MEETING WITH FOREIGN LEADERS

Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting

Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting

On October 3, the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting convened in Tokyo.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel participated in the meeting together with Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida and Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera. The meeting was held for the first time since June 2011, and this was the first “2+2” meeting in Tokyo that the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan’s Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defense all attended.

Given the increasingly severe security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the ministers discussed such matters as the medium-to long-term direction of Japan–U.S. security cooperation and the realignment of United States Forces in Japan, including mitigating impacts on Okinawa, and issued a Joint Statement (a summary of the Joint Statement is provided below).

1. Overview

(1) Strategic Vision for Japan–U.S. Alliance

  • Resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance.
  • Reflect our shared values such as democracy. Promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
  • It is to be based on:
  • Revising the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation;
  • Expanding security and defense cooperation; and
  • Approving new measures that support the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

(2) The United States continues to implement its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

  • Reiterated the ongoing mutual commitment to complete the agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

(3) Japan’s security policy

  • Make more proactive contributions to addressing the challenges faced by the international community.
  • Continue coordinating closely with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the U.S.–Japan Alliance.
  • Specific efforts include:
  • Preparing to establish its National Security Council and to issue its National Security Strategy;
  • Reexamining the legal basis for its security including the matter of exercising its right of collective self-defense;
  • Expanding its defense budget;
  • Reviewing its National Defense Program Guidelines;
  • Strengthening its capability to defend; and
  • Broadening regional contributions.
  • The United States welcomed these efforts and reiterated its commitment to collaborate closely with Japan.

(4) Assessment of Regional Situations

  • A range of threats to peace and security as well as challenges to international norms include:
  • North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns;
  • Coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain;
  • Disruptive activities in space and cyberspace;
  • Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), etc.
  • Continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military investments.

2. Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

Japan–U.S. “2+2” ministerial meeting
Japan–U.S. “2+2” ministerial meeting

(1) Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation

  • Revision of the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation
  • Objectives for this revision include:
  • Ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of U.S.–Japan defense cooperation;
  • Expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the Alliance;
  • Promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners;
  • Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination;
  • Describing appropriate role-sharing based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities;
  • Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response; and
  • Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance.
  • Directed that this task for the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) be completed before the end of 2014.

(2) BMD Cooperation: Confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second TPY-2 radar.

(3) Cooperation in Cyberspace: The need for close coordination with the private sector. Promote a whole-of-government approach. Welcomed the signing of a Terms of Reference for a new Cyber Defense Policy Working Group.

(4) Cooperation in Space: Welcomed the conclusion of the U.S.–Japan Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sharing Agreement and early realization of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA) provision of SSA information to the United States.

(5) Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities: Welcomed the establishment of a bilateral Defense ISR Working Group.

(6) Joint/Shared Use of Facilities: Welcomed the efforts of the Joint/Shared Use Working Group to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces posture in areas, including Japan’s southwestern islands. Progress in the joint/shared use strengthens the Alliance’s deterrent capabilities while building a stronger relationship with local communities.

(7) Bilateral Planning: Welcomed progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed efforts toward refining bilateral plans.

(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation: Welcomed the new linkage established between bilateral discussions at the Systems and Technology Form and dialogue on Roles, Missions, and Capabilities.

Through collaboration such as the participation of Japanese industries in the production of the F-35 aircraft, bilateral cooperation should deepen as Japan examines its Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.

(9) Extended Deterrence Dialogue: Noted with satisfaction the meaningful outcome of bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue. Continued commitment to holding the dialogue on a regular basis.

(10) Information Security: Welcomed the serious efforts by Japan in establishing a legal framework for further ensuring information security.

(11) Joint Training and Exercises: Decided to take advantage of various opportunities to increase training outside of Okinawa including MV-22 Osprey’s participation in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region, to reduce the amount of time located and training in Okinawa.

(12) Host National Support (HNS): Affirmed the importance of the HNS.

3. Regional Engagement

(1) Regional Capacity Building: Resolved to collaborate on capacity building projects. Welcomed the strategic use of Official Development Assistance by Japan.

(2) Maritime Security: Affirmed their intent to cooperate further in maritime security and counter-piracy.

(3) Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Encouraged efforts to extend bilateral cooperation as well as to promote trilateral and multilateral coordination.

(4) Trilateral Cooperation: Noted the success of the trilateral dialogues carried out regularly with Australia and the Republic of Korea.

(5) Multilateral Cooperation: Noted the importance of working together to strengthen institutions that promote economic and security cooperation.

4. Realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

(1) Realignment on Okinawa

  • Land returns: Welcomed the progress on land returns based on the April 2013 Consolidation Plan.
  • Relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma: Confirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. Reaffirmed the strong commitment of both Governments. The United States welcomed recent developments including the submission of the request for approval of public water reclamation permit to Okinawa Prefecture by the Government of Japan in March 2013.
  • Hotel-Hotel Training Area: Directed to reach an arrangement in principle for the partial lifting of restrictions for a portion of the Hotel-Hotel training area by the end of November 2013. Committed to continue to consult on other possible measures.
  • The Environment: Decided to reach a substantial understanding by the end of November 2013 on a framework for access to U.S. facilities and areas slated for return, for the purpose of facilitating local authorities’ planning of land use prior to its return.

(2) Iwakuni

  • Confirmed that the bilateral consultations on the relocation of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated.
  • Affirmed that the Maritime Self-Defense Force would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni.
  • Acknowledged that the relocation of elements of Carrier Air Wing Five from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017.

(3) Guam

  • Confirmed the significance of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan: sustaining the forward presence of U.S. forces, facilitating the development of Guam as a strategic hub, and mitigating the impact on Okinawa.
  • Announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement.
  • Noted the significance of Japanese cash contributions to the development of training areas in Guam and Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which benefit the Alliance by supporting the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units to Guam and by enabling the shared use of these training areas by U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces.
  • Completed work reflecting the breakdown of costs associated with developing facilities, including training areas and infrastructure.
  • Announced that U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to relocate from Okinawa to Guam in the first half of the 2020s.

(4) Advanced Capabilities

  • Confirmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan has strategic significance:
  • MV-22 aircraft;
  • P-8 maritime patrol aircraft (beginning in December 2013);
  • Global Hawk unmanned aircraft (beginning in spring 2014); and
  • F-35B aircraft (in 2017).
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