

### Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (The preamble)

In recent years, the international community firmly recognizes the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials to terrorists and countries of concern. Addressing non-proliferation issues, such as restricting or controlling export of these weapons and their means of delivery, is a pressing issue for peace and stability of the international society today.

Meanwhile, international public opinion calling for restricting certain conventional weapons is also on the rise from a humanitarian point of view and it is an important challenge for each country to tackle the issue of certain conventional weapons by striking a balance between the humanitarian requirement and the defense necessity.

As an effort to cope with these challenges, a system aimed at promoting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is established in cooperation with each country in the world. (See Fig. III-3-3-1)

**Fig. III-3-3-1 Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regarding Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials**

Classification	Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others				Conventional Weapons
	Nuclear Weapons	Chemical Weapons	Biological Weapons	Delivery Means (Missiles)	
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) Restriction on illegal transactions of small arms and light weapons System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Australia Group (AG)		Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
New International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540				

Against this background, Japan has pledged to play a positive role in a practical and gradual approach toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation aimed at a nuclear-free world, disarmament and non-

proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and missiles as their means of delivery, and a global effort to restrict certain conventional weapons.

This section will explain about efforts being made by the Defense Ministry and the SDF regarding endeavors by the United Nations and other international organizations on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons.

## 1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

### 1. Nuclear Weapons

#### (1) Relevant Treaties

Treaties related to control of nuclear arms, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and export-control systems are shown in Fig. III-3-3-2.

**Fig. III-3-3-2 Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons)**

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuclear non-proliferation The NPT recognizes the five countries—the United States, Russia, the U.K., France and China—as nuclear weapon states. It prohibits acquisition of nuclear arms by non-nuclear weapon states.</li> <li>• Nuclear disarmament The NPT obliges nuclear weapon states to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith.</li> <li>• Peaceful use of nuclear energy The NPT recognizes the “inalienable” right of signatory states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (Article 4-1) The NPT obliges non-nuclear weapon states to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)<sup>2</sup> to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy for peaceful use to military technologies. (Article 3)</li> <li>• The NPT entered into force in 1970.</li> <li>• There are 190 signatory countries to the NPT.</li> </ul>
	Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CTBT prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion by signatory states at any place in the world, including outer space, the atmosphere, underwater and underground.</li> <li>• The CTBT has been signed by 177 states and ratified by 137 states. (Of 44 designated countries whose ratification is necessary for the treaty’s enforcement, 41 countries have ratified it)</li> <li>• All of the 44 states need to ratify the treaty so that it can enter into force. But some of states which have yet to ratify the treaty are uncertain if they will ratify it. As a result, the treaty has yet to enter into force.</li> </ul>
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) <sup>4</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling exports of materials, equipment and technologies that could be used for development of nuclear arms.</li> <li>• The NSG was formed in 1978 following a nuclear test by India in 1974.</li> <li>• The group consists of 45 countries.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/npt/index.html>>

2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/iaea/index.html>>

3. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/ctbt/index.html>>

4. See<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/nsg/index.html>>

#### (2) Japan’s Efforts

Japan has been continuing to strive for an early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and for the reinforcement of IAEA safeguard measures from a viewpoint of strengthening global efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Japan has been also actively participating in discussion being made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

## 2. Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons

### (1) Relevant Treaties

Treaties related to control of chemical and biological weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation of these weapons, and export-control systems are shown in Fig. III-3-3-3.

**Fig. III-3-3-3 Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (biological and chemical weapons)**

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The CWC pursues to abolish chemical weapons by prohibiting signatory states from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring or using such weapons and obliging them to destroy the weapons if they own them. A strict verification system has been established to make the implementation of the convention effective.</li> <li>○ The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established in The Hague, the Netherlands in 1997 in order to implement verification measures stipulated under the CWC following its enforcement.</li> <li>○ The CWC entered into force in 1997.</li> <li>○ CWC signatory states: 182 countries.</li> </ul>
	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The BWC is designed to destroy biological weapons already in possession of some countries as well as prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.</li> <li>○ The BWC entered into force in 1975.</li> <li>○ BWC signatory states: 155 countries</li> </ul>
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Australia Group (AG) <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The AG has been trying to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons by controlling exports of materials, manufacturing facilities and related technologies that could be used for making such weapons.</li> <li>○ The first meeting took place in 1985.</li> <li>○ Participating states: 40 countries</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/cwc/index.html>>  
 2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/bwc/index.html>>  
 3. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/ag/index.html>>

### (2) Japan's Efforts

a. Since 1980, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have dispatched GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons to the negotiations to draft the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established in the Hague, the Netherlands, to implement verification measures stipulated in the convention. (See Reference 53)

The Chemical School of the GSDF, located in Saitama City, Saitama Prefecture, has synthesized a small quantity of chemical materials to research protective measures, which are subject to regulations of the convention. In line with the regulations, the school has opened its facilities to inspection by the OPCW six times since the OPCW's establishment.

The Government of Japan has been working on the project to dispose of chemical weapons that were abandoned in China in line with the CWC. Past investigations have shown that an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons that were abandoned by the former Imperial Japanese Army in China remain buried in the Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province.



GSDF officers being dispatched to OPCW [From left are Colonel Urano (Head of Operation and Planning Branch of Inspectorate Division), Major General Akiyama (Director of Inspectorate Division) and Major Shinkai(Inspector)]

The Defense Ministry and the SDF have cooperated in the project by sending four officials, including GSDF officers, to the Cabinet Office, which is in charge of the project. The Defense Ministry has also dispatched GSDF officers specializing in chemistry and ammunition disposal to China to help the excavation and collection of the abandoned weapons.

Since 1999, SDF officers have been so far dispatched to China for six times for the disposal of discarded chemical weapons in the country. From August to September of last year, eight SDF officers were sent to Han Xianyao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province where they identified the excavated shells and took measures to prevent them from being activated and exploding.

b. Regarding the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or BWC), Japan has dispatched GSDF officers with expertise in pharmacology and medicine to related conferences such as multilateral negotiations meant for introducing BWC verification measures, aimed at supporting global efforts to reinforce the convention.

c. Regarding the Australia Group (AG), Japan has sent officials to the AG’s annual meeting since 1994 in order to support global efforts to make regulations and rules set by the group effective.

### 3. Delivery Means (Missiles)

#### (1) Relevant agreements

International political agreements regarding control of weapons-delivery means, disarmament and non-proliferation of such means, and export control systems are shown in Fig. III-3-3-4.

**Fig. III-3-3-4 Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles)**

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The HCOC is a political agreement that mainly stipulates principles such as prevention of proliferation of ballistic missiles and restraint on tests, development and deployment of such missiles, and confidence-building measures among member states.</li> <li>○ The HCOC was adopted in 2002.</li> <li>○ Participating states: 126 countries</li> </ul>
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The MTCR is designed to control exports of missiles, which can serve as means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and general-purpose equipment and technologies that are capable of contributing to missile development.</li> <li>○ The MTCR was established in 1987.</li> <li>○ Participating states: 34 countries</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtrcr/index.html>>

2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtrcr/mtrcr.html>>

#### (2) Japan’s Efforts

The Defense Ministry has dispatched its officials to an annual meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) since 1992 in order to make MTCR regulations and rules effective.

## 2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons

### 1. Relevant Treaties

Shown in Fig. III-3-3-5 are treaties and export-control systems related to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons whose use are deemed inhumane.

Fig. III-3-3-5 Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CCW is designed to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, such as land mines and booby traps.</li> <li>• The CCW entered into force in 1983.</li> <li>• Signatory states: 102 countries</li> </ul>
	Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Convention) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The convention totally prohibits the use mines, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel while obligating signatory states to destruct stockpiled mines within four years and remove laid mines within 10 years. It also stipulates international cooperation regarding the removal of anti-personnel mines and assistance of mine victims.</li> <li>• The convention entered into force in 1999.</li> <li>• Signatory states: 153 countries</li> </ul>
	Restriction on Illegal Transactions of Small Arms and Light Weapons	The United Nations is currently studying ways to restrict illegal transactions of small arms and light weapons and to reduce excessive accumulation of such arms.
	System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms	This register system has been in operation from 1992 to help increase the transparency of armaments, following a proposal made by Japan along with the countries of the European Community (then). Under the system, each country is required to register to the United Nations the quantity of its annual exports and imports of defense equipment in seven categories <sup>3</sup> and the countries where such equipment is imported or exported.
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Wassenaar Arrangement <sup>4</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This arrangement is an international export control regime aimed at achieving following objectives.               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) To contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations</li> <li>(2) To prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organisations as part of global efforts to fight against terrorism</li> </ol> </li> <li>• The arrangement was established in 1996.</li> <li>• Participating states: 40 countries</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/ccw/ccw.html>>

2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/mine/index.html>>

3. The seven are 1) battle tanks, 2) armored combat vehicles, 3) large-caliber artillery systems, 4) combat aircraft, 5) attack helicopters, 6) warships and 7) missiles and missile launchers. As a result of an institutional review in 2003, MANPADS was newly registered as equipment under a subcategory of the "missile and missile launcher" category.

4. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/wa/index.html>>

## 2. Japan's Efforts

### (1) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW)

In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been underway among the States Parties to work out ways to reduce the humanitarian risks caused by the explosive remnants of war (ERW), such as unexploded ordnance.

At their meeting in 2003, CCW States Parties adopted Protocol V, which concerns post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to reduce the risks of ERW. The protocol entered into force in November last year.

At the third review conference in November last year, the State Parties recognized the need for the global community to take urgent action to problems caused by the ERW, particularly by unexploded cluster munitions (munitions that eject multiple sub munitions), and decided<sup>37</sup> to focus their discussion on such munitions.

Japan has decided to address issues related to cluster munitions while striking a balance between giving humanitarian consideration and keeping defense need<sup>38</sup>. Based on this idea, the Defense Ministry has dispatched its officials to the Meeting of the States Parties and the Groups of Governmental Experts of CCW, both of which are held to discuss and negotiate the addition of a protocol.

## **(2) Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines**

The Defense Ministry and the SDF began disposal of the anti-personnel mines in January 2000. Japan completed the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in February 2003, with the exception of a minimum number of anti-personnel mines necessary for the development of and training in mine detection or mine clearance techniques, as permitted by the Ottawa Convention.

Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry, in order to ensure Japan's national security, has been acquiring "an anti-personnel obstacle system," an alternative to anti-personnel mines that would not be banned by the convention and would not cause harm to civilians, which will be used for the time being, combining directional fragmentation charges<sup>39</sup>.

Although 153 countries have signed the convention as of February this year, only 12 out of 25 ARF member countries have joined the convention. The Defense Ministry has thus been encouraging ARF member countries that have yet to sign the convention to do so.

Furthermore, the Defense Ministry has actively supported<sup>40</sup> the international efforts in the problem of anti-personnel mines by annually reporting to the United Nations the data regarding exceptional possession and by sending its officials to relevant international meetings.

## **(3) System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms**

As well as registering with the United Nations annual data on imports of its defense equipment, the Defense Ministry has provided<sup>41</sup> information on its possession, domestic procurement and the transfer of small arms on a voluntary basis.

Moreover, officials of the Defense Ministry have been dispatched from time to time to expert meetings and others aimed at improving and strengthening the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.

# **3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others**

## **1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)**

### **(1) Background behind Adoption of the PSI**

In December 2002, the Bush administration, alleging that states suspected of weapons proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran, have been seeking to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), announced the National Strategy Against WMD, which sought a three-point comprehensive approach to such weapons: countermeasures against proliferation, non-proliferation and response to the consequences of the use of WMD.

As part of such approach, President George W. Bush announced in May 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)<sup>42</sup>. The initiative had garnered support from more than 80 countries, including Japan, as of February this year.

## **(2) Past Achievements of PSI and Japan's Efforts**

PSI Participating countries have agreed to a Statement of Interdiction Principles<sup>43</sup>, which stipulates the purposes of the PSI and principles of interdiction, and have conducted exercises for ground, maritime and air interdiction operations so each participating country can enhance its interdiction capability to implement the PSI. A total of 26 interdiction exercises have been conducted by April this year.

In addition to conducting these interdiction exercises, participating countries have held plenary meetings (high-level policy meetings) and meetings of Operational Expert Working Groups in order to examine policy-related and legal issues. As a result of these PSI activities, participating countries were able to handle actual interdiction cases successfully, for example the BBC China Incident<sup>44</sup>.

Given the objective of the PSI is consistent with its security need, Japan has played an important role in PSI as one of its core members for some time since the establishment of PSI in 2003.

Japan has also actively participated in PSI's efforts as a member of its Operational Expert Working Group, consisting of 20 countries<sup>45</sup> at present.

## **(3) Efforts by the Defense Ministry and the SDF**

The Defense Ministry and the SDF think it necessary to actively commit to PSI by making maximum use of the SDF's defense capability while keeping cooperation with relevant organizations and countries. Japan has taken part in information-gathering activities, including dispatching Defense Ministry staff to PSI-related meetings since the third PSI plenary meeting in Paris, and sending officials to PSI interdiction exercises as observers.

Through these activities, the Defense Ministry and the SDF believe they can play an important role in the PSI by providing relevant organizations and countries with information gathered in patrol and surveillance operations by the SDF's vessels and aircraft during PSI interdiction operations. The Defense Ministry and the SDF also believe that they can play other roles in maritime interdiction operations, including stopping suspicious ships and conducting on-the-spot inspections, in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, in the event of an issuance of an order for maritime security operations.

Based on the belief, Japan has actively participated in PSI interdiction exercises. In October 2004, the Defense Ministry and the SDF, along with the Foreign Ministry and the Japan Coast Guard, sponsored an exercise for PSI maritime interdiction operations<sup>46</sup>. Participants in the exercise demonstrated their training on boarding a suspicious ship and conducting an on-the-spot inspection there.

As part of "outreach" activities aimed at strengthening the comprehensive non-proliferation regime, including the PSI, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have positively provided the national defense authorities of other Asian countries with information and knowledge that they have obtained through their past interdiction exercises in a bid to promote understanding by these Asian countries concerning the PSI. (See Fig. III-3-3-6)

## **(4) Future Efforts**

Under the New National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan, in a bid to further solidify its peace and security, has pledged to participate proactively and on its own initiative in activities being conducted by the global community to improve the international security environment. In addition, the Mid-Term Defense Program calls for Japan to participate in joint exercises on international peace cooperation activities, including the PSI.

In light of cases, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in areas surrounding Japan, Japan should do its utmost to prevent proliferation of such weapons by regarding the PSI as a broadly defined security issue including defense, diplomacy, law execution and export control and by tackling the issue proactively and on its own initiative even during peacetime.

Therefore, Japan will positively commit itself to PSI activities. In order to expedite its commitment to the activities, Japan will try to establish an ideal organizational structure within the Government in close cooperation with relevant organizations.

**Fig. III-3-3-6 Defense Ministry Participation in PSI Interdiction Exercises (Since Last Year)**

Date	Exercises	Exercise Place	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF	
2006	April	Interdiction exercise hosted by the Netherlands	Rotterdam	Dispatched as observer
	April	Air interdiction exercise hosted by Australia	Darwin	Dispatched for command post training Dispatched as observer for field training
	May	Interdiction exercise hosted by Turkey	Facility in each country (command post training) Ankara (field training)	Dispatched for command post training Dispatched as observer for field training
		Interdiction exercise hosted by the United States		
October	Interdiction exercise hosted by the United States	Facility in each country (command post training) Manama, Bahrain (field training)	Dispatched for command post training Dispatched as observer for field training	
2007	April	Air interdiction exercise hosted by Lithuania	Vilnius (Lithuania)	Dispatched as observer
	May	Maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Slovenia	Koper (Slovenia)	Dispatched as observer

From a viewpoint of improving the SDF's response capability, Japan will consider participating in various interdiction exercises and sponsoring such exercises in the future.

## **2. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

In April 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security and therefore the United Nations is prepared to take adequate and effective action against such threats. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction urges all U.N. Member States to 1) refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actor from attempting to develop WMD and their means of delivery, 2) adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor from manufacturing WMD and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, and 3) establish effective border-controls and export-controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

Recognizing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could disturb peace and stability of the international community, including Japan, and that preventing such weapons from proliferating to terrorists and other non-State actors is an urgent task, Japan supports the U.N. resolution and holds expectations that all U.N. Member States will observe the resolution.

## Notes

- 1) The formal name is the “Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations.” (Law 79 of 1992) See <[http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO\\_J/relatedbill/index.html](http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/relatedbill/index.html)>
- 2) The formal name is the “Special Measures Law concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions.” (Law 113 of 2001) See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampo/houan/tero/index.html>>
- 3) The formal name is the “Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq.” (Law 137 of 2003) See <[http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq\\_h.html](http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html)>
- 4) In June last year, the Public Officers Election Act was revised, enabling from March this year SDF personnel being dispatched overseas to cast an absentee ballot based on International Peace Cooperation Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. In unified municipal elections in April this year, a total of 340 SDF personnel cast an absentee ballot, including members of the 23rd Golan Heights Mission Transport Unit and (Israel and Syria) and members of the Air Transport Unit for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Mission (Iraq and Kuwait).
- 5) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and Britain as occupying powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member countries to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq.
- 6) The Joint Staff Office has sent two SDF officers to the Coalition Group, consisting of liaison officers from about 60 countries participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) undertaken by the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command.
- 7) Unit in charge of rear-support activities in the process of GSDF withdrawal (inspection of numbers and volume, customs clearance, rinsing and fumigation of equipment)
- 8) London (July 2005), Paris (October 2005), Jordan (Amman in November 2005)
- 9) As of March 2007, 37 countries were participating in the ISAF, which is designed to support the Afghanistan Government through maintenance of security in the country, in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a hotbed of terrorism again.
- 10) Japan is taking various measures for preventing terrorist attacks with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls, gathering and analysis of terrorism-related information, measures for preventing hijackings and others, measures for NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), keeping guard on important domestic facilities, and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an “Action Plan for Preventing Terrorist Attacks” containing 16 items of specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as international sharing of the information on lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verifications of foreign hotel guests, strengthening of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities.
- 11) Defined as supply of goods and labor to militaries of foreign countries, provision of benefits to these militaries, and other measures that are implemented by Japan. (Article 3-1-1 of the Law)

- 12) Defined as search and rescue operations for people who have become victims after participating in battles staged by militaries of foreign countries that are implemented by Japan. (Article 3-1-2 of the Law)
- 13) Defined as humanitarian activities (transport of food, clothing, pharmaceuticals and other life-related goods and materials, and provision of medical services) that are implemented by Japan to relieve people who have become victims of terrorism and those who are feared to be affected by the terrorism on the basis of U.N. resolutions on 9/11 terrorist attacks and related requests of the United Nations. (Articles 3-1-3 of the Law)
- 14) Tents (1,025), blankets (18,500), vinyl sheets (7,925), sleeping mats (19,980), and water containers (19,600) with a total weight of about 200 tons
- 15) An organization meant to settle issues related to refugees by expediting their international protection and supporting their efforts to return to their home countries on their own, permanently settle on host countries and settle in third countries.
- 16) As well as with the United States and Britain, Japan exchanged notes with Germany, New Zealand and France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Greece in 2003 and with Pakistan in 2004, bringing the number of countries with whom notes were exchanged to 11. These notes stipulate that Japan's cooperation and support activities are based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. The Government of Japan has also repeatedly explained to Japan's cooperation and support-recipient countries that goods provided to these countries as part of such activities are to be used appropriately so as to serve the purposes envisaged under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and may not be transferred to third parties without the prior consent of Japan. The recipient countries have accepted Japan's explanation on the matter.
- 17) Activities being conducted in line with a U.N. resolution and under the control of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and safety in the international community to deal with the outbreak of disputes, including ensuring the observance of an agreement concerning prevention of renewed military conflicts between the warring parties.
- 18) Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations or countries based on humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military disputes, and restoration work in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are started in line with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the UNHCR.
- 19) Japan considers core operations of the PKF to mean: 1) monitoring activities in connection with the observance of a cease-fire agreement, relocation of military forces, forces withdrawal and disarmament; 2) stationing and patrolling in buffer zones; 3) inspection and check of weapons being brought in or out; 4) recovery, storage and disposal of discarded weapons; 5) assistance in drawing a cease-fire line between conflicting parties; and 6) assistance in the exchange of prisoners of war between conflicting parties.
- 20) This is a review panel established in 2000 upon request by then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that measures be recommended to strengthen the ability of the United Nations on peacekeeping. The panel is comprised of 10 members, including former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi (panel chairman) and Hisako Shimura, President of Tsuda College.
- 21) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/exchange/01.html>>
- 22) Dialogue aimed at directly contributing to shared recognition of issues to be addressed, and contributing to policy coordination, and joint defense exercises that can directly lead to the facilitation of international peace cooperation activities by the SDF.
- 23) Mutual observation of units, dispatch of personnel to each other's training as observers, participation in various forums, symposiums and seminars, exchanges of information, interchanges of defense equipment

- and technologies, and provision of know-how and other practical information by the SDF in the field of disaster relief operations.
- 24) See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/01/10keikaku.html>>
  - 25) The Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
  - 26) Specific bilateral collaboration since peacekeeping operations in Cambodia includes cooperation in aid missions in Iraq's Samawah and joint humanitarian support being provided following the huge earthquake off Indonesia and the consequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean.
  - 27) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/03/13.pdf>>
  - 28) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/06/06d.html>>
  - 29) GSDF troops completed their withdrawal from Iraq in September last year.
  - 30) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/change/pdf/india01.pdf>>
  - 31) Prime Minister Abe's speech to NAC "Toward Further Cooperation between Japan and NATO" (tentative translation) See <[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/19/eabe\\_0112.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/19/eabe_0112.html)>
  - 32) The total membership is 25 countries and the EU. The 25 countries are 10 ASEAN nations—Indonesia, Cambodia (since 1995), Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar (since 1996) and Laos—North Korea (since 2000), ROK, China, United States, Japan, India (since 1996), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan (since 2004), Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste (since 2005), Mongolia(since1998), Russian Federation and Bangladesh (since 2006).
  - 33) CBM: confidence-building measures: efforts to disclose military information, impose some control on military action and promote military exchanges as well as preventing accidental military clashes from the viewpoint of fostering confidence-building among countries (Source: technical term list of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan)
  - 34) See <[http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/06/02a\\_01.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/06/02a_01.html)>
  - 35) The MSDF dispatched two vessels to the first submarine rescue exercise in the Western Pacific called "Pacific Reach 2000," hosted by the Singaporean Navy in 2000. In the 2002 exercise, the second of its kind, 10 vessels from five countries, including three vessels sent by the MSDF, participated. Techniques to rescue submarines were demonstrated in waters west of Kyushu.
  - 36) Multilateral search and rescue exercises were conducted mainly in waters south of the Kanto region to help participating vessels get accustomed to procedures and main points which are necessary when searching for or rescuing wrecked vessels. MSDF ships posing as wrecked commercial vessels were used for the exercise. Participating countries: Japan, India, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, France and Russia (nine countries).
  - 37) Study is underway within the framework of the CCW to solve problems related to cluster munitions. There are also moves outside the CCW framework to seek prohibition of the use of cluster munitions that cause intolerable harm to civilians, including an international conference held in Oslo in February this year and a similar conference in Lima in May.
  - 38) Given Japan being an island country which has a long coastal line around the country, it is extremely important for Japan to take swift action in the wake of landing operations by an enemy country and various other emergency situations in order to smash its military units which are being deployed widely to invade Japan. Japan has owned cluster munitions, which have effective firepower to expeditiously bring wider areas under control, judging the possession of such munitions by a country which has adopted an exclusively defense-oriented policy is necessary for the defense of the country. Japan has no plans to use cluster munitions overseas. When facing the situation in which the use of cluster munitions in Japan has become necessary, the Government will do its utmost for appropriate evacuation of citizens.

- 39) Anti-infantry combat explosives for obstructing the approach of enemy's infantry. In order that citizens are not injured indiscriminately, these explosives are actuated while the target is being watched by SDF personnel using them. They are not designed to explode by the presence, approach or contact by humans.
- 40) Between 1999 and December 2006, the Defense Ministry recommended to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) retired GSDF officers for supporting antipersonnel landmine removal activities in Cambodia. So far, two retired officers were dispatched as a maintenance and transportation advisor to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) under the framework of JICA's long-term dispatch of an expert.
- 41) In 2005 reporting, only five countries out of the ARF members—Australia, Canada, Japan, the United States and New Zealand—provided information. Among them, only Japan provided information on the transfer of small arms.
- 42) The PSI is a proposal intended to encourage participating countries to join forces in taking possible measures in line with existing international and domestic laws in order to prevent proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time for each country to make possible efforts to strengthen relevant international and domestic laws.
- 43) Under the Statement of Interdiction Principles, PSI participating countries are committed to join hands in stopping weapons of mass destruction and related materials from flowing to and from states and non-state actors that raise proliferation concerns. The Statement also calls on all countries concerned about the proliferation to support the PSI and join forces with PSI participants in taking possible measures to stop the flow of such weapons, with the willingness to implement them. Under the Statement, all countries that have a stake in non-proliferation are committed to take specific actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as much as possible within the range of related international law and domestic law.
- 44) In September 2003, the German Foreign Ministry obtained information that BBC China, a vessel whose registered nationality was Antigua and Barbuda, an island country in the Caribbean Sea, was heading for Libya to transport nuclear-related materials. The German Government dispatched intelligence experts to Italy, and conducted an inspection of the ship with the cooperation of the Italian Government and the U.S. Navy. The inspection revealed that the ship's container number was fabricated. The German Government confiscated the nuclear-related equipment (aluminum-made tubes that can be converted into centrifugals) after the ship was brought to Taranto, Italy. This incident helped unearth Libya's nuclear development program and the so-called "Khan Network," underlining the effectiveness of the PSI.
- 45) The United States, Japan, Britain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Australia, Poland, Singapore, Norway, Canada, Russia, Turkey, Greece, Denmark, New Zealand and Argentina
- 46) Exercises for maritime interdiction operations, sponsored by Japan, were conducted in waters off Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Port in order to mainly improve interdiction abilities of relevant organizations of participating countries, strengthen the mutual cooperation between Japan and participating countries, and to promote understanding by non-PSI members of the PSI. Warships dispatched from such countries as Australia, France and the United States participated in these exercises. From the SDF, vessels, aircraft and others participated. The Japan Coast Guard joined the exercises with its patrol boats and aircraft. Observers were sent to the exercises from 18 countries.