This section explains historical developments of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and deepening process of the Japan–U.S. Alliance that indicates the future direction.

## 1 Historical Developments

Japan and the United States have traditionally developed security cooperation based on factors such as the security environment surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-2-1)

During the Cold War era, the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Declaration) in 1996. The Declaration reaffirms the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. It also calls for a review of the 1978 Guidelines...

### Fig. III-2-2-1 Changes in areas of Japan–U.S. defense Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Posture for Detering Aggression]</td>
<td>[Cooperation under normal circumstances]</td>
<td>[2005] Examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Japan: Possess defense capability, assure utilization of facilities and areas by U.S. Forces.</td>
<td>♦ Japan and U.S. maintain required defense posture.</td>
<td>[Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ U.S.: Maintain nuclear deterrent capability, forward deployments of combat-ready forces capable of reinforcing them.</td>
<td>♦ Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities.</td>
<td>♦ Confirmed important concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Conduct studies on joint defense planning for the defense of Japan.</td>
<td>♦ Security dialogues, armed control and disarmament, PKO, etc.</td>
<td>[Improvement of the international security environment]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan]</td>
<td>♦ Bilateral defense planning, mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan, establishment of coordination mechanism, etc.</td>
<td>♦ Bilateral defense cooperation in improving the international security environment remains vital to the alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ U.S. Forces: Support SDF. Conduct operations (strike power, etc.) to complement functions of SDF.</td>
<td>♦ Cooperation in response to an armed attack against Japan</td>
<td>♦ Strengthen cooperation with other partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Consult when required.</td>
<td>♦ Response to guerrilla-commando type attacks (SDF: Have primary responsibility for repel operations. U.S. Forces: Provide appropriate support.) Response to ballistic missile attack (SDF/U.S. Forces: Cooperate, coordinate. U.S. Forces: Provide intelligence, use strike power.)</td>
<td>♦ Redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peace keeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Conduct studies on facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces.</td>
<td>♦ Cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan</td>
<td>♦ Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Cooperation on HA/DR, peacekeeping, reconstruction, counter-terrorism, maritime security, counter-piracy, etc.]</td>
<td>♦ Activities initiated by either government.</td>
<td>♦ Strengthening BMD and operational capability, enhancing BMD system capability, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Japan's support for U.S. Forces activities</td>
<td>♦ relief activities, search and rescue, etc.</td>
<td>♦ Cooperation on environmental challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Use of facilities, rear area support</td>
<td>♦ Japan–U.S. operational cooperation</td>
<td>♦ Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Japan–U.S. operational cooperation</td>
<td>♦ SDF: Surveillance, minesweeping</td>
<td>♦ Cooperation on environmental challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ U.S. Forces: Operations to restore the peace and security</td>
<td>♦ U.S. Forces: Use of facilities, rear area support</td>
<td>♦ Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Cooperation on HA/DR, peacekeeping, reconstruction, counter-terrorism, maritime security, counter-piracy, etc.</td>
<td>♦ Cooperation on environmental challenges</td>
<td>♦ Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Cooperation on HA/DR, peacekeeping, reconstruction, counter-terrorism, maritime security, counter-piracy, etc.</td>
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<td>♦ Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"2005"<br>
Examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas.
[Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan]<br>
[Improvement of the international security environment]<br>
[Bilateral defense cooperation in improving the international security environment remains vital to the alliance.]

"2007"<br>
Highlighted the following roles, missions, and capabilities.
[Redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peace keeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan.]
[Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group.]
[Strengthening BMD and operational capability, enhancing BMD system capability, etc.]

"2011"<br>
Deepen and broaden following security and defense cooperation.
[Expand joint training and exercises. Study further joint and shared use of facilities. Expand cooperation in ISR activities, etc.]
[Transfer of SM-3 Block II to third parties.]
[Establishment of a bilateral extended deterrence dialogue on a regular basis.]
[Space ♦ Cyber ♦ Bilateral/multilateral cooperation ♦ Cooperation on HA/DR, peacekeeping, reconstruction, counter-terrorism, maritime security, counter-piracy, etc. ♦ Cooperation on environmental challenges ♦ Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group]
for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation\(^1\) (Former Guidelines), and the promotion of cooperative relations between the two countries in fields such as studies concerning ballistic missile defense; the consolidation, realignment, and reduction of U.S. military facilities and areas in Okinawa; and the promotion of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting held in the following year (1997), new Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) were approved as part of the promotion of cooperative relations indicated within the Declaration from the previous year. These indicated the general framework and orientation for the roles and modalities for cooperation and coordination between Japan and the United States in the development of a platform for more effective and reliable Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in times of armed attacks against Japan, when events arise in the region, and in states of emergency, based on the changes in the state of affairs following the Cold War.

Afterwards, in light of the further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan and the United States have enhanced consultations related to security. Through these Japan–U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan–U.S. Alliance was arranged through three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage), the examination of Japan–U.S. consultations.

### Fig. III-2-2-2  Overview of Japan–U.S. Consultations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultation</th>
<th>First stage</th>
<th>Second stage</th>
<th>Third stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting: The two countries agreed to further bilateral consultations in the general field of security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>Confirmation of common strategic objectives (at the first stage)</td>
<td>Roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the U.S. (at the second stage)</td>
<td>Force posture realignment (realignment of U.S. Force structure in Japan) (at the third stage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignments for the Future</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Roadmap for Realignments Implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting: Implementation of the realignment roadmap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 An advance directive created in 1978. It concerned the state of Japan–U.S. cooperation, and was established in order to realize the aims of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, etc., more effectively.
Part III  Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 2  Strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 2  Deepening of the Japan–U.S. Alliance

Fig. III-2-2-3

The Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the SDF showed in “United States–Japan Roadmap” for Realignment Implementation

1. Realignment in Kanto Area

[Yokota]
- Establishment of the bilateral and joint operations coordination center (UOCOC) at Yokota Air Base
- Return of portions of airspace, and collocation of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers to the Yokota RAPCON facility, etc.
- Civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the United States)

[Sagami General Depot (SGD)]
- Establishment of facilities along with the transformation of headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (support facilities, including a training center)
- Return of some portions of land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (approximately 15ha)
- Return of land for underground rail and road (approximately 2ha)
- Joint use of a specific area (approximately 35ha) of open space in the western side of SGD

2. Realignment in Okinawa

[Shared Use]
- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
- JASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

[Land Returns]
- The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base
- A detailed consolidation plan is being developed

Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 (total return, approximately 16ha)

Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return, approximately 274ha)

Naha Port (total return, approximately 56ha)
- A replacement facility will be constructed in the Naha Port and Harbor Plan Urasoe-Pier district

Futenma Air Station (total return, approximately 481ha)

1. Base facility for helicopters—The Futenma Replacement Facility will be constructed in the area from Oura Bay to the coastal area south of Camp Schwab

2. Base facility for aerial refueling tankers—Relocation to Iwakuni (deploy on a rotational basis to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam)

3. Base function for contingency use—Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Air Bases and others

Legend:
- Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base
  (Land area as of January 1, 2011)

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Legend:
- Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base
  (Land area as of January 1, 2011)

[Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps]
- III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), approximately 8,000 personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate to Guam (The affected units will relocate from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zuckeran, and Makiminato Service Area.)
3. Relocation of Aircraft

Relocate U.S. aircraft (Kadena, Misawa, Iwakuni) to such SDF facilities as Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, or Guam. Relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed upon at the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011.

Deployment of X-Band Transportable Radar for BMD (AN/TPY-2: so-called “X-Band Radar System”)

Relocation of Carrier Air Wing (F/A-18×49, EA-6B×4, E-2C×4, C-2×2: total 59 aircraft) to Iwakuni

Relocation of KC-130 (12 aircraft) to Iwakuni

Relocation of CH-53D (8 aircraft) to Guam

Relocation of JMSDF E/O/UP-3, U-36A (17 aircraft) to Atsugi

KC-130 (12 aircraft) will deploy on a rotational basis to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Note: Portion of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni

Deployment of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

Relocation of aircraft (F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, C-2) to Iwakuni

Part III  Measures for the Defense of Japan

Section 2   Deepening of the Japan–U.S. Alliance
tion of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage), and the examination of a force posture realignment (third stage). Their contents were confirmed at the “2+2” meeting in May 2007, and were complemented at the “2+2” joint statement in May 2010. (See Figs. III-2-2-2, III-2-2-3)

Strengthening of the Japan – U.S. Security Arrangements

Parallel to such bilateral political discussions, the two countries enhanced their cooperative relations in various aspects, including military operations, by dealing with specific issues. For instance, as part of the cooperation under normal circumstances stipulated by the Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation, Japan and the U.S. are working together on studies of joint operation plans for response to or of armed attacks against Japan, mutual cooperation plans to for situations in areas surrounding Japan and others. Based on such collaboration, the two sides carry out not only conventional command post exercises and field training drills between units, but also joint trainings including combined joint field training exercises, and strive for the further improvement of interoperability.

Japan also participates in trilateral trainings together with the armed forces of the U.S. and Australia, and in multilateral exercises such as Cobra Gold. As a result, the cooperative arrangements between Japan and the U.S. have made significant progress in a variety of fields. In recent years U.S. forces stationed in Japan have also participated in emergency drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments. Furthermore in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the U.S. forces performed relief activities as part of Operation Tomodachi in cooperation with the SDF, putting into practice the capacities acquired through joint Japan–U.S. exercises.

Regarding response to ballistic missiles, the two sides held discussions on sharing of operational information and scope of response, thereby improving the joint response capacity in times of ballistic missile attack. As a result of these efforts, Japan and the U.S. managed to closely cooperate and coordinate their response to the ballistic missile launch carried out by North Korea in April 2009. In terms of equipment as well, in addition to efforts to improve capabilities for response to conventional threats, the two sides are advancing joint development of new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptors with enhanced capabilities in order to secure response to the sophistication and diversification of future ballistic missile threats.

As for efforts for improvement of the international security environment, for a period of approximately eight years with interruption, since December 2001, Japan conducted maritime replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (and after expiration of that law, pursuant to the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Law), providing fuel to vessels of the U.S. and other foreign nations engaged in maritime interdiction operations against terrorism. Since 2003, for a period of approximately five years, Japan has been engaged in initiatives based on the former Iraq Special Measures Law. Through these activities implemented jointly with the U.S., Japan managed to deepen and reinforce the cooperative ties with the U.S. in the field of security.

Japan has advanced cooperation with the U.S. in various fields through the international disaster relief activities and the international peace-keeping operations carried out in Haiti. Specifically, Japan has been using U.S. bases in California and Miami as relay hubs to Haiti and has cooperated with the U.S. in coordination activities for the use of the Haiti International Airport in order to implement aerial transportation of personnel and goods for unit deployment and dispatch of personnel. Regarding anti-piracy response operations in the Gulf of Aden, Japan is providing cooperation to on-site inspections carried out by relevant countries through sharing of information with units dispatched by the U.S., E.U. and other countries and organizations. The importance of such cooperative relations between Japan and the U.S. is increasing in the context of Japan’s efforts for achieving stabilization in the Asia-Pacific region and for improving the global security environment.

As the opportunities for cooperation between Japan and the U.S. are on the rise, the instances for reciprocal provision of supply and services within the framework of the Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA) ratified in 1996 have increased from 200 cases annually to more than 500 cases in recent years. These developments demonstrate that the cooperative ties between Japan and the U.S. in the field of logistic support are steadily advancing and expanding.
The cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, which have borne numerous results thus far as noted above, welcomed the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in 2010.

In the Japan–U.S. Summit Meeting 1 held on November 13, 2009, as part of efforts to deepen the Japan–U.S. Alliance, then Prime Minister Hatoyama proposed the start of dialogue processes to deepen the Japan–U.S. Alliance (processes for deepening the alliance) as the countries welcomed the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty; President Obama concurred with his proposal. On January 19, 2010, the actual day of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the remarks and statement between the Japanese and U.S. leaders were

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announced, and a joint statement of the “2+2” was released. Throughout 2010, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF carried out a series of events to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan—U.S. Security Treaty— from initiatives implemented on the government level, to events organized by on-the-ground units of the SDF. (See Fig. III-2-2-4)

In such ways, Japan and the United States have decided to enhance dialogue in order to further promote and deepen Japan—U.S. security cooperation over a broad range of areas in the future, so as to make the Japan—U.S. Alliance even more unshakable. Therefore, Japan will promote specific consultations with the United States at the ministerial-level, and at the working-level under instructions from ministers.

For instance, in the Joint Statement after the “2+2” meeting held on May 28, 2010, the two countries demonstrated their determination to promote and deepen security cooperation in a wide range of fields, so as to ensure that the Japan—U.S. Alliance adapts to new challenges in the 21st century. At the Japan—U.S. Summit Meeting 1 held on November 13, 2010, the two countries expressed their desire to deepen and develop the Japan—U.S. Alliance with three pillars at its center: security, economy and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. At the joint press conference held on January 13, 2011, Defense Minister Kitazawa reaffirmed that the ministers concurred for the acceleration of talks to deepen the Japan—U.S. Alliance in security, so as to demonstrate the joint vision of the alliance for the 21st century.

### 3 Japan—U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting (June 21, 2011)

As a result of bilateral discussions on the deepening of the Japan—U.S. Alliance carried out on various levels under the aforementioned political leadership, on June 21, 2011, the Japan—U.S. Security Consultative Committee held its first in four years (since 2007) “2+2” meeting in Washington DC. The meeting was attended by Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsumoto as representatives of Japan, and by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton for the U.S. At the meeting, the two sides confirmed the achievements of the process of deliberations in the aspects of security and defense cooperation. The Joint Statement issued at the “2+2” meeting re-examined and revised the common strategic objectives stipulated in the Joint Statements of the “2+2” meetings held in 2005 and 2007, and expressed the determination of the two countries to deepen and expand security and defense cooperation. The participants also agreed to supplement the United States—Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation adopted in 2006, and confirmed the stable implementation of realignment, and at the same time reached a consensus to work together in order to enhance response capabilities to various contingencies in Japan and the U.S. taking into consideration the close collaboration between the Japanese SDF and the U.S. Armed Forces in response to the March 11 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear emergency. Furthermore, the participants confirmed the consensus between the U.S. and Japan regarding the cost sharing for the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. Below is an outline of the aforementioned agreements.

### 1 Common Strategic Objectives

Based on the assessment of the changing security environment, the common strategic objectives between Japan and the United States for 2005 and 2007 were reviewed and reaffirmed. The outline of the review is as follows.

- Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region, and enhance the ability to respond to various situations.
- Deter provocations by North Korea, achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization, resolve issues related to proliferation, ballistic missiles illicit activities, and humanitarian concerns including the matter of abduction.

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Part III  Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 2  Strengthening of Alliance Security and Defense Cooperation

Strengthen the cooperation among the United States, Japan, and ASEAN, and support ASEAN’s efforts to promote democratic values and a unified market economy

Encourage India’s growing engagement with the region and participation in regional architectures, and promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, Japan, and India

Promote effective cooperation through open, multi-layered regional networks and rule-making mechanisms including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and East Asia Summit (EAS)

In order to support fragile states, and promote human security, strengthen Japan–U.S. cooperation in areas of humanitarian assistance, governance and capacity building, peacekeeping operations, and development assistance

Prevent and eradicate terrorism

Seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, while maintaining necessary deterrence, and promote the nonproliferation and reduction of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Prevent and eradicate piracy, and maintain safety and security of maritime domain by defending the principle of navigation

Maintain the Japan–U.S. cooperation with respect to protection of and access to space and cyberspace

Strengthen international cooperation on disaster prevention and relief, promote safety of civilian nuclear programs, enhance the capability to address nuclear accidents, and promote dialogue on the diversification of supplies of critical resources and materials

Look forward to an expanded U.N. Security Council that includes Japan as a permanent member

Promote stability and prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa, ensure Iran’s full compliance with its international obligations and return to serious negotiations on nuclear programs, strengthen civil efforts to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) to promote effective governance and development, and support Pakistan’s efforts to strengthen civilian governance and implement economic reforms

In order to address the evolving regional and global security environment, a decision was made to enhance further bilateral security and defense cooperation in the following areas, based on Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines and the United States’ 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

(1)  Strengthening deterrence and contingency response

Refine bilateral plans, continuously study the roles, missions, and capabilities, and accelerate bilateral cooperation on noncombatant evacuation operations

Expand joint training and exercises, study further joint and shared use of facilities, and promote cooperation in areas such as expanding information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISPR) activities

Regarding the SM-3 Block IIA cooperative development program, study future issues in preparation for transition to a production and deployment phase. In this regard transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA to third parties may be allowed in accordance with the Exchange of Notes dated June 23, 2006 in cases where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the further transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA. And the Joint Arms and Military Technology Commission (JAMTC) is designated as the consultation mechanism for such future third party transfers

Establishment of a bilateral extended deterrence dialogue on a regular basis, deepen the bilateral space security partnerships, and welcoming the establishment of bilateral strategic policy dialogue on cyber security issues

(2)  Alliance Cooperation in a Regional and Global Setting

Promote trilateral and multilateral cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and other operations as the circumstances allow, through joint exercises and mutual logistics support

Shared views on the importance of establishing a regional

Reference  See Chapter 1, Section 2-5
Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

(3) Enhancing Alliance Foundations

- Emphasized the importance of further improving information security systems
- Continuously examine and enhance bilateral frameworks in order to make operational cooperation more effective, more tailored to the emerging security challenges, and more responsive to various situations
- Closer cooperation in equipment and technology between Japan and the United States. In particular, the Government of Japan will promote its ongoing study to respond to the trend toward international joint development and production. The United States encourages these Japanese efforts

Progress on the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

In view of the current evolving regional security environment, Japan and the United States emphasized the increasing importance of the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan, including in Okinawa, in order to maintain deterrence and strengthen Alliance capabilities. The two also reaffirmed the commitment to reducing the impact on local communities, including Okinawa. The following items were discussed and resolved to continue making progress towards realizing the objectives of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap.

(1) Realignment on Okinawa

- A verification and validation of the location, configuration, and construction method for the replacement facility for Futenma Air Station was made based on the analysis of the Futenma Replacement Facility Experts Study Group (ExSG). The Ministers determined that the replacement facility is to have two runways aligned in a “V”-plan, with reclamation of the sea as the primary construction method. Each runway portion is to have the length of 1,800 meters of uniform weight bearing capacity, inclusive of overrun, exclusive of seawalls. The Ministers decided that minor adjustments to the plan could be considered provided that the environmental impact assessment procedures and construction could be completed without significant delay.
- The SCC reaffirmed the commitment to relocate approximately 8,000 III MEF and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam. Furthermore, the ministers confirmed the commitment to ensure the funding necessary for the steady implementation of relocation in accordance with terms and conditions of the Roadmap and Guam International Agreement. The United States continues to examine the unit composition III MEF remaining in Okinawa.
- The Ministers noted that completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and the Marine relocation will not meet the previously targeted date of 2014 and confirmed their commitment to complete the above projects at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indefinite use of the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, while maintaining Alliance capabilities.
- The SCC members reaffirmed that the return of facilities and areas south of Kadena is to be steadily implemented. It was decided that a detailed consolidation plan would be concluded and made public as quickly as possible.
- The SCC members reaffirmed that the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on tangible progress toward completion of the replacement facility. The relocation to Guam will realize the consolidation and return of most of the facilities south of Kadena.
- The ministers decided that both sides are to continue to explore further ways for impact mitigation in Okinawa including further measures with respect to the Hotel/Hotel training area.
- The SCC members reaffirmed their commitment to noise abatement in Kadena.

(2) Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- The SCC members welcomed the transformation of the U.S. Army Command and Control at Camp Zama including the incorporation of I Corps (Forward).
- The Ministers also welcomed the steady progress made thus far on the relocation of the Ground SDF Central
Readiness Force Headquarters (CRF HQ) to Camp Zama by Japan Fiscal Year 2012.

(3) Yokota Air Base
- The Ministers noted that the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) is to commence its operations by the end of FY2011.
- The Ministers welcomed the return of portions of Yokota air space to Japanese control in 2008.

(4) Relocation of Elements of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni
- The Ministers welcomed the progress made to date in terms of the development of facilities necessary for the relocation of aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni.
- The Government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima Island is considered to be the candidate for the new SDF facility. In order to enhance defense posture in southwestern Japan, this facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by U.S. forces as a permanent field carrier landing practice site.

(5) Training Relocation
- The Ministers welcomed the January 2011 Joint Committee Agreement, including Guam as a host location. They decided to study further options for training relocation, including the expansion of both bilateral and unilateral training, inside and outside Japan, such as to Guam.

(6) Joint/Shared Use of Facilities
- The SCC members welcomed the establishment of the Joint/Shared Use Working Group.

(7) Environment
- The Ministers welcomed the establishment of the Working Group on an Agreement on the Environment and decided to accelerate the consideration of an agreement on reasonable access to U.S. facilities and areas for environmental surveys prior to land returns.

The Host Nation Support (HNS)
The Ministers welcomed the results of the comprehensive review of Host Nation Support (HNS) followed by the entry into force of the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA). They also agreed to exert maximum effort to maintain stable employment of the employees of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan.

As stated above, amidst the security arrangement environment that is increasingly obscure and uncertain, the “2+2” shows a direction in conducting vigorous negotiations on the deepening of Japan–U.S. Alliance in the comprehensive fields that both countries have interest in security arrangements in common. It is essential to realize the agreement in the joint statement steadily and in a planned manner. Based on this, it is also essential to build on the robust allied relationship established over the past 50 years to deepen and develop into the one befitting the new half century.