Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy

As described earlier, there are two objectives for Japan’s security: to prevent threats from reaching Japan and to repel them, and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that threats will reach Japan.

Japan will achieve these objectives by combining Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community in an integrated manner.

1. Japan’s Own Efforts

Japan’s security depends first and foremost on its own efforts. Based on this recognition, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will make its utmost efforts, utilizing all available means, to prevent threats from reaching the country directly. The guidelines state that in the event that these efforts fail to prevent the threat from reaching the country, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making the appropriate decisions and bringing together all relevant organizations, such as the SDF, the police and the Japan Coast Guard, and ensuring adequate cooperation among them. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems to respond to various emergency situations, and the central and local governments will work together closely to establish adequate systems.

At the same time, Japan will engage in its own diplomatic activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment.

The guidelines prescribe that Japan’s defense capabilities, which are the ultimate guarantee of national security, shall be multi-functional, flexible, and effective, and that the improvement of efficiency and rationalization are necessary in order to realize such capabilities.

2. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to ensuring Japan’s security, and the presence of the U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the progress made in Japan-U.S. cooperation in dealing with global issues, as exemplified in the fight against terrorism, the close Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship plays a significant role in the effective promotion of international efforts to prevent and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies.

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements do not function simply because of the existence of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In order to make this agreement effective, it is essential to make continuous efforts in times of peace. From this perspective, the National Defense Program Guidelines clearly specify the following efforts.

(1) Implementation of Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the United States (Strategic Objectives, Role-sharing and Military Posture)

Based on the posture of Japan’s security and defense capabilities clarified in the National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and military posture while working to harmonize perceptions of the new security environment and the appropriate strategic objectives. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden on local communities which host U.S. military facilities, while maintaining the deterrent capabilities that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.
(2) Various Efforts for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements shall be enhanced through active promotion of measures including information sharing, various forms of operational cooperation and collaboration on ballistic missile defense (BMD).

3. Cooperation with the International Community
The National Defense Program Guidelines state that in order to improve the international security environment in cooperation with the international community and to help maintain the security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The guidelines also state that based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region extending from the Middle East to East Asia is crucial to Japan. Therefore, the Government of Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries concerned in order to deal with common security challenges. Japan will also actively engage in U.N. reforms, as well as promote efforts for multilateral frameworks for security in the Asia-Pacific region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

2. Vision for Future Defense Capabilities

1. Role of Defense Capabilities
In recognition of the new security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines define the role of defense capabilities as:
1) Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies
2) Preparation for a response to a full-scale invasion
3) Proactive efforts, on Japan’s own initiative, to improve the international security environment

The guidelines state that Japan will efficiently maintain the SDF posture deemed necessary to carry out missions effectively in each area.

NDPG 1995 clearly stated the maintenance of the defense posture of each branch of the SDF. However, the current National Defense Program Guidelines adopt the idea that a new SDF posture should be formed in the process of joint operations being conducted to respond to each contingency. Based on this concept, the guidelines specify in a comprehensive manner, the role and response to be fulfilled in each contingency and the concept of the SDF posture under “The Role of Defense Capabilities.”

(1) Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies
The idea behind the response to new threats and diverse contingencies presented in the National Defense Program Guidelines is as follows.

As new threats and contingencies are difficult to predict and have the potential to emerge suddenly, Japan will effectively counter such changes by forming and deploying highly ready and mobile defense force units capable of responding appropriately to the characteristics of each situation in accordance with the characteristics of the units and Japan’s geographical characteristics. When contingencies do actually occur, the defense force will act quickly and appropriately to seamlessly respond to the situation and in close collaboration with the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations in accordance with the circumstances and the need for division of labor.

Major responses to new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows.
a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
Japan will effectively deal with ballistic missile attacks by maintaining a system to counter such attacks, including a BMD system, to be established at an early date.

Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats through efforts to build the BMD system as well as relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1)

b. Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Forces
In response to guerillas and special operations force attacks, Japan will maintain the necessary defense force structure to effectively deal with the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner, including swift and concentrated unit deployments. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2)

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands
Because of Japan’s geographical characteristics, featuring many offshore islands, invasion of such islands can be envisioned as one method of orchestrating an armed attack against Japan. In this regard, Japan must maintain a defense structure which is capable of dealing with precise guidance attacks by transporting SDF units by sea and air in a flexible manner. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3)

d. Patrol and Surveillance of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Responses to Violations of Japan’s Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special Operation Vessels and Other Vessels
In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies, early detection is extremely important for the prevention of undesirable events, as well as the prevention of expansion if such an event should it occur. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remains a key role of the SDF. For this reason, Japan will maintain a defense structure that includes warships, aircraft and other equipment necessary to achieve this aim.

Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond swiftly and appropriately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning armed North Korean special operation vessels and submerged navigation within Japanese territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will take appropriate actions against such spy ships in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in Japan’s territorial waters. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4)

e. Response to Large-Scale and Special Disasters
In the event of a large-scale natural disaster or a special disaster such as a nuclear disaster, it is of extreme importance that Japan utilize the capabilities of the SDF to ensure the security of the people. For situations in which protection of life or property are necessary, Japan will maintain an adequate force structure consisting of defense force units and personnel with specialized abilities and expertise with the ability to undertake disaster relief operations throughout Japan. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5)

(2) Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion
While the likelihood of full-scale invasion is declining, new defense capabilities are required for Japan to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies. Proactive engagement is also required of Japan, on its own initiative, aimed at improving the international security environment.

In recognition of this security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines state that Japan will depart from the previous defense build-up concept that emphasizes so-called Cold War-type counter-armor warfare and implement a sweeping review of its defense equipment and personnel earmarked for responding
to full-scale invasion with an eye toward reducing numbers.

At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense capability is to respond to full-scale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up will require time, Japan will secure the most fundamental element of its defense capabilities in order to prepare for full-scale invasion. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3)

(3) Proactive Efforts on Japan’s own Initiative to Improve the International Security Environment

a. Proactive Engagement on its Own Initiative in International Peace Cooperation Activities

It is stated in the current National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative with the objective of further ensuring the peace and security of Japan, rather than simply “to make a contribution” as was stated in the previous version of the guidelines.

The scope of international peace cooperation activities is extremely broad, and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner with diplomacy as part of the country’s unified efforts. Within the framework of the Government’s overall policy, the SDF must be appropriately engaged in international peace cooperation activities drawing on its self-sustainability and organizational capabilities. For this reason, the SDF plans to establish the infrastructure necessary to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, maintaining a highly ready force posture for relevant units, and improving transport and other capabilities.

In order for Japan to appropriately participate in international peace cooperation activities, it was determined that necessary arrangements would be made including efforts to prioritize these activities within the SDF’s overall missions. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1)
b. Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges
Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in view of the changes in the international security environment and in recognition of the fact that such efforts contribute to the effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, activities which contribute to the peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the area of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-3)

2. Fundamental Elements of Japan’s Defense Capabilities
Following are fundamental elements of Japan’s defense capabilities that are included in the National Defense Program Guidelines, which are necessary to fulfill the defense missions described earlier.

(1) Enhancement of Joint Operation Capabilities
In order to execute its missions swiftly and effectively and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture so that all SDF services can operate in a unified manner in such situations from the moment they arise.

For this reason, the Joint Staff was established and the infrastructure for joint operations was put in place in such areas as education and training, and information and communications, and the SDF reexamined its existing organizations for joint operations capabilities so as to enhance their efficiency. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4)

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities
In order for defense capabilities to function effectively with multi-functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government of Japan to retain and utilize advanced intelligence capabilities, including the ability to detect contingencies as early as possible and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately.

Therefore, Japan will strengthen its advanced and diversified intelligence-gathering capabilities and enhance its comprehensive analysis and assessment capabilities, bearing in mind threats in the security environment and technological trends. Japan will also strengthen its intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which will play a role in supporting these capabilities, and in this regard, Japan will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress of Science and Technology in Japan’s Defense Capabilities
In order to realize multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations resulting from progress in information science and technology should be adequately reflected. In particular, advanced command and communications systems, as well as information communication networks shall be established to develop reliable command and control systems while the rapid intelligence-sharing systems that are indispensable to the SDF’s joint operations described above will be enhanced in line with the advanced information and communication technologies available in Japan and abroad.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources
In order to achieve greater outcomes with limited human resources, it is necessary to recruit human resources with high potential and train and educate them to adequately respond to increasingly diverse and international SDF missions and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech defense equipment.

Research and education on security issues will be promoted together with a reinforcement of the manpower foundation for promoting such research.
3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability

The attached table of the National Defense Program Guidelines clarifies the specific posture for the defense capabilities needed to fulfill the missions described above. The following provides an overview.

1. Ground Self-Defense Force

(1) Formation and Deployment of Basic Strategic Units Responding to the New Security Environment

As regionally deployed units (basic strategic units), eight divisions and six brigades, which are responsive and highly mobile, will be formed in preparation for effective and timely response to new threats and diverse contingencies that are often difficult to predict. The eight divisions and six brigades will each be stationed in one of 14 sections demarcated with consideration given to Japan’s geography, which is characterized by mountains, rivers and straits. (See Fig. II-2-2-1)

Fig. II-2-2-1 Deployment of Divisions and Brigades and its Concept under the National Defense Program Guidelines

- Modernized Readiness Divisions and Brigades
  Units formed and deployed with focus placed on responsiveness, mobility and the efficient operations of heavy equipment, such as tanks and artillery, to enable rapid and effective responses to new threats and diverse situations.

- Modernized Comprehensive Divisions and Brigades
  Units formed and deployed with focus placed on total balance to allow responses to all situations, ranging from responses to new threats and diverse situations to dealing with full-scale invasions in the future.

(2) Securing Personnel Resources (Manpower)

a. A departure from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept will be pursued, and a personnel (manpower)-oriented system will be created in order to enhance the response to new threats and diverse contingencies such as attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, large-scale disasters and participation in international peace cooperation activities.

b. To ensure effective response capability, the number of regular defense officers will be increased from 145,000, set forth in NDPG 1995 to 148,000.

c. Meanwhile, the amount of primary equipment—tanks and artillerys—will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicles for artillery, respectively. (See Fig. II-2-2-2)
Part II  The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

(3) Formation of Central Readiness Force and International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit

In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies should they occur, the Central Readiness Force will be newly organized, consisting of Mobile Operation Units and various other specialized units. Within this force, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit will be newly organized for proactive engagement on Japan’s own initiative in international peace cooperation activities.


(1) Posture of New Destroyer Units for More Effective Response

In order to secure as many well-trained destroyers as possible among a limited number of vessels and to enable prompt response to diverse contingencies, destroyer units will be formed according to the level of training rather than the conventional fixed formation.

Mobile Operation Units will be integrated into eight divisions (one division consisting of four vessels) to enable swift and continuous response to contingencies. The formation of Regional District Units will be modified so that one unit is deployed in each of five patrol districts in view of the current security environment.

(2) Formation of Submarine Units Focusing on Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

Submarine units will continue to retain a total of 16 submarines (units are to be consolidated, from six divisions with two or three vessels per division to four divisions with four vessels each). The new formation of submarines to be deployed in important maritime traffic points in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan for information gathering purposes is intended to detect signs of new threats and diverse contingencies as early as possible to enable a flexible response.
(3) Improving the Efficiency of Combat Aircraft Units

While ensuring the continued surveillance posture of the surrounding sea area, as well as its responsiveness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft (including patrol aircraft, and minesweeping and transport helicopters) will be reduced from approximately 170 to 150 as a result of consolidation of units and improvements in efficiency.

For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, P-3C successor aircraft (P-1) with improved performance will be introduced, and the current eight squadrons will be integrated into four squadrons for increased efficiency. From the viewpoint of increasing operational efficiency, patrol helicopter units will be consolidated from eight squadrons to five, and will be carrier-based, in principle.

3. Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units

Although fighter aircraft units will continue to be major units in order to permit appropriate action in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, in light of the decreased probability of a full-scale invasion of Japan, the number of aircraft will be reduced from approximately 300 to 260 by means of improvements in operational efficiency.

The number of combat aircraft, including fighters, will be reduced from approximately 400 to 350 in line with such developments as the downsizing of air reconnaissance units. (See Fig. II-2-2-3)

![Deployment of Fighter Units](image)

(2) Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities

In order to allow Japan to effectively respond to an invasion of its offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established, and next-generation transport aircraft (C-X) with superior transport and aviation performance will be prepared. (See Fig. II-2-2-4)
(3) **Division of Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups**

The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized from the single group described in NDPG 1995 into two groups: E-767 early-warning and control aircraft units and E-2C early-warning aircraft units.

### 4. Major Equipment and Major Units Also Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the posture of the SDF must be capable of taking on various roles to deal with diverse tasks. In particular, it has been deemed important for Japan to attempt to obtain understanding for its BMD system both domestically and abroad by explaining the system as specifically as possible and ensuring its transparency. To that end, the guidelines, in the attached table, specify “major equipment and major units also available for ballistic missile defense.” (See Fig. II-2-2-5)
### Fig. II-2-2-5 Comparison of Program Outlines and Structures when Mid-Term Defense Program is Complete

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized personnel</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>About 161,000 (Note) About 152,000 (Note) About 144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready reserve</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionally deployed units in peacetime</td>
<td>12 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 combined brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile operation units</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 artillery brigade</td>
<td>1 armed forces</td>
<td>1 armed forces</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
<td>1 airborne</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 combined training brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-to-air guided missile units</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main equipment Tank</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>About 900</td>
<td>About 600</td>
<td>About 790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main artillery</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>About 900/tank</td>
<td>About 600/tank</td>
<td>About 890/tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer units (for mobile operations)</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Regional units) 10 units</td>
<td>(Regional units) 7 units</td>
<td>(6 divisions)</td>
<td>(6 divisions)</td>
<td>(6 divisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 minesweeper flotillas (Land-based) 18 squads</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla (Land-based) 13 squads</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol aircraft units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main equipment Destroyers</td>
<td>About 60 ships</td>
<td>About 50 ships</td>
<td>47 ships</td>
<td>48 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>About 600</td>
<td>About 600/tank</td>
<td>About 600/tank</td>
<td>About 600/tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 220 aircraft</td>
<td>About 150 aircraft</td>
<td>About 160 aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft control &amp; warning units</td>
<td>28 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter units</td>
<td>10 squadrons</td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
<td>12 squadrons</td>
<td>12 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support fighter units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air refueling/transport units</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air guided Missile Units</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main equipment Combat aircraft (fighter aircraft)</td>
<td>About 430 aircraft (about 350 aircraft)</td>
<td>About 400 aircraft (about 300 aircraft)</td>
<td>About 350 aircraft (about 260 aircraft)</td>
<td>About 350 aircraft (about 260 aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main equipment Aegis-equipped destroyers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 ships</td>
<td>4 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft control &amp; warning units</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7 groups</td>
<td>7 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air guided missile units</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 squadrons</td>
<td>4 squadrons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Regarding the sufficiency of SDF Regular Personnel in the Mid-Term Defense Program, in order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations, and for active and major participation in international peace cooperation activities, current levels shall be maintained, with a target of approximately 148,000 personnel.
4. Additional Elements for Consideration
The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the following elements shall be taken into consideration in building up, maintaining and operating defense capabilities.

In light of severe fiscal conditions, defense expenditures must be curbed by further rationalizing and streamlining of defense forces, and overall defense capability needs to function smoothly and efficiently through harmonization of operations with other measures implemented by the Government.

In addition, the Government will make the following efforts: promotion of measures to curb the lifecycle cost of procuring defense equipment, implementation of effective and efficient research and development activities, as well as the allocation of limited resources to core technological fields for the establishment of a truly necessary defense production system and technological foundation.

In order to efficiently maintain and upgrade Japan’s defense-related facilities, the Government will take various measures to promote more harmonious coexistence between these facilities and the local communities.

2. Time frame for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review
The National Defense Program Guidelines provide a clear vision for Japan’s defense capabilities for the next decade, based on the idea that it is important to set a concrete timeline for achieving the goals of defense capabilities more clearly.

In addition, in a report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, it was recommended that, “taking into consideration the continuously changing security environment and ever-advancing technological trends, Japan should continually and flexibly review” its defense vision, and therefore it was deemed desirable for Japan to review its defense vision on a regular basis in line with the security environment and technological changes. As such, the National Defense Program Guidelines will be reviewed and, if necessary, will be revised after five years or should there be a significant change in the security environment, taking into consideration such change in the environment, technological progress and other relevant factors at the time.

5. Three Principles on Arms Exports
A statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released at the time of the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines addressed issues related to arms export control. It stated that given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) would contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and from the viewpoint of contributing to the security of Japan, the Government would exempt items related to BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related provisions, on the condition that those items would be subject to strict export control. (See Reference 10 - 11)

In addition, with regard to cases of joint development and production with the United States as well as cases seen as contributing to counterterrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions were raised through the process of developing the National Defense Program Guidelines, it mentioned that the Government would decide whether to take any actions in the future on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the basic principle as a peace-loving nation of avoiding exacerbation of international conflicts.

The statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary clarified that Japan would continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing carefully with arms export control in light of the country’s basic philosophy as a peaceful country, which is the basis for the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.