Section 2. National Defense Policies of Countries and Other Effort

1. The United States

1) Security and Defense Policies

For a long time, the defense policy of the United States - a continental state shielded by two oceans - was based on the assumption that the war would not be fought on the country's soil. However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (9-11 terrorist attacks) made the United States recognize that its geographical advantage could not make its territory free from a direct attack. The United States has decided to give top priority in its national security to homeland defense.

In the "National Security Strategy" released in March 2006, the United States confirms that the safety of the United States is no longer secured by the two oceans and states that the United States can protect its nations by leading an effort of the international community to end tyranny and promote democracy. As the United States cannot achieve such idealistic goals by itself, the U.S. approach is realistic about the means to realize them, relying on cooperation with allies, partners, and the international community.

In the "Quadrennial Defense Review" (QDR) released in February 2006, it is described that as the United States is at the "long war" against the terrorist networks, it is necessary to reorient the capabilities of U.S. forces to address the new security challenges on the basis of the lessons learned from the recent operational experiences. Especially, as it is necessary to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges, U.S. plans to strengthen special operation forces and increase unmanned aerial vehicles.

Furthermore, QDR repeatedly stresses that as the Department of Defense (DoD) cannot win "the long war" the United States faces today alone, it is essential to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners QDR also emphasizes that measures necessary to ensure close coordination within the DoD and supports to international institutions remain important.

a. Assessment of Security Environment

The United States considers that the security environment of today is different from that of the Cold War in that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was clearly recognized as an enemy, while it is difficult to predict who, where, and when will pose threats to and attack the United State. The "National Defense Strategy" identifies four challenges the United States is expected to face in today's uncertain security environment:

i) Traditional challenges: Threats of military conflicts among nations employing conventional forces. Although the United States takes advantage over other countries in this area, the possibility that enemies pose threats to the U.S. cannot be ruled out.

ii) Irregular challenges: challenges employing such irregular means as terrorism and insurgency in order to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political wills. Irregular challenges have been intensified by the rise of political, ethnic, and religious extremism and the ineffective control over the territories that creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents in some countries.
iii) Catastrophic challenges: Threats involving the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. In case rogue states or transnational terrorists seek to acquire WMD, threat to the United States will particularly increase.

iv) Disruptive challenges: Threats coming from adversaries who are seeking to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities by means of breakthrough technologies to offset the current U.S. advantages. Such breakthrough technologies as biotechnology, cyber attacks, or space weapons could endanger the United States.

b. Defense Strategy

The United States outlines the strategic objectives in the security environment: i) securing the United States from direct attack, ii) securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action, iii) strengthening alliances and partnerships, and iv) establishing favorable security environment. In addition, the "National Defense Strategy" describes such four activities to accomplish strategic objectives as follows:

i) Assure allies and friends by fulfilling alliance and other defense commitments.

ii) Dissuade potential enemies from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions by sustaining and developing the military advantage of the United States.

iii) Deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts.

iv) Defeat adversaries by employing military power, as necessary, together with other instruments when deterrence fails.

Furthermore, the "National Defense Strategy" shows the following four implementation guidelines for strategic goals:

i) Active, layered defense: it is necessary to defeat challenges to the United States early and at a safe distance. Therefore, preventive actions such as security cooperation, forward deterrence and nonproliferation initiatives are critical. As these actions cannot be implemented solely by the United States, cooperation with allies and friends is essential. It is also necessary to improve the capabilities to defend homeland by strengthening missile defense and other defensive measures.

ii) Continuous transformation: In order that the United States ensures its advantage, U.S. forces need to continuously transform itself by changing business practices of the Department of Defense and its relationship with interagency partners and other countries as well as methods of fight (concept of war, definition of threats, operation style, organization, and composition of weapons).

iii) "Capabilities-based" approach: In current security environment, it is difficult to predict when and where threats to the United States will emerge. However it is possible to predict the capabilities
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enemies will employ to attack the United States. Therefore, the United States continues to adopt the “capabilities-based” approach proposed in the QDR 2001 and focuses on what capabilities are needed to counter an enemy's capabilities.

iv) Managing Risks: Based on the concept of risk management proposed in the QDR 2001 (at the end of September 2001), the United States identifies various risks that may arise in pursuing the strategic objectives with limited resources, and manages controls them properly.41

c. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The QDR states that it is necessary to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges on the basis of the security environment and the defense strategy described above. Specifically, it lists the following four priority areas for capability development:

i) Defeating terrorist networks: In order to win the war on terror, it is necessary to deter the terrorist networks from securing their sanctuaries by attacking relentlessly. Therefore, in addition to developing information collection capabilities and special operation force, U.S. forces strengthen their cooperation with interagency partners and provide training to security forces of other countries. To defeat terrorist networks in a battle of ideas as well as in a battle of arms, the U.S. force will strengthen its strategic communication and improve language and cultural awareness.

ii) Defending the homeland in depth: In order to cope with threats to the homeland of the United States, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with interagency partners as well as to maintain the posture to deter invasion. To implement this, U.S. forces need not only to strengthen their deterrence by missile defense and other defensive measures, but also to increase capabilities of consequence management in response to emergencies.

iii) Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads: While the United States encourages the countries that will affect the future security to become constructive partners by expanding its security cooperation and other measures, it hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail by enabling allies and partners, further diversifying its basing posture, maintaining its military primacy in key areas.

iv) Preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction: the United States needs to take both preventive and responsive measures so that it addresses the threat of WMD by adversaries. U.S. forces develop capabilities to lessen the damage in case of WMD attacks while they strengthen their capabilities to identify and track WMD and their related materials as preventive measures.

d. Force Planning

The 2001 QDR described that the United State adopted an approach to construct its forces for the following four objectives: i) to defend the United States, ii) to maintain forward-deployed forces in four important regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia), iii) to defeat swiftly adversaries in two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes and to defeat decisively an adversary in one of the two theaters, and iv) to conduct a limited number of lesser military and humanitarian contingencies.

However, since he lessons learned from experiences in the war on terror suggest that U.S. forces need to operate around the globe and not only in and from the four regions called out in the 2001 QDR and that "swiftly defeating" or "winning decisively" against adversaries may be less useful for some types of operations, the 2006 QDR concludes that while continuing to take the capabilities-based approach, the United States has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: i) Homeland Defense, ii)
War on Terror/Irregular (Asymmetric) Warfare, and iii) Conventional Campaigns:

i) Homeland defense: In steady state, U.S. forces deter external threats to the homeland of the United States and provide necessary supports to interagency partners by conducting joint trainings and other measures so that they can contribute to homeland defense. In surge, they respond to attacks by means of WMD, etc., and also take measures to minimize the damage from them.

ii) War on terror/irregular warfare: In steady state, U.S. forces deter transnational terrorist attacks through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends and conduct counter insurgency operations. In surge, they conduct a potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign, whose level of effort is equal to that of the operations presently conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

iii) Conventional campaigns: In steady state, U.S. forces deter invasions or coercion by other countries through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends through security cooperation such as military exchanges and joint exercises. In surge, they wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression.

e. Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The U.S. is currently working on the review of the global defense posture. The Bush administration explained in August 2004 that, over the next ten years, the plan "will bring home about 60,000 - 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees."

One of the reasons for this review is the change in the security environment. In the Cold War era, the United States deployed its heavy forces forward with the certainty that it knew adversaries and where potential battles would be fought. In the security environment after the end of the Cold War, however, it is difficult to predict who would be enemies and where the battles would occur. Therefore, by reviewing the posture of U.S. forces, the U.S. will redeploy most of its large-scale forces that have stationed forward to cope with threats in the Cold War era, while making efforts to further improve rapid reaction capabilities by moving its most rapidly deployable forces forward in case of emergencies in unpredictable locations.

Another reason of this posture review is that as stresses on U.S. military personnel and their family members increased with frequent overseas operations after the Cold War, there has grown greater concerns about the morale and readiness of the military forces. As the transformation of U.S. forces exploiting
innovation in military technologies in the recent years have improved their fighting capabilities and mobility, it is no longer appropriate to evaluate the capability of the forward-deployed forces by the number of military personnel. Therefore, in reviewing the posture of U.S. forces, the U.S. aims to improve the capabilities of the forward-deployed forces by utilizing the fruits of force transformation, while attempting to restore the morale and readiness of the military forces by sending many service members who are stationed abroad back to the United States.

As specific measures in this posture review, the United States will send two army divisions deployed in Europe back to the homeland while reorganizing into more expeditionary forces by deploying Striker Brigade Combat Teams, reinforcing an airborne brigade, and creating a joint task force as well as building new bases and training facilities in East European countries.

In Asia, the United States announced to improve the capabilities of U.S. forces to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened long-range strike capability, streamlined and consolidated headquarters and a network of access agreements. Specifically, the United States is working on: i) the forward stationing of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities in the Pacific, ii) deployment of advanced strike assets in the Western Pacific, iii) restructuring U.S. military presence and command structure in Northeast Asia, and iv) establishing a network of sites to provide training opportunities and contingency access in Central and Northeast Asia.

f. Nuclear Strategy

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2002 declares a U.S. shift in nuclear force planning from an
approach based on mutual assured destruction against Russia\textsuperscript{46}: the United States should maintain the minimum required for the security of the United States, its allies, and friends, and the United States must have new deterrent force composed of nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defense systems (missile defense). The NPR asserts that deterrence should shift from the old triad in the Cold War era comprising i) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ii) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and iii) strategic bombers to a new triad of i) non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, ii) active and passive defense system, and iii) defense infrastructure (defense industry, procurement system, etc.). The new triad depends less on nuclear weapons by emphasizing the importance of missile defense and conventional forces (advanced weapons in particular), and makes deterrence more reliable in an environment where WMD are proliferating. The 2006 QDR follows the concept of the new triad defined in NPR and declares that the United States holds a wider range of conventional strike capabilities and missile defense capabilities, while maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

g. FY2007 Budget Request

The national defense budget request for 2007 is the first budget that is based on the 2006 QDR. It emphasizes: i) to prevail in irregular warfare (the Modular conversion of the Army forces,\textsuperscript{47} increase in special operation forces, etc.), ii) homeland defense (developing countermeasures against, missile defense, etc.), iii) maintaining military superiority (procurement of vessels and aircraft), and iv) supporting military personnel and their families (housing policy). The Department of Defense proposed $439.3 billion budget, a $28.5 billion increase over the previous year's budget, or an increase of about 6.9%.

2) Military Posture

Regarding nuclear forces, the United States completed reduction of the number of its strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) by December 2001, the deadline set in the treaty. The current nuclear forces of the United States consist of 550 ICBMS, 14 SSBNs (Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered), 432 SLBM, 114 strategic bombers, and 5,966 nuclear warheads. In addition, the United States intends to decrease the number of its nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 by the end of 2012 in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ("Moscow Treaty"). The 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deliver precision-guided conventional warheads using long-range Trident Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles in two years, while reducing the number of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.

![Striker equipped with both striking ability and mobility (U.S. Army)](image1)

![Attack nuclear submarine that can accommodate special operations forces (U.S. Navy)](image2)

As mentioned above, the United States will reduce its dependence on nuclear forces and give greater emphasis to conventional forces, especially advanced weapons.
U.S. ground forces consist of 10 Army divisions (approximately 490,000 soldiers) and three Marine Corps divisions (about 180,000 marines). U.S. ground forces are forward-deployed in Germany (two army divisions), South Korea (one Army division), and Japan (one Marine Corps division). To cope with the war on terror, U.S. ground forces reorganize their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units. The 2006 QDR announces that the U.S. Army will newly organize 117 modular brigades of Regular Army (42 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and 75 support brigades), 106 modular brigades in the Army National Guard (28 BCTs and 78 support brigades) and 58 modular brigades of Army Reserve (all are support brigades) to expand readily available combat power by 46% and improve a balance between combat and support forces.

The U.S. Marine Corps is reorganizing its force structure based on the lessons from its operations since 2001 and also improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare by establishing Foreign Military Training Units to train indigenous forces worldwide. As the United States enhance its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the war on terror and in military operations in Iraq, Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was established in February 2006.

The U.S. maritime force consists of approximately 1,120 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines), totaling about 5.71 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean, the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific Ocean and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. The 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deploy at least 6 operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific.

The U.S. air power consists of roughly 3,560 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea. In the 2006 QDR, it is assured that the United States will strengthen its offensive capabilities with conventional weapons by developing a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018, modernizing B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers, and accelerating the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles. On the other hand, it states that the number of the Air Force end strength will be reduced by about 40,000 full-time equivalent personnel.

To improve the mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is procuring C-17 transport aircraft modernizing C-5 transport aircraft, and prepositioning equipment at various theaters.

3) Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The Army which is composed of two divisions deploys a total of approximately 22,000 personnel in the region: the 2nd Infantry Division, the 19th Theater Support Command and others, totaling about 20,000 personnel, in the ROK and the 9th Theater Support Command and others, totaling about 2,000 personnel in Japan.

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet which is in charge of the area including east Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea under the Pacific Fleet whose headquarters is in Hawaii. The 7th Fleet placed its main bases in Japan and Guam and deploys one aircraft carrier and other ships and about 16,000 personnel. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies and other vital interests of the United States, and
ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet include aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one the Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force, the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircrafts is deployed in Japan, with about 16,000 personnel including the forces afloat. In addition, maritime prepositioning ships loaded with heavy equipments and others are deployed in the West Pacific.

The Air Force deploys three air forces under the Pacific Air Force whose headquarters is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings which are equipped with F-15, F-16, C-130 fighters in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in Korea, with about 23,000 personnel in total.

2. Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, which covers an area equivalent to approximately 60% of Japan, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two - north and south - for more than half a century. Even today, the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). North Korea has only half the population of the ROK, and is economically far outstripped by the ROK. Nevertheless, the size of North Korea's armed forces far exceeds those of the ROK, as shown in the figure. Such military confrontation has continued since the armistice of the Korean War.

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia, to say nothing of Japan.

(1) North Korea

North Korea has been advocating as its basic national policy the construction of a "strong and rising great power," aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas - intellectual, political, military, and economic - and it adopts a "military first policy" to realize this goal. The policy has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise from reform and construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of reform. 51 Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea's military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and regularly visits military forces, it would appear that he intends to continue running the country by attaching importance to and relying on them.

Although North Korea is faced with serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for foods and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. 52 For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated nearly 5% of the overall population. 53 It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to an official announcement made at the Supreme People's Assembly in April this year, the proportion of defense budget in this year's national budget is 15.9%, but it is estimated that the official defense budged represents only a portion of the real defense expenses.

Furthermore, it seems that North Korea maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetrical military capabilities, by developing, deploying and proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and also by maintaining large-scale special operations forces.

By acting in this way, North Korea increases military tension over the Korean Peninsula, and its behavior constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for entire East Asian region, including Japan.

1) WMDs and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMDs, issues of North Korea's nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its capability of chemical and biological weapons.

As for ballistic missiles, it seems that North Korea has deployed Scud B, Scud C, and Nodong. Furthermore, the country seems to be conducting R&D to extend the range of its ballistic missiles.

a. Nuclear Weapons

North Korea had been suspected of developing nuclear weapons. In 1993, North Korea refused a request for a special inspection made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and declared its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As a result, suspicions of North Korea developing nuclear weapons at a graphite-moderated nuclear reactor (5-MW reactor) in Yongbyon, to the north of Pyongyang, were aggravated. The Agreed Framework signed between the United States and North Korea in 1994 once showed a roadmap to settle this issue through dialogue.
Under the Agreed Framework, the United States had been supplying heavy oil as an alternative energy to North Korea since 1995, and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established to provide North Korea with light water reactors.

Since then, no violations of the Agreed Framework by North Korea had been detected. However, in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea admitted the existence of a uranium-enrichment program for nuclear weapons when James A. Kelly, then Assistant Secretary of State visited North Korea that month.

As the international community's concerns over the nuclear issue of North Korea mounted, North Korea announced in December 2002 that it would resume the operations of the nuclear-related facilities in Yongbyon that had been frozen under the Agreed Framework. In January 2003, North Korea again declared the withdrawal from NPT. In February of the same year, the IAEA submitted a report on the North Korea nuclear issue including the violation of IAEA Safeguard Agreement to the U.N. Security Council. At the end of this month, it was confirmed that the graphite-moderated nuclear reactor (5-MW nuclear reactor) in Yongbyon which had been frozen was operating. Subsequently, North Korea claimed that it needed to maintain a "nuclear deterrent" and has repeated words and actions which increase tensions including the indication of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods (April 2003), acknowledgement of the completion of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods (October 2003), release of the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it produced nuclear weapons (February 2005), and announcement of the completion of reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods in the graphite-moderated nuclear reactor which had resumed operation (May 2005). In the course of these movements, the supply of heavy oil and the construction project of light water reactors by KEDO had been suspended. In May 2006, the abolition of the construction project was officially decided among the nations concerned.

On the other hand, Six-Party Talks were held five times since August 2003 to pursue a peaceful solution to this problem and achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the 4th Six-Party Talks held from July 26 to August 7 and from September 13 to 19, 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time that was centering on the verifiable abandonment of "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" by North Korea. However, the 5th Six-Party Talks in November failed to build consensus on the specific procedure to implement the joint statement and was adjourned. Subsequently, North Korea accused the United States of recognizing a bank in Macao which has business with North Korea as "institutions of primary money laundering concern", claiming that it is a financial sanction by the United States and has been delaying the participation in the Six-Party Talks.

Regarding North Korea's response to nuclear issues described above, some people argue that it is resorting to brinkmanship by intentionally heightening tension to receive compensation. However, other people argue that North Korea's ultimate objective is to acquire nuclear weapons. Because the ultimate goal of North Korea is believed to be the maintaining of its existing regime, it appears that the two foregoing views are not incompatible.

The North Korean nuclear issue is an important issue not only for the security of Japan but also for the international community, from the viewpoint of the nonproliferation of WMDs. Considering a series of North Korea's latest words and actions and the fact that the country's once-suspected nuclear weapons development is not yet resolved, there is some possibility that North Korea has already achieved
considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program.

b. Biological and Chemical Weapons

Because North Korea is an extremely closed country and most materials, equipment, and technology used in the manufacture of biological and chemical weapons are for dual-use, which makes camouflaging their actual use quite easy, details of biological and chemical weapons developed or held by North Korea is not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons, although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, it is also believed that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing agents, and has vast stocks of such chemicals, and has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Conventions.\(^6\)

c. Ballistic Missiles

It is believed that since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C,\(^6\) a variant of Scud B with extended range, missiles and exported them to Middle Eastern countries, etc. By the 1990s, North Korea allegedly began developing longer-range ballistic missiles, such as Nodong. There is a strong possibility that the ballistic missile North Korea test-launched over the Sea of Japan in 1993 was a Nodong. In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile based on Taepo Dong 1 over Japan. Partly because North Korea is an extremely closed country, details of their ballistic missiles are still

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Fig. 1-2-5

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unclear. However, it appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles in order to enhance military capabilities, to earn foreign currency, as well as political and diplomatic purposes. North Korea had announced moratorium on launching of ballistic missiles\textsuperscript{62}, but in March 2005, the country declared that it was “not bound to the moratorium on missile launch at present” because dialogue between North Korea and the United States was "totally suspended" after the Bush Administration took office in 2001. Also, it is pointed out that North Korea is carrying out engine combustion test for ballistic missiles\textsuperscript{63} and test for new short-range ballistic missiles of solid fuel propellant system.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, it would appear that North Korea is steadily pursuing the development of ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{64}

It seems that Nodong is a single-stage ballistic missile based on a liquid fuel propellant system and a significant number of Nodong seem have already deployed. It is thought to have a range of about 1,300 km, and is able to reach almost all parts of Japan. Although its specifications are unconfirmed in detail, it is thought to be based on the Scud technology, which would indicate that it does not, for example, have the accuracy to carry out pinpoint attacks on specific target installations.

Because North Korea is a closed country, it is extremely difficult to verify the intention of its military activities. It is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country. Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded on a Transporter-Erector-Launched (TEL) and operated with mobility. Therefore, it is thought to be difficult to detect specific signs of detailed location and timing Nodong launch in advance.

It seems that North Korea has developed Taepo Dong 1 with a longer range and also been pursuing the development of Taepo Dong 2. Taepo Dong-1 missile is assumed to be a two-stage liquid-fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The range of Taepo Dong 1 is considered to be approximately 1,500 km or more. A missile launched in 1998 was though to have been based on Taepo Dong 1. It has been surmised that North Korea could have used this launch to verify the performance of the technology concerning the separation of multistage booster, attitude control, and thrust control.

Taepo Dong 2, which is thought to be under development, is a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage. It is considered to have a range of approximately 6,000 km. Thus, the range of North Korean ballistic missiles are expected to be extended further, including the possibility that the derivative missiles of Taepo Dong 2\textsuperscript{65} are created.\textsuperscript{66} In July this year, North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles, including a Taepo Dong 2, to the Sea of Japan despite advance warnings by concerned states including Japan.

In July 2006, North Korea test-fired several ballistic missiles including Taepo Dong 2 into the Sea of Japan, neglecting prior warnings given by related countries including Japan.

Furthermore, as the background of North Korea's rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that it imported various materials and technologies from outside. It was pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or its related technologies, including Nodong or its related technologies to Iran and Pakistan\textsuperscript{57}. North Korea admitted to exporting ballistic missiles, "in order to procure foreign currency."\textsuperscript{66} It was pointed out that North Korea promotes the development of missiles using funds procured by the transfer or proliferation of missiles.

North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles along with nuclear issue are unstabilizing factors for the entire international society as well as the Asia-Pacific region, and their future progress is concerned seriously.

2) Military Posture

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines
(all soldiers should be trained as cadres, all forces should be modernized, all citizens should be armed, and all territory should be fortified).  

North Korea's military capabilities are made up mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. Although North Korea has been making efforts to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities and readiness, most of its equipment is outdated.

In addition, North Korea has large scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence-gathering and sabotage to guerilla warfare. This force is thought to be approximately 100,000 troops. Moreover, it seems that there are many underground military installations across the country.

**Recent Military Trends on the Korean Peninsula**

*Fig. 1-2-6*
a. Activities in Recent Years

North Korean forces appear to be maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and readiness even now, and continuing their infiltration exercises. In June 2002, there was an exchange of fire between North Korean and ROK's patrol boats across the Yellow Sea. In February 2003, a North Korean MiG-19 flew over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) across the Yellow Sea. In March 2003, North Korean military planes including MiG-29 approached and pursued a U.S. military plane flying over the Sea of Japan.

These military activities may have been simple incidents, or they have been intentional in order to increase tension as a part of brinkmanship or to raise the morale and support the military structure under the "military first policy." Therefore, it is necessary to watch for future North Korean developments.

In December 2001, a suspicious boat was detected to the southwest of Kyushu and eventually sank. After salvaging and inspecting the suspicious boat, it was identified as a covert-operations boat of North Korea. In 1999, a ship suspected of being North Korean covert-operations boat infiltrated Japanese territorial waters and later seemed to have arrived at a harbor in northern North Korea.

b. Military Capabilities of North Korea

The North Korean Army comprises 27 divisions of approximately one million troops, roughly two-thirds of which are believed to be deployed in forward areas along the DMZ. The main body of the North Korean army is infantry, but they also maintain armored and artillery forces, including roughly 3,500 tanks. North Korea is thought to have deployed long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240-mm multiple-launch rockets and 170-mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities including the capital city of Seoul and bases in the northern part of the ROK.

The Navy has about 640 ships with total displacement of approximately 105,000 tons and is chiefly made up of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. It also has 21 Romeo-class submarines, and about 50 midget submarines and about 135 air-cushioned landing craft which are thought to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces.

The Air Force has about 590 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but it does include some forth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s. North Korea also has a large number of out-of-date An-2s, believed to be used to transport special operations forces.

Partly to maintain and strengthen its state of readiness, North Korea still actively conducts various types of training. On the other hand, given the serious food situation, the military is also thought to be engaged in agriculture assistance work.

3) Domestic Affairs

After President Kim II Sung died in 1994, in 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly was held for the first time in four-and-half years, and the general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, Kim Jong Il was reappointed as Chairman of the National Defense Commission, which was newly defined as the "state's supreme office." At the Supreme People's Assembly held in September 2003, Kim Jong Il was reappointed as Chairman of the National Defense Commission again. Some point out that the North Korean regime is somewhat not as stable as it was due to an increasing disparity between the rich and the poor, loosening of social control in the worship of money, and declining military morale. However, in view of the fact that national events are held and diplomatic negotiations are made in an orderly manner, the regime in North Korea based around Kim Jong Il, chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on the right track.