China has released defense white papers titled China’s National Defense every two years since 1998, and the nation also conducts a lot of dialogue with national defense authorities of other countries.\(^84\) Furthermore, in August 2007, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted annual reports based on each system.

In this manner, China has regularly published compiled documents on its national security while reintegrating itself into and commencing participation in U.N. systems regarding armaments and military expenditures.\(^85\) These and other efforts can be appreciated as a contribution to improving the transparency of its military capabilities.

However, China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the international society. For example, as for a detailed breakdown of national defense spending, China basically announced only the total amount and general purposes for the three categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Slight progress was seen in China’s National Defense in 2008 in terms of information disclosure but it does not provide a basic breakdown such as procurement costs for major weapons. Moreover, the report for the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures submitted by China in 2009 was not filled out in accordance with the standard format used by Japan and many other nations, whereby a detailed breakdown of military expenditure is required; the information disclosed was almost as simple as that provided in China’s defense white papers.

Details have yet to be disclosed regarding the cause of the breach of international law in November 2004, where a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters.
Moreover, in January 2007, when China conducted an anti-satellite weapons test, the Chinese government gave an insufficient explanation of the details and intention of the test to allay Japan’s concerns. In addition, in November 2007, China sent notification indicating a refusal for U.S. naval vessels including U.S. aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* to pull into Hong Kong on the expected day of arrival, but then later revised their notice and allowed the vessels to port. However, the U.S. naval vessels had already abandoned their port and changed course. These incidents incite concern over China’s decision-making and behavior concerning its military.

China is steadily growing as a major political and economic power, and its military power also attracts attention from other countries. In order to allay concerns over China, it is becoming more and more important for China itself to improve transparency of its national defense policy and military capability. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.

3. National Defense Budget

China announced a national defense budget for FY2010 of approximately 519.1 billion yuan. The initial budget amount announced represented a growth of approximately 9.8% compared to the initial budget amount from the previous fiscal year. While this falls short of its previous rates, China still maintains a high growth rate, with its announced national defense budget continuing to increase at a rapid pace. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has more than doubled in size over the past five years, and has grown 18-fold over the past 20 years. As regards the relationship between defense and the economy, China positions the build-up of defense capabilities as an important task as economic development, explaining that it “sticks to the principle of coordinated development of economy and national defense” in China’s National Defense in 2008. Accordingly, it is believed that China will continue to input resources for the improvement of its defense capabilities within the range of not hampering its economic development.

In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses.

(See Fig. 1-2-3-1)
4. Military Posture

China’s military forces are composed of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission. The PLA is defined as a people’s army created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force (strategic missile force). (See Fig. I-2-3-2)

(1) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community.

China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate range ballistic missiles/medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The survivability and readiness of China’s ballistic missile forces are under improvement by updating liquid propellant type to a solid propellant one. Moreover, it is also believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving precision, introducing MIRV and other means. China has developed the DF-31, which is a new mobile-type ICBM with a solid fuel propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL), and the DF-31A, an extended model of the DF-31, which appears to have already begun to be deployed. Regarding SLBMs, the country currently appears to be developing the JL-2, a new SLBM with a range of approximately 8,000km, and constructing Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to carry the missiles. Now that the DF-31 and the DF-31A have been deployed, once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin.
As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has deployed liquid-propellant DF-3 and DF-4 missiles. Currently, however, the country also deploys the DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear
warheads. It is believed that China possesses conventional ballistic missiles with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and is developing conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers. China also possesses the DH-10, a cruise missile with a range of 1,500km or longer. These missiles might complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. In addition to IBRM/ MRBM, China also possesses a 100 plus dozens of H-6 (Tu-16) medium-range bombers that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and cruise missiles.

Concerning short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), China possesses a large number of DF-15 and DF-11, and they are believed to be deployed against Taiwan.

China announced that it had conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in January 2010, and attention will be paid to China’s future trends in ballistic missile defense. (See Fig. I-2-3-3)

(2) Ground Forces
The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. The country aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifically, China is improving mobility by such measures as switching from the past
regional-defense model to a nationwide-mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the air force) and special operations forces. The country is making its military units smaller, modular and multi-functional and also working on reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. In 2009 China carried out “Stride 2009” exercises which traversed across military regions and were deemed its largest ever exercises of this type. These exercises are believed to have been designed to verify and improve capabilities necessary for deploying army units to distant areas, such as the army’s long range maneuvering capabilities and logistical support capabilities, including the mobilization of militia and public transportation.

(3) Naval Forces
The naval forces consist of three fleets – the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 950 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.34 million tons. The navy is in charge of the maritime national defense and protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively constructing new types of domestic submarines to enhance its submarine force. Additionally, the Navy is increasing surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities, and is increasing and improving landing ships and supply ships. Also, a large hospital ship was commissioned in October 2008. In view of these developments in the modernization of the Chinese Navy, it is believed that China is trying to build capabilities to perform operations in areas more distant from China’s shore.

With regard to the possession of aircraft carriers, at the Japan-China Defense Ministers meetings held in March and November 2009, Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie remarked that China cannot remain “without an aircraft carrier indefinitely” and that “the possession of aircraft carriers should be determined in comprehensive consideration of various factors including economic development, the level of the shipbuilding, and security factors.” Furthermore, a number of senior military officials have also made positive remarks about possessing an aircraft carrier. China also purchased Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, from Ukraine, and carried out renovations, and has also constructed a structure replicating an aircraft carrier on land. Based on these facts it is believed that China is currently advancing research and development on technology necessary for the possession of aircraft carriers.

(4) Air Forces
The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 1,950 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth-generation modern fighters is rising steadily. China is domestically mass producing J-10 fighters and carried out import and licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as importing Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities from Russia. Moreover, China is believed to be developing its next generation fighter domestically. China is importing highly sophisticated long-range surface-to-air missiles from Russia in order to improve air defense.
capabilities. It is making continuous efforts to improve its in-flight refueling capabilities and early warning and control system, which are essential for the operation of a modern air force. Furthermore, it is reported that China has a plan to import a number of large cargo aircraft from Russia.

China has also begun to enhance the electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capabilities of its aircraft in addition to increased efforts in actual reconnaissance flights against surrounding countries. In recent years in particular, Chinese air activities that appear to be some form of information gathering against Japan have been observed. Also, in September 2007, H-6 medium-range bombers flew into the Japanese air defense identification zone over the East China Sea to advance near to the Japan-China median line. In March 2010 a Y-8 early warning aircraft similarly flew to advance near to the Japan-China median line. What is more, it has also been reported that Air Force fighters and other aircraft are engaged in training that involves in-flight refueling over the South China Sea.

Judging from this modernization of air forces and the activities by aircraft, it is believed that China is improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, aiming to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in the anterior area, and improving long range transportation capabilities. Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by Chinese air forces in the area surrounding Japan.

(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities
China continues to put forth efforts for space development. The country has launched various satellites into space using indigenously produced rockets, successfully conducted manned space flights, and launched a lunar orbiter. In September 2008, China launched the Shenzhou-7 manned spaceship and its astronaut successfully performed China’s first extravehicular activities. As it appears that in China’s space development military and non-military sectors are related, there is the possibility that China utilizes space for such military purposes as information gathering, communications, and navigation. Recently, several high ranking officials in China’s Air Force expressed the Air Force’s policy of actively working on utilization of space.

China is developing anti-satellite weapons, and the country tested the destruction of its own satellite in January 2007, applying ballistic missile technology. It is also pointed out that China is developing a system that uses laser beams to hamper satellite functions.

China is thought to have interest in cyber warfare and they are believed to have organized and be currently training a cyber warfare-specialized unit.

China’s interest in anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare can be attributed to the increasing reliance of information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, on satellites and computer networks.

5. Activities in Waters Near Japan
(1) Situation of Activities in Waters Near Japan
China has been intensifying its maritime activities in recent years. With regard to activity in waters near Japan, Chinese naval vessels have been observed conducting what appeared to be exercises or
information gathering activities. Chinese government ships have also been observed engaging in apparent oceanographic research within the exclusive economic zone of Japan\textsuperscript{112}.

Advancements to the Pacific Ocean by Chinese naval surface vessels have also been confirmed\textsuperscript{113}. For example, in October 2008, four Chinese naval vessels, including a Soveremenny-class destroyer, passed through the Tsugaru Strait\textsuperscript{114} and sailed south to the Pacific Ocean to circle Japan. In November 2008, four naval vessels, including a top-of-the-line Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean. In June 2009, five naval vessels, including a Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the waters northeast of Okinotori Island before engaging in apparent drills. In March 2010, six naval vessels, including a Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean. These vessels were reported to have advanced to the South China Sea\textsuperscript{115}. Furthermore, in April 2010, 10 naval vessels, including Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, passed the channel between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the waters west of Okinotori Island, before engaging in apparent exercises\textsuperscript{116}. At the time, Chinese ship-borne helicopters flew near the Japanese destroyers monitoring the vessels a couple of times.

In addition, a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, breaching international law. In September 2005, it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Soveremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around the said gas field. In October 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier \textit{Kitty Hawk} in international waters reportedly near Okinawa. The foreign submarine’s approach to a U.S. aircraft carrier is a militarily noteworthy incident\textsuperscript{117}. In December 2008, two Chinese maritime research ships of the State Oceanographic Administration conducted navigation operations not permitted to foreign ships under international law such as hovering and cruising within the territorial waters of Japan near the Senkaku Islands.

Besides activities in waters near Japan, China is enhancing its activities in the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, over which it is engaged in territorial disputes with neighbors, including some ASEAN countries. In March 2009, Chinese ships including a Chinese naval vessel, a Chinese maritime research ship of the State Oceanographic Administration, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries patrol ship, and trawlers approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. Other incidents also occurred in the same month\textsuperscript{118}. What is more, in November 2008 and May 2009 a flotilla of vessels consisting of a Luyang II-class destroyer, a Yuzhao-class amphibious ship and other vessels reportedly conducted exercises in the waters of the South China Sea. (See Fig. I-2-3-4)
(2) Objectives of Activities in Waters Near Japan

Taking into general consideration relevant factors including China’s geographic location and economic globalization as well as the fact that China explicitly states in its laws and other means that its navy assumes the role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety, maritime activities by the Chinese navy and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives.

The first objective is to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from the country in order to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. For example, China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. If China aims to hold back by force foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea.

The third is to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in exploring and drilling oil and gas fields as well as building facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and South China Sea. It is believed that the aims of the naval vessels operating near the drilling facilities of the Kashi oil and gas fields in September 2005 included the demonstration of their naval capabilities of acquiring, maintaining, and protecting maritime rights and interests.

The fourth is to defend the sea lanes of communications for China. The background of this is the
fact that the sea lanes of communications, including crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important lifelines for the increasingly globalizing Chinese economy. It depends on future international situations at the time as to how far the Chinese Navy should defend the sea lanes of communications by itself, but given recent modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, the scope of their capabilities is believed to expand beyond waters near China.

Attention needs to be paid to Chinese maritime activities with the objectives described above, including the operation of naval vessels and oceanographic research activities near Japan and development of facilities that serve as bases for these activities.\textsuperscript{119}

6. International Military Activities

In recent years the PLA has begun emphasizing nontraditional missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and anti-piracy. In order to carry out these missions it is becoming more active in dispatching units overseas.\textsuperscript{120} The backdrop for this stance on international military activities is believed to be the fact that China’s national interests have expanded beyond its national borders, thereby increasing its need to protect and promote its national interests overseas. It is also seen as being backed by China’s intent to strengthen its stature by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community as a great power.

China states that it consistently supports and actively participates in U.N. peacekeeping operations. According to China’s National Defense in 2008, the country has sent a total of 11,063 military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations. According to the United Nations, as of January 2010, China had deployed a total of 2,131 personnel, police officers, and military observers to 10 U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), thus showing a certain presence in peacekeeping operations. China’s aim in its proactive attitude to U.N. peacekeeping operations is seen to include its intent to strengthen relations with the regions where the peacekeeping operations are conducted, particularly with regard to relations with African nations.

China has also been taking part in international initiatives to deal with piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. As its first mission in distant waters, the Chinese Navy has dispatched vessels to these waters since December 2008 to make them escort Chinese and other ships. This demonstrates that the Chinese Navy is improving its capacity to execute naval operations in increasingly distant waters. It is also thought to be an expression of the fact that China is placing a greater emphasis on protecting its own sea lanes of communication.\textsuperscript{121}

7. Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting practical exercises and large-scale exercises, including cooperative exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises in order to modernize its operational capability. The whole PLA military training conference held in 2006 emphasized promoting a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training
under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect since 2009, highlights training for military operations other than war (MOOTW), education in the knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint exercises by different services.

In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, a human resource strategy project was launched to develop human resources capable of directing informatized operations and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards, and it is believed that the objective of this is to secure highly-capable human resources. Moreover, in 2000, in order to recruit highly-capable and highly-educated people, the military started a system where civilian college students are provided with scholarships and then allowed to enter the military as commissioned officers after graduation.

China has been developing a mobilization system with a view to effective use of civilian resources in the case of war and other emergency. In February 2010, China enacted National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization.

8. National Defense Industry Sector
While China imports highly sophisticated equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed to place emphasis on indigenous production of military equipment. The country manufactures much of its equipment domestically and is now actively making research and development efforts on new equipment. China’s national defense industry sector appears to be developing due to an improvement of private industry infrastructure accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, and the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector is working as a base for the modernization of China’s military.

Favorable growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors; however, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. In particular, emphasis has been placed on two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for building the national economy, and in turn civilian technologies are absorbed for a build-up of national defense. Specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the ship building industry. Furthermore, China maintains that it encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries, thus appearing to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries.

3. External Relations
1. Relations with Taiwan
China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is the underlying premise and
foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon efforts for peaceful unification, expressing that it will take policy and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and protect their due authority, while it has also repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force from the standpoint of strong opposition to any intervention in the unification of China by foreign powers as well as any move toward independence of Taiwan. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, provides that China will not renounce use of force, stating that China will employ non-peaceful means if a serious situation occurs which would lead to Taiwan’s separation from China.

Ma Ying-jeou, who took office in May 2008, advocates a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development through expanding economic exchange with China and the status quo rather than independence. The leaders of both sides’ authorized organizations for cross-strait talks met for the first time in 10 years in June 2008, and direct chartered passenger weekday flights, direct maritime links, and direct mail services between China and Taiwan began in December 2008. In January 2010 consultations for the conclusion of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which would be equivalent to a free trade agreement (FTA) between the two sides, were initiated. As these and other moves show, relations between the two sides continue to move forward centered mainly around the realm of economics. On the security front, while President Hu Jintao made appeals for China and Taiwan to make contact and hold exchanges over military issues at an appropriate time, and explore the creation of mechanisms for building mutual trust over military security, President Ma Ying-jeou has expressed demands including withdrawal of the Chinese missiles which are pointed at Taiwan. Attention will be paid to trends in the future relations between China and Taiwan.

2. Relations with the United States

There are various outstanding problems between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential for China in developing its economy, it is believed that China will continue to desire to maintain that stable relationship.

The United States expresses that it welcomes a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the international community over international issues such as the recovery of the world economy and proliferation of WMDs. The United States proclaims that it will monitor the Chinese military’s modernization, and while it recognizes that the two nations do not agree on every issue and makes it clear that it will be candid on human rights and other issues, it also states that disagreement between the two should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest.

On the Chinese side President Hu Jintao stated that China and the United States would work together to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship in the twenty-first century. China thus shows its stance of emphasizing the stable development of U.S.-China relations through pragmatic cooperation over an extensive array of fields.

Military exchanges have also developed between China and the United States. The countries have
been conducting various policy dialogues. China has dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits by naval vessels. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. But while China wants to develop relations between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, it asserts that there are a number of issues that must be resolved in order to realize sound development in said relations. These include arms sales to Taiwan, the activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft within China’s exclusive economic zones, legal hurdles in mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in China on the part of the United States. Some unstable facets have been observed in the military exchanges of the two countries, such as the notification of suspensions of the major military exchanges with the United States when the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010. On the other hand, the United States maintains that China’s military development, lack of transparency, and other issues raise questions about its future conduct and intentions. It asserts that U.S.-China relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust. With regard to military exchanges, it is believed that the aim is to improve the current situation, wherein such exchanges are frequently suspended, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining more stable channels for mutual understanding.

3. Relations with Russia
Since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, both countries have continuously maintained a stance of placing importance on their bilateral relationship. The deepening of the “strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which was established in the mid-1990s, has been emphasized. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was concluded. Subsequently in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once evolved into a military clash, came to a settlement. The two countries share a common idea that they will promote the multipolarization of the world and building of a new international order. In addition, economic motives have been driving the good relationship between them in recent years.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China; however, some point out that their trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China.

It is also pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying such sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia itself.

China-Russia military exchanges include regular visits by highest-ranking defense officials and joint military exercises. They conducted their first joint exercise in the Shandong Peninsula and other areas in China in August 2005. In August 2007, a joint anti-terrorism exercise was conducted by the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In addition Russia and China held “Peace Mission 2009”, a joint military exercise consisting of anti-terrorism operations, in July 2009. It
is believed that through these joint military exercises with Russia, the two countries can deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between their military forces and show the presence of China and Russia as one pole in the multipolarizing world, and China can learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines.

4. Relations with North Korea
North Korea and China have a “traditional friendship,” and North Korea seems to rely heavily on China for a great portion of its food assistance and energy supply. Accordingly, China is believed to have a stronger influence on North Korea than other countries. China agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1695, which condemned the launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea in 2006, UNSCR 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea in relation to the nuclear tests, the Security Council presidential statement in April 2009 condemning North Korea’s missile launch, and UNSCR 1874, which settled additional measures against North Korea in response to the nuclear test in May 2009. In addition, China has played an active role chairing the Six-Party Talks that have been held in Beijing since 2003, and the international community expects that China will continue its proactive efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.

5. Relations with Other Countries
(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries
As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been continuously developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Through diplomatic forums, the country is deepening economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries, and recently, it has been proactively advancing cooperation in the security sector.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Thus China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states, which might be influenced by terrorism caused by Islamic extremists and other factors. Chinese engagement in SCO, which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of China’s concerns in such areas. Moreover, China is also believed to be interested in the energy resources of Central Asia and is promoting cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.
(3) Relations with South Asian Countries
While China has continued to be at odds with India due to issues such as border conflicts, it has traditionally maintained a favorable relationship with Pakistan, which has been at odds with India as well. Cooperation in the military sector, such as exporting weapons and transferring military technologies has also been reported. On the other hand, in recent years China has been committed to improving its relationship with India while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Actively conducting mutual visits by top leaders with India, China states that relations with India are strategic and that the issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once culminated in military clashes, is progressing. It is believed that the development of relations with India can be attributed to the two states’ placing of importance on economic growth as well as responses to progressing U.S.-India relations.

Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted joint naval search and rescue exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003. In December 2007, “Hand-in-Hand 2007,” the first anti-terrorism joint exercise since the 1962 China-India border conflict, was conducted between both countries’ armies, and the anti-terrorism joint exercise “Hand-in-Hand 2008” was conducted in December 2008.

(4) Relations with EU Countries
Trade between China and EU countries has grown remarkably in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, at diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

Regarding information technology, avionics, and air-independent propulsion systems for submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than that of China or Russia, which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China was lifted, it is possible that the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China, and that they would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. Japan has expressed to the EU its objection to lifting the arms embargo on China, and it is necessary to pay continuous attention to future discussions within the EU.

6. International Transfer of Weapons
China has provided developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas with weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft, and it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Namibia and Zimbabwe. China has particularly close relations with Pakistan, and it has been reported that the two countries are working on joint programs including the development of JF-17 fighters. With regard to arms exports, China states that it does not interfere in the domestic affairs of importing countries. It has been pointed out that China is supplying weapons to countries that have problems in terms of democracy and human rights, and attention is paid as to whether China will improve the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community.
4. Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Taiwan, under the guidance of building the “hard rock” defense advocated by President Ma Jeou Ying, identifies prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conflict, and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and takes the military strategy of “resolute defense and credible deterrence.”

Taiwan, for improved expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to transform its armed forces currently consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to introducing advanced technologies and improving joint operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August 2009, the Taiwanese armed forces have resolved to strengthen its disaster prevention and disaster relief capabilities.

In August 2005, then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian announced a policy to increase the ratio of the defense budget to its GDP, which was approximately 2.4% in FY2005, up to 3% within three years, in order to meet increasing demands for national defense. Taiwan states that it reached a ratio of 3% in 2008. The Ma administration also sets out the policy that the defense budget will not go below 3% of the GDP, in principle. (See Fig. I-2-3-5)

With regard to Taiwan’s military power at present, ground forces include 41 Army brigades and three Navy Marine Corps brigades with a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that the total of 1.65 million reserve personnel of air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Jing Guo fighters, etc.

In view of the fact that China is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military...
believes it still needs to modernize the equipment. In October 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of the possible sale of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and AH-64D attack helicopters, and other equipment to Taiwan. In January 2010 it also notified Congress of the possible sales of PAC-3 missiles, UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and others. Taiwan also wishes to purchase F-16C/D fighter aircraft and other arms from the United States and the issue is to be observed.

Taiwan is also promoting the independent development of equipment. Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles are deployed and it is believed that Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:

1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming number of troops; however, their capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities in recent years, such as building large landing ships.

2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, as well as overwhelming Taiwan in terms of quantity, has been steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years in the qualitative sphere, where Taiwan had superiority.

3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles with a range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.

In addition to sizes of forces and performance and quantity of equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as objectives and characteristics of envisioned military operations, operational posture, proficiency of military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as China is rapidly modernizing its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China. Attention should be paid to the modernization of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan. (See Fig. I-2-3-6)
Section 4  Russia

1. General Situation

Russia claims that it has restored the level of social and economic development that was lost in the 1990s. It asserts that under President Dmitry Medvedev it will continue to pursue its national interests as a “strong state,” while aiming to further the multipolarization of the international community.

One of the contributing factors to Russia recovering its national power to such an extent was the economic recovery propelled by price hikes of crude oil, its major export product. Russia takes the stance, in pursuing military modernization, that the country will not be drawn into the arms race and jeopardize economic development. However, it is considered that there are various sorts of factors that might restrain further social and economic development, such as excessive dependence on the energy resource sector. Russia itself realizes that it must undertake a number of sweeping modernizations for the further development of the country. These include breaking free of its conventional resource-dependant economy, refashioning its economy and society on a fundamentally new foundation backed up by technical innovation, establishing a democratic political system, and eradicating corruption. How Russia will overcome these challenges will be the focus of attention in the future.

2. Security and Defense Policies

1. Basic Posture

Approved in May 2009, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation through to 2020 sets out national and international objectives and strategic priorities for national security and for solid national development.

The National Security Strategy views that Russia’s influence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the creation of a multi-polar world and using the potential of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations are listed as having a negative impact on the interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the United States’ plan to deploy a missile defense system in Europe as well as the approach of NATO’s military infrastructure to the Russian border. Furthermore, it does not rule out the possibility that the conflicts over resources will be resolved by force. In order to ensure strategic security, Russia claims it will, under the central role of the United Nations in the international security, enhance cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States. Russia says it will use political, legal, economic, military and other instruments in order to uphold national sovereignty and interests.

As for the field of national defense, viewing as a threat the series of policies of some developed nations that pursue superiority in the military field, particularly in the area of strategy by developing high-tech weapons, non-nuclear strategic weapons, and global missile defense systems, Russia exemplifies, as challenges for strengthening defense capabilities, a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent readiness units and improving organizational and military
alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its strategic nuclear forces.

In February 2010 the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was formulated as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere. This doctrine demonstrates the recognition that, while the probability of a large-scale war breaking out is on the decline, the military dangers facing Russia are increasing, which is evidenced by the approach of NATO’s military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, as well as the construction and deployment of a strategic missile defense system. Furthermore, it also states that Russia will maintain permanent combat-readiness to deter and prevent conflict, and that in the event of war it will repel aggression and forcibly put a stop to military actions.

The doctrine regards nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It also claims that in addition to maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capacity, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction were to be used against it or its allies or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons have been used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

Furthermore, concerning the use of its army, it claims that Russia may use its armed forces outside of its territory for the purposes of peacekeeping operations pursuant to resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, etc., and of the protection of Russian citizens overseas. Furthermore, it lists as characteristics of modern wars the frequent use of weapons comparable to nuclear weapons and high-tech weapons, the expansion of the scale of the use of weapons to aerospace areas, information wars, and it claims that it must equip each echelon of its forces with the requisite new equipment, such as new precision guidance weapons or information command systems.

2. Military Reform

Having gone through the chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with the difficulty in maintaining its a military posture of the same level as during the Cold War era because of the severe economic situation and the decline in population in the 1990s, Russia began a full-scale process for military reform in 1997 by heeding the three pillars of reform: down-sizing, modernization, and professionalization.

Currently, Russia is showing progress in the modernization of military forces, including the reduction of the number of soldiers, structural reforms, the improvement of combat-readiness, and the development and introduction of new types of equipment.

The country’s troop reduction goal, set in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel, is scheduled to be achieved by 2016. In terms of structural reforms, thus far Russia has shifted to three services and three independent corps and has integrated military districts. In order to improve combat readiness for the high probability of a small-scale conflict, it is currently promoting a reorganization from its previous division-based command structure to a brigade-based command structure, while also moving forward with reorganizing all of its combat forces to permanent readiness units.
Regarding the modernization of military forces, in October 2006 the president approved the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015, and accordingly, approximately five trillion rubles (approximately 15 trillion yen) will be spent in the development and procurement of military equipment by 2015.146

Furthermore, in order to make effective the combat readiness of permanent readiness units, Russia is promoting the introduction of a contract service system which secures personnel with high combat readiness capabilities by selecting them through contract from among the recruited military personnel. Russia also recognizes as a challenge securing human resources who possess expert skills and knowledge through treatment improvement, etc.148

It is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years. (See Fig. I-2-4-1)

3. Military Posture
1. Nuclear Forces
The Russian military emphasizes nuclear forces in order to supplement its conventional forces. In addition, it allots focus to nuclear forces to secure a global position in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, and as a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States. It is believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit.

Russia is gradually reducing the number of its strategic nuclear missiles due to issues such as aging. However, it still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) following the United States in scale, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long range bombers (Tu-95MS Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks).

Regarding the update of nuclear missiles, Russia began to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, beginning with the deployment of new Topol-M ICBM (SS-27) units in

![Fig. I-2-4-1 Russia’s Defense Budget from FY2006 to 2010](image)

Note: Official figures announced by Russian Government.
In addition, flight trials for the RS-24, which appear to be a multi-headed version of the Topol-M, started in 2007.

In April 2007, Russia launched a Borey-class ballistic missile submarine (nuclear powered) (SSBN); however, it is believed that construction of the new SSBN is behind its initial schedule. Russia also started a flight test in September 2005 for the new-type SLBM Bulava, which appears to mount Borey-class SSBNs. However, it has been pointed out that all flight tests as of 2008 have been unsuccessful, and they have not yet reached the stage of deployment.

In addition, the United States and Russia agreed in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) before it expired on December 5 of that year. In April 2010 the U.S. and Russian Presidents signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which stipulates reducing both side’s deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after entry into force of the treaty.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces.

2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia recognizes the need to outfit its conventional forces with new equipment, and it is assumed that Russia implements the development and procurement of such equipment based on its state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015. In January 2010 Russia carried out its first test flights for its so-called fifth generation fighters, and continued attention needs to be paid to trends in their future development.

Furthermore, the Russian armed forces have been striving to maintain their combat readiness by promoting the reorganization of all of their combat forces to permanent readiness units and have been carrying out large-scale exercises using its conventional forces in Europe. In addition, Russia is intensifying its military activities; its naval aircraft carrier units were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in 2008 as well as in 2007; it has taken part in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; in 2008 its naval vessels visited Central and South American countries for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

However, as there are issues such as difficulties in securing personnel and lax military discipline due to the decrease in the population of young men as well as poor living conditions for military personnel, the modernization of conventional forces is not necessarily sufficient.

As for the future Russian armed forces, since there are opaque elements which may influence Russia’s future economic and social development, it is necessary to continue to observe their future trends.
Column: Status of Fifth Generation Fighters in Various Countries

While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, a fifth generation fighter is considered to have more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations because they have been combined with the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth. The United States’ F-22, which is currently considered to be the sole fifth generation fighter currently in use, possesses advanced stealth capabilities, supersonic cruising capabilities, sophisticated fire control capabilities, and more.

The nine countries of the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway are jointly developing the F-35 based on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. They are moving forward with the development of three types: the F-35A conventional takeoff and landing model, the F-35B short range takeoff and vertical landing model, and the F-35C carrier-borne model.

Russia is currently developing its PAK FA (Future Frontline Aircraft System), which it is aiming to equip beginning in 2015, and conducted test flights for it in January 2010.

China is also believed to be developing a next generation fighter, with the opinion that it will begin operation around 2010.

4. Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

1. General Situation
The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian military operations in the vicinity of Japan appear to be increasingly active, including exercises and drills.

Since 2003, Russia has conducted military exercises in the Far East region, including “Vostok”, which is a large-scale anti-terrorism exercise that has been held four times so far, and “Mobility 2004”, which was an exercise for the country’s permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region.

Furthermore, with regard to activities done throughout Russia and with the involvement of the entire Russian military, “Stability 2008”, a major joint strategic military exercise involving the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, was conducted in 2008, and in “Zapad 2009”, a major joint strategic military exercise conducted with Belarus in 2009, Russia is thought to have verified the new command organization indicated in the Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Given that the overall Russian armed forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts with the inter-theater mobility of its permanent readiness units, it is necessary to continue paying attention to the positioning and trends of the Russian armed forces in the Far East region with the movement of units in other regions also in mind. (See Fig. I-2-4-2)
(1) Nuclear Forces
As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s, and approximately 30 Tu-95MS Bear long range bombers are mainly deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In addition, SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, a variety of weapons are deployed in the Far East region, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and sea- (undersea) and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 80 Tu-22 are deployed in the west of Lake Baikal and coastal areas, including the area across from Sakhalin.
(2) Ground Forces
Ground forces in the Far East region have continued to shrink. As part of its military reforms, it is believed that Russia is promoting a reorganization from a division-based command structure to a brigade-based one, while also reorganizing all of its combat forces to permanent readiness units. They now consist of 15 divisions and brigades and approximately 90,000 personnel. Also, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy has a naval infantry division with an amphibious capability. (See Fig. I-2-4-3)

![Chart](image)

(3) Naval Forces
The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet comprises approximately 240 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 550,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear-powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. The forces have been scaled down. (See Fig. I-2-4-4)
(4) Air Forces

In terms of air forces in the Far Eastern region, Russia deploys approximately 570 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy. This number continues to shrink, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities. (See Fig. I-2-4-5)
2. Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories
Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan’s Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory. However, the numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times. Nevertheless, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are still deployed in the region.

The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to maintain the status quo.

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan
The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from peak numbers; however, some activities seem to be on the rise again\textsuperscript{158}.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities seem to be on the rise in recent years. For example, joint exercises and counter-piracy operations have been carried out, in extended voyages by vessels deployed in the Pacific Fleet, and nuclear submarines carry out patrols\textsuperscript{159}.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long distance bombers and carrying out flights of Tu-95MS long range bombers which are refueled in mid-flight. Moreover, due to an upturn in its fuel situation, etc., pilot training time is on an upward trend, and there also seems to be an increase in activities such as flights approaching Japan and exercises and training\textsuperscript{160}.

(See Fig. I-2-4-6)
5. External Relations

1. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States

(1) General Situation

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Dmitry Medvedev in July 2008, which sets out the basic foreign policy of Russia, presents the view that Russia’s international status has been elevated as one of the influential centers in the trend toward multipolarity and lists the following three basic foreign policies: (a) to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, (b) to commit to resolving global issues multilaterally in accordance with the rule of international law, and (c) to form friendly relations with neighboring counties. Russia identifies the development of bilateral/multilateral cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the first priority of foreign policy, and it maintains relationships including multi-lateral frameworks such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Russia has promoted military integration with CIS member countries, stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS; Russia has dispatched its federal forces to remain in Ukraine, Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), Moldova (Transdniestre), Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz; it has also concluded agreements to form a joint air defense system and joint border security treaties with CIS member countries. (See Fig. I-2-4-7)

With increasing activities by Islamic armed forces in Central Asia/Caucasus, Russia pursued military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Since U.S. and other military forces launched the military campaign in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, Russia has permitted U.S. assistance or U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Georgia. On the other hand, in 2003, Russia established an air force base in Kyrgyz to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force. Russia also had a division (approximately 8,000 personnel) stationed in Tajikistan, and later made an agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004, securing a Russian military base in the country. Furthermore, in June 2009 a permanent, joint rapid reaction force was created with the enhanced function of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.

(2) Georgia Conflict

The Georgia conflict is the incident that broke out in August 2008, touched off by the armed conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia and introduced a large-scale armed intervention by Russia, against the backdrop of Georgia’s suppression on movements seeking separation and independence by South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the fact that relations between Georgia, which was taking a pro-U.S./Europe policy, and Russia had grown strained. With mediation by the European Union (EU), the conflict itself ended after five days. However, the relationship between Russia and Europe-U.S., which had been appealing for a peaceful resolution based on the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity, deteriorated...
as Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Moreover, Russia has also displayed moves to strengthen military cooperation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. How Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will influence the movement of secession and independence within the CIS, such as the Chechen Republic in the Russian territory, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Transdniester in Moldova is worthy of attention.

2. Relations with the United States

Russia agreed with the United States in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I).

Russia strongly opposed an agreement that had been reached to begin full-scale negotiations for the deployment of the ballistic missile defense (MD) system being promoted by the United States, part of which would be deployed in the Czech Republic and Poland, on the grounds that this system would be pointed at Russia and has the potential to negatively impact its own nuclear deterrent capabilities. However, in September 2009 the United States announced that it was revising its plan to deploy the MD system in Europe, in response to which Russia assessed it at a certain value. But this is not to imply that the United States has suspended its plan to deploy MD in Europe itself.

In addition, the Presidents of the United States and Russia signed a new treaty in April 2010 on reducing strategic arms to replace the START I. With regard to the MD system, this treaty stipulates that there exists an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that the current strategic defensive arms will not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of both the United States and Russia. The treaty also prohibits using launchers of ICBM, etc., for MD, and using launchers of MD for ICBM, etc. However, Russia’s interpretation is that the treaty will become invalid in the event that the United States develops its capabilities pertaining to the MD quantitatively or qualitatively and threatens the potential capabilities of its nuclear forces. Attention will be paid to future Russian responses as the United States’ MD plan progresses further.

3. Relations with Europe and NATO

Russia, as a rule, has been against the accession to NATO of former Soviet Union countries as well as Central and Eastern European countries.

However, Russia took steps to build a new cooperative relationship with NATO following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia participates in decision making to a certain degree and acts as an equal partner in areas of common interest. Meanwhile, Russia was dissatisfied that NATO countries would not ratify the Application Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) because Russian forces would not withdraw from Georgia and Moldova. Thereafter, discussions were held in such forums as the
NRC; however, Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in December 2007, halting inspections based on the treaty. Russia expressed concerns that Ukraine and Georgia reached an agreement with NATO about their future membership at the NATO summit meeting in April 2008\textsuperscript{175}, and NATO’s announcement in April 2009 that it would hold multilateral drills in Georgia. But foreign minister-level NRC meetings were resumed in June 2009, and it is believed that NATO-Russian relations, which had been at a standstill because of the Georgia conflict, have returned to normal for the time being.

In addition, Russia has also proposed a new European security treaty which would get rid of the existing NATO-centered security framework and set out new basic principles for security in the European and Atlantic Ocean region\textsuperscript{176}.

4. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and the region is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East, anti-terrorist measures, and security\textsuperscript{177}. The country is currently implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing natural gas fields in Sakhalin. In order to develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, it is important for Russia to enhance economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and China. For this reason, Russia emphasizes relations with these countries in its foreign policy and has joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)\textsuperscript{178}, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)\textsuperscript{179} (See Section 3-3). Additionally, Russia signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004.

5. Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboronexport State Corporation\textsuperscript{180} as part of its on-going efforts to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards the military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia has exported its jet fighters and warships to countries including India, Algeria, ASEAN member countries, China, and Venezuela\textsuperscript{181}. In addition, Russia signed agreements with North Korea and Iran on military technology cooperation in 2001.
Fig. 1-2-4-7  CIS Member States
Section 5 Southeast Asia

1. General Situation
Southeast Asia holds key positions for traffic linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and is an important region for Japan. The countries in this region are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened the relationships of interdependence within and outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are still incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed, though the number of incidents of piracy has been on the decline in recent year. In order to cope with these problems, the countries in the region are working to build sufficient military forces not only for traditional national defense but also to address new security issues such as anti-terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, they have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their navy and air forces.

In this region, the United States is developing relationships of confidence with Southeast Asian countries and working to strengthen their readiness through numerous joint military exercises such as the multinational military exercise Cobra Gold and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the provision of military technology and military assistance. (See Fig. I-2-5-1)
2. Defense Policy of Each Country

1. Singapore

Given the concentration of people and their property in limited national land space and deepening economic interdependence with other countries, Singapore identifies diplomacy and deterrence as the twin pillars of national defense for maintaining peace and stability, and gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-quarter of its national budget\(^{184}\). As its national defense policy, Singapore declares that it will strengthen dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation with armed forces of countries within and outside Southeast Asia and promoting Total Defense\(^{185}\). Faced with the need to appropriately and flexibly respond to war, terrorism, peacekeeping activities, and humanitarian crises, Singapore is working on the transformation of the Third Generation Singapore Forces to implement effective responses with limited resources, and is striving to modernize equipment and enhance operational capabilities\(^{186}\).
Singapore is making aggressive efforts to modernize military equipment, including the earliest introduction in Southeast Asia of early-warning aircraft, air refueling tankers and a submarine rescue mother ship\(^{187}\). Regarding enhancement of operational capability, it conducts training by stationing its troops overseas on an ongoing basis to overcome constraints on training areas due to limited land space\(^{188}\).

Singapore makes efforts for regional cooperation based on friendly cooperative relations with other Southeast Asian countries, including the conclusion of defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region\(^{189}\). Also, aiming to contribute to the stability and development in the region, Singapore supports the United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 1990 permitting the United States to use military facilities in Singapore. This allows U.S. forces to promptly respond to emergencies in the Middle East and Africa. The United States ranks Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two countries signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security to further strengthen cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogues.

Singapore has been actively participating in international peace cooperation activities as well. Though on a limited scale, in addition to U.N. peacekeeping activities, it has dispatched personnel, aircraft, and naval vessels to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Eden\(^{190}\).

2. Malaysia

Malaysia, surrounded by other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), considers that its strategic interests have close ties with those of countries in the region and that any threat to ASEAN or an ASEAN country is a threat to Malaysia\(^{191}\).

For this reason, Malaysia regards the strengthening of bilateral relations with neighboring countries, strengthening of ASEAN, cooperation with Islamic countries, South-South cooperation, and the upholding of the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Malaysia’s defense policy revolves around the fundamental principles of Self-Reliance, Regional Cooperation and Foreign Aid\(^{192}\). Malaysia sets forth deterrence and Total Defense as their defense concepts and regards a strategy to repel aggression and the buildup of highly reliable military force as important and the involvement of not only the military but also all the people as necessary.

Malaysia conducts bilateral military exercises and promotes military cooperation with other countries, including the United States, Australia, and India, but does not take part in multilateral exercises other than those under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)\(^{193}\), and maintains the national security system based on the FPDA.

Furthermore, like other Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia or the Philippines, Malaysia actively participates in U.N. peacekeeping activities\(^{194}\), and has also sent its troops for antipiracy measures in the Gulf of Aden\(^{195}\).
3. Indonesia

While there is a perception that within the next several years there is yet to be any indication of a conventional military threat from outside, the intensity of trans-national security threats has actually significantly increased in the past few years. Indonesia states that it treats non-military security issues as a part of national defense issues. To that end, Indonesia is promoting Total Defense through both military defense and non-military defense activities under the idea that all people utilizing all resources available, maintaining Indonesia’s independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unification. Furthermore, Indonesia is implementing military reform, which includes the prohibition of the involvement of military officers in politics and business activities, and the separation of military and police roles.

In foreign policy, Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other ASEAN states and pursues independent and proactive diplomacy as its basic idea. In its national defense policy, Indonesia makes it clear that it does not rely on other nations for the safety of the nation and also is not part of any defense pacts with other countries. However, Indonesia regards defense and military cooperation with the United States as significant for the development of the country’s defense force, not only for the interest of Indonesia but also for its regional security interests, and has strengthened cooperative relations with the United States in such fields as military education and training, and military equipment procurement in recent years.

Though International Military Education and Training (IMET) with the United States was temporarily suspended due to disputes over the activities of Indonesian forces in Timor-Leste, the United States in November 2005 decided to resume IMET and also decided to resume arms exports to Indonesia. In February 2008, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Indonesia and held talks with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and then Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono, where they agreed to strengthen cooperation in counter-piracy activities and counterterrorism as well as military cooperation. In January 2009, the Indonesian Navy and the U.S. Navy conducted a joint exercise of their Special Forces on the island of Java. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Indonesia as part of the tour of Asian countries, her first foreign trip as top U.S. diplomat, and reached an agreement with then Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda to build a comprehensive partnership in various areas, including security cooperation, and to further strengthen the bilateral relationship.

Indonesia believes that the participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities leads to the elevation of its status in the international community, and has dispatched a total of some 18,000 military personnel on 43 contingents. Between March and late November 2009, Indonesia sent its surface force for the first time to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), including the country’s state-of-the-art Sigma-class corvette.

4. Thailand

Under its flexible omnidirectional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States
and China. Thailand’s national defense policy consists of the two elements of 1) enhancement of the defense capabilities of the armed forces, and coordination and integration with other government institutions; and 2) strengthening of security cooperation relationships with neighboring countries, the regional community, and the international community. On this basis, it has adopted the national defense strategy that revolves around the three pillars of Security Cooperation, United Defense, and Active Defense. Thailand is promoting close security cooperation with neighboring countries, the buildup of defense capabilities, and reform of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence.

Thailand believes that while risks of traditional threats such as a large-scale invasion have decreased, the risk of non-traditional threats such as international terrorism are on the rise, and in particular the insurgency in southern Thailand by separatists poses a national challenge going forward. Thailand also has border disputes with neighboring Myanmar and Cambodia, and the disputes occasionally heighten tensions between Thailand and Cambodia. The insurgency in the south is raising realistic concerns for Thailand, but in the area of build-up of defense capabilities, it is modernizing the armed forces centering on the naval and air forces and is the sole owner of an aircraft carrier in Southeast Asia.

With respect to relations with the United States, which serves as the core of security cooperation, Thailand believes the presence of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region provides security assurances for many countries as well as security concerns for some states. Thailand has established a good relationship with the United States by maintaining cooperation with the United States since the Cold War era. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and the United States maintained the cooperative relationship, and they have been conducting the joint military exercise Cobra Gold since 1982. Cobra Gold became a multinational exercise in 2000, and includes noncombat missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

In addition to U.N. peacekeeping operations, Thailand has been actively engaged in international peace cooperation activities, dispatching its troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2003, the United States designated Thailand as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) in appreciation of its proactive participation in the U.S.-led war on terror. The United States also views Thailand, together with Japan, Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, as the cornerstone of peace and security in Asia.

5. Vietnam

In the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was the largest donor of assistance for Vietnam, and Russia owned a naval base in the Bay of Cam Ranh. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations, and established diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and states that it will actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries under its foreign policy principles of multilateral participation and respect for diversity. Based on its experiences with the independence war, Vietnam emphasizes that other countries must strictly respect its independence, national sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity, and declares that it will
neither join any military alliance nor give any foreign country permission to have military bases in Vietnam. Vietnam advocates a posture of all-people national defense, and states that maintaining a peaceful and stable environment for socio-economic development, achieving industrialization and modernization, and building a socialism-based market economy are its vital national interests and the objectives of its national defense policy.

Vietnam believes that a state of tension which may lead to armed conflict remains unsettled in Southeast Asia and that territorial disputes are becoming complicated; in particular, those relating to sovereignty and national interests in the South China Sea have been on the rise. Vietnam highly appreciates the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities, and insists that international cooperation in such areas as counterterrorism and the war against terror should be carried out within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

Vietnam has maintained close ties with Russia particularly in the area of national defense since the Cold War era, and aside from the use of the Bay of Cam Ranh by Russia, Vietnam depends almost totally on Russia for its military equipment. In 2001, Vietnam and Russia signed the Joint Statement for a Strategic Partnership, and agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense.

Regarding relations with the United States, the two countries concluded an agreement on International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program in June 2005 and major progress was witnessed in bilateral military cooperation. In June 2006, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam, and agreement was reached to expand military exchanges between the two countries. Many U.S. defense-related personnel, including the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, frequently visited Vietnam between 2006 and 2007, and in April 2007, the United States partially lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam. In October 2008, the first strategic dialogue was held between Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Mark Kimmitt to build up cooperative relations between the two countries in political, security, defense and other areas. Further, in December 2009, Vietnamese Minister of Defence Phung Quang Thanh visited the United States.

6. The Philippines

The Philippines perceives terrorism by domestic anti-government armed groups as the most serious threat to national security. Since 2004, the country has been implementing reform programs in the areas of defense planning, improvement of operational and training capabilities, reform of military structures and modernization of forces in accordance with a defense reform program called the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR).

The Philippines and the United States have a history of a close relationship and maintain a long-standing, tight military cooperation relationship. The two countries maintain the cooperative relationship, with the continuation of the mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the eviction of U.S. forces in 1992. The two countries have been conducting the
large-scale annual joint military exercise Balikatan since 2000 as counterterrorism measures against terrorist groups including the Abu Sayyaf Group\textsuperscript{213}. The Philippines and the United States have also conducted other joint exercises, including Balance Piston and Talon Vision. The United States designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), as the United States views the Philippines as the cornerstone of peace and security in Asia\textsuperscript{214}.

3. Military Modernization in the Region

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have been modernizing their militaries against a backdrop of economic development and other factors.

In May 2009, Singapore took the first delivery of four U.S.-made F-15 fighters for the detachments in Idaho, United States. Singapore plans to have a total of 24 F-15 fighter jets, all of which are scheduled to be delivered by 2012. Singapore has also participated in the joint development program of the F-35 fighter, the first Asian country to do so. As for the naval strength of Singapore, all six French-made Formidable-class frigates with stealth capability were commissioned in 2009. Singapore also purchased two secondhand Swedish-made submarines, which are scheduled to be delivered by the end of 2010 after upgrading and refurbishing operations.

Malaysia started introducing Russian-made Su-30 fighters from 2007, and the delivery of all 18 of them was completed in 2009. As for naval strength, Malaysia’s first submarine (the Scorpène-class submarine jointly developed by France and Spain) was commissioned in January 2009, and a second one in November 2009. Malaysia also placed orders for six German-made Kedah-class corvettes, and all of them are scheduled to be commissioned by the end of 2010.

Indonesia introduced two each of Russian-made Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003, and plans to ultimately own a total of five of each. Regarding naval strength, in 2009 Indonesia completed the commissioning of four Dutch-made Sigma-class corvettes. In addition, in September 2007, Indonesia agreed with Russia to strengthen military technological and defense cooperation, and signed an agreement to purchase $1 billion worth of Russian-made weapons with government loans. The agreement reportedly covers such weapons as two Kilo-class submarines.

Thailand in 2007 decided to purchase Swedish-made JAS-39 fighters as well as aircraft with early-warning systems. Thailand does not own any submarines at present, but it is reported to have started considering the purchase of a submarine\textsuperscript{215}.

Vietnam purchased four Su-30 fighters in 2004, and there are reports that the country is making an additional purchase of the fighter jet\textsuperscript{216}. In December 2009, Vietnam was reported to have concluded a contract to purchase six Kilo-class submarines from Russia\textsuperscript{217}.

Many Southeast Asian countries have expanded the growth of their defense spending in recent years, and this is considered one of factors that make the modernization of military equipment possible. Aside from this factor, there are views that sensitive relations among Southeast Asian countries to the military buildup, the growing influence of China, and the limited effectiveness of the regional security
institutions as a confidence-building measure, are behind the ongoing military modernization in Southeast Asia\textsuperscript{218}.

4. Relations with China
There are currently territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries and China over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands\textsuperscript{219}. At the Summit Meeting between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China held in November 2002, ASEAN member countries and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea\textsuperscript{220}, which aims for a peaceful settlement of the territorial issue. However, no major development has been seen in the drafting of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea\textsuperscript{221}, which would provide more concrete behavior and possess legal binding force. Movements observed in recent years with regard to the relationship with the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands include an increase in activities of neighboring countries claiming ownership and subsequent protests against these claims\textsuperscript{222}.

In recent years, China has actively pushed the related countries to give priority to the development of resources in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, setting aside the territorial issue. For example, in September 2004, China and the Philippines agreed on a joint oil field exploration in the waters of the Spratly Islands, and in March 2005, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam reached an agreement on the launch of a joint exploration of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. However, the Philippines did not agree to the renewal/extension of the agreement and withdrew from the agreement in July 2008.

In recent years, China has been making efforts to develop cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries. The first ASEAN-China Summit was held in 1997, and at the 11th ASEAN-China Summit in 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China is “ready to enhance cooperation with ASEAN in non-traditional security fields, and will fund training such as the maritime investigation training in the Malacca Strait.”

In the area of national defense, mutual visits of senior military officials and exchanges and cooperation between troops of ASEAN countries and China are under way, centering on bilateral exchanges. China conducted the first joint search and rescue exercise with Thailand in 2004, the first of its kind with any Southeast Asian nation. A joint patrol was launched in the Gulf of Tonkin by Vietnamese and Chinese naval vessels in April 2006. In 2007 and 2008, the special forces of China and Thailand came together to conduct a combined counterterrorism military exercise\textsuperscript{223}. In 2009, China and Singapore conducted a joint counterterrorism exercise\textsuperscript{224}. Further, in 2007, China provided Cambodia with patrol boats as an assistance package, and in 2008, China reportedly concluded a contract to sell two patrol boats to Timor-Leste.

5. Regional Cooperation
Southeast Asian nations utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework for the region. In addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a dialogue forum on the political and security sectors in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) has been held annually since
2006. Furthermore, at the 13th ASEAN Summit in 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted, containing the basic principles for establishing the ASEAN Community by 2015, and entered into force in December 2008 after the completion of the ratification procedures of all member states. At the 15th ASEAN Summit held in October 2009, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was formally established, underscoring steady progress toward the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015. At the same Summit, ASEAN set forth its policy of holding summit meetings with the United States and Russia as part of the dialogue with extra-regional countries, and it also expressed its appreciation of the United States’ accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a strong signal of its involvement in peace and security of the region. At the ASEAN summit meeting in April 2010 an agreement was made to hold an expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM+8), and in addition they mentioned holding summit meetings with the United States and Russia, continuing efforts to strengthen relations with countries outside the region.

In the Southeast Asian region, multilateral cooperation is being promoted in frameworks other than ASEAN as well, in order to deal with a wide variety of security issues such as transnational problems including terrorism and piracy.

In July 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore started the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols for vigilance against pirates in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In this effort, the naval forces of the three countries patrol their own territories in cooperation with each other. Subsequently, in September 2005, the countries launched their joint coastline airborne patrols code-named Eyes in the Sky. In September 2008, Thailand joined these schemes. As another counter-piracy measure, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships and Asia (ReCAAP), proposed and led by Japan, entered into effect in September 2006, promoting the sharing of information concerning piracy and establishment of cooperation systems.

Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have conducted joint exercises including maritime interdiction training within the framework of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA).

6. Regional Issues
In Southeast Asia, while intra-regional cooperation is in progress, some unstable factors remain.

In July 2008, the tension between Cambodia and Thailand intensified over the disputed border area near the Preah Vihear Temple, and the opposing forces exchanged gun fire in October 2008, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries on both sides. Later, the field commanders of both sides held talks and agreed to conduct joint patrols around the temple, in an effort to alleviate the tense situation. Subsequently, however, sporadic exchanges of gun fire have occurred between the two sides.

In the Philippines, armed conflicts between government forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have continued for some 40 years. Progress was made in the peace process following the ceasefire agreement of 2003 and activities of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) from 2004. Since August 2008, however, armed clashes intensified again over the settlement of the
pending land problem, and after Malaysia, one of the principal members, withdrew from the IMT, the IMT suspended its operations at the end of November 2008. Subsequently, in December 2008, the Philippine Government and the MILF agreed to put together the IMG again, reopening negotiations for a peace agreement. Following this development, Japan and Malaysia dispatched personnel to the IMT again, and the IMT officially resumed its activities in Mindanao\textsuperscript{231}. Going forward, it is desired that a final agreement on peace in Mindanao will be reached at an early date\textsuperscript{232}.

In Timor-Leste, Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia dispatched their troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in April 2006 in response to a worsening security situation, and subsequently in August 2006, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established\textsuperscript{233}.

In February 2008, President José Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao of Timor-Leste were attacked by armed groups. Since then, however, the security situation has been stabilized as a result of continued political and economic efforts. The mandate of UNMIT was extended to February 26, 2011, from the standpoint of promoting peace, stability, and development of newly born nation\textsuperscript{234}. In the meantime, Timor-Leste aspires to gain accession to ASEAN by 2012.
Section 6 South Asia

1. India

1. General Situation

India is surrounded by many countries and has long coastlines totaling 7,600km. The country has the world’s second largest population of more than one billion following China and has great influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographic position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. India is expected to play an important role in maritime security.

India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, languages and cultures within it, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world’s largest democratic nation. Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and systems, such as liberalism, democracy and a market economy.


India, as its national security policies, lists the possession of military capabilities to protect national interests and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism and low-intensity conflicts to conventional wars and nuclear wars; and enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

In fact, India actively participates in peacebuilding assistance, including U.N. peacekeeping operations. As of February 2010, about 9,000 personnel are involved in 9 peacekeeping operations. India has been sending naval vessels off the coast of Somalia to conduct coast guard surveillance operations against piracy since October 2008.

India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use on nuclear weapons and maintaining the unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test conducted in 1998. In addition, in its nuclear doctrine released in January 2003, India expressed its commitment to continuing export controls of nuclear weapons and missile-related materials and technologies, and participating in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, as well as to creating a nuclear-free world. However, the doctrine declares that India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India by biological or chemical weapons.

The Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 13 corps with approximately 1,100,000 personnel; naval forces of two fleets, totaling approximately 350,000 tons, and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 670 combat aircraft.

India is expanding the procurement of equipment from foreign countries and also joint development as the Russian and former Soviet equipment which comprises 70% of its arsenal becomes obsolete. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier, and in addition to promoting a construction plan for one new domestic aircraft carrier, will introduce another aircraft carrier from Russia upon completion of
repair work as explained later. In July 2009, India's first domestic nuclear submarine was launched. Further, it is reported that one Russian Acula class nuclear submarine will be supplied to India during this year. In addition, in conjunction with the retirement of the now-degraded MiG-21 fighter-interceptors, India is planning for procurement of multi-purpose fighter-interceptors, and in February 2007 Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony announced that the country would procure 126 multi-purpose fighter-interceptors through a bidding process\textsuperscript{239}.

India is currently building up a ballistic missile that could load a nuclear warhead. In September 2003, India announced that it would operationally deploy the Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile with the army\textsuperscript{240}. In February 2010, it succeeded in the fourth test launch of the Agni-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile and it is reported that India had begun development of the Agni-5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)\textsuperscript{241}.

India is working toward the practical realization of ballistic missile defense as a defensive response measure to threats against the homeland. In November 2006, December 2007, and again in March 2009, missile interceptor test was conducted, and reported to be a success\textsuperscript{242}. India has started negotiations with the United States on its ballistic missile defense system\textsuperscript{243}. (See Fig. I-2-6-1)

3. Foreign Policies
   
   (1) Basic Posture
   
   India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s, and is actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy, thereby steadily increasing its presence in the international community.
India’s rapid expansion of military cooperation with friendly nations not only strengthens the security environment of the South Asia region, but also is expected to enhance security worldwide. In recent years, India has been making efforts to expand military exchanges, such as by conducting joint exercises with various other countries²⁴⁴.

(2) Relations with the United States
India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, while the United States is also promoting the expansion of involvement in India in line with the economic growth of India, thus leading to increasingly stronger mutual relationships in various fields.

In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States and made a joint statement with then U.S. President George W. Bush that the relationship between the two countries would transform into a global partnership through which they would cooperate in the fields of space exploration, nuclear energy for civilian applications, and military and non-military technologies. Subsequently in March 2006, President Bush in turn visited India for the first time in six years as president of the United States²⁴⁶, and agreed with Prime Minister Singh to strategically strengthen bilateral relations. Further, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited India in July 2009²⁴⁶, and Prime Minister Singh made an official visit to the United States in November of the same year for talks with U.S. President Barack Obama²⁴⁷.

As for cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, in October 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then Foreign Minister Pranab Mukerjee signed the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

In the security field, in June 2005, then Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee and then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year military agreement called the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, based on the recognition that the U.S.-India defense relationship is an important pillar in the mutually beneficial relations between the two countries, which are changing over time. In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its intention to enhance cooperation with India on security issues, including maritime security²⁴⁸. Secretary of Defense Gates visited India in January 2010 for talks with Prime Minister Singh and Defense Minister Antony to discuss antiterrorism measures, Indian-Pakistan relations, the problem of Afghanistan, and overall regional security.

India and the United States have carried out active military exchanges, including joint military exercises. The “Malabar 09” exercise was carried out with additional participation from Japan off the coast of Okinawa during April and May of 2009²⁴⁹. The “Yudh Abhyas 2009” joint training exercises were carried out in India in October 2009 with participation by Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers from the United States to train for the War on Terror²⁵⁰.

India has expressed an interest in U.S. weapons. India has already purchased a used amphibious ship from the United States²⁵¹, and the United States has approved the sale of a P-8 patrol aircraft to India²⁵² in March 2009.
(3) Relations with China
India has been trying to improve relations with China through mutual visits by leaders despite the Tibet issue and unresolved national border issues between the two countries as well as concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and the modernization of its military force, including naval forces. When then Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited India in March 2004, the two countries agreed on the expansion of military exchanges. Subsequently in December 2004, based on this agreement, a visit to China by an Indian Chief of Army Staff was made for the first time in 10 years. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two countries reached an agreement on establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity. In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India, the first time in 10 years, that a Chinese president met with Indian Prime Minister Singh. Both agreed that the development of a strategic and cooperative partnership between China and India is commonly recognized as an important issue and announced a joint declaration that includes holding regular summit meetings. Further, in October 2009, Prime Minister Singh spoke with Premier Wen when visiting Thailand to attend the East Asian Summit and agreed to steadily close the gap regarding views on the border issue between the two countries and make efforts to reduce tensions. The first China-India security talks were held in Beijing in November 2007, with the second talks held on December 2008 in Delhi and the third on January 2010 again in Beijing. At the third talks, agreement was reached to strengthen mutual trust and improve cooperation while celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. In December 2007, the first joint military exercise between the armies of the two countries – an India-China anti-terrorism joint exercise – took place in Yunnan Province in China. In December 2008, the second joint exercise – a China-India anti-terrorism joint exercise – took place in India.

(4) Relations with Russia
India has maintained a close relationship with Russia through mutual visits made annually by both leaders. In October 2000, the two countries signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership to further strengthen their bilateral relations, and have been promoting acquisition of T-90 tanks by India from Russia as well as joint development of a supersonic cruise missile. In December 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Russia for talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In addition to a joint statement by the leaders of both countries, agreements were signed including an intergovernmental agreement regarding cooperation in military technology. Russia is a major supplier of weapons to India. In January 2004, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov visited India and concluded a contract to sell a retired aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, to India. Also in January 2007, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and conducted a consultation meeting on military technology cooperation, joint exercises, and other issues. Further, Russian Prime Minister Putin visited India in March 2010 to conclude a contract for the purchase of 29 MiG-29K carrier based fighter aircraft and to discuss joint development of a multipurpose transport and a fifth generation fighter aircraft.
In addition, the two countries have conducted joint military exercises since 2003\textsuperscript{261}.

(5) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries
Since the latter half of the 1990s, India has been emphasizing relations with East Asian countries, including ASEAN members. In October 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)\textsuperscript{262}.

2. Pakistan
1. General Situation
Pakistan, with approximately 160 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Since Pakistan borders Afghanistan and in the past the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, Pakistan’s attitude towards the international fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting increasing international attention.

The military government established by General Pervez Musharraf (then Chief of Army Staff) who effected a military coup d’état in October 1999 came to an end after nine years and Asif Ali Zardari was elected President in September 2008. However, soon after his inauguration, President Zardari faced difficulties controlling the government, being stuck between the war on terror led by the United States and the acts of retaliatory terrorism stemming from anti-U.S. sentiment being carried out by armed groups in the country. A major cleanup operation was launched in October 2009 against Islamist insurgents in the South Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the northwest of the country and it has been reported that several insurgent bases have been neutralized. In February 2010, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani stated that the primary goals of military operations in the Agency had been achieved. However, terrorist attacks thought to be retaliatory are increasing, causing many civilian casualties\textsuperscript{263}.

2. National Defense Policy
Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense.

The Pakistan Armed Forces include ground forces of nine corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 40 warships, totaling approximately 79,000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 400 combat aircraft.

In recent years, Pakistan has been actively proceeding with development of a ballistic missile capable of mating with a nuclear warhead and cruise missiles. Pakistan first test-launched the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile in August 2005\textsuperscript{264}. From January to February 2008, in exercises of the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Strategic Missile Group (SMG), following actions in 2006\textsuperscript{265}, it consecutively conducted test launches of various intermediate-range ballistic missiles it owns, including the Ghauri (Hatf-V), and the Shaheen 1 (Hatf-IV). And in March 2004, the test launch of the
intermediate-range ballistic missile Shaheen 2 (Hatf-VI) was conducted. This seems to demonstrate that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic missiles to its forces. (See Fig. 1-2-6-1)

3. Foreign Policies

(1) Relations with India

India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India after World War II, have had three large armed conflicts over the Kashmir territorial issue and others. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has continued, with dialogues repeatedly resumed and suspended, and it constitutes one of the root causes of confrontation between India and Pakistan.

However, in February 2004, “multiple dialogues” for the normalization of relations between the two countries, including on the Kashmir issue, were initiated. Although definite progress had been seen in the bilateral relationship before this time, no fundamental solutions to the issues were in place and relations between the two countries had become tense again after the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Later efforts of the international community, led by the United States, served to put a hold on any further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India and Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gillani of Pakistan met for talks in Egypt while attending the Non-Aligned Movement summit in July 2009, where they issued a joint statement and agreed in principle to restart the multiple dialogues to discuss the outstanding issues which had been stopped since the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai. In February 2010, in New Delhi, vice foreign ministers’ talks were restarted after one and a half years, at which they agreed to continue contact. Later in the year, a summit meeting and a foreign ministers’ conference were held, in April and July respectively. However, the “multiple dialogues” have not yet restarted.

(2) Relations with other countries

Pakistan, while attaching importance to friendship and cooperation with Islamic countries, maintains close relations with China as a countermeasure against India. In October 2008, President Zardari visited China and held talks with President Hu Jintao, allowing both leaders to reach a consensus to raise the strategic partnership to a new level. Further, it has been reported that production of the JF-17 fighter aircraft developed jointly between the two countries had begun in July 2009. Also, since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan has expressed its intention to cooperate with the efforts against terrorism by the United States and others. This cooperative attitude was highly appreciated by the international community, and the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan by the United States and other countries due to Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1998 were lifted. Pakistan strengthened military cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism. In March 2005 the United States decided to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, lifting its freeze on the sale that had lasted over 20 years. Furthermore, in March 2007, then U.S. President George W. Bush visited Pakistan and strongly praised Pakistan's support for anti terrorism issues. The two countries confirmed their policy of promoting terrorism-related information sharing. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Pakistan in January 2010 for talks with President Zardari, Prime Minister Gillani, and Chief of
Army Staff Kayani to discuss the reevaluation of strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Pakistan's role therein.274

Regarding the issue of nuclear proliferation involving Pakistan, then President Pervez Musharraf disclosed in February 2004 that some Pakistani scientists, including Dr. Khan, were involved in nuclear proliferation, although the president denied the Pakistani government’s involvement in any kind of proliferation activity.275
Section 7 Australia

1. General Situation
Australia shares basic values with Japan such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy, and is allied with the United States as are Japan and the Republic of Korea. Focusing on neighboring regions such as Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, Australia has been broadly and actively involved in resolving international security issues such as the problem in Afghanistan.

2. Security and National Defense Policy
In May 2009, Australia released the defense white paper titled “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030”\(^{276}\) for the first time in the nine years since 2000, which presented national defense policies for the period through to 2030, based on a strategic outlook for the future. The white paper states that Australia has strategic interests in (1) the defense of Australia against direct armed attack; (2) the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood, which Australia shares with Indonesia, New Zealand, and other countries; (3) the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean; and (4) preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.

It is stated that the defense policy should be founded on the principle of self-reliance in direct defense and in relation to the country’s unique strategic interests, but with a capacity to do more when required, consistent with those strategic interests that Australia might share with others, and within the limits of its resources. This defense policy means that Australia must have the military capacity to (1) act independently where Australia has unique strategic interests at stake, and in relation to which it would not wish to be reliant on the combat forces of any foreign power; (2) lead military coalitions where Australia has shared strategic interests at stake with others, and in relation to which it would be willing to accept a leadership role; and (3) make tailored contributions to military coalitions where Australia shares wider strategic interests with others and is willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests.

It then gives priorities to the tasks of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as follows: (1) to deter and defeat attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries; (2) to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; (3) to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region; and (4) to contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world.

In order to carry out these tasks, the ADF will need to be more potent in certain areas, particularly undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surface maritime warfare, air superiority, strategic strike, special forces, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and cyber warfare. Specifically, Australia intends to acquire 12 new future submarines, three new air warfare destroyers
Around 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) and maritime-based land-attack cruise missiles. The Government is committed to 3 percent real growth in the defense budget for 2017-2018 and 2.2 percent real growth to 2030.

3. Relationship with Other Countries

Australia attaches importance to its alliance with the United States and intends to strengthen cooperation through security policies with neighboring countries in order to maintain the stability of the region.

1. Relations with the United States

Australia recognizes that the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region relies significantly on the presence of the United States, and emphasizes the importance of its alliance with the United States based on the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS Treaty). Australia holds the annual Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), a cabinet level meeting of foreign and defense ministers. In addition to the annual consultations, Australia stresses the importance of the alliance as a reason for the Australian military’s activities in Afghanistan. The close alliance is being maintained by taking part in the review process and consultations of U.S. strategy regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, and repeated discussions in contribution to the preparation of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Further, Australia carries out the joint training exercise “Talisman Saber” with the United States, and making efforts to improve interoperability for cooperation on humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions. In addition to declaring participation in the U.S. lead F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, Australia intends to cooperate in missile defense. Further, they are promoting cooperation in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), military satellite communications, information, and cyber security.

2. Relations with China

Australia understands that China possesses strategic influence that extends beyond East Asia, and that U.S.-China relations are the most important factor for strategic stability in the Asia Pacific region. Australia understands that China’s increased defense spending due to economic growth, if not explained, has the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern, and China is facing pressure for transparency. With this understanding, Australia is carrying out Australia-China Strategic Defense Dialogues regularly to further mutual understanding and cooperation in common areas of interest. Further, exchanges are being carried out to develop Australia-China defense relations including joint search and rescue training in addition to mutual port visits by warships.

3. Relations with Southeast Asian countries

Australia emphasizes cooperation with the various countries of Southeast Asia to fight terrorism and crime in the region, and engages in security related cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Brunei.
Australia sees Indonesia as having the most important defense relations in neighboring regions\textsuperscript{290}. Given the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005 and the terrorist bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, Australia has deepened counter-terrorism cooperation\textsuperscript{291} and the two countries concluded a framework agreement regarding security cooperation which described cooperation across a wide range of defense relationships in November 2006\textsuperscript{292}. Also, in January 2009, the two countries signed the Australia Indonesia Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation which focuses on counter-terrorism, maritime security, intelligence, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping. Australia is also carrying out comprehensive joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore\textsuperscript{293} regarding non-traditional threats such as terrorism and maritime safety under the Five Power Defence Arrangements framework\textsuperscript{294}.

4. Overseas Activities

Australia identifies the security, stability, and cohesion of the neighboring region as one of its strategic interests; fragile states in the neighboring region are potential havens for criminals and terrorists, and domestic conflicts would inflict considerable damage on the regional community, including Australia. Thus, Australia is committed to contributing to regional stability by providing active support, including the deployment of military forces\textsuperscript{295}.

If the Australian government decides that it is in Australia's wider strategic interests to undertake operations in the Middle East or other remote regions, Australia would do so only after the Government has satisfied itself that its forces have the necessary environment to ensure the success of the operations with minimum risk to the deployed forces\textsuperscript{296}.

Based on this policy, Australia is deploying about 3,000 personnel abroad out of its 55,000-strong force\textsuperscript{297} mainly in the following areas. (See Fig. I-2-7-1)

1. Timor-Leste

Australia has actively supported the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the independence movement gained momentum there. The ADF leads the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), and about 400 troops are working with about 150 New Zealand troops\textsuperscript{298}.

2. Solomon Islands

Australia has actively supported the stability and development of the Solomon Islands since ethnic disputes intensified there in the late 1990s. The operation has been led by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since July 2003\textsuperscript{299}. About 80 ADF troops comprise the military component of RAMSI together with the forces of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, and engage in providing security for RAMSI’s multinational Participation Police Force.
3. Afghanistan

Australia announced its support for the United States immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 under the U.S.-Australia alliance, and dispatched its troops to Afghanistan in October 2001. Australia is participating as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the aim to prevent the proliferation of terrorism and to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists by providing support to enable Afghanistan to become a peaceful and stable country. The country has expressed a commitment to maintain the Australian military presence in Afghanistan. Additional units were deployed in July 2009, and currently an approximate 1,550 troops are engaged in reconstruction support activities in Uruzgan Province and the training of Afghan security forces. Further, approximately an additional 800 troops are operating around the region in support of the Afghanistan mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig. I-2-7-1 Overseas Deployment of ADF (As of May 2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (inside Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (outside Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFO Multinational Force and Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID UN/AU Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI UN Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Source: The website of the Department of Defence of Australia.
Section 8   Europe

1. General Situation
With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared and regard an outbreak of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other developments as new security challenges.

To adapt to new and emerging threats, Europe has sought to stabilize the security environment primarily by strengthening and expanding the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 28 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). Moreover, many European countries are proceeding with the development of their own capacity to cope with these new challenges.

2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks
1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions
(1) Development of a system necessary for a new role
Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has been shifting the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

This shift has also been reflected in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, reviewed in 1999, in which NATO added conflict prevention, crisis management, and other missions to its primary mission of collective defense, based on the view that various dangers are difficult to forecast, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, human rights suppression, and the dissolution of a state, still remain in Europe and surrounding regions.

Also, to fill the gap between U.S. and European capability, reform of military capability is being carried out in NATO such as structural reform. Improvement of the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been ongoing since 2002 and it was declared in November 2006 that complete operational capability had been achieved. However, as unit deployment to Afghanistan increases and is extended, the future form of the NRF is under consideration to handle the issues faced. In June 2009, it was agreed to develop a new chain of command and combat capability formation mechanism by the meeting of NATO defense ministers.

Further, in order to define NATO’s long term role in the new security environment of the 21st century, a declaration was made to begin the process of drafting a new Strategic Concept at the NATO summit of April 2009. NATO is currently drafting a new Strategic Concept in the group of experts and so on and is going to make their decision at the NATO summit in November 2010.

The EU, enhancing its own commitment to security issues, adopted its first security strategy paper in December 2003, titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy.” It sets forth the objectives of addressing major threats including terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, collapse of states, and organized crime, through the stabilization of surrounding
regions and multinational cooperation.

In December 2008, the EU released the Declaration On Strengthening Capabilities. This was released with the Statement on Strengthening International Security as a document related to the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, which reviews the progress in implementing the security strategy. The declaration calls for the EU to increase personnel, equipment/materials, and facilities necessary to respond to threats listed in the European Security Strategy of 2003.

Furthermore, unlike NATO, the EU does not assume the mission of defending its member states; however, it has been strengthening cooperation with NATO and working on the development of a system necessary in order to conduct military activities of its own, such as peacekeeping, in cases where NATO does not interfere. In January 2007, the EU established its own operations center in Brussels and a posture was prepared to have two battle groups in a permanent state of readiness. In November 2009, the EU adopted the Ministerial Declaration: ESDP Ten Years – Challenges and Opportunities and demonstrated a policy of improving effectiveness and flexibility for the operation of the battle group limited to emergency operations was expressed to strengthen EU defensive capability while working to improve operational planning and direction capability.

With the Lisbon Treaty, the new fundamental EU treaty, coming into force in December 2009, the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was established along with the associated European External Action Service under control of the position. Much interest is now focused on how these newly organized external policy institutions of the EU will function. (See Fig. I-2-8-1)

(2) Commitment to a New Role

NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003, which marked its first operation outside Europe, and the NATO-led ISAF mission expanded its presence in October 2006 to cover the whole country. At the NATO summit meeting held in spring 2008, the Bucharest Summit Declaration was adopted, which states that the ISAF mission is NATO’s top priority. Since then, some progress has been made, such as the transfer of the security responsibility in Kabul from ISAF forces to Afghan national security forces, but the country is faced with challenges in security and other areas. In the Summit Declaration on Afghanistan adopted at the NATO Summit held in April 2009, member states agreed on issues including to improve support for training for Afghan national forces and police forces, to send troops on a short-term basis to stabilize security in preparation for the Afghanistan presidential elections, and to support the building of a closer relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In November 2009, a restructuring of the ISAF was carried out in which the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) took over daily peacekeeping and reconstruction support, and the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) is supporting the training of the Afghan security forces and police. Further, in December, the meeting of NATO foreign ministers announced the intent to deploy a total of over 7,000 personnel from member states.
Based on the agreement made at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO is training the Iraqi security forces in Iraq, and also continues its missions such as the maintenance of security in Kosovo which declared independence in February 2008.

Moreover, European countries play an active role in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. From October 2008, NATO sent the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) comprising navy forces of member states to waters off the coast of Somalia to conduct counter-piracy operations, alternately deploying the SNMG1 and SNMG2 fleets. In Operation Ocean Shield being carried out since August 2009, support to strengthen counter-piracy capabilities for countries which request it has been added to the mission of counter-piracy operations. In March 2010, NATO extended the period of this operation until the end of 2012. The EU has been engaged in Operation Atalanta, its first maritime mission, since December 2008, deploying vessels and aircraft from each nation

The EU led peacekeeping operations in Macedonia in 2003 for the first time using NATO’s equipment and capabilities. The EU also conducted its first peacekeeping operations outside Europe without utilizing NATO’s equipment and capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. In December 2004, the EU took over the mission of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), which had been operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and sent troops to Chad and Central Africa in January 2008. These operations represent the EU’s proactive involvement in risk management/maintenance of security. (See Fig. I-2-8-2)

(3) Criteria for Arms Export in Europe

In December 2008, the Council of European Union Foreign Ministers adopted the Council Common Positions defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (EU Common Position), which sets out a new common ground for approving exports based on arms export control laws of EU member states. Unlike the previous European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU Code of Conduct), the EU Common Position has legally binding power and requires member countries to take more stringent measures.
Fig. 1-2-8-1 European Security Organization (as of April 2010)

Legend:
- ▲: PIP members (23 countries)
- ▼: WEO associate members
- ▼: Countries that maintain a cooperative partnership with the WEO
- ◆: WEO observers

Note: The Warsaw Pact Military Organization was dissolved in April 1991. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved as a political organization after the signing of the dissolution agreement on July 1, 1991 and ratification of the parliament of the member states.
2. Geographical Expansion of Security Frameworks and Partnership

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework\(^\text{312}\). At present, most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are NATO member states and have borders with Russia, which has consistently opposed NATO’s expansion to the east.

At the same time, NATO has pursued a policy of partnership with non-NATO member countries. For example, NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP)\(^\text{313}\), which aims to foster confidence and improve interoperability with non-NATO European countries, and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)\(^\text{314}\), which seeks stability in the Mediterranean region.

NATO is also strengthening relations with Contact Countries\(^\text{315}\) such as Australia and Japan with a view to conducting activities outside the region.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia have sought to improve relations, and established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 in light of the need to deal with common issues concerning security. NATO and Russia have continued to pursue dialogue and cooperation in areas such as anti-terrorism efforts, arms control, and theater missile defense. While the NATO-Russia dialogue was temporarily suspended after the Georgia conflict in August 2008, at the NATO summit in December 2009 it was agreed to resume the official NRC to include the cabinet level talks, and the foreign minister level NRC was resumed in June of the same year. Further, a meeting was held in December of

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Response Force (NRF)</th>
<th>EU Battle Groups (Combat Groups)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swif...situation...worldwide</td>
<td>Responding to EU-led missions, such as peacekeeping operations, in cases where there is no NATO intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing joint task forces formed mainly by...4,000 troops, plus maritime, air, and specialized units</td>
<td>Thirteen 1,500-strong units will be formed. Of these, two units are capable of rapid simultaneous deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of force: Approx. 25,000 troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment begins within 5 days of an order</td>
<td>Deployment begins within 5 days of an order and is completed within 15 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability of 30-day operations</td>
<td>Capability of 30-day operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One year rotation (in the case of ground units, 6 months of training, and 6 months on standby)</td>
<td>Units will be formed and on standby by rotation within the unilateral or multinational framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic operational concept: to be dispatched as an initial response unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segmentation of units is possible depending on the mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative was formulated in November 2002</td>
<td>Initiative was formulated in June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototype force was formed in October 2003</td>
<td>Complete operational capability was achieved in January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial operational capability was acquired in October 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete operational capability was achieved in November 2006</td>
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</table>
the same year between NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and Russian president Medvedev to discuss common areas of interest including efforts regarding Afghanistan and terrorism.

The number of EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is also expanding, with the accession of 10 countries in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. (See Fig. I-2-8-3)

![Enlargement of NATO and EU Membership](image)

3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Situations
Since the end of the Cold War, individual countries conscious of the new threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD have begun to place emphasis on the allocation of personnel to missions other than homeland defense. As a result, there has been an emphasis on strengthening transport capability for overseas deployment in defense building, giving consideration to the role of NATO and other defense organizations. Moreover, many European countries have been implementing quantitative reductions and restructuring of their military power, while channeling efforts into modernizing their military and increasing national defense expenditures.

1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has maintained the perception that it is not subject to any direct military threats
and therefore has pursued military reform focused on enhancing capability in order to cope with new threats since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the United Kingdom regards international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as major threats and has improved its overseas deployment capability and readiness\(^\text{316}\).

The first National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, announced in March 2008, highlights the broadened view of national security to include threats to individual citizens, and it considers transnational crime, pandemics, flooding and others as threats along with terrorism and the spread of WMD. It also cites factors such as climate change, the increasing demand for energy, and poverty as causes of these threats. To cope with these diverse and interrelated threats and risks, the strategy takes a multilateral approach through the U.N., EU, and NATO while seeking cooperation not only between the military and the police, but also with the private sector and regional governments, with a view to addressing threats at an early stage.

The strategy affirms the existing assessment, concluding that state-led threats will not emerge in the predictable future\(^\text{317}\). The strategy nevertheless states that the international security environment has grown more complex and less predictable and that while the reemergence of such threats in the long run is unlikely, they cannot be discounted, thus it sets forth a policy for maintaining strong defense capabilities\(^\text{318}\). To be specific, it gives priority to the procurement of equipment for supporting its ongoing operations, including strategic transportation, support helicopters and armored vehicles. At the same time, it plans to invest for the long term in a broad range of military capabilities for the defense of the United Kingdom such as aircraft carriers, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare, which are difficult to rebuild from zero. Furthermore, in a white paper issued in December 2006, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, the United Kingdom announced it would maintain its own nuclear deterrence based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the 2020s and beyond\(^\text{319}\).

These military capabilities will guarantee the United Kingdom’s future security while enabling it to make contributions to peacekeeping and other international efforts and thus contribute to the international security environment.

Further, the United Kingdom plans to carry out a “Strategic Defence Review in 2010 to review national defense policy for the coming security environment\(^\text{320}\). It released Adaptability & Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review (green paper) in February of the same year, which lists and organizes the discussion points ahead of the deliberations for the Strategic Defence Review, stating that it is necessary to reevaluate the role of the military in consideration of the complex and uncertain security environment and national defense budget restrictions\(^\text{321}\).

2. Germany

In its first national defense white paper in 12 years issued in October 2006, Germany specified that the primary mission of its allied forces remains national defense and collective defense in the traditional sense. However, it declared that in light of the expansion of new threats including terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism, are the most likely missions to come.
To ensure the necessary military capabilities to meet the above mission, Germany plans to give priority in resource allocation to strengthening strategic transport capacity, global reconnaissance and efficient command with high interoperability. Specifically, Germany is currently planning to introduce A-400M transport aircraft and has also completed launches of five satellites fitted with a synthetic aperture radar SAR-LUPE by July 2008. In addition to reducing personnel and relocating its domestic camps and facilities, it is also restructuring its military into joint units grouped by function: intervention, stabilization and assistance.

3. France

France, in its White Paper on Defense and National Security, issued in June 2008, identified risks ranging from cyber attacks to environmental crises, in addition to the direct threats of mass terrorism and ballistic missiles, stating that these threats and risks are interconnected due to globalization and that the continuity between domestic and foreign security has taken on strategic significance.

The regions cited as those that have influence on the stability of France and Europe included the area extending from the Atlantic to the Indian oceans; sub-Saharan Africa; Russia, with whom relationship-building is important; the Balkans, whose stability is of essence; as well as Asia, which is growing in its importance. It specifies five statutes of France’s national security strategy: prevention, nuclear deterrence, protection, and overseas intervention, based on accurate perception, knowledge, and anticipation of conditions in a world characterized by uncertainty and instability. The report states that France will strengthen these functions and combine them flexibly in order to adapt to changes in the strategic environment over the next 15 years.

In July 2009, the “Loi de programmation militaire 2009–2014” was ratified by the parliament. This plan was the first midterm plan to take into account the national defense and security strategies laid out in the White Paper on Defense and National Security. It includes the establishment of a council for national defense and security as well as a council for national intelligence, an increase in the equipment related budget, and a force reduction of 54,000 personnel.

Regarding France’s foreign relations, France calls for strengthening of EU security and renovation of transatlantic relations, and restored its full participation in NATO integrated military structure in April 2009 in view of the changes in the situation since France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military structure and, in particular, the complementary relationship between the EU and NATO.

With respect to the provision of military power, France intends to meet operational requirements such as enhancing protection capabilities while reducing personnel and consolidating military bases, as well as to proceed with strengthening its intelligence functions and modernizing its military equipment.
a strong, prosperous, and successful China that engages in greater cooperation. The QDR is a document that the Secretary of Defense must submit to Congress every four years according to US Code, Title 10 § 118. The document clarifies policies for national defense strategy, military composition, plans to modernize forces, national defense infrastructure, budget plans, etc., in view of the security environment over the ensuing 20 years. The Department of Defense reported it to Congress in February 2010.

The NPR is required to comprehensively review the nuclear posture of the United States over the ensuing five to ten years and submit a report to Congress. Reports were previously submitted in 1994 and 2002, making this the third report.

The QDR indicates that the rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will continue to reshape the international system. In addition, the rise of China is one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that engages in greater cooperation.

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The QDR points out that North Korea and Iraq are developing and deploying new ballistic missile systems, and that these systems pose a threat to United States forces deployed forward. China, also, is developing and fielding large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (CM), new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. However, China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization program, raising a number of questions regarding its long-term intentions. Therefore, U.S.-China relations must be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. Both countries should sustain open channels of communication to discuss disagreements.

The 2001 QDR stipulated that forces were to be composed based on the following four objectives: 1) to defend the U.S. homeland, 2) to provide forward deterrence in the four major regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, East Asian coastal areas, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia), 3) simultaneously defeat the enemy quickly in any two theaters of operation while also decisively defeating the enemy in one of the two, and 4) address the limited number of small contingency situations. The 2006 QDR, however, indicates that experience from recent operations has made clear that it is necessary to conduct operations not only in the four major regions but also globally, and that the ideas of “quick defeat” and “decisive defeat” are not necessarily suited for long-term irregular warfare. As this is the case, the 2006 QDR indicates that military potential should be composed in a way that prepares the necessary capabilities in the following three fields: 1) homeland defense, 2) war on terror / irregular warfare, and 3) conventional campaign(s).

At a press conference on February 1, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the following statement, voicing that the current way of thinking for handling two major regional conflicts was insufficient, “one of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some time, the two-major-theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex that when the two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s.”

Joint press conference by then U.S. President Bush and then President Kufor of Ghana (February 20, 2008).

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture Review announced by the Clinton administration in September 1994 states as follows: (1) Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable (nuclear/conventional) aircraft; (2) Eliminate the option to carry nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM-N) on surface ships: (3) Retain the option to deploy TLAM-N on attack submarines; and (4) Retain the current commitment of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and Continental United States (CONUS) and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. The new NPR includes that the United States is to retain a

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1 U.S. Code, Title 50 § 404a stipulates that the President must submit a national security strategy to Congress every year, but this responsibility has not necessarily been fulfilled every year. For example, the former Bush administration only released said strategic report in September 2002 and March 2006. The Obama administration released the strategy in May of this year for the first time.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the United States’ policy for implementing its national security strategy and indicates a framework for strategic documents of the Department of Defense, including the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NDS was released in March 2005 and then again in July 2008. The 2008 NDS stipulated that the United States’ national interests were to protect itself and allied nations from attack or coercion, promote international security in order to contain conflicts and stimulate economic growth, and to secure access to the global commons, global markets that are born from the global commons, as well as to resources. The strategy indicates that, in order to pursue these objectives, military capabilities will be developed along with other efforts, including diplomatic and economic means, and said capabilities will be invoked if necessary. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates points out in the foreword of the NDS that, “The United States will soon have a new President and Commander-in-Chief, but the complex issues the United States faces will remain. This strategy is a blueprint to succeed in the years to come.”

2 The NPR is required to comprehensively review the nuclear posture of the United States every ten years and submit a report to Congress. Reports were previously submitted in 1994 and 2002, making this the third report.

3 The QDR points out that North Korea and Iraq are developing and deploying new ballistic missile systems, and that these systems pose a threat to United States forces deployed forward. China, also, is developing and fielding large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (CM), new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. However, China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization program, raising a number of questions regarding its long-term intentions. Therefore, U.S.-China relations must be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. Both countries should sustain open channels of communication to discuss disagreements.

4 The 2001 QDR stipulated that forces were to be composed based on the following four objectives: 1) to defend the U.S. homeland, 2) to provide forward deterrence in the four major regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, East Asian coastal areas, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia), 3) simultaneously defeat the enemy quickly in any two theaters of operation while also decisively defeating the enemy in one of the two, and 4) address the limited number of small contingency situations. The 2006 QDR, however, indicates that experience from recent operations has made clear that it is necessary to conduct operations not only in the four major regions but also globally, and that the ideas of “quick defeat” and “decisive defeat” are not necessarily suited for long-term irregular warfare. As this is the case, the 2006 QDR indicates that military potential should be composed in a way that prepares the necessary capabilities in the following three fields: 1) homeland defense, 2) war on terror / irregular warfare, and 3) conventional campaign(s).

5 At a press conference on February 1, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the following statement, voicing that the current way of thinking for handling two major regional conflicts was insufficient, “one of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some time, the two-major-theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex that when the two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s.”

6 Joint press conference by then U.S. President Bush and then President Kufor of Ghana (February 20, 2008).

7 As for non-strategic nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture Review announced by the Clinton administration in September 1994 states as follows: (1) Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable (nuclear/conventional) aircraft; (2) Eliminate the option to carry nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM-N) on surface ships: (3) Retain the option to deploy TLAM-N on attack submarines; and (4) Retain the current commitment of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and Continental United States (CONUS) and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. The new NPR includes that the United States is to retain a
dual-capable fighter capable of equipping both conventional and nuclear weapons and apply a Life Extension Program to the nuclear warheads that would be equipped in these aircraft.

8 This is commensurate with counterterrorism expenses under the previous Bush administration and includes expenses for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

9 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers.

10 The figure as of September 30, 2009. This figure includes all deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads. The United States also released the number of nuclear warheads possessed each year from 1962 and the number dismantled each year since 1994.


12 In the organizational reform of the U.S. Army, its conventional pyramid structure (army, corps, divisions, and brigades) will be reorganized into the headquarters with command and control functions and self sufficient combat units (the size of a brigade) so that it can respond to various situations promptly and flexibly by combining headquarters and working units according to the purpose and scale of the mission.

13 The budget proposal for FY2011 includes a budget for researching next-generation bombers and maintaining production infrastructure for bombers.

14 The budget proposal for FY2011 states that no additional production of the C-17 airlifter will be requested. The U.S. has sufficient C-17 to meet airlift needs with the 223 that are already in force or in production.

15 While there is the possibility for changes in specifics and timing, this is a plan to improve BMD capabilities over four phases by deploying SM-3 Block IA by 2011, SM-3 Block IB by 2015, SM-3 Block IIA by 2018, and SM-3 Block IIB by 2020.

16 Briefing by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright (September, 17 2009).

17 As cyber-related units, Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), 24th Air Force, and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed. In addition, Army Forces Cyber Command (ARFORCYBER) is going to be established no later than October of this year.

18 The figures of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2009), and it could change according to unit deployment.

19 North Korea says it will open the door to the “powerful and prosperous nation” in 2012, which falls on the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il Sung.

20 Joint editorial of the Korean Workers’ Party’s journals Rodong Shinmun and Workers (June 16, 1999).

21 Constitutionally, the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, “commands and takes the reins of all armed forces” as the “Supreme Leader” of North Korea. The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, the equivalent of the Ministry of Defense in other countries, appears to be placed under the National Defense Commission, not under the Cabinet.

22 The approximate percentage of active service members in total population is 0.2% in Japan, 0.5% in the United States, 0.7% in Russia, and 1.4% in the ROK.

23 Then White House Press Secretary Dana Perino announced in a statement on April 24, 2008 that North Korea had assisted Syria’s covert nuclear activities. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI)’s Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 pointed out, “Despite the Six-Party October 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology.”

24 Generally, missiles propelled by liquid fuel can only be fueled right before the launch. On the other hand, missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system are considered to be militarily superior to those based on a liquid fuel propellant system because they are capable of immediate launches with their propellant stored in airframes beforehand, signs of their launches are unlikely to be detected in advance, and they are easy to store and handle.

25 The second and third rounds of the Six-Party Talks were held in February and June 2004 respectively, the fourth round from July to August and in September 2005, and the fifth round in November 2005, December 2006, and February 2007. The sixth round was held in March and September 2007.

26 In June 2008 North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program. However, as of May 2009, no agreement has been made concerning a specific framework for verification.

27 The DNI Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 said that “while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so.” On plutonium-based nuclear weapons, U.S. Forces Korea commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Appropriations Committee in March 2010 that “we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons.”
Regarding uranium-based nuclear weapons, the DNI Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 pointed out, “The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons.”

In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated that “North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.” Further, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed that that “we must assume…if there are no major changes in its (North Korea’s) national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system.

In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, stated that “North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program,” and “We believe that Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents.” He also stated that “North Korea is believed to have a long-standing biological warfare program that could support the production of biological warfare agents.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 pointed out that “It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents remain stored in a number of facilities scattered around the country and that North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as anthrax bacteria, smallpox, and cholera.”

North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002)

The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300km and 500km, respectively.

Of a total of seven ballistic missiles North Korea launched in July 2006 after completely abandoning the freeze on ballistic missile launches announced in 1999, the third one is believed to have been a Taepodong-2 fired from the Taepodong district in the northeastern coastal area. The launch of other Scud and Nodong missiles had more practical characteristics, based on the indication that the missiles were launched before dawn, a number of different types of ballistic missiles were launched in succession over a short period of time, the launch was carried out using a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), and ballistic missiles with different ranges were landed within a certain area. This leads to the assumption that North Korea has improved the operability of ballistic missiles.

All seven ballistic missiles launched were assumed to have landed in the military target practice area (the area surrounded by the points at 1) 39 degrees 9 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 37 minutes east longitude; 2) 41 degrees 12 minutes north latitude and 129 degrees 50 minutes east longitude; 3) 41 degrees 30 minutes north latitude and 131 degrees 59 minutes east longitude; 4) 41 degrees 15 minutes north latitude and 132 degrees 6 minutes east longitude; and 5) 38 degrees 55 minutes north latitude and 128 degrees 2 minutes east longitude), for which the navigation warning was issued by the Japan Coast Guard upon notification by North Korea on June 22, 2009.

For instance, making a three-stage missile by installing a booster at the warhead of a two-stage missile.

In his statement for the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated that preparations are currently underway in North Korea to field a new intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. The BMDR Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 noted, “A mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is also under development (by North Korea).” The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 points out that North Korea has been developing IRBM with a range of over 3,000 km since the end of the 1990s and has recently deployed them.

In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period.” The BMDR Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out, “North Korea has developed an advanced solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).”

The DNI Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 noted that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Pakistan…illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities.” Some point out that North Korea conducts tests in importing countries such as Iran and Pakistan and is making good use of the test results.

Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962.

Covert operations to infiltrate enemy territories by dispersed small units.

Reportedly, North Korea has two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers’ Party. For example, the operation department of the Party is said to be in charge of
transporting agents. Moreover, General Burwell B. Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009 that “North Korea still keeps the world’s largest Special Forces with more than 80,000 troops.” Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2008 points out “North Korea’s special forces number some 180,000. Considering the operational environment in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has intensively improved the capabilities of its special operations by strengthening training programs for night, mountain, and street-to-street fighting.

Kim Jong II was re-elected as Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2009. In April 2007, a large-scale military parade including the march of missile units was held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army with Kim Jong II in attendance.

In 2009, North Korea is believed to have increased the number of members of the National Defense Commission and took measures to strengthen or clarify the functions of the National Defense Commission, centering on the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, by positioning the Chairman of the National Defense Commission as the “supreme leader” of North Korea under constitution and specifying the mission of the Commission as “making decisions on important national policies in order to carry through the military-first revolution.”

On a U.S. TV program broadcast in September 2009, President Barack Obama, relaying an assessment by former President Bill Clinton who visited North Korea in August 2009, said Kim Jong II, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, seems “pretty healthy and in control.” There were no official reports on public activities by Kim Jong II, for 50 days since mid-August 2008 (the longest period of such “disappearance” since he assumed the post of the General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party in 1997). Since November 2008, however, he has been appearing in the public scene more frequently than ever, including a meeting with former U.S. President Bill Clinton in August 2009 and talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in September 2009.

In December 2008, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) forecasted that North Korea would produce approximately 3.34 million tons of crops between November 2008 and October 2009, estimating required imports at 1.79 million tons. It has been pointed out that acceleration of inflation as a result of the simultaneous raising of wages and commodity prices amid the unresolved shortage of commodities, the widening of income gaps as a result of the implementation of these new measures, as well as an increased inflow of outside information, have led to rising dissatisfaction with the regime in some areas, or at least signs of such dissatisfaction are emerging.

In public activities by Kim Jong II, the number of activities related to economic affairs exceeded that of activities related to military affairs for the first time since he assumed the post of General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party in 1997.

The Joint Investigation Group assessed that the sinking was causes by a torpedo due to precise measurement and analysis of the damaged part of the hull which indicated that a shockwave and bubble effect caused significant upward bending of the keel, compared to its original state, and the shell plate was steeply bent, with some parts of the ship fragmented. As for evidence that the torpedo was launched from a North Korean midget submarine, the Joint Investigative Group stated that the torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a dredging ship on May 15 perfectly matched the schematics of the CHT-02D torpedo included in the introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes, among other reasons.

The same day, ROK Defense Minister Kim Tae-young announced that the ROK would take measures against North Korea, including the restarting of psychological warfare, the implementation of a joint ROK-U.S. anti-submarine exercise, and preparations for marine blockades in and outside of ROK territorial waters.

From the May 20, 2010 announcement of a spokesman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea. From the May 25, 2010 statement of a spokesman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea. The Country Report on Terrorism 2008 published in April 2009 states that “the United States rescinded the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the North Korean government had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the government of assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” In February 2010, President Obama submitted a letter to the President of the Senate and the Chairman of the House of Congress stating that as a result of the careful examination of North Korea's behavior up to November 2009, North Korea “does not meet the statutory criteria to again be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.”

In October 2009, the ROK government announced that at the request of North Korea, the ROK will provide 10,000 tons of corn to North Korea in the first assistance program under the Lee Myung Bak administration, and in January 2010, North Korea notified the ROK of its acceptance of the aid offer.

North Korea signed an agreement on economic cooperation and a number of other agreements with China.

The previous treaty contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means available. This
provision, however, was dropped from the new treaty.

56 In August 2009, Russian Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov was quoted as saying that the Russian Armed Forces have deployed the new surface-to-air missile S-400 in order to ensure Russia’s safety in the event of North Korea’s missile launch failure.

57 For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively. In October 2009 French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed a special presidential envoy for an analysis of the situation for the consideration of the establishment of diplomatic ties with North Korea, and the special envoy visited North Korea in November 2009. In December 2009, North Korea agreed to the establishment of a French diplomatic office in Pyongyang.

58 After the ARF ministerial meeting in July 2008, North Korea signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).

59 According to a remark by the spokesman of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the “grand bargain” package deal proposal seeks a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by putting a complete set of denuclearization steps by North Korea and the corresponding measures that North Korea wants from the five countries of Japan, the United States, the ROK, China, and Russia.

60 The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.-ROK joint defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective joint operations in case of emergency. Under the U.S.-ROK joint defense system, the operational control authority over ROK forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in wartime.

61 The United States is advancing the realignment of its forces stationed in the ROK in line with the June 2003 agreement to relocate its forces to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the October 2004 agreement to cut the number of its forces stationed in the ROK by 12,500 from approximately 37,500. The two countries agreed at the summit meeting in April 2008 to maintain the current strength of 28,500 as the appropriate level.

62 The Joint Vision states, “Over that time, our security Alliance has strengthened and our partnership has widened to encompass political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. Together, on this solid foundation, we will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust” and “The Alliance is adapting to changes in the 21st Century security environment. We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ security interests.”

63 The SCM joint statement reemphasized the non-acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and stated that North Korea’s ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests represent direct and serious threats. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates emphasized anew the strong and robust U.S. commitment in the event of crisis for the defense of the ROK, not only through its forces deployed on the Korean Peninsula but also by strategically and flexibly boosted and deployed U.S. forces and capabilities available in all parts of the world for the defense of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Furthermore, Gates reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence using the full range of military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, strike capabilities of conventional weapons and missile defense capabilities, to ensure the security of the ROK.

64 The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 described North Korea as follows: “North Korea’s conventional military capabilities, weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles, and forward military deployment pose direct and serious threats to our national security.”

65 The reform plan has four pillars: (1) expansion of a civilian base for national defense, (2) build-up of military structure and system of the forces in conformity with characteristics of modern wars, (3) reorganization of the national defense management system into a low cost, high efficiency system, and (4) improvement of barrack culture in accordance with the trends of the time.

66 The Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009-2020) revised the force strength from 500,000 to 517,000.

67 The Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009-2020) prioritizes the following measures in order to prepare for North Korean threats: 1) organize front-line troops in a manner that allows them to exercise their combat strength immediately after the outbreak of war to secure the security of the metropolitan region; 2) boost surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, and interception capabilities in order to block and eliminate North Korea’s asymmetric threats in enemy areas to the utmost extent; 3) secure strong reserve mobile power for each unit in order to counter enemies with a numerical advantage; and 4) secure combat sustainability by stabilizing noncombat zones and nurturing elite reserve forces.


69 The primary missions of the Seventh Mobile Corps are described as the protection of sea lanes, deterrence against North Korea and support for the government’s external policies. The Seventh Mobile Corps consists of
three mobile squadrons. In addition to the 71st Mobile Squadron (Busan), the 72nd Mobile Squadron (Jinhae) is scheduled to be created in August 2010 and the 73rd Mobile Squadron (Jeju) in 2014. The Seventh Mobile Corps has one Aegis-equipped vessel and six destroyers under its command, and more Aegis vessels and destroyers to be put in service in the future are expected to be deployed to the corps.

At a press conference, then ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang Hee referred to an agreement reached at the ROK-Russia summit meeting in 2008, and said his meeting with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov provided a momentum to elevate the bilateral military relationship a notch higher.

The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK armed forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, a bill concerning the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations passed parliament.

It is reported that there are 55 ethnic minorities living in China, besides the Han Chinese ethnic group.

“Scientific Development Concept” chiefly consists of “adhering to standardized plans and consideration for all perspectives, maintaining a people-oriented position of establishing comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development concept and the need to promote complete economic, social, and human development.” (As commented by President Hu Jintao at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in October 2003) The construction of a “Harmonious Society” is defined as a process to continue dissolving social inconsistencies. The “Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society” (adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2006).

Building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020 is a goal of the Party and the state as outlined in General Secretary Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2007.

China traditionally adopted the strategy of a “People’s War” based on the recognition that a world-scale war was possible. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla warfare using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, China has come to place importance on local wars such as conflicts that occur over its territorial land and waters since the first half of the 1980s based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place on a long-term basis. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the country started to implement measures to improve its military operation abilities in order to win a local war under highly technological conditions. Recently, it has been stated that the core of military modernization is to strengthen capabilities to win a local war under informatized conditions.

Military parades carried out during events celebrating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 1999.

China amended Regulations on the Political Work of the People’s Liberation Army in 2003 to add the practices of Media, Psychological and Legal Warfare to its political work. The Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) of the U.S. Department of Defense explains Media, Psychological and Legal Warfare as follows:

• Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests
• Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.
• Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions.


The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (February 2010) states that it will be necessary to retain the capacity to protect the United States and its allies in an environment wherein states with a wide range of sophisticated weapons exercise anti-access capability to impede the deployment of U.S. forces. It points out that “China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems.”

China’s National Defense in 2008 states that “…it works to increase the country’s capabilities to maintain maritime, space and electromagnetic space security and to carry out the tasks of counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, emergency rescue, and international peacekeeping.”


The CCP’s constitution amended in 2002 states, “Upon the 100th anniversary of the party’s foundation (in
introduction of derived models with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads. SRBMs on the shore opposing Taiwan, and it is engaged in efforts to increase offensive capability, including the launch of solid propellant missiles in advance, and the risk of suffering a preemptive attack is believed to be lower.

88 commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the formation of the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) states that by December 2009 China had deployed 1,050 to 1,150 SRBMs on the shore opposing Taiwan, and it is engaged in efforts to increase offensive capability, including the introduction of derived models with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads.

89 China announced that the rate of growth for its FY2010 national defense budget is “an increase of 7.5% compared to the previous year,” but this is the growth rate by comparing the spending of FY2009 with the initial budget of FY2010.

86 For example, China’s National Defense in 2008 provides details of personnel expenses, operation maintenance costs, and equipment costs only for the defense budget for FY2007 each by active force, reserve force, and militia.

87 National defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. The national defense budget amount for FY2010 within nationwide fiscal expenditures is said to be 532.1 billion yuan. This budget amount represents growth of approximately 10.7% compared to the national defense budget (initial budget) within the nationwide fiscal expenditures for the previous fiscal year.

85 China disclosed some fighter aircraft and submarines which had previously been generally undisclosed to foreign delegates, including delegates from Japan, at the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Navy (in April) and of its Air Force (in November), which were held in 2009. This is thought to be a sign of its posture of working to improve transparency with regard to the military.

84 China’s National Defense in 2008 states that “in the past two years, senior PLA delegations have visited more than 40 countries, and defense ministers and chiefs of staff from more than 60 countries have visited China.”

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82 Generally, liquid propellant missiles require a long time for liquid fuel to be injected immediately prior to launch, whereas with solid propellant missiles the propellant is loaded in advance and they can be launched immediately. Therefore, compared to liquid propellant missiles, it is more difficult to detect signs of the launch of solid propellant missiles in advance, and the risk of suffering a preemptive attack is believed to be lower.

81 Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. According to China’s National Defense in 2002, it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.

80 The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistical support for combat operations in wartime. China’s National Defense in 2002 explains, “Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.”

79 Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions — one for the CCP and one for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the military forces.

78 Simply applying rates of foreign exchange to the national defense budgets of foreign countries to convert them into another currency does not necessarily reflect the accurate value as revealed in the country’s price level. But hypothetically speaking, if China’s national defense budget for FY2010 were converted at a rate of 14 yen per yuan, then this would result in approximately 7.2671 trillion yen. The 2009 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI; June 2009) estimated that China’s military expenditures for 2008 were approximately $84.9 billion, ranking it second place in the world behind the United States.

77 China’s official defense budget does not include the main expenditure categories. For example, China’s National Defense in 2008 provides details of personnel expenses, operation maintenance costs, and equipment costs only for the defense budget for FY2007 each by active force, reserve force, and militia.

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75 China’s announced national defense budget achieved a double-digit-percent growth on the initial-budget basis for 21 successive years up through FY2009.

74 U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) estimates China’s defense spending on military-related expenditures as more than $150 billion in FY2009. The same report indicates that China’s official defense budget does not include the main expenditure categories.

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69 The Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence of the United States published in February 2009 states that China is developing conventionally armed short- and long-range ballistic missiles with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) that could be used to attack U.S. naval forces and airbases.

68 U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (August 2010) states that by December 2009 China had deployed 1,050 to 1,150 SRBMs on the shore opposing Taiwan, and it is engaged in efforts to increase offensive capability, including the introduction of derived models with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads.

67 At the press conference on the day after it was announced that the test had been carried out, a spokesperson from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “The test would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft. The test was defensive in nature and targeted at no country. It is consistent with the defensive national defense policies that China has consistently pursued. There is no change in China’s position on missile defense issues.”
China’s National Defense in 2008 explains that China’s Air force is “working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force.” U.S. Department of Defense’s Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (May 2006) points out that the goal of the PLA Air Force is “to develop a mobile, all-weather, day-night, low altitude, and over-water force that is capable and flexible enough to quickly perform multiple operational tasks and to project power beyond the “first island chain.”

China’s National Defense in 2008 refers to an increase in the capabilities to maintain space and electromagnetic space security.

Concerning Chinese military forces, there is a view that believes that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, they intend
to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international society tolerate and accept changes in the situation. (Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report).

China’s National Defense in 2006 states “The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations.” Additionally, with regard to Chinese Navy training, Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli is reported to have stated in April 2009 that, “Open sea training has been normalized.” This was the first identified passage by Chinese surface combatants through the Tsugaru Strait.

These vessels are reported to have passed through the Bashi Channel and advanced to the South China Sea, cruised in the waters adjacent to the Spratly Islands, and conducted military drills in the waters of the Paracel Islands.

In April 2010, PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA, reported that a multi-branch joint force of the East Sea Fleet, which consists of submarines, destroyers, frigates, supply ships, and ship-borne helicopters, had begun an open sea deployment training to conduct training for “Three Wars” (“Psychological Warfare,” “Media Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare”), counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy as well as actual match-style exercises. Some of these ten vessels conducted exercises in the middle of the East China Sea before advancing to the Pacific Ocean. At the time, a Chinese shipborne helicopter flew near to the Japanese destroyer Suzunami, which was monitoring the Chinese vessels. At its nearest it came at a distance of approximately 90 m horizontally and the altitude was approximately 50 m. Since it was recognized that flying in this manner posed a danger to the safe navigation of the Japanese vessel, the recognition was conveyed to the Chinese government to inquire after the fact via diplomatic routes. Later, another Chinese shipborne helicopter approached destroyer Asayuki, which was monitoring the vessels in the Pacific Ocean and flew in a circle around it. At its nearest it came at a distance of approximately 90 m horizontally and the altitude was approximately 50 m, constituting an act that posed a danger to the safe navigation of the Japanese vessel. Since similar incidents occurred in succession, remonstrance was made to the Chinese government via diplomatic routes.

A view was presented that China is inclined to adopt a more confident and assertive stance than before, and the anti-satellite weapons test in January 2007 and the Chinese Song-class submarine incident in October 2006, where the submarine surfaced near the USS Kitty Hawk, can be seen in such a context. (The testimony of then Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless at the U.S. China Economy and Security Review Commission on February, 2007)

Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that “in the past several years, they [Chinese] have become more aggressive in asserting claims for the EEZ.”

It is reported that China is constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island.

When Haiti was struck by a major earthquake in January 2010, the China International Search and Rescue Team (CISAR), which includes military personnel such as engineers, departed for the scene the day after the earthquake struck.

China’s National Defense in 2008 mentions that the Chinese Navy is developing cooperation in distant waters, and has been gradually boosting its capacity to respond to nontraditional security threats.

The organizations authorized to deal with cross-strait talks are the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the Chinese side and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwanese side. Discourse at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (May 2010).

Remarks by Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Caihou in a conference with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009).

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR; February 2010).

Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.

The organization was established in June 2001 and the original members are China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). The missions of the organization include promoting cooperation between member countries in a vast range of sectors, including security, politics, culture, and energy. Since the organization’s establishment, it has developed organizationally and functionally, such as in holding regular summit-level meetings, and establishing the organization’s head office and the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS).

North Korea seems to emphasize negotiations with the United States over the nuclear issue, and it is believed that China, apprehensive that the destabilization of situations in surrounding countries would lead to repercussions within China, hesitates to employ firm measures. In light of this, there is a view that China’s wieldable influence on North Korea is limited.
In an interview with the newspaper Izvestia last year (October 14, 2009), Secretary Nikolai Patrushev of the Russian Security Council stated that, “We also adjusted the conditions of use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional aggression – not only to full-scale wars, but also to regional and even to local wars,” and, “In situations critical for national security we do not rule out a possibility of using a preemptive (or preventive) conventional aggression – not only to full-scale wars, but also to regional and even to local wars,” and, “In the speech of then President Putin titled “Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020,” he said that Russia’s military spending will be in keeping with the national capability and will not be to the detriment of their social and economic development priorities.

With regard to China’s and Taiwan’s military strength, the Taiwanese National Defense Report 2009 assessed that, “Military superiority between the two sides has already clearly tilted toward the Chinese side.”

In the speech of then President Putin titled “Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020,” he said that Russia’s military spending will be in keeping with the national capability and will not be to the detriment of their social and economic development priorities.

With the impact from the slump in crude oil prices and the financial crisis in recent years, negative growth was recorded for the last year’s economic growth rate (-7.9%; 5.6% in 1998) for the first time since the financial crisis in Russia (1998).

Troops were reorganized, in the midst of a military forces reduction after the launch of the Russian Federation’s armed forces, to strengthen combat readiness through concentrating personnel. It is hoped that this will enable them to promptly respond during the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a minor conflict. In the meantime, in September 2008 the president approved the “Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” and it was decided that all the combat forces would be transformed into combat-ready troops.

This is a revised version of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation which was formulated in April 2000.

In the Doctrine, the general notion pertaining to threats is split into two categories: military dangers (a state of interstate or intrastate relations that may, in certain conditions, cause the emergence of a military threat) and military threats (a state of interstate or intrastate relations where there is the real possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict). It lists for the former’s example the approach of NATO’s military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, the construction and deployment of a strategic missile defense system, as well as the territorial claims and the intervention against Russia and its allies. For the latter it lists the radicalization of military and political situations, and ostentatious displays of military strength designed to provoke through exercises in its adjacent territories.

Russia supposes that it will use precision guidance weapons as part of its strategic deterrence.

The doctrine of April 2000 states that, “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” The current doctrine deletes the wording on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, it does not touch on the use of nuclear weapons as a “response” to a “large-scale” aggression in the event where conventional weapons have been used, and the description of the non-preemptive use of nuclear weapons has been made less clear.

In an interview with the newspaper Izvestia last year (October 14, 2009), Secretary Nikolai Patrushev of the Russian Security Council stated that, “We also adjusted the conditions of use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional aggression – not only to full-scale wars, but also to regional and even to local wars,” and, “In situations critical for national security we do not rule out a possibility of using a preemptive (or preventive) nuclear strike against the aggressor.”

According to the revisions of the law related to national defense signed by the president in November 2009, Russia can agilely use its armed forces outside of its territory for the following purposes: (1) to repel an armed attack against Russian armed forces overseas, (2) on the request of another country that has been attacked, (3) to protect overseas Russian citizens from armed attack, and (4) to crack down on acts of piracy and to ensure the safe navigation of ships. In the revision it was decided that the use of the armed forces outside of Russian territory would be adopted by the president based on a decision by the Federation Council of Russia, but in December 2009 the council resolved to grant authority related to the use of the armed forces outside of Russian territory to the president.

It was decided that the total military force would be limited to 1 million people as of 2016 by a presidential order in December 2008 (approximately 1.13 million people as of 2008).

The president approved the document titled “Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” in September 2008, which resolved that the command structure be reorganized (reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district—army—division—regiment to a three-tiered structure of military district—operational command—brigade), all combat forces be converted to permanent readiness units, and the class structure of commissioned officers be revised, etc. It claimed to have completed the structural
reorganization to a three-tiered structure in December 2009, but hereafter there remains the challenge of setting in place a system to operate the structure. Moreover, according to reports, four “united strategic commands” were established by presidential decree in July 2010 to operate the ground, naval, and air forces in a consolidated manner based on the current six military districts.

In his annual State of the Nation Address in November 2009, President Medvedev stated that Russia would promote upgrading equipment such as ballistic missiles to new models. Furthermore, giving priority to the procurement of high-tech equipment, the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2011 to 2020 is under preparation and takes into account the lessons learned from the Georgia conflict.

In April 2007, then President Putin stated that professional servicemen would account for two-thirds of the armed forces in his annual address. In addition, the period for conscription was reduced to 12 months as of January 2008. According to news reports, senior military officials have stated that contract soldiers will be reduced and conscripted soldiers will be increased since the challenge of creating a professional army has not been achieved. This will require further attention in the future.

President Putin’s speech “Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020” (February 2008). In order to ensure the necessary number of junior officers, efforts are being made to ensure human resources, by restructuring the military academy, establishing an education center in private higher-education institutions (universities) to train officers on short-term assignment, setting up special education courses in the military academy to train professional non-commissioned officers.

Joint Statement by the leaders of the United States and Russia regarding negotiations on further reductions in strategic offensive arms (April 1, 2009)

Warheads mounted on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) (the number of warheads which is actually emplaced on them is counted) as well as nuclear warheads loaded on deployed heavy bombers (one nuclear warhead is counted for each heavy bomber). In addition, it stipulated verification measures that are simpler and less costly than those in START I, while also touching on the mutual relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. Following the entering into force of this treaty, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), which stipulates that the deployed nuclear warheads of both countries should be reduced to between 1,700 to 2,200 (excluding stored nuclear warheads) by December 31, 2012, will be rendered invalid.

Based on the current situation wherein countries other than the United States and Russia retain intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), Russia had hinted at withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which only regulates the United States and Russia. But in October 2007 Russia announced the globalization of the INF Treaty to the international community together with the United States.

The need for new equipment is touched on in the annual speech by President Medvedev in November 2009, and in the military doctrine that was formulated in February 2010.

While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, a fifth generation fighter is considered to have more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth. According to various news reports, Russia aims to mass-produce and equip its fifth generation fighter PAK FA (Future Frontline Aircraft System) by 2015. Based on news reports (Russia Now, February 4, 2010), the features of Russia’s fighters prior to the fifth generation are as follows.

First generation: Subsonic jet fighters equipped with cannons that appeared after World War II (Examples: MiG-15, MiG-17)

Second generation: Sonic fighters equipped with missiles (Examples: MiG-19, MiG-21)

Third generation: Fighters equipped with more powerful engines and more advanced radar (Examples: MiG-23, MiG-27)

Fourth generation: Fighters with new onboard equipment, powerful radar, and extensive armaments (Examples: MiG-29, Su-27)

Advanced fourth generation: Fighters that are equipped with a thrust deflecting engine and phased array radar, have multi-functionality, and are furnished with a digital cockpit (Examples: MiG-29SMT, MiG-35, and Su-35)

“Vostok 2010” is scheduled for June-July 2010 in the Far Eastern and Siberian military districts. In addition to the units in the military districts mentioned above, it is also believed that combat-ready troops in the Volga-Ural military district will also take part.

In October 2009 Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Nikolay Makarov stated that, “Through the ‘Zapad 2009’ exercises we confirmed the truth of our views concerning the military organization for the transition to the ‘Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.’” Moreover, Chief Makarov also indicated that, “In the ‘Zapad 2009’ exercises every service and army corps took part. Troops were moved through the use of railroad, aircraft, and maritime transport methods, and drills were carried out on all sorts of elements of combat behavior”.

During the war with Georgia in August 2008, the Russian military not only put in troops from the North
Caucasus region, but also those from other regions as well.

157 Estimated number of military personnel within the Siberian and the Far Eastern Military Districts.

158 In the Siberian Military District an exercise was carried out to evaluate the newly reorganized brigade in the wake of the military reforms in March 2009. In addition, there was a news report that then Commander in Chief of Ground Forces Vladimir Boldyrev said that exercises testing the brigades in the “Future of the Armed Forces” would be carried out 30 times in 2009. (Russia Now, March 23, 2009).

159 The number of cases of the Russian fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and disclosed is as follows: three cases in the Soya Strait in FY 2009 (two in 2007, three in 2008), none in the Tsugaru Strait (none in 2007, two in 2008), and ten cases in the Tsushima Strait (none in 2007 and one in 2008), showing an increase in the last few years.

160 Long range flights in the vicinity around Japan were carried out in areas surrounding Japan by Tu-95 long range bombers in October and November 2009, and January, March, April, May, June, July and August 2010, by Tu-160 long range bombers in June 2010, and by Tu-142 patrol planes in September and October 2009.

161 In August 2008, after the Georgia conflict, President Medvedev expressed the view that Russia has regions where it has its privileged interests.

162 Aiming to maintain regional peace and security and implement a joint response to terrorism, etc., SCO conducts an anti-terrorism drill “Peace Mission” and makes efforts for the stability of Afghanistan.

163 Russia and Belarus signed an arrangement on a united regional air defense system in February 2009.

164 Some CIS countries attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. Each member state of GUAM, a regional structure formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (the acronym “GUAM” is composed of the initial letters of the member states) had been taking mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. Georgia seceded from the CIS in August 2009. On the other hand, in Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, whose base of support is a region that is strongly influenced by Russia, was appointed as the new President in February 2010. Attention will be paid to trends in the improvement of relations with Russia in the future.

165 In August 2001, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan provided one troop unit each (battalion or smaller unit) to form the Collective Rapid Deployment Force that consisted of 1,000 to 1,300 personnel. The headquarters is located in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyz. In May 2004, Tajikistan provided another two troop units, and Russia and Kazakhstan provided one unit each as well. As a result, the force has expanded to nine battalions with 4,500 personnel.

166 In November 2005, U.S. forces withdrew from Uzbekistan. In February 2009, Kyrgyz notified the United States that it would close down its air base in Manas that the U.S. uses for anti-terrorism operations. But in June 2009 the United States and the Kyrgyz signed an agreement on the creation of a Transit Center at this base.

167 However, Uzbekistan and Belarus did not sign at the Non-Official Summit of the Heads of the CSTO (July-August 2009) concerning its creation.

168 Russia concluded a border security agreement with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in April 2009, and signed an agreement over the establishment of a Russian military base within Abkhazian territory with Abkhazia in February 2010.

169 The Chechen Republic was hit by large-scale terrorist attacks in 1999 with the involvement of insurgents. The Russian government conducted sweep operations on anti-independence opposition groups and many prominent terrorists were either killed or captured. The overall number of terrorist attacks has been on the decline since 2007, although attacks on VIPs and police officers have occurred sporadically in Ingushetia and Dagestan.

170 Joint Statement by the leaders of the United States and Russia regarding negotiations on further reductions in strategic offensive arms (April 1, 2009).

171 The United States plans to set in place MD systems which include sea-based missiles and mobile radar by 2011 and land-based missiles in a phased manner from then until 2020, on the grounds that the threat to Europe from Iran’s medium and short range missiles to which the United States needs to respond has developed more rapidly than predicted.

172 Statement by the Russian Federation concerning missile defense (April 8, 2010).

173 The following nine items have been named as common interests: 1) the fight against terrorism, 2) crisis management, 3) the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, 4) arms control and confidence measures, 5) theater missile defense, 6) search and rescue at sea, 7) military cooperation and defense reform, 8) responses to civilian emergency situations, and 9) new threats and challenges.

174 At the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 1999 summit in Istanbul, agreement was met on changing the possession limit by bloc to a possession limit by country and territory, ensuring transparency and predictability, trust building and verification measures, and compliance with the current CFE Treaty until the CFE Application Treaty took effect. As of present, only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have ratified the CFE Application treaty, and it has yet to enter into effect.
In a statement released in September 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Ukraine’s aspirations towards NATO membership are in conflict with the security interests of Russia.

Proposed by President Medvedev during a visit to Germany in June 2008.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008).

“Peace Mission 2009,” an SCO joint exercise for anti-terrorism, was held in July 2009.

Rosoboronexport became a subsidiary of Rostechnology, a state-run public corporation founded in November 2007.

From 2003 to 2004, Russia concluded contracts with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam to sell its Su-27 and Su-30 jet fighters and some fighters have already been delivered to the contracting countries. In March 2010 Russia agreed to deliver an aircraft carrier to India by the end of 2012, and concluded a contract to sell MiG-29K fighters to India. In 2006, Russia concluded agreements with Algeria and Venezuela to sell Su-30 jet fighters, and a number of them have already been delivered to these countries.

According to a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the number of incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia has been declining every year, from 170 cases in 2003 to 158 cases in 2004, 102 cases in 2005, 83 cases in 2006, 70 cases in 2007, 54 cases in 2008, and 45 cases in 2009.

CARAT is a collective term for a series of the bilateral exercises held between the United States and six Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).

The ratio of defense spending to the national budget has stood at 26-32% from 2000 through 2009. Singapore has the policy of keeping its defense budget to no more than 6% of its gross domestic product (GDP), and this ratio has been in the 4-5% range between 2000 and 2010.

Based on the perception that national defense cannot be achieved by conventional military force alone, being faced with limited human resources and changes in the nature of modern warfare, Total Defense is promoted whereby people are organized in five components: Psychological, Social, Economic, Civil, and Military Defense.

The Third Generation Singapore Forces place emphasis on three aspects: integration/networking, holistic advancements, and technological advancement.


Singapore conducts flight training by establishing detachments in the United States, the F-15SG in Idaho and the F-16 in Arizona, and also carries out training by dispatching its troops for a long period of time to France, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, and other countries.

Singapore concluded a Defence Cooperation Agreement with India in 2003; as well as other similar agreements with Germany in 2005; with China and Australia in 2008; and with New Zealand, Vietnam and South Korea in 2009. In December 2009, Japan and Singapore signed a Memorandum on Defence Exchanges.

Singapore dispatched landing ships, transport planes and air tankers to Iraq for a total of 11 times between November 2003 and December 2008, while it sent dental officers and construction engineering corps to Afghanistan between May 2007 and January 2010. Furthermore, Singapore dispatched a naval vessel for counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in operations under the command of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) from April 2009 to July 2009. In January 2010, Singapore took over command of CTF-151 from the United States and took charge of the task force until April 2010.

Based on the website of the Malaysian Ministry of Defense.

The Malaysian Ministry of Defense explains Self-Reliance, Regional Cooperation and Foreign Aid as follows:

· The pursuit of self-reliance involves not only combat forces but also a logistical support network and the defense industry.
· Regional Cooperation involves the promotion of strong bilateral defense cooperation among ASEAN countries.
· Foreign Aid involves seeking assistance from outside the region when the level of threat is beyond the country’s capability as well as the utilization of the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

In April 2009, Chief of Army Muhammad Ismail Jamaluddin stated that the Malaysian Army would not participate in any other multilateral joint exercises than the FPDA.

As of the end of April 2010, Malaysia has dispatched a total of 1,084 servicemen on U.N. peacekeeping missions, including 741 to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and 215 to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

In August 2008, when two chemical tankers of Malaysian registry were attacked in succession by pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Malaysia dispatched naval vessels and special forces for rescue operations in order to protect Malaysian commercial ships passing through the waters there. Subsequently, in June 2009, the Malaysian Navy
requisitioned a container ship from one of the country’s private shipping companies and sent them to the Gulf of
Aden for antipiracy measures.

198 IMET provides the military personnel of U.S. allies and friendly nations with opportunities for studying and
training at U.S. military educational institutions. In action against Indonesia’s suppression of independence
movements in Timor-Leste, the United States in 1992 suspended IMET for Indonesia. Though sanctions against
Indonesia were partially lifted in 1995, the United States suspended IMET again in 1999.
200 Sigma-class corvettes have been built in the Netherlands, with the first of them commissioned in 2007. The
corvette has a full displacement of some 1,700 tons, is about 90 m long, 13m wide and of 3.6m draft. Indonesia
currently has four Sigma-class corvettes.
201 According to Defence of Thailand 2008, United Defence means the consolidation of national power by the
armed forces in every dimension including military, political, economic, socio-psychological, and scientific and
technological aspects, for national defense. Active Defence means that the armed forces prepare, reinforce,
develop, and administer all military resources so that they are self-sufficient and ready to be used as a deterrent
to solve problems and to settle disputes.
202 Based on Defence of Thailand 2008.
203 The aircraft carrier Chakri Naruebet was built in Spain and commissioned in 1997. The flattop has a full
displacement of some 11,500 tons, and is some 180m long and some 30m wide. Its main tasks are search and
rescue operations and EEZ surveillance; however, some point out that the aircraft carrier rarely goes to sea due
to funding shortages.
204 Based on Defence of Thailand 2008.
205 Thailand, the United States, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and the ROK participated in the Cobra Gold
exercise, with some 100 people taking part from Japan’s Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces.
206 Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), which was a status established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the Nunn Amendment of 1987, allows designated countries to receive benefits in military areas such as
eligibility to have military equipment. A status of MNNA also strongly represents a designated country’s close
military cooperation with the United States. On top of Thailand, the 13 other countries of Australia, Egypt, Israel,
Japan, ROK, Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan have
been designated as MNNAS.
207 Remarks of then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte at the 5th annual United States Asia
208 The all-people national defense is described as efforts to build up defense capabilities by combining the unity
of people and the political system under the guidance of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
210 The United States amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, opening the way for exports of
nonlethal defense articles to Vietnam on the condition of case-by-case licenses or approvals.
211 The Philippine Constitution states that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines,” unless the Senate formally approves a treaty and furthermore, if Congress requires it, that the
people of the Philippines vote for the treaty, since the end of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991. However, in
addition to the mutual defense treaty and the military assistance agreement, the Philippines concluded the
Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998 and the Mutual Logistics Supply Agreement in
2002, maintaining close military relations with the United States.
212 When the 1947 Philippine-U.S. agreement on military bases was revised in 1966, the time limit for the
presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Negotiations regarding the Military Bases
Agreement began in 1992 but were difficult, and furthermore Clark Air Base was rendered unusable due to the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. Although the two nations signed a U.S.-Philippines friendship cooperation
treaty the same year, the Philippines Senate rejected it, and since they could not agree on an alternate treaty, in
December 1991 the Philippines government announced, with U.S. agreement, that the Military Bases Agreement
would be terminated. Clark Air Base Field was returned in November 1991, followed by the return of the Subic
Naval Base in November 1991. U.S. forces stationed at the two bases were moved to Guam, Okinawa, and other
locations. Subsequently, the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, providing for the legal
status of U.S. military personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.
213 Balikatan has been conducted since 1991, but it was suspended between 1995 and 1999 due to the domestic
conditions of the Philippines. It was resumed in 2000.
South China Sea to be a “core interest.”

Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia), Japan, Bangladesh, China, India, The Republic of Korea, and Sri

outside the ASEAN region, including Japan.

ADMM in May this year, a decision was made to establish the ADDM-Plus, to include eight nations from

ASEAN military assets and capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and others. Also, at the 4th

the principles for membership in the enlarged ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM Plus), the use of

including natural disasters, terrorism, maritime security, pandemics, and three concept papers were adopted, on

2009 that the company will supply Vietnam with eight Su-30 fighters by the end of 2010.

It was reported in December 2009 that Vietnam has agreed to purchase six Kilo-class submarines for a total

of some $2 billion and Russia will build them at the pace of one submarine a year.

Based on the Military Balance (2010), published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Currently, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim territorial rights over the

Spratly Islands, while China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim rights over the Paracel Islands. Chinese and

Vietnamese naval forces engaged in an armed conflict in 1988 over the Spratly Islands amongst escalating
tensions at the time. However, there have not been any major armed conflicts since.

The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is a political declaration that clarifies
general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea.

The draft of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was proposed by the Philippines at an

ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in 1999 and discussion has continued at other meetings thereafter. However,

the draft has yet to be adopted as there are major differences in countries’ opinions on the details.

China conducted military exercises in the Paracel Islands in November 2007 and it was reported in December

2008 that the Chinese government approved the establishment of “Sansha City” including the Spratly Islands,


condemned and expressed concerns about the visit of then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian to Itu Aba Island

of the Spratly Islands. In February 2009, China protested against the legislation of the Philippines Archipelagic

Baseline Law, and Taiwan and Vietnam both announced that the Spratly Islands and others belonged exclusively
to them and that they would not approve of any act of infringement of this. In November 2009, the Hainan

provincial government of China decided to establish a committee of villagers in some islands of the Paracel

Islands, which drew Vietnam’s denunciation as an act to infringe on its territorial rights, and when China sent

ships to control fishery operations to the Paracel Islands, Vietnam lodged a protest with China that the act

represented a serious violation of Vietnamese sovereignty. Recently, China has reported that it considers the

South China Sea to be a “core interest.”

In July 2007, a joint exercise codenamed Strike 2007 was conducted in Guangzhou, China, followed by the


A joint counterterrorism exercise code-named Cooperation 2009 was conducted in Guilin, China, in June

2009, with some 60 people each participating from China and Singapore.

The 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting discussed a wide range of cross-border security issues,

including natural disasters, terrorism, maritime security, pandemics, and three concept papers were adopted, on

the principles for membership in the enlarged ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM Plus), the use of

ASEAN military assets and capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and others. Also, at the 4th

ADMM in May this year, a decision was made to establish the ADDM-Plus, to include eight nations from

outside the ASEAN region, including Japan.

Based on the principles of the consensus system and of non-interference in internal affairs, ASEAN failed to

take effective measures against Myanmar, etc., and thus the direction of organizational reform attracted much

attention. The ASEAN Charter has adopted the principle of unanimity as before; thus, when a consensus cannot

be reached, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision is to be made. Furthermore, the Charter

prescribed that in the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to

the ASEAN Summit for decision and that ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. The ASEAN

Charter strives for the enhancement of its organization and institutions as mentioned above.

The first ASEAN-U.S. Summit was held in conjunction with the ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in

November 2009. The second Summit with Russia is scheduled to take place by the end of 2010.

Based on the Chairman’s Statement of the 15th ASEAN Summit.

The ReCAAP is designed to enhance cooperation among maritime security agencies of the countries involved

through the establishment of a piracy-related information sharing system and a cooperation network among the
countries. The ASEAN member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei,
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia), Japan, Bangladesh, China, India, The Republic of Korea, and Sri
Lanka participated in the negotiations on the agreement. However, Indonesia and Malaysia did not sign the agreement. Meanwhile, Norway became the first extra-regional party to sign the agreement, bringing the number of parties to the agreement to 15.

The IMT comprised Brunei, Libya, and Japan, is chaired by Malaysia and has conducted truce monitoring in Mindanao since October 2004 based on the ceasefire agreement reached in July 2003 between the Philippines government and the MILF.

The newly resumed IMT comprised Malaysia, Japan, Brunei, including some NGOs.

In December 2009, Japan decided to join the International Contact Group (ICG), which comprises Japan, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and four nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The ICG is providing advice to parties for peace in Mindanao and participating in peace negotiations as an observer.

At present, the International Stabilization Force (ISF) consists of the two countries of Australia (some 400 members) and New Zealand (some 150 members).

The mandate of UNMIT has been extended to February 26, 2011, under the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1912 adopted in February 2010. As of the end of March 2010, a total of 1,553 members have been sent from 40 countries.

The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million.

The Annual Defense Report published in August 2009 states that the threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons, drugs, and nuclear technology are threats which require vigilance without rest with regard to relations with surrounding nations with the understanding that security threats to India are not limited by borders.

The number of personnel from the Indian forces engaged in U.N. peacekeeping operations has been ranked either third or fourth in the world since 2001.

In October 2008, the Indian government approved the dispatch of Navy vessels on a patrol mission to the Gulf of Aden, and in November 2008, a frigate of Indian Navy sank a fishing vessel which had been hijacked by pirates.

Regarding the procurement of multipurpose fighters, Defense Minister Antony has cited the provision of the contract which calls for introduction of technology created through joint development.

India also conducted a test launch of the Agni-2 in November 2009; however, it was reported that the test had failed.

In December 2007, Dr. V. K. Saraswat, Chief Controller at the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) of India’s Ministry of Defence said that “the Agni-4 is still in the design stage and so we cannot give a date for the trials and several tests remain before we operationalize it.” However, in February 2010, he stated to reporters that the Agni-5 is categorized as an ICBM with a range of over 5,000km and that there are plans for a test launch to take place within a year.

In March 2009, in the Bay of Bengal in eastern Orissa Province, India conducted a test of shooting down a ballistic missile with an interceptor missile, and reported success. It is also said that India successfully conducted similar tests in 2006 and December 2007.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters at the press conference during his visit to India in February 2008, “Missile defense talks with India are in the very initial stages. We have just started to talk about conducting a joint analysis about what India’s needs would be in the realm of missile defense and where cooperation between us might help advance that.”

From March to May 2007, the Indian Navy dispatched a fleet and held joint exercises with Singapore, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and other countries.

Then U.S. President Bush called India a “natural partner” of the United States.

Both countries agreed to begin “strategic dialogue” to discuss wide ranging issues including the prevention of nuclear proliferation and measures for global warming. Minister of External Affairs S. M. Krishna expressed his understanding at the press conference following the talks that U.S.-India relations had entered a “third phase” on top of the existing relationship of cooperation in the realms of the economy and politics.

U.S. President Obama received Prime Minister Singh as the first state guest since the beginning of his administration. After the talks, he announced a policy to move forward with cooperation in new areas in addition to announcing a joint statement and reaffirming the “Global Partnership”.

In cooperation with India, the United States intends to provide India with capabilities and technologies required for the country to improve its defense capabilities to an appropriate level, including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighters.

Originally, the “Malabar” exercise was a bilateral exercise between the United States and India, but five countries took part in Malabar 07-2, including Japan, Australia, and Singapore.

Seventeen Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers participated from the United States.

India purchased an Austin-class Amphibious Transport Dock from the U.S. Navy in 2007, and the vessel was commissioned as INS Jalashwa in June 2007. This vessel is the first former U.S. vessel possessed by Indian
P-8 is a new type of U.S. Navy patrol aircraft. The United States had not exported the aircraft before it did to India.

In the agreement, China recognized that Sikkim belongs to India. Also, the two countries agreed to continue efforts for the early settlement of the pending border issue.

The two countries agreed to hold regular summit meetings and established the target of doubling the bilateral trade amount to $40 billion by 2010. They also signed an agreement on such issues as investment protection and mutual establishment of new Consulates General.

At the talks, both countries agreed to continue talks in order to reach an equitable accord acceptable to both countries. They also verified that efforts would be made to protect the peace and security of border regions.

The objective of this exercise is reported to be the strengthening of mutual understanding/trust and the promotion of relationships between Chinese and Indian military forces. Hand-in-Hand 2007 in December 2007 and Hand-in-Hand 2008 in December 2008 saw the participation of about 100 military personnel from both sides.

Both countries signed agreements including an agreement regarding a military technology cooperation program to run from 2011 through 2020, an agreement regarding maintenance for equipment and weapons sold by Russia to India, the November 12, 2007 agreement protocol regarding cooperation in the development and manufacturing of military transports, and an agreement regarding cooperation in nuclear energy use for peaceful purposes.

The two countries signed a document concerning a joint development project for mid-size, multi-purpose transport aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. In addition, study was made of a proposal to provide India with additional T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighters, and Mil-17 helicopters within the framework of the agreement already concluded. It was confirmed to enhance the production capabilities of the Brahmos cruise missiles now under joint nuclear development by the two countries as well as to aim to develop the air launch version of the missile. An intergovernmental agreement was concluded concerning the contract for licensed production of engines for MiG-29 fighters. It was also agreed that the two countries would conduct joint anti-terrorism military exercises in Russian territory in April and September 2007.

The joint exercise India has been conducting every other year since 2003.

At the same time, India signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN and the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.

President Zardari delivered the first address to the Parliament in September 2008. He said that his administration would continue the three-pronged strategy of the previous administration but that the use of force would only be used as a last resort against terrorism, advocating the necessity of renouncing violence and making peace with those who are willing to make peace as well as of investing in the development and social improvement of the local people. He also stressed the need of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) reform to root out terrorism. While he asked the government to stay firm in its resolve to not allow its soil to be used for terrorist activities against foreign countries, he also stated that Pakistan would not tolerate the violation of its sovereignity and territorial integrity by any power in the name of combating terrorism.

Pakistan also conducted a test launch of the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile in March 2007.

From November to December 2006 Pakistan conducted a series of initial test launches of the Ghauri (Hatf-V) and Shaheen (Hatf-IV) intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir territorial issue. India’s territorial claim over Kashmir is based on a document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through referendum in accordance with the 1948 U.N. Resolution.

In August 2005, the two countries agreed on the prior notification of ballistic missile testing and on the establishment of a hotline between their Vice Foreign Ministers.

In December 2008, General Kayani, Chief of Army Staff, released a statement after a meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, He Yafei, who visited Pakistan to ease tensions. He demonstrated Pakistan’s stance of avoiding armed conflict, highlighting the need to de-escalate and avoid conflict in the interests of peace and security.

While both Prime Ministers agreed that talks were the only method to move forward (with relations between the two countries) and to separate (Pakistani) anti-terrorism measures from (the restarting of) the multiple dialogues (between India and Pakistan), a specific date for the restart of talks was not touched on.

English papers in Pakistan dated March 8, 2009, reported that the Pakistani Air Force and a Chinese company had struck a deal to jointly produce 42 JF-17 fighter aircraft.

Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it
provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out operations to sweep up terrorists in the border regions of Afghanistan. Also, Pakistan started to dispatch warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. In appreciation of this support from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

Further, in March 2009 the navies of twelve nations of Pakistan, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Japan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and Turkey participated in the Pakistan hosted multinational joint military training exercise "Aman 2009." China deployed naval special forces to the exercise in addition to warships.

At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India’s nuclear test were lifted.

Regarding the possibility of extending nuclear energy cooperation to Pakistan, then President Bush only referred to the differences between Pakistan and India in terms of energy needs and history. In response, Pakistan said that it was important for the United States to treat Pakistan and India equally in order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.

The United States has expressed the intention to provide 12 RQ-7 "Shadow" unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to Pakistan.

In September 2005, then President Musharraf reportedly demonstrated his recognition that the Khan network had probably exported a dozen ultracentrifuges to North Korea. In May 2008, BBC News reported that the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan said allegations that he passed on nuclear secrets were false. In the interview, he said that there was pressure put on him to accept the charges “in the national interest.”


It has been decided that the destroyer combat system will be a U.S.-made Aegis system equipped with SM-6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles.


A trilateral security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. The United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand’s non-nuclear policy.

Talisman Saber is a biennial joint exercise between the United States and Australia, first carried out in 2005, and aims to improve readiness and interoperability in operations ranging from traditional wars to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. In 2009 it included more than 24,000 troops participating from the United States and Australia in amphibious assault training, urban combat training, and airborne training.

The Joint Combined Training Capability Memorandum of Understanding was concluded in 2009 to improve the quality of joint training and reduce cost.

Australia announced its participation in the U.S. missile defense program in December 2003. At the AUSMIN in 2004, the United States and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a 25-year framework for missile defense system development and testing (details of the MOU have not been disclosed). In August 2004, Australia selected the Aegis air warfare system as the combat system for new air warfare destroyers (AWD). It is suggested that the AWD would support the ballistic missile defense system.


The 2009 Defence White Paper states that “China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin… But the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans. China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernization appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan.” In its regularly scheduled press conference of May 5, 2008, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense stated that “the modernization of China’s military strength is not a threat to any nation. Related nations should view this objectively and without bias.”

From a speech given by then Minister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon at the Australian Defence Force Academy on March 10, 2009.

The 12th Australia-China Strategic Defense Dialogue was held in October 2001. Note that these talks were raised to the chief of staff/assistant defense minister level in 2008.

The 2009 Defence White Paper states, “Developing our defence relationship with China is therefore a priority. Greater engagement is essential to encourage transparency about Chinese military capabilities and intentions, understand each other’s approaches and secure greater cooperation in areas of shared interest.”

In addition to carrying out joint search and rescue exercises, the first such exercises between the navies of Australia and China off the coast of Qingdao in October 2004, a trilateral search and rescue exercise with the addition of New Zealand was carried out in the Tasman Sea in October 2007. It is reported that in September 2009, the Chief of the Australian Defence Force and the U.S. Commander, Pacific Command, agreed to
approach China with the possibility of military training exercises between the three countries.

In July 2004, the ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was signed between Australia and ASEAN.

Australia signed a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with the Philippines in March 2003 and a status of forces agreement in May 2007 regarding visiting units. Further, approximately 130 Philippine soldiers are being trained in Australia.

Regarding Vietnam, Vietnamese officers are being trained in Australia based on a bilateral defense cooperation program, and regional defense dialogues have been carried out since 1998.

Australia concluded a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with Thailand in October 2002. Australia also signed a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with Brunei in February 2002.

In addition to signing a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism in February 2002, Australia and Indonesia jointly held a regional summit regarding counter-terrorism in March 2007.

The agreement regarding a framework for security cooperation, called the Lombok Agreement, was signed in November 2006 and took effect in February 2008. Its goals include the cooperation in the war on terror and transnational crimes, defense, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, intelligence, maritime and aviation security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and response to contingencies.

A large scale military exercise called “Bersama Padu,” was held in 2006 around the South China Sea, and a joint air force training exercise called “Bersama Shield” is also held each year in Malaysia.

Australia signed a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with Malaysia in August 2002. Further, in addition to a permanent Australian Air Force presence in Malaysia's Butterworth air base, the Malaysian military receives training in Australia based on the Australia Malaysia joint defense program which began in 1994, and joint exercises are carried out every year.

Australia signed a memorandum of understanding regarding defense cooperation with Singapore in August 2008.

This took effect in 1971. The framework stipulated that in the event of an attack on or threat to Malaysia or Singapore, the nations of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom would discuss the response. In recent years focus has been expanded to include non-traditional threats such as terrorism and maritime security as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief.


The breakdown of the military forces is as follows: Army: approx. 27,500 personnel, Navy: approx. 13,200 personnel, Air Force: 14,100 personnel.

In April 2006 demonstrations by rebels in Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, turned into riots, and the ADF was dispatched in response to a request from the Government of Timor-Leste. In December 2009, stating that the security conditions of Timor-Leste had improved, the Australian Department of Defence announced that the Australian military presence be reduced from 650 to 400 troops, and the ISF announced it would shift its focus to improving the capability of the Timor-Leste military.

The activities began with participation of South Pacific nations, led by Australia, in response to a request for assistance from the Government of the Solomon Islands, where a deteriorating security situation triggered by tribal conflict was out of control. The 15 participating countries include Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga.

This is from a statement by Australian Minister for Defence John Faulkner in a speech in support of the U.S. reevaluation of its strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Australian military is the largest contributor to the ISAF among non NATO member nations. Australia has expressed support for the reevaluation by the United States of its Afghanistan and Pakistan strategies and has not set a deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, it has stated that there is also no plan to increase the deployment.

The government announced on April 29, 2009 that it would deploy approximately 450 additional personnel to Afghanistan. The additional units include approximately 330 personnel engaged in training and support of the Afghanistan military in Uruzgan Province and approximately 120 troops deployed temporarily to maintain security during the elections in August of the same year.

Two sea patrol aircraft, three transports, and one frigate are operating in the Middle East. It was announced in May 2009 that in addition to their anti-terrorism mission, the patrol aircraft and frigate would also take on the mission of responding to piracy.

In contrast to the mission of collective defense (collective defense within the region) provided in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mission of conflict prevention and crisis management is called a non-Article 5 mission.

Two strategic commands; Allied Command, Europe and Allied Command, Atlantic; were merged into one Allied Command Operations, and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) was established to supervise the transformation of capabilities and improvement of interoperability of NATO forces.
In an effort to strengthen NATO's Strategic Airlift Capability, three C-17 airlifters were procured from the United States and began operations between July and October 2009.

Article 42 section 7 of the fundamental European treaty amended by the Lisbon Treaty stipulates aid and assistance by other member states if the territory of a member state is the victim of armed aggressions. However, it also stipulates that actions based on this article shall be consistent with commitments under NATO.

As of April 2010, units from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Portugal are participating in Operation Atalanta. There has also been participation from non-EU member states such as Norway.

The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 made a decision enabling access to NATO's assets and capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union (WEU). Most of the roles and missions of the WEU were transferred to the EU. As a result, it was decided, at the NATO Washington Summit Meeting held in April 1999, to once again permit the use of NATO's assets and capacities by the EU. This decision was called the Berlin Plus. In December 2002, NATO and the EU made a permanent arrangement concerning the above decision.

Stating that security conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained unstable, the European Council announced that it was prepared to continue its military role in support of Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond 2010.

In March 2009, military missions in Chad and the Central African Republic were transferred from the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD RCA) to United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).

They are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of combat unit missions in crisis management, including 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations, 2) peacekeeping, and 3) peacebuilding.

Four central/eastern European countries and three Baltic States (Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovakia) joined in March 2004 and Albania and Croatia joined in April 2009. The Council of European Union Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2008 called for Georgia and Ukraine to accelerate political, military and other reforms towards accession to the EU.

Established in 1994. Separate cooperation agreements have been concluded between NATO and non-NATO countries of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) such as Central and Eastern European countries.

Established in 1994, the MD currently has seven participant countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia). Its objective is to foster stability in the Mediterranean region through political dialogue and engagement in NATO-related activities by Mediterranean countries.

The term “Contact Country” has been used since the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting in 2004. NATO pursues partnerships on a case-by-case basis with countries which share common interests and concerns with NATO.

The white paper titled Delivering Security in a Changing World published in December 2003, states the need for rapid and long-range deployment of military force in order to deal with international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. It set the objective of establishing defense capabilities to support three concurrent operations, including one long-term peacekeeping operation.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 stated that a direct military threat to the United Kingdom did not exist and that recurrence of such a threat could not be predicted.

Delivering Security in a Changing World released in December 2003 stated that there was no longer a need for capacity to prepare for the recurrence of direct, traditional, strategic threats to the United Kingdom or its allies.

The currently operating Vanguard class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to begin decommissioning in the early 2020s. Therefore, the U.K. government considered whether or not to maintain its nuclear deterrent and consequently announced this white paper. In March 2007, the House of Commons adopted the motion submitted by the government to support the policy set forth in the white paper.

The Cameron government which was inaugurated in May 2010 has determined to implement a “Strategic Defence and Security Review” under the newly formed National Security Council.

The questions raised as requiring deliberation are: 1) “Given that domestic security cannot be separated from international security, where should we set the balance between focusing on our territory and region and engaging threats at a distance?”, 2) “What approach should we take if we employ the Armed Forces to address threats at distance?”, 3) “What contribution should the Armed Forces make in ensuring security and contributing to resilience within the UK?”, 4) “How could we more effectively employ the Armed Forces in support of wider efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen international stability?”, 5) “Do our current international defence and security relationships require rebalancing in the longer term?” and 6) “Should we further integrate our forces with those of key allies and partners?” In addition, the necessary reviews will be conducted into efforts relating to Afghanistan.

The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well-organized military formations in intensive multilateral operations,
such as those executed by NATO combat readiness troops or EU battlegroups, with the goal of providing the foundation for peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that have a certain level of military formations and performs peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the target areas, through activities including the management of command, educational, and training organizations.

At the launching ceremony of the ship submersible ballistic nuclear-powered (SSBN) submarine, *Le Terrible*, in March 2008, French president Sarkozy expressed his view of the country’s nuclear capability; given the existing risk of nuclear proliferation and other threats, nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee to protect France from any state’s aggression against vital national interests and it is essential to maintain its missile capabilities, both submarine-launched and air-launched. He also announced his decision to reduce France’s air-launched nuclear missile capability by one-third, which means its arsenal would become no more than 300 warheads. Further, on January 27, 2010, the new SLBM (M-51) was successfully test launched from a submarine for the first time.

On March 17, 2009, the French government won a parliamentary vote on its plan to return to NATO’s integrated military command. While the government announced its participation in NATO’s integrated military command in April at the NATO Summit, President Sarkozy stated in his speech delivered in March 2009 that France will retain an independent nuclear deterrent.