

The logo for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is a circular emblem. It features a map of the world in the center, surrounded by a laurel wreath. The words "UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS" are written in a semi-circle above the map.

UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

The Challenges of UN Peacekeeping

**Peace and Security Symposium
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by
Robert Gordon

A Traditional View of UN Peacekeeping



"... AND TELL 'EM IF THEY DON'T STOP WE'LL SEND 'EM
ANOTHER SHARP NOTE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL".

In The Beginning

- **UN Charter**
- **Traditional PK.** Started in 1948 in Middle East.
Response to inter-state conflict

Characteristics

Support ceasefires and buffer zones by inter-positioning; observe, verify, report missions; principally static military (led) tasks. 3 traditional principles as doctrinal base.

- **UN Nineties Nadir.** End of cold war (SC able to act).
Also shift from inter-state to intra-state conflict. Little PK capacity and no peace to keep. Rwanda, Som, FRY led to doctrinal rethink – Agenda for Peace - Brahimi Report.
- **Multi-Dimensional or Contemporary PK.**
Response to intra-state conflict

Characteristics


Multi-Dimensional or Contemporary PK.

Characteristics: response to intra-state conflict;

- manoeuvrist not static - dealing with whole state (protecting space not line);
- supports parties and comprehensive peace agreements;
- complex lines of operation (political, security, humanitarian, developmental) and complex mandates;
- integration of civilian and security tasks under one political command;
- Focus on POC means increasing use of Chap VII by SC to mandate up to lethal force to protect civilians using “all necessary means”.

Is conflict paradigm changing again? Our response?

Uniformed Personnel in the Field 1991 to Present



Development of Peacekeeping

From traditional peacekeeping to multi-dimensional peacekeeping.

or

From observing a peace to keeping a peace
and

while keeping a peace, on occasions,
needing to enforce it.

(if so mandated and working within ROE)

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
“robust peacekeeping”

(Neither imposing force nor yielding to force)



Today's UN Peacekeeping Missions


MISSIONS ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS




Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

- Response in shift from inter to intra-state conflict
- Complex mandates in volatile, polarized, distressed, dysfunctional environment.
- New mandates to protect civilians blurs concept of Chap VI and Chap VII missions.
- Multi-disciplinary and multi-national (need joint planning). Many lines of operation to desired end state.
- Involve a wide range of internal and external actors. Coherence only thro' integration
- Primacy of political activity – in *supported* role. Mil/Police in *supporting* role.
- No purely military solutions. But still lack of civilian and specialist capacities. (Capability-based PK)


Paradigm Not Linear



The Compression of UN Levels of Command




UN's Comparative Advantage - An Integrated Mission




UN PKO Realities

- Fragile triangular dynamics (SC- Sec - MS)
- Complex and variable support of TCCs/PCCs.
- Insufficient rapidly deployable civilian expertise
- UN required to operate bureaucratic budgeting. Little flexibility. Affects logistics and tempo
- Limitations in capability of DPKO as a superior HQ.
- Incoherent interests of member states / international community.
- Ad hoc C3I and difficult passage of info, (compared to media).
- Lack of doctrinal clarity/unity in the use of force.

The Space for DPKO Ops



Post-Conflict Tasks & Actors



Changing Context for Peacekeeping

Effects of Global Financial Crisis – “do more with less”.

Tension between FCCs and T/PCCs – impact on delivery of robust peacekeeping and PoC

Erosion of consent for large PKO – focus on transition and peacebuilding (but insufficient expertise)

Changing paradigm of conflict – outpacing structures and doctrinal thinking in UN Secretariat and MS.

All put increased pressure on senior mission leadership and increased need for partnerships.

Take- Aways

- For PKO there must be a peace to keep - but SC decides. However, x should = y especially in mandates.
- Success depends on a united SC and positive regional engagement.
- End states are political, but they must be articulated and agreed at strategic level. Military solutions alone are illusionary.
- PSOs are complex and require integrated planning and multi-agency / dimensional solutions. A comprehensive approach.
- UN PKOs may be militarily “inefficient” but they have unique moral authority/legitimacy - but they are **not** a universal instrument. Increasing scope for partnerships.
- Short-termism is a blight. Peace is more than absence of war. Long-term supportive relationships/partnerships are needed. Foundations for PB established during PK.

