

Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenal by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery

		United States		Russia		United Kingdom		France		China	
Missiles	ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)	450 Minuteman III:	450	324 SS-18: SS-19: SS-25: SS-27: RS-24:	54 30 90 78 72	_____	_____	_____	_____	52 DF-5 (CSS-4): DF-31 (CSS-10):	20 32
	IRBM MRBM	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	160 DF-4 (CSS-3): DF-21 (CSS-5): DF-26	10 134 16
	SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles)	336 Trident D-5:	336	192 SS-N-18: SS-N-23: SS-N-32:	48 96 48	48 Trident D-5:	48	64 M-45: M-51:	16 48	48 JL-2 (CSS-NX-14):	48
Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles		14		13		4		4		4	
Aircraft		78 B-2: B-52:	20 58	76 Tu-95 (Bear): Tu-160 (Blackjack):	60 16	_____	63 Mirage2000N: Rafale:	23 40	60 H-6K:	60	
Number of warheads		Approx. 4,500		Approx. 4,490 (including Approx. 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads)		215		300		Approx. 260	

Notes:

- Data is based on "The Military Balance 2017," the SIPRI Yearbook 2016, etc.
- In January 2017, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of September 1, 2016 —the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,367 and the delivery vehicles involved 681 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,796 and the delivery vehicles involved 508 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2016, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 1,930 (including 180 tactical nuclear warheads).
- In November 2015, the U.K.'s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be no more than 180.
- According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 100-120 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 110-130, Israel a maximum of 80, and North Korea 10.

Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or Region	Ground Forces (10,000 persons)	Country or Region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of Vessels	Country or Region	Number of Combat Aircraft
India	120	United States	625.2	893	United States	3,581
China	115	Russia	205.2	1,054	China	2,722
North Korea	102	China	163.0	744	Russia	1,325
Pakistan	56	United Kingdom	61.3	136	India	917
Republic of Korea	50	India	49.0	286	Republic of Korea	618
United States	48	France	37.7	288	Egypt	603
Vietnam	41	Indonesia	26.2	171	North Korea	563
Myanmar	38	Italy	22.9	181	Taiwan	507
Iran	35	Turkey	21.7	208	Israel	473
Egypt	31	Republic of Korea	21.3	240	Pakistan	471
Indonesia	30	Germany	20.7	125	France	408
Russia	27	Australia	20.6	103	Turkey	377
Turkey	26	Taiwan	20.5	392	Saudi Arabia	349
Thailand	25	Spain	18.9	172	Iran	335
Sudan	24	Brazil	18.0	110	United Kingdom	308
Japan	14	Japan	47.9	134	Japan	400

Notes:

- Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from "The Military Balance 2017" and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2016–2017 and other sources.
- Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2016, and combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
- Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.


Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Country or Region	Military Service System	Regular (10,000 persons)		Reserves (10,000 persons)
United States	Volunteer	138		84
Russia	Conscription / Volunteer	83		200
United Kingdom	Volunteer	15		8
France	Volunteer	20		3
Germany	Volunteer	18		3
Italy	Volunteer	17		2
India	Volunteer	140		116
China	Conscription	218		51
North Korea	Conscription	119		60
Republic of Korea	Conscription	63		450
Egypt	Conscription	44		48
Israel	Conscription	18		47
Japan	Volunteer	Ground	14	3.2 (0.4)
		Maritime	4.2	0.05
		Air	4.3	0.06

Notes:

- Data from "The Military Balance 2017" and other sources.
- Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2016. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and is not included in the total figure.
- Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.
- In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former.
- China has announced that the PLA would be reduced by 300,000 troops by the end of 2017.

Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan



Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline)

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

I. Purpose

- As Japan's security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.
- In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.
- The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security.
- With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach.
- When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy.
- The Strategy will guide Japan's national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner.

II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

1. Principles Japan Upholds

- Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued "Open and Stable Seas."
- Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
- Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries.
- Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize "a world free of nuclear weapons."
- Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold.

2. Japan's National Interests and National Security Objectives

- To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition.
- To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end, it

is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability).

- To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.

National Security Objectives

- To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan's peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.
- To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.
- To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.

III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

- (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation
 - The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is increasing its presence in the international community. The United States, which has the world's largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.
 - The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding.
- (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials
 - The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international community.
- (3) Threat of International Terrorism
 - International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to the advancement of globalization.
 - Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad.
- (4) Risks to Global Commons
 - In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious.
 - In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of respective states.
 - Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat.
 - There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite collisions amongst others.
 - Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious.
- (5) Challenges to Human Security
 - Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals.
 - These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community.
- (6) The Global Economy and Its Risks
 - The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the

- entire global economy is growing.
 - Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules are becoming apparent.
 - The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by emerging countries are observed.
2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region
- (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region
- The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized.
- (2) North Korea's Military Buildup and Provocative Actions
- North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other countries is being substantially aggravated.
 - As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.
 - North Korea's abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan's sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility.
- (3) China's Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas
- There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues.
 - China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency.
 - China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan's territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own "Air Defense Identification Zone").
 - The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability.

IV. Japan's Strategic Approaches to National Security

1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan's Capabilities and Roles
- To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments.
 - Enhancing Japan's resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large.
 - In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies.
- (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment
- The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats.
 - It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.
 - It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan's position in the international community.
 - By highlighting Japan's attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities.
 - Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions.
- (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan
- Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations.
 - Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.
 - In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.
 - With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.
- (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan's Territorial Integrity
- Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities.
 - Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.
 - Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities.
- (4) Ensuring Maritime Security
- As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing "Open and Stable Seas," which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force.
 - Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks.
 - Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.
- (5) Strengthening Cyber Security
- Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan's critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.
 - Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc.
 - Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense cooperation.
- (6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism
- Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and analyzing intelligence on the situation of international terrorism.
- (7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities
- Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open source intelligence.
 - Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government's disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy formulation.
- (8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
- From the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.
 - While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.
- (9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes
- Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites. Japan will also enhance a system for space situational awareness.
 - Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies.
- (10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities
- Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan's technological capabilities.
 - Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government.
 - Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding technologies in diplomacy.
2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance
- Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community.
 - The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners.
 - In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace,

stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. Alliance.

- (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas
 - Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy.
 - Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, and strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and large-scale disaster response operations.
- (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces
 - While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements, in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including Okinawa.
3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan's Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region through the following approaches.

 - Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic interests.
 - ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security cooperation. Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together closely in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues.
 - Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation.
 - ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its unity.
 - India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership.
 - Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly but in a calm manner to China's recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion.
 - Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant Security Council resolutions.
 - Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole.
 - In promoting these efforts, Japan will actively utilize and engage in multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks.
 - Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region.
 - European countries are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE.
 - Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges.
 - Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with the Gulf States, encompassing political and security cooperation beyond natural resources and energy. In addition, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East.
 - Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process.
4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community

As a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community.

 - (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations
 - Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.
 - Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council.
 - (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law
 - In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan's principles and positions are duly reflected.
 - Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of legal systems.
- (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
 - Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of "a world free of nuclear weapons."
 - Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea's nuclear and missile development issues and Iran's nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance.
- (4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation
 - Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities.
 - Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance.
 - Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations concerned.
- (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism
 - Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international legal framework.
 - Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc.
5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community.

 - (1) Sharing Universal Values
 - Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.
 - Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights.
 - Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women.
 - (2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security
 - It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address development issues as part of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.
 - Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and play a leading role in the formulation of the next international development goals.
 - Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community.
 - (3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries
 - Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including students and administrative officials, and provide them education and training. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to ensure that these personnel can contribute to development in their home countries.
 - (4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System
 - Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP. Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
 - (5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues
 - Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable supply of energy and other natural resources.
 - In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming.
 - (6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges
 - Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges.
 - Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture.
6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding
 - In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.
 - It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan's security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security.
 - (1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases
 - Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness.
 - (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities
 - It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations with other countries.
 - With the Prime Minister's Office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages.
 - Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas.
 - By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan's

position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the form of international opinion.

(3) Reinforcing the Social Base

- It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.
- Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region.
- Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan.

(4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base

- Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education.
- Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of higher education, think tanks, etc.
- Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government officials.

Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond are included in the reference.

Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as of the end of FY2013.

(Additional reference)

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond

I. NDPG's Objective

In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan sets out the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond" as new guidelines for Japan's national defense, based on "Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013" (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the "National Security Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it retains the largest national power.

There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called "gray-zone" situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles continues to be a deep concern despite non-proliferation efforts by the international community. The presence of countries with weak governance and failed states feeds the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These problems continue to pose imminent security challenges.

In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where coastal states unilaterally asserted their rights and took action based on their own assertion concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas.

Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation. In addition, military strategies and military balance in the future are anticipated to be significantly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies such as those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capability and nanotechnology.

2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. Specific and practical cooperation and collaboration have progressed to settle challenges particularly in non-traditional security fields. In the meantime, gray-zone situations over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations.

North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment and proliferation of WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which may be used to deliver such weapons, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical military capabilities.

North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other countries. Such North Korean military trend constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities.

In particular, North Korea's ballistic missile development has presumably entered a new stage, as technological improvements have been made to extend

the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile launches. Also, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls for restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. North Korea's nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan's security.

As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly stated the purposes and goals of the military buildup and therefore, transparency concerning its military and security is not fully achieved.

In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated Japan's airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an "Air Defense Identification Zone" based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overflight above the high seas.

China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and are expanding their operational areas which include areas north of Japan.

As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional and global security.

As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening their readiness and introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active.

The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region (the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region) and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints in order to maintain the stability and growth of the region while enhancing its relationships with its allies and expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its stance clear to prevent coercive actions that aim at changing the status quo in the region in cooperation with allies and partners.

3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources. Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic, through strengthening an "Open and Stable Seas" order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity.

Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous damage and the impact may spread not only nationwide but also to other countries. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for large-scale disasters.

4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, since the formulation of "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond" (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). As the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the non-military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding to shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability.

III. Japan's Basic Defense Policy

1. Basic Policy

In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities.

When implementing these measures, under the Constitution, Japan will

efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

2. Japan's Own Efforts

Recognizing that a country's security depends first and foremost on its independent efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own initiative to prevent various situations and will seamlessly respond to them as the situation evolves with the National Security Council as the control tower, while maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned.

(1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture

Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close regular interagency cooperation in normal times. In the event of various situations, the Government, under strong political leadership, will appropriately and promptly make decisions. Japan will seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance the capability to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign countries in an emergency situation and ensure their safety.

In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and formulating and reviewing them as well as expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training and exercises.

(2) Japan's defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and represent Japan's will and ability to deter threats from directly reaching Japan and defeat them if threats should reach Japan.

In the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense Force's (SDF's) total functions and capabilities against various situations.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, including "gray zone" situations which require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter "ISR") activities. Moreover, the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In dealing with situations, depending on their development, minimizing damage by effective response through achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of the Japanese people, and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace.

Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.

At the same time, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships in order to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which is closely related to its own security. Japan will also engage in international peacekeeping and other similar activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, non-traditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the international security environment) and other efforts more proactively than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in light of the diversified roles and increased opportunities of the defense force.

From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security environment, the defense force based on this NDCG should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF's operation.

3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,

together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan's national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with its allies, including Japan, and partner countries. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severer, it has become more important than ever for Japan's security to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective.

(1) Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

In order to ensure Japan's national security by maintaining and strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance's contingency response capabilities, while strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to "gray-zone" situations.

To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination including contingency response and medium-to long-term strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning, and Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

(2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields

The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, by strengthening cooperation not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance.

(3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a critically important location in terms of national security and where the stationing of U.S. forces significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures, in light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and areas there.

4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been taken mainly in non-traditional security fields, including disaster relief. Multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making progress. However, security challenges are becoming more serious than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region.

Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.

Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with which Japan shares security interests and security cooperation has been advancing, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability with Australia.

Moreover, efforts will be made to promote the partnerships among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening cooperative relationships under trilateral frameworks among Japan, the U.S. and ROK and among Japan, the U.S. and Australia.

As Chinese activities have a significant impact on regional security, Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China in order to enhance mutual understanding and will develop confidence-building measures to prevent unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in dealing with the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan.

Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including the

Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), high-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen understanding about the intention of Russian military activities and develop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional stability.

Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance. In addition, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these countries in the field of disaster management in light of the increasing frequency and growing scale of disasters in the region. Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities.

As capacity building assistance is effective in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, Japan will promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including the Official Development Assistance, and aligning it with joint training and exercises and international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also strengthen cooperation with relevant countries which actively provide such support, thereby expanding the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.

Under ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan in cooperation with the United States and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises and play a major role in enhancing confidence-building measures among countries in the region, attaching importance to multilateral frameworks such as the ARF and the ADMM Plus.

(2) Cooperation with the international community

It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, there are increasing opportunities for such forces to play an important role not only in preventing and responding to conflicts and maintaining peace but also in supporting post-conflict reconstruction, building peace and promoting confidence-building and friendly relationships.

Therefore, Japan will promote various initiatives to improve the global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community.

Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance in order to respond to global security challenges, including regional conflicts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and problems related to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, while regularly cooperating with its ally and relevant countries with which it shares security interests and with international organizations and other relevant bodies.

In this respect, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries and will work with them in responding to these challenges. Japan will also promote cooperation and exchanges with regard to equipment and technology with these countries and organizations.

In order to stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment based on the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities, including international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities, in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, with comprehensive consideration given to the significance of the dispatch of SDF units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units and Japan’s political and economic relationships with recipient countries.

With regard to international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase the number of SDF personnel it dispatches to assume positions of responsibility at organizations such as the local mission headquarters and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, Japan will conduct a study on various challenges it has to overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of fields, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute to the training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. The Role of the Defense Force

Japan’s future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2) above, and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.

(1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations

In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and certainly protect the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an understanding of military developments in other countries and to detect any signs of development at an early stage.

Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.

Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are emphasized in particular:

a. Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan

In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive area around Japan, Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any incursions into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty. Furthermore, should the acts in question become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible measures for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan.

b. Response to an attack on remote islands

In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to the units deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with appropriately.

c. Response to ballistic missile attacks

Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch and facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multi-layered defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will take steps to minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will protect key facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy the infiltrating units.

d. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up persistent ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede efficient action by the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair any damage, while taking necessary steps to contain it. Moreover, in light of society’s growing dependence on outer space and cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s capabilities when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing to comprehensive, government-wide initiatives.

e. Responses to major disasters

Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and deploy the requisite units and take all possible measures as part of its initial response, and maintain its presence in the longer term, when required. Moreover, as well as providing a meticulous response to the needs of disaster-stricken citizens and local government bodies, Japan will engage in appropriate partnerships and cooperation with local governments and the private sector, in order to save lives, carry out emergency repairs, and provide livelihood support.

(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific and improvement of global security environments

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole including the vicinity of Japan.

Moreover, working in partnership with its ally and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance, effectively fulfilling its key role in initiatives focused on the stabilization of the security environment, including the building and strengthening of intra-regional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to respond appropriately to global security issues including regional conflicts, the expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance, thereby working on improvement of the global security environment.

Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when engaging in the aforementioned initiatives.

a. Holding training and exercises

As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace.

c. Promoting capacity building assistance

Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource development and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby improving the security

environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

d. Ensuring maritime security

As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an “Open and Stable Seas” order which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this field and enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those surrounding our country.

e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities

Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities to meet diverse needs, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis on playing more of a leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its readiness posture to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the situation, Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted overseas deployment.

f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation

Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament activities undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. In doing so, Japan will make active, effective use of the SDF’s knowledge, including through personnel contribution. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can serve as their means of delivery, as well as the proliferation of arms and goods and technology which could be diverted to military use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations and other relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives.

2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces

(1) Basic approach

The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.

Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.

At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to unforeseen changes in the situation in the future and to maintain and inherit them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized

From the perspective of efficiently developing an effective defense force, the SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces.

a. ISR capabilities

In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various situations, while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft and vessels in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and the SDF will adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.

b. Intelligence capabilities

Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to signs of various situations and take necessary measures based on medium-to long-term military trends mainly in its vicinity.

In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to combine various types of intelligence on images and maps to exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of highly capable personnel in information gathering analysis.

c. Transport capability

In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen integrated transport capacity including maritime and airborne transport capacity, with collaboration with the civilian transport sector. In doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying roles and assignments among various means of transport, considering their respective characteristics.

d. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities

In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner, the SDF will take steps to deploy the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main headquarters of each service, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. Furthermore, the SDF will

facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF’s units such as basic operational units (divisions and brigades) through the establishment of a new central headquarters to control all of the regional armies, as well as greater efficiency and streamlining of the command and control function in each regional army headquarters, and other measures.

Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its information and communications capabilities that are prerequisites for supporting nationwide operation, starting with the communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services.

e. Response to an attack on remote islands

In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is a prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc.

Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands at sea, the SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region.

In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

f. Response to ballistic missile attacks

To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against the threat of ballistic missiles.

With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary.

g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

While strengthening information collection capability using satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will secure effective, stable use of outer space so that satellites can continuously exercise their capabilities even in contingencies by enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. In implementing such initiatives, the SDF will form organic partnerships with research and development institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S.

As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest equipment will be continuously developed and secured in order to prevent actions that hinder efficient SDF activities.

h. Responses to major disasters, etc.

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear emergency, it is of vital importance to respond swiftly from the initial stages of the impact and carry out such tasks as information gathering on the extent and nature of the damage from the air by aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency repairs. In this regard, the SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately size units, and by establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach.

i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities

In international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities, the SDF will strengthen the necessary protective capabilities to carry out its operations, ensuring the safety of personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation.

From the standpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation activities more effectively, Japan will consider measures for making more effective use of the SDF Operational Facility for Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti.

Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering capability required for operations, the SDF will enhance its education, training and personnel management systems in order to facilitate the continuous dispatch of adequate personnel for overseas cooperation activities.

3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces

The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF are outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specifics of major organizations and equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, and international peace

cooperation activities.

Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-proficient rapidly deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and move via the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (2) c. above, the GSDF will maintain half of these in Hokkaido, given the excellent training environment there.

The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern region will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent stationing of the units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the deploy ability of the aforementioned units, and the establishment of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF.

- b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in order to prevent invasion of Japan's remote islands while still at sea, as far as possible.
 - c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in order to effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below.
 - d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics.
- (2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF)
- a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopter units strengthened by increased numbers of equipment, including the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull, in order to effectively conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations etc., thereby facilitating agile response in such areas as the defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traffic, and international peace cooperation activities etc.

Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below, the destroyers will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers capable of providing Japan with multi-layered defense against ballistic missile attacks.
 - b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by increased numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad underwater intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.
 - c. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.
 - d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively conduct minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with the compact-type hull referred to in a. above.
- (3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
- a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and control units will be equipped with ground-based warning and control radar that can detect and track any ballistic missiles flying into Japanese air space, as well as providing persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. Air warning units will be enhanced in order to conduct effective warning, surveillance and control in the air over long periods in the event of "gray zone" situations.
 - b. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by highly capable fighter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan based on a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircrafts and relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain enhanced aerial refueling and transport units that will enable fighter aircraft and air warning units, etc. to carry out various operations sustainably in the air space surrounding Japan.
 - c. The ASDF will maintain air transport units in order to effectively carry out the mobile deployment of ground-based units etc., and international peace cooperation activities etc.
 - d. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers referred to in (2) a. above, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (1) c. above.

V. Basic Foundations for SDF

To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects of this are as follows.

1. Training and Exercises

Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the tactical skills in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises.

In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the exercise areas, etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, so that timely and appropriate training and exercises can be carried out, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises.

2. Operational Infrastructure

The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions that serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively.

Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness.

The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away.

The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade SDF equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition.

3. Personnel and Education

Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and missions more diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.

The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan's security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations as part of the government.

In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations.

In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel.

4. Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability to engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians.

The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the viewpoints of enhanced joint capabilities.

5. Defense Production and Technological Bases

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence.

At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe fiscal situation and rises in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly sophisticated and complex, the numbers of units of procured equipment are on the decline. Moreover, the environment surrounding Japan's defense production and technological bases is becoming more severe. For instance, the competitiveness of foreign companies is growing, as a result of the advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring and consolidation of the defense industry.

In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay.

With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner through, for example, the utilization and provision to disaster-stricken countries and others of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become the mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the equipment. In this context, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by

utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.

Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, including in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment through introducing a project manager system, as well as through considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts and further upgrading the contract system to provide cost reduction incentives to companies, aiming to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle of equipment.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system, and strive to achieve more rigorous procedures for the acquisition of equipment.

7. Research and Development

The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe fiscal situation.

In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Defense will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan's technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas.

From the aspect of security, it is necessary to utilize civilian technology effectively also in the field of security through regularly assessing the trend in science and technology including information related to technological development as well as consolidating the capabilities of the government, industry and academia. Under such recognition, the Ministry of Defense will strive to make effective use of civilian technology that can also be applied to defense (dual-use technologies), by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies.

The Ministry of Defense will examine its research and development initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives.

8. Collaboration with Local Communities

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc. are exceedingly important from the perspective not only of the effective improvement and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also of the recruitment of SDF personnel, as well as the provision of re-employment support for them.

Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, with a view to their improvement and operation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports community medicine through emergency patient transport using SDF search and rescue aircraft in others, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. At the same time, in operating the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry of Defense will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy.

9. Boosting Communication Capabilities

The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties.

10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense will promote various partnerships, including education and research exchange with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas.

11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF's joint operation functions and enhancing policy-making and communication functions.

VI. Additional Points

1. These Guidelines set out the form of Japan's defense force over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over

the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense force will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment while advancing such initiatives in a timely and appropriate manner.

2. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised adequately.
3. In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan's defense force as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function.

Category		Present (as of the end of FY2013)	Future
GSDF	Authorized Number of personnel	approx. 159,000	159,000
	Active-Duty Personnel	approx. 151,000	151,000
	Reserve-Ready Personnel	approx. 8,000	8,000
	Major units	Rapid Deployment Units Central Readiness Force 1 armored division	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
	Regional Deployment Units	8 divisions 6 brigades	5 divisions 2 brigades
MSDF	Major units	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units 5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
	Major units	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units 8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments
	Major units	Destroyer Units 4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions
	Major units	Submarine Units 5 divisions Minesweeping Units 1 flotilla Patrol aircraft Units 9 squadrons	6 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons
ASDF	Major equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) 6 Submarines 16 Combat Aircraft approx. 170	54 (8) 22 approx. 170
	Major units	Air Warning & Control Units 8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons) Fighter Aircraft Units 12 squadrons Air Reconnaissance Units 1 squadron Air Refueling/Transport Units 1 squadron Air Transport Units 3 squadrons Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units 6 groups	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons — 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 6 groups
ASDF	Major equipment	Combat aircraft Fighters	approx. 340 approx. 260
	Major equipment	Combat aircraft Fighters	approx. 360 approx. 280

Notes: The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.

Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specified above.

Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)

(December 17, 2013 Approved by

National Security Council and the Cabinet)

The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has been established as shown in the attached document.

(Attachment)

Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)

I. Program Guidelines

In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) (hereinafter "NDPG2013"), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. It will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation. At the same time, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force will serve as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF structure, a highly effective joint defense force will be efficiently developed by comprehensively prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities identified through joint operation-

based capability assessments of the SDF's overall functions and capabilities against various scenarios.

Given the considerations mentioned above, the SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense forces based on the following program guidelines:

1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its responsibilities including providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global security environment. With a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities. In addition, defense forces will enhance their capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security environment such as U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and others in the fields of non-traditional security). The SDF will steadily develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these functions and capabilities.

2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response to various situations, including defense posture buildup in Japan's southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities.

At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization of its activities.

3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness.

4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF's strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system.

5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in conjunction with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation and consultations with the United States in a wide range of areas including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for furthering smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

6. Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan's public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.

II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), given the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations of basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades, an armored division, and divisions/brigades) and various units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. In addition, the GSDF promote efficiency and rationalize the command and control function of each regional army headquarters, as well as review other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of such efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command.

In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. By establishing a coast observation unit, area security units in charge of initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be established.

From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with newly-introduced mobile combat vehicles and removal of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu into newly organized tank units under direct command of the Western Army. In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into field artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies.

2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG).

Five divisions will consist of other destroyers as well. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued.

3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base.

To prevent the relative decline of Japan's air defense capabilities and ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills.

4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013.

III. Major Programs regarding SDF's Capabilities

1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations

(1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K), and conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J), as well as take necessary measures after fully reviewing the value of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles with patrol capabilities. With a view to increasing the number of destroyers, the SDF will also introduce new, compact-type hull destroyers with additional multifunctional capabilities. The SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft, and fixed air defense radar, as well as continuously improve its existing airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). In addition, the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles will support the establishment of a joint unit with persistent ISR capabilities in broad areas. The SDF will also undertake organizational reform that integrate ground-based aerial search and rescue functions into the ASDF, which are currently performed by both the MSDF and ASDF.

(2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands

(a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure

With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies, the SDF will deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island. Considering the current operational situation of the existing AWACS (E-767) and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C), the SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft as stated in (1), and establish one squadron consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section II-3. By preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region, a fully-prepared surveillance posture will be maintained.

(b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority

For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including cruise missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the number of fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two as stated in Section II-3, continue to facilitate procurement of fighter aircraft (F-35A), modernize its fighter aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air combat capabilities and network functions of its fighter aircraft (F-2). In addition, after considering its options, it will take necessary measures to replace fighter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more capable fighter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). The SDF will also procure new aerial refueling/transport aircraft, and continuously work to equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). In addition, the SDF will examine what is the appropriate air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

(c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic, the SDF will effectively conduct various activities including holding persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations; procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K); and conducting service-extension activities on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J) as stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce new compact-type hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In addition, the SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters required for enabling destroyer units to sustainably conduct activities as situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-to-ship guided missiles.

(d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations and improve effective response capabilities, transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) will continue to be procured. Besides the ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft that complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering the possibility of new

multipurpose helicopters that will success the existing multipurpose helicopters (UH-1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities, the SDF will avoid functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation.

The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment capabilities, by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles that support units' amphibious landing efforts on remote islands, and refitting existing Tank Landing Ships (LST). The SDF will consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations, and reach a conclusion regarding its acquisition. With a view to efficiently conducting large-scale transportation movements in coordination with the SDF's transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the private sector and reserve personnel.

Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be introduced in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations will be organized. The SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver deployment training for prompt unit deployment to remote islands. While improving guidance capability of existing precision-guided bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles, the SDF will also promote the development of improved capabilities of ship-to-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their firing range.

(e) Development of C3I

From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, aimed at establishing a command and control system which enables the dynamic operation of units across the country so as to immediately concentrate necessary units into the area to be dealt with, such as remote islands, the SDF will take steps to station GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. In addition, as stated in Section II-1, the SDF will expedite the establishment of the Ground Central Command, while promoting efficiency and rationalizing the command and control functions of each regional army headquarters, as well as reviewing the functions of some regional army headquarters.

With regard to the information and communications capabilities which serve as a foundation for nation-wide operations, and the goal of strengthening the communications infrastructure on remote islands, the SDF will extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base. The SDF will strive to enhance data link functions among the three services, upgrade the field communications systems, continue to promote the utilization of outer space for defense-related purposes, and develop an X-Band communications satellite with high performance. The SDF will take additional necessary measures after considering the necessity of further enhancements to its communications systems.

(3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Given North Korea's improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles.

For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and continue to improve the capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in (2)(b), the SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems.

Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases. The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture, and make an effort to establish the basis for deployment of the SDF to respond to a ballistic missile attack.

The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. Also, based on appropriate role-sharing between Japan and the U.S., with a view to strengthening the deterrence capacity of Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole by enhancing Japan's own deterrence and response capabilities, the MOD will study its possible response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and will take necessary measures.

In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units. In sensitive locations such as where a number of nuclear power plants are located, the SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants.

(4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace

(a) Promoting Utilization of Outer Space

The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. With a view to ensuring the constant availability of these capabilities in a variety of contingencies, the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies and knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate cooperation including in the area of personnel development with such organizations.

(b) Response to Cyber Attacks

To continuously ensure sufficient security against cyber attacks, with consideration to enhancing capabilities through joint operations and efficiency in resource allocations, the SDF will establish the necessary system by such measures as to enhance the survivability of the command and control systems and information communication networks of the three services, to strengthen capabilities for information gathering and research and analysis, and to develop a practical training environment where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace. In addition, the SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks, response measures and technological trends, including through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks and joint exercises with allies.

Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise on a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are increasingly sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, expanding learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and cultivating expertise through personnel management efforts.

To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close coordination with relevant government agencies by regularly providing expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve training and exercises.

(5) Response to Large-scale Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on a joint operational approach. These efforts will enable a sustained response over the long term. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, to gather information on the extent and nature of the damage by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact and immediately engage in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting people's lives. In addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction activities including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private sector's efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant government agencies, local governments and private sector organizations, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF's disaster and deployment operations is affected.

(6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for MOD/SDF to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will strengthen all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing intelligence.

With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, with a view to flexibly meeting the demands of changes in the security environment, the MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a related move, the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a variety of information and intelligence overlaid on a map or image, while promoting the comprehensive and efficient geospatial database development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT gathering capabilities including by increasing the number of personnel to be newly dispatched as Defense Attachés. It will also reinforce its posture for gathering and analyzing information from overseas through cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system for collecting public information.

In an effort to meet the increasingly complex and diverse needs from policy departments and operational sides, in a timely and precise manner, in the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the MOD will strengthen its comprehensive information gathering and analysis capabilities, through such efforts as the review of its recruitment efforts and the composition of its human resources to develop highly competent analysts, integration and enhancement of its cross-organizational intelligence curriculum, and regularization of the efforts to place the intelligence side personnel for a given period in the policy departments and operational sides.

Considering the importance of information security, under the current severe fiscal situation, and in pursuit of more efficient intelligence gathering, the MOD will promote the all-source analysis expected to create great synergies, through seeking to enhance the posture of and the effective collection management, and facilitating complete information sharing between those who need to know, including relevant government agencies.

2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments

From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities to properly address global security challenges. The following elements will be particularly important to these efforts:

(1) Holding Training and Exercises

In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will seek to improve interoperability and build and strengthen practical cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

(2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels not limited to high-level exchanges, but including unit-level exchanges, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HA/DR, maritime security, and ensuring the stable use of outer space and cyberspace.

(3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance

By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will help countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such fields as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and military medicine, so as to stabilize the security environment, as well as strengthen relations with defense authorities of those countries. Cooperating with partners actively engaged in capacity building such as the United States and Australia, with due consideration for coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and efficient support in capacity building.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security

For the purpose of maintaining “Open and Stable Seas”, which serve as the cornerstone of Japan’s peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime state, and ensuring security of maritime traffic, the MOD will further cooperate with allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as help gulf countries improve their own capabilities. In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the SDF will also leverage a variety of opportunities to promote combined training and exercises with countries which share Japan’s goal of maintaining maritime security.

(5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities

To immediately commence international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will reinforce its emergency response and transport capabilities. To steadily engage in its activities for the long term, the SDF will work to further ensure the safety of its activities by strengthening information-gathering and equipment protection capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve communications, supplies, military medicine, and support for families of military personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which are highly appreciated at the SDF’s activity areas, the SDF will work to facilitate international peace cooperation activities that more effectively meet the needs of the SDF’s activity areas. Japan will strengthen the development of personnel who can play an active role in the field of international peace cooperation activity, and will send more personnel to mission headquarters of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping operations which would help Japan in making more contribution in the field.

The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant government agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.

To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation in such operations.

(6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation

In order to contribute to various activities in the field of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations, Japan will continue its active engagement including its contribution of personnel to these efforts. Given that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that serve as their means of delivery pose a severe threat to the peace and stability not only to Japan, but also to the international community as a whole, in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will facilitate efforts towards nonproliferation such as participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

3. Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability

(1) Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, the SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises will be conducted in a tailored and visible way. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, the SDF will expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido, by SDF units across the country, to conduct effective training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility. Doing so will enable nation-wide deployment of well-trained units stationed in Hokkaido. To carry out effective training and exercises in the SDF’s southwestern region, where only limited space is available for SDF

training, and accounting for relations with local communities, the MOD will continue effort to expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF. In addition, actively engaging in bilateral trainings at home and abroad with U.S. Forces such as the U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to promptly develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities.

Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. In addition, the government will conduct various simulation exercise and comprehensive training and exercises regarding various situations including civil protection on a regular basis in a tailored manner.

(2) Operational Infrastructure

Given that SDF camps and bases are indispensable for rapid deployment and response to various contingencies as well as for ensuring a sustained response posture for the long term, the resiliency of military camps and bases will be enhanced. In particular, the SDF will strengthen its capabilities to immediately rebuild various camp and base support functions such as runways, information-communication infrastructure, and stable fuel supply. For the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations, necessary measures will be taken with consideration especially to developing a deployment structure in the southwestern region. In addition, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, the SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations, as well as steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted.

To keep availability ratio of equipment at higher standards with lower costs, the MOD will conduct research as to what activities hamper improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term contracts raise predictability and enhance cost-effectiveness, the MOD will expand the use of its new contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance.

(3) Personnel and Education

Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long-standing perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops and the effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

(a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution

Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of achieving a composition of ranks that enables the three services to accomplish their respective missions in the most appropriate and sustainable way, the SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers equipped with necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/airman.

To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/airman ranks, by encouraging early retirement and more appropriately managing its privates/seaman/airman. While taking into consideration the status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF will conduct research on new systems for early retirement including systems used by other countries. With a view to maintaining the proper age distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures to allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the SDF will review the final promotion rate of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers, and manage personnel more appropriately with consideration to personnel’s physical strength so as to maintain SDF’s strength.

(b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including its female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF’s strength.

To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious Badge program.

In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to the Joint Staff Office and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel in the government who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to a variety of situations.

(c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support

In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased pursuit of higher education, in order to continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) to provide financially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, through sharing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts as measures to provide more incentives for companies

to employ retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment environment.

(d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. To that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel and their assignment to duties commensurate with their specialized knowledge and skills including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private sector's transport capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize reserve personnel including those who have experience as ship crew. The SDF will also encourage the appointment of reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be taken as well with broad consideration to using reserve personnel, including for call-ups in various situations. Furthermore, to increase the adequacy of reserve personnel, the SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the reserve program, and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel.

(4) Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military medicine capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range of missions in responses to various situations and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. By reinforcing education for medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel with more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve frontline first aid capabilities, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the need for enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore, the SDF will also reinforce the functions of the National Defense Medical College, establishing it as a hub for education, and research in the field of defense medical science.

(5) Defense Production and Technology Base

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology base is essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment in Japan, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and Japan's intention to maintain and reinforce above-mentioned base, the MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technology base as a whole.

With a view to enhancing the technological capability and improving productivity of Japan's defense production and technology base, as well as increasing global competitiveness, Japan will actively promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development, such as through international joint development and production with other countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields where Japan enjoys an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies, the MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft developed by the MOD/SDF, to civilian uses.

The MOD will promote international joint development and production and civilian uses of defense equipment in a way that benefit both manufacturers and the government.

(6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

To carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, a project manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project management including insertion of a technological perspective throughout the life-cycle of equipment design, R&D, full rate production, acquisition, sustainment, capability upgrade and eventual disposal. In relevant efforts, the MOD will establish a database of past contracts, which it will use to develop a simulation model for price estimation, so as to enable independent estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private sector's knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise in the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost derived from the analysis concerned and the real value of the life-cycle costs.

To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify contract types and allow for the efficient acquisition of various equipment, the government will take necessary measures after considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, introduce longer-term contracts, which raise the predictability for companies and lead to lower costs, and establish a flexible system for accepting orders such as, the use of a consortium that enables convergence of technologies from respective, globally competitive companies.

(7) Research and Development (R&D)

Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan's severe fiscal situation, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of the SDF.

In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles in view of

replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle-range surface-to-air guided missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft.

With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing technological advantage in the areas of strategically important fields, the MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to development of major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term perspectives. It will do this while considering the latest trends in science and technology, changes in battle field techniques, the potential for international joint research and development, and availability of effective joint operations among major pieces of equipment.

From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions, while strengthening the function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. In doing so, the MOD will always pay attention to keeping abreast of scientific technological trends including information relevant to technological development and gathering industry-academic-government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will also promote to have military technologies employed in civilian activities.

In order to achieve effective and efficient R&D in consideration of the items stated above, the MOD will re-examine its research and development posture, and take necessary measures.

(8) Collaboration with Local Communities

As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such efforts as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment and re-employment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated harmonization between defense facilities and their surrounding local communities, the MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. In these efforts, based on the governmental contract policies vis-a-vis small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while considering efficiencies, the MOD will promote various measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders.

(9) Boosting Communication Capabilities

Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign countries are of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of SDF missions, the MOD will strive to provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks with due consideration to consistency in the information content. Efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF activities abroad will be facilitated by such means as improvement of its English web site.

(10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base

To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and crisis management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of education on security-related matters at educational institutions, including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers as experts in security and crisis management. The role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank associated with the MOD will be strengthened, through such efforts as facilitating coordination with policy-making divisions by relocating the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the MOD's headquarters is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges with foreign research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the NIDS in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the MOD faces in a timely and appropriate manner.

(11) Promoting Reform of the MOD

The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, with the intention of optimizing its defense force build-up, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense build-up with a focus on joint operation-based capability assessments, and take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, to enhance the prompt and efficient operation of the SDF, by such effort as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office, the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy.

IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure Japan's national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation while strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS).

V. Quantities of Major Procurement

The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces described in the Annex Table of NDPG2013 over 10-year time frame, this program will focus on build-up of defense forces the best adapted to the current security environment.

VI. Expenditures

- The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24, 670 billion in FY2013 prices.
- For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970 billion over the next five years.
- This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

VII. Other

While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

Service	Equipment	Quantity
GSDF	Mobile Combat Vehicles	99
	Armored Vehicles	24
	Amphibious Vehicles	52
	Tilt-Rotor Aircraft	17
	Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)	6
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles	9 companies
	Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	5 companies
	Tanks	44
MSDF	Howitzers (expect mortars)	31
	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	5
	Submarines	(2)
	Other Ships	5
	Total (Tonnage)	15 (approx. 52,000 t)
	Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	23
	Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K)	23
ASDF	Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)	9
	New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft	4
	Fighters (F-35A)	28
	Fighter Modernization (F-15)	26
	New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft	3
ASDF	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	10
	Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)	2 groups & education
	Joint units	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above.

Reference 8 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned

(As of March 31, 2017)

Type	Recoilless Guns	Mortars	Field Artillery	Rocket Launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft Machine Guns	Tanks	Armored Vehicles
Approximate number owned	2,500	1,100	430	100	50	660	980

Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.

Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2017)

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	8	300	2 (8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
		AH-1S	Anti-tank	59	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
	Rotary-wing	OH-6D	Observation	44	140	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	37	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H /J	Utility	131	120	2 (11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	57	150/140	3 (55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	40	150	2 (12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
AH-64D	Combat	13	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines		
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-1	Patrol	11	450	11	38	35	Turbofan, quadruple-engine
		P-3C	Patrol	62	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	34	150	3	20	16	Turboshaft, twin-engine
		SH-60K	Patrol	52	140	4	20	16	Turboshaft, twin-engine
		MCH-101	Minesweeping and transport	8	150	4	23	19	Turboshaft, triple engine
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Fighter	201	mach 2.5	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engine
		F-4EJ	Fighter	52	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine
		F-2A/B	Fighter	92	mach 2	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, single-engine
		F-35A	Fighter	4	mach 1.6	1	16	11	Turbofan, single-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	13	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine
		C-1	Transport	17	mach 0.76	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	14	320	6 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		KC-767	Aerial refueling transport	4	mach 0.84	4-8 (200)	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
ASDF	Fixed-wing	KC-130H	Addition of aerial refueling functions transport	2	320	6 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		E-2C	Early warning	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engine
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	15	150	3 (55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engine

Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.

2. F-4EJs include 48 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

3. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2016.

Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service

(As of March 31, 2017)

Category	Destroyer	Submarine	Mine warfare ship	Patrol combatant craft	Amphibious ship	Auxiliary ship
Number (vessels)	46	17	25	6	11	29
Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)	255	50	26	1	28	125

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Reference 11 Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2017)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Antiballistic	Patriot (PAC-3)	ASDF	Approx.300	Approx.5.2	Approx.26	Program + command + radar homing
	SM-3	MSDF	Approx.1,500	Approx.6.6	Approx.35	Command + IR image homing
Antiaircraft and antimissile	Patriot (PAC-2)	ASDF	Approx.900	Approx.5.3	Approx.41	Program + command + TVM
	Improved Hawk	GSDF	Approx.640	Approx.5.0	Approx.36	Radar homing
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx.570	Approx.4.9	Approx.32	Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)		Approx.100	Approx.2.7/2.9	Approx.16	Image + IR homing Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDF/ASDF	Approx.100	Approx.2.7	Approx.16	IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)	GSDF	Approx.12	Approx.1.4	Approx.8	Image + IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B)		Approx.13	Approx.1.5	Approx.8	IR image homing
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)		Approx.12	Approx.1.4	Approx.8	Image + IR homing
	Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile		Approx.100	Approx.2.9	Approx.16	Active radar homing
	Surface-to-air missile for base air defense	ASDF	Approx.100	Approx.2.9	Approx.16	Active radar homing
	Standard (SM-1)	MSDF	Approx.590	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)		Approx.710	Approx.4.7	Approx.30	Command + radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)		Approx.230	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)		Approx.300	Approx.3.8	Approx.25	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	RAM (RIM-116)	ASDF	Approx.73	Approx.2.8	Approx.13	Passive radar homing + IR homing
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)		Approx.230	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx.89	Approx.2.9	Approx.13	IR homing
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx.91	Approx.3.0	Approx.13	IR homing
Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)	Approx.220		Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing	
Type-99 air-to-air missile (B) (AAM-4B)	Approx.220		Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing	
Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)	ASDF	Approx.95	Approx.3.1	Approx.13	IR homing	
Antiship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDF	Approx.660	Approx.5.1	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-12 surface-to-ship missile		Approx.700	Approx.5.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing + GPS
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx.680	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx.680	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx.530	Approx.3.8	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)		Approx.660	Approx.5.1	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)	ASDF	Approx.510	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)		Approx.600	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)		Approx.540	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B)	Approx.530		Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS	
Antitank	Type-87 anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx.12	Approx.1.1	Approx.11	Laser homing
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx.11	Approx.0.9	Approx.12	IR image homing
	TOW		Approx.18	Approx.1.2	Approx.15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Antilandcraft and antitank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx.33	Approx.1.6	Approx.15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx.59	Approx.2.0	Approx.16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
	Middle range multi-purpose missile		Approx.26	Approx.1.4	Approx.14	IR image homing Laser homing
	Hellfire	MSDF	Approx.47	Approx.1.6	Approx.18	Laser homing
	Maverick		Approx.300	Approx.2.5	Approx.31	IR image homing

Reference 12 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/ B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
Fiscal Year										
1955	75,590	9,915	△0.8	8,107	△2.8	1,349	△3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	△0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	△2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.9	0.959	6.65	11.2
2009	5,102,000	885,480	6.6	517,310	9.4	47,028	△0.8	0.922	5.31	9.1
						47,741	△0.1	0.936	5.39	9.2
2010	4,752,000	922,992	4.2	534,542	3.3	46,826	△0.4	0.985	5.07	8.76
						47,903	0.3	1.008	5.19	8.96
2011	4,838,000	924,116	0.1	540,780	1.2	46,625	△0.4	0.964	5.05	8.62
						47,752	△0.3	0.987	5.17	8.83
2012	4,796,000	903,339	△2.2	512,450	△5.2	46,453	△0.4	0.969	5.14	9.06
						47,138	△1.3	0.983	5.22	9.20
2013	4,877,000	926,115	2.5	527,311	2.9	46,804	0.8	0.960	5.05	8.88
						47,538	0.8	0.975	5.13	9.02
2014	5,004,000	958,823	3.5	564,697	7.1	47,838	2.2	0.956	4.99	8.47
						48,848	2.8	0.976	5.09	8.65
2015	5,049,000	963,420	0.5	573,555	1.6	48,221	0.8	0.955	5.01	8.41
						49,801	2.0	0.986	5.17	8.68
2016	5,188,100	967,218	0.4	578,286	0.8	48,607	0.8	0.937	5.03	8.41
						50,541	1.5	0.974	5.23	8.74
2017	5,535,000	974,547	0.8	583,591	0.9	48,996	0.8	0.885	5.03	8.40
						51,251	1.4	0.926	5.26	8.78

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.

2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2009 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2017), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen in FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, and 21.6 billion yen in FY2017), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 13 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Fiscal year	Item	Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
2009		885,480	47,028 47,741	5.3 5.4	248,344	28.0	53,104	6.0	70,701	8.0
2010		922,992	46,826 47,903	5.1 5.2	272,686	29.5	55,872	6.1	57,731	6.3
2011		924,116	46,625 47,752	5.0 5.2	287,079	31.1	55,100	6.0	49,743	5.4
2012		903,339	46,453 47,138	5.1 5.2	263,901	29.2	54,057	6.0	45,734	5.1
2013		926,115	46,804 47,538	5.1 5.1	291,224	31.4	53,687	5.8	52,853	5.7
2014		958,823	47,838 48,848	5.0 5.1	305,175	31.8	54,421	5.7	59,685	6.2
2015		963,420	48,221 49,801	5.0 5.2	315,297	32.7	53,613	5.6	59,711	6.2
2016		967,218	48,607 50,541	5.0 5.2	391,738	33.1	53,580	5.5	59,737	6.2
2017		974,547	48,996 51,251	5.0 5.3	324,735	33.3	53,567	5.5	59,763	6.1

Notes: 1. The education and science expenditures for FY2010 are post-overhaul figures.

2. The upper figures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2017), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen in FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, and 21.6 billion yen in FY2017), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 14 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item	Fiscal year	2013		2014		2015		2016		2017	
		Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions		19,896	42.5 41.9	20,930	43.8 42.8	21,121	43.8 42.4	21,473	44.2 42.5	21,662	44.2 42.3
Materials		26,908 27,642	57.5 58.1	26,909 27,918	56.2 57.2	27,100 28,680	56.2 57.6	27,135 29,069	55.8 57.5	27,334 29,589	55.8 57.7
Equipment acquisition		7,442	15.9 15.7	7,964	16.6 16.3	7,404	15.4 14.9	7,659	15.8 15.2	8,406	17.2 16.4
R&D		1,541	3.3 3.2	1,477	3.1 3.0	1,411	2.9 2.8	1,055	2.2 2.1	1,217	2.5 2.4
Facility improvement		950	2.0 2.0	950	2.0 1.9	1,293	2.7 2.6	1,461	3.0 2.9	1,571	3.2 3.1
Maintenance		11,134	23.8 23.4	11,361	23.7 23.3	11,808	24.5 23.7	11,707	24.1 23.2	10,888	22.2 21.2
Base countermeasures		4,381	9.4 9.2	4,397	9.2 9.0	4,425	9.2 8.9	4,509	9.3 8.9	4,529	9.2 8.8
The cost for SACO-related projects		88	0.2	120	0.2	46	0.1	28	0.1	28	0.1
U.S. Forces realignment related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)		646	1.4	890	1.8	1,426	2.9	1,766	3.5	2,011	3.9
Introduction of government aircraft		—	—	—	—	108	0	140	0.3	216	0.4
Others		1,460	3.1 3.1	760	1.6 1.6	758	1.6 1.5	744	1.5 1.5	723	1.5 1.4
Total		46,804 47,538	100.0	47,838 48,848	100	48,221 49,801	100	48,607 50,541	100	48,996 51,251	100

Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.

2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.

3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.

4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.

5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.

6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.

7. The "others" category in FY2013 includes an expenditure amounting to 68.9 billion yen which is necessary to be carried over to the Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

8. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

9. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2017), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen in FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, and 21.6 billion yen in FY2017), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 15 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country	Fiscal year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2016
Japan (100 million yen)		46,804	47,838	48,221	48,607	48,996
		47,538	48,848	49,801	50,541	51,251
		0.8%	2.2%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%
U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)		607,795	577,897	562,499	565,375	573,010
		△6.6%	△4.9%	△2.7%	1.01%	1.01%
		0.8%	2.8%	2.0%	1.5%	1.4%
China (100 million yuan)		7,202	8,082	8,896	9,544	10,444
		10.7%	12.2%	10.1%	7.6%	7.1%
Russia (100 million RR)		21,036	24,791	31,814	37,753	28,358
		16.1%	17.9%	28.3%	18.7%	△24.9%
Republic of Korea (100 million won)		344,970	357,057	374,560	387,995	403,337
		4.7%	3.5%	4.9%	3.6%	4.0%
Australia (1 million Australian dollar)		25,434	29,303	32,695	32,882	35,191
		5.0%	15.2%	11.6%	0.6%	7.0%
U.K. (1 million GBP)		34,800	34,500	35,200	35,000	35,500
		1.6%	△0.9%	2.0%	△0.6%	1.4%
France (1 million euro)		38,092	38,921	36,791	39,939	—
		0.3%	2.1%	△5.5%	8.6%	—

- Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
 2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.
 3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2017 are estimated values.
 4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (However, since FY2015, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. For FY2015, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released.) In addition, through FY2015, the rate of growth over the previous year was calculated from the central government expenditure. For FY2016, as only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure was released, the rate of change was calculated by comparing with the FY2015 and FY2017 defense expenditure (886.9 billion yuan and 1.0226 trillion yuan) in the central ministry expenditure.
 5. Russia's defense expenditure is based on the FY2013-2016 expenditures and the FY2017 budget amount (as of February 2017) in the Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal Treasury (initial).
 6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.
 7. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2012 are based on U.K. Defence Statistics 2013 published by the Ministry of Defence. The figures for FY2013 and after are based on the initial budget in the budget message.
 8. The French defense expenditure for FY2017 is undisclosed as of June 2017.
 9. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (8.8 billion yen for FY2013, 12.0 billion yen for FY2014, 4.6 billion yen for FY2015, 2.8 billion yen for FY2016, and 2.8 billion yen for FY2017), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment from which the expenses to reduce the burden on the local community (64.6 billion yen for FY2013, 89.0 billion yen for FY2014, 142.6 billion yen for FY2015, 176.6 billion yen for FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen for FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen for FY2015, 14.0 billion yen for FY2016 and 21.6 billion yen for FY2017), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.

Reference 16 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on July 1, 2014)

Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has flourished as an economic power through continuous efforts of its people and built a stable and affluent livelihood. Japan, as a peace-loving nation, has also been cooperating with the international community and international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.), and has proactively contributed to their activities, adhering to the Charter of the United Nations. The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered significant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further fortify such a position.

During the 67 years since the Constitution of Japan came into effect, the security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally transformed and is continuing to evolve, and Japan is confronted by complex and significant national security challenges. There exist no prospects of the realization of the so-called formal "U.N. forces", an ideal proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, even when considering only the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War, the shift in the global power balance, rapid progress of technological innovation, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as international terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, and there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could have a direct influence on the security of Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to the sea, outer space and cyberspace have been spreading and become more serious. No country can secure its own peace only by itself, and the international community also expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capability.

Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival as well as securing its people's lives are the primary responsibility of the Government. In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to fulfill its responsibility, the Government, first and foremost, has to create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by advancing vibrant diplomacy with sufficient institutional capabilities, and has to pursue peaceful settlement of disputes by acting in accordance with international law and giving emphasis to the rule of law.

Moreover, it is important to appropriately develop, maintain and operate Japan's own defense capability, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan's ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the region. In particular, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts before they materialize and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating

the effectiveness of the Japan-United States security arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the security of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses.

In accordance with the basic orientation presented by Prime Minister Abe at the May 15 press conference which took place after the report of "the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security" was submitted on the same day, discussions have been repeatedly held in the ruling parties and examination has also been conducted by the Government. Based on the result of the discussions of the ruling coalition, the Government will promptly develop domestic legislation necessary for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people, in accordance with the following basic policies:

- Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack
 - (1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In such situations of infringement that does not amount to an armed attack, it is an even more important task to prepare and ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant agencies, including police organizations, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), premised on the basic allocation of their roles.
 - (2) Specifically, in order to respond to various unlawful acts, under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, which include enhancing the respective agency's response capabilities, strengthening collaboration among agencies including information sharing, examining and developing concrete response guidelines, accelerating procedures to issue orders, and improving exercises and training.
 - (3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement from the outside that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in which police agencies cannot respond because of the weapons possessed by the armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application of related provisions to order public security operations or maritime security operations in advance and establish a common understanding among relevant agencies. At the same time, in order to avoid the spread of damages caused by unlawful acts while internal administrative procedures are taken, the Government will also make concrete considerations on measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures in light of circumstances.
 - (4) Moreover, for ensuring Japan's security, it is important for the SDF and

the United States armed forces to respond seamlessly in close cooperation to a situation where an attack occurs against the units of the United States armed forces currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack depending on its circumstances. Assuming a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in the course of various peacetime activities carried out in coordination between the SDF and the United States armed forces and referring to the concept of “use of weapons” for the purpose of protecting its own weapons and other equipment under Article 95 of the SDF Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States armed forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law, premised on request or consent by the United States.

2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community
(1) So-called Logistics Support and “Ittaika with the Use of Force”

A. So-called logistics support is an activity that does not in itself constitute a “use of force”. For instance, when international peace and security are threatened and the international community is united in responding to the situation in accordance with a U.N. Security Council resolution, there exist situations in which it is necessary for Japan to conduct such support activities to armed forces of other countries carrying out legitimate “use of force” based on the resolution. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “noncombat area”, etc. have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “ititaika with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“ititaika with the use of force”) by other countries.

B. The SDF, even under such legal frameworks, has steadily accumulated its records of various support activities, and the expectations to and trust in Japan have been growing. Amid a major change in the security environment, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to enable the SDF to play sufficient roles in wide-ranging support activities for peace and stability of the international community. It is also vital from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan’s peace and security to enable the carrying out of such activities more than before without hindrance.

C. The Government, while premising on the theory of so-called “Ititaika with the use of force” itself, based on the accumulation of discussions related to the “ititaika with the use of force” and considering factors such as the SDF’s actual experiences to date and the reality of U.N. collective security measures, no longer takes the current framework uniformly limiting SDF’s activities to such areas as “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area” where the issue of “ititaika with the use of force” does not arise. Instead, the Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “ititaika with the use of force” by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities to armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for peace and stability of the international community:

(a) Do not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support.

(b) Immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation.

(2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities

A. To date, Japan has developed necessary legislation and has conducted international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In conducting such activities, Japan has limited the right of SDF personnel to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation activities to so-called self-preservation type and protection of its own weapons and other equipment since use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons are directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.”

B. From the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan needs to enhance its efforts to promote the peace and stability of the international community. To that end, it is important to be able to participate in international peace cooperation activities including peace keeping operations (PKOs) sufficiently and proactively. Moreover, given that many Japanese nationals are actively working overseas and face risks of being involved in emergency situations such as terrorism, it is necessary to enable the rescuing of Japanese nationals abroad by use of weapons subject to the consent of acceptance from the territorial State which, under international law, has the obligation to extend protection to foreigners who are within its territories.

C. Based on the above, the Government will proceed with developing legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF’s

use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not invoke “use of force” including U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as police-like activities that do not invoke “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with a consent from the territorial State, through ensuring that “a state or a quasi-state organization” does not appear as the adversary:

(a) As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., since “consent by the State to which the areas in which activities are conducted belong” and “consent by the parties to the conflict to activities conducted” are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as the adversary. For more than 20 years, this has been demonstrated by Japan’s experience of U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc. When the use of weapons for the execution of missions is expected to exceed self-preservation and protection of its own weapons and other equipment including when the SDF is tasked with the maintenance of order such as the protection of population, which is deemed as an important mission in recent U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is necessary that consent from the parties to the conflict is stably maintained, especially because of the nature of the activities.

(b) When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area.

(c) The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc. based on deliberations etc. at the National Security Council.

(d) Use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent constraint of the strict principle of proportionality which is similar to the principle of police proportionality.

3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

(1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situations, the Government has examined what constitutional interpretation would be appropriate, as sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained. In this regard, logical consistency and legal stability are required for the Government’s constitutional interpretation.

Accordingly, it is necessary to draw a logical conclusion for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limit of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date.

(2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councilors on October 14, 1972.

This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution

(3) To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc. as mentioned at the outset, in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc.

Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.

Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to

the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government's view to date.

- (4) As a matter of course, Japan's "use of force" must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned "use of force" permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this "use of force" includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan's survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan.
- (5) Moreover, even when "use of force" is permitted under the Constitution, since they are carried out to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, it is natural to require an assurance of democratic control. The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that prior approval of the Diet is in principle

required upon issuing orders of operations to the SDF for carrying out "use of force" permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.

4. The Way Forward for Developing Domestic Legislation

When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make a decision in accordance with deliberations, etc. at the National Security Council. Including such procedures, domestic legislation which serves as the legal basis is necessary in order to enable the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Based on the basic policies described above, the Government will herewith commence the tasks of drafting legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations in order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. The Government will give adequate consideration, and as soon as it completes its preparation, it will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations.

Reference 17 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)	(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan's survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required	○ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense) ○ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation) ¹ ○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, civil protection, etc.) ¹
Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) ¹ (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)	○ Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others' Military Actions Related Measures Act)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies — not required; services — required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) ² (3) Cabinet decision: supplies — not required; services — required (approval of the Prime Minister)	○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others' Military Actions Related Measures Act ○ Provision of services as a related measure ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)	○ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law ○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ³ ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required	○ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons ○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard
Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty
Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	○ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control) ○ Use of weapons

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister; when the response is for a submerged submarine, approval of the Prime Minister is not subject to Cabinet decision)	○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Counter-piracy operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-2 and Anti-Piracy Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister	○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by the missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister	○ Use of weapons
Disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters ⁴	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-2)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-3)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Same as in disaster relief dispatch
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84)	When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required	○ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) ⁵
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required	○ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3)	Emergency situations overseas	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to conduct rescue measures such as guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty, and to execute duties
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4)	Natural disasters, unrest, and other emergency situations overseas	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: as necessary (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)	Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security	(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister; services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Support Act, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)	Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community	(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister; services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Disaster Relief Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	
International peace cooperation activities (Primary operations of peacekeeping force and "safety-ensuring" operations) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)	United Nations peacekeeping operations and internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (so-called primary operations and "safety-ensuring" operations of peacekeeping activities)	(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: required (only if the operations are conducted by SDF units, etc.; prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty ○ Use of weapons to execute duties (when conducting so-called "safety-ensuring" operations)
International peace cooperation activities (Operations other than primary operations of peacekeeping force) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)	United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, and international humanitarian assistance (operations other than the so-called primary operations and "safety-ensuring" operations of peacekeeping activities)	(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty ○ Use of weapons for so-called "kaketsuke-keigo"

(All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law)

- Notes: 1. Measures based on an assumption of direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not applicable to the situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan's survival.
2. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).
3. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.
4. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.
5. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

Reference 18 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Defense operation	Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant cast guard officers, are not present.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations	Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations. If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles	Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan. ¹

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad	Article 94-6, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security - Logistics support activities, etc.		SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law - Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 25 and 26, International Peace Cooperation Act - International peace cooperation operations		SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces' units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called "safety-ensuring" operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called "kaketsuke-keigo (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request)" operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other foreign armed forces, which are actually engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including joint exercises and training, and excluding the activities carried out in the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted), may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situations when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding the SDF facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.
Article 12, The U.S. and others' Military Actions Related Measures Act		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably depending on necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of other the SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Maritime Transportation Restriction Act		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of War Act		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, International Peace Support Act		SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Note: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

Reference 19

Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2016)

Types of Exercise	Date	Location
Field exercise	November 4, 2016	Toyama Prefecture
	November 15, 2016	Tokyo
	February 2, 2017	Kyoto Prefecture
Simulation exercise	February 2, 2017	Kagoshima Prefecture
	November 10, 2016	Shizuoka Prefecture
	November 22, 2016	Osaka Prefecture
	November 24, 2016	Oita Prefecture
	January 17, 2017	Yamagata Prefecture
	January 18, 2017	Iwate Prefecture
	January 19, 2017	Mie Prefecture
	January 20, 2017	Hiroshima Prefecture
	January 23, 2017	Shiga Prefecture
	January 24, 2017	Shimane Prefecture
	January 26, 2017	Aichi Prefecture
	January 27, 2017	Okayama Prefecture
	January 31, 2017	Fukui Prefecture
	February 6, 2017	Nagasaki Prefecture
	February 7, 2017	Fukuoka Prefecture
	February 8, 2017	Fukushima Prefecture
February 9, 2017	Kanagawa Prefecture	
February 10, 2017	Tokushima Prefecture	
February 14, 2017	Ehime Prefecture	

Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007.
 Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008.
 Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009.
 Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010.
 Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011.
 Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012.
 Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013.
 Implemented in 13 Prefectures in FY2014.
 Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2015.

Prefectures that Conducted Joint Exercises More than Once

Number of Times Conducted	Location
Twice	Fukushima Prefecture (2009, 2016), Tochigi Prefecture (2009, 2014), Chiba Prefecture (2007, 2013), Nagano Prefecture (2007, 2008), Osaka Prefecture (2006, 2016), Shimane Prefecture (2007, 2016), Hiroshima Prefecture (2007, 2016), Kagawa Prefecture (2009, 2013), Nara Prefecture (2008, 2015), Yamanashi Prefecture (2009, 2015)
Three times	Hokkaido Prefecture (2006, 2011, 2015), Aomori Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2013), Akita Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2015), Saitama Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2010), Niigata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2013), Gifu Prefecture (2007, 2011, 2014), Shizuoka Prefecture (2007, 2015, 2016), Aichi Prefecture (2007, 2013, 2016), Kyoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2016), Hyogo Prefecture (2009, 2011, 2015), Okayama Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2016), Yamaguchi Prefecture (2007, 2008, 2015), Nagasaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2016), Kumamoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2013), Oita Prefecture (2008, 2014, 2016), Kagoshima Prefecture (2007, 2012, 2016), Okinawa Prefecture (2009, 2012, 2013)
Four times	Iwate Prefecture (2009, 2010, 2015, 2016), Ibaraki Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2010, 2014), Kanagawa Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2015, 2016), Mie Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2015, 2016), Shiga Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2014, 2016), Tottori Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2006, 2008), Fukuoka Prefecture (2006, 2011, 2014, 2016), Saga Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2011, 2014), Miyazaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014)
Five times	Yamagata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016), Tokyo (2006, 2009, 2013, 2015, 2016)
Seven times	Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)
Nine times	Tokushima Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), Ehime Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)
Eleven times	Fukui Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)

Reference 20

Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

(April 27, 2015)

A STRONGER ALLIANCE FOR A DYNAMIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

1. OVERVIEW

Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter convened the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in New York on April 27, 2015. In light of the evolving security environment, the Ministers reconfirmed the Alliance's commitment to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Ministers announced the approval and release of new, revised "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" (the Guidelines), which update the roles and missions of the two countries and promote a more balanced and effective Alliance to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. The Ministers discussed a variety of regional and global challenges, initiatives to enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation in various areas, promotion of enhanced regional cooperation, and moving forward on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

As articulated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States is actively implementing its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Central to this is the ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional. Japan highly values U.S. engagement in the region. In this context, the Ministers reaffirmed the indispensable role of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in promoting regional peace, security, and prosperity.

As Japan continues its policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace," based on the principle of international cooperation, the United States welcomes and supports Japan's recent monumental achievements. Among these are: the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan on July 1, 2014, for developing seamless security legislation; the creation of its National Security Council; the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets; the Basic Act on Cybersecurity; the new Basic Plan on Space Policy; and the Development Cooperation Charter.

The Ministers affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthened by the new Guidelines and the two countries' respective security and defense policies, continues to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment.

The Ministers also reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands are territories under the administration of Japan and therefore fall within the scope of the commitments under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands.

2. THE NEW GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION

The Guidelines, which were first approved on November 27, 1978, and revised on September 23, 1997, have provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. At the SCC meeting in Tokyo on October 3, 2013, the Ministers shared views on the evolving security environment and directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines to ensure that the Alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security.

Today, the SCC approved the SDC's recommended new Guidelines, which accomplishes the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the new Guidelines and Japan's efforts to develop seamless security legislation, the Ministers acknowledged that such legislation would make bilateral efforts under the new Guidelines more effective. The United States welcomes and supports the ongoing efforts to develop the legislation, which is to reflect Japan's policy of "Proactive Contributions to Peace" and its July 2014 cabinet decision.

The core of the Guidelines continues to be the steadfast commitment to Japan's peace and security. The new Guidelines detail the ways and means through which the two governments continue to strengthen their ability to fulfill that commitment through seamless, robust, flexible, and effective Alliance responses while expanding bilateral cooperation across a range of other areas, such as:

Alliance Coordination Mechanism: Under the new Guidelines the two countries are establishing a standing, whole-of-government mechanism for Alliance coordination, enabling a seamless response in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Regional and Global Cooperation: The new Guidelines enable the Alliance to make greater contributions to international security initiatives wherever appropriate in a way consistent with Japanese laws and regulations, such as peacekeeping operations, maritime security, and logistic support. The Ministers reiterated the importance of cooperating with regional and other partners as well as with international organizations.

New Strategic Cooperation: A dynamic world requires a modern Alliance, and the new Guidelines lay a foundation for the two countries to cooperate in space and cyberspace and in conducting operations intended to have effects across domains.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: The new Guidelines describe ways the two governments can work together to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation in responding to a large-scale disaster in Japan or around the world.

A Strong Foundation: The new Guidelines also describe programs and activities that pay dividends in every aspect of bilateral cooperation, including defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security, and educational and research exchanges.

The Ministers confirmed their intention to start bilateral work under the new Guidelines. In this context, the SCC directed the SDC to implement the new Guidelines, including establishing the standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism and upgrading the Bilateral Planning Mechanism, thereby strengthening bilateral planning. The Ministers also expressed their intention to negotiate expeditiously an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines.

3. BILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION

The Ministers noted with satisfaction ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and response capabilities by enhancing bilateral security and defense cooperation in a variety of areas. The Ministers:

- confirmed the strategic importance of deploying the most modern and advanced U.S. capabilities to Japan, which enhances Alliance deterrence and contributes to

the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to Kadena Air Base, the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base, the deployment of the USS Green Bay, an upgraded amphibious transport ship, and U.S. plans to deploy Marine Corps F-35B aircraft to Japan in 2017. In addition, the Ministers welcomed U.S. plans to deploy additional Aegis ships to Yokosuka Naval Base by 2017, as well as the swap-out of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington with the more advanced USS Ronald Reagan later this year;

- committed to continued engagement through the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, which reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including through discussion of nuclear and conventional capabilities;
- stressed the importance of sustained cooperation in enhancing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, particularly the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system to Kyogamisaki in December 2014 and the planned deployment of two additional BMD-capable destroyers to Japan by 2017. Working in concert, these assets are to directly contribute to the defense of Japan and the United States;
- highlighted enhanced collaboration on space security, particularly in the areas of resiliency and developing capabilities, through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space and the Space Security Dialogue. The Ministers also highlighted increased cooperation resulting from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's provision of space situational awareness (SSA) information to the United States, as well as the establishment of a new framework to discuss space-related issues between the two defense authorities;
- called for continued progress in cooperation on cyberspace issues, particularly in the areas of threat information sharing, mission assurance, and critical infrastructure protection, through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue and the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group;
- lauded enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation, particularly the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base and Japan's plans to procure advanced ISR platforms;
- praised expanded logistics and defense equipment cooperation, as reflected by Japan's new Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the recent U.S. decision to establish an F-35 regional maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade capability in Japan. The Ministers highlighted strengthened defense equipment cooperation through the linkage of the Systems and Technology Forum and the Alliance Roles, Missions, and Capabilities dialogue, which facilitates joint research and development of advanced capabilities; and
- affirmed the importance of enhanced information security cooperation, as reflected by continued progress through the Bilateral Information Security Consultations and by Japan's implementation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets. As a result of this legislation, the Government of Japan has put in place the policies, practices, and procedures necessary to facilitate the secure exchange of sensitive information in peacetime and during contingencies.

In addition, the Ministers affirmed that host nation support has demonstrated continued Japanese support for the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in Japan, which contributes to Japan's peace and security in an increasingly complex security environment. The Ministers, noting that the current host nation support commitment, as stipulated in June 2011 SCC documents, expires in March 2016, expressed their intention to start consultations on future arrangements to provide an appropriate level of host nation support.

Recognizing the expanding scope of bilateral activities, the Ministers affirmed their intent to consider at the earliest opportunity an appropriate bilateral consultation framework that would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Alliance management processes.

4. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Recognizing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment, the Ministers highlighted recent progress in the following areas:

- Increased cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations, as reflected by close coordination in responding to the November 2013 typhoon in the Philippines;
- Continued close coordination on partner capacity building, particularly in Southeast Asia, including through the provision of coastal patrol vessels and other maritime security capacity building endeavors; and
- Expanded trilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly with key partners such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Ministers highlighted the recent signing of a trilateral information sharing arrangement with the ROK concerning the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, and resolved to utilize the framework as the foundation for expanded trilateral cooperation into the future. The Ministers also affirmed their intention to pursue closer cooperation with Australia on capacity building activities in Southeast Asia, and on security and defense issues through the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum.

5. REALIGNMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN

The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments' continued commitment to implement the existing arrangements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan as soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the relocation of the KC-130 squadron from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni and confirmed their commitment to continue aviation training relocation, including to locations outside of Okinawa, through efforts such as the development of training areas and facilities.

As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki

area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments' unwavering commitment to the plan and underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion and the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. The United States welcomes the steady and continuing progress of FRF construction projects.

The Ministers also reaffirmed the importance of land returns south of Kadena Air Base based on the 2006 "Roadmap" and the April 2013 Consolidation Plan, and reiterated the two governments' determination to work continuously on the implementation of the plan and anticipated the update of the plan by Spring 2016. The Ministers highlighted the on-time return of the West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran on March 31 of this year, which marked the most significant land return completed to date in accordance with the plan.

The Ministers confirmed that the two governments are steadily implementing the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, based upon the amended Guam International Agreement.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to protect the environment and confirmed the importance of making further efforts in environmental matters. To that end, the Ministers welcomed progress on a supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship and confirmed their intention to continue negotiating the ancillary documents of the Agreement as expeditiously as possible.

Reference 21 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)

I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

In order to ensure Japan's peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments' national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the "National Security Strategy" and the "National Defense Program Guidelines". The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation ("the Guidelines") provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

- A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.
- B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements.
- C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
- D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.

The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address

seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan's peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.

B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command.

C. Bilateral Planning

The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan's peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan's Peace and Security

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan's peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan's peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

- assess the situation;
- share information; and
- develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.

To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan's peace and security.

A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan's peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan's peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan's peace and security.

2. Air and Missile Defense

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage,

and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.

3. Maritime Security

The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary.

4. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other's assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

5. Training and Exercises

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern.

6. Logistic Support

Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements.

7. Use of Facilities

In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries' respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.

In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country's capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants.

The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.

2. Maritime Security

Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.

3. Measures to Deal with Refugees

If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan's peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.

4. Search and Rescue

The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search

and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

5. Protection of Facilities and Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.

6. Logistic Support

The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

7. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

a. Principles for Coordinated Actions

If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region.

Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security.

Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments.

The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other's forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan.

b. Concept of Operations

i. Operations to Defend Airspace

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will

conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies.

iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

v. Cross-Domain Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other's ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces' special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate.

c. Operational Support Activities

The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations.

i. Communications and Electronics

The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness.

ii. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

iii. Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

iv. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection

The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan's request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan's survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:

1. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.

2. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

3. Maritime Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate.

4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.

5. Logistics Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan's peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan's activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces' cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver

effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.

When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

A. Cooperation in International Activities

The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include:

1. Peacekeeping Operations

When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.

2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.

3. Maritime Security

When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities.

4. Partner Capacity Building

Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.

5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.

6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets.

7. Training and Exercises

In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures.

8. Logistic support

When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations.

The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.

VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

A. Cooperation on Space

Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation.

The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.

B. Cooperation on Cyberspace

To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:

- maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
- share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
- ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance;
- contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
- conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

VII. Bilateral Enterprise

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:

- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security

Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level.

In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information.

The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing.

C. Educational and Research Exchanges

Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side's research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

VIII. Processes for Review

The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

Reference 22 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa

(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.

(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
 - Camp Kuwae: Total return.
 - Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
 - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
 - Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
 - aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
 - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.

- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
 - Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
 - ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.
- (d) Relationships among Initiatives
- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
 - Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
 - The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
 - Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
 - In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
 - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
 - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
 - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.
3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
 - A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
 - The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
 - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
 - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
 - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
 - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
 - The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
 - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
 - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military dual-use.
4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
 - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
 - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
 - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
- Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
 - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
 - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
 - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
 - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
 - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
 - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities—Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni—will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
 - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
 - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
 - In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
 - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
 - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.
(Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)

Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)

Preamble

- (1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap.
- (2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility.
- (3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan's defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance.

I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa

- (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia.
- (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.
- (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap.
- (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam.
- (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is \$8.6 billion. Japan's financial commitment will be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to \$2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized.
Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment.

II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity

- (1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats).
- (2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012.

III. Land Returns in Okinawa

- (1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5)
- (ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp

Kuwaie, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwaie Tank Farm No.1

(iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps' relocation to locations outside of Japan:

Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area

(2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012.

IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma

(1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.

(2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment.

(END)

For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website.
(<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/ano/kyougi/js20120427.html>)

Reference 24 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2016

Joint Training

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Japan-U.S. Joint Exercise (field exercise)	Oct. 30- Nov. 11, 2016	Japan's surrounding sea and airspace, SDF bases, U.S. Forces Japan bases, as well as Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding sea, airspace, etc.	Each Staff Officer, Defense Intelligence Headquarters Regional, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Sasebo District, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Totaling approximately 25,000 personnel Totaling approximately 20 vessels Totaling approximately 260 aircraft	Headquarters of the U.S. Forces Japan, Fifth Air Force, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, U.S. Army Japan, III Marine Expeditionary Force, 7th Fleet Amphibious Force, etc. Totaling approximately 11,000 personnel	Exercise and training for SDF joint operations including remote island defense in an armed attack situation and anticipated armed attack situation; joint responses with the U.S. Forces; and responses in a situation that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Field training with U.S. Army Part 2	May 31- Jun. 16, 2016	Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska and surrounding training area	1st Airborne Brigade Totaling approximately 80 personnel	Major units of 4-25 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 120 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability
Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (YS-70)	Jun. 12-22, 2016	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington	Western Army, Ground Staff Office, etc. Totaling approximately 150 personnel	I Corps, U.S. Army, Pacific Command, etc. Totaling approximately 200 personnel	Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army
Field training with U.S. Marines (RIMPAC 2016)	Jun. 24- Aug. 8, 2016	Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay in Oahu, Hawaii, Pohakuloa Training Area in the Island of Hawaii, and their surrounding sea and airspace	Western Army Headquarters, Western Infantry Regiment, Central Readiness Force, etc. Totaling approximately 50 personnel	Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command, 3rd Marine Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 600 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability and staff capacity pertaining to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
Field training with U.S. Marines Part 1	Aug. 29- Sep. 8, 2016	Ohjojihara Maneuver area	Sixth Division Totaling approximately 400 personnel	Major units of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 200 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability
Field training with U.S. Army Part 1	Aug. 29- Sep. 21, 2016	Aibano Maneuver area and Camp Imazu	Third Division Totaling approximately 900 personnel	Major units of 2-27 Infantry Battalion, 3-25 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 450 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability
Field training with U.S. Army	Sep. 6-23, 2016	Yakima Training Center, Washington	Eighth Division Totaling approximately 300 personnel	2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, major units of 2-1 Infantry Battalion Totaling approximately 230 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability
Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (YS-71)	Nov. 30- Dec. 13, 2016	Camp Kengun, etc.	Western Army, etc. Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel	I Corps, U.S. Army, Pacific Command, U.S. Army Japan, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, etc. Totaling approximately 1,600 personnel	Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army
Field training with U.S. Marines in the U.S.	Jan. 30- Mar. 10, 2017	Camp Pendleton, California and U.S. naval facility in San Clemente Island, etc.	Western Army Headquarters, Western Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 350 personnel	1st Marine Expeditionary Force Totaling approximately 500 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 2	Mar. 6-17, 2017	Sekiyama Maneuver area, Soumagahara Maneuver area, and Camp Soumagahara	Twelfth Brigade Totaling approximately 300 personnel	2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 450 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Japan-U.S. joint overseas cruise training	Mar. 29- Apr. 4, 2016	Around Okinawa, etc.	1 vessel	Several vessels	Joint cruise training
Minesweeping special training	Jul. 15-30, 2016	Mutsu Bay	23 vessels, 10 aircraft	1 vessel, 3 aircraft, approximately 7 underwater disposal personnel	Minesweeping training
Antisubmarine special training	Aug. 22-26, 2016	Sea area south of Kyushu	2 vessels, several aircraft	4 vessels, several aircraft	Antisubmarine training
Medical special training	Oct. 20, 2016	Berkey Field at U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base, U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka	Yokosuka District Headquarters, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, Medical Service Unit Yokosuka Totaling approximately 150 personnel	Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, etc. Totaling approximately 300 personnel	Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination in the medical area
Minesweeping special training	Nov. 17-30, 2016	Sea of Hyuga	21 vessels, 3 aircraft	1 vessel, approximately 8 underwater disposal personnel	Minesweeping training
Japan-U.S. joint command post exercise	Feb. 6-16, 2017	U.S. Naval Academy	Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters, Command and Staff College, etc. Totaling approximately 40 personnel	Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet U.S. Naval Academy, etc. Totaling approximately 60 personnel	Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination, etc.

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Japan-U.S. joint cruise training	Mar. 7-13, 2016	Sea area west of Kyushu, etc.	2 vessels	Several vessels	Joint cruise training
	Mar. 27-29, 2016	Sea area west of Kyushu, etc.	5 vessels	Several vessels	

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Air defense combat training Aerial refueling training Tactical air transport training	Jun. 3-18, 2016	Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, their surrounding airspace, etc.	12 Aircraft	Several aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training	Jul. 15-19, 2016	Airspace around Okinawa	4 Aircraft	10 Aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, etc.	Jul. 25-29, 2016	Airspace off Komatsu	6 Aircraft	5 Aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Interceptor combat training	Sep. 13, 2016	Airspace around Kyushu	2 Aircraft	2 Aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training	Oct. 12, 2016	Airspace around Okinawa	8 Aircraft	10 Aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air rescue response training	Oct. 17-21, 2016	Ukibaru Jima training area and sea and airspace surrounding Ukibaru Jima	4 Aircraft	3 Aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, etc.	Dec. 5-16, 2016	Airspace west of Hokkaido and airspace off Misawa	4 Aircraft	4 Aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training Search and rescue training Aerial refueling training	Dec. 16, 2016	Airspace around Okinawa	11 Aircraft 1 Fire unit	27 Aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills

Reference 25 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

Item	Summary	Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development	Completion date
	Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low-vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications	Completed	
SM-3 Block IIA	Development of advanced missile interceptor	June 2006	Ongoing
Hybrid electric propulsion	Research on technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor	November 2012	Ongoing
High-speed multi-hull vessel optimization	Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area	March 2014	Ongoing
Comparison of operational jet fuel and noise exposures	Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel	November 2015	Ongoing
Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader	Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit	February 2017	Ongoing

Reference 26 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2014)

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
Apr. 6, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas Agreed to advance trilateral cooperation, including cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia and among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, and also to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Secretary Hagel stated that he plans to deploy two additional BMD (ballistic missile defense)-equipped Aegis ships to Japan by 2017 Minister Onodera explained the gist of "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," and secretary welcomed Japan's effort in this area Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would further accelerate specific cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa Welcomed the recent progress in the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan
May 31, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas Minister Onodera welcomed the temporary deployment of Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base and the additional deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar system to Japan Agreed to continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries Minister Onodera explained that the Japanese government has begun domestic discussions on Japan's defense policy. The U.S. welcomed and supported such efforts by Japan Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan Agreed to promptly and steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will accelerate specific cooperation in mitigating the impact on Okinawa

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
Jul. 11, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas Agreed in addition to close bilateral cooperation between Japan and the U.S. to advance trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK and Japan, the U.S., and Australia The Japanese side explained the purport of the Cabinet decision on the development of a new security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. Agreed to release an interim report on the work to revise the Guidelines at an appropriate timing Agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Agreed to proceed swiftly and steadily with the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab Welcomed the relocation of KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni The Japanese side raised the issue of noise caused by the flight of transient aircrafts at MCAS Futenma, among other matters. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.
Apr. 8, 2015	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands Agreed that they would continue to oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in any area, including the East China Sea Confirmed strong intent to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the process of the revision of the Guidelines The Japanese side explained the status of discussions pertaining to the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. Instructed their respective authorities to consider establishing a new framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities, bearing in mind that risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace are common security challenges to the two countries Welcomed the progress on the efforts to develop a maintenance base shared by the two countries, namely, the U.S. decision to establish a regional depot for the F-35 in Japan, and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma The Japanese side requested continued cooperation to mitigate impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.
Apr. 27, 2015	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") Meeting/ New York	Minister of Defense Nakatani Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Carter Secretary of State Kerry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Released the new Guidelines, and confirmed that they would further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands (reiterated in the Joint Statement) Shared recognition on the importance of "rule of law," including the recent situation in the South China Sea, and agreed that unilateral attempts to alter the status quo cannot be neglected and they would work with the international community to advance various efforts Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma The Japanese side requested cooperation to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side is committed to mitigating impact. Confirmed intent to continue negotiation on the ancillary documents of a supplementary Agreement on cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship as quickly as possible
Apr. 28, 2015	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exchanged views on the situation in the South China Sea, and agreed to continue to strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries Agreed to further advance Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation Confirmed that the new Guidelines will strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the importance of swiftly implementing the new Guidelines The Japanese side explained the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported Japan's efforts in this regard. Welcomed the establishment of the "Space Cooperation Working Group" as a framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue efforts such as realizing bilateral plans pertaining to U.S. base consolidation in Okinawa. Agreed to seek early agreement on a framework for reciprocal defense procurement and to further deepen equipment and technology cooperation.
May 30, 2015	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and other areas Agreed to further advance trilateral defense cooperation, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation Agreed to continue strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in terms of contributing to regional peace and stability The Japanese side explained the recent Cabinet decision on the Legislation for Peace and Security and the commencement of Diet deliberations Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, such as establishing the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expeditious negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Welcomed the fact that the outcome of the discussions in the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group was compiled, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyberspace The Japanese side stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa. The Japanese side is explaining to the Japanese people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan from 2017 would enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region but the Japanese side requested provision of necessary information from the viewpoint of ensuring safety. The U.S. side stated that it would provide necessary information and ensure the safe operation of the Osprey, including the MV-22 already deployed to Japan.
Nov. 3, 2015	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Malaysia	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. The Japanese side stated that it will support the U.S. Forces' activities in the South China Sea. In light of North Korea's posture to continue activities for launching long-range ballistic missiles, confirmed that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate on this matter Agreed to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation with the ROK, Australia, and the Philippines In light of North Korea's posture to continue activities for launching long-range ballistic missiles, confirmed that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate on this matter The Japanese side explained the recent enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and the U.S. side stated that they support and welcome the enactment Welcomed the establishment of the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM). Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa, and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter. The Japanese side requested that the U.S. Force minimize the impact on the local residents in the relevant areas associated with their operation and give maximum consideration to the aspect of safety. The U.S. side expressed its intention to always ensure maximum safety of both the local residents and the U.S. Forces personnel. Regarding the Host Nation Support (HNS), agreed that they would continue to hold consultations between the two countries, and make efforts to reach an early agreement In light of the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
Jun. 4, 2016	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed their intention to devise a set of effective prevention measures, including the review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas With regard to North Korea's provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines Welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP-MOU), and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology The Japanese side stated that Japan's position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it fully understands Japan's position and would maintain close cooperation with Japan. The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including training relocation to outside of Okinawa Prefecture. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate with Japan. Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area
Sep. 15, 2016	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconfirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas With regard to North Korea's provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016 The Japanese side stated that Japan's position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter. Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area
Dec. 7, 2016	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreed to oppose North Korea's nuclear and missile development as well as unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks Agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to collaborate closely with the existing strong Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation Welcomed the efforts under way based on the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security, including the signing of the Japan-U.S. ACSA and the commencement of Japan-U.S. joint training in accordance with the Legislation for Peace and Security Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016 Confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to realize the return of a majority of the Northern Training Area in December 2016 With regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter
Feb. 4, 2017	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shared the view that China's activities in the East and South China Seas pose security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region Shared the view that advances in North Korea's nuclear and missile development constitute grave security threats to the stability of Japan and the United States and the region Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands Agreed to strengthen engagement in the East China Sea Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks The Japanese side stated that it will strengthen its defense capabilities and expand Japan's role in the Alliance The U.S. side stated that it will remain committed to the defense of Japan, and underscored that the U.S. commitment to the region will be enhanced through its ongoing presence Confirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the United States' unwavering commitment to extended deterrence Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking into account the Guidelines established in 2015 The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the steady progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces Japan. The U.S. side stated that it seeks to advance the realignment through Japan-U.S. collaboration. With regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan
Jun. 3, 2017	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shared the view that North Korea's successive ballistic missile launches and other acts are flagrant provocations against the stability of Japan and the United States and the region and are absolutely intolerable, and that it is important to have close Japan-U.S.-ROK collaboration in addition to Japan-U.S. collaboration The Japanese side highly praised the United States' visible commitment to the peace and stability of the region, including the dispatch of its carrier strike group, and stated that it is important to strengthen pressure on North Korea Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands Confirmed that Japan and the United States will deepen their cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in the East China Sea and regarding engagement in the South China Sea Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and welcomed the joint training between the SDF and the carrier strike group being conducted in the Sea of Japan as an activity contributing to this end Agreed that they will continue to coordinate for the prompt holding of a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting Agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the U.S. side announced its commitment to continue to promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Reference 27 Joint Statement

February 10, 2017

President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held their first official meeting today in Washington D.C. and affirmed their strong determination to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and economic relationship.

U.S.-Japan Alliance

The unshakable U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace, prosperity, and freedom in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. commitment to defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, is unwavering. Amid an increasingly difficult security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States will strengthen its presence in the region, and Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities in the alliance. The United States and Japan will continue to implement and expand defense cooperation as laid out in the 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. The United States and Japan will further enhance cooperation with allies and partners in the region. The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining international order based upon the rule of law.

The two leaders affirmed the commitment of the United States and Japan to the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, to ensure the long-term, sustainable presence of U.S. forces. They affirmed that the United States and Japan are committed to the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henoko area and in adjacent waters. It is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands. The United States and Japan will deepen cooperation to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea. The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining a maritime order based on international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States and Japan also call on countries concerned to avoid actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of outposts, and to act in accordance with international law.

The United States and Japan strongly urge North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and not to take any further provocative actions. The U.S.-Japan Alliance is fully capable of ensuring the security of Japan. The United States is fully committed to defending its homeland, forces, and allies, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities. The two leaders affirmed the importance of an early resolution of the abductions issue. They also affirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The United States and Japan are also committed to rigorous implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea.

The United States and Japan will strengthen their bilateral technological cooperation on defense innovation to meet the evolving security challenges. The United States and Japan will also expand bilateral security cooperation in the fields of space and cyberspace. The United States and Japan also strongly condemn terrorism in all forms and manifestations and will enhance our cooperation to fight against terrorist groups that pose a global threat.

The two leaders instructed their foreign and defense ministers to convene a Security Consultative Committee (SCC: "2+2") meeting to identify ways to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through the review of the respective roles, missions, and capabilities of the two countries.

U.S.-Japan Economic Relations

The United States and Japan represent 30 percent of the world's GDP and share an interest in sustaining a strong global economy, ensuring financial stability, and growing job opportunities. To advance these interests, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their commitments to using the three-pronged approach of mutually-reinforcing fiscal, monetary, and structural policies to strengthen domestic and global economic demand.

The two leaders discussed opportunities and challenges facing each of their economies and the need to promote inclusive growth and prosperity in their countries, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world. They emphasized that they remain fully committed to strengthening the economic relationships between their two countries and across the region, based on rules for free and fair trade. This will include setting high trade and investment standards, reducing market barriers, and enhancing opportunities for economic and job growth in the Asia-Pacific.

The United States and Japan reaffirmed the importance of both deepening their trade and investment relations and of their continued efforts in promoting trade, economic growth, and high standards throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Toward this end, and noting that the United States has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the leaders pledged to explore how best to accomplish these shared objectives. This will include discussions between the United States and Japan on a bilateral framework as well as Japan continuing to advance regional progress on the basis of existing initiatives.

In addition, the two leaders expressed interest in exploring cooperation across sectors that promote mutual economic benefits to the United States and Japan.

The two leaders decided to have their countries engage in an economic dialogue to discuss these and other issues. They also reaffirmed their intent to continue cooperation in regional and global fora.

Invitations to Visit Japan

Prime Minister Abe invited President Trump for an official visit to Japan during the course of this year, and also welcomed an early visit of Vice President Pence to Tokyo. President Trump accepted these invitations.

Reference 28 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ

Item	Outline	Grounds
Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) ¹	Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
Labor costs	Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
	Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987	Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)
	Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1996)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
	The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625 during the SMA period	Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)
Utilities costs	The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be increased in stages from 22,625 to 23,178 during the SMA period	Special Measures Agreement (FY2016)
	Electricity, gas, water supply, sewage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
Utilities costs	The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001	Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)
	The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel, etc., equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010	Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)
	The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ will be phased in from current 76% (approximate) to 72% over the new SMA period.	Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)
Utilities costs	The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to approximately 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ each year will be reduced from 72% to 61%.	Special Measures Agreement (FY2016)
	Training relocation costs	Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the GOJ have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996

Notes: Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the "Criteria for adopting FIP projects" to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows: 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors. 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others). In Japan-U.S. agreements including the Special Measures Agreement (FY2016), it was agreed that the amount of FIP funding will not be less than 20.6 billion yen each year.

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
	20. Awase Meadows Golf Course	47			◎		Returned on July 31, 2010
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makinato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on November 30, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62					Returned on September 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha) Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
	(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)	58	○				Returned on October 31, 2006
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of the eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(18. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
16 facilities, 20 issues		973	7	7	3	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Change agreed on December 21, 2001
MCAS Futenma	21. Lands along eastern side	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area	43	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996
3 facilities, 3 issues		48	2	1	0	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the "Area" column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
 2. A single circle in the "Classification" column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
 3. The numbers in the "Scope" column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.
 4. "SCC" in the "Classification" column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de-zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

Reference 30 The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series

of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

- Futenma Air Station — See attached.
- Northern Training Area
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:
 - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
 - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
- Aha Training Area
Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Sobe Communication Site
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port
Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).
- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
- Parachute drop training
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station

Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.

- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

- Accident reports
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.
- Supplemental automobile insurance
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
- Payment for claims
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
 - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
 - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
 - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.
- Quarantine procedures
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.
- Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

- I. Introduction
 - a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
 - b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In

addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

- c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.
2. Decisions of the SCC
 - a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
 - b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
 - c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
 - d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
 - e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
 3. Guiding Principles
 - a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
 - b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
 - c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the

location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.

- d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
 - e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
 - f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

 - a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
 - b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
 - c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
 5. The Next Steps
 - a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
 - b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
 - c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

Reference 31 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc. • February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) • December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,010 ha) was returned
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen • July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen • June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m²) was returned • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Sobe Communication Site [approximately 53 ha])
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated • July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha) • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield [approximately 191 ha])
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station • September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) • October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station
MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38 ha) • January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities • February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished • March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened • December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished • April 2017: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) were furnished * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*	(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997
Parachute Drop Training	• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	• July 2000: Furnished
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base	• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp • July 2013: Parking space, etc. were furnished • July 2014: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc. • December 2016: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc. • January 2017: Relocation completed • March 2017: Maintenance hangar, parking apron, etc. were furnished
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base*	* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. * August 2014: Relocation of all 15 aircraft from MCAS Futenma to Iwakuni Air Base was completed

Reference 32 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility

Month & Year	Background
April 1996	Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.
December 1996	SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).
November 1999	Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use
December 1999	Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab
July 2002	“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.
November 2003	Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.
August 2004	A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.
October 2005	“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)
April 2006	“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).
May 2006	• “2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved • “Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. • “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.
August 2006	Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”
August 2007	The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.
April 2009	Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.
September 2009	Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People's New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.
November 2009	Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.
December 2009	Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.
May 2010	“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”
August 2010	Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report
June 2011	“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.
December 2011– January 2012	The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.
February 2012	The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
April 2012	“2+2” Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.

Month & Year	Background
December 2012	Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.
March 2013	Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.
April 2013	Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.
October 2013	“2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
December 2013	Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project
July 2014	Started the construction of replacement facilities
October 2014	Joint press release by Japan and the United States → Reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma
April 2015	“2+2” Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
October 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project • The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism recognized the request of the Okinawa Defense Bureau and decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit
November 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit
March 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The government announced it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation • Landfill work was suspended • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit • Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
April 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court-suggested settlement under the philosophy of “haste makes waste,” and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that its understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe’s strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation.
June 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it fully understands the views of the Japanese Government and will continue to work closely with Japan.
July 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act
September 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it will continue to work closely with Japan.
December 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa in a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act (finalized victory of the national government) • Governor of Okinawa retracted the revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project • Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction
February 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
April 2017	Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation

Reference 33 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures	
West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	Returned
The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned
Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2014 or later
A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2019 or later ¹
Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided	
Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)	JFY2025 or later
Lower Plaza Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later ^{2,3}
Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area	JFY2025 or later
Naha Port	JFY2028 or later
Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1	JFY2022 or later
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma	JFY2022 or later
Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan	
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	—
The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2024 or later ⁴

Note:

- 1: Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing.
- 2: Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.
- 3: Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.
- 4: Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

Reference 34 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

(Signed on February 17, 2009)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Affirming that Japan–the United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives,

Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–the United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, “United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”) will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance,

Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self- Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar (\$10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars (\$6,090,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year

2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly,

Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam—estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars (\$3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars (\$1,000,000,000) for a road,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement.
2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”).

Article 2

The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to paragraph 2 of Article 9 of this Agreement.

Article 3

The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America.

Article 4

The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation.

Article 5

The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably.

Article 6

The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in paragraph 1. (a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects.

Article 7

- (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements.
(b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year.
- Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars).
- (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 3. (b) of this Article.
(b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year.
- (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 4. (b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
(b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
- The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions.

Article 8

The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration.

Article 9

- Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.
- United States' measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan's financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap.

Article 10

The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 11

This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged.

Reference 35

Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

(Signed on October 3, 2013)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Recalling the Joint Statement of Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee, dated April 27, 2012, which announced, inter alia, that the two governments are to consult regarding further actions to be taken in light of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, signed at Tokyo on February 17, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"), Desiring to amend the Agreement, Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The fifth to ninth paragraphs of the preamble of the Agreement shall be deleted, and the following six paragraphs shall be inserted immediately after the fourth paragraph:

"Recalling that Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap and, as part of the adjustments, decided to delink both the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as "III MEF") personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, in its Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as "the Joint Statement"),

Recognizing that the Joint Statement confirmed that a total of approximately 9,000 personnel of III MEF, along with their dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan,

Reaffirming that the Joint Statement confirmed that, of the preliminarily estimated eight billion, six hundred million United States dollars (\$8,600,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan is to provide up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) (equivalent to three billion, one hundred twenty-one million, eight hundred eighty-seven thousand, eight hundred fifty-five United States dollars (\$3,121,887,855) in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be completed as soon as possible,

Reaffirming further that the Joint Statement confirmed that the United States is to fund the remaining costs and any additional costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam,

Recalling that the Joint Statement announced that the two Governments are to consider cooperation in developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and United States forces,

Recalling that, under the plans outlined in the Roadmap as adjusted, the Joint Statement, and the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa published in April, 2013, a part of the consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depends on the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa,

and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on Japan's direct cash contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure as well as necessary measures by the Government of the United States of America,"

Article 2

The phrase "approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents" in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase "the III MEF personnel and their dependents".

Article 3

The phrase "facilities and infrastructure on Guam" in Article 2 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase "facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands".

Article 4

Article 3 of the Agreement shall be deleted.

Article 5

The phrase "facilities and infrastructure on Guam" in Article 4 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase "facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands", and the following sentence shall be inserted at the end of Article 4 of the Agreement:

"Such facilities may include training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands."

Article 6

Article 4 of the Agreement shall be renumbered as Article 3, and the following Article shall be inserted immediately after renumbered Article 3:

"Article 4

The Government of the United States of America, with the intent to provide reasonable access, shall favorably consider requests by the Government of

Japan to use training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, including those whose development has been funded with Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest.”

Article 7

Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds for the Relocation, which may include (1) United States funds and (2) Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement.

Article 8

It is confirmed that the Agreement as amended by this Protocol applies to cash contributions made either before or after the entry into force of this Protocol by the Government of Japan in accordance with paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement, their accrued interest, and the projects funded by the cash contributions.

Article 9

This Protocol shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement.

Reference 36 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces

June 6, 2011	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.
June 13, 2012-	Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc. to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 29-	Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). • Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. • The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.
July 23	Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 19	Released the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey’s operations.
October 6	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
January 28, 2013	The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.
April 30	The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).
July 30	The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 25	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
May 11, 2015	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.
December 13, 2016	Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.
February 1, 2017	Periodic aircraft maintenance of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.
March 14	Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.

Reference 37 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan

1. Purpose

It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.

2. Special Measures, etc.

(1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

- In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents' lives more convenient and to developing industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.
- The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.

(2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts

- Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.
- Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council's meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).

(3) Measures for USFJ local employees

- Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.

3. Expiration of the Law

This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment.

Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.

2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation.

However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan's financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.

Reference 38 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (signed on January 16, 2017)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "United States Government"), hereinafter referred to as the "Parties";

Confirming that the United States armed forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "United States armed forces") under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "Treaty") and the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Status of Forces Agreement"), both signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East;

Bearing in mind the "Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component" announced by the Parties on July 5, 2016, and its recognition of the spirit of Alliance cooperation and the mutual commitment of Japan and the United States to strengthen the Alliance further and to enhance deterrence in a complex regional and global security environment;

Acknowledging the essential role of members of the civilian component defined in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Civilian Component") in fulfilling the United States' obligations under the Treaty, as well as the importance of training and education processes for United States personnel with Status of Forces Agreement status;

Wishing to strengthen cooperation between the Parties by establishing a framework, including this Agreement which supplements the Status of Forces Agreement, with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component;

Affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Joint Committee provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Committee") as the means for consultation between the Parties on all

matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement; and

Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component further contributes to achieving the objective of the Treaty and strengthening the Alliance;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The purpose of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation between the Parties with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint Committee. Through the Working Group, the Parties shall retain the right to initiate consultations regarding implementation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 3

The Parties shall continue to cooperate fully, through the framework of the Joint Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays an essential role in fulfilling the United States' obligations under the Treaty.

1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint Committee to develop.

2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that the United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component. Such criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component have skills or knowledge required for the accomplishment of mission requirements.

ARTICLE 4

Through the framework of the Joint Committee, the Parties also shall cooperate to strengthen mechanisms and procedures to ensure that persons ordinarily resident in Japan are excluded from being members of the Civilian Component.

ARTICLE 5

1. The Parties, through the framework of the Joint Committee, shall establish a procedure so that the Government of Japan is notified promptly of contractor employees who have been designated as members of the Civilian Component. The Parties shall consult in the Working Group upon the request of either Party regarding such notification.

2. Upon the development of criteria as directed in Article 3, the United States Government is to establish and maintain procedures for formalized, regular

reviews of contractor employees who are designated as members of the Civilian Component to ensure that they are in fact eligible for such status.

- The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall establish procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component. The United States Government is to provide such reports to the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE 6

If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for resolving matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement.

ARTICLE 7

- This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.
- This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement remains in force.
- Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this Agreement by giving one year's written notice through diplomatic channels to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017.

Reference 39 Direction of the MOD Reform (Outline)

(August 30, 2013 Ministry of Defense)

The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe; there has been awareness of the lessons learned from the operations of units through the Great East Japan Earthquake and other incidents; and the political environment has been changing, such as the move towards establishing the National Security Council (NSC), and taking comprehensive, exceptional measures relating to the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

The MOD reform will undertake full-fledged reform based on these changes in the situation, taking into adequate account the matters highlighted in previous considerations. The direction of the reform is as follows:

- Remove the barriers between civilian officials and uniformed personnel
In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in each of the Staff offices and major commands.
- From partial to total optimization (defense capabilities build-up)
Vertical divisions between the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces will be eliminated, and a procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up based on joint operations. In addition, further efficiency and optimization in equipment acquisition will be attempted, based on consistent management across the life-cycle of the equipment, contributing to the total optimization of defense capabilities.
- Make accurate decisions more swiftly (joint operations)
In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and make the decision-making process swifter, a review of the organization will be conducted so that duties concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff.
- Further enhancement of policy-planning and public relations capability
The policy-planning capability will be strengthened to cope with the drastic increase in international affairs-related work and the founding of the NSC. Together with this, the public relations capability will be enhanced.


In order to ensure that reforms are truly effective, it is vital to change the mentality of both the civilian officials and the uniformed personnel. Furthermore, it is necessary to advance reforms smoothly, to avoid disruption and stagnation in response to contingencies. Accordingly, it is important to establish a series of reforms through steady and phased implementation while the Internal Bureau and Staff offices concurrently support the Minister of Defense. Reform is, ultimately, something that is implemented without end. It is natural that it should be constantly examined, while efforts are made for further reform and improvement.

Reference 40 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1993	May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan
1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2005	Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures)
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD
2006	July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch
2007	The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started
	SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started
2009	March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
	April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
	July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan
2012	March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
	April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea
	December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
2014	North Korea launched ballistic missiles in March, June, and July
	March 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
	March 26: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 600 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
	June 29: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
	July 9: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
2015	July 13: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
	July 26: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
2015	March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan

2016	<p>North Korea launched over 20 ballistic missiles including those claimed to be “satellites” in a single year</p> <p>February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued</p> <p>February 7: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>March 10: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>March 18: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>April 15: Launched a ballistic missile</p> <p>April 23: Launched a ballistic missile</p> <p>April 28: Launched two ballistic missiles</p> <p>May 31: Launched a ballistic missile</p> <p>June 22: Launched two ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 100 km and fell near the east coast of North Korea The second flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>July 9: Launched a ballistic missile</p> <p>July 19: Launched three ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan; the second failed to fly on and did not fall into the Sea of Japan, the details being unclear; and the third flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>August 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, one of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch</p> <p>August 24: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>September 5: Launched three ballistic missiles, all of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan</p> <p>October 15: Launched a ballistic missile</p> <p>October 20: Launched a ballistic missile</p> <p>December 22: At the Nine Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the ballistic missile defense enhanced-capability interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA) would progress to the joint production and deployment stage</p>
2017	<p>North Korea launched ballistic missiles beginning in February</p> <p>February 12: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>March 6: Launched four ballistic missiles, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell into the Sea of Japan (three in the Japanese EEZ)</p> <p>April 5: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 60 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>April 16: Launched a ballistic missile that exploded immediately after launch</p> <p>April 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which fell inland approximately 50 km from the launch site</p> <p>May 14: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>May 21: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</p> <p>May 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan</p> <p>July 4: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan</p>

Reference 41 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles



Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military

- Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies.
- In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet.

Reference 42 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity

2012	<p>April: Agreed in a Japan-US Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole</p> <p>June: Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC)</p> <p>September: “Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces” formulated</p>
2013	<p>May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting</p> <p>July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC)</p> <p>August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area</p> <p>October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities</p>
2014	<p>March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command</p> <p>November: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted</p>
2015	<p>January: Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet</p> <p>January: National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat</p> <p>May: Joint statement issued by the CDPWG</p> <p>September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision</p>
2016	<p>April: MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology</p>

Reference 43 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)

FY	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Kumamoto Earthquake* (28)
Number of Dispatches	520	555	521	541	515	—
Personnel	12,410	89,049	66,267	30,035	33,123	814,200
Vehicles	2,068	7,949	9,621	5,170	5,824	—
Aircraft	684	1,255	1,232	888	725	2,618
Vessels	1	51	0	2	11	300

* Kumamoto Earthquake is excluded in compiling FY 2016 dispatch results

Reference 44 Implementation and Participation Record of Major Drills Related to Disaster Dispatch (FY2016)















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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Implementation of integrated disaster prevention exercises by the Self-Defense Forces (training for responding to Nankai Trough Megathrust Earthquake) (2) Implementation of operational training by the Ministry of Defense Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (3) Participation in “Disaster Prevention Day” operational training by the Government Headquarters (4) Participation in government’s role-playing simulation exercise (5) Participation in Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise (6) Participation in integrated training in preparation for large-scale tsunamis (7) Participation in nuclear disaster prevention training | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (8) Participation in training for medical responses in case of large-scale earthquakes (9) Participation in training in collaboration with the Shizuoka Prefecture comprehensive disaster reduction drills (10) Participation in training in collaboration with the Nine Cities and Prefectures joint disaster prevention training (11) Participation in training in collaboration with the Tokai Region wide-area collaboration disaster prevention training (12) Participation in other general disaster prevention training implemented by local government, etc. |
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Reference 45 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)

(Apr. 1, 2011 – Jun. 30, 2016)

	Dialogue	Date	
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministerial Meeting • Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM Plus) • Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM Plus WG) • Experts’ Working Group (EWG) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime Security EWG • Military Medicine EWG • Counter-Terrorism EWG • Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG • Peacekeeping Operations EWG • Humanitarian Mine Action EWG ○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting among defense authorities 	<p>(Aug. 2013, Nov. 2015)</p> <p>(Apr. 2012, Apr. 2013, Apr. 2014, Feb. 2015, Apr. 2016, Apr. 2017)</p> <p>(Feb. 2013, Mar. 2013, Feb. 2014, Jan. 2015, Feb. 2016, Mar. 2017)</p> <p>(Sep. 2012, Nov. 2012, May 2013, Sep. 2013, Feb. 2014, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, Feb. 2015, Sep. 2015, Oct. 2015, Mar. 2016, Nov. 2016)</p> <p>(Jul. 2012, Oct. 2013, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, May 2015, Sep. 2015, Jan. 2017)</p> <p>(Apr. 2012, Mar. 2013, Oct. 2014, Oct. 2015, Dec. 2016)</p> <p>(Aug. 2012, Jan. 2014, Jul. 2014, Dec. 2014, Aug. 2015, Dec. 2015, May 2016, Dec. 2016, May 2017)</p> <p>(Jun. 2012, Nov. 2012, Apr. 2013, Feb. 2014, Sep. 2014, Mar. 2015, Sep. 2015, Oct. 2016, May 2017)</p> <p>(Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, Oct. 2015, Oct. 2016, May 2017)</p> <p>(May 2012, Nov. 2012, Apr. 2013, May 2013, Dec. 2013, Apr. 2014, Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2015, Apr. 2016, May 2016, May 2017, Jun. 2017)</p>
	Hosted by the private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) 	<p>(Jun. 2012, Jun. 2013, Jun. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2016, Jun. 2017)</p>
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting ○ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum ○ Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges ○ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) ○ International Seminar for Military Science ○ International Conference of Cadets 	<p>(Nov. 2014, Nov. 2016)</p> <p>(Mar. 2013, Feb. 2014, Oct. 2014, Sep. 2015, Sep. 2016)</p> <p>(Mar. 2013)</p> <p>(Oct. 2012, Oct. 2013, Mar. 2015, Mar. 2016, Mar. 2017)</p> <p>(Jul. 2012, Jul. 2013, Jul. 2014, Jun. 2015)</p> <p>(Feb. 2013, Mar. 2014, Mar. 2015)</p>	

Reference 46 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements

	Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement	Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	Information Security Agreement	Security and Defense Cooperation Documents	Foreign and Defense Ministerial level Meetings ("2 + 2"), etc.
 United States	Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983 Established the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006	Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in October 1996 Signed in April 1998 and revised in September 1999 Signed in February 2004 and revised in July 2004 Signed in September 2016 and entered into force in April 2017	Signed and entered into force in August 2007	Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960	(five most recent cases) May 2006, May 2007, Jun. 2011, Oct. 2013, Apr. 2015
 Australia	Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in December 2014	Signed in May 2010 Entered into force in January 2013 Signed in January 2017	Signed in May 2012 Entered into force in March 2013	Signed memorandum in September 2003 Revised memorandum in December 2008	Jun. 2007, Dec. 2008, May 2010, Sep. 2012, Jun. 2014, Nov. 2015
 United Kingdom	Signed and entered into force in July 2013	Signed in January 2017	Signed in July 2013 Entered into force in January 2014	Signed memorandum in January 2004 Revised memorandum in June 2012	Jan. 2015, Jan. 2016
 France	Signed in March 2015 Entered into force in December 2016	Agreed to begin negotiations at the "2+2" in January 2017	Signed and entered into force in October 2011	Signed exchange of notes in April 2002 Revised annex statement in August 2003 Signed statement of intent in July 2014	Jan. 2014, Mar. 2015, Jan. 2017
 India	Signed in December 2015 Entered into force in March 2016	—	Signed and entered into force in December 2015	Signed memorandum in September 2014	(vice ministerial-level meetings) Jul. 2010, Oct. 2012, Apr. 2015, Mar. 2017
 Republic of Korea	—	Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011	Signed and entered into force in November 2016	Signed statement of intent in April 2009	—
 Indonesia	Agreed to begin negotiations at the "2+2" Meeting in December 2015	—	—	Signed memorandum in March 2015	Dec. 2015
 Philippines	Signed in February 2016 Entered into force in April 2016	—	—	Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015	(vice ministerial-level meetings) Agreed to establish meetings in Jun. 2014
 New Zealand	—	Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014	—	Signed memorandum in August 2013	—
 Germany	—	—	—	—	—
 Italy	Signed in May 2017	—	Signed in March 2016 Entered into force in June 2016	Signed statement of intent in June 2012 Signed memorandum in May 2017	—
 Canada	—	Agreed to begin negotiations for conclusion at the Japan-Canada Vice-Minister level "2+2" dialogue in August 2011 Agreed substantively in May 2017	—	—	(vice ministerial-level meetings) Aug. 2011, Mar. 2014, Apr. 2016
 Russia	—	—	—	Signed memorandum in August 1999 Revised memorandum in January 2006	Nov. 2013, Mar. 2017
 NATO	—	—	Signed and entered into force in June 2010	Announced Individual: Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between Japan and NATO in May 2014	—

* Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Viet Nam, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Sweden, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia and the Netherlands; signed statement of intent with Turkey

* Agreed with Malaysia to begin negotiations on defense equipment and technology transfer agreement in May 2015

Reference 47 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016)

(Number of students)

Institution	Country																			Sub total	
	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	Singapore	Malaysia	Vietnam	Cambodia	Timor-Leste	Laos	Myanmar	India	Pakistan	Republic of Korea	Mongolia	Australia	United States	United Kingdom	Germany	France		Canada
National Institute for Defense Studies	1										1				1	2					5
National Defense Academy	5	2				8	3	2	2	3			1	3	1	8			8		46
Ground Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1					1	1			2	1	4	3	1		3					17
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	2	2								1				2	1						8
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	2									2	1		3			1					9
Joint Staff College	2			1	1	1							3			2	2			2	17
Total	13	4	0	1	1	10	4	2	2	11	3	4	12	4	3	16	2	0	8	2	102

Reference 48 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense

(Apr. 1, 2011 – Jun. 30, 2017)

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense Internal Bureau and others	Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	The 8th forum was held in Sendai in September 2016, with the participation of vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries. Candid and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding the topics of "Current Regional Security Status," "United Efforts to Tackle Common Challenges," and "Future of ASEAN-Japan Defense Cooperation" under the theme "To Improve Security Environment in the Region: Enhancement of Defense Cooperation between ASEAN and Japan."
	Tokyo seminar on common security challenges	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. It is a seminar open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as common security challenges and policies for promoting regional cooperation thereby making a venue for open discussion toward the promotion of regional cooperation.	With the participation of intellectuals from inside and outside Japan and defense authorities, discussions were held on the topic entitled "Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Future Role of Japan and ASEAN." The event contributed to efforts to improve the security environment and promoted regional dialogue and cooperation in March 2013.
	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.	With the participation of 26 countries, 24 in the Asia-Pacific region and France and the U.K., the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 21st Forum was held in March 2017. Opinions were exchanged on "Peacekeeping Operations: Upcoming Challenges and Ways to Cooperate Ahead" and "Domestic Challenges of Defense Authorities."
Hosted by Ministry of Defense GSDF MSDF ASDF	Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting officers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.	In August 2016, with the participation of 22 countries from the Asia-Pacific region and other regions, group discussions under the theme of "The Role of Army Types during Large-Scale Disasters." In addition, training for areas affected by the Kumamoto Earthquake and other activities were held.
	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 20th Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2016. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 19 countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme "Logistics Cooperation in International Emergency Assistance Activities."
	Army Command and General Staff College Seminar	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of army colleges from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.	With the participation of students from army colleges in 19 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the 16th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held in August 2016. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Leadership Teamwork in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Multilateral Environment."
	Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.	The 20th seminar was held in February 2017 with the participation of Navy military personnel from 15 countries, the personnel from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), personnel from Osaka University graduate school, and the Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of "Strengthening Maritime Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region." In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the MSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.
	Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Staff College Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2015, with the participation of officials related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar.)	Air staff college personnel and researcher from four countries were invited in October 2016 for keynote speeches and presentations. And they exchanged the views on the theme of "The Strategic Role of Air Power."
International Air Command and Staff Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of air staff college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.	With the participation of air staff college students in 21 countries, the 16th seminar was held in October 2016. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Air Power and Multilateral Cooperation."	

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research."
		International Cadets' Conference	In March 2017, 19 countries were invited to the 20th conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of "The Time We Become Leaders."
	National Institute for Defense Studies	International Symposium on Security Affairs	In July 2016, notable researchers and practitioners from the United States, ROK, and Japan were invited to this symposium to exchange opinions under the theme "The Future Security Environment Surrounding North Korea."
		International Security Colloquium	In July 2016, researchers and practitioners from the United States and ROK were invited to this colloquium, and opinions were exchanged among the invited foreign experts together with Japanese experts under the theme "The Future Security Environment Surrounding North Korea."
		International Forum on War History	In September 2016, researchers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan were invited to this forum to exchange opinions under the theme "Japan's Alliances from a Historical Perspective."
		Asia-Pacific Security Workshop	In January 2017, researchers were invited from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Australia, and the United States, to exchange opinions on the theme of "Security outlook of the Asia Pacific countries and its implications for the defense sector."

Reference 49 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureau and others	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
		Putrajaya Forum	This event, hosted by the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security and participated in by national defense experts from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has participated since the first forum in 2010.
		Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD)	This event, hosted by the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia (organized by the Indonesian Defence University) and participated in by the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has participated since the first dialogue in 2011.
		Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)	This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012.
	Joint Staff	Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
Hosted by the Government	GSDF	Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.
		Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.
		Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC)	LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the first event of which was held in April 2013. The GSDF Chief of Staff was officially invited to the second symposium held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the "Current situation and the future of Japan-U.S. Cooperation" which gained support from the U.S. Army Pacific Commander and other participants from different countries.
		Chief of Army's Exercise (CAEX)	CAEX is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.
		PACOM Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)	Held for the first time in May 2015, hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific from the perspective of contributing to the amphibious operations capacities of friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to contribute to regional stability through strengthening relations with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and enhancing interoperability. It has been held annually since then. Japan has participated from the first meeting.
		Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)	Hosted by AUSA, the annual meeting provides opportunities for exchanging opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and since 2014 the Chief of the Staff of the GSDF participated in the meeting twice to deliver speeches.

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue		Overview		
Hosted by the Government	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.	
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.	
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.	
		Asia Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.	
		Indian Ocean Naval Symposium	This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.	
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.	
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995.	
		Air Power Conference (APC)	APC is a conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange international views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.	
		International Conference on Air & Space Power (ICAP)	These international conferences on air and space are hosted by Turkish Air War College. ICAP, on the theme of the future of the air forces, and ISAW, on the theme of the history of the air forces, are respectively held every other year. Japan has participated since their first conferences in 2013.	
		International Symposium on the history of Air Warfare (ISAW)		
	Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence	Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)	Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia-Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.	
	National Institute for Defense Studies	ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting	Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001.	
		NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)	CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries taking turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013).	
	Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.
		Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010. The Summit did not take place in 2011.
Munich Security Conference		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010.		
Halifax International Security Forum		Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.		
The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.		

Introduction

- "Vientiane Vision: Japan's Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN" is Japan's own initiative for the future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation
- Annually follow up the implementation of the specific and practical activities listed in the Vision through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum starting from 2017

Contents


1. Background of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation

- (1) The Asia-Pacific region faces increasingly serious challenges for the security, which makes more difficult for any single country to respond alone
- (2) ASEAN is a hub for the regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region with an increasing importance. Japan and ASEAN have traditionally maintained strong ties; Further enhancement of bilateral/multilateral cooperation is crucial in ensuring a stable regional security environment
- (3) Japan welcomes the establishment of ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 and supports its centrality and unity. Since the establishment, ASEAN-Wide multilateral cooperation has become even more important, in addition to bilateral cooperation with its individual member states

2. Evolution of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: deepening "exchanges" toward "cooperation"


- (1) Starting defense exchanges from 1990s: enhancing mutual understanding and confidence through defense exchanges
- (2) Developing defense cooperation from 2000s: more practical/ operational defense cooperation with ASEAN member states
- (3) Deepening defense cooperation from 2010s: starting new projects such as capacity building cooperation with further specific and practical activities and promoting multilateral cooperation through regional frameworks such as ADMM-Plus

[Reference] Development of Japan-ASEAN Defense Exchanges and Cooperation



3. Future Direction of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: Toward the "ASEAN-Wide" Practical Cooperation

- (1) Purpose: In addition to the cooperation with "Individual ASEAN Member States," "ASEAN-Wide" cooperation will be expanded through promoting practical cooperation with a view to 1. respecting and promoting shared principles such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights, 2. promoting and enhancing the rule of law, 3. supporting ASEAN efforts to strengthen its centrality and unity which is a cornerstone of regional cooperation
- (2) Direction: In order to contribute to regional peace, security and prosperity, future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation will be focused on the following three points
 - To consolidate the order based on the principles of international law governing peaceful conduct among states, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to uphold principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space
 - To promote maritime security which is a foundation for the regional peace and prosperity, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space
 - To cope with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities in various fields
- (3) Measures: Conducting practical defense cooperation by effectively combining the following diverse measures
 - 1) Promotion of International Law (PIL): sharing understanding and experience regarding international law, especially in the field of maritime security, through i.e. conducting researches and sponsoring seminars, etc., with a view to its effective implementation.
 - 2) Capacity Building Cooperation (CBC): conducting CBC in various fields such as HA/DR, PKO, landmine and UXO clearance, cybersecurity, defense buildup planning (sharing know-how), etc.
 - 3) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (DETC): transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources regarding DETC, holding seminars on defense industries, etc.
 - 4) Joint Training and Exercises (JTE): continued participation in multilateral joint training and exercises, inviting ASEAN observers to Self- Defense Forces' training, etc.
 - 5) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchange (HRD/AE): Inviting Opinion Leaders from ASEAN, etc.



(4) The JMOD institutional development to better address "ASEAN-Wide" practical cooperation based on the Vision

(June 2012 – June 2017)

Country	Period	Description	Format	Beneficiary	Dispatched personnel
Mongolia	October 2012	Seminar on military medicine	Short-term	Central hospital of the Mongolian Armed Forces, etc.	2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	November 2013	Training on military medicine at GSDF Central Hospital, etc.	Invitation	General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital	—
	June - July 2014	Human resource development in civil engineering	Long-term	Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University	9 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	July 2014	Seminar on military medicine	Short-term	General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital	3 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials

Country	Period	Description	Format	Beneficiary	Dispatched personnel
Mongolia	February - March 2015	Training on civil engineering at GSDF Engineer School	Invitation	Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University	—
	March 2015	Training on military medicine at GSDF Sapporo Hospital	Invitation	General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital	—
	July - September 2015	Human resource development in civil engineering	Long-term	Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University	15 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	February 2016	Training on civil engineering at GSDF Engineer School	Invitation	Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University	—
	July - September 2016	Human resource development in civil engineering	Long-term	Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University	19 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
Vietnam	October 2012	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Vietnamese Navy, etc.	3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	March 2013	PKO training	Invitation	Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People's Army	—
	May 2013	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Vietnamese Navy	2 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	September 2013	Seminar on underwater medicine	Invitation	Vietnamese Navy	—
	September 2013	Seminar on aviation safety	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	5 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	February 2014	Training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Invitation	Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam	—
	March 2014	Training on aviation safety, etc.	Invitation	Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam Air Defence and Air Forces	—
	March 2014	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Vietnamese Navy, etc.	3 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	November 2014	Seminar on aviation safety	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	February 2015	Seminar on international aviation law	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	2 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	March 2015	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Vietnamese Navy, etc.	4 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	November 2015	Seminar on aviation safety	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	November 2015	Seminar on aviation medicine	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	March 2016	PKO training at United Nations	Invitation	Peacekeeping Center of Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People's Army	2 Joint Staff personnel, 1 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	March 2016	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Vietnamese Navy, etc.	3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	April 2016	PKO training by engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan	Invitation	Peacekeeping Center of Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People's Army	1 Joint Staff personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	November 2016	Seminar on aviation safety	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	November 2016	Seminar on aviation medicine	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	March 2017	Training on aviation medicine	Invitation	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	—
	June 2017	Seminar on air rescue	Short-term	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force and related organizations	4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
Timor-Leste	December 2012 - March 2013	Human resource development in vehicle maintenance	Long-term	Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 4 private-sector organization members
	October 2013 - March 2014	Human resource development in vehicle maintenance	Long-term	Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members
	June 2014	Training on logistics support by GSDF	Invitation	Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	—
	September - November 2014	Human resource development in vehicle maintenance	Long-term	Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 3 private-sector organization members
	July 2015	Instruction of vehicle maintenance	Short-term	Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	5 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	October - November 2015	Instruction of civil engineering (hosted by the Australian Defence Force)	Long-term	Timor-Leste Defence Force engineers	8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	February 2016	Instruction of vehicle maintenance	Short-term	Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	August 2016	Instruction of vehicle maintenance	Short-term	Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	6 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	October - November 2016	Technical instruction of engineering activities (hosted by the Australian Defence Force)	Long-term	Timor-Leste Defence Force engineers	7 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	December 2016	Training on vehicle maintenance by GSDF	Invitation	Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	—
February 2017	Instruction of vehicle maintenance	Short-term	Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force	4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official	
Cambodia	January - March 2013	Human resource development in civil engineering	Long-term	National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia	4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members
	December 2013 - March 2014	Human resource development in civil engineering	Long-term	National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia	16 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members
	September - October 2014	Human resource development in civil engineering	Invitation	Cambodian Ministry of National Defense Engineer Department, Cambodian Army Headquarters Engineer Corps	—
	October - November 2014	Human resource development in civil engineering	Long-term	National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia	3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	November 2015	Human resource development in civil engineering	Short-term	National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia	3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	February 2017	Human resource development in civil engineering	Short-term	National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia	7 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official

Country	Period	Description	Format	Beneficiary	Dispatched personnel
Indonesia	February 2013	Seminar on oceanography	Short-term	Indonesian Navy	3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	July 2013	Seminar on oceanography	Short-term	Indonesian Navy	1 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	February 2014	Training on oceanography	Invitation	Indonesian Navy	—
	February 2015	Seminar on international aviation law	Short-term	Indonesian Ministry of Defense	2 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	March 2016	Seminar on oceanography	Short-term	Indonesian Navy	2 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	January 2017	Training on oceanography	Invitation	Indonesian Navy	—
	March 2017	Seminar on international maritime law	Short-term	Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Indonesian Navy, etc.	5 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
Myanmar	December 2014	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Myanmar Army and Navy, etc.	3 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	January 2015	Seminar on aviation meteorology	Short-term	Myanmar Air Force	4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	March 2015	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Myanmar Army	1 GSDF personnel 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	August 2015	Training on aviation meteorology at ASDF units/facilities, etc.	Invitation	Myanmar Air Force	—
	September 2015	Training on underwater medicine at MSDF units/facilities, etc.	Invitation	Myanmar Navy	—
	October 2015	Training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at GSDF units/facilities, etc.	Invitation	Myanmar Army	—
	December 2015	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Myanmar Army and Navy, etc.	4 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	March 2016	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Myanmar Army	3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	December 2016	Seminar on underwater medicine	Short-term	Myanmar Army and Navy, etc.	4 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	February 2017	Seminar on aviation meteorology	Short-term	Myanmar Air Force, etc.	6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	February 2017	Seminar on international aviation law	Short-term	Myanmar Air Force, etc.	6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
March 2017	Training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at SDF Central Hospital, GSDF units/facilities, etc.	Invitation	Myanmar Army	—	
Papua New Guinea	July 2014	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Papua New Guinea Defence Force	2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	June – August 2015	Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory	Invitation	Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band	—
	March 2016	Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory	Invitation	Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band	—
	August 2016	Guidance on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory	Short-term	Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band	8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	October – November 2016	Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory	Invitation	Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band	—
	January – March 2017	Guidance on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory	Long-term	Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band	5 GSDF personnel
	May – July 2017	Guidance on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory	Invitation	Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band	—
Philippines	February 2015	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Invitation	Philippine Air Force	—
	June 2015	Seminar on international aviation law	Short-term	Philippine Air Force	3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	June 2016	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Philippine Army	2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	July 2016	Seminar on diesel engine maintenance	Short-term	Philippine Navy	3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	May 2017	Instruction of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (medical)	Short-term	Philippine Army, etc.	2 Joint Staff personnel, 2 GSDF personnel
Malaysia	June 2015	Seminar on international aviation law	Short-term	Royal Malaysian Air Force	3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	October 2016	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Royal Malaysian Army	2 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
ASEAN member states	January 2016	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for ASEAN member states hosted by Japan and the United Kingdom	Short-term	ASEAN governments, militaries, and civil organizations	2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
Laos	February 2016	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People's Army	1 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
	June 2016	Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People's Army	3 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	August 2016	Instruction of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	Short-term	Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People's Army	6 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
Thailand	April 2016	Seminar on international aviation law	Short-term	Royal Thai Armed Force	3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials
	May 2016	Training on aviation safety by ASDF units, etc.	Invitation	Royal Thai Air Force	—
	April 2017	Seminar on aviation safety	Short-term	Royal Thai Air Force	5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official
Kazakhstan	October 2016	Seminar on military medicine	Invitation	Kazakhstan Ministry of National Defence	—

Reference 52 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)

(Apr. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)

Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Cobra Gold	February 2015 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, India, Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, China, Malaysia, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
	January - February 2016 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, India, Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, China, Malaysia	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
	January - February 2017 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China, India	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.
Pacific Partnership	May – July 2014 (Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Malaysia, Chile, ROK	1 vessel, 1 aircraft (personnel transportation) Approximately 40 personnel
	May – August 2015 (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Philippines)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore	1 vessel Approximately 60 personnel
	July – August 2016 (Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Palau, Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand	1 vessel Approximately 70 personnel
	March – May 2017 (Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Vietnam)	Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., ROK	2 vessels Approximately 70 personnel
ARF-DiREx	May 2015 (Malaysia)	Japan, U.S., India, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mongolia, Laos, etc.	Approximately 10 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Internal Bureau, Eastern Army, Air Training Command, SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Ominato Hospital
ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercises	April – May 2014 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Canada, France, EU	7 personnel
ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise	September 2016 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Australia, New Zealand, Russia	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau
ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Counterterrorism Exercise)	May 2016 (Brunei and Singapore)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Russia	1 vessel
ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Mahi Tangaroa 16)	November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)	Japan, U.S., Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, etc.	1 vessel
Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise	Garuda Canti Dharma August – September 2014 (Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, ROK, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mongolia, Australia, Jordan, etc.	Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force
	Keris Aman August 2015 (Malaysia)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, ROK, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Australia, etc.	5 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force
	Shanti Prays III March – April 2017 (Malaysia)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, ROK, Nepal, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, etc.	Central Readiness Force 2 personnel
Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)	June – July 2014 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., etc.	8 personnel
	June – July 2015 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Approximately 40 personnel
	May – June 2016 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Approximately 50 personnel including observers
Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Convention	May 2014 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Philippines, Brunei, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Canada, U.K., France	Approximately 30 personnel
	May 2015 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Canada	Approximately 30 personnel
	April - May 2016 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., ROK, China, Australia, UAE, etc.	Approximately 30 personnel
	April - May 2017 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, UAE, etc.	Approximately 20 personnel
KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy	March – April 2014 (Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Singapore, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Russia, etc.	1 vessel
	April 2016 (Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, China, Russia, etc.	1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training	June 2013 (Waters and airspace around Guam)	Japan, U.S., Australia	1 vessel 2 aircraft
	August 2014 (Waters and airspace around Guam)		2 aircraft
	September 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)		1 vessel
	December 2015 (Waters around Micronesia)		1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel
	January – February 2016 (Waters around Singapore - India)		1 vessel
	December 2016 (Waters around Micronesia)		1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training	July 2014 (Waters west of Kyushu)	1 vessel	
	June 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)	1 vessel	
	October 2016 (Waters west of Kyushu)	1 vessel	
	November 2016 (Waters around Japan)	1 vessel	
	January 2017 (Waters around Japan)	1 vessel	
	March 2017 (Waters around Japan)	1 vessel	
	April 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu)	1 vessel 1 aircraft	

Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Training	March 2016 (Waters off the Sanriku Coast)		2 aircraft
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Joint Training	September 2016 (Waters around Hawaii)		1 vessel
Japan-Canada-Singapore Trilateral Training	June 2017 (Waters south of Shikoku)		1 vessel
U.S. and India-Hosted Maritime Joint Exercise (Exercise Malabar)	July 2014 (Waters south of Shikoku – east of Okinawa)	Japan, U.S., India	2 vessels Several aircraft
	September – November 2015 (Waters and airspace east of India)	Japan, U.S., India	1 vessel
	June 2016 (Waters east of Sasebo - Okinawa)	Japan, U.S., India	1 vessel 3 aircraft
Multilateral Training (TGEX KOA KAI EAST)	October – December, 2014 (Waters around San Diego)	Japan, U.S., Canada	1 vessel
Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)	August – September 2014 (Waters around Australia)	Japan, Australia, etc.	1 vessel 2 aircraft
	September 2016 (Waters around Australia)	Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.	1 vessel 2 aircraft
U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise	October – November 2014 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	2 vessels
	April 2016 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	2 vessels
U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise	May 2017 (Bahrain)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Several personnel
Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise	August 2015 (Waters around Singapore and Indonesia)	Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, etc.	3 vessels
	June 2017 (Waters around Guam)	Japan, U.S., etc.	5 personnel
Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise	May 2016 (Waters around ROK)	Japan, U.S., ROK, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore	2 vessels
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)	February 2015 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)		Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel
	February 2016 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)		Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel
	February 2017 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)		Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 480 personnel
Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Exercise Southern Jackaroo)	May 2014, May 2015, May 2016, May 2017 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Approximately 100 personnel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Exercise Talisman Saber)	July 2015 (Australia)		Approximately 40 personnel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Michinoku Alert)	November 2014 (Tohoku)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Northeastern Army Approximately 12,500 personnel, approximately 1,700 vehicles
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Northern Rescue 2015)	August 2015 (Hokkaido)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Northern Army Headquarters Approximately 3,300 personnel, approximately 300 vehicles
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Nankai Rescue 2017)	July 2016 (Central District)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Middle Army 5,500 personnel, approximately 700 vehicles, 10 aircraft
RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)	June – August 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, China, ROK, U.K., etc.	2 vessels, 3 aircraft, Western Army, etc.
	June – August 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, Columbia, Chile, etc.	2 vessels, 2 aircraft, Western Army, etc.
Japan-Australia-New Zealand Joint Training	August 30, 2014 (Surrounding airspace of Darwin)	Japan, Australia, New Zealand	2 aircraft
New Zealand Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Ngatahi)	November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)	Japan, New Zealand, etc.	2 aircraft
Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)	August 25-September 5, 2014 (New Caledonia)	Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France	4 personnel
	November 2016 (New Caledonia)	Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France	5 personnel
Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2015)	September 28-October 7, 2015 (New Caledonia)	Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France	7 personnel
Japan-France-U.K. Joint Training	May 2015 (Waters west of Kyushu)	Japan, U.S., France	1 vessel, 2 aircraft
Japan-France-U.K. Joint Training	May 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu – Guam – Northern Mariana Islands)	Japan, France, U.K., U.S.	220 personnel, 1 vessel, 2 aircraft
Pakistani Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Training (Aman-17)	February 2017 (Surrounding airspace of Pakistan)	Japan, Pakistan, etc.	2 aircraft
Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise	March 2017 (Waters around Malaysia)	Japan, Malaysia, U.S., etc.	1 vessel
Multilateral Counter-Piracy Joint Training	April 2017 (Gulf of Aden)	Japan, U.S., U.K., ROK	1 vessel, 1 aircraft

Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Jun. 2014	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (5th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✧ 2+2” Meeting: 1) Agreement reached to strongly oppose the use or force of power to change the status quo unilaterally, 2) Confirmed a substantive agreement on the Agreement negotiation regarding the transfer of the defense equipment and technology ✧ Defense Ministerial Meeting: Agreement reached to promote the strengthening of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation such as an expansion of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training
	Jul. 2014	Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting) ✧ Issued Joint Statement (signed defense equipment transfer agreement, approved proposals to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, and decided to commence negotiations to create an agreement for facilitating Japan-Australia joint activities and training, etc.)
	Oct. 2014	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✧ Examined possibility of potential cooperation on F-35, examined possibility of submarine cooperation, technical exchanges (e.g., marine hydrodynamics), etc.
	May 2015	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✧ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation
	Jun. 2015	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✧ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation
	Nov. 2015	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✧ Confirmed the importance of joint exercises and further deepening defense equipment and technology cooperation
	Nov. 2015	Visit to Australia by Minister of Defense (6th “2+2” Meeting) ✧ 1) Shared grave concern over large-scale land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and agreed to comply with freedom of navigation and of overflight, 2) Agreed to further enhance joint exercises and promote cooperation in the fields of capacity building assistance, cyber, and outer space
	Dec. 2015	Visit to Japan by Prime Minister of Australia (Summit Meeting) ✧ Issued Joint Statement (Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond)
	Aug. 2016	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✧ Agree to further progress in defense cooperation through capacity building support, joint exercises, etc.
	Jan. 2017	Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting) ✧ Sign Japan-Australia ACSA
Apr. 2017	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (7th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✧ Identified series of new initiatives for further strengthening Japan-Australia defense cooperation	
	Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff (Sep. 2014, Jun. 2015, Sep. 2016), Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff (Nov. 2014, Jan. 2017), Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff (Feb. 2015, Mar. 2016, Feb. 2017), Visit to Australia by Chief of Joint Staff (Aug. 2014)	
	Visit to Japan by Australian Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Aug. 2015), Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army (Apr. 2016), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy (Mar. 2015), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force (Oct. 2014), Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army (Apr. 2016)	
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Sep. 2015)	
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF) (Aug. 2014, Oct. 2015, Apr. 2016), Dispatching ASDF aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767) to Australia (Feb. 2015, Mar. 2016, Feb. 2017), Shooting competition organized by the Australian Army (May 2014, Apr. 2015, Apr. 2016)	
	Aug. 2014	Visit to Hamamatsu and Chitose Air Bases by Royal Australian Air Force aircraft (E-7A)
	Aug. – Sep. 2014	Participation in the Royal Australian Navy hosted multinational joint maritime exercise “Kakadu 14”
	Oct. 2015	Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise 2015
	Jan. – Feb. 2016	Participation in Japan-U.S.-Australia joint cruising exercise
	Apr. 2016	Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise 2016
	May 2016	Joint exercise with Australian Navy submarines
	Sep. 2016	Participation in multinational joint exercise Kakadu 2016 hosted by the Australian Navy
	Sep. 2016	Visit to U.S. Yokota Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (KC-30A) and implementation of exchanges between inflight refueling and airlift troops
	Dec. 2016	Visit to Chitose Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (government plane: B-737) and implementation of exchanges between special airlift troops
Dec. 2016	Participation in Exercise Southern Jackaroo, U.S.-Australia military training exercise hosted by Australia Army	
Japan – U.S.– Australia trilateral cooperation	Oct. 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	May. 2015	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✧ Joint Statement issued and agreement reached to further deepen the trilateral defense cooperation
	Feb. 2016	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Oct. 2016	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (GSDF) (May 2014, May 2015, Jul. 2015, May 2016, May 2017), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF) (Aug. 2014, Sep. 2014, Feb. 2016), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF) (Feb. 2015, Feb. 2016, Feb. 2017) Japan-U.S.-Australia humanitarian assistance and disaster relief/trilateral disaster relief exercises (Dec. 2015, Dec. 2016)	
	Jul. 2014	2nd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff)
	Feb. 2015	Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)
	Jul. 2015	3rd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Townsville) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Jun. 2016	4th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Jun. 2017	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))

Reference 54 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014–Jun. 30, 2017)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Oct. 2014	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Nov. 2014	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Halifax International Security Forum)
	May 2015	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sep. 2015	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Oct. 2015	Visit to the ROK by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✧ Issued first joint press release. Agreed on the importance of Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation regarding issues of concern for the security of the two countries.
	Oct. 2015	Visit to the ROK by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jan. 2016	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2016	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jun. 2016	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✧ The two ministers agreed to strengthen the system for emergency communication between the MOD and the ROK Ministry of National Defense.
	Mar. 2016	Visit to the ROK by MSDF Chief of Staff
Apr. 2016	Visit to Japan by ROK Army Chief of Staff	
Sep. 2016	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))	

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Sep. 2016 Mar. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Apr. 2015 Aug. 2015	10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul) 21st Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Seoul)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Oct. 2015 Nov. 2015 May 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Feb. 2017	Japan-ROK joint search and rescue exercise (MSDF), participation of ROK naval vessels in Fleet Review Participation of the ROK Navy Band in Japan Self-Defense Force Marching Festival Participation of MSDF vessels in Pacific Reach (MSDF) hosted by the ROK Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF) Visit to the ROK by Sasebo District Commandant (MSDF) Visit to Atsugi Air Base by ROK Navy P-3C (MSDF) Visit to Japan by Commander of the 2nd Operations Command of the ROK (GSDF)
Japan – U.S.– ROK trilateral Cooperation	Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015 Jan. 2016 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Dec. 2016 Mar. 2017 Mar. 2017 Apr. 2017 Apr. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The Ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation including North Korea, while agreeing to continue the close Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation. Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Hawaii) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ The three ministers once again emphasized their resolute position that they do not accept North Korea's continued possession and development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. They agreed to continue to hold consultations on the security issues facing the three countries and to coordinate among the three countries. Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ The three ministers instructed their working-level officials to study ways of promoting communication and coordination among the trilateral defense authorities. They agreed to conduct the first Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon 2016 (exercise held in June 2016). Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (maritime interdiction exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Seoul) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (anti-submarine exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Tokyo) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ The three countries recognized that they face common security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and reaffirmed the importance of continuing cooperation between the three countries including consultations among their defense authorities.

Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014-Jun. 30, 2017)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Mar. 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015 Feb. 2016	Visit to Japan by Prime Minister of India (Summit Meeting) ☆ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and both sides reaffirmed the importance of their bilateral defense relationship and agreed to launch working-level consultations on defense equipment cooperation. Memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. Visit to Japan by Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of India (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ☆ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries which have shared interests in the maritime security domain, as well as defense cooperation and exchange, etc. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ☆ The Japanese side requested cooperation on advancing US-2 cooperation. Both sides confirmed importance of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges. Visit to Japan by Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army Visit to India by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting) ☆ Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and Agreement concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information were signed. Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff
High-level talks between heads of defense	Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Dec. 2016 Dec. 2016 Apr. 2017 May 2017	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Agreement reached to strengthen Japan-India and Japan-U.S.-India cooperation, including regular participation in Exercise Malabar as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation. Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi) ☆ Agreed to steady implementation of cooperation and exchange projects at each level from high level exchanges to expert-to-expert exchanges. Visit to India by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy Staff, Indian Navy Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of India (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Aug. 2014 Mar. 2015 Apr. 2015 Feb. 2016 Mar. 2017	3rd meeting of the US-2 Joint Working Group Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation 3rd Vice-Minister/Secretary level "2+2" dialogue, 4th Defence Policy Dialogue 1st Japan-India Air Component Staff Talks 4th Vice-Minister/Secretary level "2+2" dialogue, 5th Defence Policy Dialogue

Unit-level exchange, etc.	Jul. 2014	Exercise Malabar (in waters around Japan)
	Oct. 2015	Exercise Malabar (in waters east of India)
	Oct. 2015	Participation of Indian naval vessels in Japan Self-Defense Forces Fleet Review
	Dec. 2015	Expert-to-expert exchanges in aviation safety (Japan)
	Feb. 2016	MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Indian Navy (in waters east of India)
	Mar. 2016	Expert-to-expert exchanges between test pilots (India)
	Mar. 2016	Unit-to-unit exchanges between U-4 transport aircraft crews (in India)
	Mar. 2016	Expert-to-expert exchanges between test pilots (Japan)
	Jun. 2016	Exercise Malabar (Sasebo and in waters east of Okinawa)
	Jun. 2016	Unit-to-unit exchanges involving Indian Air Force transport aircraft crews in ASDF bases.
	Jul. 2016	ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft dispatched to India.
	Dec. 2016	Japan-India goodwill exercise
	Mar. 2017	Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area (Japan)

Reference 56 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014–Jun. 30, 2016)

High-level talks between heads of defense	Mar. 2015	13th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense deputy ministers) (Tokyo)
	May 2015 Nov. 2015	Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✧ The two sides confirmed that they would swiftly begin operations of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism and on the importance of deepening bilateral defense exchanges
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Jun. 2016	Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Nov. 2016	14th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense deputy ministers) (Beijing)
	Jan. 2015	4th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Tokyo)
	May 2015 Jun. 2015 Nov. 2016	2nd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo) 5th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Beijing) 6th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Tokyo)

Reference 57 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014–Jun. 30, 2017)

High-level talks between heads of defense	May 2015	Japan-Russia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Mar. 2017	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Oct. 2014	15th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises
	Dec. 2014	Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army
	Jan. 2017	16th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises

Reference 58 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)

High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense	Cambodia	Oct. 2014	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister)
		May 2015	Japan-Cambodia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
		Jun. 2015	Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
		Sep. 2015	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister)
		Feb. 2016	Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
		Aug. 2016	Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Indonesia	Sep. 2016	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister)
		Oct. 2016	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Air Force (AFFJ)
		Jun. 2014	Visit to Indonesia by ASDF Chief of Staff
		Oct. 2014	Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff
		Feb. 2015	Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff
		Mar. 2015	Visit to Japan by Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Indonesia (Summit Meeting) ✧ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange
Indonesia	May 2015	Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Aug. 2015	Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Sep. 2015	Visit to Indonesia by GSDF Chief of Staff	
	Sep. 2015	Visit to Japan by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia	
	Dec. 2015	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Indonesia (1st Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✧ Agreement reached to initiate negotiations for an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, and on MSDF's participation in multilateral exercise KOMODO 2016	
	Dec. 2015	Visit to Japan by Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff	
Indonesia	Apr. 2016	Visit to Japan by Indonesian Army Chief of Staff	
	Apr. 2016	Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff	
	Apr. 2016	Visit to Japan by Indonesian Army Chief of the General Staff	
	Aug. 2016	Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Sep. 2016	Visit to Japan by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia	
	Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016	Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff (AFFJ) Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Joint Staff	
Laos	Oct. 2014	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos	
	Feb. 2015	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Sep. 2015	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos	
	Nov. 2015	Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✧ Concurred that the two countries would continue to coordinate and cooperate with each other through the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief EWG	
	Feb. 2016	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Apr. 2016	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Aug. 2016	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Sep. 2016	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos	
	Nov. 2016	Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos (2nd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting))	
	Nov. 2016	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	
	Nov. 2016	Visit to Laos by Chief of Joint Staff	

High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense	Malaysia	Jun. 2014 May 2015 May 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017	Visit to Malaysia by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Chief of Defence Force, Malaysian Armed Forces Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia Visit to Japan by Chief of Navy of Malaysian Navy Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Myanmar	Jul. 2014 Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jul. 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Apr. 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016	Visit to Myanmar by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services of Myanmar Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by Minister of Defense (1st ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting) Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force Visit to Japan by Deputy Commander-in-chief of Defence Services of Myanmar and the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Secretary of National Defense Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force (AFFJ)
	Philippines	Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 Mar. 2015 May 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 May 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Feb. 2017 Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017 Apr. 2017 May 2017	Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to Japan by Philippine Secretary of National Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✕ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Army Visit to Japan by President and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✕ Concurred that the two countries would enhance capacity building assistance and deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFFJ) Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Singapore	Oct. 2014 May 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 May 2015 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chief of Air Force of the Republic of Singapore Air Force Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Singapore by Chief of Joint Staff (14th Shangri-La Dialogue) Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Thailand	Nov. 2014 Jul. 2015 Jul. 2015 Feb. 2016 Mar. 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Aug. 2016 Nov. 2016 Mar. 2017 May 2017	Visit to Japan by Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Thailand by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Army Commander Visit to Thailand by Minister of Defense (Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander
	Vietnam	Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Feb. 2015 May 2015 Sep. 2015 Oct. 2015 Nov. 2015 Jul. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jun. 2017	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Commander of Air Defense and Air Force Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People's Navy Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense (Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff (Pacific Partnership) Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
	Brunei	Nov. 2014 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2016 Aug. 2016	Visit to Brunei by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Regular discussions between defense ministry high-level talks between heads of state and defense representatives	Cambodia	Sep. 2014	3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 4th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Tokyo)
	Indonesia	Nov. 2014 Oct. 2016	6th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 7th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
	Philippines	Mar. 2015 Feb. 2017	Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Manila) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)
	Singapore	Dec. 2014 Apr. 2017	14th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Singapore) 15th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
	Thailand	Mar. 2015 Aug. 2016	12th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 12th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 13th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 13th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Thailand)
	Vietnam	Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Dec. 2015 Nov. 2016	5th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Hanoi) 6th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)
	Myanmar	Mar. 2017	2nd Japan-Myanmar-Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)
	Unit-level exchange, etc.	Southeast Asian Member States and Multilateral Exchanges etc.	Aug. 2014 Feb. 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Jul. 2015 Aug. 2015 Dec. 2015 Jan. – Feb. 2016 Feb. 2016 Mar. 2016 Apr. 2016 May 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Dec. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017 Mar. – Apr. 2017 May 2017 May 2017

Reference 59 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)

High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense	Timor-Leste	Mar. 2015 Jun. 2016	Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Timor-Leste)
	Mongolia	Jun. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Oct. 2015 Oct. 2015 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016	Visit to Mongolia by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Vice Minister of Defense of Mongolia (19th Tokyo Defense Forum) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Mongolia by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Chief of the General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Mongolia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Mongolia Air Force Commander
	New Zealand	Jun. 2014 Aug. 2014 Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 Jun. 2016 Feb. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of Army of the New Zealand Defence Force Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by New Zealand Secretary of Defence Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sri Lanka	Jun. 2014 Dec. 2016	Visit to Sri Lanka by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Maldives	Dec. 2016	Visit to the Maldives by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	New Zealand	Sep. 2014 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2017
Pakistan		Nov. 2014 Aug. 2016	7th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 8th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad)
Mongolia		Dec. 2014 Jan. 2016	2nd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 2nd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities (Ulan Bator) 3rd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 3rd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and security authorities (Tokyo)

Unit-level exchange, etc.	New Zealand	Aug. 2014 Nov. 2015 Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017	Japan-Australia-New Zealand joint exercise PSI Exercise Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H) Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy Multilateral joint exercise hosted by New Zealand Navy Dispatch of ASDF's KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise
	Pakistan	Mar. 2015 Feb. 2016 Jan. 2017 May 2017	Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise Japan-Pakistan goodwill exercise Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)
	Sri Lanka	Apr. 2015 Nov. 2015 Mar. 2016 May 2016 Jul. 2016 Dec. 2016 Apr. 2017	Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
	Maldives	Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015	Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise
	Philippines	Sep. 2016 Jan. 2017 May 2017	Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise
	Malaysia	Aug. 2015 Apr. 2016 May 2017	Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise
	Brunei	May 2017	Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise

Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (Past Three Years)

(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)

High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense	United Kingdom	Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Sep. 2015 Jan. 2016 Jun. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Apr. 2017	Visit to the U.K. by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the Air Staff Visit to the U.K. by Minister of Defense (1st Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) → Confirmed the progress of defense equipment and technology cooperation, and exchanged opinions regarding strengthening cooperation on global security issues, regional situations, etc. Visit to the U.K. by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by U.K. Secretary of State for Defence (2nd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) → Confirmed the two countries would strengthen cooperation on defense equipment and technology, joint exercises, capacity building assistance for Southeast Asia, ACSA, etc. Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the Air Staff Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence
	France	Jun. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Mar. 2015 Jan. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jun. 2017 Jun. 2017	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense Visit to France by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of France (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of France (2nd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) → Signed defense equipment and technology transfer agreement, and exchanged opinions regarding Japan-France security and defense cooperation, security policies, regional situations, etc. Visit to France by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense Visit to France by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) → Agreed to begin negotiations on ACSA, and affirmed that the two countries would promote the materialization of the first cooperation program in the equipment and technology field as well as joint training Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense
	Germany	May 2015 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Germany by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense Visit to German by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference)
	Italy	Feb. 2015 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 May 2017	Visit to Italy by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Italy by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Spain	Aug. 2014 Nov. 2014	Visit to Spain by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Belgium	Feb. 2015	Visit to Belgium by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
	Netherlands	Oct. 2015 Dec. 2016	Visit to Japan by Netherlands Chief of Defence Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Netherlands (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Sweden	Mar. 2015 Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017	Visit to Japan by Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces Visit to Sweden by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Sweden by Chief of Joint Staff
	Finland	Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017	Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Finland (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Finland by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland Visit to Finland by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Finland Air Force Commander
	Estonia	May 2015	Visit to Estonia by State Minister of Defense

High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense	Bulgaria	May 2015	Visit to Bulgaria by State Minister of Defense	
	Latvia	May 2015	Visit to Japan by State Secretary of Defence of Latvia	
	Poland	Jun. 2015	Visit to Japan by Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Poland	
	Georgia	Nov. 2015	Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Georgia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) :✕ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and signed a memorandum on defense exchanges	
	Czech Republic	Dec. 2015	Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Czech Republic (Japan- Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting) :✕ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges	
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	NATO	Jun. 2016 Jan. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Visit to NATO by Minister of Defense (talks with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg)	
	United Kingdom	Sep. 2015 Oct. 2016	14th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 15th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London)	
	France	Nov. 2014 Sep. 2015 Jul. 2016	17th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 16th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 18th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tokyo) 19th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 17th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Paris)	
	Germany	Oct. 2014 Jun. 2016	14th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 15th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 13th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Berlin)	
	Italy	Dec. 2015	3rd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)	
	Spain	Oct. 2016	1st Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid)	
	Poland	Sep. 2014 Mar. 2016	1st Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Warsaw)	
	Sweden	Oct. 2015	3rd Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)	
	Finland	Oct. 2015	1st Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Helsinki)	
	Norway	Nov. 2014	2nd Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)	
	NATO	Feb. 2016 May 2017	14th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo) 15th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo)	
	EU	Nov. 2016	1st Japan-EU Security and Defense Meeting (Belgium)	
	Unit-level exchange, etc.	NATO	Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014	Japan-NATO bilateral exercise Japan-NATO bilateral exercise
		EU	Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 Mar. 2015 Jan. 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jan. 2017	Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise (twice) Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		United Kingdom	Jul. 2014 Jul. 2015 Apr. 2016 Jul. 2016 Jul.-Aug. 2016 Oct.-Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 May 2017	Dispatch of ASDF's KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to the U.K. Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise Dispatch of ASDF's KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. Port call in London by MSDF training squadron Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. multilateral exercise
France		May 2015 Mar. 2016 May 2016 May 2017 Jun. 2017	Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise Japan-France goodwill exercise Japan-France goodwill exercise Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. multilateral exercise Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show)	

High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others	Turkey	May 2015 May 2016 Jun. 2016	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Visit to Turkey by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Turkey by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Canada	Nov. 2014 Oct. 2015 Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Jun. 2016	Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Canada (Halifax International Security Forum)) Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Canada (3rd Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)) Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Brazil	Aug. 2014 Feb. 2016	Visit to Brazil by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Brazil by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Colombia	Mar. 2015	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Colombia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Middle East/ Africa	Aug. 2014 Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jan. 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015 May 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017 Feb. 2017	Visit to South Africa by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of Djibouti Navy Visit to Djibouti and South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Jordan by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Turkey by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Egypt by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by UAE Air Force Commander Visit to Djibouti by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to South Sudan by State Minister of Defense Visit to Saudi Arabia by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Qatar by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Oman by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of Jordan
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Canada	Jun. 2014 Dec. 2016	8th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Turkey	Jan. 2015	2nd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Jordan	Apr. 2015	1st Japan-Jordan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Saudi Arabia	Jun. 2015 Nov. 2016	1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Security Dialogue (Riyadh), 2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities
	Egypt	Oct. 2015	1st Japan-Egypt Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, Japan-Egypt Consultation between defense authorities
	Kuwait	Mar. 2016	1st Japan-Kuwait Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
	UAE	Dec. 2015	1st Japan-UAE Security Dialogue (Abu Dhabi)
	Qatar	Jun. 2014 Nov. 2015	1st Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Doha)
	Bahrain	Dec. 2015 Dec. 2016	2nd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Manama) 3rd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Unit-level exchange, etc.	Turkey	Nov. 2014 Jun. 2015 Dec. 2015 Jun. 2016
UAE		Jan. 2017 Apr. 2017	Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchanges (Al Ain) (ASDF) Japan-UAE goodwill exercise
Saudi Arabia		Apr. 2017	Japan-Saudi Arabia goodwill exercise

Reference 62 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy

1. Purpose of the Legislation

To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the economy of Japan and the people's lives.

2. Definition of Acts of Piracy

Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan's territorial waters, etc.:

(1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons

3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy

A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows:

(1) 2 (1) – (4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death.

(2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 5 years

(3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 3 years

4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy

(1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy.

(2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, maritime safety officials may use weapons to the extent that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy

(1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency).

(2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters.

(3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded.

(4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel.

Reference 63 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

Item	International Peace Support Act	International Peace Cooperation Act	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)
Purpose	○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community	○ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts towards international peace	○ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	○ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	○ Cooperation and support activities ¹ ○ Search and rescue activities ¹ ○ Ship inspection operations ³	○ International peacekeeping activities ○ Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security ○ International humanitarian assistance ○ International election monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities	○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security	○ Replenishment support activities
Areas of Operation	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. ○ High seas and the airspace above	○ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq) ² ○ High seas and the airspace above ²	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required) ² ○ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above ²
Diet Approval	○ Prior approval required without exception	○ To be discussed in advance in the Diet in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety-ensuring operations ⁴	○ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures ⁴	(Note 5)
Diet Report	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay

Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place.

2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.

3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries.

4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.

5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval.

Reference 64 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities
(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(As of June 30, 2017)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq, etc.	Jan. 2004 – Jul. 2006	Approx. 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
	Kuwait, etc.	Jun.– Sep. 2006	Approx. 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf, etc.	Feb. 20 – Apr. 8, 2004	Approx. 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait, etc.	Dec. 2003 – Feb. 2009	Approx. 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Nov. 2001– Nov. 2007	Approx. 320	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.		–	• Transportation of materials

(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Jan. 2008 – Feb. 2010	Approx. 330	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels

(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF (Maritime Force)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden	Mar. 2009 – Dec. 2016	Approx. 400	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
		Dec. 2016 –	Approx. 200	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
MSDF (Air Unit)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	May 2009 – Jul. 2014	Approx. 120	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.
	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Jul. 2014 – Jul. 2015	Approx. 70	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Jul. 2015 –	Approx. 60	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
MSDF (Support Unit)	Djibouti	Jul. 2014 –	Approx. 30	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.
MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)	Bahrain, etc.	Aug. 2014 –	Under 20	Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151
MSDF (Local Coordination Center)	Djibouti	Jul. 2012 – Jul. 2014	3	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation

GSDF (Air Unit)	Djibouti	May. 2009 – Jul. 2014	Approx. 70	Security of activity base and P-3C
GSDF (Support Unit)	Djibouti	Jul. 2014 –	Approx. 80	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.

(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities

			Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks		
PKO	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire monitors	Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993	8	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border 		
		Engineer unit	Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993	600	1,200	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities 		
PKO	United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 – Jan. 1995	5	10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters 		
		Transport coordination unit	May 1993 – Jan. 1995	48	144	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport 		
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	Sep.– Dec. 1994	260		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies 		
		Air transport unit	Sep.– Dec. 1994	188		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo) Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations 		
PKO	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 1996 – Feb. 2009	1st-3th personnel: 2	38	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters 		
			Feb. 2009 – Jan. 2013	14th-17th personnel: 3				
		Transport unit	Feb. 1996 – Aug. 2012	1st-33rd personnel: 43	1,463	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transport food and other supplies Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance 		
			Aug. 2012 – Jan. 2013	34th personnel: 44				
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000	113		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel 		
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	Jan. 2001	138		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR 		
PKO	United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISL) from May 20, 2002)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004	1st rotation: 10 2nd rotation: 7	17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance Public welfare support operations 		
		Engineer unit	Mar. 2002 – Jun. 2004	1st and 2nd rotation: 680 3rd rotation: 522 4th rotation: 405				
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	Mar. – Apr. 2003	50		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR 		
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	Jul. – Aug. 2003	98		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims 		
PKO	United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Arms monitors	Mar. 2007– Jan. 2011	6	24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force 		
PKO	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Headquarters staff	Oct. 2008– Sep. 2011	2	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector Database management 		
PKO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013	2	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items 		
		Engineer unit	Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013	1st rotation: 203 2nd rotation: 346 3rd and 4th rotation: 330 5th and 6th rotation: 317 7th rotation: 297 Withdrawal support unit: 44				
PKO	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	Military liaison officer	Sep. 2010 – Sep. 2012	2	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste 		
PKO	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	Headquarters staff	Nov. 2011 –	4	29	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics Management of database Planning and coordination of engineering duties Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports 		
		Engineer Unit	Jan. 2012 – May 2017	1st rotation: 239 2nd – 4th rotation: 349 5th and 6th rotation: 401 7th – 10th rotation: 353 11th rotation: 354 Withdrawal support unit: 58 (Number of personnel for 1st to 4th rotations includes personnel at the local support coordination center)			3,912	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities Coordination regarding logistics
		Local support coordination center	Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2013	1st rotation: approx. 30 2nd – 4th rotation: approx. 20				

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).

2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International disaster relief activities in Philippines (typhoon disaster)	Local operations coordination center	Nov. 12 – Dec. 13, 2013	1,086	• Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others
	Medical assistance unit/Air support unit			• Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid materials
	Maritime dispatched unit			• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
	Airlift unit			• Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
International disaster relief activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (search)	Local support coordination center	Mar. 11 – Apr. 28, 2014	137	• Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and relevant countries
	MSDF Patrol aircraft unit			• Rescue operations including searching
	ASDF Airlift unit			• Rescue operations including searching
International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)	Local coordination center	Dec. 5 – 11, 2014	4	• Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities
	Air transport unit		10	• Transport activities
	Epidemiological study support	Apr. 21 – May 29, 2015	1	• Support for WHO's epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)	Local support coordination center	Jan. 3 – 9, 2015	Approx. 350	• Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries
	International disaster relief surface force			• Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501
International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)	Joint operations coordination center	Apr. 27 – May 22, 2015	4	• Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries
	Medical support unit		Approx. 110	• Medical treatment for affected people
	Air transport unit		Approx. 30	• Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment
International disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)	Air patrol unit	Nov. 15 – 18, 2016	Approx. 30	• Evaluation of damages by aircraft (one P-1 aircraft)

Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.
 2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

Reference 65 Background Related to South Sudan

2005	January: The Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army signed North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) March: The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) established with mission of supporting CPA implementation, etc.
2008	October: Began dispatching (logistics staff and information staff) to UNMIS
2011	July: UNMIS mission completed with South Sudan independence. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is newly established with the purpose of establishing peace and security and supporting nation building in South Sudan November: Cabinet decision to dispatch staff officers (logistics staff and information staff) to UNMISS December: Cabinet decision to dispatch engineering unit, etc. and staff officers (engineering staff) to UNMISS
2012	January-March: Engineering unit, etc. (First rotation Unit) dispatched to South Sudan's capital Juba May-June: Engineering corps, etc. (Second rotation Unit) dispatched (unit replaced approximately every six months thereafter)
2013	May: Government of Japan announced expansion of geographical areas of activities for engineering corps December: Clashes in Juba between President's supporters and anti-government forces December: Transfer of 10,000 bullets to UN in response to request from UN etc. (returned the following year)
2014	May: UNMISS mandate renewed (from nation building to focus on protecting civilians) May: Then Minister of Defense Onodera visits South Sudan October: Cabinet decision to dispatch staff officers (air transport staff) to UNMISS
2015	January: Then Minister of Defense Nakatani visits South Sudan August: Government and anti-government forces sign the agreement concerning the resolution of conflicts
2016	April: Southern Sudan Provisional Government is established July: Clashes in Juba between government and anti-government forces August: UNMISS mandate renewed (establishment of regional protection force) October: Minister of Defense Inada visits South Sudan November: New tasks such as the so-called "kaketsuke-keigo" conferred on engineering unit
2017	March: Announcement that engineering unit would be withdrawn by the end of May (dispatch of staff officers will be continued) May: Engineering unit's activities ended. Unit disbanded after the Return of Colors ceremony.

Reference 66 Japan's Basic Thinking Regarding the Termination of Operations of the Engineering Unit of the Self Defense Force in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (Provisional Translation)

March 10, 2017
 Cabinet Secretariat
 Cabinet Office
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Ministry of Defense

1. Since January 2012, the Government of Japan has dispatched the engineering units of the Self Defense Force (SDF) to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which was established to support the nation-building of the Republic of South Sudan, the newest country in the world. Since the engineering unit was dispatched, five years have passed with the total number of personnel reaching approximately 4,000, making it the longest deployment. (Before UNMISS, the longest deployment of engineering units was to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which lasted for 2 years and 11 months.)
2. Throughout its deployment, the SDF engineering unit has steadily implemented its mission amidst a severe environment in line with its initial purpose of

- contributing to the nation-building of newly-independent South Sudan.
- The SDF engineering unit's achievements, including road repair for improving the livelihood of local residents and construction of facilities for internally displaced people in South Sudan, are the largest among previous deployments to UN Peacekeeping Operations..
- The SDF engineering unit's major activities demonstrate the scale of its achievements, larger than any past deployment of Japan to UN PKOs—for instance, approximately 210 km of road repairs and 500 thousand square meters of land development.
3. Such dedication by the SDF engineering unit has been appreciated and highly praised by the United Nations as well as by South Sudan. His Excellency Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, has commended Japan in particular, in his address on the occasion of the opening of the Transitional National Legislature of the Transitional Government of National Unity, that he would like to "personally thank and appreciate the Japanese Government and people for their continued support to the government and the people of South Sudan;" through Japan's development programs.
 4. As the deployment of the SDF engineering unit to UNMISS has marked a milestone of five years in January 2017, making it the longest deployment of an engineering unit, the Government of Japan has been reviewing a possible way forward in a comprehensive manner.

5. As the period of dispatch of the SDF to UNMISS authorized by a cabinet decision is to expire at the end of March 2017, the Government of Japan has summarized the result of the review as follows.
- (1) The nation-building process of South Sudan is entering a new stage with the efforts of the international community, as illustrated below:
- Last year, the UN established a Regional Protection Force (RPF) responsible for providing a secure environment in and around Juba, and decided to increase the force level of UNMISS. Although the prospect for an early dispatch of the RPF had been uncertain, the deployment process has started, advancing efforts for stability in South Sudan.
 - In addition, in South Sudan, promoting reconciliation among different ethnic groups and advancing the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan is imperative. Towards this end, the Government of South Sudan decided last year to initiate the process of national dialogue, and recently has announced to start it in March. This illustrates the progress in the political process towards stability in the country.
- (2) On the other hand, as mentioned above, the SDF has contributed to UNMISS more than to any other past PKO activity. This is demonstrated by the more than five years of activities of the engineering unit—the longest deployment for an engineering unit—and their many activities including to improve roads in Juba, the capital. In light of these activities, Japan considers that it can move on to a new phase regarding engineering activities in Juba.
6. Considering the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner, Japan has come to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to shift the focus of its assistance from engineering activities by the SDF to support for self-reliance of the government of South Sudan.
7. Specifically, the SDF engineering unit will withdraw from Juba around the end of May after the current 11th rotation of the SDF engineering unit completes its current task of road repair. Japan has decided that it would be appropriate to proactively contribute to a new phase of the nation-building of South Sudan through continuing and expanding the following activities:
- Support for the progress in the political process in South Sudan such as assistance for monitoring the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
 - Support for the national dialogue including assistance for various domestic groups in South Sudan such as religious and youth groups to enable their participation.
 - Human resources development such as capacity building of public financial management abilities for government officials and enhancement of police capabilities.
 - Humanitarian assistance including food assistance.
8. The end of the SDF engineering unit's activities do not mean the end of Japan's assistance for South Sudan. Japan will continue to contribute to peace, stability and the nation-building of South Sudan in various ways.
9. Furthermore, Japan will continue to contribute to the activities of UNMISS through dispatching staff officers to its headquarters. Japan will also ensure smooth coordination in ending the activities of its engineering unit, such as by transferring the unit's heavy machinery to UNMISS. Besides Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, Bangladesh, and China have been engaged in engineering activities in South Sudan. In addition, the UK has also started deployment of its engineering unit. Japan will continue to make possible contribution to their activities through close coordination with these countries at UNMISS headquarters.
10. Regarding the conclusion to terminate the SDF engineering unit's activities, Japan has already explained its conclusion to the UN, the Government of South Sudan, and countries concerned. In response, Mr. Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, Mr. Herve Ladsous, the Under-Secretary General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Mr. David Shearer, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNMISS stated that they highly valued and appreciated the SDF for their dedicated activities and that they respect the conclusion made by the Government of Japan.
11. Under the banner of the Proactive Contribution to Peace, building on the past experiences of peacekeeping operations and making use of its own strengths, Japan will continue to contribute proactively in the field of international peace cooperation such as through enhancing capacity building and dispatching units and personnel.
- Reference 1: Comparison of Japan's engineering activities between past UN peacekeeping missions and under UNMISS.
- Period: approximately 5 years and 2 months (about 5 times of UNTAC in Cambodia)
 - Number of personnel: 3,854 (about 1.7 times of UNTAET and UNMISSET in East Timor)
 - Major engineering activities:
 - Road repairs: about 210 kilometers (double of UNTAC work)
 - Land development: about 500,000 square meters (about 4 times of MINUSTAH work)
 - Building facilities: 94 locations (about 4 times of MINUSTAH work)
- Reference 2: In his speech to the Transitional National Legislature of the Transitional Government of National Unity on February 21, President Salva Kiir stated, "I want to take this opportunity to personally thank and appreciate the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and the Japanese government and people for their continued support to the government and the people of South Sudan through developmental programs and in the Security Council. I am also grateful to the Japanese Ambassador to South Sudan, Mr. Kiya Masahiko for his exemplary diplomatic engagement efforts, which have strengthened bilateral relations between our countries."

Reference 67 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations

(As of June 30, 2017)

(1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 – Jul. 31, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General) ¹
Jun. 23, 1997 – Jun. 23, 2000	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Oct. 1, 2002 – Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 11, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Aug. 27, 2013 – Aug. 31, 2016	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Dec. 2, 2002 – Jun. 1, 2005	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jan. 16, 2011 – Jan. 15, 2014	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 18, 2013 – Sep. 17, 2016	Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 1, 2015 –	Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Aug. 29, 2016 –	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Feb. 11, 2017 –	Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)	1 administrative official

Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.

(2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
November 21 – 30, 2008	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
May 22 – June 6, 2009	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)
August 28 – September 5, 2009	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
April 10 – 17, 2010	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel) ^{Note}
August 14 – 30, 2010	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
November 15 – 20, 2011	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
July 31 – August 5, 2012	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
December 15 – 19, 2012	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
March 9 – 14, 2013	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
August 28 – September 1, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
October 5 – 9, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
March 8 – 13, 2014	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
March 23 – May 25, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
August 12, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
October 5 – 9, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
October 6 – 23, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 19 – April 1, 2015	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
June 4 – July 1, 2015	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
September 5 – 20, 2015	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
October 22 – November 7, 2015	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 21 – April 1, 2016	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
May 31 – June 17, 2016	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
November 4 – 19, 2016	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 6 – 19, 2017	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
June 2 – 18, 2017	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Note: First dispatch of female SDF personnel.

Reference 68 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel

(As of March 31, 2017)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff etc.	Total
Authorized	150,863	45,364	46,940	3,987	247,154
Actual	135,713	42,136	42,939	3,634	224,422
Staffing Rate (%)	90.0	92.9	91.5	91.1	90.8

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel						Fixed-Term Personnel			
	Officer		Warrant Officer		Enlisted (upper)		Enlisted (lower)			
Authorized	45,524		4,940		140,005		56,685			
Actual	42,444	(2,150)	4,632	(45)	137,951	(7,901)	16,402	(1,244)	22,993	(2,367)
Staffing Rate (%)	93.2		93.8		98.5		69.5			

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.

Reference 69 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2016)

Classification			Number Applied	Number Recruited	Competition Ratios
Officer candidates		GSDF	2,879 (399)	206 (21)	14.0 (19.0)
		MSDF	1,527 (207)	120 (22)	12.7 (9.4)
		ASDF	2,105 (456)	69 (11)	30.5 (41.5)
		Total	6,511 (1,062)	395 (54)	16.5 (19.7)
Non-commissioned officers	Technical Petty Officer	MSDF	48 (8)	7 (1)	6.9 (8.0)
	Technical Sergeant	ASDF	0	0	—
	GSDF personnel (Nursing)	GSDF	16 (11)	3 (2)	5.3 (5.5)
Aviation students		MSDF	597 (50)	71 (3)	8.4 (16.7)
		ASDF	2,833 (281)	66 (6)	42.9 (46.8)
		Total	3,430 (331)	137 (9)	25.0 (36.8)
Non-commissioned officer candidates		GSDF	13,485 (2,057)	2,991 (199)	4.5 (10.3)
		MSDF	3,927 (522)	1,263 (45)	3.1 (11.6)
		ASDF	6,900 (1,289)	757 (202)	9.1 (6.4)
		Total	24,312 (3,868)	5,011 (446)	4.9 (8.7)
Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)		GSDF	18,667 (2,485)	5,164 (749)	3.6 (3.3)
		MSDF	4,804 (519)	1,008 (116)	4.8 (4.5)
		ASDF	5,596 (882)	1,438 (81)	3.9 (10.9)
		Total	29,067 (3,886)	7,610 (946)	3.8 (4.1)

Classification		Number Applied	Number Recruited	Competition Ratios	
National Defense Academy Students	Recommended	Humanity and social science	152 (46)	20 (8)	7.6 (5.8)
		Science and engineering	260 (33)	82 (8)	3.2 (4.1)
		Total	412 (79)	102 (16)	4.0 (4.9)
	Selective exam	Humanity and social science	95 (15)	10 (3)	9.5 (5.0)
		Science and engineering	111 (7)	30 (3)	3.7 (2.3)
		Total	206 (22)	40 (6)	5.2 (3.7)
	General exam (first term)	Humanity and social science	6,624 (2,734)	68 (10)	97.4 (273.4)
		Science and engineering	8,889 (1,693)	224 (26)	39.7 (65.1)
		Total	15,513 (4,427)	292 (36)	53.1 (123.0)
	General exam (second term)	Humanity and social science	219 (44)	9 (3)	24.3 (14.7)
		Science and engineering	521 (60)	28 (3)	18.6 (20.0)
		Total	740 (104)	37 (6)	20.0 (17.3)
National Defense Medical College students		6,815 (2,117)	84 (21)	81.1 (100.8)	
National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)		2,207 (1,784)	74 (68)	29.8 (26.2)	
GSDF High Technical School Students	Recommended	150	64	2.3	
	General exam	2,571	251	10.2	
	Total	2,721	315	8.6	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.

2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2016.

Reference 70 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel

(As of March 31, 2017)

Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)	Special Service		Regular Service	
	Authorized Strength	Non-Authorized Strength	Authorized Strength	Non-Authorized Strength
	Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense		Administrative Officials, and others 29	Part-Time Officials
	SDF Personnel			
	Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense	Candidates for SDF Personnel		
	Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	Reserve Personnel 47,900		
	Director General, and others 630	Ready Reserve Personnel 8,075		
	Administrative Officials, and others 20,390	Candidate Reserve Personnel 4,621		
	SDF Regular Personnel 247,154	National Defense Academy students		
		National Defense Medical College students		
		GSDF High Technical School students		
		Part-Time Officials		

Note: Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations

Reference 71 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2016

○ Integrated training

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Units, etc.	Note
Training for transportation of overseas Japanese nationals and others	Aug. 23 – Sep. 1, 2016	Camp Utsunomiya, Komaki Airbase, Republic of Djibouti, etc.	Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Central Readiness Force, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 150 personnel and 1 aircraft	To enhance ability to deploy units overseas and their operational capabilities relating to transport of overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and U.S. Forces
Training for protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others	Dec. 12 – 16, 2016	Soumagahara Training Area, Iruma Airbase, etc.	Each Joint Staff, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, etc. Approximately 490 personnel, 3 aircraft, 1 transport vessel, and approximately 20 vehicles	To enhance joint operations capabilities relating to protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and relevant organizations
SDF joint exercise (command post exercise)	Jan. 23 – 27, 2017	MOD Ichigaya area and the locations of other participating Units in exercise, etc.	Internal Bureaus, each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, regional units, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 8,700 personnel	To maintain and enhance the SDF's joint operations capabilities through studying and practicing SDF joint operations

○ GSDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Units, etc.	Note
Army Corps field training exercise (Northern Army)	Sep. 26 – Oct. 5, 2016	Northern Regional Army District	Northern Army Headquarters, 2th Division, 7th Division, 5th Brigade, 11th Brigade, 1st Artillery Brigade, 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, etc. Approximately 12,000 personnel, 3,000 vehicles and approximately 40 aircraft	To maintain and enhance Army's capability to respond to various situations
Army Corps field training exercise (Western Army)	Oct. 10 – 31, 2016	Western Regional Army District	Western Army, Central Readiness Force, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Kanto Logistics Depot, Kansai Logistics Depot, etc. Approximately 15,000 personnel, 3,500 vehicles and approximately 45 aircraft	
Army Corps field training exercise (Middle Army)	Jul. 5 – 9, 2016	Middle Regional Army District	Middle Army key units Approximately 5,500 personnel, 700 vehicles and approximately 10 aircraft	

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Units, etc.	Note
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Jun. 21 – Aug. 2, 2016	Middle-Northern Regional Army Districts (Hamataiki Training Area, Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)	14th Brigade Headquarters Approximately 1,800 personnel, approximately 640 vehicles and 8 aircraft	To enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Sep. 21 – Oct. 5, 2016	Northeastern-Northern Regional Army Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division Approximately 1,000 personnel, 200 vehicles	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Nov. 3 - 13, 2016	Northern-Eastern Regional Army Districts (Kita-Fuji Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade Approximately 410 personnel and 180 vehicles	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 4 – Nov. 6, 2016	Northeastern-Western Regional Army Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division Approximately 500 personnel and 150 vehicles	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 19 – Nov. 15, 2016	Northern-Western Regional Army Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)	Key units of one tank regiment of the 2nd Division, 1st Artillery Brigade, Northern Army Engineer Troop, etc. Approximately 700 personnel and 300 vehicles	

○ MSDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Units, etc.	Note
MSDF exercise (map exercise)	Sep. 26 – Oct. 9, 2016	Maritime Staff Office, MSDF Staff College and the locations of other participating Units	Maritime Staff Office, Commands of the Self-Defense Fleet, District Headquarters, Material Command, etc. Approximately 3,000 personnel	To conduct drills for unit operations, maritime operations, etc.

Reference 72 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2016)

	Name of Training	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Oct. 11 – Dec. 21 2016	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	16 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 520 personnel
	Surface-to-ship missile unit level live-fire training	Oct. 1 – Nov. 1 2016	Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.	2 surface-to-ship missile regiments and artillery training unit Approximately 240 personnel
MSDF	(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Jul. 22 – Oct. 21 2016	Sea areas surrounding Hawaii	1 submarine
	(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Oct. 14 – Jan. 14 2016	Sea areas surrounding Hawaii	1 submarine
	(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of Escort Flotilla	Feb. 24 – Mar. 18 2016	Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam	4 destroyers
ASDF	Annual practice by antiaircraft units	Aug. 31 – Nov. 18 2016	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	6 Air Defense Missiles groups, Air Defense Missile Training Group Approximately 370 personnel

Reference 73 Main Measures for Re-employment Support

Items	Measures for employment support	Description
Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel	Occupational aptitude testing	Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes
	Technical training	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement (large sized vehicle operation, large sized special motor vehicle operation, crane operation, boiler maintenance, nursing care [home helper], information processing, chief warehouse manager [new in FY2017], third-fifth grade maritime officer [new in FY2017], maritime II-category special radio operator [new in FY2017], etc.)
	Disaster prevention and risk control training	Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan
	Correspondence courses	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public qualification (financial planner, electrician, hazardous materials engineer (class B), real estate transaction specialist, medical clerk, childminder [new in FY2017], third grade maritime officer [new in FY2017], etc.)
	Business management training	Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement
	Career guidance	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and attitude toward reemployment
	Outsourcing career counseling, etc.	Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel
Measures for internal support personnel	Training for support personnel	Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel
Measures for promotion outside of SDF	Support publicizing to business owners	Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of retiring uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire
	Inviting business owners on unit tours	Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the employment support situation, etc.

Reference 74 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government

(as of March 31, 2017: 402 persons)

Prefectural Government	Government Employment situation
Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government (three persons), Sapporo City Government (two persons), Hakodate City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Kushiro City Government, Obihiro City Government (two persons), Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Rumoi City Government, Tomakomai City Government, Bibai City Government, Ashibetsu City Government, Akabira City Government, Nayoro City Government (two persons), Chitose City Government (four persons), Takigawa City Government, Sunagawa City Government, Noboribetsu City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kitahiroshima City Government, Hokuto City Government, Matsumae Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town Office, Naganuma Town Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Bihoro Town Office, Engaru Tow Office (two persons), Shirai Town Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Memuro Town Office, Kushiro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office
Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government, Aomori City Government (two persons), Hirosaki City Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Misawa City Government, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office, Oirase Town Office, Sannohe Town Office
Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government, Morioka City Government, Miyako City Government, Hanamaki City Government, Tono Town Office, Hachimantai City Government, Takizawa City Government, Yamada Town Office

Prefectural Government	Government Employment situation
Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government, Natori City Government, Tagajo City Government, Iwanuma City Government, Oohira Village Office, Minamisanriku Town Office
Akita	Akita Prefectural Government, Yokote City Government, Odate City Government, Yuzawa City Government, Daisen City Government, Senboku City Government
Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government, Yamagata City Government, Sakata City Government, Tendo City Government, Higashine City Government, Asahi Town Office
Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government
Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Ryugasaki City Government, Shimotsuma City Government, Jyoso City Government, Ushiku City Government (two persons), Moriya City Government
Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government
Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government, Numata City Government, Shibukawa City Government
Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government, Saitama City Government, Fukaya City Government, Soka City Government, Asaka City Government, Wako City Government
Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government, Ichikawa City Government, Funabashi City Government, Tateyama City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons), Mobarra City Government, Narita City Government, Narashino City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Urayasu City Government, Isumi City Government, Oamishirasato City Government
Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons), Shinagawa Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Adachi Ward Office
Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (eight persons), Kawasaki City Government (three persons), Sagami City Government, Yokosuka City, Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Ebina City Government, Zama City Government
Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government, Tsubame City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Sado City Government, Tainai City Government
Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government
Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Komatsu City Government, Kaga City Government, Nomi City Government
Fukui	Fukui Prefectural Government (two persons), Fukui City Government, Awara City Government, Takahama Town Office
Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Fujiyoshida City Government, Minami-alps City Government
Nagano	Nagano Prefectural Government, Matsumoto City Government, Ina City Government, Chino City Government
Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government (two persons), Gifu City Government, Minokamo City Government, Kakamigahara City Government, Kaizu City Government
Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government (six persons), Shizuoka City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Atami City Government, Shimada City Government (two persons), Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Izu City Government, Makinohara City Government, Oyama Town Office
Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government, Toyohashi City Government, Kariya City Government, Nishio City Government, Nagagori City Government, Tokai City Government, Obu City Government, Takahama City Government, Toyoake City Government, Aisai City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Ama City Government, Nagakute City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Office, Higashiura Town Office, Minamichita Town Office (two persons), Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office
Mie	Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Yokkaichi City Government, Ise City Government, Kuwana City Government, Nabari City Government, Owase City Government, Kameyama City Government, Toba City Government, Shima City Government
Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government, Konan City Government
Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government, Yawata City Government, Kyotango City Government, Kizugawa City Government, Seika Town Office (two persons)
Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Kaiduka City Government, Hirakata City Government, Ibaraki City Government, Izumisano City Government, Tondabayashi City Government, Kawachinagano City Government, Matsubara City Government, Daito City Government, Izumi City Government, Takai City Government, Shijonawate City Government, Osakasayama City Government, Toyono Town Office
Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government, Miki City Government, Kawanishi City Government, Yabu City Government
Nara	Nara Prefectural Government (two persons), Nara City Government (three persons), Gojo City Government (two persons)
Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Hashimoto City Government, Koya Town Office
Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government (three persons), Tottori City Government, Yonago City Government, Sakaiminato City Government, Yurihama Town Office, Hokuei Town Office
Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government
Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government
Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government (two persons), Hiroshima City Government, Kure City Government, Higashihiroshima City Government, Hatsukaichi City Government, Kaita Town Office
Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Nagato City Government, Shunan City Government, Waki Town Office
Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (three persons), Komatsushima City Government, Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Awa City Government, Miyoshi City Government
Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Zentsuji City Government
Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government, Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government
Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government
Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government (two persons), Tagawa City Government, Kasuga City Government, Onojo City Government, Munakata City Government (two persons), Dazaifu City Government, Itoshima City Government, Nakagawa Town Office, Kasuya Town Office, Chikuzen Town Office
Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (three persons), Karatsu City Government, Yoshinogari Town Office
Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Nagasaki City Government, Sasebo City Government (two persons), Shimabara City Government, Omura City Government (three persons), Matsuura City Government, Iki City Government, Minamishimabara City Government
Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Ozu Town Office, Takamori Town Office
Oita	Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Oita City Government, Beppu City Government, Saiki City Government, Kitsuki City Government
Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons), Nobeoka City Government (two persons), Nichinan City Government, Kobayashi City Government, Hyuga City Government, Kushima City Government, Saito City Government, Ebino City Government, Tsuno Town Office
Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Tarumizu City Government, Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Soo City Government, Kirishima City Government

* Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2017 (part-time personnel included).

Reference 75 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014)

The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports") and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries

have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international

community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures.

An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

- 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
- 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
- 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure

In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licensor.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.

For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

Reference 76 Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ○ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total of 1,379 disposal operations (average of approximately 27 operations per week), weighing approximately 42.1 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 25.6 tons, (accounting for about 61% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Removal of Underwater Mines ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others. ○ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. ○ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total 23,598 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 4.2 tons in total (1 underwater mines disposed). (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Medical Activities ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ○ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services. ○ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs. ○ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. ○ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.
Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings ⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services. ○ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.
Exchanges with Local Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. ○ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.

Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.


4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.

Reference 77 Activities Contributing to Society

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Acceptance of Other Parties for Education and Training ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The SDF, responding to requests from other parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel ○ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, and education on chemical disasters response are provided to police officers, Japan Coast Guard Personnel and firefighters. Aircraft-maneuvering training is provided to police officers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy accept employees of private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries for education.
Transportation Work ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ GSDF, MSDF and ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister. ○ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)
Ceremonial Work at National Events ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard⁴ forming a line for guests⁵ and firing a gun salute for them⁶ ○ Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.
Cooperation in Antarctic Research Expedition ⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Since the seventh expedition in 1965, the SDF has extended cooperation such as operating its icebreaker and has contributed significantly to Antarctic research projects, which marked their 50th anniversary in FY2007. The new icebreaker "Shirase" went into service in 2009, and the SDF will continue to provide support for such projects in the future. ○ In cooperating in the 7th Antarctic Research Expedition since November 2015, the SDF has transported expedition members and approximately 1,040 tons of supplies to Showa Station, and provided cooperation for the hydrographic survey planned by the expedition team.
Other Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Acting on requests from the Japan Metrological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions. ○ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps. ○ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)⁸ ○ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support for flights of private chartered aircraft to Iwoto island, and the dispatch SDF of music bands.

- Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
 2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.
 3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.
 4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect.
 5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them.
 6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.
 7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
 8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

Reference 78 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities



- Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area
 Areas around air bases are classified as follows according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise:
 Class 1 Area: Areas where WECPNL is 75 or higher
 Class 2 Area: Section of Class 1 Areas where WECPNL is 90 or higher
 Class 3 Area: Section of Class 2 Areas where WECPNL is 95 or higher
 * Criteria used for area classifications until 2012 are: WECPNL at 75 or higher, 90 or higher, and 95 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively.
 Criteria used for area classifications in 2013 and beyond are: Lden at 62 or higher, 73 or higher, and 76 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively.
 (2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.
 (3) Lden
 The equivalent noise level over a day being assessed by weighing noises measured early evening and at night.
 Notes: 2. If losses are caused due to acts of the U.S. Forces in Japan, they are compensated according to the Act on Compensation of Special Losses Caused by Act of United States Forces and Other Forces stationed in Japan.

Review of the uses of Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defense Facilities

◆ Background

- ◆ Diversification of local needs (demand for allocation to soft business)
- ◆ Evaluation results of the "business classification" by the Government Revitalization Unit ⇨ "To make the uses more free and improve usability"

Before revision

Improvement of public-use facilities

Public-use facilities:
Transportation and communications facilities, sports and recreational facilities, environmental health facilities, education and cultural facilities, medical facilities, social welfare facilities, facilities associated with fire-fighting, facilities that contribute to the stimulation of industry

After revision

Improvement of public-use facilities

So-called soft business (Newly added)


- Soft businesses such as the following are envisioned:
- Assistance for medical expenses (medical expenses for elementary school pupils and younger, examination costs for pregnant women, etc.)
 - Assistance for the cost of running community buses (operational costs for welfare buses, etc.)
 - Assistance for the cost to conduct a diagnosis of earthquake resistance for schools and other facilities (cost of diagnosing the earthquake resistance of elementary / junior-high school buildings, etc.)

Review of the calculation of the ordinary amount issued under the Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defense Facilities

(1) Revision of calculation method

① Change in the budget allocation for calculation elements (budget allocation for "operation" will be increased)

② Establishment of new training points relating to large-scale or specific training (amount will be increased if joint Japan-US training, large scale exercises, etc., are held)



(2) Consideration for cities, towns and villages with high population density (population density points will be added)

(3) Consideration for the particularity of US Forces operations (points will be added to facilities used by stationed forces)

(4) Appropriate reflection of the effects of operations (number of flights point and exercising personnel points will be subdivided)

Defense facilities and cities, towns and villages newly designated as Specified Defense Facilities and Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages, respectively


Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages	Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages	Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages
Matsushima Air Base	Ishinomaki	Kasumigaura Air Base	Tsuchiura	Sagami General Depot	Sagamihara
Iwo To Air Base	Ogasawara, Tokyo		Ami, Inashiki District, Ibaraki Prefecture	Tokushima Air Base	Matsushige, Itano District, Tokushima Prefecture
Naval Air Facility Atsugi	Fujisawa	Utsunomiya Air Base	Utsunomiya	Metabaru Air Base	Yoshinogari, Kanzaki District, Saga Prefecture
Ashiya Air Base	Mizumaki, Onga District, Fukuoka Prefecture	Soumagahara Air Base	Shintō, Kitagunma District, Gunma Prefecture		Kamimine, Miyaki District, Saga Prefecture
Torishima Range	Kumejima, Shimajiri District, Okinawa Prefecture	Kisarazu Air Base	Kisarazu	Northern Training Area	Kunigami, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture
Shimokita Test Center	Higashidōri, Shimokita District, Aomori Prefecture	Camp Zama	Sagamihara		Higashi, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture
				Zama	

Reference 80

“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)


Outline of the survey period: January 8–18, 2015
 Respondents: Japanese citizens aged 20 years or older in Japan
 Valid responses (rate): 1,680 (56.0%)
 Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel
 For details, refer to <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/index.html>

1 Interest in the SDF and defense issues




Notes: 1. Total of “very interested” and “somewhat interested” (Total of “very interested” and “slightly interested” until the survey of November 1984).
 2. Total of “hardly interested” and “not at all interested.”
 3. For gender- and age-specific information, see: <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/zh/z01.html>.

2 Impression toward the SDF




Notes: 1. Total of “good impression” and “somewhat good impression” (Total of “good impression” and “do not have bad impression” until the survey of February 2006).
 2. Total of “somewhat bad impression” and “bad impression” (Total of “do not have good impression” and “bad impression” until the survey of February 2006).


3 Defense capabilities of the SDF




4 Evaluation of the SDF disaster relief activities



5 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF



6 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities



Reference 81

Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2016)

	Ministry of Defense Headquarters	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches	Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency	Total
1. Number of disclosure requests	2,125	2,569	273	4,967
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure	2,049	2,739	189	4,977
Requests accepted	1,054	1,139	51	2,244
Requests partially accepted	909	1,571	109	2,589
Requests declined	86	29	29	144
3. Number of administrative protests	3,694	5	3	3,702
4. Number of lawsuits	6	0	0	6