The new NDPG call for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, in place of the Dynamic Defense Force from the 2010 NDPG, as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and security.

The concept of a Dynamic Defense Force focused more attention on operations when compared with the Basic Defense Force Concept carried on since the 1976 NDPG. For example, it emphasized not only a static deterrent, but also a dynamic deterrent, from the standpoint of having a defense force that is not completely dependent on the Basic Defense Force Concept.

However, with the security environment surrounding Japan growing more challenging, the number of situations, including “gray zone” situations, requiring the SDF’s response is on the rise and becoming more protracted, in addition to activities during peacetime. Nevertheless, the quality and quantity of the defence force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily sufficient. At the same time, a wide-ranging logistical support foundation has become essential for the effective execution of various SDF activities.

The new NDPG, fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrent and response capabilities by pursuing further joint operations, improving the operational standards of defense equipment, and further increasing defense activities, as well as ensuring the necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capabilities underpinning various activities. Additionally, it requires the building of the most effectively operational posture, which will be accomplished through further enhancing the logistical support foundation on a broader scope.

Capability assessments were carried out from the perspective of joint operations as a specific measure for securing the necessary quality and quantity of the defence capabilities. SDF operations are carried out using joint operations, but as for the build-up of defense capability, the method of capability assessments has not fully reflected the perspective of joint operations, as most of the assessments have been conducted individually for the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. This indicates that the optimal defense capabilities buildup has not been carried out for the SDF as a whole.

As a result, the new NDPG carry with it great significance because it identifies functions and capabilities of particular emphasis from a comprehensive viewpoint based on capability assessments focused on the functions and capacities of the entire SDF, strictly focusing on the basic approach of responding to various situations by joint operations. By advancing defense capability buildup based on the results of these capability assessments, it has become possible to realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability buildup, overcoming the boundaries of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces more easily than ever.

Compared to the 2010 NDPG, the new NDPG calls for the establishment of a wider-ranging logistical support foundation. For example, SDF camps and bases will become important deployment staging grounds for the dispatch for disaster relief, and to minimize damages to these camps and bases, it is essential to improve survivability including recovery capabilities. Additionally, failure to provide adequate accommodations for personnel or family support measures will make it impossible to respond immediately during a situation and fully ensure readiness. In addition, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including “skills,” “experience,” “physical strength,” and “morale,” it is necessary to ensure the edge of SDF troops. As such, it is important to carry out rigorous training and exercises in peacetime as well as comprehensively carry out personnel education measures, such as recruitment and support for re-employment, including the further utilization of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel. Furthermore, the collaboration and cooperation with local governments and relevant organizations as well as understanding and cooperation of the general public is indispensable to enabling the SDF to respond appropriately to various situations. As a result, it is extremely critical to actively strengthen collaboration with local communities and boost communication capabilities. Given the vital importance of fundamentally enhancing the wide-ranging logistical support foundation compared to the 2010 NDPG to effectively carry out various activities, as explained above, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of infrastructure for enabling a broad range of defense capabilities to be exhibited, such as training, exercise and operational infrastructure, personnel and education, defense production and technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancing of intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense.

1 The ability to maintain organizational functions in the event of an enemy attack on bases or facilities.
The new NDPG clearly states Japan’s basic policy on defense from the standpoint of highlighting the most fundamental matters essential to the Japan’s defense, as explained below.

First, in light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries, while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense capabilities to fully exercise their capabilities.

Under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended
deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Based on this, the new NDPG defines the following three approaches as key pillars for Japan’s defense within today’s increasingly severe security environment.

1. Japan’s own efforts;
2. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and
3. Active promotion of security cooperation

Each of these approaches is explained in further detail below.

**Japan’s Own Efforts**

1. **Building a comprehensive defense architecture**

   Given the increasingly severe security environment, the new NDPG calls for Japan to efficiently develop highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. It also states that in the event of various situations, Japan will appropriately and promptly make decisions and seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

   Furthermore, the new NDPG states Japan will continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an emergency situation.

   In order to take such approaches appropriately, the new NDPG requires that Japan increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training, and exercises.

2. **Japan’s Defense Forces – Building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force**

   The new NDPG declares that Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and in the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments against various situations.

   In addition, the new NDPG states that Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further escalation of a situation. At the same time, new NDPG states that minimizing damage in dealing with situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy\(^2\) and air superiority\(^3\) is essential.

   Therefore, Japan will attempt to enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.

   From these viewpoints, the new NDPG states that defense force needs to prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole, and the defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, the new NDPG states Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation.

   In this regard, characteristics prioritized by the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, “resiliency” and “connectivity” which had not been expressed in the previous NDPG, are newly pointed out. This is based on the result of reviewing functions and capability to be especially prioritized from a comprehensive perspective after implementing capability assessments based on joint operations. Specifically, “resiliency” refers to necessary and sufficient securing of “quality” and “quantity” of defense capabilities that underpin various activities, and further strengthen the basic foundation for SDF. “Connectivity” refers to the strengthening of posture to collaborate with relevant ministries and offices, local governments, private sector, and to cooperate with the U.S., to seamlessly respond to various situations, from peacetime to contingencies.

3. **Strengthening on the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

   The new NDPG stands firmly footed on the recognition that Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security, and that the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions as public

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\(^2\) Maritime supremacy refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force in seas and can carry out maritime operations without suffering extensive damages by the opposing force.

\(^3\) Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force in skies and can carry out airborne operations without suffering extensive damages by the opposing force.
goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. From this perspective, the new NDPG places emphasis on the following efforts.

(1) Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance’s contingency response capabilities. At the same time, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to “gray-zone” situations. To that end, Japan will expand joint training and exercises, joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination.

(2) Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Broad Range of Fields
The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the international community, by strengthening cooperation not only in anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping and counter terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace, among others. As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology.

(3) Steady Implementation of Measures Relating to the Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan
Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures.

Joint Training between MSDF and the U.S. Navy

Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region
The new NDPG cites the following initiatives as part of Japan’s initiatives to promote a variety of cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region.

Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), and make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example, by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-serving agreement.

Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as international peace-keeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability with Australia.

Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China, and develop confidence-building measures to prevent and avoid unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in dealing with the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan.

Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, high-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchange, and enhance bilateral training and exercises in order to develop mutual trust with Russia.

Japan will promote security dialogues with India in a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises, as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities.

Additionally, the new NDPG cites capacity building assistance as an effective means in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, and as such, Japan will promote and carry it out in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Official Development Assistance, and based on this, Japan will expand the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.
In addition, the new NDPG states that in multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, Japan in cooperation with the U.S. and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region, and Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises.

(2) Cooperation with the International Community
It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, such forces play an important role in building peace and promoting confidence-building. Based on this, the new NDPG calls for Japan to promote various initiatives to improve the global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community.

Specifically, Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and capacity building assistance, and, Japan is strengthening its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries.

Furthermore, the new NDPG states that Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular, will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities.

3 Future Defense Forces

Role of the Defense Forces
Under the new NDPG, Japan’s future defense forces will be developed based on the concept of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.

(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations
Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations from the stage of provocation, including gray zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.

Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

In particular, the following points will be emphasized: (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters.

(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment
Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the region.

Moreover, working in partnership with its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance.

In order to respond appropriately to global security issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance.

Japan will attach importance to the following in particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooper-

4 To have an advantage over the other party in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing and conveying intelligence.
Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF

(1) Basic Approach
The SDF, from the standpoint of maintaining an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense capabilities, has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies, to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.

The new NDPG states that based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.

At the same time, the new NDPG states that in terms of preparation for an invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized
The new NDPG calls for the SDF to selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces.

ISR capabilities
Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.

Intelligence capabilities
Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations, and take other actions.

In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of personnel in information gathering and analysis.

Transport Capability
In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with the civilian transport sector on a regular basis.

Command and Control, and Information and Communication Capabilities
In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the GSDF, among other measures. The SDF will also strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services, along with other capabilities.

Response to an Attack on Remote Islands
In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc. The SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region.

In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against ballistic missiles.

With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of
Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take necessary means.

- **Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace**
  
  While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will enhance the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness.

  As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment.

- **Responses to major disasters, etc.**
  
  The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately size units.

- **Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities**
  
  The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units. The SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and on strengthening logistics and medical service structure. The SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems.

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**Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense Forces**

The new NDPG states that the architecture of each service of the SDF will be established as outlined in (1) to (3) below, based on the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized that were identified in “2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces.”

See Fig. II-4-3-2 (Annex Table of the NEW NDPG); Fig. II-4-3-3 (NDPG Comparison Tables)
(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

The GSDF needs to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations. Therefore, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment there.

The GSDF will review the organization and equipment with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics.

The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel available to respond to major disasters or other situations.

(2) Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)

The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers from 48 in the 2010 NDPG (12 escort divisions) to 54 (14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response capabilities for various missions and have more compact designs and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Aegis-equipped destroyers\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Destroyers equipped the Aegis Weapon System that uses high performance computers to process target search, detection, identification and attack operations.
**Part II: Japan’s Security and Defense Policy**

**New National Defense Program Guidelines**

**Chapter 4**

**Fig. II-4-3-3 NDPG Comparison Tables**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GSDF</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorized Number of Personnel</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
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<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve-Ready Personnel</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
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<td>Regionally deployed units in peacetime</td>
<td>12 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 combined brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDF Major units</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Deployment Units</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 artillery brigade</td>
<td>1 artillery brigade</td>
<td>1 amphibious</td>
<td>1 training group</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td>1 training group</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>7 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NDPG</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASDF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>(approx. 1,200)²</td>
<td>approx. 900</td>
<td>approx. 600</td>
<td>approx. 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (Main artillery)¹</td>
<td>(approx. 1,000/vehicle)²</td>
<td>(approx. 900/vehicle)</td>
<td>(approx. 600/vehicle)</td>
<td>(approx. 400/vehicle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>approx. 60</td>
<td>approx. 50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>approx. 220</td>
<td>approx. 170</td>
<td>approx. 150</td>
<td>approx. 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Warning &amp; Control Units</td>
<td>28 warning groups</td>
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<td>8 warning groups</td>
<td>4 warning groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>20 warning squadrons</td>
<td>20 warning squadrons</td>
<td>24 warning squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 AEW group</td>
<td>2 squadrons</td>
<td>1 AEW group</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ASDF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Aircraft Units</td>
<td>10 squadrons</td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
<td>12 squadrons</td>
<td>12 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support fighter units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Refueling/Transport Units</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Equipment</td>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>approx. 430</td>
<td>approx. 400</td>
<td>approx. 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fighters)</td>
<td>(approx. 350)²</td>
<td>approx. 300</td>
<td>approx. 260</td>
<td>approx. 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions³</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 ships</td>
<td>6 ships⁴</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aegis-equipped destroyers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Warning &amp; Control Units</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 warning groups</td>
<td>4 warning squadrons</td>
<td>11 warning groups/units</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
1. Categorized as main artillery up till 2004 NDPG, but categorized in the 2010 NDPG as artillery except for surface-to-air guided missile units.
2. Although not stated in the 1976 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG table after 1995.
3. “Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions” refers to the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF.
4. According to the 2012 NDPG, additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.

The MSDF regularly carry out information gathering and warning and surveillance activities undersea and at sea. It will also maintain the augmented submarine fleet as well as patrol aircraft units in order to patrol surrounding waters⁶ and carry out defense operations effectively.

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⁶ The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.
(3) Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)

The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as establish one new squadron in the air warning unit\(^7\).

As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a two-squadron architecture.

The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF.

\[\text{See Fig. II-4-3-4 (Fighter Unit Architecture)}\]

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\(^7\) The Airborne Early Warning Group was reorganized on April 20, 2014 and the 603rd Squadron with E-2C early warning aircraft was newly established at Naha Air Base.
The GSDF has decided to promote the following operations to strengthen the defense posture in the southwestern region based on a three-step concept of deterrence and response: “dispatch of units from peacetime”; “rapid deployment”; and “recapturing.”

[Dispatch of Units from Peacetime]
- First, deploy a GSDF coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island to organize the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities.
- Also, strengthen the posture of the remote islands in the southwestern region defense by establishing area security units in the remote islands where no SDF units are deployed, in order to enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies, including disasters.

[Rapid Deployment]
- In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with various situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In doing so, the rapid deployment divisions and brigades shall introduce mobile combat vehicles (MCVs) suitable for transportation by aircraft and other means, as well as organize rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations.

[Recapturing]
- In a bid to conduct sufficient amphibious operations, which land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade (tentative name) of several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be established.

In order for the GSDF to implement a more effective, new defense posture in the southwestern region, it is essential to improve rapid deployment capability of the GSDF units and to be able to carry out swift and flexible nation-wide operations. To achieve this, new equipment such as tilt-rotor aircraft, amphibious vehicles and MCVs will be installed, as well as organizing a new integrated headquarters (Ground Central Command (tentative name)) that controls the regional armies of the GSDF, as well as promote efficiency and rationalizing command and control function of each regional army headquarters. At the same time, a “mobile ground defense force that responds rapidly” will be established to realize a Dynamic Joint Defense Force.

Increasing the Number of Destroyers and Submarines

The new National Defense Program Guidelines specify to ensure sea superiority in order to effectively conduct various operations, such as around-the-clock surveillance and anti-submarine warfare, and to secure the defense of the surrounding waters and the safety of maritime traffic.

For this reason, in terms of the MSDF squadron, the guidelines specify to increase the number of destroyers to 54, and the number of submarines from 16 to 22, following on from the 2010 Guidelines.

In accordance with this increase, the total number of escort divisions and submarine divisions will be increased by one unit, respectively, from the current number of divisions, resulting in 14 escort divisions and 6 submarine divisions.

In addition, in light of the increase in the number of destroyers, for the purpose of securing the necessary capabilities, “new destroyers” will be introduced while taking account of the cost situation. The new destroyers will be equipped with detachable facilities, as well as capabilities for anti-mine operations which were traditionally conducted by minesweeping vessels, in order to respond to various operations. Furthermore, the body of the destroyer will be made more compact compared to the existing general purpose destroyers, by carefully selecting equipment and functions. For example, they will be equipped with a towed array sonar system (TASS) instead of a sonar system on the body. The detail will be reviewed with the Ministry of Defense, aiming to start procurement in the second half of the period of the new Mid-Term Defense Program.
Enhancement of the Posture of Air Defense and Patrol and Surveillance

For the purpose of enhancing the defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF plans to increase the number of F-15 fighters at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two squadrons. In addition, in order to keep up with the modernization of military air power of the surrounding countries and to ensure the ability to take adequate response in future, it is planned to modernize the current F-15 fighters and improve the capability of F-2 fighters, as well as continuously introduce F-35A fighters, of which procurement started in FY2012. Furthermore, in light of the operational posture of the fighter units and the geographical characteristics of the southwestern region, it is planned to introduce new aerial refueling/transport aircraft required for the fighter units to conduct various operations in the airspace surrounding Japan.

Moreover, the capability of surface-to-air PATRIOT guided missile system will be further improved, and new interceptor missile with advanced capabilities (PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement [MSE]) will be introduced, which is capable of responding to cruise missile and aircrafts, as well as conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD).

In addition to such efforts, considering the situation that military activities are becoming more active in other countries in the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, including the southwestern region, it is planned to develop an infrastructure to deploy a mobile air control and warning radar in the offshore islands in the southwestern region, and to improve the current E-767 airborne warning and control system (AWACS), in order to ensure a watertight surveillance posture in peacetime.

Since the territory of Japan includes many offshore islands, the role of airborne early-warning groups that complement the fixed warning and control radars is important for the surveillance of the airspace surrounding Japan. Considering this situation, a new squadron consisting of E-2C early warning aircrafts, the 603rd Squadron, was established at Naha Air Base in April 2014, for the purpose of further enhancing the surveillance posture in the southwestern region. Furthermore, a new airborne warning and control system (AWACS) will be developed in the future, due to the necessity of ensuring the surveillance posture that can respond to various situations from the earliest stage for a prolonged period of time.
**4 Basic Foundation for SDF**

To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; but it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The new NDPG first states the above recognition, followed by the following efforts to be prioritized.

1. **Training and Exercises**

Through routine SDF training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve tactical skills. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises.

In the southwest region, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community.

2. **Operations Infrastructure**

The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, in order to maintain the support functions so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively. Moreover, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program for each service, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness.

The SDF will undertake deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away.

In addition, the SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials (securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition, and maintaining and upgrading SDF equipment).

3. **Personnel Education**

The SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale. Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.

The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the integrated operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain personnel who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations.

In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option. Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to retire at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations. Furthermore, in order to support sustainable operation of units, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills, and take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel.

4. **Medical**

The SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. The SDF will improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation.
Defense Production and Technological Bases

The MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and technological bases as a whole, and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay.

Additionally, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. Against this backdrop, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In doing so, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

See Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, the MOD will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle through introducing a project manager system. The MOD will also aim to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle through considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts.

The MOD will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system.

See Fig. II-4-3-5 (The Project Manager System)

Research and Development

The MOD will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe fiscal situation.

In conjunction with this, the MOD will promote research...
and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan’s technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas.

The MOD will strive to make effective use of dual-use technologies, by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies, in order to utilize this effectively in the field of security.

The MOD will examine its research and development initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives.

**8 Collaboration with Local Communities**

The MOD and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, the MOD and the SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

The MOD and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and in operating the military camps, etc., the MOD will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy.

**9 Boosting Communication Capabilities**

The MOD and the SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties.

**10 Enhancing the Intellectual Base**

The MOD will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the MOD will promote various partnerships with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas.

**5 Additional Points**

These new NDPG set out the form of Japan’s defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines revised adequately.

In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan’s defense capabilities as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function.