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I Purpose

The international community is facing changes defining an era. We are reminded once again that globalization and interdependence alone cannot serve as a guarantor for peace and development across the globe. The free, open, and stable international order, which expanded worldwide in the post-Cold War era, is now at stake with serious challenges amidst historical changes in power balances and intensifying geopolitical competitions. Meanwhile, a host of issues such as climate change and infectious disease crises are emerging, requiring cross-border cooperation among nations. Today, we are in an era where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined in international relations.

To date, advanced democratic countries, including Japan, have devoted themselves to upholding universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, and to spearheading the effort to shape the international society of coexistence and coprosperity. Numerous countries around the world, including developing countries, have also enjoyed the fruits of international peace, stability, and economic development in this globalized world rooted in such order.

At the same time, however, dissatisfaction stemming from widening economic disparities and other factors are generating renewed feelings of tensions at the domestic level and even in inter-state relations. Guided by their own historical views and values, some nations, not sharing universal values, are making attempts to revise the existing international order. In the course of almost a century, humanity has invested itself in defining a fundamental international principle of the general prohibition of the use of force. Yet, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the “UN Security Council”), which has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, has overtly trampled on this very principle. This is coupled with ongoing unilateral changes to the status quo and such attempts at sea. In addition, some states, not sharing universal values, are exploiting unique approaches to rapidly develop their economies and science technologies, and then, in some areas, are gaining superiorities over those states that have defended academic freedom and market-economy principles. These moves challenge the existing international order, thereby intensifying geopolitical competitions in international relations. In the face of that, many developing and other nations are striving to avoid embroiling themselves in geopolitical competitions. We are even observing that some states are now following the lead of those not sharing universal values.

At a time when geopolitical competition is intensifying, issues are arising elsewhere in the world which call for global cooperation at large. We live in an era where there is a greater imperative than ever before for the international community to rally together in cooperation beyond differences in values, conflicts of interest, and others for the sake of taking on those global challenges that transcend national borders and put the very existence of humankind at risk such as climate change and infectious disease crises.

Turning our eyes to the neighboring region, Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific

region, especially in East Asia. Across the globe, historical changes in power balances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, are occurring. In addition, in the vicinity of Japan, military buildups, including of nuclear weapons and missiles, are rapidly advancing, coupled with mounting pressures by unilaterally changing the status quo by force. Moreover, grey zone situations over territories, cross-border cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructures, and information warfare through spread of disinformation, are constantly taking place, thereby further blurring the boundary between contingency and peacetime. Furthermore, the scope of national security has expanded to include those fields previously considered non-military such as economic, technological and others, and thus the boundary between military and non-military fields is no longer clear-cut either.

Japan also faces difficult domestic challenges such as a declining and aging population with a low fertility rate and a severe fiscal condition. With a view to resolving these challenging economic and social agendas at home and to bringing about economic growth, Japan must ensure an international environment that is conducive to facilitating cross-border economic and social activities such as trade of goods, energy, and food which are essential for industries, and the movement of people.

We live in the world of a historical inflection point and in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Against this backdrop, Japan must protect its own national interests, including the peace, security and prosperity of Japan, the safety of its people, and the coexistence and coprosperity of the international community by steadfastly preparing for the worst-case scenario, including fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. To this end, we will strive to proactively foster a desirable security environment for Japan by carrying out vigorous diplomacy. In addition, possessing defense capabilities, which enable Japan to firmly defend itself on its own, will indeed bolster the solid footing of Japan’s diplomacy.

To achieve these objectives, Japan needs a strategy that integrates its national responses at a higher level by taking a panoramic view of the diverse dimensions of international relations as a whole, where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined, including geopolitical competition and responses to global-scale challenges, and then by taking full advantage of comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities. From this standpoint, the Government of Japan hereby sets forth the National Security Strategy as its supreme national security policy document. The Strategy provides strategic guidance for Japan’s national security policy areas, including diplomacy, defense, economic security, technology, cyber, maritime, space, intelligence, official development assistance (ODA), and energy.

Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy (decided by the National Security Council and approved by the Cabinet Decision on December 17, 2013) was formulated in 2013. Guided by the policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of the international cooperation, the Legislation for Peace and Security was enacted. By so doing, the Government has put arrangements in place where Japan can seamlessly respond to situations concerning security. While maintaining the fundamental principles of the Japanese national security, grounded in these arrangements, the strategic guidance and policies under this Strategy will dramatically transform Japan’s national security policy after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution.

Meanwhile, the exercise of power as a nation begins with the determination of its people. In order to steadily execute the Strategy, which encompasses a broad range of fields beyond the traditional boundaries of diplomacy and defense, it is essential

for the Government to gain the understanding and cooperation of its people regarding the content and execution of the Strategy and to foster an environment in which they can voluntarily and proactively participate in Japan's security policy.

The Strategy consists of the following:

The Strategy first outlines Japan's national interests, which should serve as the starting point in defining a national security strategy. Then, based on these national interests, the Strategy lays out basic principles concerning Japan's national security that have been nurtured over the course of the postwar security history and experiences as well as by the choices of the Japanese people. Additionally, it presents the current security environment surrounding Japan and its security challenges. On this basis, it sets out national security objectives that Japan should achieve, and identifies ways and means, namely through strategic approaches, by which it can deliver on the objectives through capitalizing on the Japanese comprehensive national power. Then, the Strategy puts forward various foundations of Japan, which sustain the execution of the strategic approaches.

II Japan's National Interests

Japan's national interests to be preserved and developed are listed below:

1. Japan will maintain its sovereignty and independence, defend its territorial integrity, and secure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals. Japan will ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded in freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and traditions. Furthermore, Japan and its nationals will continue to strive so that Japan and its nationals are respected and favorably regarded around the world.
2. Japan will achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic growth, thereby consolidating its own peace and security. And, while working to realize Japan's economic prosperity, Japan will maintain and strengthen an open and stable international economic order and achieve an international environment in which Japan and other countries can coexist and prosper together.
3. Japan will maintain and protect universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and international order based on international law. In particular, Japan will maintain and develop a free and open international order, especially in the Indo-Pacific region where Japan is situated.

III Fundamental Principles Concerning Japan's National Security

As a prerequisite for the execution of Japan's national security policy in pursuit of protecting its national interests, the following are the fundamental principles concerning Japan's national security.

1. Japan will maintain the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on international cooperation. In order to further embody this principle in the international community and to protect our own national interests in the time ahead, and based on the recognition that the primary responsibility for defending Japan lies with itself, Japan will squarely face the ever-changing security environment by decisively taking on necessary reforms and reinforcing our national security capabilities and roles.
2. Japan will execute its security policy in a manner that maintains and upholds universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. As one of the most mature and stable advanced

democratic countries in the world, even amidst a complex and severe security environment, Japan will strive to maintain and uphold universal values and principles in cooperation with other countries, and lead the international community by example.

3. As a peace-loving nation, Japan will adhere to the basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
4. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the provision of extended deterrence, will remain the cornerstone of Japan's national security policy.
5. Japan will attach importance to coexistence and coprosperity alongside other countries, cooperation with like-minded countries, and multilateral cooperation.

IV Security Environment Surrounding Japan and Japan's National Security Challenges

In defining its national security objectives, the security environment surrounding Japan and its national security challenges are listed below.

1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

- (1) Since the formation of the previous National Security Strategy in 2013, the international community has consistently gone through rapid changes, in conjunction with the center of gravity of global power shifting to the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated. These changes are likely to carry on over the medium-to-long term and to have historical consequences that will transform the nature of the international community.
- (2) Many opportunities and benefits are presented worldwide such as economic development, technological innovation, people-to-people exchanges, and the creation of new cultures. At the same time, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States, Japan's ally with the world's greatest comprehensive power, and international frameworks such as the G7 to manage risks in the international community and to maintain and develop a free and open international order. The United Nations, which should embody the will of the international community at large, has experienced a round of confrontation and thus has not fully lived up to fulfilling its functions. This is largely due to the fact that nations, not sharing universal values, or political and economic systems based on such values in common, are expanding their influences, thereby manifesting risks around the globe. Specifically, some states, which do not exclude the policy of increasing their own national interests at the expense of others, are expanding their influence through both military and non-military means, attempting to unilaterally change the status quo, and accelerating actions to challenge the international order. Such moves have sharpened competition and confrontation among states in wide-ranging areas, including military, diplomatic, economic, and technological fields, and have shaken the foundation of the international order. As a result, the current international security environment has become complex and severe, one where inter-state relations and interests of each and every nation are intertwined with each other in a mosaic-like manner.
- (3) The following are prominent examples of the complexity and severity of the current international security environment.

- (i) Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts against the territorial sovereignty and others of other nations are taking place, combined with military and non-military means. In particular, Russia's aggression against Ukraine constitutes a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force, and shakes the very foundation of the international order.
- (ii) In cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic domains, and other areas, the risks that impede free access to and utilization of these areas are becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of cyberattacks, in which the risk of exposure is relatively low and attackers have an advantage, is growing rapidly. Cyberattacks have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the form of state-sponsored cyberattacks. It is highly likely that hybrid warfare, combining military and non-military means to achieve military objectives such as information warfare which utilizes the spread of disinformation prior to an armed attack, will be conducted in an even more sophisticated form in the time ahead.
- (iii) Addressing those issues not necessarily deemed as security targets in the past, such as supply chain vulnerabilities, increasing threats to critical infrastructures, and leadership struggles over advanced technologies, has also become a major security challenge. As a result, the scope of security has expanded to include the economic sector, making economic measures even more necessary to ensure security.
- (iv) In the field of international trade and economic cooperation, which in principle should be mutually beneficial, some nations are trying to expand their own influence by economically coercing other nations through such means as restricting the exports of mineral resources, food, and industrial and medical supplies, as well as providing loans to other nations in a manner that ignores their debt sustainability.
- (v) As major nations increase competition in advanced technology research and the use of its outcomes for security and other purposes, some nations are illegally stealing information related to advanced technologies developed by private companies, universities, and other organizations in other countries and using it for their own military purposes.
- (vi) Due to the changing power balances and diversifying values around the world, strong leadership is being lost in the global governance structure at large. As a result, the international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges such as climate change, free trade, arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, terrorism, global health including measures against infectious diseases, and food and energy issues. In addition, vulnerable countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific Islands are disproportionately suffering large damages from extreme weather and reduction of land area due to climate change, the global spread of infectious diseases, and shortages of food and energy.

2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region

The global security environment and challenges articulated above are particularly prominent in the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated, and its severity may be on the rise in the future. In this regard, the security environment and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, including notable trends of countries and regions in particular, are as follows.

(1) Overview of Security in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific region is the core of global vitality, home to more than half of the world's population. The dynamism of the intersection of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans is a growth engine for the global economy. Japan, situated in this region, is well positioned to benefit from this.

At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region faces a host of security challenges. For example, several nations and regions that possess large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do not share universal values, nor political and economic systems based on such universal values. There exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and other relations based on historical backgrounds. In addition, Japan faces threats and challenges of various types and intensities, such as unilateral changes to the status quo and such attempts in the East and South China Seas and other areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters.

Guided by the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (hereinafter referred to as "FOIP"), in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has the vital importance of striving to realize a free and open international order based on the rule of law and securing regional peace and stability in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(2) China's Activities in the Area of Security

China has set clear goals to achieve "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," the full completion of "building China into a great modern socialist country" by the middle of this century, and the prompt buildup of the People's Liberation Army to be elevated to "world-class standards." Under these national goals, China has been increasing its defense expenditures at a continuously high level and extensively and rapidly enhancing its military power, including its nuclear and missile capabilities, without sufficient transparency.

In addition, China has intensified its attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the maritime and air domains including in the East and South China Seas, such as its intrusions into the territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, and has expanded and intensified its military activities that affect Japan's national security in the Sea of Japan, the Pacific Ocean, and other areas as well. Furthermore, China is strengthening its strategic ties with Russia and attempting to challenge the international order.

The international community strongly urges China, the second largest economy in the world and one of the major countries leading today's global economy, to make further efforts to address global issues, including climate change, in a manner befitting its international influence. Yet, China does not participate in international frameworks in which other major official creditor nations take part in together, and its development finance and other related activities lack adequate transparency. In addition, China is redoubling its strategic efforts to establish its security in the economic field, and there have been instances of China taking advantage of other countries' dependence on China to exert

economic pressure on other countries.

While maintaining its policy of peaceful reunification of Taiwan, China has not denied the possibility of using military force. In addition, China has been intensifying its military activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan, including the launch of ballistic missiles into the waters around Japan. Regarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, concerns are mounting rapidly, not only in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, but also in the entire international community.

It is expected that China contributes, together with Japan, to the peace and stability of the international community including the Indo-Pacific region, through building constructive relations with the international community via communications at various levels including at the summit level as well as repeating dialogue and cooperation with the international community, including Japan.

However, China's current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(3) North Korea's Activities in the Area of Security

In the Korean Peninsula, the large-scale military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea are in confrontation with one another. North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in accordance with a series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. While facing serious economic difficulties without any improvement in its human rights situation to date, North Korea continues to heavily allocate its resources to military affairs.

In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with an unprecedented frequency and in new ways, rapidly enhancing its capabilities. In particular, North Korea is making rapid progress in its missile-related technologies and operational capabilities, exemplified by its launching of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles with a range covering the U.S. mainland, launching missiles in new ways including missiles flying with irregular trajectories, and launching missiles from various platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL), submarines, and trains.

Furthermore, North Korea intends to bolster its nuclear capabilities both in quality and in quantity at the maximum speed. When considered together with its rapid development of missile-related technologies, North Korea's military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before.

The issue of abductions by North Korea is a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens. It is an urgent issue for the Government to resolve under its responsibility. It is also a universal issue for the international community to take on as a violation of basic human rights.

(4) Russia's Activities in the Area of Security

Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its other actions clearly demonstrate that it does not hesitate to resort to

military forces to achieve its own security objectives. In addition, Russia continues to repeat words and actions that could be interpreted as threats to use of nuclear weapons.

Russia is accelerating its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Russia is also strengthening its armaments in the Northern Territories, which is an inherent territory of Japan. This is presumably due to the background that the Sea of Okhotsk plays as an area of activity for strategic nuclear submarines, an important part in Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

Furthermore, Russia has been doubling down on strategic coordination with China. In particular, in recent years, these two countries have ramped up their military coordination by continuing to conduct joint exercises and drills, such as joint navigation by their naval vessels and joint flights of their bombers in the vicinity of Japan.

By its recent aggression against Ukraine and others, Russia's external and military activities and others have shaken the very foundation of the international order, and are perceived as the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region. In addition, Russia's external and military activities and others in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong security concern.

V National Security Objectives of Japan

The following are the national security objectives of Japan to ensure its national interests in the face of the above-mentioned national security challenges. These objectives are grounded in the fundamental principles of Japan's national security as outlined in III.

1. Japan will continue to be a nation capable of protecting its sovereignty and independence, autonomously determining its domestic and foreign policies, and defending its territory and the safety of life, person, and the properties of its nationals. To this end, Japan will reinforce its own capabilities and roles, and together with its ally, the United States, and like-minded countries and others, deter contingencies and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in Japan and its vicinity. If by any chance a threat should reach Japan, Japan will disrupt and defeat the threat and minimize the damage caused, and bring it to an end in a manner favorable to protecting its national interests.
2. Japan will proactively ensure, through executing its security policy, an international environment in which its own economy can grow. By doing so, Japan will work to achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth, in which economic growth promotes the improvement of the security environment surrounding Japan. Concurrently, Japan will ensure the self-reliance of its economic structure, as well as advantages over other countries and ultimately the indispensability of its technologies.
3. As a major global actor, Japan will join together with its ally, like-minded countries and others to achieve a new balance in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In so doing, Japan will prevent the emergence of situations in which any one state can unilaterally change the status quo easily, and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law.
4. Japan will work on multilateral cooperation in the fields of international economy, response to global issues such as climate change and infectious diseases, and the formation of international rules and regulations, and then generate

an environment in which the international community can coexist and prosper.

VI Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan

Japan will implement strategic approaches to achieve its national security objectives, harnessing its comprehensive national power as an integrated and efficient means.

1. Main Elements of Comprehensive National Power for Japan's National Security

- (1) First is diplomatic capabilities. The basis of national security is to proactively create a peaceful, stable, and highly predictable international environment based on the rule of law and to prevent the emergence of threats. Over the years, Japan has devoted itself to diplomatic undertakings and international cooperation to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide. Rooted in these traditions and experiences, and guided by significantly enhanced diplomatic implementation architecture, Japan will continue to nurture relations of trust with many countries, engage in diplomatic efforts to gain understanding and support for its country's position, and carry forward international cooperation with the aim of pursuing coexistence and coprosperity with other countries.
- (2) Second is defense capabilities. These capabilities are the last guarantee of Japan's national security and embody the will and ability to resolutely defend our nation. In light of the current reality of the world, this function cannot be replaced by any other means. By means of defense capabilities, Japan will deter threats from reaching it, and if threats are indeed posed to Japan, it will disrupt and defeat them. In addition, fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities will bolster the solid footing of our diplomacy for proactively fostering a desirable security environment for Japan.
- (3) Third is economic capabilities. Economic capabilities are the foundation of policies to achieve a peaceful and stable security environment. As the world's third largest economy and a major player in shouldering an open and stable international economic order, Japan will undertake free and fair trade and investment activities. In addition, Japan will provide high value-added goods and services that are indispensable to the global supply chain to accomplish its economic growth.
- (4) Fourth is technological capabilities. The creation of science, technology, and innovation is the source of Japan's own economic and social development. In addition, the appropriate use of technological capabilities plays a crucial role in improving Japan's national security environment and is also indispensable in addressing global issues such as climate change. Japan will actively capitalize on its advanced technological capabilities, developed over the years in the public and private sectors in the field of national security, without being bound by its conventional way of thinking.
- (5) Fifth is intelligence capabilities. In a rapidly and complexly changing security environment, the collection and analysis of high-quality and timely information is essential for the Government to make accurate decisions. To this end, under close cooperation between the policy and intelligence departments, and through comprehensive analyses utilizing all means of collection and sources of information possessed by the Government, information on national security should be obtained as early and accurately as possible, and

shared and utilized within and outside the Government. In addition, the Government and the private sector will work on information security to prevent leakage of critical information on its national security.

2. Strategic Approaches and Major Ways and Means

- (1) Develop Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Create a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthen a Free and Open International Order
 - (i) Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements at its core, plays an indispensable role not only for the security of Japan but also for the realization of peace and stability in the international community, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, for the U.S. commitment to the region to be maintained and strengthened, deepened cooperation between Japan and the U.S. at a concrete level in the Indo-Pacific region is of vital importance. Bearing these considerations in mind, Japan, while ensuring the bilateral coordination at its strategic levels, will work in coordination with the United States to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance in all areas, including diplomacy, defense, and economy.
 - (ii) Maintain and Develop a Free and Open International Order and Strengthen Ties with its Ally, Like-minded Countries and Others

As a nation in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further promote efforts to realize a FOIP by deepening cooperation with like-minded countries through the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone and through efforts such as the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India (Quad) partnership. To this end, Japan will strive to make the vision of a FOIP more universal around the world, create rules to expand the free and fair economic zone, improve connectivity, empower governance of countries and international organizations, and expand efforts to ensure maritime security.

Japan will also further enhance diplomatic engagement with developing countries, which are economically growing and becoming more influential in the international arena. By doing so, Japan, together with as many countries as possible, will strengthen a free and open international order based on the rule of law.

Furthermore, Japan will build a multilayered network among its ally and like-minded countries, expand it, and strengthen deterrence. Thus, while utilizing frameworks such as the Japan-U.S.-ROK, and Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan will enhance security cooperation with Australia, India, the ROK, European countries, ASEAN countries, Canada, NATO, EU, and others. Specifically, Japan will promote enhanced engagement with like-minded countries and others in the Indo-Pacific region through bilateral and multilateral dialogues, bilateral training and exercises, conclusions of information protection agreements, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), joint development of defense equipment, transfer of defense equipment and technology, capacity building support, strategic communication, and Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO).
 - (iii) Strengthen Diplomacy with Japan's Neighboring

Countries and Regions as well as Efforts toward Resolution of Various Issues of Concern, including Territorial Issues

Both Japan and China have important responsibilities for the peace and prosperity of the region and the international community. Japan will build a “constructive and stable relationship” with China through communication at various levels, in which Japan asserts its position and calls for responsible actions, while continuing dialogue including on issues of concern and cooperation on matters of common interests. This is essential for peace and stability in the international community, including in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan will strongly oppose China’s growing attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force, demand it to not conduct such activities, and respond in a calm and resolute manner. Additionally, with regard to China’s rapid strengthening of its military capabilities and expansion of military activities, Japan will strongly encourage China to improve transparency and to cooperate constructively with international efforts for arms control, disarmament and other such efforts, in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others. Furthermore, in order to nurture a relationship of trust, Japan will enhance communication with China in the security field. Japan will also promote efforts, including the establishment of a framework for avoiding and preventing the occurrence of unforeseen situations with China.

At the same time, based on the recognition that it is possible to cooperate with China in the fields of economy and people-to-people exchange in a mutually beneficial way, Japan will develop appropriate economic relations in a manner that contributes to Japan’s economic development and economic security, and revitalize people to people exchanges with China. In addition, in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries as well as with international organizations and others, Japan will cooperate with China in areas that need to be tackled together such as global issues, while encouraging China to comply with international rules and standards, increase its own transparency and predictability, and play a responsible and constructive role commensurate with its international influence.

Japan’s relationship with Taiwan has been maintained as a non-governmental working relationship based on the Japan-China Joint Communiqué in 1972. Japan’s basic position regarding Taiwan remains unchanged. Taiwan is an extremely important partner and a precious friend of Japan, with whom Japan shares fundamental values, including democracy, and has close economic and personal ties. Peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is an indispensable element for the security and prosperity of the international community, and Japan will continue to make various efforts based on its position that the cross-Strait issues are expected to be resolved peacefully.

The ROK is a highly important neighboring country to Japan both in a geopolitical context and in regard to Japan’s security. With the response to North Korea and other issues in mind, Japan will enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK strategic coordination, including in the area of security. To this end, Japan will

communicate closely with the ROK in order to develop Japan-ROK relations based on the foundation of the friendly and cooperative relations that have developed since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965. Japan will also appropriately address issues of concern between the two nations, based on its consistent positions. With regard to the issue over the sovereignty of Takeshima, which is an inherent territory of Japan, Japan will make persevering diplomatic efforts, based on the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance with international law, and responding firmly based on the consistent position of Japan.

With regard to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, Japan will urge North Korea to take concrete actions toward its complete denuclearization, based on the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant UN Security Council resolutions through strengthening regional deterrence, fully implementing sanctions against North Korea, including those based on UN Security Council resolutions, and pursuing diplomatic efforts in close coordination with the U.S. and the ROK. Concerning Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. In particular, it is the basic recognition of Japan that normalization of relations with North Korea will not be possible without resolving the abductions issue, a serious humanitarian issue with a time constraint. Japan will make every effort to ensure the safety of all abductees and realize their immediate return at the earliest possible date, investigate the truth regarding the abductions, and transfer those who executed the abductions.

With regard to the relations with Russia, Japan will respond in a manner that protects its own national interests in light of the severe security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Japan will prevent Russia from taking actions that undermine the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while cooperating with its ally and like-minded countries and others. As for the Northern Territories issue, which is the greatest concern regarding our diplomacy with Russia, Japan’s basic policy of concluding a peace treaty through the resolution of the territorial issue remains unchanged.

- (iv) Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation
Japan will further strengthen its efforts in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, in order to improve its security environment and realize peace and stability around the world by halting and reversing the trend of arms buildup, including nuclear weapons, in the vicinity of Japan, and to prevent the occurrence of situations such as threats of nuclear weapons. Specifically, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, will spearhead international efforts in realizing a “world without nuclear weapons.” Taking into account regional non-proliferation issues such as North Korea and Iran, Japan will maintain and strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its cornerstone, and steadily promote practical and

realistic efforts while appropriately addressing present international security challenges.

In addition, Japan will undertake non-proliferation policy with a focus on preserving and bolstering the international export control regime to prevent the proliferation of weapons and related sensitive technologies, implementing appropriate non-proliferation measures domestically, and supporting capacity building of each country.

With regard to biological, chemical, and conventional weapons, Japan will actively engage in multilateral efforts and rule-making, including on the Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

(v) International Counter-Terrorism

Acts of terrorism are unjustifiable regardless of their motivation and must be firmly condemned. Japan will take a firm position against them and take counter-terrorism measures in coordination with the international community. In this regard, Japan will promote measures against international terrorism and take thorough steps to ensure the security of critical facilities for the livelihoods of its people such as nuclear power plants in Japan. Furthermore, Japan will build arrangements to cooperate with others such as foreign countries and corporate enterprises, including information sharing, to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

In addition, Japan will reinforce its mechanisms and capabilities for collecting and analyzing information on the international terrorism situation.

(vi) Climate Change Measures

Climate change is a security issue that affects the very existence of humankind. Extreme weather events due to climate change significantly impact Japan's national security in various ways including through more frequent and severer natural disasters, increased responses to disasters, more serious energy and food problems, a decrease in national land area, and increased use of the Arctic sea routes.

Japan will lead the way in advancing efforts both at home and abroad with all stakeholders, including its ally and like-minded countries. Specifically, Japan will embark on initiatives toward the realization of a decarbonized society through structural transformation of the energy and industrial sectors, including maximizing the use of renewable and nuclear energies, and the creation of innovation through bold investments in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 46% from FY 2013 in FY 2030, and realize net-zero by 2050.

Japan will also stand at the forefront in galvanizing global efforts for minimizing negative impacts of climate change upon the international security environment. As part of these efforts, Japan will provide assistance to island nations and other developing countries where climate change poses imminent threats so that sustainable and resilient economies and societies can be built.

(vii) Strategic Use of ODA and Other International Cooperation

Guided by the vision of a FOIP, Japan will strategically utilize ODA to maintain and develop a free and open international order and to realize coexistence and coprosperity in the international community.

Specifically, Japan will provide assistance to strengthen connectivity through quality infrastructure and human resource development, maritime security, the rule of law, and economic security, thereby strengthening relationships of trust and cooperation with developing countries and others. Japan will also engage with partners in the international community at large that support the vision of a FOIP.

Also, under the concept of "human security," Japan will lead international efforts to solve global issues such as poverty reduction, health, climate change, environment, and humanitarian assistance. In so doing, Japan will strengthen its support for overseas operation of Japanese companies, and enhance collaboration between ODA, and other non-ODA public funds. Japan will also continue to strengthen coordination with various stakeholders including international organizations and NGOs.

For the purpose of deepening security cooperation with like-minded countries, apart from ODA for the economic and social development of developing countries and other purposes, a new cooperation framework for the benefit of armed forces and other related organizations will be established. Japan will provide equipment and supplies as well as assistance for the development of infrastructures to like-minded countries in view of strengthening their security capacities and improving their deterrence capabilities. This is part of the efforts to reinforce the comprehensive defense architecture.

(viii) Promotion of People-to-People Exchanges

The promotion of mutual understanding among people and countries is the foundation for mitigating inter-state tensions and creating peaceful and stable international relations. With a view to promoting understanding of Japan abroad and fostering an international environment in which Japan and its people are favorably regarded, Japan will engage in people-to-people and cultural exchanges. Specifically, Japan will promote exchanges at various levels and in various fields, including exchanges with government officials, intellectuals, and cultural figures from countries and regions around the world, student exchanges, youth exchanges, sports exchanges, and others. In addition, Japan will support those programs intended to introduce the rich culture of Japan and to spread the Japanese language overseas.

(2) Strengthening Japan's Defense Architecture

(i) Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities as the Last Guarantee of National Security

Across the globe, unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force are constantly taking place, and military buildups in the vicinity of Japan are rapidly expanding. The possibilities are not precluded that serious situations shaking the foundation of the international order, such as Russia's aggression against Ukraine, may occur especially in East Asia in the future. In order to respond to this security environment, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities.

It is difficult to accurately predict when an entity with powerful military capabilities will come to have an intention to directly threaten other countries. Therefore, Japan must pay attention to the capabilities

of such actors and develop defense capabilities to take all possible measures to ensure the security of Japan in peacetime. Moreover, Japan's defense capabilities must be able to respond to new ways of warfare as a result of advances in science and technology.

From this perspective, Japan will respond to situations in a multi-layered way by cross domain operational capabilities that enhance the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) capabilities overall, through the synergy of organically integrated capabilities in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains as well as in ground, maritime and air, and by stand-off defense capabilities and other capabilities that will enable us to respond to invading forces from outside the sphere of threats. In addition to manned assets, by reinforcing unmanned defense and other capabilities, Japan will establish defense capabilities where various capabilities are integrated. Furthermore, in order to maximize effective use of the current defense equipment, Japan will further enhance the effectiveness of defense capabilities by improving mobility, securing ammunition and fuel, and hardening major defense facilities as a top priority.

A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In recent years, in Japan's surroundings, there have been dramatic advances in missile-related technologies, including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations, such as saturation attack. Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense capabilities by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories.

Looking ahead, however, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone.

For this reason, we need counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF's capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent's further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself

against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities on which the Government expressed its view on February 29, 1956, which stated that, under the Constitution, "as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible." These are also capabilities that the Government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision.

This Government view squarely applies to measures for self-defense taken under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, presented in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, and the capabilities that Japan has now decided to acquire can be used when the above-mentioned Three Conditions are met in compliance with this view.

Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan's Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they will be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible.

While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes just as they do in defending against ballistic missiles and others.

Furthermore, Japan will consistently strengthen coordination and cooperation between the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), including control over the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) by the Minister of Defense in the event of a contingency.

Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) utilizing SDF assets in the form of cross-governmental coordination will also be implemented.

In light of Japan's current security environment, Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. Specifically, by FY 2027, five years after the formulation of the Strategy, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining the support of its ally and others. Furthermore, by approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point at which it will be possible to disrupt and defeat invasions against its nation much earlier and at a further distance. In addition, as a top priority in five years from now, Japan will maximize effective use of its current equipment, while strengthening its core capabilities for the future of the SDF.

The above measures related to the development of the SDF architecture and defense policies will entail unprecedented undertakings in terms of size and content. The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities will not be achieved by a temporary increase in spending, but rather, the Government will be required to maintain a certain level of expenditure.

Hence, these policies will be delivered in accordance with the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Program based on this National Security Strategy. Japan will also need to take appropriate measures for securing stable fiscal resources.

In FY 2027, as per its own judgement, Japan will take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, reach 2% of the current GDP, through building on the contents of necessary defense capabilities, and by taking into account indexes of international comparison, with a view to coordination with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(ii) Coordinating with Reinforced Comprehensive Defense Architecture.

The core effort in addressing Japan's defense challenges will be to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities. However, because of wide-ranging security targets and fields, Japan will utilize not only its defense capabilities but also its comprehensive national power, including diplomatic and economic capabilities, to defend itself. With this in mind, Japan will reinforce its comprehensive defense architecture by promoting efforts in four areas that complement and are inseparable from the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities under the frameworks of relevant ministries and agencies, namely research and development, public infrastructure development, cyber security, and international cooperation, to enhance deterrence capabilities of Japan and like-minded countries.

In addition to this, Japan will promote cooperation with organizations inside and outside the Government, including local public authorities, to develop its defense architecture as a whole.

(iii) Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Base as Defense Capabilities Themselves

Japan's defense production and technology base is an indispensable foundation for ensuring stable research and development, production, and procurement of defense equipment in Japan. Therefore, Japan will advance defense production and technology bases because they are characterized as defense capabilities themselves. Specifically, in order to build a strong and sustainable defense industry, Japan will promote various initiatives, including making business projects more attractive and actively leveraging the outcomes of advanced technological research in the public and private sectors for research and development of defense equipment. Japan will also reinforce the system for research and development of new defense equipment and take other measures.

(iv) Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,

its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of the related procedures for transfer of defense equipment and technology will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves.

In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by implementing measures including providing various forms of assistance to smoothly promote such transfers.

(v) Strengthening the Foundation for SDF Personnel to Fulfill Abilities as Core of Defense Capabilities

Japan will solidify the human resource base for the SDF personnel, the core of its defense capabilities, in order for the personnel to further fulfill their abilities. To this end, Japan will work to secure diverse and talented SDF personnel from diverse backgrounds. On top of this, Japan will set in place an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment, and foster an environment so that female members can play more active roles. Japan will also improve treatment of SDF personnel, and drive efforts to foster an environment in which all SDF personnel can maintain high morale and fully fulfill their abilities.

(3) Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States

Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities and deepen security cooperation with the United States. By undertaking such efforts, Japan will further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. that is backed by its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. Particularly, based on constant examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the U.S., for the purpose of strengthening the Alliance's deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will undertake efforts to coordinate bilateral operations including cross-domain operations and the use of Japan's counterstrike capabilities, improve interoperability, deepen cooperation in the cyber, space and other fields, advance equipment and technological cooperation that capitalizes on advanced technologies, carry out more advanced and practical bilateral exercises, conduct joint Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), conduct joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and increase joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, while further developing coordination functions of such framework as the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). In doing so, Japan will strengthen the foundations of information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and the U.S. can fully employ their capabilities.

At the same time, while undertaking these efforts, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, from the viewpoint of mitigating impacts on local communities including Okinawa.

(4) Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions

In the current security environment, the boundaries between military and non-military, peacetime and contingency, have become blurred. Hybrid warfare is taking place, and gray zone situations are constantly arising. Japan will

seamlessly protect its national interests by promoting cross-governmental policies in diverse fields, including cyber, maritime and space domains, technology, intelligence, and ensuring the safety of its people at home and abroad.

(i) Improving Response Capabilities in the Field of Cybersecurity

In order to ensure secure and stable use of cyberspace, especially the security of the nation and critical infrastructures, the response capabilities in the field of cybersecurity should be strengthened equal to or surpassing the level of leading Western countries.

Specifically, in order to be able to respond to emerging cyber threats at any time, Japan will first establish a mechanism to continuously assess the information systems of government agencies, to improve measures against cyber threats as necessary, and to constantly manage vulnerabilities of government agencies' information systems. As part of these efforts, the Government will continue to enhance defense throughout the lifecycle of information systems of government agencies, including those used in the fields of diplomacy, defense, and intelligence, from installation to disposal, while also promoting the development and effective use of human resources inside and outside the Government, by actively adopting cutting-edge concepts and technologies related to cybersecurity at all times.

In addition, Japan will introduce active cyber defense for eliminating in advance the possibility of serious cyberattacks that may cause national security concerns to the Government and critical infrastructures and for preventing the spread of damage in case of such attacks, even if they do not amount to an armed attack. For this purpose, the Government will take further steps to develop information gathering and analysis capabilities in the field of cybersecurity and establish systems to implement active cyber defense. Therefore, the Government will advance efforts to consider to realize necessary measures including the following (a) to (c):

- (a) Japan will advance efforts on information sharing to the Government in case of cyberattacks among the private sector including critical infrastructures, as well as coordinating and supporting incident response activities for the private sector.
- (b) Japan will take necessary actions to detect servers and others suspected of being abused by attackers by utilizing information on communications services provided by domestic telecommunications providers.
- (c) For serious cyberattacks that pose security concerns against the Government, critical infrastructures, and others, the Government will be given the necessary authorities that allow it to penetrate and neutralize attacker's servers and others in advance to the extent possible.

In order to realize and promote these efforts, including active cyber defense, the National center for Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) will be constructively restructured to establish a new organization which will comprehensively coordinate policies in the field of cybersecurity, in a centralized manner. Then, the Government will work on legislation

and strengthen operations for the purpose of materializing these new efforts in the field of cybersecurity. These measures will contribute to the reinforcement of a comprehensive defense architecture.

In addition, the Government will improve coordination with other policies that contribute to the enhancement of cybersecurity, such as economic security and the enhancement of technical capabilities related to national security.

Furthermore, the Government will continue to work for the enhancement of information gathering and analysis, attribution and its public announcement, as well as formulation of international frameworks and rules in a coordinated manner with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(ii) Promoting Maritime Security and Strengthen Maritime Law Enforcement Capabilities

As a maritime nation surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with one of the world's most extensive jurisdictional waters, Japan will work with its ally, like-minded countries, and others to promote efforts to ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight and to ensure safety, as well as maintain and develop the international maritime order based on universal values, including the rule of law. Specifically, Japan will advance multilateral maritime security cooperation by enhancing maritime surveillance to respond to threats in sea lanes, active bilateral drills and exercises with other countries, and overseas port calls. In addition, anti-piracy and intelligence gathering activities will be conducted to ensure the safety of maritime traffic.

While undertaking international cooperation in these areas, Japan will ensure freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and other waters, promote peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law, strengthen relations with those coastal states along the sea lanes, and actively utilize the Arctic sea routes. Furthermore, Japan will continue to actively utilize the SDF facility in Djibouti in order to secure stable use of the sea lane.

The role played by the JCG, Japan's maritime law enforcement agency, is essential to its national security. In order to ensure the security of Japan's territory, including the areas surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and to respond effectively in the event of multiple major incidents, Japan's maritime law enforcement capabilities will be significantly reinforced, in conjunction with efforts to strengthen its organization. Specifically, in accordance with the new policy on strengthening maritime law enforcement capabilities, the JCG will promptly increase assets and introduce new technologies, secure sufficient operational expenses, renew degraded vessels, and secure and train personnel.

In addition, the coordination and cooperation between the JCG and the SDF will be consistently strengthened, including the Minister of Defense's control over the JCG in the event of an emergency.

Furthermore, international coordination and cooperation with maritime law enforcement agencies in the United States, Southeast Asian countries, and other countries will be carried forward.

(iii) Reinforcing Comprehensive Efforts for Space Security

To ensure safe and stable utilization of space, which is indispensable for economic and social activities, Japan will strengthen its response capabilities in the field of space security. Specifically, while promoting the use of the space domain by the SDF, JCG and others, Japan will drive forward measures to capitalize on Japan's overall space-related capabilities in the field of security, such as strengthening cooperation between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the SDF.

In addition, Japan will set up a framework for the Government's decision-making in unforeseeable circumstances, strengthen mechanisms for understanding the space domain, promote measures to address the issue of space debris, expand the development of capabilities to hinder command and control as well as information and communications at the other end, and Japan will enhance cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries, and others, including on the formulation of international codes of conduct.

Furthermore, Japan will utilize its civilian space technology in its national defense by supporting and fostering Japan's space industry, including the construction of satellite constellations, thereby realizing a virtuous cycle to further encourage the development of its space industry

In order to put the agenda and policies in the field of space security into practice, Japan will put together the Government's concept and reflect it in the Basic Plan on Space Policy and other relevant documents.

- (iv) Enhancing Public-private Partnerships for Improving Technical Capabilities and Proactively Capitalizing on Outcomes of Research and Development in the Security Field

Cutting-edge science and technology are advancing at an accelerated pace, and it has become extremely difficult in practice to distinguish between technologies for civilian use and for security purposes. Against this backdrop, in order to widely and actively utilize Japan's advanced technological capabilities in the public and private sectors for security purposes, Japan will strengthen the system to improve technological capabilities of the public and private sectors that can be used for security purposes, to utilize, in a whole-of-government manner, funds and information related to research and development. Specifically, for the purpose of promoting research and development of science and technology that contributes to the enhancement of the comprehensive defense architecture, a whole-of-government mechanism will be established to match research and development needs based on the views of the Ministry of Defense with the appropriate technological seeds possessed by relevant ministries and agencies, in addition to implementing these projects. On top of that, Japan will promote active utilization of funds and outcomes related to government-wide R&D, including the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program, for the security sector.

Japan will also work to further strengthen assistance for gathering information, development, and training in the area of cutting-edge and critical technologies and to put in place arrangements.

In order to promote private-sector innovation and

to actively utilize the results of such innovation in the security field, Japan will promote the participation of a wide range of leading-edge researchers including those in the academia, while obtaining understanding and cooperation of all parties concerned. Japan will also work across the Government to foster an environment in which the defense industry can fully harness the opportunities offered by other private sector innovations.

- (v) Strengthening Intelligence Capacities for Japan's National Security

Japan will reinforce its arrangements and capabilities in the field of intelligence, which is closely related to the maintenance of a sound democracy, smooth decision-making by the Government, and effective external communications. Specifically, in order to strengthen Japan's ability to analyze global trends from a broad, accurate, and multifaceted perspective across diplomatic, military, and economic spheres, Japan will significantly enhance its information-gathering capabilities from various information sources, including human intelligence, open source intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. In particular, with regard to human intelligence, the structure for collecting information will be enhanced and strengthened.

As for imagery intelligence, the functions of information gathering satellites will be expanded and enhanced, and collected information will be utilized more effectively by strengthening the cooperation and coordination between the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center and the Ministry of Defense as well as the SDF.

In addition, a mechanism will be established to aggregate information in an integrated manner, and the coordination between the policy and intelligence departments will be enhanced. At intelligence departments, intelligence analysis capabilities will be strengthened to provide high-value-added analysis results to policy making departments through comprehensive analysis (all-source analysis) utilizing all of the intelligence means possessed by the Government, including the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI).

Also, while taking into account the discussions on the establishment of a new security clearance system in the economic security field, the arrangement for information security will be further solidified.

In addition, from the perspective of bolstering the ability to respond to information warfare in the cognitive domain, including spread of disinformation, a new structure will be established within the Government to aggregate and analyze information on disinformation and others originated abroad, to strengthen external communications, and to enhance cooperation with non-governmental agencies. Furthermore, strategic communication will be actively implemented in a coordinated manner within the Government.

Japan will also promptly consider effective measures by both public and private sectors to prevent the misuse of geospatial information in the security area.

- (vi) Reinforcing Response Capabilities within Japan with Contingencies in Mind

In preparation for a direct threat to Japan, Japan will enhance response capabilities in wide ranging areas at home. Specifically, as part of the reinforcement

of the comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will establish a cross-governmental mechanism to develop and enhance the functions of public infrastructures such as airports and seaports based on the needs of the SDF and the JCG for their smooth utilization and deployment in response to protection of its nationals, peacetime training, and deployment during contingencies. At the same time, rules will be established for ordinary utilization of airports and seaports with a view to responding to contingencies. These efforts will be promoted in cooperation with local municipalities and residents.

To ensure the smooth activities of the SDF and U.S. forces, and others, measures will be taken to develop arrangements for transportation and storage of SDF ammunition and fuel, coordinate with related parties and organizations regarding use of civilian facilities by the SDF and U.S. forces, ensure secure and flexible use of radio waves, and ensure that SDF facilities and activities be not negatively impacted by civilian facilities.

Regarding measures to secure critical infrastructures, which are closely linked to sustaining the daily livelihoods, such as nuclear power plants, and measures against illegal landing on remote border islands, Japan will make efforts to seamlessly respond to crises in various forms and stages that do not amount to armed attacks, in addition to armed attack situations. For that purpose, the SDF, Police, the JCG, and others will establish a coordination framework and strengthen their response capabilities by enhancing the equipment, systems, and training, in order to seamlessly respond to crises in various forms and stages that do not amount to armed attacks, in addition to armed attack situations.

(vii) Reinforcing Mechanisms for the Protection of Japanese Nationals

Japan will reinforce a mechanism for the protection of Japanese nationals through, for instance, efforts to protect residents, in cooperation of the Government, local municipalities, and designated public institutions. Specifically, for the purpose of achieving prompt evacuation of residents, including those in the Southwest region well in advance of an armed attack, Japan will take measures such as formulating a plan for smooth evacuation as soon as possible, securing the means of transportation of the public and private sectors, developing and coordinating the use of airports, seaports, and other public infrastructures, securing various types of evacuation facilities, and working with international organizations.

In order to enhance the efficacy of these efforts, Japan will also consider the necessary policies, including structural arrangements through promoting coordination among the Government, local municipalities, and designated public institutions, after conducting and assessing drills for the evacuation of residents.

Furthermore, while consistently tackling the enhancement of the information transmission function of J-ALERT, the Government will work to share information and raise public awareness on evacuation activities in preparation for emergencies concerning ballistic missiles.

(viii) Reinforcing Architecture and Measures for the

Protection of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas
Japan will reinforce arrangements and measures to protect Japanese nationals and others overseas from threats such as conflicts, natural disasters, infectious diseases and terrorism. Specifically, efforts will be made to take measures, including for raising awareness of Japanese nationals overseas on safety measures from peace time, providing safety information in a timely manner, ensuring means of evacuation, and strengthening cooperation with related countries.

In this context, consular services at Japanese embassies and consulates, which serve as the most critical hub for protection of Japanese nationals overseas, will be strengthened in terms of structure and capabilities. At the same time, the SDF and other assets will be promptly mobilized for evacuating Japanese nationals and others overseas, when necessary and feasible. To this end, cooperation among relevant ministries and agencies will be enhanced.

Furthermore, while gaining understanding from the Government of Djibouti, the SDF facility there, which has been in operation for counter-piracy activities, will be also utilized for the protection of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

(viii) Securing Resources Essential for Japan's National Security including Energy and Food

From the perspective of ensuring smooth economic and social activities in Japan and abroad, as well as the ability to sustainably respond in the event of an emergency, the Government will promote policies to secure resources essential for Japan's national security, such as energy security and food security, which form the basis of its people's lives and social and economic activities.

To ensure energy security, in addition to advancing ties with resource-rich countries, diversifying supply sources, and enhancing procurement risk assessment and other methods, Japan will maximize the use of energy sources that contribute to its energy self-sufficiency, such as renewable energy and nuclear power, and will strategically develop and solidify energy sources for this purpose. In cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries, and international organizations, Japan will drive forward measures to improve Japan's energy self-sufficiency ratio and build a robust energy supply system that can withstand contingencies.

With regard to food security, the situation surrounding the supply and demand of food and trade worldwide is unstable and uncertain. As Japan depends largely on imports of food and production materials from overseas, the risks associated with Japan's food security are manifesting themselves. Therefore, transforming the structure of its food supply is key. Specifically, Japan will produce at home what can be produced here in Japan to the extent possible and work to secure domestic production of items and materials that highly dependent on foreign countries, in conjunction with ensuring stable imports and appropriate supplying of national stockpiles. In pursuit of this, Japan will expand the production of grains, ramp up the production of feed, amplify the use of domestic resources such as compost, and then appropriately carry out measures to ensure stable

imports and the national stockpiles of items that are difficult to procure at home, so that Japan can ensure stable food supply to our people and bolster Japan's food security.

With a view to responding to global food security crises, Japan will improve the international environment for food supply, improve food production, and provide support to vulnerable countries, in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries, and international organizations.

(5) Promoting Economic Security Policies to Achieve Autonomous Economic Prosperity

Economic security is to ensure Japan's national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures. In the face of various threats at hand through economic means, Japan will coordinate ideas on necessary economic measures and execute these measures comprehensively, effectively and intensively to enhance Japan's self-reliance and to secure the advantage and indispensability concerning our technologies and others.

Specifically, Japan will reinforce its mechanisms for promoting economic security policies, and work with its ally and like-minded countries, as well as in cooperation with the private sector, to take measures including those indicated below. Japan will consistently consider and revisit these measures, and in particular, continuously assess the risks that exist in each industry, and implement other necessary security measures in a whole-of-government manner.

- (i) Japan will steadily implement and constantly review the Economic Security Promotion Act (Law No. 43, 2022, hereinafter referred to as the "Promotion Act"), and further reinforce efforts in this regard.
- (ii) With regard to supply chain resilience, Japan will curb excessive dependence on specific countries, carry forward next-generation semiconductor development and manufacturing bases, secure stable supply for critical goods including rare earth, and promote capital reinforcement of private enterprises with critical goods and technologies, and strengthen the function of policy-based finance, in pursuit of protecting and nurturing critical goods.
- (iii) Japan will consider reviewing government procurement procedures, including those by local municipalities, as well as expanding the scope of the prior screening system under the Promotion Act, with regard to the critical infrastructure field.
- (iv) With regard to data and information protection, Japan will carry out additional measures to ensure more appropriate management of sensitive data and safety and reliability of information and communication technology services. In addition, keeping in mind information security practices of leading countries and needs of the industries, examinations will be made to bolster Japan's information security, including security clearance.
- (v) For the purpose of fostering and preserving technology and other purposes, Japan will proceed with specific considerations in further stepping up support and developing systems for information gathering, development, and fostering of advanced critical technologies, taking on additional measures to enhance investment screening and export control as well as

response to forced technology transfer, and further advancing research integrity and measures against talent drain.

- (vi) Japan will promote effective efforts against economic coercion by foreign countries.
- (6) Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules

Japan will maintain and strengthen an open and stable international economic order by preventing non-military pressure by certain states aimed at impeding independent national foreign policy decision-making and sound economic development. Specifically, while maintaining and strengthening the multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core, Japan will enhance its own measures to counter against unfair trade practices and economic coercion, including through working to solidify international norms in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries.

In addition, in order to achieve the development of economic order and sustainable and inclusive economic growth in the Indo-Pacific region and extend the free and fair economic order, we will maintain the high standards of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), ensure the full implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, and materialize other economic partnership agreement negotiations and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

Furthermore, Japan will pursue implementing mutually beneficial economic cooperation as well as maintaining and strengthening international frameworks and rules. To be specific, in order to avoid situations where recipient countries fall into "debt traps" due to opaque forms of assistance to developing countries by some states and others, Japan will spearhead global efforts to ensure that states and institutions comply with international rules and standards and carry out development finance in a transparent and fair manner.

In addition, Japan will provide capacity-building support for developing countries to enhance their self-reliance and present attractive options for the economic development of developing countries, including support in coordination with its ally and like-minded countries and development finance institutions.

(7) Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity in the International Community

Japan's national security can only be fulfilled through the peace and stability of the international community. In order to achieve coexistence and coprosperity with the international community, Japan will cooperate with the international community in ways commensurate with its international standing, economic capabilities, and technological capabilities.

- (i) Promote Multilateral Cooperation and Strengthen Ties with International Organizations and Frameworks
Japan has built relationships of trust with many countries, regardless of differences in political and economic systems, through various forms of cooperation. On this basis, through multilateral diplomacy, Japan will strive to realize the goals it attaches importance to and cooperate with the international community for coexistence and coprosperity by engaging in tailored communications with these countries and strengthening cooperation with the United Nations and other

international organizations.

In particular, the UN plays a role in a wide range of fields, including conflict management, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, protection and promotion of human rights, climate change, food crisis, natural disasters, and refugee issues, and Japan will strengthen cooperation with the UN and countries surrounding the UN to further promote multilateral cooperation. At the same time, given that the UN Security Council does not function adequately when a permanent member is a party to a dispute, and that other inherent limitations of the UN are becoming apparent, we will lead efforts to strengthen the functions of the UN, including reform of the UN Security Council.

In addition, Japan will advance efforts to enable Japanese nationals to play an even more active role as staff in the UN and other international organizations.

(ii) Efforts to Address Global Challenges

The Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”), adopted by the UN in September 2015 are goals for the international community as a whole to address global challenges in an integrated manner, including peace, the rule of law, and human rights, with no one being left behind. Rather than addressing each goal individually, Japan will contribute to the achievement of the SDGs by taking on and preventing complex interrelated risks based on the concept of human security.

In addition, with regard to global issues such as climate change, infectious diseases, energy, food problems, and the environment, which have a direct or indirect impact on Japan’s national security, Japan will expand the circle of cooperation not only to include its ally and like-minded countries, but also many other countries and organizations, and then enhance international efforts.

Fully recognizing that global health, including measures against infectious diseases, is an important issue for the international community, encompassing not only economic and social risks but also major national security risks, Japan will cooperate with its ally and like-minded countries as well as international organizations and other relevant partners to take all possible measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond to future infectious disease crises on a regular basis, based on its experience in responding to COVID-19. In doing so, Japan, in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries as well as with international organizations and other relevant partners, will steadfastly deliver medical care at home, and secure infectious disease control supplies including medicines from the early stages of infection crises, and undertake efforts to advance the ability to respond to infectious diseases based on scientific knowledge. The Government will also work to reinforce its own function of serving as the control tower in response to infectious disease crises. Furthermore, Japan will strive to advance health systems and relevant international frameworks that contribute to the enhancement of response capabilities of infectious diseases in developing countries.

In addition, the Government will actively promote global efforts in realizing more resilient, equitable and sustainable universal health coverage (UHC).

Additionally, in order to appropriately respond to

the rapidly growing needs for humanitarian assistance around the world in recent years, Japan will step up efforts necessary to provide humanitarian assistance promptly and on a sufficient scale. Furthermore, Japan will actively accept displaced people due to war or natural disasters in foreign countries.

The protection of human rights is the fundamental responsibility of each and every country. Japan will raise its voice against serious human rights violations and continue to build on dialogue and cooperation with various countries for the sake of the protection and promotion of human rights.

Given the vulnerable position of women in conflict, Japan will spearhead international efforts to promote the protection and redress of women’s human rights. Japan will also undertake efforts around the globe to achieve gender equality and promote women’s empowerment in all areas.

The international peace cooperation, including peacekeeping operations (PKO) that Japan has long contributed in order to promote peace and stability in the international community, fosters cooperation with other Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and helps to develop Japan’s human resources. Therefore, Japan will continue to actively engage in various forms of cooperation including dispatch of personnel and strategic use of capacity building assistance.

VII Domestic Base that should be Strengthened to Support Japan’s National Security

1. Strengthening the Economic and Fiscal Bases

Japan will achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth, in which economic growth promotes further improvements in Japan’s national security while ensuring a security environment in which its economy can grow.

Japan will also ensure sustainable response capabilities in the event of contingencies across a broad array of sectors. To this end, Japan will promote cooperation between the public and private sectors to secure energy, food, and other resources, develop infrastructure, and build stable supply chains for parts and other items essential for security.

Furthermore, as Japan’s economy is highly dependent on foreign countries, Japan has critical importance in maintaining the confidence of international markets and having adequate fiscal capacity to secure the necessary funds to meet a substantial increase in fiscal demand associated with securing resources and defense equipment in the event of contingency. Thus, Japan will work consistently to reinforce the economic, monetary, and fiscal bases which serve as the foundation of Japan’s national security. This is a premise for Japan’s continuous and stable national security policy including fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

2. Reinforcing the Social Base

Japan will consistently engage in efforts to deepen the understanding of and cooperation on national security among the people of Japan and organizations, inside and outside the Government, including local municipalities and corporate enterprises. Japan will also pay respect to other countries and their citizens, and foster love for its own country and homeland. In addition, Japan will further promote efforts to ensure that activities of the members of SDF and JCG, police officers, and others who dedicate themselves to hazardous duties for

the peace and security of Japan be appropriately appreciated across its society. Furthermore, measures will be taken to ensure understanding and cooperation of residents living near security-related facilities, which form the basis for the activities of these personnel.

In addition, Japan will redouble efforts to put forward information at home and abroad on matters that concern both the public and private sectors, such as issues related to its territory and sovereignty, protection of its nationals, and cyberattacks, and to broaden understanding of the current activities of the SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan.

Furthermore, Japan will improve public and private sector mechanisms and response capabilities in preparation for the next infectious disease crisis, and promote measures for disaster prevention and mitigation in advance.

3. Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The importance of information and technology in the field of national security is on the rise, and ensuring an intellectual base that generates such information and technology is essential to improving security. From this perspective, Japan will promote measures to foster practical cooperation among the Government, business community and academia in the security field, to drive forward information sharing between the public and private sectors for encouraging measured and accurate responses to national security issues, such as the spread of disinformation and cyberattacks, and to step up cooperation between the public and private sectors to facilitate effective communication of Japan's security policy at home and abroad.

VIII Duration, Evaluation, and Revision of the Strategy

The National Security Strategy will fulfill its complete purpose only when its contents are to be executed. Measures based on the Strategy will be strategically and sustainably implemented in a timely and appropriate manner under the National Security Council which serves as the control tower for national security. Furthermore, the National Security Council will regularly and systematically evaluate the security environment and execution

of measures based on this document. The Strategy will be executed approximately over the coming decade. Should Japan expect any significant changes including in the security environments, it will make necessary revisions.

IX Conclusion

At this time of an inflection point in history, Japan is finding itself in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. In no way can we be optimistic about what the future of the international community will bring.

However, the world which we have built will continue to be able to nurture economic prosperity thanks to vibrant trade and investment, innovation from global interactions of diverse talents, and new and attractive cultures. We should hold on to these hopes.

We are now standing at the crossroads of ushering in either a world of hope or a world of adversity and distrust. This very choice will depend on the actions of the international community in the time ahead, including Japan. Japan will ensure its security on the basis of comprehensive national power in areas where the international community is in confrontation. In areas where the international community should engage in cooperation, by contrast, we will continue to fulfill a leading and constructive role in resolving a broad array of issues. Japan's action in this way worldwide will further enhance its presence and credibility in the international arena and expand the circle of like-minded countries and others, thereby leading to improve the security environment surrounding Japan.

Even standing at this crossroads between a world of hope and a world of adversity and distrust amidst the most severe and complex post-war security environment, Japan, blessed with a stable democracy, the established rule of law, a mature economy, and rich culture, will advocate policies grounded in universal values and then lead the way in undertaking efforts to reinforce the international order with steadfast resolve.

(December 16, 2022)

I Objectives of National Defense Strategy

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace and it is the very heart of Japan's national security.

Since the end of World War II (WWII), in the face of the Cold War as well as the dramatic changes in the security environment that ensued its ending, Japan has preserved peace and security for 77 years by: enhancing its diplomatic strength and defense capability and expanding and deepening cooperation with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the key pillar. In so doing, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has ensured civilian control of the military and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan under these basic precepts will not ever change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation.

As Russia's aggression against Ukraine attests, the international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has entered into a new crisis. China continues to advance its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. North Korea escalates its activities as it launches ballistic missiles at an unprecedented high frequency, and pursues further miniaturization of its nuclear weapons. Russia has launched an aggression against Ukraine while its military activities in the Far East have been trending upward. Given the foregoing, in the future one cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the stable post-war international order. As Japan is situated on the very frontline of these trends, it is no exaggeration to say the future shape of Japan's security and defense policy has a direct link to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

The fact that Russia, a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the "UNSC"), has launched an aggression against Ukraine, tells us that maintaining Japan's own sovereignty and independence can be achieved through its own independent and voluntary efforts, and that it is important to expand the role Japan can play to avoid inviting foreign aggression. In today's circumstance, no country can now protect its own security alone. As challenges to the post-war international order continue, it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. For this cooperation and collaboration to produce meaningful results, Japan must strengthen its own efforts more than ever before, and our ally, like-minded countries and others also expect Japan to play a role commensurate with its national strength. Japan, its ally, like-minded countries and others are called upon to not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through further synergistic effects from common efforts.

Amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals.

Japan also needs to strengthen Japan's architecture for national defense that integrates various elements of national power. Thinking strategically, Japan should promote these two lines of effort as a coherent whole. It is this undertaking that provides the way forward to bolster Japan's deterrence capabilities and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and which forms the foundation of security cooperation with like-minded countries and others.

The United States this year devised a new National Defense Strategy. It is therefore timely for Japan and the United States to align their respective strategies and promote defense cooperation in an integrated manner.

Based on this recognition, the Government hereby finalizes the National Defense Strategy (hereinafter referred to as "NDS") to comprehensively present Japan's defense objectives, approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as "NDPG"), which have served as Japan's basic guidelines for development, sustainment and operation of defense capability with the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as "SDF") as its core and formulated six times since 1976.

The policies concerning the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and the levels of defense buildup that underpin it, which have been decided by the Government through the NDS and "Defense Buildup Program" ("DBP," approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022), represent a major turning point for post-war defense policy. By formulating this Strategy, which provides mid-to long-term directions and a breakdown of the reinforcement of defense capabilities, the Government will make efforts to deepen the Japanese public's understanding about the significance of this major turning point.

II Changes in the Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges

1 Changes in the strategic environment

Following the development of information society and the expansion of international trade, economic and culture interactions among states further expand and deepen. On the other hand, states that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent significant challenges to the free and open international order underpinned by the rule of law. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis.

In addition, the global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competition across the political, economy and military spheres is emerging. Such trends are especially notable in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has been continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. Not only China but also North Korea and Russia have further intensified their activities.

As the interstate competition between China and the United States in particular is expected to further intensify in various fields, the United States has presented a view that the next ten years will be the decisive decade for its competition with China.

Rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that could dramatically alter the character of warfare and thus prove to become "game changers." China in particular has been rapidly promoting accelerated

technological innovation and its application for military purposes under the name of the “military-civilian integration strategy”. China is notably accelerating military capability development premised on unmanned assets that leverage artificial intelligence (AI). These trends are resulting in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the way warfare is prosecuted.

In addition, there exist a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other domains, the expansion of information warfare including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

2 Military trends of Japan's neighboring countries and regions

In the report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “NCCPC”), China sets the goals of “basically completing modernization of national defense and the military” by 2035 and building “a world-class forces” by the middle of this century. And in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee in 2020, the achievement of “the centenary goal of the People’s Liberation Army” by 2027 was added as a target. In a report to the NCCPC in 2022, it was newly stated that elevating the People’s Liberation Army to a “world-class standards” at an early stage is a strategic task for fully building “a modern socialist country.” With these goals in mind, China calls for a “new system for mobilizing resources nationwide,” promotes integrated development of “mechanization, informatization and the application of smart technologies” and thereby extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner. China defines the next five years as the crucial period to start the full-scale construction of a “modern socialist country.”

China’s published national defense expenditures exceeded Japan’s defense-related expenditures for the first time in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 and has since increased at a rapid pace, reaching in FY2022 approximately 4.8 times of Japan’s defense-related expenditure. China’s published national defense expenditures are assessed to represent only a portion of actual amount spent for military purposes. Supported by the rapid growth of defense expenditures, China now possesses modern naval and air assets in larger numbers than does Japan. China is strengthening its capabilities in new domains including the space and cyber. Regarding nuclear forces, it appears highly likely that China intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable nuclear warheads by the end of the 2020s. With respect to missile forces, China, a non-signatory to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has deployed numerous surface-launched intermediate-range missiles, which the INF Treaty covered. China is also operationalizing anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range land-attack cruise missiles, and developing and deploying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). These efforts are aimed at improving military capabilities to deny foreign military’s access to, and deployment in, China’s surrounding areas as well as to impede foreign military activities in those areas (the so-called anti-access/area-denial, or “A2/AD” capability). China also continues to develop and deploy unmanned assets. Increased activities of unmanned assets have been confirmed in Japan’s surrounding areas.

Backed by these military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly in the areas around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain. China is increasing military pressure on Taiwan. In the South China Sea, it continues to entrench its

military foothold.

Chinese naval ships are intensifying their activities in waters around the Senkaku Islands. Under such circumstances, China Coast Guard ships repeatedly make intrusion into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese navy vessels have been seen navigating in Japan’s territorial waters and contiguous zones around Japan’s southwestern islands.

Regarding Taiwan, the report to NCCPC in 2022 reiterated that China “will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” At the same time, the report also stated that “we have thus maintained the initiative and the ability to steer in cross-Strait relations,” and “complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized.” In recent years, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting in China’s favor, and China has been intensifying military activities around Taiwan. It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli where Chinese military is continuously operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities. Moreover, China has launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents. China thus has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan but also in the entire international community.

China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

In order to maintain its regime, North Korea has concentrated its efforts on enhancing its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles. It is assessed that North Korea already possesses the technological capabilities to mount a nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles, whose range includes Japan and is able to attack Japan with such a missile. Regarding ballistic missiles, a delivery means of WMDs, North Korea is rapidly improving its related technologies and operational capabilities by, for example, diversifying launch modes. In particular, North Korea in recent years has been seemingly aiming to complicate indication and warning, detection, and interception of its missiles, by pursuing the operationalization of ballistic missiles that can fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories as well as by launching these missiles from various platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEL), submarines and trains. North Korea appears to be advancing its research and development setting its priorities to attain “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” and “solid fuel-propelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)” with a range covering the U.S. mainland among other things, which renews concerns over its future technological advancements. These nuclear and missile developments and others by North Korea violate a series of UNSC resolutions and others, and significantly undermine the peace, stability and security of the region and the international community. North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very

foundation of the international order and is perceived as the most significant and direct threat to defense in the European region. As for the areas surrounding Japan, the Russian forces are also accelerating their military activities including through the deployment of newer-model equipment and implementation of large-scale military exercises in the Far East region including the Northern Territories. In recent years, Russia has ramped up its military coordination with China by conducting activities such as joint navigation of their naval vessels and joint flights of their bombers. Russia's military activities in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong concern from a defense perspective.

In case that these activities are conducted simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific region, it would be necessary to take a close look at what implication they would have for the region.

3 Defense challenges

An unprecedented situation is unfolding: Russia, a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear weapon state that bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability, has launched an outright aggression against Ukraine, repeatedly taken actions and sent messages that can be interpreted as threat of nuclear weapons use. This is an event that shakes the very foundation of the international order that the international community has built since the end of WWII. Such unilateral change to the status quo by force that is occurring in Europe could also occur in the Indo-Pacific region.

The military background for Russia's aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine's defense capability against Russia was insufficient, thus failing to discourage and deter Russian aggression. Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities.

Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have the intention and capability to respond to invasions jointly to deter invasions from outside.

Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so. Accurately gauging other's intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state's decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize.

To protect one's own country from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability, thereby making said states realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult. It is also necessary to build one's own capability, that is defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities, to discourage opponents from harboring the intention to launch an aggression.

The way of warfare has also drastically changed. In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive missile strike by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare such as false-flag operations, asymmetric attacks leveraging the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains and with unmanned assets, and public remarks by nuclear powers that could be interpreted as threat using nuclear weapons. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities.

Surrounded by seas and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is endowed with a vast EEZ and continental shelves: spread widely therein are the life, person, and property of the Japanese nationals, as well as its territory, territorial waters, airspace, and various natural

resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation that depends on overseas trade for the majority of its resources and food, it is essential to reinforce the free and open maritime order as well as to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight.

Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population, and information centers concentrate in urban areas and many critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas. Protecting Japanese nationals and critical infrastructures from various threats is among Japan's security challenges.

Japan is undergoing rapid population decline and ageing with declining birth rates. Tight fiscal conditions linger. It is essential that Japan make more efficient use of budget and labor force.

III Japan's Basic Defense Policy

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor for ensuring Japan's security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan's resolve and capability to defend itself to the end.

Since the end of WWII, Japan has consistently committed to modest and efficient development of its defense capabilities. In particular, since the formulation of the NDPG in 1976 (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976), the purpose of Japan's possessing its own defense capability had been presented as, rather than to counter specific threats, to avoid Japan's becoming a power vacuum and thus a destabilizing factor in the region surrounding Japan.

After the end of the Cold War, SDF's roles and missions have expanded to cover various situations including domestic and international large-scale disaster responses and International Peace Cooperation Activities. The 2010 NDPG (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) stated that defense capability development will no longer depend on the "Basic Defense Force Concept," which placed importance on the deterrence effect from the existence of defense capability itself. The subsequent 2013 NDPG (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) called to squarely face the reality of increasingly severe security environment and to build a truly effective defense capability. Meanwhile, Japan's neighboring countries have drastically strengthened their military capabilities, and rapidly expanded and intensified missile launches and coercive military activities, threatening the security of Japan and the region.

As these activities escalate, it is extremely difficult to predict when and how intentions will change and unilateral changes to the status quo by force will occur. It is clear from Russia's aggression against Ukraine that a unilateral change to the status quo by force causes massive human and material damage, with disruption in economy, finance, energy as well as maritime and air traffic felt not only regionally but also globally, seriously affecting people's daily lives.

To account for the foregoing, Japan must clearly demonstrate the intention that Japan will never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. To this end, Japan must: fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities with a focus on opponents' capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare. and, actively adapt to new ways of warfare. Japan cannot engage in these efforts alone: Japan needs close cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others. This strategy thus intends to clearly define Japan's defense objectives and present approaches and specific means to achieve

those objectives, thereby ensuring all efforts will be made in an integrated manner.

-Japan's defense objectives are as follows:

The first objective is to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force.

The second objective is to deter, through cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan's peace and security. Should such an eventuality occur, our objective is to swiftly respond in whatever ways and bring the situation under control at an early stage so that the situation would not lead to invasion of Japan.

The third objective is, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, to rapidly respond to the invasion in a tailored and seamless manner; to take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression. and, while receiving support from the ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion.

In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential. Japan will defend itself to the end in all situations through the combination of its own efforts to achieve the first, second and third defense objectives and extended deterrence and others provided by the United States.

-Approaches to realize Japan's defense objectives are as follows. Specific means will be presented later in the description of respective approaches:

The first approach is, in an effort of strengthening of Japan's own architecture for national defense, to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, which constitute the core of national defense, and to reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country.

The second approach is to further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by further strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally. The third approach is to reinforce collaboration with like-minded countries and others with whom Japan cooperate to uphold and reinforce a free and open international order.

1 Strengthening Japan's own architecture for national defense

It goes without saying that the success of Japan's national defense depends on its own efforts. Only when a country musters strong will and efforts to defend itself can it protect and support itself and its allies, etc., in times of emergency. The first approach therefore is to make renewed efforts to strengthen Japan's own architecture for national defense that integrates all aspects of national power. At the core of such efforts is the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

(1) Fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan's security. Japan has aimed to build a defense capability that can respond to and deter a range of possible situations in a truly effective manner. More specifically, in accordance with the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 18, 2018), Japan, in order to operate seamlessly across all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies, has striven to build the Multi-Domain Defense Force, which organically fuses capabilities in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum with those in ground, maritime and air domains and is capable of sustained and flexible activities through joint operations.

As the international community finds itself in the most challenging time since the end of WWII, Japan has explored the shape of future defense capability, considering the opponent's

capabilities as well as new ways of warfare, performing various analyses, including capability assessment, regarding responses to various possible situations. Building upon these efforts, to continue to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals from unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the current Multi-Domain Defense Force through further accelerated efforts.

The basic thoughts that underpin our efforts to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities are as follows:

- a. First, with a fundamentally reinforced defense capability, Japan should be able to take primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasion against Japan. This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost. In addition, if Japan possesses a defense capability to enable disrupting and defeating invasion, this capability, coupled with that of the United States, Japan's ally, will be able to deter not only an invasion against Japan, but also deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region. This will help foster a security environment where such forcible actions are not tolerated.
- b. Second, a fundamentally reinforced defense capability should be able to deter invasion against Japan through activities such as: persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). training and exercises conducted as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO). and measures against aircraft intruding into Japan's territorial airspace. Such a defense capability should also be able to swiftly respond to and address a range of situations in a seamless manner.

Such a defense capability must come with high readiness and response capability. We need to prepare training infrastructures both inside and outside Japan. we also need a flexible work environment so that SDF can, even in the face of ever-increasing volume of peacetime operations, conduct sufficient volume of training and exercises necessary for improving the ability of SDF personnel and the proficiency of SDF units.

- c. Third, a fundamentally reinforced defense capability should be able to adapt to new ways of warfare. It must operate with U.S. forces and integrate a variety of missions such as cross-domain operations, hybrid operations including information warfare, and missile interception and counterstrike. To that end, Japan first needs to identify functions and capabilities necessary for national defense, in accordance with the guidance in the National Security Strategy (NSS), NDS and DBP as well as joint operational concepts aligned with the guidance, and then determine how those capabilities should be distributed among the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces.
- d. As part of the functions and capabilities required for the defense of Japan described above, Japan needs capabilities with which to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion itself. Japan therefore will strengthen "stand-off defense capabilities" and "integrated air and missile defense capabilities."

Should deterrence fail and an invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface, and air. To this end, Japan will strengthen "unmanned defense capabilities," "cross-domain operation capabilities," and "command and control/

intelligence-related functions.”

Japan would also need to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush to the opponent’s will to invade. Japan will thus strengthen “mobile deployment capabilities, civil protection,” and “sustainability and resiliency.”

- e. Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities as when and how unilateral changes to the status quo occurs is hard to predict:

More specifically, by FY2027, five years after the formulation of the Strategy, Japan will strengthen its defense capability to the point where Japan is able to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against this nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats with the support of its ally and others. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will make further efforts to attain this defense objective and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point where Japan is able to disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and at places further afield.

The top priorities for the next five years are twofold: first, to maximize effective use of its current equipment, Japan will improve operational rates, secure sufficient munitions and fuel, and accelerate investments in defense facilities for improved resiliency; and second, Japan will strengthen its core capabilities for future operations.

This defense capability development will be constantly reviewed and adapted according to the ever-evolving security environment surrounding Japan.

- f. This fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities entails significant costs and a commensurate increase in personnel strength. In a way that serves to realize fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to a scrap-and-build approach, optimize SDF’s organization and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further the ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions, while giving due consideration to the defense production base. In addition, to account for population decrease and declining birthrates/aging population, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving and optimization.
- g. The purposes of the above-mentioned fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities are none other than to not allow unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to deter invasion against Japan.

Fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s own defense capabilities will further enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; collaboration with like-minded countries will be enhanced as well. By doing so, Japan will ensure that opponent fully recognize Japan’s intention and capability, do not underestimate Japan, and do not overestimate their own capabilities, thereby deterring invasion against Japan. This is the purpose of Japan’s fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

- h. A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities.

In recent years, in Japan’s surroundings, there have been dramatic advances in missile-related technologies, including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations, such as saturation attack. Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan

will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense capabilities by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories.

Looking ahead, however, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone.

For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities on which the Government expressed its view on February 29, 1956, which stated that, under the Constitution, “as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible.” These are also capabilities that the Government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision.

This Government view squarely applies to measures for self-defense taken under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, presented in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, and the capabilities that Japan has now decided to acquire can be used when the above-mentioned Three Conditions are met in compliance with this view.

Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan’s Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they will be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible.

While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes just as they do in defending against ballistic missiles and others.

(2) Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country

To defend Japan, SDF needs to be strong. Also self-evident is that national defense cannot be achieved without a whole-of-country approach. In addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture by integrating Japan’s national power--

diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological--as well as by systematically combining all policy means. To enhance the whole-of-government undertaking, it is essential to break down sectionalism within the Government. From this perspective, Japan will enhance the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan's national power. This undertaking is an indivisible part of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. The national government will also promote cooperation with local governments and private entities.

- a. Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan's enhanced defense architecture are important for our efforts to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force. By promoting robust diplomatic efforts through the promotion such as the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan will: proactively create a peaceful, stable, and predictable international environment. prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force. and ensure Japan's peace and security and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the international community.

Working together with these diplomatic efforts, the Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as "MOD/SDF") will promote cooperation with our ally and multilayered collaboration with like-minded countries and others to create a desirable security environment. Also, in order to continue to demonstrate the intention and capability to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and influence opponent's actions, it is necessary to improve and enhance training and exercises as FDO and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally and like-minded countries and others.

- b. To detect indications of contingencies at early stages, relevant government agencies need to conduct persistent ISR and analysis in collaboration from peacetime. Also important are swift government-level decision-making and inter-agency coordination tailored to the given situation. With respect to integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension, Japan will enhance fact-checking and counter-messaging to deal with disinformation, thereby enhancing the whole-of-government response from the current point in time as well as during contingency.
- c. It is important not to allow unilateral changes to the status quo by force through acting collaboratively between relevant agencies based on the whole-of-government decision-making. For this purpose, Japan will improve the effectiveness of its response by conducting simulations and joint training and exercises while establishing coordination procedures from peacetime across the whole government. In particular, to protect critical facilities such as nuclear power plants and respond to infringements that do not amount to armed attacks from outside Japan and armed attack situations in the vicinity of remote islands, SDF will conduct training and exercises assuming contingencies with the police and Japan Coast Guard from peacetime, and establish necessary collaboration procedures, including the procedure to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard in an armed attack situation.
- d. Since the domains of space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum are basic infrastructure in people's daily lives and are vitally important for carrying out cross-domain operations in defense of Japan, Japan will reinforce relevant capabilities across the whole government.

Regarding the space domain, securing its stable use for information gathering, communication, positioning, etc., is

vitally for ensuring the lives of our nationals and our defense, and MOD/SDF will reinforce cooperation and collaboration including research and development with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and private companies. In doing so, MOD/SDF will further apply civilian technologies into the defense field, facilitate investment in technology development in the private sector and improve space capabilities for Japan as a whole.

In the cyber domain, it is important to work together with international partners, relevant ministries and agencies, and private companies to gather and share information at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as to strengthen response capability in the cybersecurity field as a whole country. In line with the government's overall cybersecurity policy which will be comprehensively coordinated in a centralized manner, MOD/SDF will enhance its cybersecurity capability, while also promoting initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure providers, and defense industry.

With regard to the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, its range of application and use have expanded to cover the ground, maritime, air, space, and cyber domains, making it the frontlines of offense and defense in contemporary warfare. For this reason, ensuring superiority in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum is extremely important for reinforcing deterrence and conducting cross-domain operations. MOD/SDF will work closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to ensure SDF's stable and flexible use of radio waves both for civilian purposes and for SDF's command and control as well as intelligence gathering activities.

- e. In an era where victory or defeat is determined by the mastery of new ways of warfare underpinned by advanced technologies, it has become critical to leverage cutting-edge technologies for defense purposes.

Under the whole-of-government mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will leverage the cutting-edge technology research and development conducted by relevant government organizations for defense purposes based on the needs of MOD/SDF. In addition, MOD/SDF will implement initiatives to link the results of research and development conducted by start-ups and other companies and various research institutions into early production and deployment of defense equipment, utilizing the defense industry.

- f. National administrative agencies, local governments, public entities, and private enterprises must make joint efforts in a cooperative and collaborative manner, in order to respond to an invasion against Japan while protecting the lives of Japanese nationals and in order to respond to various contingencies including large-scale disasters.

First, based on defense needs, under the inter-agency mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, the Government will develop and upgrade airports, seaports and other facilities, particularly in the southwestern region. To enable SDF to use, for purposes including peacetime training, facilities such as existing airports and seaports as operation infrastructure, the Government will take necessary measures such as the establishment of a framework for interagency coordination.

Japan will also deepen collaboration with relevant organizations regarding the expansion of the use of civilian vessels and aircraft for SDF's maneuver and deployment, and

coordinate and cooperate to systematically implement civil protection measures employing such vessels and aircraft. In addition, MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as reinforcing whole-of-government civil protection training assuming an armed attack situation and other situations, as well as enhancing information transmission function of the national early warning system (J-ALERT) in preparation for an attack by ballistic missiles or other means.

Furthermore, Japan will establish an effective mechanism to balance defense requirements with socioeconomic activities such as the installation of wind power generation facilities so that the defense-related facilities can fully function through the smooth use of sea, airspace and radio waves.

In addition, concerning the transportation and storages of SDF's ammunition and fuel, Japan will reinforce collaboration with the relevant ministries and agencies while taking measures for further facilitation.

Japan will promote similar initiatives for smooth implementation of Japan-U.S. bilateral responses to various contingencies.

- g. For Japan, a maritime nation, reinforcing the maritime order and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight are extremely important for peace and security. To this end, Japan will work to secure the national interest in Japan's territorial waters and the stable use of its important sea lanes.

First, MOD/SDF will promote maritime security cooperation guided by the vision of FOIP, with our ally and like-minded countries as well as coastal states in the Indo-Pacific, while closely cooperating and collaborating with Japan Coast Guard, responsible for maritime security in Japan.

In order to secure the stable use of sea lanes, Japan will make necessary efforts to conduct counter-piracy operations and ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in cooperation and collaboration with relevant organizations. In this regard, Japan will make stable, long-term use of its operation activity in Djibouti.

- h. To enable SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, Japan will strive to gain understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents around their facilities. Japan will actively engage in public relations activities regarding the policies and activities of the MOD/SDF and also the role of U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of local communities, while fulfilling accountability. At the same time, Japan will continue to promote measures to improve the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those against noise from the perspective of promoting cooperation to the defense of Japan.

In some communities, SDF's emergency patient transport and the very existence of SDF units themselves are making a major contribution to the communities' maintenance and vitalization. In conducting unit reorganization, establishing as well as administering camps and bases, Japan will give due consideration to regional characteristics and SDF's contribution to local economy so as to gain understanding of local governments and residents.

2 Joint deterrence and response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The second approach is to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan's security policy, and fundamental reinforcement of Japan's

defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and will further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. By demonstrating such joint resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will prevent escalation of emergencies from gray-zone situations to conventional armed invasions and eventually the use of nuclear weapons, and deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will disrupt the invasion. To this end, both Japan and the United States constantly modernize the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by aligning strategies and prioritizing goals together. In doing so, building upon the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's own defense capabilities, Japan will play a larger role for the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region under the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Specifically, Japan will work on the following measures:

(1) Strengthening Japan and U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities

Japan's NDS and the United States' National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing cost on opponents and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their roles, missions and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner.

Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations including space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum and to improve interoperability. Regarding Japan's counterstrike capabilities, Japan will work with the United States to establish a cooperative posture including information gathering in order to effectively employ the capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce collaboration in such areas as air-defense, anti-surface warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine-warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT); protection of assets and facilities, and logistic support. In order to effectively realize the division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to improve allied response capabilities, including readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training.

In addition, in order to ensure that U.S. extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence including those at the ministerial level.

As joint measures from peacetime to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as well as to deter various contingencies from emerging, Japan will further expand and evolve operations including joint FDO and ISR. In order to effectively conduct these operations, Japan will actively make such efforts as promoting participation of like-minded countries and others and protecting assets, namely U.S. vessels and aircraft, by SDF.

Furthermore, as part of efforts to strengthen allied deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will on a regular basis increase joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, and promote mutual deployment of both units to their respective facilities for training or other purposes.

(2) Reinforcing alliance coordination functions

To conduct aligned joint response of Japan and the United States in any situation, Japan will further upgrade the overall coordination functions centered on the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM).

In addition, in order to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will promote closer operational coordination by leveraging the ACM and others.

(3) Reinforcing the foundation for allied response

Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases.

First, in order to further reinforce information sharing at all levels, Japan will fundamentally reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and the United States can fully employ their capabilities. Also, in order to ensure the Alliance's technological edge, interoperability, readiness, and persistent warfare capabilities, Japan will further reinforce defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, improvement in mutual interchangeability, shared use and reinforcement of various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capability of U.S. military equipment in Japan and reinforcement of supply-chain.

(4) Measures to support stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will promote various measures to provide stable support for the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, such as steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the initiatives to reinforce the readiness and resiliency of U.S. Forces in Japan, while optimizing the bilateral joint posture to respond to the severe security environment.

Particularly in Okinawa, which occupy a critically important location for Japan's security, Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the relocation of units and training, while dealing with the increasingly severe security environment.

In order to smoothly and effectively implement aforementioned Japan-U.S. undertakings, it is essential to gain understanding of Japanese nationals: Japan will enhance efforts such as active public messaging about their significance and importance.

3 Collaboration with like-minded countries and others

The third approach is to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others. In order to counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to ensure Japan's security, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only our ally but also as many countries as possible. From such perspective, Japan will promote efforts to contribute to realizing the vision of a FOIP.

First of all, Japan will, while placing the Japan-U.S. Alliance the key pillar of its security policy, proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country. In doing so, Japan will further promote institutional frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), and Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

With Australia, under the "Special Strategic Partnership" in

the Indo-Pacific region and the guidance of the renewed "Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation", Japan will build the closest cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and deepen consultations at all levels including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2"), bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation. In addition, in light of such developments as the RAA, Japan will pursue actions such as exercises and rotational deployment in Australia. Given the prospect of cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia, in the event of contingencies, Japan will mutually consult and collaborate with Australia, focusing on logistics support and information sharing. From the viewpoint of ensuring effective responses to contingencies, Japan will promote discussions on the scope, objectives and forms of operational cooperation on a regular basis.

With India, Japan has established the Special Strategic and Global Partnership. In order to reinforce strategic collaboration, while utilizing frameworks such as "2+2," Japan will further deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges including service-to-service exchanges in a broad range of fields including maritime security and cybersecurity, while promoting training and exercises as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.

With partners like the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, Japan will mutually reinforce involvement in global security issues as well as challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, Japan will build close cooperation with them by placing their Alliance with the United States built through such arrangements as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a cornerstone, and implement consultations such as "2+2," bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation including the joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, and mutual dispatch of vessels and aircraft. In doing so, Japan will reinforce cooperation through jointly monitoring illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea and the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

With NATO and the European Union (EU), based on the bilateral relations with above-mentioned European countries, Japan will reinforce collaboration with regard to international rule-makings and involvement to the security of the Indo-Pacific region.

With the Republic of Korea (ROK), considering the importance to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance in response to the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, Japan will reinforce the collaboration among Japan, the United States and the ROK through measures including trilateral training and exercises.

With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote measures including consultation at each level, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, and bilateral cooperation with third parties, in a bilaterally coordinated manner in order to further collaborate to tackle the challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan will reinforce collaboration with Nordic-Baltic states, which are facing unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and are working on cutting-edge initiatives such as information warfare, cybersecurity, strategic communication and hybrid warfare. Japan will also reinforce collaboration with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic and Poland, countries that show interest in strengthening their relationships with Japan.

With regards to Southeast Asian countries, Japan will support their efforts to reinforce centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through such means as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers' Informal Meeting. Furthermore, from the perspective of stabilizing the security of the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will implement consultations at all levels, including "2+2," strategic port calls and air visits, and bilateral/multilateral training and exercises depending on the situation of each country. In addition, with the aim of stabilizing the region, Japan will implement transfer of defense equipment and capacity building, which contribute to reinforcing defense capabilities of the region.

With Mongolia, in light of its strategic importance as a democratic country geographically located between China and Russia, Japan will promote defense equipment and technology collaboration to elevate cooperation in the political and security fields to a new dimension, in addition to implementing defense exchange at all levels, capacity building and multilateral exercises.

With Central Asian countries, with which Japan has only had a few achievements in defense exchanges despite the fact that these countries are located in a geopolitically important region between Asia and Europe, Japan will accumulate defense exchanges including capacity building in areas of mutual interest.

With Pacific Island countries, Japan, as an important partner, will engage in cooperation including capacity building through collaboration with countries including its ally and like-minded countries. In doing so, Japan will also consider cooperation with organizations other than military forces such as coast guard.

With Coastal States of the Indian Ocean and Middle Eastern countries, Japan will promote defense cooperation, based on the importance of stable use of sea lane and an energy and economic perspective. At the same time, Japan will also develop defense cooperation with countries including African countries in terms of responding to global challenges. In particular, Japan will strengthen cooperation with Djibouti and secure the long-term and stable use of the SDF operation facility there in order to reinforce our operational base in the region, for activities including counter-piracy and rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

While promoting collaboration with like-minded countries and others, Japan will pay attention to communication with China and Russia.

With China, in order to build a "constructive and stable relationship," Japan will promote multilayered dialogues and exchanges including Japan-China security dialogue. In doing so, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international code of conduct, and improve transparency regarding its strengthening of military capabilities buildup and its defense policies, while also conveying the concerns Japan has in a candid manner. Japan will also make use of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China including the hotline, in order to avoid unexpected contingencies between the two countries.

With regard to Russia, based on the stance that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are unacceptable, Japan condemns the aggression against Ukraine to the maximum extent possible, and will closely cooperate with the international community including G7 in taking appropriate measures. At the same time, Japan will maintain necessary communication with Russia, which is our neighboring country, in order not to incur unexpected contingencies and unnecessary friction.

IV Key Capabilities for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

The following are the basic concepts and contents of the seven functions and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan, which are derived from the comprehensive operation concept in line with the basic policies set forth in the Strategies.

1 Stand-off defense capabilities

In order to protect Japan's territory, which stretches approximately 3,000 km along the both north-south and east-west axes: Japan will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defense capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations outside of threat zones.

First of all, Japan will possess necessary and sufficient capabilities in a multilayered manner across the country to be able to disrupt and defeat these vessels and landing forces invading Japan in multilayered manner and from various locations in Japan. Also, Japan will reinforce capabilities that can be launched from various platforms with such diverse capabilities as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic glides which are difficult to intercept.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce capability to enable operation of stand-off missiles including surface-launched and ship-launched models. In doing so, to secure sufficient capability in prior to the establishment of increased production of domestic stand-off missile, Japan will promptly procure stand-off missiles manufactured overseas.

In the future, by approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its capability to enable operation of aircraft-launched stand-off missiles and will acquire capability to operate hyper velocity gliding missiles with irregular trajectories, hypersonic guided missiles, and other stand-off missiles.

In addition, Japan will have the capability to persistently gather accurate target information regarding vessels and landing forces, which is essential for stand-off defense capabilities, and possess command and control-related capabilities to transmit the information in real time. Japan will also possess information analysis capabilities including the evaluation of results after a response, as well as the resiliency and redundancy of information networks.

2 Integrated air and missile defense capabilities

As a country surrounded by sea, it is extremely important for Japan to respond to airborne threats. In recent years, along with the improvement of the capabilities of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft, the emergence of anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has diversified, complicated, and advanced airborne threats.

To this end, Japan will fundamentally reinforce detecting, tracking and intercepting capabilities, and establish a system to enable unified and optimized operation of various sensors and shooters through networks to reinforce integrated air and missile defense capabilities.

As a response to the missile attacks from an opponent's country to Japan, Japan will first intercept missiles flying to Japan over the high seas and Japan's territorial airspace with its missile defense system. Subsequently, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent missile attacks including ballistic missiles, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities to enable itself to conduct effective counterstrike in the opponent's territory. By having capability to conduct effective counterstrike and facilitate interception by missile defense, Japan will restrict opponent's missile launches and thereby deter missile attacks from happening.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce the capabilities of warning and control radar and surface-to-air missile and procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels. Japan will also reinforce the capability to respond to small UAVs with weapons including directed-energy weapons.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its integrated air and missile defense capabilities by further introducing research on capability to respond to hypersonic weapons in the gliding phase and interception by non-kinetic means to deal with assets such as small UAVs.

3 Unmanned defense capabilities

Unmanned assets are often relatively affordable compared to manned equipment and have the great advantage of being able to minimize human loss and operate continuously for a long period of time. Furthermore, by combining these unmanned assets with AI and manned equipment, it can be a game-changer that fundamentally transform force structure and way of warfare, enabling Japan to gain asymmetrical advantages in the air, sea, and underwater domains. For this reason, these unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support. Japan will also promote initiatives to optimize the equipment system and organization of SDF by automation and labor-saving through the mission replacement of manned assets.

To this end, SDF will acquire practical capabilities in a wide range of missions by introducing unmanned assets through early production and deployment or leasing by FY2027. In particular, Japan will promote the early production and deployment of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) to acquire and maintain underwater superiority.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further materialize the style of warfare using unmanned assets, accelerate the development and introduction of equipment based on the geographical characteristics of Japan, and expand full-scale operation. Furthermore, SDF will reinforce the ability to simultaneously control multiple unmanned assets using system such as AI.

4 Cross-domain operation capabilities

It has become increasingly important for Japan to overcome inferiority in individual domains by conducting cross-domain operations which organically fuse capabilities in all domains including space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea, and airspace to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, and thereby ensuring Japan's national defense.

- (1) In the space domain, MOD/SDF will reinforce its operational capabilities in the land, sea, and air domains by proactively integrating novel form of space use including satellite constellation, and by receiving information gathering, communication, and positioning etc. from space. Also, in order to respond to threats to the stable use of space, MOD/SDF will develop ground and space-based surveillance capabilities, build-up a Space Domain Awareness (SDA) structure, and bolster the resiliency of our space assets to enable the continuation of missions in response to various situations.

By FY2027, MOD/SDF will utilize space to develop essential infrastructure for unit operations and enhance our SDA capability.

By approximately ten years from now, MOD/SDF will further enhance our space operation capabilities by

increasing multi-layering and redundancy in space use and also by acquiring new space capabilities.

- (2) In the cyber domain, MOD/SDF will cooperate with whole-of-government initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, including active cyber defense. MOD/SDF will realize advanced cybersecurity posture by shifting to a posture that is able to conduct continuous risk management primarily on critical information systems, by significantly increasing the number of cyber personnel particularly by utilizing external human resources who have advanced cyber skills. MOD/SDF will protect itself from every cyber threat with these advanced cybersecurity capabilities and will utilize these capabilities to the initiatives to reinforce cybersecurity as a whole country.

To this end, by FY2027, MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems even under cyberattacks and to support cyber defense of the defense industry.

By approximately ten years from now, MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities, force projection capabilities and operational bases to perform its missions even under cyberattacks, while reinforcing its posture to support cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF.

- (3) In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, MOD/SDF will effectively function its electronic warfare capabilities and its support capabilities while impairing opponent's capabilities of accomplishing missions even under a severe electromagnetic spectrum environment including communication jamming by the opponent. Also, MOD/SDF will reinforce electromagnetic spectrum management function for the entire SDF to utilize electromagnetic spectrum more effectively.
- (4) MOD/SDF will expand capabilities necessary to disrupt or neutralize the opponent's use of space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains.
- (5) Regarding ground, maritime, and air defense capabilities, which form the basis of cross-domain operations, Japan will fundamentally reinforce these capabilities by steadily introducing naval ships and fighter aircraft to maintain and enhance maritime and air superiority; and, introducing new surface combatants and developing next generation fighter aircraft, while leveraging advanced technologies and bearing in mind collaboration with unmanned assets.

5 Command and control / Intelligence-related functions

The character of warfare will continue to increase in speed and complexity. In order to win in future battles, Japan needs to ensure superiority in decision-making, whereby commanders at various levels can make decisions more promptly and more accurately than their opposites. For this purpose, Japan will enhance command and control and intelligence-related functions from a cross-domain perspective including prompt and assured materialization of ISRT by building networks that are enhanced by AI and come with real-time responsiveness, resiliency, and flexibility.

By FY2027, Japan will develop intelligence capabilities capable of responding to hybrid warfare and integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension. Japan will also develop near-real-time information gathering capabilities by utilizing assets such as satellite constellations, etc.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities by

utilizing various means including AI to the greatest extent. Japan will also establish a system to share information in real time through further reinforcement of information gathering assets.

In addition, the necessity to continuously and accurately grasp the intentions and capabilities of Japan's neighboring countries is more crucial than ever. To this end, Japan will reinforce the capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) based on functions such as signal, imagery, human, and open-source intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, and OSINT), and fundamentally reinforce comprehensive analysis capabilities including the utilization of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to effectively collect, arrange, analyze, share and protect information, from operational intelligence to strategic intelligence. At the same time, Japan will promote cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic intelligence-related organizations and take necessary measures to more effectively utilize the intelligence collected through information gathering satellites for SDF's activities.

Moreover, in order to effectively respond to integrated information warfare, including the spread of disinformation, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the organization and functions of MOD/SDF, and conduct information sharing and bilateral/multilateral exercises with its ally and like-minded countries.

6 Mobile deployment capabilities / Civil protection

In response to an invasion of Japan including its remote islands, Japan needs to ensure that deployed units are always operational, and that necessary units are swiftly maneuvered and deployed according to situations to secure maritime and air superiority and disrupt the access/landing of units invading Japan. For this purpose, Japan will make maximum use of civilian transportations including Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), while reinforcing maritime and air transport capabilities of SDF.

In addition, in order to enable smooth and effective transportation and replenishment of units through these initiatives, Japan will reinforce the logistic posture through integrations, expansion of airport and seaport facilities usage capacity in the southwestern region, where remote islands are particularly concentrated, and conduct improvement of logistics capabilities, while proactively promoting the modernization of logistics bases located throughout the country.

SDF will not only defeat the infringements upon remote islands but also carry out civil protection missions by utilizing its reinforced mobile deployment capabilities for evacuating residents.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce its transportation capabilities by measures such as expanding the use of PFI vessels, thereby acquiring the ability to quickly build up defense posture in the southwestern region and working to expedite the evacuation of residents.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further reinforced its transport capabilities and accelerated transport and replenishment through the improvement of supply bases.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

- (1) In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of SDF is not necessarily sufficient in the form of ammunitions and fuel, and the number of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure and maintain sufficient war sustainability so that SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. Therefore, Japan will improve ammunition production capacity, secure ammunition storage commensurate with

the amount of ammunition produced, promptly acquire necessary and sufficient ammunition, promptly ensure necessary and sufficient amount of fuel required, and establish a system to enable operation of all equipment except those under planned maintenance.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will resolve the situation of ammunition shortage. Also, Japan will reinforce its production posture for high-priority ammunition and install more ammunition storage facilities. Furthermore, Japan will resolve parts shortages and ensure that all equipment except those under planned maintenance are operationally available.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will maintain appropriate inventory of ammunition and parts and complete the installation of further ammunition storage facilities. Regarding defense equipment, Japan will maintain appropriate stock of parts including those for new equipment.

- (2) Furthermore, in order to ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and preventing an easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency, Japan will promote measures such as making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures, relocate and consolidate facilities ensuring stand-off distance, and steady construct barracks and housing and maintain aging buildings. Moreover, Japan will conceal and deceive equipment to improve resiliency.

In addition, the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy shifts, will inevitably further impact future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, defense equipment and security environment surrounding Japan, which demand Japan to deal with a variety of issues related to these matters.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will promote measures to construct underground command headquarters, and relocating and consolidating facilities in major bases and camps to improve resiliency of respective facilities. In addition, Japan will promote reinforcement of facilities and infrastructure against disasters such as tsunamis, starting from bases and camps that are anticipated to be damaged significantly and are important for operations.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further improved resiliency of defense facilities.

- (3) In order to save the lives of SDF personnel and mitigate risks to their person, and thereby enabling them to respond to an invasion of Japan for a longer period of time and with greater strength, Japan will reinforce emergency relief capabilities and transform medical functions by developing a seamless medical care and transportation system from the frontlines to the final rear destination, increasing the chances of survival for each personnel.

V The Future of Self-Defense Forces

1 Role of SDF in the seven key fields

In the seven fields of key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Force (GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF) will fulfill the following roles.

Regarding stand-off defense capabilities, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will build required and sufficient number of launching stand-off missiles from vehicle, ship and aircraft capable of diverse responses from outside of the threat envelope and against vessels and landing forces invading Japan.

Regarding integrated air and missile defense capabilities, as a basic role, MSDF destroyers will assume interception in the upper layer and GSDF and ASDF will assume interception by surface-to-air missiles in the lower layer, and Japan will reinforce capabilities to respond to future airborne threats such as hypersonic weapons. Also, each SDF service will utilize capabilities such as stand-off defense capabilities etc. as counterstrike capabilities.

Regarding unmanned defense capabilities, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will significantly reinforce their defense capabilities in unmanned aerial, maritime, underwater and ground assets in accordance with their respective division of roles, concurrent to their review of existing units.

Regarding cross-domain operations, in the space domain, ASDF will reinforce various functions including space situational awareness. In the cyber domain, MOD/SDF as a whole will reinforce its capabilities to contribute to the reinforcement of cybersecurity of the entire country; and in particular, GSDF will play a core role to expand foundations such as for human resource development. In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will acquire and reinforce defense equipment for the electronic warfare and also promote introduction of equipment for deception utilizing electromagnetic spectrum. Also, in light of the rapid buildup of conventional forces of neighboring countries, Japan will continue to enhance the quality and quantity of ground, maritime and air defense equipment for conducting cross-domain operations in cooperation with the capabilities in the above-mentioned domains.

Regarding command and control and intelligence-related functions, Japan will reinforce the information gathering capabilities of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, accelerate decision-making based on gathered information, and develop a network that enables definite command and control. Also, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the intelligence functions of the DIH, including the ISRT required for the operation of stand-off missiles, and reinforce collaboration with the command and control function.

Regarding mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection, Japan will reinforce SDF's mobile deployment capabilities by securing medium-sized and small vessels by GSDF, transport vessels by MSDF, and transport aircraft by ASDF to rapidly deploy units to remote islands, when an invasion against Japan is predicted. Additionally, GSDF will reinforce its architecture including unit reinforcement for the protection of civilians in Okinawa.

Regarding sustainability and resiliency, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will secure the necessary amount of ammunitions, fuel and mobile equipment on a daily basis, to allow for SDF's continuous operation, and improve the resiliency of defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for exercising capabilities.

2 Concept of developing SDF architecture

Based on the roles in seven fields as mentioned above, development of joint operational architecture as well as development of architectures of GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and DIH will be conducted in following basic concepts.

In order to reinforce effectiveness of joint operational posture, Japan will establish a permanent Joint Headquarters which can unify command of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF by reviewing the existing organization. Furthermore, Japan will promote defense equipment system benefitting joint operation.

GSDF will develop a system that places importance on reinforcing cross-domain operation capabilities and disrupting invading forces from a distance by reinforcing surface-launched stand-off defense capability, which has many advantages,

maintaining sustainability and resiliency, reinforcing rapid maneuver and disperse deployment capabilities to islands located in Southwestern areas, introducing unmanned assets, improving integrated air and missile defense capabilities including response to drones, and command and control and intelligence-related functions, including systems necessary for disperse deployed units.

In light of increasing missile threats in recent years, MSDF will develop a system to reinforce air-defense capability, promote labor-saving and automation measures, reinforce integrated information warfare capability, ensure superiority underwater, reinforce stand-off defense capabilities and surface rear support capability, and enable persistent unit operation that require high level of speed and activity. In particular, MSDF will develop a system which will allow acquiring and sustaining superiority in underwater which is an important factor in cross-domain operations.

In order to persistently execute tasks through resilient and flexible operations under a high-threat environment, ASDF will develop a system which can reinforce quality and quantity of air defense capability, maintain effective stand-off defense capabilities, ensure effective missile and air-defense posture, and introduce various unmanned assets. Also, ASDF will be renewed as the Air and Space Self-Defense Force, reinforcing its space operation capability and developing a system to ensure superiority in use of space.

In addition to collecting and analyzing SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT, etc., DIH will assume the central role of responding to integrated information warfare concerning the defense of Japan and fundamentally reinforce the capability to grasp military activities of other countries in a persistent, continuous and accurate manner and analyzing and disseminating them. Furthermore, in line with the reinforcement of cross-domain operation capabilities and stand-off defense capabilities, DIH will reinforce existing capabilities and ensure seamless cooperation and collaboration with other relevant organizations.

MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its architecture to contribute to the cybersecurity of Japan as a whole country, in line with the Government's initiatives in the field of cybersecurity including active cyber defense.

3 Reinforcing policy-making function

For SDF to fully exert its capabilities and respond to the increasingly severe, complex, and rapid-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required, including in domains such as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum, and MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain policy advice from experts. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance future ways of warfare for SDF and utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies and apply those technologies to defense equipment necessary for future SDF operations from a strategic perspective, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly defense industry as their core. Furthermore, in order to promote such efforts and support the formulation of policies, Japan will review and reinforce the research system of MOD/SDF led by the National Institute for Defense Studies and reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.

VI Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation

1 Measures for protection of life, person and property of Japanese nationals

Situations that Japan must be prepared for are not limited to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and an invasion of Japan. Large-scale terrorist attacks and related attacks on critical infrastructures including nuclear power plants, large-scale disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, and infectious disease crisis caused by COVID-19 are serious threats to the life, person and property of Japanese nationals, and Japan must respond to them with its utmost efforts.

As such, MOD/SDF, in close cooperation with relevant organization such as the police, Japan Coast Guard, firefighting services, and local governments, will respond to large-scale terrorist attacks and attacks against critical infrastructures by utilizing fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities, and in the event of a large-scale disaster, will protect lives, conduct emergency recovery, and provide livelihood support. Furthermore, in the event of natural disasters or civil disturbances overseas, MOD/SDF will work closely with the diplomatic authorities to promptly and accurately rescue and transport Japanese nationals.

In order to utilize defense capabilities and smoothly implement such response, it is essential to establish a collaborative framework with relevant organizations from peacetime. Japan will conduct comprehensive training with relevant local governments and infrastructure business enterprises in order to ensure the effectiveness of response plans. Japan will also leverage such coordination to facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents, when an invasion of Japan is predicted.

2 Measures for international security cooperation

Peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community must be ensured for the peace and security of Japan. For this reason, it is necessary for MOD/SDF to utilize fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities, and, from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace bound to international cooperation, Japan must make proactive efforts towards resolving conflicts and confrontations around the world and responding to global challenges such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of large-scale international disasters caused by climate change, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and others.

Regarding International Peace Cooperation Activities including International Peacekeeping Cooperation Assignments such as UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and International Disaster Relief Activities, in line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will conduct activities with a focus on the areas where Japan has advantages such as engineering and medicine, while collecting detailed information using intelligence-related functions even in remote areas, and swiftly transferring the necessary units using mobile deployment capabilities as necessary. Furthermore, Japan will continue to dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters, taking advantage of the characteristics of Japan's SDF personnel with high levels of expertise. In addition, Japan will make the best use of accumulated experience and will provide capacity building.

From the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will also promote initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in cooperation with relevant countries and international

organizations. In doing so, Japan will utilize the knowledge of MOD/SDF to improve the effectiveness of international organizations and multilateral export control regimes.

VII Defense Production and Technology Bases as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability

Defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundation for a country to secure the research, development, production and procurement of defense equipment in a stable manner on its own and to incorporate the cutting-edge technology necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment; it is virtually defense capability itself, and its reinforcement is essential. Therefore, Japan will promote initiatives such as building a strong and sustainable defense industry necessary for a new way of warfighting, dealing with various risks, and expanding sales channels. Regarding whole-of-government initiatives such as protecting the supply-chain for general-purpose products, and managing the security of sensitive technologies and information security for civilian cutting-edge fields, MOD will implement measures necessary for defense purposes and will also collaborate with the initiatives of relevant ministries and agencies.

1 Reinforcing defense production base

Japan's defense industry is important, considered as a partner responsible for national defense along with MOD/SDF in terms of securing equipment for SDF to carry out its missions, and it is necessary to maintain and reinforce the capability to produce high performance equipment and secure high operational rates. To this end, in the defense industry, Japan will secure not only advanced technological capabilities and quality control capabilities through reinforcing the defense technology base, but also the production, sustenance, maintenance, repair, and capacity improvement of defense equipment.

In order to ensure that the defense industry can play this significant role, Japan will reinforce the bases including the entire supply chain. In doing so, Japan aims to make business attractive by introducing a new profit margin calculation method to appropriately evaluate the cost management and quality control of the defense industry to secure appropriate profits, while promoting measures to maintain and reinforce existing supply chains and promote the entry of new suppliers.

Additionally, Japan will place more emphasis on the viewpoint of maintaining and strengthening the domestic base in acquiring defense equipment, and strive for technological, qualitative, and production-time improvements while ensuring predictability for companies, and if there are no other means available even after taking these measures, Japan will consider the owning manufacturing facilities and others itself.

Furthermore, Japan will deal with supply chain risks in the defense industry, while reinforcing industrial security including cybersecurity based on international standards, as well as strengthening the security of sensitive technologies. From these perspectives, Japan will work with the defense authorities of the ally, like-minded countries and others to engage in initiatives such as supply chain protection and sensitive technology security relating to the defense industry.

2 Reinforcing technology bases

In order to acquire defense equipment required for the new way of warfare, the use of our domestic technologies is extremely important. Therefore, MOD/SDF scrutinizes proposals made by the defense-related companies to see technological potential for the new way of warfare. MOD/SDF will proactively promote

initiatives to accelerate efforts to achieve operational capability of future defense equipment technologies solely used for defense equipment, their in-house research results, as well as dual-use technologies from non-defense industries. For projects which are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective, MOD/SDF will further accelerate R&D, and operationalize R&D results, by being willing to take risks under the assumption of expected outcomes.

In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce initiatives to deploy necessary equipment by improving specifications while operating prototype units.

Furthermore, from the defense technology base perspective, Japan will promote cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others by leading international joint development as means to acquire equipment which will benefit the defense of Japan.

Moreover, MOD/SDF will establish a framework for actively exploiting cutting-edge civilian technologies developed by start-up companies, domestic research institutions, and academia, and will utilize a whole-of-government mechanism for comprehensively strengthening defense architecture.

Through the scrap-and-build of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA's) research and development-related organization, Japan will establish a new research institution in MOD to find multi-use cutting-edge technologies that contribute to defense equipment development, and to produce equipment that leads to defense innovation. Japan will also expand and enhance systems to comprehensively consider and promote the utilization of cutting-edge technology in terms of policy, operation and technology. In order to increase predictability under this system, Japan will, based on new ways of warfare, strategically publicize information on the technology fields that Japan will focus on and its outlook for research and development.

3 Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of the related procedures for transfer of defense equipment and technology will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves. In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by establishing a fund, and implementing measures including providing corporate assistance as necessary to smoothly promote such transfers.

VIII Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

1 Reinforcing human resource base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. In order to realize fundamental reinforcement of defense capability, MOD/SDF will secure necessary SDF personnel without increasing capacity. MOD/SDF must create an environment that

enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride, in light of the fact that SDF personnel are required to have more knowledge, skills and experience than before and are required to be well-grounded so as to not to be deceived by disinformation, etc. MOD/SDF will continue to work on improving living and work environments, improving treatment, promoting measures concerning honors and privileges, expanding support for families including collaboration with the families of SDF personnel and related organizations, fostering an environment in which female SDF personnel can play a more active role through flexible personnel management, promoting work-life balance, and enhancing re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a younger age, etc. In particular, it is necessary to give a certain level of consideration to SDF personnel who work in demanding environments in which high readiness and long-term missions are required and are socially isolated. In addition, each SDF personnel must recognize anew that harassment shakes the foundation of SDF, a human organization, and develops an organizational environment of zero tolerance for any harassment. These initiatives are important not only for preventing the decline of warfighting capabilities due to mid-career retirement but also for securing qualified human resources.

Regarding recruitment, MOD/SDF will further reinforce SDF recruitment capabilities to secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources. At the same time, MOD/SDF will further raise the retirement age and expand the re-enrollment of retired uniformed SDF personnel to effectively utilize experienced skills, while considering the maintenance of military strength. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will promote flexible human resource utilization and secure human resources from a wide range of areas, including personnel in the private sector with specialized knowledge and skills such as in the cyber domain. In particular, MOD/SDF will implement comprehensive measures that contribute to securing human resources, such as crew members with low sufficiency rates in naval vessels and radar site surveillance personnel. Regarding SDF Reserve Personnel and others, which supplement active SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will review its system and reinforce its architecture to drastically increase recruitment including in the cyber domain. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce cooperation with retired SDF personnel and others.

With regard to the development of the human resources that SDF has recruited, MOD/SDF will reskill SDF personnel and reinforce the educational infrastructure such as the National Defense Academy and respective SDF educational institutions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will focus on the cyber domain and other fields requiring high expertise as well as reinforcing education and research on joint operations in particular, and implement measures to effectively utilize personnel with scarce and valuable expertise. Furthermore, MOD civilian officials and others play an important role not only in supporting the activities of SDF as an element of defense capability but also in fundamentally reinforcing defense capability, designing policies associated with the fundamental reinforcement, and providing operational support to units. Therefore, MOD/SDF will work to reinforce the human resource base by securing the civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, and others necessary for this purpose and by further considering necessary systems.

In this way, MOD/SDF will implement bold measures focusing on the entire life cycle of SDF personnel, while considering the creation of an organizational environment that enables SDF personnel to demonstrate their abilities even when they are in the middle of various life events including childbirth, childcare, and nursing care.

2 Transformation of medical function

Regarding SDF medical force, MOD/SDF has been placing importance on sustaining health of SDF personnel, but from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, MOD/SDF will transform SDF medical force into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel who carry out their missions in a contingency in spite of danger.

For the purpose, MOD/SDF will develop a joint operations capability by unifying medical roles and functions common to all SDF services so that SDF can respond to various situations and undertake diverse missions both in Japan and abroad and build a posture to mobilize the full strength of SDF's medical force including the National Defense Medical College, and promote fundamental reforms to improve the combat trauma care capabilities.

In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation from the frontlines to the destination hospital, while clarifying the role of each medical establishment from the frontlines of southwestern region to the hospitals in Honshu and other islands, and standardize medical equipment and materials for transportation, and develop a system to share medical information necessary for medical care and transportation across the country including in the frontlines. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce SDF units' first aid capabilities, secure medical equipment and materials including blood and oxygen that are essential for combat trauma care, and develop a medical base in the southwestern region.

Furthermore, MOD/SDF will reinforce education and research on combat trauma care in the National Defense Medical College and improve management necessary to further enhance the

clinical experience of medical and nursing officers. In addition, MOD/SDF will complement the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers through active external training. Based on this, MOD/SDF will enhance the common knowledge and skills of respective components of SDF through integrated education and training on combat trauma care.

IX Points of Attention

1. This Strategy, under the National Security Strategy, will be implemented in alignment with strategies in other fields. The National Security Council regularly and systematically will evaluate whether the approach and means to achieve defense objectives are taken appropriately, especially whether the strengthening of the defense architecture of the whole country is surely implemented. In addition, Japan will constantly evaluate the capabilities necessary for building defense capabilities that can effectively deal with changes in the security environment, particularly focusing on opponent's capabilities, based on joint operational concepts.
2. The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities based on the strategy must be maintained and reinforced in the future. To this end, Japan will continuously consider how to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities from a mid-to long-term perspective.
3. The strategy will be executed approximately over the coming decade; should Japan expect any significant changes including in international situation and trends in technological level, it will make necessary revisions.

(December 16, 2022)

I. Program Guidelines

In accordance with the “National Defense Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December, 16, 2022), Japan will fundamentally reinforce its “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” through the synergy of organically integrated capabilities including space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies, focusing on the capabilities of our opponents and new ways of warfare. By FY 2027 or by five years from now, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining support of its ally and others. Furthermore, in approximately 10 years from now, Japan will make further efforts to better attain this defense objective and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point at which it will be possible to disrupt and defeat invasions against its nation much earlier and at a further distance. Given the guiding thoughts above, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “MOD/SDF”) will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capabilities based on the following program guidelines.

- 1 The functions and capabilities required for the defense of Japan are, firstly, Japan needs capabilities with which to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby defending invasion itself. Japan therefore will reinforce “stand-off defense capabilities” and “integrated air and missile defense capabilities”.

Secondly, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface, and air. To this end, Japan will reinforce “unmanned defense capabilities,” “cross-domain operation capabilities,” and “command and control/intelligence related functions”.

Lastly, Japan would also need to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner so as to force the opponent to give up invasion. For this, Japan will reinforce “mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection” and “sustainability and resiliency.”

Additionally, Japan will also place emphasis on the defense production and technology base, characterized as virtually integral part of a defense capability, as well as areas such as the human resource base that supports our defense capability.

- 2 In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, along with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, MOD/SDF will efficiently secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capability. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. In addition, MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment which is particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective of the areas that could directly affect the SDF’s current and future ways of warfare by incorporating

advanced civilian technologies.

- 3 In the face of Japan’s aging population with a declining birth rate, and with no prospect of an increase in the number of recruits, MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as strengthening recruitment efforts, utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel and others, promoting women’s participation, raising the retirement age for uniformed SDF personnel, utilizing diverse and distinguished personnel including retired uniformed SDF personnel, improving living and working environment, developing the human resources, improving treatments, and supporting reemployment, etc.
- 4 To further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated manner, Japan will promote cooperation, etc. related to cross-domain operations, including space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. In addition, in order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective joint response capabilities in all phases, Japan will reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity, as well as equipment and technology cooperation to promote information sharing between Japan and the United States. In addition, measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan will be steadily implemented.

In line with the vision of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security operations, Japan will further promote establishing policy frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), General Security of (Military) Information Agreement (GSOMIA/GSOIA), and transfer of defense equipment and technology agreement, while also promoting defense cooperation and exchanges including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building, and interchanges among military branches.

- 5 In fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to scrap-and-build approach, optimize SDF’s organization and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further our ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions. In addition, to account for Japan’s aging population with a declining birth rate, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving and optimization.

II Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities

In order for Japan to buildup defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining support of its ally and others by FY 2027. Japan will place emphasis on implementing the following major programs listed from 1 to 7 in fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities.

1 Stand-Off Defense Capabilities

In order to reinforce capabilities to conduct diverse responses from outside of the threat envelope and against vessels and landing forces invading Japan, MOD/SDF will continue development and production of the prototype of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile (develop surface-, ship-, and air-to-ship models), upgraded Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile and hypersonic missiles. MOD/SDF will extend the ranges of its various missiles, such as by upgrading Hyper Velocity Gliding

Projectile and hypersonic missiles. In order to fundamentally reinforce defense capability as soon as possible, MOD/SDF will procure mass-produced rounds for the above-mentioned standoff missiles, and will also continue to steadily procure foreign-made stand-off missiles, such as U.S.-made Tomahawks.

In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed research and development for further diversifying launch platforms, and will develop and procure vertical missile launch system (VLS) that can be equipped on submarines and a system that can be equipped on transport aircraft, aiming to improve the operational capability of standoff missiles.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of stand-off defense capabilities, MOD/SDF will enhance functions of information collection and analysis as well as command and control by acquiring imagery intelligence, etc. using satellite constellations and introducing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and target observation rounds, from the perspective of effective collection of target information. Since the operation of these stand-off missiles requires a series of command and control including the collection of target information and the assignment of targets to each unit to be conducted in a unified manner, a posture based on joint operation will be established. In addition, a series of functions necessary for the development and operation of stand-off missiles will be established by building additional ammunition storage facilities for storing stand-off missiles and other equipment, as well as facilities necessary for testing and maintenance, including securing facilities that can be used for live-firing.

2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

In order to enhance capabilities to detect and track threats such as Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV), MOD/SDF will procure and upgrade ground-based warning and control radars (FPS) etc., as well as procure a future warning and control radar. In addition, MOD/SDF will improve its capability to respond to HGVs and other such weapons with interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3 MSE) by upgrading the surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system and introducing a new radar (LTAMDS).

In order to respond more effectively to various situations, MOD/SDF will begin reviewing the organization and deployment of fire units and establish a multi-layered air defense system in key areas together with mid-range ground-to-air guided missile units, and conduct unit operations for deployment from peacetime. MOD/SDF will also promote the upgrade of base air defense surface-to-air missile (SAM). In addition, research and studies will be conducted on a guided missile system which is capable of responding to HGVs and other such weapons at the glide phase.

In order to enhance the capability to respond to HGVs and other such weapons, MOD/SDF will upgrade the Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air guided missile (modified), and also procure missiles such as interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM-3 Block IIA), interceptors with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3MSE), and long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6).

To achieve effective and efficient response through networking, MOD/SDF will acquire a network system that enables fire control network between destroyers and other vessels (FC network) and will possess Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). In addition, by modifying the information coordination central (ICC) of the surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system, various guided missile systems will be networked together.

To strengthen Japan's air defense capabilities, MOD/SDF will procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels that will primarily conduct BMD operations.

MOD/SDF will expeditiously develop capabilities to deal

with small unmanned aircraft, etc., by non-kinetic means through a combination of directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves (HPM).

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF's capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory.

Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three Conditions for Use of Force. Operation of this counterstrike capability will be conducted under unified command and control based on joint operations.

3 Unmanned Defense Capabilities

In order to accomplish missions while minimizing human loss, SDF will expeditiously procure various types of unmanned assets, promoting initiatives to optimize the existing equipment system and personnel deployment. In procuring these assets, MOD/SDF will aim to secure both safety and capability to effectively carry out our mission.

To conduct seamless intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT), SDF will procure long-endurance UAVs and ship-borne unmanned assets that contribute to maritime surveillance, reconnaissance UAVs that can continuously collect target information in the threat envelope of an opponent, as well as a variety of unmanned assets for ISRT. In addition, to implement rapid transport of supplies to widely dispersed deployed units, remote bases, and naval vessels, MOD/SDF will consider introducing transportation UAVs and take necessary measures.

To disrupt and defeat an invasion against Japan, MOD/SDF will procure utility/attack UAVs and miniature attack UAVs that effectively retains various attack functions to enable itself to search and identify personnel, vehicles, naval vessels from the air and quickly respond to targets.

MOD/SDF will develop and procure unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) that can be linked to naval vessels and effectively conduct various operational maneuvers. Various types of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will also be developed to gain underwater superiority.

In addition, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and UAVs will be effectively combined to improve the efficiency of security and protection systems at garrisons, bases, and critical facilities. MOD/SDF will also enhance collaboration between manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as strengthen its ability to operate multiple unmanned assets simultaneously.

4 Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities

(1) Capabilities in the Space Domain

In order to improve cross-domain capabilities, including the operation of stand-off missiles, various capabilities such as information gathering and communications utilizing the space domain will be further improved. Specifically, MOD/SDF will establish satellite constellation to improve the detection and tracking of target, with enhancing Japan-U.S. cooperation and using images from commercial satellites as supplementary endeavors. In addition, MOD/SDF will conduct required technological demonstrations to improve capabilities such as detection and tracking of HGVs using satellites, considering the possibility of cooperation with the U.S. Furthermore, in order to cope with the increasing demand for satellite communications, MOD/SDF will make efforts to establish multiple layers of communication band with higher resiliency in addition to the

conventional X-band communications.

In response to the space domain, SDF will further enhance capability to disrupt C4I and other capabilities of opponent. In addition, in order to enhance the capability for Space Domain Awareness (SDA), MOD/SDF will promote various efforts, including the development of SDA satellites scheduled for launch in FY2026, as well as further studies on the operation of multiple SDA satellites. Furthermore, in order to enhance the resilience of Japan's space system including satellites, MOD/SDF will promote the use of multiple positioning signals including Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and commercial satellites, and start development and demonstration of technology related to resilience of satellite communication.

Regarding cooperation with other countries, in addition to promoting information sharing with the U.S. and other countries on SDA, MOD/SDF will strengthen cooperation such as multilateral shared use of communication waves with high resiliency.

In order to strengthen the organizational structure and human resource base for the space domain, MOD/SDF will engage with relevant organizations such as JAXA, as well as allied and like-minded countries such as the U.S. to secure necessary human resources for space, such as by establishing a framework to effectively utilize knowledge and experience on space gained among relevant ministries.

(2) Capabilities in the Cyber Domain

In line with the government-wide cybersecurity policy which will be comprehensively coordinated in a centralized manner, MOD/SDF will enhance its cybersecurity capability, while also promoting initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure providers, and defense industry. MOD/SDF will establish a posture to secure command and control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems, to assure SDF's ability to perform its mission, and to support the cyber defense of the defense industry even under cyberattacks.

Therefore, considering the latest cyber threat situation, capability of MOD/SDF in the cyber domain will be strengthened, based on an assumption that there is no longer safe network, transitioning from the traditional idea that perimeter security is sufficient to maintain the network safety. Introducing security functions based on the "Zero Trust" concept will be considered. "Risk Management Framework (RMF)" based on a mindset that manages risks continuously, by analyzing, assessing and appropriately managing risks continuously after introduction of information systems, will be introduced. Protection posture of equipment systems and facility infrastructure systems will be strengthened. Based on an assumption that threats may have already intruded into our network, cyber threat hunting capability will be improved to detect the threats early. In addition, efforts will be made to support strengthening cybersecurity measures for defense industry, etc.

In order to strengthen the cybersecurity posture of MOD/SDF,

MOD/SDF will reorganize the GSDF Signal School into the GSDF System and Signal/Cyber School to expand the educational infrastructure to train cyber personnel. Furthermore, efforts to develop capability to disrupt opponent's use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, will be strengthened.

In order to strengthen the capability to implement these initiatives as an organization as a whole, the number of cyber personnel belonging to cyber-related units such as the SDF Cyber Defense Command will be expanded to approximately 4,000 by the end of FY 2027, and MOD/SDF will provide training

to its personnel engaged in cyber-related tasks such as system procurement, maintenance, and operations. In addition to the increase of cyber personnel belonging to cyber-related units, these efforts will bring the total number of MOD/SDF cyber personnel to approximately 20,000 by around FY2027. Further reinforcement of cyber defense architecture is intended in the future.

(3) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain

Along with reinforcing SDF's communication and radar jamming capabilities, MOD/SDF will strengthen electronic warfare capabilities by enhancing ability to detect and identify electromagnetic waves and acquiring means of deception using electromagnetic waves. In addition, MOD/SDF will expand its use of electromagnetic waves to take countermeasures against small UAVs using lasers and other means. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will reinforce electromagnetic domain management functions which reasonably manage and coordinate SDF's use of electromagnetic waves.

To this end, MOD/SDF will make the following efforts: Procurement of network electronic warfare system (NEWS) with communication and radar jamming capabilities, development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft to jam communications and other functions from outside of their threat envelope and stand-in jammers to use various types of electronic jamming within the threat envelope; Improvement of signal detection and identification capabilities of naval vessels and fixed-wing patrol aircraft by installing radio wave detection equipment; development of anti-aircraft electronic warfare equipment to jam radar from ground. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will verify the provision of jamming capabilities to fixed-wing patrol aircraft and take measures as necessary. In addition, MOD/SDF will start operation of vehicle-mounted laser devices for responding to small UAVs and take measures for early deployment of directed energy technologies such as high-energy laser systems and high-power microwaves (HPM). Along with adding the functions to monitor and manage the use of electromagnetic domain in each SDF system, MOD/SDF will work closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to ensure SDF's use of spectrum necessary for its activities.

(4) Capabilities in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains

MOD/SDF will accelerate the acquisition of equipment, etc. and capability improvement, etc. in each of the SDF services, and strengthen capabilities in the ground, maritime, and air domains that form the basis of cross-domain operations. MOD/SDF will actively utilize advanced technology to steadily upgrade equipment, etc. in each of the SDF services, and enhance advanced operational capabilities to collaborate with unmanned assets.

5 Command-and-Control and Intelligence-related Functions

(1) Enhancing Command-and-Control Functions

In order to ensure a swift and reliable command and control, MOD/SDF will establish resilient communications, system network, and data infrastructure, establish a real-time command and control posture, conduct studies on command and control capabilities that enables unified command of each SDF service, and take measures as necessary.

To this end, MOD/SDF will develop a cloud as a common infrastructure to reinforce information sharing function for cross-domain operations; upgrade the SDF central command system to strengthen the command and control function and its connection with related ministries and agencies; procure a future command and control system to strengthen GSDF's autonomous operational capability; upgrade the command and control system to further

speed up the decision-making cycle in the MSDF; upgrade Japan Aerospace Defense Ground environment (JADGE) to strengthen the resilience of the command and control function in the ASDF; and enhance the mobility and flexibility of command and control function; procure a space operation command and control system which centrally commands and controls the operation of space-related equipment and reinforce resilience of the satellite use. Additionally, MOD/SDF will enhance the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) necessary for sharing those information.

(2) Enhancing Information Gathering and Analysis Functions

MOD/SDF will establish a seamless intelligence gathering and analysis scheme by persistently collecting information on military trends in the vicinity of Japan and fundamentally reinforcing our capability and posture to process, analyze, and disseminate such information, as well as establish a posture that can promptly provide information that contributes to policy decisions and SDF unit operations. In addition, MOD/SDF will examine the ideal state of information sharing with U.S. forces and joint operations for unmanned assets, and take necessary measures.

To this end, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), which plays a central role in intelligence functions for the defense of Japan, will strengthen the capabilities of each function, such as signal, imagery, human, and open-source intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, and OSINT), while expanding the training base for analysts, etc., enhancing the system for intelligence collection and analysis, including the utilization of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and augmenting its defense attach. system. The SDF will build a satellite constellation for acquiring target detection and tracking capabilities, which will be complemented by various initiatives such as the strengthening of cooperation with the United States and the use of commercial satellites, as well as the strengthening of information gathering capabilities from space domain using information-gathering satellites and commercial satellites. In addition, various types of UAVs, etc. that are indispensable for effective ISR implementation will be procured.

(3) Responses to Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive Dimension

In the international community, emphasis is being placed on information warfare, which is an attempt to create a favorable security environment by influencing the public opinion and decision-making of other countries through disinformation and strategic communications, etc., and minimizing the impact to one's own decision-making, even when conflict has yet to arise. MOD/SDF will establish a system and posture that ensures the capability to cope with information warfare.

To this end, the DIH, which plays a central role in responding to integrated information warfare, will strengthen the system for information collection, analysis, and communication. In addition, the following functions will be developed: automatic collection and analysis of open-source information using artificial intelligence (AI), which will enable continuous collection and analysis of information on trends in each country; automatic collection of information on social networking sites, etc., to determine the authenticity of information communicated by each country; and future forecasting functions for estimating the security situation.

6 Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection

In order to secure capabilities for swift and reliable transportation of necessary units to defeat the invasion of islands to the southwest region, MOD/SDF will procure various transportation assets such as transport ships (LSVs, LCUs and maneuverable boats),

transport aircraft (C-2), aerial refueling/ transport aircraft (KC-46A, etc.), and transport/ utility helicopters (CH-47J/JA, UH-2). In addition, MOD/SDF will secure additional private finance initiative (PFI) vessels specialized for mass transportation of vehicles and containers to supplement the maritime transportation capability.

To enhance self-sufficiency in transportation to southwestern regions, MOD/SDF will procure transportation vehicles (container trailers) and cargo handling equipment (large cranes and large forklifts). In addition, MOD/SDF will conduct research and development of a landing support system to improve the efficiency of transportation toward islands where the size of seaports is limited. At the same time, MOD/SDF will make efforts to reduce transportation needs by stockpiling supplies in the southwestern region.

In addition, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the SDF's mobile deployment and civil protection, the government as a whole will work on measures to develop and strengthen airports and seaports, and others, particularly in the southwestern region, and take necessary measures to enable SDF to use facilities such as existing airports and seaports, as operational infrastructure. Furthermore, the government as a whole will deepen collaboration with relevant organizations regarding the expansion of the use of civilian vessels and aircraft for SDF's maneuver and deployment, and coordinate and cooperate to systematically implement civil protection measures employing various transport assets of the SDF, in addition to civilian vessels and aircraft. In doing so, the government as a whole will strengthen civil protection training for armed attack situations as well as secure various evacuation facilities. In addition, MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as reinforcing SDF units capable of also responding to civil protection, and utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

(1) Procurement of Various Ammunitions

Procure required quantities of various ammunitions, including standoff missiles such as the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile, interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM-3 Block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3MSE), long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6), and Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air guided missile (modified) promptly. In order to mass-produce ammunitions quickly and stably, MOD/SDF will encourage the defense industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen maintenance posture for the various ammunitions.

In addition, in order to meet the increasing storage requirements for ammunitions, MOD/SDF will promote the expansion of ammunition storage facilities and the disposal of unused ammunitions.

(2) Securing fuel, etc.

MOD/SDF will secure necessary amount of fuel for SDF operations. In addition, in order to secure fuel requirements quickly and stably, MOD/SDF will build new fuel tanks while also renting private fuel tanks. In addition, MOD/SDF will secure necessary quantities of food and clothing.

(3) Improving the Operational Availability of Defense Equipment

By securing necessary budget for maintenance and material, with lead time in consideration, while dealing with the increasingly sophistication and complexity of defense equipment, MOD/SDF will eliminate the number of non-mission capable equipment caused by material shortage and maximize the number of operationally available equipment by FY 2027. To this end, the

supply warehouse will be renovated to improve the precision of supply and demand forecasts and to shorten the time it takes for units to receive parts. In increasing the number of operationally available units, MOD/SDF will promote the outsourcing of maintenance and other operations to outside parties in order to make effective use of limited resources. In addition, MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of digital transformation (DX) in the logistics support field to optimize maintenance and upkeep. In addition, MOD/SDF will expand comprehensive contracts, including Performance Based Logistics (PBL) where outcomes are acquired through performance-based arrangements that will deliver SDF's requirements in maintenance.

(4) Facility Improvement

In conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition, including standoff missiles, SDF will secure necessary ammunition storage facilities. In securing the ammunition storage facilities, SDF will pursue and promote efficient joint operations among the SDF services, joint use of U.S. ammunition storage facilities, and dispersed deployment to islands from the viewpoint of ensuring the resiliency of the ammunition.

In order to protect major equipment and command posts, etc., and ensure a tenacious fighting posture, MOD/SDF will establish underground basing, reinforce facilities, take electromagnetic pulse (EMP) measures for command posts, construct dispersal pads for fighter aircraft, build hardened alert shelters, and establish redundant utility infrastructures.

In addition, the base security function will be strengthened while reducing the number of personnel. In addition, MOD/SDF will develop facilities to enable efficient operation of new equipment such as unmanned assets.

When renovating existing facilities, protective measures against explosives, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, electromagnetic waves, and guerrilla attacks shall be provided.

Structural reinforcement of facilities in accordance with their functions and importance, and relocation and consolidation of facilities to ensure stand-off distance shall also be implemented.

In order to prevent the functional decline of SDF facilities in the event of large-scale disaster, MOD/SDF will promote countermeasures against disasters such as tsunamis, starting from bases and camps that are expected to be damaged significantly and are important for operations. In the future, SDF will improve the resiliency of defense facilities and infrastructure in bases and camps in order to adapt and respond to various challenges associated with climate change, and to fulfill SDF's missions and roles.

MOD/SDF will smoothly execute facility improvements in a focused manner over a five-year period, while utilizing the knowledge of relevant ministries and agencies as well as private sector.

III Organization of Japan Self-Defense Forces

Based on the program guidelines, the structures of each SDF services shall be developed as described in 1 through 5.

1 Joint Operation Structure

- (1) A Permanent Joint Headquarters will be established in order to build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among each SDF services. In this regard, in light of the rapidly increasing severity of the security environment surrounding Japan, MOD/SDF will make

every effort to pursue the establishment of a Permanent Joint Headquarters as soon as possible and, upon the new establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, SDF will examine how each unit, including joint units, should be structured.

- (2) For further improvement of capabilities in the cyber domain, including constant and continuous monitoring of MOD/SDF's network and systems as well as the capability to disrupt opponent's use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, SDF will possess a cyber defense unit as a joint unit, in order to fundamentally reinforce cyber defense capability.
- (3) In addition, a new maritime transport unit will be established as a joint unit to improve the mobile deployment capabilities to the southwestern region.

2 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess

- (a) Regarding the basic operational units, the 15th Brigade will be reorganized into a division in order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region. The other eight divisions, five brigades, and one armored division will be operated on the basis of rapid deployment in order to deter and respond immediately to various situations effectively and rapidly. In addition, units with specialized functions such as airborne units, amphibious rapid deployment units and air rapid deployment units will be also operated on the basis of rapid deployment.

In this regard, based on a favorable training environment, one division, two brigades, and one armored division that maintain a high level of proficiency will be placed in Hokkaido on the premise that they will be deployed and transported rapidly by the integrated transport capability.

As a premise for the above measures, GSDF will thoroughly ensure optimizing organizational capacity, and will consider how to structure the posture in the mid-and long-term span.

- (b) In order to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, surface-to-ship missile units equipped with upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles will be retained. Furthermore, units equipped with Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile, and a long-range guided missile unit equipped with upgraded Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile and hypersonic missiles will be newly established.
- (c) In order to protect important bases, etc. from various airborne threats, surface-to-air missile units equipped with upgraded Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles (modified) will be retained.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units.

- (a) In order to strengthen cross-domain capabilities, GSDF will newly establish a new anti-aircraft, and the electronic warfare unit and reinforce the electronic warfare unit on islands. Furthermore, a new multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit that retains information gathering and attack capabilities, etc., will be established. In addition, a new unit will be established to ensure advantages in information warfare, including in the cognitive dimension, in coordination with cyber and electronic warfare.
- (b) In order to strengthen sustainability and resiliency, the logistics support system will be strengthened by establishing a new branch depot in the southwestern region, and reorganizing the Ground Material Control Command to centrally operate each logistic depot.

- (c) In order to secure the increased personnel necessary to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, cyber capabilities, etc., MOD/SDF will abolish units mainly composed of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and allocate the regular uniformed SDF personnel belonging to the units to fulfill the personnel requirements. In addition, MOD/SDF will manage SDF Ready Reserve Personnel as replacements.

3 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess

- (a) To conduct persistent and multilayered information gathering and surveillance in the waters around Japan in peace time, MSDF will possess surface units strengthened by the introduction of patrol vessels and other vessels so that it can persistently respond to an increasing volume of activities, such as ensuring security of maritime traffic, which is the foundation of stable economic activities, and conducting overseas deployment for security cooperation with other countries. And in a contingency, in order to secure Japan's territory and the waters around Japan and to ensure security of maritime traffic, MSDF will possess strengthened and increased destroyer units and minesweeper units, as well as strengthened patrol helicopter units to enable effective and sustained execution of various operations such as anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and anti-mine warfare. In addition, MSDF will procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels that will primarily conduct BMD operations
- (b) To conduct information gathering and surveillance in the waters around Japan continuously in peace time, and to gain and maintain underwater supremacy, a critical area for cross-domain operations, during contingency, MSDF will possess strengthened submarine units.
- (c) To conduct persistent and multi-layered information gathering and surveillance in the waters around Japan in peace time, and to conduct various operations including reconnaissance, targeting, and anti-submarine warfare in a contingency, MSDF will possess strengthened fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units

- (a) To enhance the capability of responding to integrated information warfare, including the cognitive dimension, and to develop a posture to enable swift decision-making, MSDF will conduct necessary research and development. In addition, MSDF will newly establish an Information Warfare major unit to carry out comprehensive information warfare through consolidating units with intelligence, cyber, communications, meteorology and oceanography functions.
- (b) To establish a multilayered surveillance posture, to secure underwater and maritime superiority, and to reduce loss of human resources, MSDF will introduce various unmanned assets, such as UAVs, USVs including the use of existing manned vessels, and UUV, as well as newly establishing unmanned asset units.
- (c) MSDF will establish a system that can sustainably carry out unit operations that require a high level of speed and volume of activities, under the joint operation system, through reorganizing the structure of the major units and establishing new units as necessary.
- (d) MSDF will improve the capability of Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters, etc. responsible for the operation of the Joint Task Force, to improve warfare sustainability. In addition,

MSDF will initiate a review of logistics posture and take necessary measures to ensure the sustainability and robustness of MSDF.

- (e) Destroyers and Frigates (DDG, DD, FFM), and other vessels will be equipped with stand-off missiles, such as upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile.
- (f) In addition to (e) above, to gain underwater supremacy, MSDF will develop a submarine (SS) equipped with Vertical Launching System (VLS) with the aim of acquiring stand-off missiles carrying submarines.
- (g) MSDF will decommission vessels that have been in service for a considerable amount of years and have limitations in expandability, etc., and increase the number of labor-saving frigate (FFM), etc., at an early date. In addition, in order to enable diverse operations such as distributed maneuver operations, MSDF will increase the number of air defense destroyers and improve the air defense and electronic warfare capabilities of destroyers and frigates (DDG, DD, and FFM). Furthermore, to enhance mine warfare capabilities, the number of minesweepers that control unmanned minesweeping assets will be increased, and the number of replenishment ships will be increased to strengthen logistical support capabilities on the sea. In addition, in order to respond to air attacks in a contingency, etc., the modification of destroyers ("Izumo" type) will be promoted to enable the operation of fighter aircraft (F-35B).
- (h) MSDF will procure fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) with enhanced capability and patrol helicopter (SH-60K (upgraded version)), and improve the electronic warfare, anti-ship attack, and other capabilities of fixed-wing patrol aircraft.

4 Japan Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess

- (a) ASDF will possess a warning and control unit equipped with a grounded-based warning and control radar to conduct persistent warning and surveillance of the airspace around Japan including the vast airspace over the Pacific Ocean, as well as to detect and track new airborne threats such as HGVs in addition to ballistic missiles flying toward Japan. In addition, ASDF will possess airborne warning and control units consisting of reinforced airborne warning units to effectively monitor and control the airspace around Japan for a longer period of time in times of heightened tensions such as the so-called gray-zone situations.
- (b) The ASDF will possess a greatly enhanced fighter aircraft unit in terms of both quality and quantity, where fighter aircraft and their supporting functions can work in unison to provide a comprehensive posture for Japan's air defense and other operations. In addition, to ensure fighter units can continue to fight tenaciously in various air operations of increasing intensity in the airspace around Japan, etc., ASDF will possess an enhanced aerial refueling/transportation unit and air rescue unit.
- (c) ASDF will possess an enhanced air transport unit to effectively conduct mobile deployment of troops, etc. and international peace cooperation activities, etc.
- (d) In addition to coordinating with the GSDF's surface-to-air missile units in conducting air defense in critical areas, ASDF will possess an enhanced fire unit to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats, with the capability to respond in the terminal phase, providing multi-layered protection to Japan from ballistic missile attacks.
- (e) ASDF will possess a specialized space domain unit with

enhanced SDA capabilities to ensure the stable use of space.

- (f) ASDF will possess an unmanned aircraft unit to collect information in areas relatively remote from Japan and to conduct persistent surveillance in the air when the situation becomes tense.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units.

- (a) In order to further refine and strengthen the quality and quantity of Japan's air capability, ASDF will accelerate the pace of replacement of fighter aircraft that are not suitable for modernization (F-15) with fighter aircraft (F-35A and F-35B). In addition, ASDF will continue to upgrade capabilities for modernized fighter aircraft (F-15), such as improving its electronic warfare capability, equipping stand-off missiles, and increasing the number of equipped missiles. Furthermore, with regard to fighter aircraft (F-2), from the viewpoint of strengthening stand-off defense capability, upgrade program will be promoted for a total of two squadrons for them to carry upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, etc. In addition, ASDF will conduct necessary studies by FY2027, and take necessary measures in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capability. In this regard, studies on the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be conducted.
- (b) Joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft with the UK and Italy will be promoted, while ensuring freedom of modification and interoperability with the allied country, so that by the end of FY 2035, when fighter aircraft (F-2) are expected to start retiring, fighter aircraft capable of securing and maintaining air superiority in the future can be delivered. In addition to the fighter aircraft itself, development of systems including unmanned aerial vehicles, etc., will be undertaken with the possibility of international collaboration in sight.
- (c) Furthermore, for the sake of efficient training of pilots of cutting-edge fighter aircraft such as the F-35 and next-generation fighter aircraft, ASDF will take necessary measures after studying the ideal education system, including the integration of ground training and flight training by training aircraft as one education system.
- (d) In order to continue the battle tenaciously, a system for rapid development of deployment infrastructure, etc. will be established so that mobile and dispersed operations can be carried out at various locations. In addition, necessary studies will be conducted on operational concepts of air capability so that air capability can be flexibly concentrated and directed to the front of the aggression of Japan.
- (e) In order to respond to high-intensity air operations and from the viewpoint of persistent combat, the aerial refueling and transport aircraft (KC-46A, etc.) will be increased in order to strengthen the aerial refueling function and rescue aircraft (UH.60J) will be replaced. In addition, in order to strengthen the air defense posture in the airspace around Japan, including the vast airspace over the Pacific, ASDF will promote the deployment of mobile warning and control radars, etc., on the islands on the Pacific side, as well as increase airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D). In order to implement rapid maneuvering deployment of ground units, etc., ASDF will procure transport aircraft (C-2).
- (f) In order to improve the operational capability of stand-off missiles, ASDF will introduce unmanned aerial vehicles that can persistently collect target information inside the opponent's threat envelope, and new operational intelligence units will be established to strengthen the intelligence

function necessary for the execution of the unit's mission.

- (g) ASDF will continue to upgrade the capabilities of surface-to-air missile PATRIOT system and others in order to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats.
- (h) In order to strengthen the space operation capability, development of SDA posture will be promoted steadily, and a new specialized space domain missions unit commanded by a general will be established, and the "Air Self-Defense Force" will be renamed to "Air and Space Self-Defense Force".

5 Optimizing Organizational Capacity

The number of SDF personnel in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will be reviewed as necessary to optimize organizational capacity, targeting the level at the end of FY2022. In addition, the capacity necessary to strengthen the joint operation system will be transferred from each SDF, and GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF, to meet the increased personnel requirements of MSDF and ASDF. To this end, approximately 2,000 GSDF personnel will be transferred to joint unit, MSDF and ASDF, respectively.

During the period of this plan, necessary measures will be taken to secure the necessary number of personnel without increasing the total number of SDF personnel.

IV Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to further reinforce deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated manner, Japan will establish a posture to work together with the United States on a regular basis and promote cooperation with the United States in cross-domain operations including space, cyber and electromagnetic domain and measures to improve interoperability, cooperation in the use of Japan's counterstrike capabilities, air-defense, anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious operations, airborne operations, ISRT, protection of assets and facilities, and logistic support. In addition, Japan will improve its responsive capabilities, including the readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training.

In order to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and occurrence of various situations, Japan will further expand and deepen joint Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and will on a regular basis increase joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, and promote mutual deployment of both units to their respective facilities for training or other purposes. In addition, Japan will further develop coordination functions between Japan and the United States, and will realize closer operational coordination with like-minded countries and others with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its core.

In order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective joint responses in all phases, Japan will reinforce measures related to information security and cybersecurity for facilitating information sharing between Japan and the United States, and will further enhance defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, improvement in mutual interchangeability, sharing and reinforcing of various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capability of U.S. military equipment in Japan, and reinforcement of supply-chain.

2 Steady Implementation of Measures to Support the Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

From the perspective of not only supporting the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan but also strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will steadily secure funding for expenses related to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, including Host Nation Support.

V. Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others

While guided by the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges based on the recognition that creating a security environment that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and essential initiative that contributes to Japan's defense itself and also relates to its basic foundations. In particular, considering the policy on collaboration with like-minded countries and others indicated in the National Defense Strategy, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues, service-to-service exchanges and personnel exchanges such as liaison officers, Japan will appropriately combine, depending on characteristics of each SDF services, and strategically implement specific initiatives taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country, such as strategic port calls and air visits, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacitybuilding, and International Peace Cooperation Activities, in order to improve interoperability among SDF and armed forces of like-minded countries and to strengthen Japan's presence.

Based on such significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and thoroughgoing initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of operation procedures, development of organizational systems, review of institutions including treatment, and establishment of infrastructure such as hotlines between countries including secure communications, and will further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and agencies as well as with other countries, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan's initiatives. In doing so, Japan will particularly emphasize the following.

1 Bilateral/Multilateral Training and Exercises

Taking their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges into account, Japan will promote bilateral/multilateral training and exercises including logistics cooperation. Through this, Japan will demonstrate the intention and capability to create a desirable security environment and will also seek to improve interoperability with like-minded countries and strengthen cooperative relationships with them.

2 Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Considering that cooperation in defense equipment is an initiative that spans more than half a century from conception to retirement, Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation including overseas transfers of defense equipment and international joint development and strive to enhance our partners' military capabilities and strengthen mid-and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, these initiatives should be combined with other efforts such as defense cooperation and exchange, training and exercises, and capacity-building to be promoted effectively. In this regard, Japan will consider the transfer of equipment that has reached a considerable number

of years in service and has limited expandability to like-minded countries through early decommissioning or early removal from service.

3 Capacity Building

Japan will further strengthen its efforts of capacity-building to armed forces and others of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, aiming to create a desirable security environment for Japan, while promoting the strengthening of relations with the countries to be assisted. In this regard, Japan will coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and work together with its ally and like-minded countries such as the United States and Australia, so as to maximize results. In addition to those for Southeast Asian countries, capacity-building for Pacific Island countries will be expanded

VI Elements Supporting Defense Capabilities

1 Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance the deterrence effectiveness, MOD/SDF will conduct bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with Australia, India, and European and Southeast Asian countries in addition to SDF's joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises, in a planned and visible way to demonstrate Japan's intention and capability that unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts will not be tolerated. In doing so, MOD/SDF will seek to enhance and strengthen training and exercises as FDO which are flexibly implemented according to the situation, as well as enhance the content of training and conduct new training utilizing favorable training environments overseas, based on the development of Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and other measures.

In addition, to maximize the capabilities of SDF units in a contingency, MOD/SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of training areas and other facilities in Hokkaido and other areas in Japan, and steadily establish and enhance the necessary training infrastructure in Japan. In addition to expanding the joint/shared use of

U.S. military facilities and areas by SDF and the use of civilian airport and seaport facilities, MOD/SDF will enhance training for rapid deployment of its units to islands such as those in the southwestern region, joint training, and civil protection training, etc., with relevant organizations such as the police, Japan Coast Guard, firefighting services and local governments to appropriately respond to infringements that do not amount to armed attacks from outside as well as armed attacks in the vicinity of remote islands.

In order to expand such training, it is necessary to obtain the understanding and cooperation of related local governments and local residents. Therefore, while taking all possible measures to ensure the safety of training, MOD/SDF will give due consideration to the surrounding environments of training infrastructures, including training ranges in Hokkaido and other areas in Japan.

2 Reinforcing Coordination and Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

In order to appropriately respond to any types of contingencies, coordination and cooperation with Japan Coast Guard will be further strengthened. To this end, MOD/SDF will deepen the information sharing and coordination mechanism with Japan Coast Guard, as well as enhance various response procedures and training, including developing procedures to have the Minister

of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard in an armed attack situation and conducting joint training.

3 Collaboration with Local Communities

To enable SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, Japan will strive to gain understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents around their facilities.

Japan will actively engage in public relations activities regarding the policies and activities of MOD/SDF and also the role of U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of the local communities, while fulfilling accountability. At the same time, Japan will continue to promote measures to improve the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those against noise from the perspective of promoting cooperation to the defense of Japan.

In addition, in light of the fact that in some regions, the very existence of SDF units contribute greatly to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities, and the transportation of emergency patients by SDF support the local medical service, MOD/SDF will give due consideration to the characteristics of the regions and the contribution to the local economy in order to gain understanding of the local governments and residents upon reorganization of units as well as placement and operation of SDF camps and bases. In addition, based on the national government's policy on contracts concerning small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), MOD/SDF will promote various measures that contribute to local economies, such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders, while also taking efficiency into consideration.

4 Reinforcing Policy-Making Functions

In order for SDF to fully exert its capabilities and response to the increasingly severe, complex, and rapid-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required including such domains as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum and MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain policy advice from experts. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance future way of "warfare" for SDF and how to utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies as well as apply those technology to defense necessary for this from a strategic perspective, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly defense industry as their core. Furthermore, in order to promote such efforts and support the formulation of policies, MOD/SDF will review and reinforce its research system led by National Institute for Defense Studies and reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.

In addition, MOD/SDF will contribute promoting security education by dispatching lecturers to educational institutions and enhancing public symposiums, etc., so that citizens can accurately recognize knowledge and information on security policy. MOD/SDF will also promote various measures to further utilize social networks, which are becoming increasingly diverse, and to enhance our ability to disseminate information, including in foreign languages. In addition, in order to further strengthen the research and education functions of MOD/SDF, centering on National Institute for Defense Studies, MOD/SDF will expand networks and organizational collaboration with domestic and foreign research and education institutions, universities, think tanks, and other organizations.

VII Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation

1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters

In the event of various types of disasters including natural disasters such as the Nankai Trough Earthquake, nuclear disasters, and other special disasters, MOD/SDF will take all possible measures to ensure initial response promptly by transferring and deploying units of sufficient scale, while maintaining joint operations as the basis of its operations.

At the same time, measures will be taken to strengthen the response posture, such as the procurement of UAVs(near-field), helicopter satellite communication systems (helicopter SATs), lifesaving systems, and emergency power supplies.

In addition, in close coordination and cooperation with related ministries and agencies, local governments, and the private sectors, MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as conducting various training and exercises, formulating plans, and securing alternative functions and deployment infrastructure in the event of a disaster.

Furthermore, including in areas where many nuclear power plants are located, MOD/SDF will conduct training in cooperation with related organizations, verify coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after examining such issues as securing deployment infrastructure in the vicinity of nuclear power plants.

2 Measures for Maritime Security and Use of the Airspace based on Existing International Rules

Recognizing that open and stable seas and the use of the airspace based on existing international rules are the foundation of peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation, and based on the vision of a FOIP, MOD/SDF will promote efforts such as port calls by naval vessels and aircraft on various occasions with other countries that share awareness of maritime security and the use of airspace based on existing rules such as through joint training and exercises, equipment and technologies cooperation, capacity building and information sharing. In this way, MOD/SDF will actively and visibly demonstrate our willingness and capability for the stability of the maritime order and the use of the airspace based on existing international rules.

3 International Peace Cooperation Activities

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will continue to promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host countries. In particular, by making good use of accumulated experiences, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, capacity building related to UN PKO such as the UN Triangular Partnership Program (TPP), and the dispatch of staff members to UN headquarters, etc., in order to contribute to the improvement of the security environment. In addition, in order to strengthen the systems concerning international activities including rescue or transportation of Japanese nationals overseas in the unstable international situation, the Central Readiness Regiment and the International Operations Training Unit will be integrated to form a new international operations force with high readiness and high technical capabilities in the field of facilities and unmanned aircraft operation, etc.

MOD/SDF will expand curriculum of the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, and given the importance of cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign

countries, and non-governmental organizations, MOD/SDF will strengthen the cooperation with them through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel but also other personnel from various backgrounds.

Regarding the SDF's operation facility in Djibouti for counter-piracy operations, MOD/SDF will promote renewal/upgrade to ensure its long-term and stable utilization for regional security cooperation, including the protection and transportation of Japanese nationals abroad in the Middle East and Africa.

VIII New Measures for Early Deployment of Defense Equipment

MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment which is particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective of the areas that could directly affect the SDF's current and future operations. Those areas include stand-off defense capabilities, maritime assets, soft kills, unmanned defense capabilities, AI, next-generation information and communications, space domain, DX, high-power energy and integrated information warfare. For acceleration of defense equipment deployment, MOD/SDF will receive proposals from the defense-related companies or incorporate advanced civilian technologies through start-up companies, domestic research institutes and other organizations. To this end, MOD/SDF will establish a new framework to deploy defense equipment within the next five years and to operate it with intensive iterations of operational verification, evaluation, and improvement, in addition to flexibly reviewing administrative procedures, contracting methods and other rules of MOD/SDF that might be obstacles to this acceleration of deployment efforts, and to realize its full-scale operation within approximately the next 10 years.

IX Defense Production and Technological Base as Virtually Integral Part of a Defense Capability

1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base

While Japan's defense industry is responsible for each stage of the equipment life cycle, the equipment and defense industry are inseparable. In this context, the defense production and technological bases are virtually integral part of a defense capability.

While the defense business requires a large investment of management resources to meet advanced performance requirements and maintenance measures, companies are facing diverse issues; profitability is lower than the level defined by the procurement system, the industry is currently considered as unattractive because sales channels are limited to SDF, and growth is not expected, and various risks, such as supply chain risks and cyberattacks, are apparent.

In order to address these issues, MOD/SDF will make defense industry more attractive, by adopting method to evaluate each company's quality management, cost management and delivery management for defense business to calculate company's costs and profits accurately. In addition, MOD/SDF will adopt a method of acquiring equipment that further emphasizes the viewpoint of maintaining and strengthening the domestic infrastructure while developing company's predictability for projects, such as the plan-and-proposal method. As for equipment to be procured under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procurement, efforts will be made to promote the participation of domestic companies, as well as to streamline and improve efficiency.

In order to cope with various risks and maintain and strengthen the defense production bases, appropriate fiscal measures and financial support will be provided for companies' initiatives such as upgrading manufacturing and other facilities, strengthening

cybersecurity, making supply chains more resilient, and business succession.

MOD/SDF will conduct supply chain surveys to identify supply chain risks and promote new entrants to the supply chain to strengthen the supply chain and incorporate advanced commercial/basic technologies. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will cooperate with defense authorities of allies and like-minded countries, etc., to mutually complement supply chains. In this way, the supply chain will be strengthened to contribute to stable procurement.

Since the protection of information from intelligence activities and cyberattacks by foreign countries, or other cause, is a prerequisite for defense production and international equipment and technology cooperation, MOD/SDF will reinforce industrial security system while taking measures for steady implementation of Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry as well as for formulation and application of Defense Industrial Security Manual. In addition, MOD/SDF will implement sensitive technology security in conjunction with economic security measures such as the patent application non-disclosure system.

2 Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

MOD/SDF will realize acceleration of defense equipment development through various efforts concerning R&D by identifying specific projects necessary for future warfare and organizing the entire picture up to the acquisition. Based on the integrated equipment system, which is systematically organized for future battles from the viewpoint of joint operations, MOD/SDF will intensively invest in equipment/technology fields (1)-(6) that are directly linked to future battles. Furthermore, by improving the efficiency of the R&D process, including improving the capabilities of conventional equipment, and by introducing new methods, MOD/SDF will realize shortening the time required for R&D and lead to the acceleration of defense equipment deployment.

At the same time, MOD/SDF will establish a mechanism to promptly abolish projects for research and development with low prospects for results.

In order to secure technological superiority in the future, and realize advanced capabilities ahead of other countries, MOD/SDF will pursue and implement technological cooperation, including international joint research and development and research and development that incorporates a wide range of advanced commercial/basic technologies, and at the same time will invest heavily in technologies that can be directly linked to defense applications, aiming to acquire technologies at an early stage. In doing so, MOD/SDF will promote collaboration with projects in related ministries and agencies and actively utilize the results of those projects.

Based on the above, the policy division, the operational division, and the technological division will work in unison to promote measures related to the study of future battle strategies and the utilization of advanced technologies.

From the perspective of gathering Japan's scientific and technological capabilities, MOD/SDF will strategically release the information on technological fields and research and development prospects that it enhances predictability for companies and others. In addition, in order to fundamentally reinforce the functions to produce defense innovation and groundbreaking equipment, etc., a new research institute will be established in Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) after FY2024 through scrap-and-build, the R&D -related organizations of the agency, and the strengthening of the R&D system will be implemented. In addition, from the viewpoint of effective implementation of

initiatives related to advanced technologies, MOD/SDF will strongly promote technological cooperation not only with domestic research institutes but also with allies and like-minded countries such as the United States, Australia, and the U.K.

Promote the development of equipment that anticipates equipment transfer from the development stage and review of SDF's original specifications. In developing equipment, MOD/SDF will consider cost reductions in the mass production and maintenance phases. In addition, regarding conventional technologies such as ammunition and vehicles, measures would be taken to maintain the production and technological infrastructure.

(1) Stand-Off Defense Capabilities

Japan will acquire capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations outside of threat zones.

- a. Continue development of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile (surface-, ship-, and air-to-ship missiles), aiming to complete development of the surface-type by the end of FY2025, the ship-type by the end of FY2026, and the air-type by the end of FY2028 for the air-type.
- b. Buildup submarine-type stand-off defense capabilities that can be launched from submarines that can operate in a highly covert manner.
- c. Continue research on Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) for island defense that fly at high altitude and high speed to hit ground targets, aiming to complete the project for the early deployment by the end of FY2025. In addition, upgraded HVGP for island defense will be developed to defeat the opposing forces invading the islands, from more distant areas in the mainland, etc.
- d. Promote research on hypersonic missiles, which are difficult to be intercepted by traveling at hypersonic speeds, aiming to complete the project by FY2031, and consider the development of derivative types.
- e. Research on new anti-ship guided missile for island defense that has a longer-range, low radar cross section (RCS), and higher mobility, while having multiple functions through modularization.

(2) Capabilities to Respond to HGVs, etc.

MOD/SDF will acquire technologies to deal with Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) threats and others that are difficult to detect or intercept with existing equipment.

- a. Develop upgraded Type-03 Medium-Range SAM (modified) with capability of responding to HGV and ballistic missiles in addition to cruise missiles, etc.
- b. Conduct research and studies on guided missile systems for responding to HGV threats that travel at hypersonic speeds at high altitudes with high maneuverability.

(3) Capabilities to Respond to Drones and Swarm Attacks

MOD/SDF will aim to acquire and promptly equip technologies to economically and effectively respond to the rapidly growing airborne threat of drone swarms.

- a. Continue research on various types of high-energy lasers to intercept drones and other airborne threats.
- b. Continue research on technologies to intercept drones and other objects by radiating them with high-power microwaves (HPM).

(4) Unmanned Assets

In order to promote unmanned and labor-saving defense equipment, MOD/SDF will acquire technologies related to UUVs

while reviewing existing equipment systems and personnel assignments.

- a. Conduct research on technologies such as UUV-UUV control to enhance operational capabilities in the underwater domain.
- b. Conduct research on operational support technology to control multiple unmanned combat vehicles (UGVs) from a manned vehicle, autonomous driving technology, etc.
- c. Conduct research on technologies related to USVs in order to further reduce personnel and achieve unmanned waterborne vessels.

(5) Measures for Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft

- a. Steadily promote joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft with the UK and Italy, aiming to complete development by the end of FY2035. Research and development will also be promoted for a combat support unmanned aircraft to be collaborating with manned aircraft such as the next-generation fighter aircraft.
- b. In conducting research and development of these technologies, Japan-led development will be realized by ensuring freedom of modification for timely and appropriate upgrade in the future and domestic production and technological bases for high readiness, etc. on the premise that the aircraft maintains the capability to effectively counter numerically superior opponents.

(6) Reinforcing Other Deterrence and Response Capabilities

- a. Continue research on future railguns to improve the capability of intercepting various airborne threats.
- b. Conduct research on technology of jamming device that misleads radar and other radio wave equipment into believing that multiple threats exist by giving false information.
- c. Conduct research to reflect the technology to support commanders' decision-making into equipment by analyzing the course of action using AI to cope with the complex and fast changing combat situations.
- d. Research and develop the next generation signal intelligence aircraft, which will be the successor to the multipurpose aircraft (EP-3), with improved target information collection capability, etc.
- e. Develop new small mines that are compact and can be controlled remotely in order to lay mines quickly from naval vessels on alert watch, etc.
- f. Begin research and development of hypersonic surface-to-air guided missiles utilizing the results of elemental research on hypersonic missiles.

3 Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is not only a strategic tool of foreign and defense policy to build effective partnerships with allied and like-minded countries and to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force or invasion of Japan, but also effective in ensuring the growth of the defense industry through the expansion of defense equipment market. From this perspective, the government will take the lead in promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology by further cooperation between the public and private sectors. The government will also establish a fund and provide corporate assistance as necessary.

4 Promotion of Various Measures and Institutional Development

In order to implement the above policies, necessary budgetary measures, etc., as well as necessary legislation and financing of

projects with a high policy nature through the use of government financial institutions, etc., will be provided, and the status of their execution will be constantly verified and the system will be revised as necessary.

X Strengthening the Foundation for SDF Personnel to Fulfill Abilities as Core of Defense Capabilities

1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base

In order to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities, MOD/SDF will reinforce the human resource base by securing necessary uniformed SDF personnel and civilian officials and others, and by conducting study of necessary systems, while paying attention to the facts that individual SDF personnel are required to have more knowledge, skills, and experience than ever before and that MOD/SDF needs to develop SDF personnel who have a background to reliably deal with cross-domain operations, information warfare, and others. In this regard SDF personnel who work on research and development will be secured and their knowledge and skills will be developed. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce its education, especially focusing on domains such as cyber, and utilize civilian workforce in these domains. To this end, an environment will be created in which all SDF personnel can demonstrate their abilities even as they face life events such as childcare, childbirth, and nursing care, and MOD/SDF will take comprehensive measures focusing on the entire life cycle starting from recruitment, including reskilling of SDF personnel.

(1) Enhancing Recruitment Efforts

In order to stably secure excellent human resources in the severe recruiting environment with a declining number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, MOD/SDF will promote various recruiting measures such as digitalization of recruitment PR, and strengthen the functions of the Provincial Cooperation Offices and the cooperation with local governments and related organizations.

In addition, from the viewpoint of improving the attractiveness of fixed-term SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will review the system of Candidates for SDF personnel and improve support for the re-employment and learning at universities, etc., after the completion of their term of service. Furthermore, in light of the declining birthrate and higher education level, measures to expand the recruitment of untenured officers and to broaden the recruitment base to include college graduates, etc., should be promoted. At the same time, MOD/SDF will secure high-quality human resources at an early stage through the expansion of the SDF scholarship student system.

Furthermore, in order to incorporate human resources with specialized knowledge and skills who are expected to be active in fields such as cyber and space domains, a new SDF personnel system will be established to enable flexible recruitment and appointment, and necessary measures will be taken to utilize human resources from the private sector, including retired SDF personnel.

(2) Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others.

In order for SDF Reserve Personnel and others to effectively supplement regular SDF personnel in the changing operational environment and diversifying missions of SDF, MOD/SDF will not only improve their sufficiency rates but also fundamentally review and reinforce the system of SDF Reserve Personnel and others. To this end, after reviewing the roles of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel, MOD/SDF will expand the recruitment of them from civilians with no experience in the SDF and review the current system in light of their age

limits and training periods, and other issues.

(3) Effective Use of Human Resources

MOD/SDF continues to actively recruit female SDF personnel and appoint them according to their motivation, ability, and aptitude, as well as develop an educational infrastructure that supports their activities, and systematically develop women's quarters in the military barracks and naval vessels with an eye to increasing the number of female SDF personnel.

In addition, in order to further utilize human resources with abundant knowledge, skills, and experience, the retirement age for SDF personnel will be raised while paying attention to their military strength, and the duties in which re-enrolled SDF personnel can be engaged in will be greatly expanded.

Curbing mid-career retirements is an urgent issue, therefore a survey on SDF personnel's attitude towards mid-career retirement will be conducted in order to contribute to the consideration of effective measures to curb mid-career retirement. Taking into consideration the special nature of the missions and service environment, MOD/SDF will constantly review and implement necessary measures.

(4) Improvement of Living and Working Environment, etc.

Recognizing that there is no place for harassment which ruins the mutual trust among SDF personnel and shakes the very foundation of the entire organization, MOD/SDF will establish new measures based on the findings of the expert panel and other reviews on harassment prevention, and ensure that all SDF personnel are fully aware of them. In addition, MOD/SDF will develop an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment with continuous review of the measures taken to ensure that they are in line with the times.

In addition, MOD/SDF will steadily develop housing necessary for introducing and reorganizing units as well as ensuring readiness. MOD/SDF will also systematically take measures against aging and earthquake of barracks and housing, including modernization and preventive maintenance. Furthermore, the living and working environment for personnel will be improved by ensuring the required number of living and working equipment, replacing aging equipment, and ensuring the required number of daily consumables.

In doing so, Japan will place consideration on creating a comfortable working environment even in special environments such as naval vessels. Through these measures, MOD/SDF will aim to improve the morale of SDF personnel.

In addition to promoting efforts to ensure work-life balance, including the development and dissemination of systems that support a good balance between family and work, MOD/SDF will promote measures such as the development of childcare facilities and temporary childcare for children during emergency visits for the office based on the needs of SDF personnel. In addition, MOD/SDF will expand measures to support families in cooperation with local governments and related organizations.

(5) Human Resource Development

In order to secure human resources who can contribute to more advanced cross-domain joint operations, MOD/SDF will strengthen the education on joint operations in the educational institutions such as the Joint Staff College and staff colleges of each service. Each SDF service, National Defense Academy, and National Institute for Defense Studies will strengthen their education and research contents and architecture for cyber domain and others for securing and providing skilled human resources who can become the core of SDF units. In addition,

MOD/SDF will transform the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force High Technical School into a combined school of each service, as well as a coeducational school by accepting female students.

In addition, in order to further promote mutual complementation between each service of the SDF, MOD/SDF will integrate their educational programs and promote effective and efficient education and research by utilizing state-of-the-art technologies.

Furthermore, the 1st and 2nd Service Schools of the Maritime Self-Defense Force will be integrated in order to implement unified education and improve educational effects, and the T-7/T-4 successor aircraft and related systems will be upgraded to optimize the flight education and training environment for the so-called 5th generation fighter pilot training.

(6) Improving Treatment and Reemployment

Through conducting a survey of SDF personnel's overtime work, etc., MOD/SDF will make salaries and allowances based on the special nature of their missions and work environment, and continue to give due treatment to personnel engaged in harsh missions, especially on naval vessels and radar sites. In addition, treatment will be improved given the fact that missions are increasing such as the counterstrike capability. MOD/SDF will conduct research on the salary systems of military personnel in other countries, and consider how SDF personnel should be paid in the future. MOD/SDF will promote measures concerning honors and privileges for those well-deserved for achievements through many years of diligent services for their duties as SDF personnel.

In addition, given that it is the responsibility of the government to secure the livelihood of uniformed SDF personnel after retirement under the early retirement system or fixed-term service system, MOD/SDF will further improve and strengthen reemployment support by enhancing the career guidance and job training opportunities for SDF personnel scheduled for retirement, and by strengthening cooperation with local governments, relevant organizations, and private companies, etc.

2 Transformation of Medical Functions

In order to cope with various situations and respond to diverse missions in Japan and abroad, MOD/SDF will promote integrated medical operations by unifying medical functions common to all SDF units, build a posture that can mobilize the full strength of SDF's medical force, including the National Defense Medical College, and promote fundamental reforms to improve the combat trauma care capabilities.

In order to save the lives of personnel who are performing their duties in a contingency without regard for danger, it is necessary to establish a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the front line to the destination hospital. For this purpose, it is necessary to strengthen the respective medical functions first aid at the front line, medical evacuation by utilizing various assets of each service to transport wounded personnel to the destination hospital, and the SDF hospitals.

First, for the first aid at the front line, MOD/SDF will increase the number of frontline combat medics certified as assistant nurse and paramedic, and further strengthen the foundation for education and training. In addition, a new joint training course for damage control surgery following first aid at the frontline will be established to systematically train personnel. Furthermore, MOD/SDF plans to provide necessary education and training regarding surgical operations on board naval vessels for those who have completed the above course in order to strengthen onboard medical care capability.

For aero medical evacuation, new training equipment will be

introduced, and an education and training environment will be established to improve first-aid capabilities during transport of wounded and sick. In implementing these education and training programs, MOD/SDF will standardize, integrate and improve common knowledge and skills among each force.

MOD/SDF considers enhancing the functions and survivability of the SDF Naha Hospital is an effective measure in strengthening medical capacity in the southwestern region. MOD/SDF will take measures for SDF Naha Hospital such as increasing the number of beds, adding medical departments, and building underground facilities. Other SDF hospitals that can be a destination will be strengthened similarly when they are reconstructed.

Since most of medical functions are common to all SDF units, MOD/SDF will promote standardizing medical equipment and materials in consideration of interoperability between each SDF service. In addition, in order to enable Self-Defense Forces hospitals and other facilities to obtain the medical information of each SDF member in a timely manner without distinction between the SDF services, the medical record of each member would be digitized, and a system would be established to enable prompt retrieval and viewing of medical record for each member.

Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds, gunshot wounds, and other similar causes. To prevent such deaths, it is extremely important to secure blood products for transfusion, and MOD/SDF would consider establishing a system to autonomously secure and stockpile blood products. In addition, in order to secure medical oxygen, which is as important as blood products in war wound care, MOD/SDF will also acquire oxygen concentrators and other relative equipment.

In addition, MOD/SDF will strengthen education and research, including combat trauma care capabilities improvement, at the National Defense Medical College in light of modern medical technology evolution. The National Defense Medical College Hospital, which is the clinical site, is to be strengthened to accommodate the acceptance of those wounded in war, in addition to advanced medical education for medical and nursing officers and skill improvement for the medical personnel of SDF. In order to accommodate the acceptance of those wounded in war, the hospital will undergo a drastic reform of its operation, and its functions will be strengthened by utilizing opportunities such as the reconstruction of the hospital. As a complement to these efforts, efforts will also be made to ensure that medical and nursing officers receive training outside the department.

XI. Optimization Efforts

1 Equipment

For GSDF, in order to optimize the air structure, the air units of divisions and brigades will be abolished with some exceptions, and helicopter functions will be concentrated in each district unit, while the functions of anti-tank and combat helicopters (AH) and observation helicopters (OH) will be transferred to UAVs and UAVs for utility/attack and surveillance, etc. The functions of AHs and OHs will be transferred to UAVs and UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes. In doing so, the minimum functions necessary will be maintained by arming existing helicopters, etc.

For MSDF, the number of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) acquisitions will be partially reviewed in conjunction with the acquisition of a dwell UAV to enhance offshore surveillance capabilities over a wide area. The number of patrol helicopters (SH-60K (upgraded version)) acquired will be partially revised due to a review of the shipboard requirements, including the installation of fighter aircraft (F-35B) on destroyers (Izumo

class). Proceed with the discontinuation of the use of multi-purpose aircraft (U-36A).

For ASDF, in order to optimize the aircraft types, it will move forward with the elimination of the use of rescue search aircraft (U.125A) and other aircraft.

Further efforts for effective and efficient acquisition of equipment include: cost reduction through planned and stable acquisition of equipment by expanding the application of long-term contracts, improving the predictability of companies and promoting efficient production, procurement in consideration of the supply-demand situation of equipment including that of other countries, and narrowing down SDF-unique specifications that cause costs to rise. In addition, the SDF's own unique procurement system, which takes into account the supply-demand situation of equipment, including that of other countries, and the narrowing of specifications, etc., will enhance the effectiveness of project management throughout the equipment life cycle.

2 Personnel

In addition to transferring the capacity necessary to strengthen the joint operation system from each of the SDF, GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF to optimize the organizational capacity of the SDF, based on the increase of required personnel by MSDF and ASDF. To this end, approximately 2,000 GSDF personnel will be transferred to joint unit, MSDF and ASDF.

In addition, the number of all SDF officers will not be increased, but rather a review of existing units and the use of outside labor force, such as private-sector contractors, will be promoted.

XII Quantities of Major Procurement

Targets to be achieved in five years and approximately in ten years for the defense capabilities to be fundamentally reinforced under this program are shown in Appendix 1.

The specific scale of the major procurement of defense equipment listed in II and III above is shown in Appendix 2.

In addition, the major formation quota and the specific scale of the major procurement of defense equipment, etc. in approximately 10 years are shown in Appendix 3.

XIII Expenditures

- 1 The expenditure aiming for the implementation of defense capability buildup described in this program for the next five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amount to approximately ¥43 trillion.
- 2 The annual defense budgets for FY2023 to FY2027 under this program amount to approximately ¥40,500 billion in total (approximately ¥8,900 billion in FY 2027), on the assumption that the following measures will be taken.
 - (1) Considering the progress of each project, further accelerate the improvement of SDF facilities in an agile and flexible manner (approximately ¥1,600 billion);
 - (2) Utilize settlement surplus in the general account further when the surplus is larger than the expected settlement surplus in 6 (approximately ¥900 billion).

In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions and the significance of other budgets related to the lives of the people, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, further optimization and rationalization of defense buildup will be thoroughly implemented, by means of suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/reduction and long-term

contracts, and securing other revenues. If the surplus does not increase to the above-mentioned level, MOD/SDF will secure financial resources virtually through these initiatives.

In the budget formulation process of each fiscal year, MOD/SDF will take care to respond to unforeseen circumstances such as changes in the security environment. On top of that, MOD/SDF will examine the progress, effectiveness, and feasibility of each project, including the equipment procurement shown in Appendix 2, and revise projects flexibly, if necessary.

- 3 The expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program amount to approximately ¥43,500 billion (excluding the amount corresponding to payments for the period outside of the program that contribute to improving project efficiency, such as maintenance), and the future obligation for each fiscal year is to be managed appropriately.
- 4 Since measures such as for equipment procurement and maintenance, facility maintenance, R&D, and system development/upgrade will be intensively implemented during the next five years from FY2023 to FY2027 under this program, MOD/SDF will make efforts to appropriately take these into account and proceed defense buildup in a stable and sustainable manner in the subsequent program based on the FY2027 level.
- 5 This program will be reviewed, if necessary, based on the medium to long-term defense and fiscal outlook, considering various factors at home and abroad such as the international environment at the time, trends in technological standards including Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and the situation of the economic power and fiscal foundation supporting the reinforcement of defense capabilities.
- 6 To secure financial resources for the stable sustainment of defense capabilities after FY2027 as well as for covering this program from FY2023 to FY2027, necessary measures will be implemented in both expenditure and revenue areas, such as the reform in government expenditure, using settlement surplus, creation of defense buildup funds utilizing non-tax revenues, and tax measures.

XIV Notes

In order to reduce the burden on Okinawa Prefecture and other local communities, specific measures regarding the review of the U.S. military force posture in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related projects will be steadily implemented.

Annex Table 1

Fields	By 5 years until FY2027*	Approx.10 Years Later
	If an invasion of Japan occurs, Japan will respond with primary responsibility and buildup defense capabilities to disrupt and defeat the invasion while gaining support from its ally and others.	Further efforts to ensure the defense concept described on the left (buildup defense capabilities to disrupt or to defeat invasion at an earlier and more distant location)
Stand-Off Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire practical capability to operate stand-off missiles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquire capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles Secure required sufficient quantities
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce capability to respond to Hypersonic Weapons Reinforce capability to respond to miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce wide-area air defense capabilities More efficient and effective UAV countermeasures
Unmanned Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand the use of UAV to strengthen capabilities to practically operate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce capability to control multiple unmanned assets simultaneously, etc.
Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities/ Civil Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce Space Domain Awareness (SDA), cybersecurity capabilities, and electromagnetic domain capabilities, etc. Reinforce ground, sea, and air domain capabilities that become basis of cross-domain operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Further reinforce space operation capability Further reinforce cybersecurity capability to enable support for entities other than SDF Strengthen ground, maritime, and air capabilities to work with UAV
Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accelerate decision-making through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc., while strengthening the resiliency of the network Strengthen information acquisition and analysis in both strategic and tactic information, including responses in the cognitive dimension 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce information gathering and analysis capabilities through the use of AI, etc., while enhancing the system for persistent information gathering and sharing
Mobile Deployment Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce the SDF's transportation and supply capabilities (deployment/civil protection), including enhancement of the SDF's transportation assets and use of PFI vessels, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Further enhancements of transportation capability Accelerate transportation and supply capabilities by improving supply centers, etc.
Sustainability and Resiliency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase quantity of ammunitions and missiles Ensure maximum operational availability of equipment except during maintenance Improve the resiliency of defense facilities for contingencies Secure required ammunition depots, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain and ensure adequate inventory of ammunitions and missiles Maintain the operational availability ratio Further improve the resiliency of defense facilities Further secure ammunition depots and other facilities commensurate with ammunition requirements
Defense Production and Technological Bases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish strong defense production bases through measures to strengthen the supply chain, etc. Focused investment in equipment areas directly linked to future warfare, and a significant reduction in research and development periods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain robust defense production base capable for realizing innovative equipment Acquire technologies for securing technological superiority in the future
Human Resource Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector, by strengthening recruitment capabilities and establishing a new SDF personnel system. Reinforce education and research (cyber and other domains, joint operations, medical) Improvement of living and working environments and treatment by taking necessary measures against aging barracks and housing and eliminating equipment shortages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Even amid a declining population eligible for recruitment, continuously and stably secure the necessary human resources, including those with specialized knowledge and skills. Further strengthen education and research Foster an organizational environment in which all members can demonstrate their individual abilities while maintaining high morale

* Accelerate investment in improving mobility, securing ammunition, and fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use of existing equipment, while focusing on fundamentally strengthening core areas of future defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense and unmanned asset defense capabilities.

Annex Table 2

Classification	Equipment Type	Procurement Quantity
(1) Stand-off Defense capabilities	Upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile (Surface-, Ship-, Air-ship)	Surface-type 11 Units
	Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) Hypersonic Missile	—
	Ship-to-surface cruise guided missile (Tomahawk)	—
		—
(2) Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities	Type O3 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (modified)	14 Units
	Aegis System-Equipped Vessels	2 ships
	Airborne Early Warning Aircraft(E-2D)	5 aircraft
	Interceptor Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense (SM-3 Block IIA)	—
	Interceptor Missiles with Upgraded Capabilities (PAC-3MSE)	—
Long-Range Ship-to-Air Missiles SM-6	—	
(3) Unmanned Defense Capabilities	Various UAVs	—
	USV	—
	UGV	—
	UUV	—
(4) Cross-Domain Capabilities	Destroyer	12 ships
	Submarine	5 ships
	Patrol Vessel	10 aircraft
	Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	19 aircraft
	Fighter (F-35A)	40 aircraft
	Fighter (F-35B)	25 aircraft
	Fighter Upgrade (F-15)	54 aircraft
	Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft	1 aircraft
Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS)	2 types	
(5) Command and Control/ Intelligence-related Functions	Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2)	3 aircraft
(6) Mobile Deployment Capabilities and Civil Protection	Transport Vessels	8 ships
	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	6 aircraft
	Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft (KC-46A, etc.)	13 aircraft

Reference

Annex Table 3

Classification	Future Posture		
Joint Units	Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units	1 squadron 1 group	
Ground Self-Defense Force	Active-Duty Personnel		149,000 people
	Major Units	Basic Operational Units	9 divisions 5 brigades 1 armored division
		Airborne Units Amphibious Units Air Transport Units	1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Stand-off Missile Units Joint Units	7 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
			2 battalions (hyper velocity gliding projectile Intended for the defense of remote islands)
			2 long-range guided missile units
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
		Electronic Warfare Units (incl. anti-aircraft electronic warfare units)	1 electronic warfare operations unit (incl. 1 anti-aircraft electronic warfare unit)
		Unmanned Vehicle Units	1 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit
Information Warfare Units	1 unit		
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Surface Vessels (Destroyers and Minesweeper vessels) Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units (Fixed-wing Patrol aircraft Units) Unmanned Vehicle Units Information Warfare Units	6 groups (21 divisions) 6 divisions 9 divisions (4 divisions) 2 divisions 1 unit
	Major Equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Aegis System Equipped Vessels Patrol Vessels Submarines Combat Aircraft	54 (10) 2 12 22 Approx. 170
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units Operational Intelligence Units	4 Aircraft Control & Warning Wings 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 groups (24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft Fighters	Approx. 430 Approx. 320

Note 1: 14 out of the 15 divisions/brigades are operated on the basis of rapid deployment.

Note 2: Regarding the number of fighter aircraft units and fighters, necessary studies will be conducted by FY 2027 and necessary measures will be taken in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capability. In this regard, the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be studied.

Reference 4 National Security Strategy

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

I. Purpose

Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival are the primary responsibilities of the Government of Japan. As Japan's security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.

Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world. In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.

Based on such a recognition, the Government of Japan hereby sets forth this National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as "the Strategy") in order to set out Japan's fundamental policies pertaining to national security.

The Strategy first elaborates on Japan's peaceful orientation to date and the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, examines its national interests and identifies its national security objectives. Furthermore, the Strategy identifies national security challenges Japan faces, taking into account the trends of the security environment surrounding Japan. Finally, the Strategy presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core, based on the recognition that in order to overcome the challenges and achieve its objectives, Japan needs to effectively utilize its diverse resources and promote comprehensive measures, strengthen the domestic foundation for national security and seek deeper understanding both at home and abroad, and advance efforts at various levels in a multifaceted and coordinated manner.

The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security, including sea, outer space, cyberspace, official development assistance (ODA) and energy.

Pursuant to the Strategy, and with the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach.

In addition, when implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy.

The Strategy will guide Japan's national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner. Should any major changes in the situation occur, the NSC will review this Strategy in consideration of the security environment at the time, and make necessary revisions.

II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

1. Principles Japan Upholds

Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural

standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system.

Surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with an immense exclusive economic zone and an extensive coastline, Japan as a maritime state has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued "Open and Stable Seas."

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

In addition, Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.) with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries.

Moreover, Japan has contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. In particular, Japan's cooperation contributed to realizing stability, economic growth and democratization in many countries, especially those in Asia, including the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Furthermore, as a peace-loving nation, complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. In particular, Japan has continuously participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), as the role of military forces diversified after the end of the Cold War. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize "a world free of nuclear weapons."

The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered significant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further consolidate such a position.

At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.

Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold.

2. Japan's National Interests and National Security Objectives

In order to achieve the fundamental principle of national security by implementation of concrete policies, the Government of Japan needs to define our national interests and national security objectives, examine them in the context of the constantly evolving security environment, and mobilize all possible means.

Japan's national interests are, first of all, to maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded on freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition.

In addition, Japan's national interests are to achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security. To this end, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, it is essential that Japan, as a maritime state, strengthens the free trade regime for accomplishing economic development through free trade and competition, and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability.

Similarly, the maintenance and protection of international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, are likewise in Japan's national interests.

In order to safeguard these national interests and to fulfill our responsibility in the international community, Japan, adopting the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation as a fundamental principle, will seek to achieve the following national security objectives.

The first objective is to strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining its peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.

The second objective is to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.

The third objective is to improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.

III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

(1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation

Since the beginning of the twenty first century, the balance of power in the international community has been changing on an unprecedented scale, and this has substantially influenced the dynamics of international politics.

The primary drivers of this change in the balance of power are the emerging countries, including China and India. In particular, China is further increasing its presence in the international community. On the other hand, though its relative influence in the international community is changing, the U.S. remains the country that has the world's largest power

as a whole, composed of its soft power originating from its values and culture, on top of its military and economic power. Furthermore, the U.S. has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (the "rebalance" policy).

While the change in the balance of power has encouraged the shift of the center of gravity of world politics and economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it has also been a reason for a weakening leadership in global governance, as exemplified by the stalled negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition, while the rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has deepened interdependence among states, it has also invited a change in the relative influence between states and non-state actors, and brought about a complex impact on the global security environment.

Sovereign states remain the principal actors in the international community, and conflict and coordination between states continue to be the most significant factors affecting global stability. However, as cross-border flow of people, goods, capital, information and other items have been facilitated more easily by the advancement of globalization, non-state actors are beginning to play a more important role in decision-making in the international community.

In addition, the advancement of globalization and technological innovation bears negative impact. Terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors are posing serious threats to the security of any country. Today, these threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could instantly have a direct influence on the security of Japan.

(2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan best understands the tragedy of the use of nuclear weapons and shoulders the responsibility to realize "a world free of nuclear weapons." The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC), and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, remain major threats to Japan and the international community. In particular, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea and the nuclear issue of Iran continue to pose grave threats to peace and stability, not only in each region but also in the entire international community. Moreover, there remain concerns over the acquisition and the use of WMD and related items by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, against which traditional deterrence may not function effectively.

(3) Threat of International Terrorism

Terrorist attacks continue to occur around the world, and the threat of terrorism by international terrorist organizations remains serious. The advancement of globalization has made it easier for those organizations to share information and conspire within their own organizations and with other groups, and to secure geographical access and acquire arms.

International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms. International terrorist organizations are utilizing politically unstable and weakly governed countries and regions as bases for operation and training for terror activities. The ideologies of such terrorist organizations are also motivating other groups and individuals to commit terrorist acts.

Some international terrorist organizations designate Japan as their target. Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad. Diversity of nationality of the perpetrators and victims in recent international terrorism cases has underscored the increasing importance of combating terrorism through international cooperation.

(4) Risks to Global Commons

In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious. While the seas are governed by international maritime law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. With regard to outer space and cyberspace, applicable norms remain to be developed due to the different positions among relevant countries.

Against such a backdrop, not only for economic development but also for the national security of each country, it has therefore become even more important to promote appropriate international rule-making over global commons and to make concerted efforts by the international community while respecting such rules.

“Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication.

However, in recent years, the number of cases of conflict of interests between or among states over natural resources and the security of respective states is increasing. As a result, there is a growing risk of incidents at sea, and of possible escalation into unexpected situations.

In the South China Sea in particular, disputes that have arisen over sovereignty between coastal states and China cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom of navigation, and stability in the Southeast Asian region. In

addition, vulnerability is also increasing in sea lanes of communication, spanning between Japan and the Middle East, on which Japan is largely dependent for its natural and energy resources, due to various problems including regional conflicts and international terrorism in and around the coastal states, as well as piracy. Therefore, advancing efforts to address these issues is also important for securing the sea lanes.

Furthermore, the Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them.

While outer space has been utilized for civil purposes, from security perspective, the importance of outer space has dramatically increased in recent years, given its use for the reinforcement of capabilities for information gathering and surveillance, as well as for securing communication means for military purposes.

On the other hand, the congestion of outer space has heightened as more countries utilize outer space. There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer

space with an increasing amount of space debris caused by anti-satellite tests and satellite collisions amongst others, as well as with the development of counter-space weapons.

Cyberspace, a global domain comprised of information systems, telecommunications networks and others, provides a foundation for social, economic, military and other activities. Meanwhile, risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to steal classified information, disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems, are becoming more serious.

In Japan, with an increasing level of connecting networks of social systems and various other elements, cyberspace is necessary for promoting both economic growth and innovation through the free flow of information in cyberspace. Protecting cyberspace from the above-mentioned risks is vital to secure national security.

(5) Challenges to Human Security

Globalization has enabled people, goods, capital, and information to instantaneously move across borders in large quantities. As a result, international economic activities have expanded, thereby bringing prosperity to the international community.

In contrast, global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country – namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters – are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), common goals in the development field to be achieved by the international community, are not likely to be achieved in some regions and sectors. In addition, the increasing demand for energy, food, and water resources due to the population growth in developing countries and the expansion of economic scale could cause new conflicts.

These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community; therefore, Japan needs to promote necessary measures based on the principle of human security.

(6) The Global Economy and Its Risks

In today’s global economy, no economy is self-sufficient and isolated from the world economy; thus the risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing. While this trend is conspicuous in the financial economy, today, it is also witnessed in the real economy, as value chains and supply chains are established across borders with increasing international specialization.

Under these circumstances, there are concerns over fiscal problems and the slowdown in the growth of emerging economies. In some emerging economies and developing countries, visible signs of protectionism as well as reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules have been observed.

Furthermore, in recent years, with the advancement of technological innovation in energy sector, one has seen the rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries and growing global demand, especially in emerging economies, for energy and mineral resources, followed by the intensified competition for the acquisition of such resources. In addition, given the aggravating environmental problems arising from climate change, there are risks of crunches in global supply and demand as well as temporary shortages of supply in food and water.

2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

(1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

The shift in the global power balance has elevated the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in the international community. While this shift provides opportunities for security cooperation, it has also given rise to regional issues and tensions.

In particular, the region of Northeast Asia is home to a host of actors, such as countries with large-scale military forces, or those possessing nuclear weapons or continuing with nuclear development. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. Countries in the region have contrasting political, economic, and social systems, and thus their security views are diverse, which constitutes another characteristic of the strategic environment of this region.

In this context, in addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to so-called “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a risk that these “gray-zone” situations could further develop into grave situations.

On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific region is also witnessing a rise in opportunities for bilateral exchanges and cooperation among countries in the region. In addition, there have been multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. These initiatives are contributing to the development of mutual understanding and enhancement of joint response capabilities. Therefore, it is important to further promote and develop these multilayered initiatives for regional stability.

(2) North Korea's Military Buildup and Provocative Actions

In the Korean Peninsula, the large-scale military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea confront each other. While North Korea continues to face serious economic difficulties without any improvement in its human rights situation, North Korea heavily allocates its on military affairs today.

In addition, North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions in the Korean Peninsula including the use of provocative rhetoric, some of which are directed at Japan, thereby increasing the tension in the region.

In particular, North Korea's ballistic missiles development, including those with ranges covering the mainland of the U.S., along with its continued attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons for warheads and equipping them to ballistic missiles, substantially aggravate the threat to the security of the region, including Japan. These concerns pose a serious challenge to the entire international community from the viewpoint of the non-proliferation of WMD and related materials.

As Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has been making efforts to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.

Furthermore, North Korea's abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan's sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility and a universal issue for the international community to address as a violation of

fundamental human rights.

(3) China's Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas

There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. On the other hand, China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas through its continued increase in its military budget without sufficient transparency. In addition, China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan, including intrusion into Japan's territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, China has shown the move that appears to unduly infringe the freedom of overflight above the high seas by establishing its own “Air Defense Identification Zone” over the East China Sea.

Such an external stance and military activities by China, coupled with a lack of transparency in its military affairs and security policy, have become an issue of concern to the international community including Japan; therefore, the Government of Japan needs to pay careful attention to this situation.

The relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has deepened in recent years, primarily in economic areas. Meanwhile, the military balance between the two sides has been changing. Thus, the cross-Strait relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability.

IV. Japan's Strategic Approaches to National Security

To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments.

Enhancing Japan's resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large. This belief forms the core of the strategic approaches in the Strategy.

Moreover, in order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies.

In light of this, Japan will take the following concrete strategic approaches, centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy.

1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan's Capabilities and Roles

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment

The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. It is thus necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

This strategic approach first requires the capability to analyze the constantly changing security environment and the course that the international community is taking. On top of this, Japan must have the power to take the lead in setting the international agenda and to proactively advance its national interests, without being confined to a reactionary position to events and incidents after they have already occurred. In doing so, it is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan's position in the international community, through effectively utilizing all strengths and features of the nation. In addition, by highlighting Japan's attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of Japan as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" to make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions. In order to advance such vibrant diplomacy, Japan will strengthen the institutional capabilities through which it undertakes diplomacy. Such overall strengthening of diplomatic capability is critical to ensure the security of Japan.

(2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan

Japan's defense force is the final guarantee of its national security which deters direct threats from reaching Japan and defeats any threat that reaches it. Japan will steadily develop its defense force.

To ensure peace and security in Japan amid the severe security environment surrounding the country, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective and joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power and the political, economic, and social situations; and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations.

Japan will also advance not only the coordination within the government, but also coordination with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.

In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in the above-mentioned efforts, Japan will develop a streamlined planning and programming process, which includes the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium Term Defense Program, based on the Strategy to enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.

In addition, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.

(3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan's Territorial Integrity

To fully protect its territories, in addition to building a comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible

for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.

Japan will also make a constant review on issues that are relevant to ensuring the security of its territories, and take effective measures.

In addition, Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders. Furthermore, from a national security viewpoint, Japan will study the situation of land ownership in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities, and review issues related to the use of such land.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security

As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, through close cooperation with other countries, in maintaining and developing "Open and Stable Seas," which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law. More concretely, Japan will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including anti-piracy operations to ensure safe maritime transport and promote maritime security cooperation with other countries.

Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities that are necessary for the above-mentioned measures, in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks. At the same time, Japan will strive to enhance the frequency and the quality of bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime security such as joint exercises.

In particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East. In this regard, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.

(5) Strengthening Cyber Security

Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts in comprehensively promoting cross-cutting measures to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities threatening cyber security; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard its critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.

To this end, Japan will strengthen public-private partnership in the areas of system design, development and operations based on risk assessment, as well as identifying incidents, minimizing damages and their expansion, and analyzing the causes of and preventing similar incidents. In addition, Japan will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, protection of control systems, and response to the issues of supply chain risk.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen inter-agency cooperation and define the roles of relevant agencies so that it can reinforce its capability to protect cyberspace and respond to incidents as a nation at large. At the same time, Japan will promote a range of measures, including enhancing the ability and function to oversee, assess, apprehend, analyze, and internationally coordinate on cyber incidents, as well as reinforcing relevant agencies in charge of those tasks.

In promoting these measures, strengthening international partnership in a wide range of areas is essential. For this, Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation. Japan will also strengthen information sharing and promote cyber defense cooperation with relevant countries.

(6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism

Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. Moreover, in order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as building a network where risk information held by private sectors can be shared more effectively and efficiently; and reinforcing the structure for analyzing the situation of international terrorism and overseas information-collecting capabilities.

(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

In order to appropriately support decision-making on national security policies, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence, open source intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. In addition, Japan will promote the utilization of geospatial intelligence with which various types of intelligence are combined.

Moreover, Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities by bolstering its human resources, including developing highly-skilled intelligence experts. Japan will thereby promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government's disposal.

Furthermore, Japan will operate the intelligence cycle more effectively through the timely provision of materials and intelligence to the NSC, which serves as the control tower of foreign and security policy, and through the appropriate utilization of intelligence in policy formulation. In addition, under the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (*provisional English translation), Japan will strengthen its counter intelligence functions by developing such intelligence protection system in order to facilitate intelligence functions throughout the Government.

(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In cases that contribute to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner, including through the utilization and provision of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to disaster-stricken countries and sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment, while dealing with the rising costs of defense equipment. In this context, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to

peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.

Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

(9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes

The stable use of outer space is not only fundamental to the lives of the people and the economy, but is also crucial for national security. Japan will therefore maintain and improve the foundation of science, technology and industry that supports the development and utilization of outer space, and promote the utilization of outer space from a security perspective.

In particular, Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites, including ones Japan possesses for the operation of the SDF units, information-gathering and analysis, maritime domain awareness, telecommunication, positioning, navigation and timing. In addition, Japan will enhance a system for space situational awareness.

Furthermore, Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies such as satellite manufacturing.

(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities

The advanced technology of Japan constitutes the foundation of its economic strength and defense forces, and is also a valuable resource that the international community strongly seeks from Japan. Therefore, Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan's technological capabilities.

In promoting measures for strengthening its technological capabilities from a national security viewpoint, Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, including information on technology development. Japan will also make effective use of technology in the area of security, by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government.

Furthermore, Japan's outstanding energy-saving and other environment-related technologies play an important role in Japan's efforts to tackle global issues together with the international community. Therefore, Japan will proactively utilize these technologies in diplomacy as well.

2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

For more than 60 years, the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements at its core, has played an indispensable role for peace and security in Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, the Alliance has also played a more critical role for peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's security. Likewise, for the U.S., the Alliance has served as the core of its alliance network with countries in the region, including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand,

and the Philippines. In this context, the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been serving as a foundation for the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Such close alliance between Japan and the U.S. is underpinned by various factors, including that the two countries share common strategic interests and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. Furthermore, Japan's geostrategic importance in supporting the U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region underlies the close alliance of the two countries.

With the above-mentioned Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation, the two countries have been working closely at various levels, including at the summit and ministerial levels. The two countries address not only bilateral issues, but also the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, including North Korea, as well as global security issues, including counterterrorism measures and non-proliferation of WMD.

In the area of economy, Japan and the U.S. aim to achieve economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region in a rules-based and transparent manner, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which will be mentioned later in this document.

Thus, Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community.

As Japan strengthens its efforts in security as elaborated above, the U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners.

In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a more multifaceted Japan-U.S. Alliance. Based on this recognition, Japan will undertake the following initiatives:

(1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas

Japan ensures its national security by enhancing deterrence through the strengthening of its own defense capability, as well as by the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the extended deterrence provided by the U.S.

Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC), while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy.

In addition, Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the following efforts: advancing joint training, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces; working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy; strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and large-scale disaster response operations.

Moreover, in order to strengthen the foundation of the

Alliance, including enhanced interoperability, Japan will advance multilayered initiatives with the U.S. such as defense equipment and technology cooperation and personnel exchanges.

(2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces

To maintain and enhance the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, it is important for Japan to cooperate proactively with the U.S. to realize the optimal force posture of the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, it is also important for Japan to reduce the impact of the U.S. forces in Japan on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

As part of this effort, while firmly supporting the smooth and effective stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan including the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements. In addition, Japan will further promote the joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces, while taking into consideration relations with local communities.

Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement measures to reduce the impact on people living near the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan. In particular, Okinawa Prefecture is situated in a critically important location in terms of national security, and the stationing of the U.S. forces there significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In the meantime, as a large part of the facilities and areas for the exclusive use of the U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated in the prefecture, Japan will make utmost efforts to reduce the impact on Okinawa, including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan's Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

As elaborated above, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance in all its aspects, including in political, economic and security areas is indispensable to improve the security environment surrounding Japan. On top of that, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the Asia-Pacific region through the following approaches, as it plays an important role in enhancing Japan's security environment.

(1) Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, such as the ROK, Australia, the countries of ASEAN, and India:

- The ROK is a neighboring country of the utmost geopolitical importance for the security of Japan. Close cooperation with the ROK is of great significance for peace and stability of the region, including in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues. For this reason, Japan will construct future-oriented and multilayered relations and strengthen the foundation for security cooperation with the ROK. In particular, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK is a key framework in realizing peace and stability in East Asia. Japan will strengthen this trilateral framework, including in cooperation on North Korean nuclear and missile issues. With regard to the issue over the sovereignty of Takeshima, Japan will make persevering diplomatic efforts, based on the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance with international law.

- Australia is an important regional partner that shares not only universal values but also strategic interests with Japan. In addition to strengthening the mutually complementary economic relations between the two countries, Japan will also strengthen its strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation. Japan will also promote a wide range of cooperation with Australia in its efforts to shape a regional order in the Asia-Pacific and to maintain and reinforce peace and stability in the international community. In so doing, Japan will utilize the trilateral framework among Japan, the U.S. and Australia, as necessary.
 - The countries of ASEAN, where economic growth and democratization have been progressing and which embraces great cultural diversity, are located in the critical areas of sea lanes of communication of Japan. Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors, including politics and security based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Given the influence ASEAN has on peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, Japan will provide further assistance to their efforts towards maintaining and strengthening the unity of ASEAN. Furthermore, Japan appreciates the efforts by the countries concerned to settle disputes in the South China Sea not by force, but in accordance with the law and rules, as shown in their efforts towards the formulation of a Code of Conduct (COC) with China. Japan will support these efforts so that an effective and legally binding code of conduct is formulated.
 - India is becoming increasingly influential, due to what is projected to become the world's largest population, and to high economic growth and potential. India is also geopolitically important for Japan, as it is positioned in the center of sea lanes of communication. Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership.
- (2) Stable relations between Japan and China are an essential factor for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. From a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan will strive to construct and enhance a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China in all areas, including politics, economy, finance, security, culture and personal exchanges. In particular, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its advancing military capabilities through its rapidly increasing military budget. As a part of such efforts, through continuing and promoting defense cooperation, Japan will seek to urge improvement in transparency of China's military and security policies, and promote measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations. Furthermore, with regard to China's recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on its unique assertion in its relations with neighboring countries, including Japan, Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalating the situation.
 - (3) With regard to the issues of North Korea, Japan will cooperate closely with relevant countries to urge North Korea to take concrete actions towards its denuclearization and other goals, based on the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. Concerning Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration. In particular, it is the basic recognition of Japan that normalization of relations with North Korea will not be possible without resolving the abduction issue. Japan will make every effort to realize the safety and prompt return of all abductees at the earliest possible date, investigate the truth regarding the abductions, and transfer those who executed the abductions.
 - (4) Under the increasingly severe security environment in East Asia, it is critical for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole, in order to ensure its security. Based on this recognition, Japan will cooperate with Russia in securing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. With regard to the issue of the Northern Territories, the most important pending issue between the two countries, Japan will vigorously negotiate with Russia under a consistent policy of resolving the issue of the attribution of the four islands and concluding a peace treaty.
 - (5) In promoting the efforts mentioned above, Japan will actively utilize and engage in the further development of functional and multilayered frameworks for regional cooperation, starting from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN+3, ARF, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and trilateral frameworks, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK, Japan-U.S.-Australia and Japan-U.S.-India, as well as Japan-China-ROK, a grouping of three large neighboring economic powers. In addition, Japan will appropriately contribute to the creation of a more institutional security framework in East Asia in the future.
 - (6) Japan will also cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region. These partners include Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Southwest Asian nations, the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. In particular, Japan will deepen its cooperation with the PICs, which possess vast exclusive economic zones and abundant maritime resources in the Pacific Ocean, in many areas including maritime cooperation, through such fora as the Pacific Islands Leaders' Meeting (PALM).
 - (7) Furthermore, Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries outside the Asia-Pacific region that play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the international community.
 - Europe has the influence to formulate international public opinions, the capacity to develop norms in major international frameworks and a large economy. Japan and European countries, especially the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, share universal values of freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and principles such as market economy. They are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At a time when the power balance of the international community is changing, in order to establish an international order

based on universal values and rules, to effectively address global challenges, and to accomplish Japan's initiatives for a peaceful and prosperous international community, Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Japan has contributed to the democratization of East European countries and Baltic countries, and will engage in strengthening relations with them, as well as the Caucasus countries.

- Emerging countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina and South Africa have been increasing their presence not only in the international economy, but also in international politics. Japan will therefore endeavor to further develop relations with such countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges.
- Stability in the Middle East is an issue that is inseparably linked to the stable supply of energy, and therefore Japan's very survival and prosperity. Given that the Gulf States are the largest source of crude oil for Japan, in order to ensure the stability of the Middle East, Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with these countries, encompassing wide-ranging economic cooperation beyond resources and energy, as well as politics and security. In this context, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East, including the issue of democratization in Arab countries that stems from the "Arab Spring," the situation in Syria, Iran's nuclear issue, the Middle East peace process and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. In the same vein, Japan will also collaborate with other countries that play important roles in the Middle East, such as the U.S., European countries, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
- Africa is a prospective economic frontier with abundant strategic natural resources and sustained economic growth. In addition, Africa has been increasing its influence in the international community. Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, and promote cooperation in international fora.

4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community

As a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community.

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations

The U.N. was established with the UNSC as the core of a collective security system for maintaining international peace and security. However, the system has not fully functioned as originally anticipated. Nevertheless, the U.N. has taken the lead on various efforts for peace and security of the world, backed by its legitimacy through universal participation by the Member States and its expertise. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, the role played by the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security has continued to grow.

Building on the invaluable experiences of having served on numerous occasions as a non-permanent member of the UNSC,

Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.

Moreover, Japan will actively contribute to diverse U.N.-led efforts, including U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and collective security measures; diplomatic efforts such as preventive diplomacy and mediation; seamless assistance efforts from the phase of post-conflict emergency humanitarian relief to recovery and reconstruction, as well as assistance through the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission.

At the same time, one must be mindful that realizing the enhancement of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the U.N., including the strengthening of collective security functions, is an urgent challenge. Therefore, Japan will continue to strive to achieve the UNSC reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council.

(2) Strengthening the Rule of Law

Japan will continue to faithfully comply with international law as a guardian of the rule of law. In addition, in order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan's principles and positions based on fairness, transparency and reciprocity are duly reflected. Furthermore, Japan will actively support international judicial organs in terms of both human capital and finance. In addition, Japan will actively engage in assistance for the development of legal systems in other countries.

In particular, Japan will involve itself in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace. While advancing policy coordination with countries with shared interests, Japan will contribute proactively to the development of international rules in the above-mentioned areas, and to the promotion of confidence building measures among countries of mutual interest. In addition, Japan will further strengthen capacity building efforts for developing countries in these fields. More concretely:

- With regard to the sea, Japan will promote regional efforts and play a leading role in creating a shared recognition that reinforcement of the maritime order governed by law and rules and not by coercion is indispensable for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole.
- With regard to outer space, emphasizing the concept of ensuring freedom of access and utilization of space, Japan will participate proactively in the efforts to formulate an international code of conduct that aims to prevent experiments of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and avoid collision of satellites, and consequently strive to ensure safe and stable use of outer space.
- With regard to cyberspace, based on the recognition of ensuring the free flow of information in cyberspace, Japan will actively cooperate with like-minded countries in the development of international rules on the premise that existing international law applies to cyberspace. Japan will also vigorously support the capacity building efforts of developing countries in this area.

(3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Japan, as the only country in the world to have suffered atomic bombings in war, will continue its vigorous efforts to seek "a world free of nuclear weapons."

In view of the threat posed by progress in nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and being mindful of future trends in the balance of nuclear forces in the Asia-Pacific region

together with the rapid advancement of military technologies, Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea's nuclear and missile development issues and Iran's nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement export control measures from a security perspective, including active participation in the discussions in the international export control regime, in coordination with other relevant countries, to prevent the proliferation of arms, as well as dual use items or technologies to countries of proliferation concern. In addition, Japan will engage in international efforts on conventional weapons, such as small arms and light weapons, and anti-personnel mines.

(4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation

Over the course of more than 20 years, Japan has dispatched SDF units and other personnel to various regions on international peace cooperation assignments, including in Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan. These contributions have been deeply appreciated both in Japan and by the international community.

Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities with its determination to contribute even more proactively to peace based on the principle of international cooperation, taking into account the appreciation and expectation Japan receives from the international community. In addition, when participating in PKO, Japan will endeavor to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through coordination with other activities, including ODA projects.

Moreover, in order to implement seamless assistance in security-related areas, including through further strategic utilization of ODA and capacity building assistance, as well as coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Japan will develop a system that enables assistance to potential recipient organizations that cannot receive Japan's assistance under the current schemes.

Furthermore, Japan as a whole will proactively engage in training for peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries. When engaging in such efforts, Japan will consult closely with countries or organizations that have experience in the same fields, including the U.S., Australia and European countries.

(5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism

Acts of terrorism are unjustifiable regardless of their motivation and must be firmly condemned. It is important for the international community as a whole to take a firm position against them.

Japan will promote international counter-terrorism efforts with the international community for national security. Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation; reinforcement of the international legal framework to stringently punish terrorists; and assistance to developing countries which do not have sufficient capacity for counter-terrorism and other measures.

Furthermore, Japan must be aware that terrorism and transnational organized crime are closely linked in light of the situation whereby the proceeds of organized crime, such as

illicit trafficking, the trade of arms and drugs, and kidnapping, form an important source of funding for terrorists. Therefore, Japan will enhance international cooperation and assistance for developing countries to prevent and combat transnational organized crime.

5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community, such as poverty, energy issues, widening disparity, climate change, natural disasters, and food-related issues, through the active and strategic utilization of ODA, as necessary.

(1) Sharing Universal Values

Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights including women's rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.

The wave of democratization that began in the countries of Eastern Europe and ASEAN in the 1990s and spread to the countries of the Arab world at the beginning of the 2010s has become an irreversible tide, coupled with the rapid development of globalization and market-oriented economic reforms.

On the other hand, as was observed in the "Arab Spring," the process of democratization does not always proceed smoothly. As an advanced, liberal and democratic nation, based on the principle of human security, Japan will actively utilize its ODA in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights, and contribute to the enhancement of the growing international trend towards the protection of human rights, including through dialogues in the area of human rights.

Japan will also engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women, cooperating with the international community to implement measures to empower women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and promote their social advancement.

(2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security

Japan has garnered high recognition by the international community, by its proactive contribution to global development in the world through utilizing ODA. Addressing development issues contributes to the enhancement of the global security environment, and it is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts as part of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

Against this backdrop, in order to contribute to the realization of human security, Japan will utilize its ODA in a strategic and effective manner. Japan will also strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, in areas such as poverty eradication, global health, education and water, in cooperation with diverse stakeholders, including international organizations and NGOs.

In addition, Japan will play a leading role in the formulation of new international development goals, namely the post-2015 development agenda. In this context, Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security

in the international community, building on our initiatives on this agenda to date.

Moreover, Japan will share the lessons learned and experiences from the many natural disasters that it has experienced, including the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. Given the expanding scale, impact and frequency of disasters globally, Japan will take the lead in international cooperation on disaster management and ensure that communities around the world have a high degree of resilience to disasters.

(3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries

Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including eminent students and administrative officials who are expected to become future leaders. Japan will make use of such opportunities to learn from their knowledge and experience, as well as providing them with opportunities to be familiarized with Japanese systems, technologies and expertise. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to enhance mutual understanding with Japan, and ensure that these personnel can contribute to sustainable economic and social development in their home countries.

Japan will engage in efforts to maintain and develop such human networks to expand and reinforce the foundations of cooperation.

(4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System

The expansion of the open and rule-based international economic system, where Japan continues to be a major player, is essential for the world economy and Japan's economic prosperity. In this regard, Japan will promote economic partnership, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among Japan, China and the ROK, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), so as to achieve comprehensive and high-level trade agreements. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the growth of the global economy, which in turn, will also bring economic growth to Japan.

In addition, rule-making for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region through the above-mentioned efforts strengthens the vigor and prosperity in the region, and has a strategic importance of strengthening the foundation for a stable security environment in the region.

It is expected that the conclusion of such 21st-century economic partnership agreements will set new and attractive precedents of trade liberalization, and promote global-scale trade liberalization in the multilateral trade regime based on the WTO.

(5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues

The stable supply of energy and other resources is essential for a vibrant Japanese economy and thus constitutes a challenge to national security. Promoting measures such as the diversification of supply sources is necessary for securing stable and low-cost resource supply. Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools to gain the understanding of countries concerned in this course.

In the area of climate change, Japan will increase its engagements towards emission reduction. Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming (the Actions for Cool Earth (ACE)) that utilizes its strengths in outstanding technologies on environment and energy, and its assistance to

developing countries. At the same time, Japan will engage in establishing a fair and effective international framework with participation by all countries. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the achievement of emission reduction by the international community as a whole and to the resolution of climate change issues.

(6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges

People-to-people exchanges are significant as they enhance mutual understanding and friendship between countries and solidify national ties, while also helping to develop a stable and friendly security environment by deepening an appropriate understanding towards Japan in the international community.

In particular, Japan will implement measures to expand two-way youth exchanges and will seek to strengthen relations with various countries into the future.

For example, Japan has recently marked 40 years of friendship and cooperation with ASEAN, where regional integration is advancing while maintaining cultural diversity. By further vitalizing exchange programs with ASEAN, Japan will further promote mutual understanding.

Moreover, through events of interest for the world, such as the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo, Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture, and will work to construct and deepen friendly relations at the individual level.

6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding

In order to fully ensure national security, in addition to strengthening key capabilities with diplomatic power and defense force at their core, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for these capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.

Furthermore, considering the importance of seeking a deeper understanding for Japan's security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security, Japan will advance the following measures.

(1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases

Defense production and technological bases are one of the important factors that support defense forces through research, development, production, operation and maintenance of defense equipment. In order to develop, maintain and operate defense capability steadily with limited resources in the medium- to long-term, Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness.

(2) Boosting Communication Capabilities

In order to promote its security policy from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its policy to the world and its people, and increase transparency. In this regard, it is necessary to deepen the understanding among the people of Japan regarding security policy and build cooperative relations and trust with other countries.

To this end, with the Prime Minister's office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information

dissemination in foreign languages. In addition, the Government as a whole will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks. In doing so, Japan will promote Japanese language education overseas, and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas.

At a time when the global security environment is becoming more complex and diverse, it becomes increasingly likely for countries to have conflicting interests. However, by precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan's position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the forum of international opinion, and contribute to the stability of the international community.

(3) Reinforcing the Social Base

In order to support national security policy from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity. In addition, it is also essential that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.

To that end, the Government of Japan will promote the following measures: foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region; raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty; and ensure the understanding and cooperation of residents around defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for the activities of the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan, through advancing measures that widen the understanding of the general public about the current status of such activities.

(4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base

In order to invigorate a national discussion and debate and contribute to high-quality policymaking on national security, Japan will seek to enhance and strengthen education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education, including through the dispatch of officials of relevant ministries. In addition, Japan will promote practical research on national security, and engage in deepening exchanges among the Government, higher education institutions and think tanks, thereby promoting the sharing of insight and knowledge.

Furthermore, Japan will promote the creation of experts and government officials that can make practical and constructive contributions to national security policy, thus broadening the pool of experts on national security.

Reference 5 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2019 and beyond

(December 18, 2018)

I. NDPG's Objective

Japan since the end of World War II has consistently treaded the path of a peace-loving nation. This has been accomplished by the persistent efforts of our forerunners under the principle of maintaining peace.

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to maintain Japan's peace and security, to ensure its survival and to defend to the end Japanese nationals' life, person and property of its nationals and territorial land, waters

and airspace. This is the foremost responsibility that Japan must fulfill as a sovereign nation. Carrying out this responsibility by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative is at the very heart of Japan's national security. Japan's defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security and the clear representation of the unwavering will and ability of Japan as a peace-loving nation. And maintaining Japan's peace and security is an essential premise for its prosperity.

At present, security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speeds. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. In addition, rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air.

Even under these circumstances, Japan will vigorously march forward as a peace-loving nation. To do so, Japan, amid the dramatically changing security environment, needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding roles Japan can fulfill. Today, no country can preserve its security by itself alone. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries are critical to Japan's national security, and this cannot be achieved without Japan's own efforts. The international community also expects Japan to play roles that are commensurate with its national power.

In strengthening its defense capability, Japan must squarely face the aforementioned realities of national security and ensure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past. In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains, Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air. On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with declining birthrates and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan's own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan's national security. As stated above, Japan's fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance's ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific.

Based on the foregoing thoughts, the Government, in line with "On National Security Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013, and hereinafter referred to as "National Security Strategy"), hereby sets forth the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond" as the new guidelines regarding how Japan's national defense ought to be to form the foundation of Japan's future.

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. Characteristics of current security environment

In the international community, interdependency among countries

further expands and deepens. On the other hand, thanks to further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging are inter-state competitions across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their influence.

These inter-state competitions occur on a continuous basis: In conducting inter-state competitions, states leverage various means such as undermining other country's sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating foreign country's public opinion by exploiting social media. Also, the so-called gray-zone situations are becoming persistent over a long period of time, playing out as part of inter-state competitions. They may possibly further increase and expand.

Such gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In addition, methods employed to alter the status quo, such as "hybrid warfare," that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones.

Driven by rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fields, military technologies are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in new domains. Since space and cyber domains are widely used for civilian purposes, if stable use of these domains is impeded, it may entail serious consequences for the safety of state and its citizens.

Due to advances in military technologies, a variety of threats can now easily penetrate national borders. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it difficult still to foresee future warfare.

In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. With respect to space and cyber domains, establishing international rules and norms has been a security agenda. In maritime domain, there have been cases where country unilaterally claims its entitlements or take actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. These have generated undue infringement upon freedom in high seas. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles as well as worsening international terrorism remain grave challenges for the international community.

Against such background, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan's surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities.

2. Situations by country and region

While remaining to possess the world's largest comprehensive national power, the United States, with inter-state competitions in a range of areas prominently emerging, has acknowledged that particularly important challenge is strategic competition with China and Russia who attempt to alter global and regional order.

To rebuild its military power, the United States is engaged in such efforts as maintaining military advantage in all domains through technological innovations, enhancing nuclear deterrent, and advancing missile defense capabilities. The United States upholds defense commitments to allies and partners and maintains forward force presence, while calling on them to share greater responsibility. The United States frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority region where it adopts a policy of strengthening alliances and partnerships.

Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including the United States are reviewing their strategies to deal with coercive attempts to alter the status-quo as well as "hybrid warfare." In view of changes in the security environment, NATO member states have been increasing their defense expenditures.

With an aim to build "world-class forces" by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of defense expenditures with continued lack of transparency. China has engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In so doing, China attaches importance to ensuring superiority in new domains: it is rapidly advancing capabilities in cyber and electromagnetic domains with which to disrupt opponent's command and control; and continues to enhance space domain capabilities through developing and experimenting anti-satellite weapons. China is also improving missile defense penetration capabilities and amphibious landing capabilities. Such capability enhancement serves to improve the so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial ("A2/AD") capabilities—capabilities to deny access and deployment of foreign militaries to one's surrounding areas and to disrupt their military operations therein—as well as to build capabilities with which to conduct military operations over greater distances. In addition, China is promoting civil-military integration policy in areas of national defense, science & technology and industry, and actively developing and acquiring cutting-edge technologies of potential military utility. Also, maritime law enforcement agencies and the military are improving their collaboration.

China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent part of Japanese territory, Chinese government vessels continually violate Japanese territorial waters despite Japan's strong protests while Chinese naval ships continuously operate in waters around the Islands. China is also expanding its military activities in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In particular, the Chinese military in recent years has frequently advanced to the Pacific, with its navigation routes and unit composition becoming more diverse. In the South China Sea, China has forcibly conducted large-scale, rapid reclamation of maritime features, which are being converted into military foothold. China in the South China Sea is also expanding and intensifying its maritime and air activities.

Such Chinese military and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments. China is eagerly expected to play active roles in a more cooperative manner in the region and the international community.

North Korea in recent years has launched ballistic missiles at unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational

capabilities such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. Given technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. Although North Korea expressed its intention for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and blew up in public its nuclear test site, it has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. There has been no essential change in North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities.

North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. North Korea also retains large-scale special operation forces.

Such military developments of North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan's security and significantly undermine peace and security of the region and the international community. Through United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international community also has made it clear that North Korea's nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities constitute a clear threat to international peace and security.

Russia is enhancing its military posture by continuing force modernization efforts with a focus on nuclear forces. Russia is in sharp confrontation with Europe and the United States over issues including situation in Ukraine. Russia's military activities are trending upward in the Arctic Circle, Europe, areas around the United States and the Middle East, as well as in the Far East including Japan's Northern Territories. Close attention therefore needs to be paid to its developments.

3. Characteristics of Japan

Surrounded by sea on all sides and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is blessed with vast Exclusive Economic Zones: spread widely therein are life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, as well as various resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation dependent on overseas trade for the bulk of energy resources and food supplies, fundamental to its peace and prosperity is to ensure the safety of maritime and air traffic by strengthening the order of "Open and Stable Oceans," an order based on fundamental norms such as rule of law and freedom of navigation.

Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population and information infrastructure concentrate in Japan's urban areas, and a large number of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas.

In addition, Japan is undergoing population decline and ageing with dwindling birthrate at unprecedented pace. Severe fiscal conditions continue as well.

4. Summary

In light of the foregoing, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was of concern during the Cold War era, remains low, Japan's security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013 and hereinafter referred to as the "former Guidelines") was formulated.

To prevent threats to Japan from materializing to menace life and peaceful livelihood of its nationals, it behooves Japan to take

measures that are in line with these realities.

III. Japan's Basic Defense Policy

In line with the National Security Strategy and from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace," Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also expanded and deepened cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Japan under these precepts will ever not change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the National Security Strategy—defend to the end Japanese nationals' life, person and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. To that end, the Government will identify national defense objectives and the means to achieve them, and proactively and strategically promote measures with added variety.

National defense objectives are: first, to create, on a steady-state basis, security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation's disposal; second, to deter threat from reaching Japan by making opponent realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and finally, should threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage.

Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan's own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and flexibly in order to deal with increasingly complex security environment that is changing at accelerating speeds.

In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and enhance its credibility. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts including comprehensive air and missile defense as well as civil protection. At the same time, towards the long-term goal of bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan will play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

1. Strengthening Japan's own architecture for national defense

(1) Building comprehensive architecture for national defense

In order to squarely address the realities of security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build national defense architecture that in all phases integrates the strengths at the nation's disposal: this structure enables not only Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts; and enables cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fields as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace.

Japan will further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic

communications by systematically combining all available policy tools.

In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray-zone” situations, Japan has been strengthening its posture under the principle of civilian control of the military. Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by enhanced support mechanism. In view of protecting the life, person and property of its nationals, Japan will also continue to strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, and, in cooperation with local governments, work to secure evacuation facilities. Japan will build a posture fully prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and ensure their safety. Japan will promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives such as electricity and communication as well as to protect cyberspace.

In addition to making aforementioned efforts, in order to ensure the effectiveness of various policies and measures, Japan will, on a steady-state basis, devise and review relevant plans while systematizing them; also, expand the use of simulations and comprehensive training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of emergency response posture.

(2) Strengthening Japan’s defense capability

a. Significance and necessity of defense capability

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace.

At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries.

Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative.

b. Truly effective defense capability – Multi-domain Defense Force

To be able to deter and counter qualitatively and quantitatively superior military threats in increasingly testing security environment, it has become vitally important to adapt to warfare that combines capabilities in new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—and traditional domains—land, sea and air.

Japan needs to develop, while qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing capabilities in individual domains, a defense capability that can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished.

In order to ensure national defense in increasingly uncertain security environment, it is also important for Japan to be able to seamlessly conduct activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. To date, Japan has endeavored to develop a defense capability that allows to engage in diverse activities in

a swift and sustainable manner. In recent years, however, SDF has had to increase the scope and frequency of its steady-state activities such as maintaining presence, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities: This is exacting a chronic burden on its personnel and equipment, generating a concern that SDF may not be able to maintain proficiency and the volume of its activities.

Japan needs to: improve quality and quantity of capabilities that support sustainability and resiliency of various activities; and develop a defense capability that enables sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities commensurate with the character of given situations.

Further, Japan’s defense capability needs to be capable of strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats as well as promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation.

In light of the foregoing, Japan will henceforth build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the former Guidelines.

(3) Roles that defense capability should play

In order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan’s defense capability must be able to serve the roles specified below in a seamless and combined manner. In particular, in view of protecting the life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan’s defense capability to fulfill diverse roles on a steady-state basis.

a. From peacetime to “gray-zone” situations

SDF will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and capability. SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications including aforementioned activities by SDF units. SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as “persistent ISR”) activities around Japan. SDF will prevent occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.

SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur.

b. Attack against Japan including its remote islands

In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures.

Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal

means and minimize damage to maintain SDF's capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed.

In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces.

c. Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains during all phases

In space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, to prevent any actions that impede its activities, SDF will conduct on a steady-state basis persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In case of such event, SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as damage limitation and recovery.

In case of armed attack against Japan, SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains.

In addition, in light of the society's growing dependence on space and cyberspace, SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations.

d. Large-scale disasters

In case of large-scale disasters, to protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals, SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments, and engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnership and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector.

e. Collaboration with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance
In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, in line with the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," Japan will effectively conduct activities described in 2. by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

f. Promotion of security cooperation

SDF will actively engage in efforts for enhanced security cooperation as stated in 3.: In accordance with policies that are tailored to individual regions and countries, SDF will strategically promote defense cooperation and exchanges such as: joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchange.

2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan's own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan's national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

As inter-state competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan's national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. The United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important.

While the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the "Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation" in order to achieve its national defense

objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds.

In further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthen its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

(1) Strengthening ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats

In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan's peace and security.

For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen cooperation in: space and cyber domains; comprehensive air and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral flexible deterrent options. Japan will also promote formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft.

(2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas

In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities such as capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy.

In order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security.

In particular, Japan will promote standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, and sharing of various networks. In order to support sustainable U.S. force activities around Japan as well as to ensure high operational availability of SDF equipment, Japan will build capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment.

To efficiently improve Japanese and U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S. equipment through optimized Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Japan-U.S. joint research and development.

With respect to SDF facilities and U.S. force facilities and areas including training facilities and areas, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use and efforts for improved resiliency.

(3) Steady implementation of measures concerning stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures including Host Nation Support (HNS). Japan will also steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan to mitigate impact on local communities while maintaining deterrence

provided by U.S. forces.

Okinawa is located in areas critically important to Japan's national security and U.S. force stationing in Okinawa greatly contributes to deterrence. The Japan-U.S. Alliance provides: At the same time, facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Japan are highly concentrated in Okinawa. In light of this, Japan in recent years has been furthering its efforts to mitigate impact on Okinawa including returns of U.S. facilities and areas. Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact on Okinawa by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of impact on Okinawa.

3. Strengthening security cooperation

In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy.

(1) Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges

With Australia, to further improve interoperability and by utilizing frameworks such as Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2"), Japan will further promote bilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation, and advance cooperative activities such as bilaterally-aligned capacity building assistance to third parties. Japan will also strengthen cooperative relations under trilateral framework among Japan, Australia and the United States, which share universal values and strategic interests.

With India, in view of enhancing strategic partnership and by utilizing frameworks such as "2+2," Japan will promote bilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation in a broad range of areas including maritime security. Japan will also strengthen cooperation among Japan, India and the United States.

With Southeast Asian countries, Japan will continue to support efforts for strengthening the centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is the key to regional cooperation, and promote practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building assistance.

With the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan will promote defense cooperation in a broad range of fields and strive to establish the foundation for collaboration. Japan will also continue to strengthen trilateral cooperation among Japan, the ROK and the United States to maintain peace and stability in the region.

With the United Kingdom and France, to contribute to the stability of maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will, while leveraging such frameworks as the "2+2," promote efforts including more practical bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement. Japan will strengthen

cooperation with European countries as well as NATO and the European Union (EU).

With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote efforts including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises as well as bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement.

With China, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote multi-layered dialogues and exchange. In so doing, Japan will continue to encourage China to play responsible and constructive roles for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement. In order to avoid unexpected situations between the two countries, Japan will utilize the "Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China" in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries. Japan will calmly and firmly deal with Chinese activities at sea and in the air around Japan.

With Russia, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia including the "2+2," high-level interactions and broad unit-to-unit exchanges, and deepen bilateral training and exercises.

With island nations of the Pacific Ocean, Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as exchanges and cooperation that utilize capabilities and characteristics of each service of SDF.

With countries in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, in order to build and strengthen cooperative relations Japan will promote exchanges at all levels, including high level, and cooperation in such fields as capacity building assistance related to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

Regarding multilateral frameworks, Japan attaches importance to the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that provide significant foundations for discussions, cooperation and exchanges related to security field in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Japan will contribute to strengthening cooperation and mutual trust among the countries in the region.

(2) Responding to global issues

From the viewpoint of securing the freedom and security of navigation and flight, Japan will promote cooperation to contribute to the improvement of capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, which include South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka, as well as Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, Japan will promote such activities as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges and active port visits at these occasions. Japan will also conduct activities such as counter-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening capabilities of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

Regarding the use of space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fields including the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others. Regarding the use of cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises.

In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive

technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF's knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. While making good use of past experiences to develop human resources, Japan will actively contribute through such efforts as sending embedded personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building assistance in areas that Japan excels. Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for counter-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities.

IV. Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

1. Guiding thoughts

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, it is essential that Japan use budget and personnel even more effectively.

In strengthening defense capability, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms.

In taking these measures, SDF will further promote jointness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding stove-piped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment. In particular, SDF will further promote jointness in a wide range of areas such as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, comprehensive air and missile defense, damage recovery, transportation, maintenance, supply, security, education, medical service and research.

With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, and work further to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

2. Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations

(1) Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains

In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan's superb science and technology. In doing so, SDF will strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones.

a. Capabilities in space domain

Effective use of satellites for such purposes as information-gathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to

the stable use of space are increasing.

SDF therefore will further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent ground- and space-based space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent's command, control, communications and information.

In so doing, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the United States and other relevant countries. SDF will also engage in organization building such as the creation of units specializing in space and dedicated career field, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space field.

b. Capabilities in cyber domain

Information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace are a foundation for SDF's activities in various domains, and attack against them seriously disrupts organized activities of SDF. In order to prevent such attack, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring of command and communications systems and networks as well as for damage limitation and recovery. In addition, SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent's use of cyberspace for the attack.

In so doing, SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and take into consideration its contributions to whole-of-government efforts.

c. Capabilities in electromagnetic domain

Since the use of electromagnetic spectrum has expanded in range and purpose, it is now recognized as a major operational domain situated on the frontline of offense-defense dynamic in today's warfare. Ensuring superiority in electromagnetic domain is also critical to realizing cross-domain operations.

SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent's electronic jamming. In addition, SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan. In order to smoothly perform these activities, SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum.

(2) Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains

SDF will enhance capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains.

a. Capabilities in maritime and air domains

In order to effectively deal with armed attack against Japan, it is extremely important for Japan to establish and maintain maritime and air superiority.

SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan.

SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV).

By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft which bring operational flexibility, SDF will improve air

operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. In so doing, as number of air bases that allow for take-off and landing of fighters is limited, Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel.

b. Stand-off defense capability

As other countries make remarkable advances in early warning and control capabilities and the performance of various missiles, SDF needs to effectively intercept attack against Japan, while ensuring safety of its personnel.

SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies.

c. Comprehensive air and missile defense capability

Japan needs to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage.

SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nationwide protection and also enhancing capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.

Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures.

d. Maneuver and deployment capability

In order to effectively deal with various situations such as attack on remote islands, requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis and to maneuver and deploy according to situation.

SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities. In addition, to enable swift and large-scale transport, SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis.

(3) Strengthening sustainability and resiliency

To be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support needs to be enhanced.

SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, SDF will improve sustainability through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, SDF will work toward more effective and efficient equipment maintenance by reviewing existing maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability.

3. Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability

(1) Reinforcing human resource base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. Securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of sustainability and resilience of defense capability, SDF needs to work even further to reinforce human resource base that sustains SDF personnel.

MOD/SDF will promote efforts, including those address institutional aspects, in order to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people. These efforts include: various recruitment measures such as cooperation with local governments and other entities; diversifying applicant pool including college graduates; expanding women's participation; appropriate extension of SDF personnel's mandatory retirement ages; leveraging retired SDF personnel as well as reserve personnel; and measures for raising fulfillment rates. MOD/SDF will also promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence.

To enable all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment and promote work style reforms at MOD/SDF to ensure proper work-life balance.

Through such efforts as enhancing joint education and research, MOD/SDF will enrich education and research to improve SDF's capabilities and foster its unity. MOD/SDF will enhance education for organization management skills. In addition, MOD/SDF will improve treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, and allowance increase that reflects the special nature of SDF's missions. MOD/SDF will also further improve re-employment support for SDF personnel in view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system.

(2) Reviewing equipment structure

MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure. In so doing, while giving due considerations to capabilities each SDF service requires for its operations, MOD/SDF will: develop equipment with multiple functional variants; optimize and standardize specifications of equipment; and jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services; reduce types of aircraft; suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased; and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness.

(3) Reinforcing technology base

As character of warfare changes dramatically due to advances in military technologies, it is becoming all the more important to reinforce technological base that has bearing on defense equipment through whole-of-government approach by leveraging Japan's superb science and technology.

MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development timelines by streamlining R&D processes and procedures. In doing so, MOD/SDF will encourage company's prior investments and leverage its strength to full potential by actively using design proposal-based competition scheme and improving foreseeability through the formulation of R&D visions on capabilities required for Japan's future national defense.

In addition, MOD/SDF will work to actively leverage

potentially dual-use, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program.

MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends.

(4) Optimizing equipment procurement

In order to secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of SDF equipment, MOD/SDF needs to acquire high-performance equipment at the most affordable prices possible. MOD/SDF also needs to do thorough cost management and reduction not only during budget development but also during budget implementation.

MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment maintenance. MOD/SDF will facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies, and promote defense equipment development that eyes towards international joint development and production as well as overseas transfer. In order to efficiently procure U.S.-made high-performance equipment, MOD/SDF will promote rationalization of FMS procurement and work to align procurement timings and specifications with U.S. forces and other parties. In taking these steps, MOD/SDF will further strengthen efforts on project management throughout the entire life cycle of defense equipment.

(5) Strengthening defense industrial base

Japan’s defense industry is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment. For the production of high-performance equipment and to ensure their high operational availability, it is necessary to make defense industrial base more resilient by overcoming challenges such as high costs due to low- volume, high-mix production and lack of international competitiveness, thereby enabling it to effectively adapt to changing security environment.

In addition to taking various measures concerning equipment structure, technological base, and equipment procurement, to create a competitive environment for companies, MOD/SDF will reform the existing contract system including affording incentives to companies. MOD/SDF will enhance supply-chain risk management and work to further expand Japanese defense industry’s participation in maintenance work of imported equipment. For whole-of-government efforts to promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases where the transfer contributes to Japan’s security, MOD/SDF will work to make necessary improvements in the Principles’ implementation. At the same time, MOD/SDF will strengthen intellectual property management, technology management and information security in order to prevent drain of important defense equipment-related technologies. Through above-mentioned measures, MOD/SDF will work to reduce equipment costs and improve industrial competitiveness, thereby striving to build resilient defense industrial base. MOD/SDF will also examine further measures to that end.

(6) Enhancing intelligence capabilities

MOD/SDF will enhance intelligence capabilities to provide

timely, effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations. MOD/SDF will strengthen capabilities for each stage of collection, processing, analysis, sharing, and protection so that SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to indications of various situations and also take requisite measures based on medium- to long-term military trends.

In so doing, while giving due considerations to technological trends in information processing, MOD/SDF will strengthen capability and posture, including those related to new domains, for the collection of SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT and others. MOD/SDF will enhance collaboration with relevant domestic agencies including the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center which operates Information Gathering Satellites and with the ally as well as with other parties. MOD/SDF will work to hire, retain and train personnel for information collection and analysis and to acquire and connect information-sharing systems. MOD/SDF also will establish more robust information security regime and strengthen counter-intelligence capability.

V. Organization of Self-Defense Forces

In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. Organic structure of major units and specific quantities of major equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.

1. Joint operation to realize cross-domain operations

- (1) In order to further promote joint-ness of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in all areas, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF’s capabilities. SDF will examine future framework for joint operation. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services.
- (2) SDF will maintain an ASDF unit that specializes in space domain missions, and strengthen its posture for joint operations in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies through such means as mission assurance and disruption of opponent’s command, control, communications and information.
- (3) SDF will maintain a cyberspace defense unit as an integrated unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF’s information and communications networks as well as to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack.
- (4) SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum. SDF will strengthen each SDF service’s posture to enable SDF to collect and analyze information concerning electromagnetic domain and to neutralize radar, communications and others operated by opponent that intends to invade Japan.
- (5) In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats: GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units; MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers; ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units; and SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability

comprising these assets.

- (6) At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations.

2. Organization of GSDF

- (1) In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains; airborne operations; amphibious operations; special operations; air transportation; defense against NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons; and security cooperation with foreign countries.

In view of the excellent training environment it offers, GSDF will maintain half of rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, on the premise that these units will deploy and move via joint transport capability.

GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including: persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities between ships and Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and other mobile operating units as well as their various training and exercises; stationing of units in remote islands hitherto without SDF presence; and establishing networks with MSDF and ASDF.

- (2) To be able to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hypervelocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.
- (3) With respect to basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in (1), GSDF will review their organization and equipment with focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. With respect to units under the direct command of regional armies, GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial firepower. GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet conditions and characteristics of each region.

3. Organization of MSDF

- (1) In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, antisubmarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, and to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities, minesweeper units and embarked patrol helicopter units. MSDF will organize surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.

With respect to the destroyers equipped with improved multi-mission capabilities, MSDF will introduce multi-crew shiftwork and promote collaboration with patrol ships equipped with high ISR capability, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.

- (2) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area underwater ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units.

By introducing a test-bed submarine, MSDF will work

to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.

- (3) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

4. Organization of ASDF

- (1) ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective, sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control during “gray zone” and other situations with heightened tensions.

- (2) In order to be able to provide for air defense in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side with a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircraft and supporting functions, ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft. In order to enable fighter aircraft units and airborne warning units to sustainably conduct various operations in wide areas, ASDF will maintain reinforced aerial refueling and transport units.

- (3) In order to be able to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces and security cooperation with foreign countries, ASDF will maintain air transport units.

- (4) In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units.

VI. Elements Supporting Defense Capability

For Japan’s defense capability to demonstrate its true value, SDF needs to constantly maintain and improve its capabilities and foster broad understanding by Japanese nationals.

1. Training and exercises

In order to maintain and improve its tactical skills, SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while, as necessary, work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. In so doing, in order to conduct more practical training, SDF will: develop and utilize domestic training ranges such as those in Hokkaido as well as fine training environment overseas; facilitate joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas; facilitate use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas; and more actively introduce training simulators and others. SDF will also actively utilize training and exercises to constantly examine and review various plans for emergencies.

2. Medical Care

SDF needs to enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel’s vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to protect the lives of SDF personnel to the maxim extent possible, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. Taking into account conditions and

characteristics of each region, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan's southwestern region. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. In order to secure medical personnel in operation units, SDF will: improve the management of the National Defense Medical College; enrich and enhance education and research such as improving medical care capabilities for war injury. In addition, SDF will improve requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance.

3. Collaboration with local communities

Amid increasingly testing and uncertain security environment, activities, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan are becoming more diverse and defense equipment more sophisticated. As a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities.

MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact

alleviation measures include noise mitigation.

MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations.

In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF's emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. At the same time, in administering garrisons and bases, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to their contributions to local economies.

4. Intellectual Base

In order to facilitate understanding of security and crisis management among the populace, MOD/SDF will work to promote security-related education at educational institutions. Within MOD/SDF, in order to achieve at high levels both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), MOD/SDF will facilitate NIDS' collaboration with the policy-making sector. MOD/SDF will further enhance its defense research regime with NIDS playing central roles. In so doing, MOD/SDF will promote systematic collaboration on education and research with other research and educational

Annex Table

Joint Units	Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units	1 squadron 1 group	
Ground Self-Defense Force	Authorized Number of Personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel	159,000 151,000 8,000	
	Major Units	Rapid Deployment Units	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Regional Deployment Units	5 divisions 2 brigades
		Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
		Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units	2 battalions
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments
		Ballistic Missile Defense Units	2 squadrons
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Surface Vessel Units Destroyers Destroyer and minesweeper vessels Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units	
	Major Equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Patrol Vessels Combat Aircraft	
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units	13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 groups(24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft Fighters	Approx. 370 Approx. 290

Notes 1. The current numbers of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY 2018) are respectively approx. 600 and approx. 500, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.

2. Fighter Aircraft Units (13 squadrons) includes STOVL Units.

institutions within the Government, as well as with universities and think-tanks of excellence both at home and abroad.

VII. Points of Attention

1. Japan's defense capability these Guidelines set forth envisions approximately 10 years. The National Security Council will conduct periodic, systematic evaluations throughout the course of implementation of various measures and programs. In order to build truly effective defense capability while firmly grasping changes in security environment, MOD/SDF will conduct verifications regarding capabilities required for Japan's defense in the future.
2. When major changes in situation are anticipated during evaluation and verification processes, these Guidelines will be amended as necessary after examining current security environment and others.
3. Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people's daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development to curb costs. MOD/SDF will work to ensure that defense capability can smoothly and fully perform its functions while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government.

Reference 6 The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond (2013 NDPG)

December 17, 2013, National Security Council Decision
Cabinet Decision

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond (2013 NDPG) are laid out as per the attached sheet.

With this, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (2010 NDPG) (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) were abolished in FY2013.

(Attached sheet)

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond (2013 NDPG)

I Objective of Developing the NDPG

Under the new security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan has set out "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond (2013 NDPG)" as new guidelines for Japan's national defense based on the "Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2013" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the "National Security Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).

II Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. With respect to the global security environment, as interdependence among countries further expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that any unrest or security issues in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor to be faced by the entire international community. In addition, the multi-polarization of the international community continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change in influence of the United States. At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue playing the role of maintaining global peace and stability, as it remains the

world's largest national power.

In addition to ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries, there is an increase in the number of so-called "gray-zone" situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles remains a grave concern despite non-proliferation efforts by the international community. Also, the presence of countries with a weakened governance system and failed states has led to the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These problems continue to pose pressing security challenges.

In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where coastal states have unilaterally asserted their rights or have taken action based on their own assertion concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas.

Also, against the backdrop of rapid technological innovation, ensuring the stable use of domains such as outer space and cyberspace as global commons is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community, including Japan. Moreover, it is anticipated that future military strategies and the balance of military power will be greatly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies such as those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capabilities, and nanotechnology.

2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. The progression of specific and practical cooperation and collaboration to settle challenges can be seen particularly in non-traditional security fields. In the meantime, "gray-zone" situations over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests tend to become prolonged, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations.

In respect to North Korea, the country operates under a military-focused system and deploys a massive military force. North Korea is also proceeding with the development, deployment, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that could potentially serve as their means of delivery, while maintaining a large-scale special operations unit. Through these activities, North Korea continues to maintain and strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities.

North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tensions in the region by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other related countries. This trend in North Korea's military activities constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security of not only Japan, but also of the entire region and the international community. Consequently, Japan needs to pay the utmost attention to such activities.

In particular, North Korea's ballistic missile development is believed to have entered a new stage, as technological improvements have been made to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile launches. Also, since North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls for restraint from the international community, it cannot be ruled out that the country may have successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and

equipped them on ballistic missiles. North Korea's nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and pressing threat to Japan's security.

As for China, while the country is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing defense expenditures to a higher level than ever, while also rapidly reinforcing its military power in a wide range of areas. As part of such efforts, China seems to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of other countries' militaries to its surrounding areas. However, since China has not clearly stated the purposes and goals of its military build-up, full transparency concerning its military and security has not been achieved.

In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in maritime and aerial domains in the region, including the East China Sea and South China Sea. In particular, China has demonstrated actions that could be called aggressive with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo through force. As for the maritime and aerial domains surrounding Japan, China has frequently intruded into Japanese territorial waters and violated Japan's airspace, along with engaging in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as announcing the establishment of the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone" based on its own assertions, thereby infringing on the freedom of overflight above the high seas.

Alongside this, China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than ever before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and their operational areas have been expanded to include areas north of Japan.

Japan is greatly concerned about these trends in Chinese military activities, and will need to continue to pay the utmost attention to them. These activities also raise concerns over regional and international security.

As for Russia, the country has been observed advancing military reform, along with modernizing its military forces; mainly by strengthening their readiness, introducing new equipment, and similar activities. In addition, the activities of Russian armed forces have been intensifying.

The U.S. has made clear its strategic decision to put greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, including regional security (rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region), and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and other constraints to maintain stability and growth in the region. Alongside this, the U.S. is enhancing its relationships with allies and expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has clearly shown its stance towards preventing attempts to change the status quo of the region by force, in cooperation with allies and partners.

3. Surrounded by the sea, Japan has a long coastline, numerous remote islands, and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For Japan, a maritime state that depends on international trade for a large amount of its natural resources and food, ensuring the safety of maritime and air traffic by strengthening the order for "Open and Stable Seas" in line with fundamental principles such as the rule of law and the

freedom of navigation is the foundation of its peace and prosperity.

In addition to the frequent occurrence of national disasters, Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from the concentration of its industry, population, and information infrastructure in urban areas, as well as the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, the country could suffer an enormous amount of damage. The impacts from a quake could spread not only nationwide, but also to other countries. The likelihood of a huge earthquake in the Nankai Trough or inland Tokyo has increased the need to take every possible measure in preparing for large-scale disasters.

4. In light of the above, while it remains unlikely that there will be a large-scale military conflict between major countries such as was feared during the Cold War era, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging, and becoming much more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe from the time of the formulation of the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). These diverse and wide-ranging security challenges and destabilizing factors are difficult for one single country to deal with alone. Under these circumstances, it has become increasingly necessary not only for cooperation between the military and non-military sectors, but also for various countries sharing interests in responding to respective security challenges to work together in a proactive response for regional and global stability.

III Japan's Basic Defense Policy

1 Basic Policy

Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities from the viewpoint of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play on the international stage. At the same time, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone, Japan will contribute even more proactively to ensuring global peace, stability, and prosperity while pursuing its own security, as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries.

Under this basic principle, Japan will build comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its infrastructure for deterring and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating diplomatic policies. It will also establish a foundation that will allow the full exercise of its defense capabilities.

When implementing these measures, under the Constitution of Japan, Japan will efficiently build up highly effective joint defense capabilities in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while also adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core provided by the

U.S. is crucial. To maintain and enhance the credibility of this extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S., while also responding in an appropriate manner through its own efforts, including employing ballistic missile defense (BMD) and civil protection. At the same time, Japan will play a forward-facing and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts towards realizing a world free of nuclear weapons, a problem the world has faced for a long time.

2. Japan's Own Efforts

Based on the recognition that a country's security policies are built upon its own independent efforts, Japan will use its collective strengths as a nation to take the initiative in its efforts towards deterring various situations at all times. In parallel with this, Japan will seamlessly respond to these situations as they unfold under the control tower of the National Security Council, while also cooperating with its allies, partners, and any other countries concerned (hereinafter, "allies, etc.>").

(1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture

Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop highly effective joint defense capabilities, making efforts to employ these capabilities with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close cooperation with relevant organizations at all times. In the event of a situation occurring, decisions will be made in a prompt and appropriate manner under strong political leadership, with the entire Government working together in seamlessly responding to a situation as it unfolds, thereby ensuring the protection of the lives and property of the people of Japan and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace, in coordination with local governments, private organizations, and others.

In addition, Japan will also continue to develop various systems for responding to a variety of disasters and protecting its people, along with enhancing its capabilities in quickly evacuating Japanese nationals and others from overseas in emergency situations to ensure their safety.

In order to take such approaches in an appropriate manner, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its response posture through the systemization of all kinds of related plans, along with their formulation and review. The use of simulations and comprehensive training and exercises will also be expanded.

(2) Japan's defense capabilities – building dynamic joint defense capabilities

Japan's defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantee of national security and represent Japan's will and ability to both prevent threats from directly reaching Japan and defeat those threats should they reach Japan.

Amid the ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, the country's defense capabilities should be constantly reviewed when considering what form they should take in the future, thereby adapting them to the changing environment. For this, Japan needs to allocate its limited resources in a focused and flexible way by carrying out joint operation-based capability assessments of the functions and capabilities of the entire Self-Defense Force (SDF) in responding to a variety of potential situations, then using these assessments to identify the functions and capabilities that should be of particular focus from a comprehensive perspective.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, has to respond to various types of situations that require SDF dispatch, including "gray zone" situations. The frequency of such situations and the time commitment needed for responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will continue to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (hereinafter, "ISR") activities alongside conducting the strategic carrying out of training and exercises in accordance with the unfolding situation at all times. Moreover, by swiftly building a response posture that includes the advance deployment and maneuvering of units in response to the security environment, Japan will demonstrate its defensive will and highly developed capabilities in preventing further escalation. Also, in the event of a situation occurring, minimizing any damage by an effective response that ensures necessary maritime supremacy and air superiority in accordance with the situation is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of Japanese people, as well as the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace.

Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capabilities by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably for joint operations, as well as developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize more robust defense capabilities.

At the same time, from the perspective of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships towards the stabilization of the Asia-Pacific region, which has a close relation to its own security. Japan will also engage more proactively in international peace cooperation activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations (UN PKO), non-traditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the international security environment) and other similar activities to address global security challenges and similar in light of the diversification and expansion of the roles of defense capabilities.

From these viewpoints, and given the changes in the security environment, it is necessary to completely optimize the functions and capabilities of future defense capabilities that should be of particular focus. These defense capabilities must also work effectively and be capable of carrying out a diverse range of activities in a seamless and dynamic manner, adapting to situations as they arise. To that end, Japan will build dynamic joint defense capabilities focusing on readiness, continuity, resilience, and connectivity in both tangible and intangible aspects and reinforced by advanced technology and communication, command, control, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities, while also considering the establishment of a wide-ranging logistics support foundation.

3 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements form the key to Japan's national security along with Japan's own efforts. Also, the Japan-

U.S. Alliance, which is centered on the bilateral Security Arrangements, functions as a common good that contributes to the stability and prosperity of not only Japan, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world at large.

Based on its policy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with allies such as Japan. Meanwhile, as the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective in order to ensure Japan's security.

(1) Strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats

In order to ensure Japan's national security by maintaining and strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance's contingency response capabilities, while also strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations in peacetime to various other situations, including cooperation in responding to "gray-zone" situations, while increasing the presence of Japan and the United States in the western Pacific region.

To that end, Japan will continue to expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities, and the shared use of U.S. armed forces and SDF facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also further tighten Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination, including contingency responses and medium- to long-term strategies such as BMD, bilateral defense planning, and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

(2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas

The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the international community, including the Asia-Pacific region, by strengthening cooperation not only in the fields of counter piracy, capacity building, HA/DR, peacekeeping, and counter terrorism, but also in the fields of maritime affairs, outer space, and cyberspace.

As for disaster response, based on the example of the Great East Japan Earthquake, during which U.S. armed forces, including U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people, Japan will further strengthen cooperation between the SDF and U.S. armed forces both within and outside Japan.

In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts in intelligence cooperation and information security, as well as cooperation in defense equipment and technology, to build a more stable and effective alliance.

(3) Steady implementation of measures concerning the stationing of the USFJ

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth

and effective stationing of the USFJ through various measures including Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. armed forces. In particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, which is located in a critically important location in terms of national security and where the stationing of U.S. armed forces significantly contributes to the deterrence capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realigning, consolidating, and reducing U.S. Forces in Okinawa (USFO) facilities and areas, including relocating Futenma Air Station, as well as dispersing their impact and other measures, in light of the large concentration of such facilities and areas in the prefecture.

4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been taken in mainly non-traditional security fields, including disaster relief. In addition, multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making progress. However, security challenges have been escalating, particularly in Northeast Asia. Therefore, Japan will promote a variety of cooperative efforts in a more multilayered manner to mitigate the trend towards confrontation and the sense of caution countries have towards one another in the region.

Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for future cooperation with the ROK by concluding agreements on the protection of classified military information, acquisition and cross-service (ACSA), and similar.

In addition, Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, a country with which Japan shares security interests and has been advancing security cooperation, as well as strengthening cooperation in fields such as international peace cooperation activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities to improve interoperability with Australia.

Moreover, efforts will be made to promote partnerships among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening cooperative relationships under trilateral frameworks, including between Japan, the U.S., and ROK and between Japan, the U.S., and Australia.

As Chinese activities can have a significant impact on regional security, Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China from the viewpoint of enhancing mutual understanding, as well as develop confidence-building measures to prevent or avoid unexpected situations. Furthermore, Japan will maintain a calm and resolute stance when responding to the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities in the maritime and aerial domains surrounding Japan.

In respect of Russia, Japan will promote security dialogues, including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2"), high-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges on a wide scale in order to deepen

its understanding of the intention of Russian military activities and develop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional stability.

Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote bilateral training and exercises and capacity building. Alongside this, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these countries in the field of disaster management in light of the increasing frequency and growing scale of disasters in the region. As for India, Japan will strengthen its relationship with the country in terms of maritime security, as well as a broad range of other fields, through bilateral training and exercises, along with the joint implementation of international peace cooperation activities.

Capacity building is effective in stabilizing the future security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation. Therefore, Japan will promote this in tandem with bilateral training and exercises and international peace cooperation activities while coordinating fully with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Official Development Assistance (ODA). Additionally, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with other countries that are actively supporting capacity building, alongside expanding the range of countries eligible for support and the scope of the support.

As for ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan, in cooperation with the U.S. and Australia, will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate in multilateral training and exercises and take a major role in enhancing confidence-building measures among countries in the region, emphasizing the importance of multilateral frameworks such as ARF and ADMM-Plus.

(2) Cooperation with the international community

It is extremely difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, in recent years, as the roles of military forces have become more diversified, there are increased opportunities for these forces to play an important role in not only deterring and responding to conflicts and maintaining peace, but also building peace, such as supporting post-conflict reconstruction and promoting confidence-building and friendly relationships between nations.

Therefore, Japan will promote various efforts to improve the global security environment at all times in cooperation with the international community.

Japan will continue to carry out, as well as strengthen, various efforts concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation, and capacity building in order to respond to global security challenges, including regional conflicts, the growth and spread of international terrorism, failed states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and issues over the oceans, outer space, and cyberspace. In addition, Japan will cooperate with its allies, relevant countries with which it shares security interests, as well as international organizations and other relevant bodies at all times.

In particular, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and

European countries including the United Kingdom and France. Moreover, Japan will work with these organizations and countries in responding to challenges, together with promoting mutual cooperation and exchanges with respect to equipment and technology.

In order to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in line with the policy of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities, including international peace cooperation assignments and disaster relief activities, in a multilayered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, taking into consideration the overall situation with regard to the significance of the dispatch of SDF units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units, and Japan’s political and economic relationships with those countries.

In respect of international peace cooperation activities in particular, Japan will continue to proactively carry out activities that make best use of the SDF’s capabilities, as well as increasing the number of SDF personnel dispatched to local mission headquarters, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPO), and similar institutions, in positions of responsibility. In addition, Japan will examine the various challenges it must overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of fields, along with taking the necessary measures to do so. Japan will also contribute to the training of national and international personnel engaging in peacebuilding by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge.

IV Approach to Defense Capabilities

1. The Role of Defense Capabilities

Japan’s future defense capabilities will be developed based on the approach to building up defense capabilities described in III. 2. (2) above. These will be capable of effectively taking the expected roles in the following fields, with the posture necessary to fulfill these roles being maintained.

(1) Effective deterrence and response in various situations

In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and thereby ensure the protection of the lives and property of the people of Japan and the sovereignty of its territorial land, waters, and airspace, Japan will ensure intelligence superiority through constant surveillance across a wide area surrounding Japan to gain an understanding of military developments in other countries at all times, while also detecting any signs of such developments at an early stage.

Through such activities, Japan will clearly demonstrate its resolve not to tolerate any changes of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will promptly and seamlessly respond to all kinds of situations, including “gray zone” situations, at a stage where early signs have been detected, ensuring the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.

Moreover, Japan will carry out an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases where multiple situations occur either consecutively or concurrently to one another.

When carrying out these efforts, the following points will be of particular focus:

i. Ensuring the security of maritime and aerial domains surrounding Japan

In addition to constant surveillance across a wide area surrounding Japan at all times, Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any intrusions into its territorial airspace. Japan will also respond to “gray-zone” situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty in an effective and prompt manner. Furthermore, even if said acts become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond seamlessly in accordance with the unfolding situation, taking all possible measures to ensure the defense and security of the maritime and aerial domains surrounding Japan.

ii. Response to an attack on remote islands

In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and defeat any invasion by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority and swiftly deploying and maneuvering the SDF units necessary for preventing an invasion, on top of units already deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, these will be recaptured. In the course of doing so, any ballistic or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with as appropriate.

iii. Response to ballistic missile attacks

Japan will detect the signs of a ballistic missile launch at an early stage to facilitate a swift, sustained response via a multilayered defense posture. Should any damages result, these will be kept to a minimum. In addition, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special operations forces concurrently with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will protect its nuclear power plants and other critical facilities, as well as search and destroy the intruding forces.

iv. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

In regard to outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build a posture of constant surveillance to prevent any acts that could impede efficient actions by the SDF at all times. Furthermore, should any situation arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair any damages, while also taking the necessary measures towards consequence management. Moreover, in light of the growing dependence on outer space and cyberspace across our entire society, in the course of strengthening collaborations with relevant organizations and clarifying the division of roles, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s capabilities to contribute to comprehensive, government-wide efforts.

v. Responses to large-scale disasters

In the event of a large-scale disaster or similar, all possible measures will be taken in the initial stages to rapidly transport and deploy the necessary SDF units, and if necessary, sustain the mobilization over a long period. In addition, the SDF units will not only respond carefully to the needs of affected residents and local governments, but will also collaborate and cooperate as appropriate with relevant organizations, local governments, and the private sector in saving lives, carrying out urgent reconstruction, and supporting livelihoods.

(2) Stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region and improving the global security environment

Through constant surveillance of the area surrounding Japan and the timely and appropriate carrying out of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, including the areas surrounding Japan.

Moreover, Japan will work in partnership with its allies to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, bilateral training and exercises, and capacity building in a more multilayered manner, thereby effectively taking a key role in efforts focused on stabilizing the security environment, including building and strengthening intraregional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.

Alongside the diversification of the roles required for military forces, Japan will strengthen various efforts concerning arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, counter piracy measures, and capacity building in order to respond appropriately to global security issues including regional conflicts, the growth and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Japan will also work on improving the global security environment.

When carrying out the above efforts, the following points will be of particular focus:

i. Carrying out training and exercises

As well as carrying out SDF training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, thereby proactively and visibly demonstrating Japan’s will and advanced capabilities with respect to regional stabilization. In addition, Japan will build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

ii. Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. In addition to the above, Japan will take further steps to promote defense cooperation and exchange in a multilayered manner, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest, including HA/DR and ensuring the stable use of the oceans, outer space, and cyberspace.

iii. Promoting capacity building

Japan will fully utilize the capabilities of the SDF to enhance the capabilities of developing countries through continuous human resource development and technical assistance, consequently improving the security environment by mainly focusing on proactively building stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

iv. Ensuring maritime security

As Japan is a maritime state, it is particularly vital for the country to maintain the order of “Open and Stable Seas,” which is the foundation of its peace and prosperity. Therefore, Japan will take all possible measures to ensure the safety of maritime

traffic. In addition, Japan will also respond to acts of piracy in cooperation with the countries involved, promoting various efforts including supporting coastal states in improving capacities in this field and taking advantage of a variety of opportunities to train in maritime domains other than those surrounding Japan to enhance bilateral training and exercises.

v. Carrying out international peace cooperation activities

Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation assignments, disaster relief activities, and other international peace cooperation activities requiring responses to diverse needs, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis on playing more of a leading role. In doing so, Japan will enhance its readiness posture to allow rapid dispatches overseas in accordance with the situation, as well as strengthening its sustained response posture in preparation of a protracted mission overseas.

vi. Cooperating in efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation

Japan will actively engage in various activities in the fields of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations. In doing so, Japan will actively make use of knowledge possessed by the SDF, including contributions by individual personnel. Moreover, since the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that could potentially serve as their means of delivery, the proliferation of arms, and goods and technology that could be used for military purposes, all pose a severe threat to the peace and stability of not only Japan, but also the international community as a whole, Japan will promote efforts towards nonproliferation in cooperation with relevant countries, international organizations, and other institutions.

2. Priorities in Building the Architecture of the SDF

(1) Basic Concept

The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the above roles required by its defense capabilities. As such, Japan has conducted capability assessments on various potential contingencies from the viewpoint of joint operations to identify the functions and capabilities that should be of particular focus for building up future defense capabilities when establishing said structure.

Based on the results of those capability assessments, the SDF will prioritize a build-up of defense capabilities that ensures maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is a prerequisite for realizing an effective level of deterrence and response in various situations, including strengthening the defense posture build-up in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will focus on the establishment of deployment and maneuver capabilities while considering the establishment of a wide-ranging logistics support foundation.

Meanwhile, in terms of preparation that mainly focuses on a landing invasion using a large-scale mobilization of ground troops such as was anticipated during the Cold War era, the SDF will possess expertise and skills only

within the scope necessary to maintain and pass these skills on at the very minimum level needed to respond to uncertain changes in future developments, thereby ensuring even greater efficiency and streamlining.

(2) Functions and capabilities that should be of particular focus

From the perspective of efficiently developing effective defense capabilities, Japan will focus on strengthening the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhancing joint functions in consideration of interoperability with U.S. armed forces.

i. Intelligence and surveillance capabilities

In order to ensure an effective level of deterrence and response in various situations, the SDF will utilize unmanned devices to carry out constant surveillance over a wide area, targeting aircraft and vessels in the maritime and aerial domains surrounding Japan. The SDF will also strengthen its posture so as to flexibly adapt to a worsening situation.

ii. Information capabilities

The SDF will strengthen systems for intelligence gathering and processing, along with analyzing and sharing the gathered information, which will allow the detection of signs indicating a variety of situations at an early stage and swiftly respond. It will also take a variety of measures based on medium- to long-term military trends, starting with those in the areas surrounding Japan.

In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information gathering capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as constant surveillance capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Moreover, the SDF will also engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to allow various types of information from images and maps to be combined and utilized in a more sophisticated way, while also establishing systems for securing and training highly capable personnel engaged in information gathering and analysis in an integrated and systematic manner.

iii. Transport capabilities

In order to ensure prompt and large-scale transport and deployment capabilities, as well as allow the swift deployment and moving of the necessary SDF units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacities, including maritime and air transport capacities, and will coordinate with civilian transport capabilities at all times. In doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying the division of roles among various means of transport in accordance with their respective attributes.

iv. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities

In order to establish a command and control system capable of managing units nationwide in a swift and integrated manner, the SDF will take steps to mutually deploy the necessary number of Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel to the main command centers of each service, thereby making it possible to utilize the knowledge and experience possessed by the respective services. Furthermore, the SDF will enable the swift and flexible nationwide operation of basic

operational units (divisions and brigades) of GSDF units through the establishment of a new unified command center for controlling each of the GSDF's regional armies, as well as greater efficiency and streamlining of the command and control functions at each army headquarters.

Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its information and communications capabilities, which are prerequisites for supporting nationwide operations, starting with the foundational communications networks on remote islands and data link functions among the three services of the SDF.

v. Response to an attack on remote islands

The SDF will strengthen its ability to respond to attacks by aircraft, warships, missiles, and similar to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which are prerequisites for carrying out an effective response to an attack on remote islands.

Also, together with strengthening integrated capabilities for preventing an attack on remote islands as much as possible while at sea, the SDF will newly develop full-scale amphibious operations capabilities for landing on, recapturing, and securing the remote islands without delay should an invasion take place.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities to enable SDF units to respond swiftly and continuously in the event of a situation occurring in the southwestern region of Japan.

In addition, the SDF will also examine approaches to its air defense posture for remote islands in the Pacific Ocean.

vi. Response to ballistic missile attacks

In light of North Korea's improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the overall improvement of its response capabilities against ballistic missiles.

In respect to the ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, the SDF will enhance its readiness posture, simultaneous engagement capabilities, and sustained response capabilities to bolster capabilities in defending the entire territory of Japan.

In addition, based on the appropriate division of roles between Japan and the U.S., Japan will examine approaches to capabilities in responding to different means of ballistic missile launches and similar that would enable the enhancement of Japan's own deterrent and response capabilities, thereby strengthening the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole.

vii. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

In addition to strengthening information gathering, command and control, and information and communications capabilities through the use of man-made satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, the SDF will ensure the effective and stable use of outer space in order that satellites can continuously exercise their capabilities even if various situations occur by enhancing the survivability of satellites through efforts including space situational awareness. In implementing such efforts, the SDF will form organic partnerships with relevant organizations in Japan, as well as with the U.S.

As for responses in cyberspace, the SDF will strengthen its integrated constant surveillance and response capabilities, along with continuously developing and ensuring expertise, technical human resources, and the latest equipment, in order to prevent acts that could impede efficient actions by the SDF.

viii. Responses to large-scale disasters, etc.

In the event of various disasters, such as exceptional disasters including a large-scale earthquake in the Nankai Trough or a nuclear disaster, it is critically important to respond swiftly during the initial stages of the impact by gathering information on the extent and nature of the damage from the air using aircraft and similar, rescue operations, and emergency reconstruction. With this in mind, the SDF will build a response posture capable of being sustained over the long-term by swiftly transporting and deploying sufficiently sized units, as well as establishing a rotating supply of necessary personnel based on joint operations.

ix. Responses towards international peace cooperation activities and similar

The SDF will ensure the safety of personnel and units engaging in international peace cooperation activities and similar while also enhancing the defense capabilities necessary to successfully carry out its duties. Moreover, in anticipation of activities over the long term in Africa and other remote locations, the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capabilities, and information and communication capabilities, along with building replenishment and medical care systems for smooth and continuous operations.

In addition, from the viewpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation activities more effectively, the SDF will consider measures for making more effective use of its base in Djibouti for counter-piracy activities.

Furthermore, the SDF will strengthen the intelligence gathering capabilities required for its activities while at the same time enhancing education, training, and human resources management systems that enable the continuous dispatch of personnel having capabilities suited to their duties.

3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces

The architecture of each service of the SDF will be developed as per items (1) to (3) below. The specifics on the scope of future major organizations and equipment are as shown in the Annex Table.

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

- i. The GSDF will maintain basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and armored divisions) furnished with advanced mobility, and intelligence and surveillance capabilities, on the basis of rapid operation, in order to be able to respond swiftly and effectively to an attack on remote islands and various other situations. In addition, the GSDF will maintain rapid deployment units furnished with specialized functions to enable these units to effectively perform airborne operations, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons,

and international peace cooperation activities.

To this end, given the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the GSDF will keep half of these highly proficient and rapidly deployable basic operational units in the prefecture. This is premised on allowing these units to be swiftly deployed and moved using the integrated transport capacities referred to in 2. (2) i. above.

The defense posture for remote islands will be enhanced and strengthened by deploying units in remote islands with no military presence by stationed SDF units, rapid deployment of each of the units referred to above, and the establishment of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF.

- ii. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units to prevent an invasion on remote islands and other areas as much as possible while at sea.
 - iii. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units to enable air defense of operation units and key areas to be effectively carried out in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) iv. below.
 - iv. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of basic operational units (divisions and brigades), aside from the rapidly deployable units referred to in i. above, with a particular focus on tanks and artillery. After ensuring further efficiency and streamlining, these units will be appropriately deployed in accordance with geographical characteristics.
- (2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF)

- i. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and carrier-based patrol helicopter units that have been reinforced by the addition of new destroyers having both improved response capabilities in diverse duties and a more compact hull. This is to enable the efficient carrying out of constant intelligence and surveillance, as well as antisubmarine warfare, thereby facilitating a swift response in defending the maritime domains surrounding Japan, ensuring the security of maritime traffic, international peace cooperation activities, and similar.

Also, along with the surface-to-air guided missile units in (3) iv. below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers having functions capable of providing Japan with a multilayered defense against ballistic missile attacks.

- ii. The MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units to enable the effective patrol and defense of the maritime domains surrounding Japan. These units will also engage in underwater information gathering and intelligence and surveillance in those domains over a wide area at all times.
- iii. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units to enable the effective patrol and defense of the maritime domains surrounding Japan. These units will also engage in surface information gathering and intelligence and surveillance in those domains over a wide area at all times.
- iv. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units to enable effective minesweeping operations in the maritime domains surrounding Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers having both improved response

capabilities in diverse duties and a more compact hull in i. above.

(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

- i. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of warning and control units and air warning units. The warning and control units have been equipped with ground-based warning and control radars capable of detecting and tracking any ballistic missiles flying in the direction of Japan, as well as carrying out constant intelligence and surveillance across almost the entire span of the aerial domains surrounding Japan. The air warning units have been enhanced so as to be capable of effective intelligence, surveillance, and control in the air in the event of a tense situation, such as a “gray zone” situation, over the long-term.
- ii. The ASDF will maintain fighter units reinforced by highly capable fighters to enable the air defense of Japan through a comprehensive posture that brings together fighters and their relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain reinforced aerial refueling and transport units to enable fighter units, air warning units, and others to successfully carry out various operations in a sustained manner in the aerial domains surrounding Japan.
- iii. The ASDF will maintain air transport units to enable the effective deployment and maneuvering of ground units and others, as well as the implementation of international peace cooperation activities.
- iv. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units having functions capable of providing Japan with a multilayered defense against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis-equipped destroyers of (2) i. above. These units will also protect key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units in (1) iii. above.

V. Foundations for Demonstrating Defense Capabilities

To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not enough to simply carry out major organizations and update equipment; it is also crucial to strengthen the various foundations underpinning defense capabilities to ensure that these can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects are as follows.

1. Training and Exercises

Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will continuously inspect and review various plans for dealing with situations while striving to enhance and strengthen training and exercises to improve the tactical skills of each of its services. In doing so, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the private sector to ensure the coherent and systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido.

In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on SDF exercise areas, the SDF will ensure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. armed forces facilities and areas while also remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, thus enabling the timely and appropriate carrying out of training and exercises, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises.

2. Operational Infrastructure

From the viewpoint of maintaining the various support functions that serve as the operational infrastructure for

its units, the SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps, bases, and similar, to enable those units to be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively.

Moreover, in light of the fact that some facilities of each of the SDF services are currently in a state of disrepair, the SDF will work to steadily repair these facilities, as well as provide the housing necessary for the rapid assembly of personnel in various situations, thereby ensuring readiness.

The SDF will also carry out any necessary examinations of civilian airports and ports, including approaches to their various day-to-day systems, to ensure that these facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure of the SDF and other institutions at an early stage in accordance with the situation. Furthermore, the SDF will provide various family support measures to alleviate the anxieties of both personnel serving away from their families, as well as their families back at home.

Along with securing and stockpiling the necessary amount of ammunition, the SDF will enhance and strengthen its operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade said equipment.

3. Personnel and Education

Given the increased sophistication and complexity of equipment, along with the diversification and internationalization of SDF duties in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to reform personnel management systems from the viewpoint of ensuring powerful troops and making effective use of human resources in the midst of a period of severe fiscal conditions. This reform will take into consideration a variety of factors, including skills, experience, physical strength, and morale.

Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution that takes into account the duties and attributes of each service of the SDF.

The SDF will also implement measures to make effective use of human resources, including further making the most of and reappointing female SDF personnel, as well as measures related to honors and privileges. In addition, to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, as well as secure a sufficient amount of personnel having a broad outlook and ideas, along with a wide range of experience related to Japan's security affairs, and that are capable of responding flexibly and rapidly to various situations as a member of government, through secondments to the Joint Staff and other relevant ministries and agencies.

In light of the worsening recruitment environment resulting from social factors such as declining birthrates and an increase in people attaining a higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread awareness of working for the SDF as a potential career.

Furthermore, since it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to ensure the livelihoods of SDF personnel, who are required to retire at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, as well as other measures.

To support the sustained operation of units in an

increasingly diversified and protracted range of situations, the use of SDF reserve personnel will be promoted in a wide range of fields, including those requiring specialized skills such as aircraft pilots. Measures will also be taken to increase enrollment of reserve SDF personnel.

4. Medical Care

To maintain the health of SDF personnel and enhance their capabilities in responding to a diverse range of missions, such as various types of situations, international peace cooperation activities, and similar, the SDF will establish efficient and high-quality systems for medical care, including turning facilities into SDF hospital bases and enhancing their functionality, as well as improving the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital and similar institutions. In addition, the SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training medical officers, nurses, emergency life-saving technicians, and other medical staff.

Besides this, the SDF will also examine revisions to regulations pertaining to emergency life-saving treatment when responding to situations. It will also improve first aid capabilities on the frontline and establish a posture for rapid medical evacuation based on the viewpoint of enhancing joint functions.

5. Defense Production and Technological Bases

Retaining adequate standards in defense production and technological bases is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance, and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment suitable for operating environments. It may also potentially contribute to improved deterrence.

Meanwhile, against the backdrop of severe fiscal conditions and rises in unit prices of equipment in line with their increased sophistication and complexity, the quantities of each type of equipment being procured are on a downward turn. Moreover, outside Japan, the environment surrounding Japan's defense production and technological bases is becoming more severe, including a growing competitiveness of overseas companies, as a result of the progression of a large-scale restructuring of the defense industry across borders.

Under the above conditions, Japan will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technological bases as a whole, along with promoting the adapting of defense equipment for civilian use, as ways of promptly maintaining and strengthening said production and bases.

In respect to contributing to peace and international cooperation, there have been increased opportunities for Japan to cooperate in a more effective manner through, for example, making use of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried by the SDF and providing this equipment to disaster-stricken countries and other places (hereinafter, "making use of defense equipment, etc."). Moreover, it has become mainstream internationally to participate in international joint development and production as a way of improving the performance of defense equipment while also dealing with rising costs. Amid the above, and from the viewpoint of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage more proactively in contributing to peace and international cooperation by making use of defense equipment, etc. Japan should also participate in the joint development and production of defense equipment and similar.

Against this backdrop, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles, adapted to the new security environment, concerning the overseas transfer of arms, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related policy guidelines have played so far. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to clarifying cases in which transfers are prohibited, limiting and strictly examining cases in which transfers could be allowed, and ensuring an appropriate level of control over transfers in terms of usages for purposes other than those agreed upon and third country transfers.

6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

To realize the effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, including for research and development, the SDF will strengthen project management that includes a technical perspective throughout the lifecycle of equipment by introducing a project manager system, as well as by examining the possibility of introducing longer-term contracts and further revising the contract system to bring about cost reduction incentives for companies, thereby improving cost-effectiveness throughout the lifecycle of equipment.

Moreover, the SDF will aim to improve readiness and response capabilities by reforming its replenishment posture through the effective use of the capabilities of the private sector. Furthermore, it will constantly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and optimization of the contract system, as well as strive to acquire equipment through more rigorous procedures.

7. Research and Development

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) will ensure that it conforms with the order of priority for the build-up of defense capabilities when starting any research and development in order to guarantee that under the severe fiscal conditions, research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized.

In addition, the MOD will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, the changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness, and the potential for international joint research and development. In doing so, the research and development will ensure Japan's technological superiority in response to new threats in strategically important fields.

From the perspective of security, regularly assessing trends in science and technology, including information related to technological development, and bringing together the capabilities of the government, industry, and academia enables civilian technology to be effectively utilized in the field of security. To this end, the MOD will work towards proactively making use of technology that can also be applied to defense (dual-use technologies) through enhanced partnerships with universities and research institutes, while also strengthening functions for controlling technology to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies. The MOD will also develop defensive technologies for civilian fields.

Japan will examine the MOD's research and development posture for achieving the above objectives.

8. Collaboration with Local Communities

The SDF will further strengthen its collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police, and the fire service, to enable responses to various situations in an appropriate manner. Such close partnerships with local governments and other institutions are exceedingly

important from the perspective of not only carrying out the effective maintenance and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also ensuring the recruitment of, and provision of re-employment support for, SDF personnel.

Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance projects for measures targeting the surrounding areas of defense facilities for their maintenance and operation, the MOD and SDF will routinely engage in various measures including proactive public relations activities related to MOD/SDF policies and activities as a way of gaining the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

In light of the fact that the presence of SDF units substantially contributes to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in certain regions, and in others, supports community-based health care through emergency patient transport using SDF search and rescue aircraft, the MOD and SDF will consider the attributes of each area when reorganizing units and arranging military camps, bases, and similar, in order to gain the understanding of local governments and communities. At the same time, the MOD will pay attention to the contribution of the operation of those military camps, bases, and similar to the local economy.

9. Boosting Communication Capabilities

The MOD and the SDF will strengthen strategic public relations activities and enhance communication using a diverse range of information media in order to increase understanding of the MOD/SDF both in Japan and overseas, which is vital for effectively and successfully carrying out the duties of the SDF.

10. Enhancing the Knowledge Base

The MOD will work on promoting education on security-related matters at educational institutions and similar to increase understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening the research systems of the MOD and SDF, focusing particularly on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the MOD will promote a variety of partnerships including education and research exchanges with other intergovernmental research and educational institutions, as well as universities and think-tanks both inside and outside Japan.

11. Promoting MOD Reforms

The MOD will promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization, thereby fostering a sense of unity among civil servants and SDF personnel, achieving total optimization in building up defense capabilities, strengthening joint operation functions, and enhancing policymaking and communication functions.

VI Additional Points

1. The NDPG sets out an approach to Japan's defense capabilities that is intended to cover the next decade. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic assessments over the course of implementing various measures and plans, as well as inspections based on joint operation capability assessments, to facilitate a smooth, swift, and appropriate transition to the future defense capabilities while also developing these measures in a timely and appropriate manner.
2. In the case that major changes in the situation are anticipated during assessment and inspection, an examination taking the security environment at that time into account will be carried out, with the NDPG revised as necessary.

3. In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, the MOD will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the build-up of defense capabilities to curb costs, as well as keep this congruent with other national measures, to ensure that Japan's defense capabilities can smoothly and sufficiently fulfill their functions as a whole.

Annex Table

Service		Current (as of the end of FY2013)	Future	
Ground Self-Defense Force	Authorized number of personnel		Approx. 159,000	
	Active-duty personnel		Approx. 151,000	
	Reserve-ready personnel		Approx. 8,000	
	Major Units	Rapid Deployment Units	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Regional Deployment Units	8 divisions 6 divisions	5 divisions 2 brigades
Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units		5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	
Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units		8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/ regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/ regiments	
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyers	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 flotillas	
		Submarine Units Minesweeper Units Patrol Aircraft Units	5 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons	
Major Equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	47 (6)	54 (8)	
	Submarines Combat aircraft	16 approx. 170	22 approx. 170	
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons	
		Fighter Units Air Reconnaissance Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	1 AEW group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 1 squadron 3 squadrons 6 groups	
Major Equipment	Combat aircraft (Fighters)	approx. 340 approx. 260	approx. 360 approx. 280	

Note 1: The current numbers of tanks and artillery (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are approx. 700 and approx. 600, respectively, however in future, these will be reduced to approx. 300 and approx. 300, respectively.
 2: Regarding major equipment/units capable of also serving in BMD missions, their build-up will be permitted within the range of the number of destroyers (Aegis-equipped destroyers), air warning & control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units specified above.

December 18, 2018

I. Program Guidelines

In the defense program for FY 2019 - FY 2023, with accordance to “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 18, 2018), Japan will significantly strengthen defense capability to build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi- Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, Japan will strengthen its defense capability effectively by allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation. Furthermore, SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self- Defense Forces in all areas, avoid stove-piped approach and optimize their organizations and equipment.

Given the guiding thoughts above, SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capability based on the following program guidelines:

1. In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology, and strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information (C4I) capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. In addition, SDF will enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Furthermore, to be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support will be enhanced.
2. In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high- performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, MOD/SDF will efficiently secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity”. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. Moreover, MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in cutting-edge technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically

shorten research and development (R&D) timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures.

3. In the face of rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates, to ensure SDF’s strength, to strive to secure human resources for SDF personnel and to improve their ability and morale, who are the core element of defense capability, MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women’s participation and leveraging reserve personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment.
4. In order to maintain and strengthen the commitment of the United States (U.S.) to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region and to secure Japan’s security, and based on the premise that Japan will strengthen its own capabilities, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperative activities and consultations with the U.S., in a wide range of areas under “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation”. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to promote defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches.

5. With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, by achieving efficiency and rationalization.
6. Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government.

II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

1. In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF’s capabilities. For the future framework for joint operations, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the new domains are operated unitarily, and come to conclusions after considering how the integrated structure should be during steady-state to appropriately execute instructions from the Minister based on the posture of the strengthened Joint Staff. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services.

SDF will establish 1 squadron of ASDF space domain

mission unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies.

SDF will establish 1 squadron of cyber defense unit as joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capabilities, including capability to disrupt, in the event of attack against Japan, opponent's use of cyberspace for the attack as well as to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF's information and communications networks.

SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff's posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum, and advance efforts to enhance defense capability related to the use of electromagnetic spectrum in each SDF service.

In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats, GSDF will establish 2 squadrons of ballistic missile defense (BMD) units. In addition, in order to operate units more efficiently including command and control in accordance with the enhancement of SDF's ballistic missile response capabilities, ASDF will reorganize surface-to-air guided missile units from 6 fire groups to 4 groups while maintaining 24 fire squadrons.

At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will establish 1 group of maritime transportation unit as Joint Unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations.

2. In order to strengthen operation capabilities in new domains, GSDF will establish cyberspace units and electromagnetic operation units as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command.

In order to respond swiftly, and to deter and counter effectively and swiftly with various situations, GSDF will transform 1 division and 2 brigades respectively into 1 rapid deployment division and 2 rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. In addition, through continuing to establish area security units in charge of initial response activities, MOD will newly establish surface-to-air guided missile units and surface-to-ship guided missile units, GSDF will strengthen its defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region. Furthermore, to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVGP) units for the defense of remote islands.

From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with mobile combat vehicles and disuse of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into newly organized field artillery units under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, GSDF will reduce its combat helicopter units under the direct

command of the respective regional armies and consider the review of their deployment to operate them effectively and efficiently.

3. In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain 4 groups mainly consisting of 1 helicopter destroyer (DDH) and 2 Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and maintain 2 groups consisting of new type of destroyers (FFM) with improved multi-mission capabilities and minesweeping vessels. MSDF will newly establish surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will establish patrol vessel units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. Furthermore, by introducing a test submarine, which the type will be changed from an existing submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. In order to effectively conduct underwater ISR and patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will continue to take measures necessary to increase the number of submarines.

4. In order to enhance the air defense posture and operate effectively in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, ASDF will reorganize 8 warning groups and 20 warning squadrons to 28 warning squadrons and establish 1 airborne early warning (AEW) wing as part of air warning and control units, and take necessary measures to establish 1 squadron of fighter aircraft units.

ASDF will disband 1 squadron of tactical reconnaissance unit with the retirement of its reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4), and will establish 1 squadron of aerial refueling/transport units to enhance its aerial refueling/transport function.

In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will establish 1 squadron of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit.

5. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY 2023 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY 2023 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY 2018.

During the period of the program, SDF will promote initiatives to optimize organizations and missions such as reviewing the existing organizations and missions whose importance has declined and assigning personnel mainly to new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.

III. Major Programs regarding SDF's Capabilities

1. Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations
 - (1) Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities in Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains
 - (A) Capabilities in Space Domain

In order to secure the stable use of space, SDF will build a structure to conduct persistent space monitoring under an appropriate role-sharing with

related ministries and agencies by such means as newly establishing space domain mission unit and establishing a space situational awareness (SSA) system and will also newly introduce space-based optical telescopes and SSA laser ranging devices.

In order to further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities, SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C4I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. SDF will also strive to secure redundancy by such means as receiving multiple positioning satellite signals including those of Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and utilizing information gathering satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites including micro ones. Additionally, in order to use these capabilities continuously, SDF will conduct necessary study and research, and newly introduce training devices to study and train responses to the vulnerabilities of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. By this strengthening of the structure for grasping the situation, SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain.

In this regard, in addition to efforts to establish new job categories and enhance education dedicated to the space domain, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and promote to enhance cooperation including the development of human resources, with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the U.S. and other relevant countries, given that cutting-edge technology and knowhow have been accumulated in these organizations.

(B) Capabilities in Cyber Domain

SDF aims to persistently ensure sufficient security against cyber attack and acquire capability to disrupt, opponent's use of cyberspace in the event of attack against Japan. With consideration to enhancing joint functions and efficient resource allocations, SDF will establish the necessary environment by such measures as expanding the structure of cyber defense squadron and other units, enhancing the resiliency of the C4 systems of SDF, strengthening capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and developing a practical training environment that can test SDF's cyber defense capability. In addition, SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, bilateral/multilateral exercises and other opportunities with the ally and other parties.

As the methods of cyber attack are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, securing personnel with expertise on a continuing basis is essential. SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, increasing learning opportunities at

institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and conducting personnel management that cultivates expertise. In addition, SDF will strengthen the cyber defense capability by utilizing superior outside expertise.

In order to enable a comprehensive response through a whole-of-government approach in cyber domain, MOD/SDF seeks to enhance close coordination with relevant ministries and agencies, etc. by providing knowledge and MOD/SDF personnel on a steady-state basis, and enhance training and exercises.

(C) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain

MOD/SDF will newly establish specialized sections in the internal bureau and the Joint Staff respectively in order to enhance the function to make policies pertaining to effective and efficient use of electromagnetic spectrum in MOD/SDF as well as to improve coordination with other ministries and agencies.

In order to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities concerning electromagnetic spectrum and develop an information sharing posture, SDF will promote the procurement of radio wave information gathering aircraft and ground-based SIGINT sensor, the upgrade of the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) system, the connection of each SDF service's systems including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and the improvement of each SDF service's data links.

In order to neutralize the radar and communications of opponent attempting to invade Japan, SDF will proceed with the procurement of fighters (F-35A) and network electronic warfare devices, and the upgrade of fighters (F-15) and utility aircraft (EP-3 and UP-3D). SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of standoff electronic warfare aircraft, high-output electronic warfare equipment, high-output microwave equipment and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ammunition.

(2) Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains

(A) Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains

(i) Strengthening a Posture of Persistent ISR

In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas at sea and in the air around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, SDF will procure new type of destroyers with enhanced capabilities to respond to a wide range of missions (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH-60K/K (upgraded version)) and ship-borne UAVs, conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J and SH-60K) and upgrade the capabilities of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1). In this respect, SDF will strengthen the posture of persistent ISR through increasing the number of the operating days by introducing rational shifts of multiple crews and coordination with patrol vessels to be newly introduced for the new type of destroyers (FFM), and through increasing the opportunities

for operation of the submarine fleet on a steady-state basis by introducing the test submarine, which the type has been changed from existing submarines. In addition, SDF will maintain a fully-prepared ISR posture through procuring airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D) and a long-endurance UAV (Global Hawk), upgrading the capabilities of the existing airborne warning and control systems (E-767), development of a new fixed air defense radar, establishing 1 AEW wing as part of air warning and control units as stated in II4, preparing an operating base for mobile air defense radars on the islands on the Pacific side and strengthening over-the-horizon radar capabilities.

(ii) Obtaining and Maintaining Air Superiority

SDF will strive for the comprehensive enhancement of air defense capability in airspace around Japan including vast air space on the Pacific side.

SDF will proceed replacing fighters that are not suitable for modernization (F-15) by increasing the number of fighters (F-35A) and will newly introduce fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (hereinafter referred to as “STOVL aircraft”) to enhance the flexibility of fighter operations, as the number of air bases that allow for conventional take-off and landing of fighters is limited. In this regard, SDF will refurbish MSDF’s multi-function helicopter carrier destroyers (Izumo class) after studying operation of STOVL aircraft so that the operation where necessary will be possible such as response to air attacks in time of emergency, ISR, training and disaster response, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel and to improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. These destroyers shall continue to engage as multi-function destroyers in a wide range of missions after refurbishment, such as the defense of Japan and the response to large-scale disasters. There will be no change in the existing Government opinion concerning equipment that cannot be possessed under the Constitution. In addition, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of modernized fighter aircraft (F-15) including the enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities, mounting stand-off missiles and increasing the number of mounted missiles. Furthermore, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-2) including the enhancement of network functions.

With regard to future fighter, SDF will procure new fighters that are capable of playing a central role in future networked warfare before the retirement of the fighter aircraft (F-2). MOD/SDF will promote necessary research and launch a Japan-led development project at an early timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight.

Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, SDF will

continue to improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). In addition, SDF will continue to procure aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-46A) and rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(iii) Obtaining and Maintaining Maritime Superiority

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic by effectively conducting various activities including holding persistent ISR, anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, SDF will procure equipment such as a new type of destroyers (FFM), conduct service-extension activities on equipment such as existing destroyers, and enhance the capabilities of equipment such as fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) as stated in (i), and will procure minesweeping/transport helicopters (MCH-101). In addition, SDF will continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels and amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and will establish the structure for enhancing tactical development and education and training capabilities. Furthermore, SDF will continue to procure surface-to-ship guided missiles and will introduce new surface-to-ship guided missiles and air-to-ship guided missiles with further extended ranges. In addition, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the introduction of long-endurance UAVs to strengthen surveillance capabilities in the water including on the vast Pacific side. Moreover, SDF will strive to steadily enhance C4I capabilities and will deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and proceed with R&D aiming at further enhancement of capabilities to utilize them for oceanic observation and ISR.

(B) Stand-off Defense Capability

In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring safety of SDF personnel, SDF will procure stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM and LRASM), which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and will proceed with R&D on HVGP intended for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles intended for the defense of remote islands and hypersonic weapons. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technology, MOD/SDF will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive R&D of related technology.

(C) Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability

In order to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage, SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection on a

steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses including their maintenance and replenishment systems.

For reinforcing its multi-layered and persistent defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, SDF will procure its land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore), continue to upgrade the capabilities of its existing Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG) and surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system as stated in (A) (ii). SDF will also conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture.

In order to effectively counter missile attacks, SDF will procure its interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 block IB and block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3MSE), long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6) and mid-range ground-to-air guided missiles.

In order to reinforce the detecting and tracking capabilities for missiles and to unitarily command and control the various equipment that each SDF service possesses, SDF will proceed with initiatives such as upgrading its Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) and procuring its air defense command and control system (ADCCS), developing its new fixed air defense radar, adding cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to its E-2D, R&D on a network system that enables engage-on-remote launch of weapons by destroyers (DD) (FC network), and research on satellite-mounted dual-wave-length infrared sensors and will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.

Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures.

In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a missile attack, SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance/response equipment, mobile combat vehicles, transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and UAVs in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities including nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units, and also enhance the ability to respond effectively and efficiently by proceeding with the networking of its troops and strengthening information sharing. In sensitive locations such as areas where many nuclear power plants are located, SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants.

(D) Maneuver and Deployment Capability

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations for a wide variety of situations and improve effective deterrence

and counter capabilities, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to command and coordinate the transport capabilities of each SDF service unilaterally from a steady-state including the reinforcement of the transport coordination function of the Joint Staff.

SDF will continue to procure transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and introduce new utility helicopters, and will also promote relevant initiatives in order to obtain the cooperation of related local governments and other entities in promptly deploying GSDF Ospreys (V-22). In developing such aerial transport capability, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the further enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness such as avoiding functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation.

In order to strengthen the transport function to remote islands, SDF will newly introduce logistics support vessels (LSV) and landing craft utilities (LCU), and consider new vessels necessary to smoothly implement amphibious and other operations in the future. SDF will also continue to actively utilize ships for which the funds and know-how of the private-sector have been utilized and consider further expansion in order to conduct large-scale transportation efficiently for coordination with the transport capabilities of SDF in light of the current situation in which they are being used effectively in dispatches to disasters and transporting its troops.

SDF will equip mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift to its rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) as stated in II-2, and will establish rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will conduct persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver training for prompt deployment to remote islands.

(3) Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency

(A) Securing Continuous Operations

In order to be able to operate units continuously at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will promote measures necessary for securing ammunition and fuel and protecting infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations.

With regard to securing ammunition, SDF will prioritize to procure anti-aircraft missiles that are necessary to secure air superiority, torpedoes that are necessary to secure maritime superiority, stand-off firepower that is necessary for countering from the outside of their threat envelopes and interceptor missiles for BMD while taking account of the needs of joint operation.

With regard to securing fuel, SDF will secure the effective emergency procurement and promote

necessary measures such as newly introduction of tankers from the perspective of stabilizing fuel supply during emergencies.

In order to minimize damage from various attacks and quickly recover functions, SDF will proceed with initiatives for the dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations while taking the perspective of protection from electromagnetic pulse attacks into consideration, and will construct a posture regarding patrol and damage recovery based on the perspective of mutual cooperation among each SDF service. In addition, SDF will also proceed with various measures to make it possible for SDF to immediately utilize private airports and ports in contingency situations.

With regard to strengthening logistics foundations, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations and proceed with the establishment of the necessary facilities. SDF will also expand some arsenals and make it possible to have them used jointly by each SDF service and will study and take the measures necessary to optimize combat service support including logistics from the perspective of joint operations.

SDF will steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases and will also proceed with measures for facilities regarding their deterioration and earthquake resistance. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted.

(B) Ensuring the Operational Availability of Equipment

In order to swiftly and effectively respond to various situations, MOD/SDF will ensure high operational availability of procured equipment by securing the necessary and sufficient funds for sustainment and maintenance of equipment, expanding the use of umbrella contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding sustainment and maintenance, sharing information on supply data between the public and private sectors, promoting the utilization of Additive Manufacturing (3D printers), which can form complex shapes with speed and precision and promoting the procurement of parts and components from international markets.

2. Priorities in Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability

(1) Reinforcing Human Resource Base

As equipment becomes more advanced and complex and missions become more varied and internationalized against the context of the rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rate, MOD/SDF will strive to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people and also promote initiatives on a priority base towards the establishment of an environment that enables all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise ability.

(A) Enhancement of Recruitment Initiatives

In order to steadily secure high-quality human

resources into the future within the severe recruiting environment accompanying the rapidly aging population and declining birth rates, MOD/SDF will proceed with measures towards expanding the recruitment of untenured troops and expanding the source for prospects including university graduates. MOD/SDF will also proceed with a wide range of solicitation measures including the enhancement of recruiting advertisement and recruiting systems and will also strengthen collaboration with local governments and related organizations, etc. Furthermore, in order to increase attractiveness at the point of recruiting, MOD/SDF will improve living and working environment and strive to improve re-employment support for being rehired as public servants and matriculating at universities after completing tenure.

(B) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to further increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will actively hire women, promote women's participation and proceed with the establishment of the foundations for the education, living and work environment for female SDF personnel.

In order to further utilize advanced-age human resources who have plenty of knowledge, skills and experience while keeping strength, MOD/SDF will raise the early retirement age for SDF personnel and promote the expansion of reenrollment and the utilization by units of the skills of retired SDF personnel in SDF fields requiring high levels of expertise. MOD/SDF will also secure personnel for units that are responsible for fields that require high levels of expertise by effectively utilizing human resources in the private sector.

(C) Improving Living and Work Environment

As the duration of the activities of the units becomes longer in response to the severe security environment, MOD/SDF will strive to improve the living and work environment, so that all the troop members who undertake the noble mission of protecting life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese national will be able to fully exercise their capabilities and fulfill their missions with high morale, by such means as steadily renewing aged daily life/workplace fixtures, steadily securing the necessary quantities of daily necessities and reducing the number of days on offshore duty per onboard person through the introduction of shifts by multiple crews, in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing and proceeding with measures against aging and earthquake resistance for facilities.

(D) Promotion of Work Style Reforms

As the number of SDF personnel under time and mobility constraints because of child rearing and nursing care increases due to the consequence of major changes in the social structure, MOD/SDF will promote work style reform at MOD/SDF such as correcting long working hours and promoting the use of holidays in order to ensure proper work-life balance so that all SDF personnel will be able to fully exercise their ability and play prominent roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will proceed with initiatives such as establishing workplace nurseries,

and will also promote measures supporting families of military personnel such as providing temporary care for children of SDF personnel who must show up at the workplace for emergency operation, while strengthening our collaboration with local governments and other entities.

(E) Enhancing Education

At each SDF service and the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ), MOD/SDF will strive to enhance the content and organizational structure of the education and training, including the academic knowledge and international sensibilities necessary to nurture broad perspectives concerning security. In addition, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering whether adequate education and research regarding joint operations is possible with the existing organizations, in order to enhance the capabilities and the unity of the SDF and promote cross-sectoral operations, and strive to strengthen education concerning the organizational management capabilities of MOD/SDF. In order to further promote mutual reinforcement between each SDF service, MOD/SDF will strive to standardize the curriculum and will utilize cutting-edge technology in order to promote effective and efficient education. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strive to build up the network of students from overseas who graduated from NDAJ as a mean of support for strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges. In order to steadily implement education and training, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering the procurement of new primary trainer aircraft as the successor to the existing primary trainer aircraft (T-7).

(F) Improving Treatment and Re-Employment Support

To enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high moral and pride, MOD/SDF will promote improving treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges and improving conditions including salaries that reflects the special nature of the missions and working environment and will strive to enhance welfare benefits including family support.

In view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system, MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by such means as promoting the further utilization of retired SDF personnel in the disaster prevention-related departments of local governments and related ministries and agencies while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel in addition to expanding vocational training subjects and support for step-by-step acquisition of qualifications.

(G) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, MOD/SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broader areas and opportunities. In order to enhance

the fulfillment of the ranks of SDF reserves, MOD/SDF will also increase the number of enrollees as reserve candidates who are drawn from people without experience as SDF personnel, and promote the appointment of SDF reserves who are former reserve candidates as reserve ready personnel. Furthermore, in order to make it easier for SDF reserves to respond to training summons, MOD/SDF will undertake the strengthening of the foundations for education and training and the revision of the content of the training, and will implement measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the employers.

(2) Reviewing Equipment Structure

MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure and strengthen the functions of the Joint Staff in order to build an effective and rational equipment structure from a joint operation perspective. MOD/SDF will also develop equipment with multiple functional variants, optimize and standardize specifications of equipment, jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services, reduce types of aircraft, suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness.

In order to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost, MOD/SDF will actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) to data processing and decision makings regarding unit operation, the procurement of UAVs and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and UUVs. MOD/SDF will also actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for radar sites and other equipment.

(3) Reinforcing Technology Base

In order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important areas of equipment and technology by making focused investments in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies, MOD/SDF will revise Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook and newly formulate R&D visions on technologies that will be important for future joint operation, presenting the future direction of medium to long-term research and development from a strategic perspective.

In order to significantly shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its process, MOD/SDF will adopt new methods such as block approach and modularization for R&D of HVGP for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles for the defense of remote islands, UUVs and hypersonic weapons. MOD/SDF will also provide the capabilities of future equipment promptly through analysis of alternatives by the technological demonstration at the initial stage of R&D.

MOD/SDF will work actively to leverage potentially dual-use, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with the countries who are making

large-scale investments in game-changing technologies such as the U.S., and promote mutually complementary international joint R&D. MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends.

(4) Optimizing Equipment Procurement

In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment procurement, MOD/SDF will enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment lifecycles. To this end, MOD/SDF will take various initiatives including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at development stage, incorporating successful cases in the civilian sector to the manufacture of defense equipment, actively adopting contracting methods such as the competitive bidding method that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise and tightening cost controls. In this regard, MOD/SDF will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifications and the review of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs, and apply them.

Regarding the cost estimation of equipment without market prices, MOD/SDF will undertake more appropriate costs calculation by making the calculation of the processing costs required for the manufacture more precise and appropriate, and will also conduct the procurement of information systems at appropriate price levels. To implement these initiatives effectively, MOD/SDF will actively develop and allocate human resources by utilizing human resources with specialized expertise, skills and experiences in the private sector, and will also strive to construct the cost-database on component level of equipment based on the information compiled from the cost estimates/contract records.

MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment sustainment and maintenance including the expansion of PBL and other umbrella contracts. MOD/SDF will also facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies regarding domestically procured equipment with low cost effectiveness by considering price reduction through imports and considering the deduction of unique specifications for domestic use. Furthermore, in light of the growing importance of the management of price, delivery time and other matters in procurement through Foreign Military Sales (hereinafter referred to as “FMS procurement”), MOD/SDF will collaborate closely with the U.S. Government and other organizations through Japan-U.S. consultations and promote initiatives towards the streamlining of FMS procurement, such as striving to acquire equipment in coordination with U.S. forces regarding the timing of procurement and specifications, and to manage the status of implementation in a timely and appropriate manner.

(5) Strengthening Defense Industrial Base

In order to strengthen the resilience of Japan’s defense industry base, which is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment, Government will actively take measures such as introducing the competition principle to Japan’s

defense industry, which is in a poor competitive environment, incorporating the knowledge, expertise, and technology of the civilian sector, and strengthen the supply chains of equipment. As part of these measures, MOD/SDF will review the contracting system with the aim of creating a competitive environment, including the introduction of the enterprise evaluation system that assesses how much a contractor company tries to contribute to strengthening of defense industry. MOD/SDF will also encourage the spin-off from defense technology to civilian purposes and the spin-on from cutting-edge technologies in the civilian sector to the defense industry including innovative manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen risk management regarding the vulnerability of supply chains of equipment through research on the supply chains and also promote the participation of Japan’s defense industry in the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment.

The government as a whole will promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases such as the transfer contributes to Japan’s security. In order to do so, based on progress and other elements in defense cooperation with our partners, the Government will make necessary improvements in implementation or related rules, promote public-private partnership in information gathering and dissemination, strengthen technology control and intellectual property management in order to prevent leakage of key defense equipment-related technologies on the occasion of overseas transfer and develop defense equipment with an eye on overseas transfer. MOD/SDF will also strengthen information security measures that will be necessary for Japan’s defense industry to participate in international businesses, and develop an information security guidebook for Japan’s defense industry. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will actively promote international joint development and production with other countries utilizing Japan’s technological strengths.

In addition, MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process and thorough cost reduction and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures.

(6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

In order to be able to provide timely and effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information.

MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities so that MOD/SDF will be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements including those related to new domains. This will be conducted by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing intelligence gathering satellites and commercial satellites, and diversifying means for information collection through new equipment such as

long-endurance UAVs. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will also strengthen the gathering posture of HUMINT through enhancing its defense attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and expand its cooperation with allied countries. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strive to achieve its even more effective and efficient posture by proactively utilizing the latest information processing technology, and will also promote all-source analysis, which fuses a wide variety of information sources together. MOD/SDF will also strive to utilize information effectively by successfully developing and connecting systems that will promote information sharing.

In order to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, MOD/SDF will promote securing and training of highly capable personnel handling information collection and analysis. Moreover, MOD/SDF will take steady measures in various directions including recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis capabilities.

With regard to information security, MOD/SDF will coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need-to-know basis, and in taking preventative measures against information leakage. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen counter-intelligence capability within MOD/SDF by promoting collaboration with relevant organizations.

3. Large-Scale Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond to it by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units based on a joint operational approach, and also will promote measures to strengthen the response posture including the deployment of drones for disasters, a helicopter satellite communication system (HeliSat), lifesaving systems, and emergency power sources. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, local governments and the private sector, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF's disaster and deployment operations is affected.

4. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

(1) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to ensure Japan's national security and to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further strengthen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" while strengthening Japan's own capability as a premise for these efforts.

Japan will continue to promote cooperation in space and cyber domains, comprehensive air and missile defense, bilateral training and exercises and joint ISR activities. Japan will also further deepen Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in various areas such as formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

In order for Japan and the U.S. to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will advance efforts for standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral

activities, sharing of various networks, building capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment and initiatives for intelligence/information security. To efficiently improve Japanese and the U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S. equipment through optimized FMS procurement and Japan-U.S. joint R&D. Furthermore, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use of SDF and U.S. force facilities, and efforts for improved resiliency.

(2) Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

In order to make the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily secure Host Nation Support (HNS).

5. Strengthening Security Cooperation

In line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges based on the understanding that realizing a security environment that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and necessary undertaking that contributes to Japan's defense itself and also relates to its basic fundamentals. In particular, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues and exchanges among military branches, in order to improve interoperability with relevant countries and to strengthen Japan's presence, Japan will appropriately combine and strategically implement specific initiatives such as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and capacity building assistance, while taking characteristics and situation specific to each region and country into account.

Based on this significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and thoroughgoing initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of operation procedures, development of organizational systems and review of systems, and will further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and agencies as well as with other countries, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan's initiatives. In this regard, Japan will focus on the following in particular.

(1) Holding bilateral/multilateral Training and Exercises

Japan will promote bilateral/multilateral training and exercises based on their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges. Through this, Japan will represent the will and ability to create a desirable security environment and will also seek to improve interoperability with relevant countries and strengthen cooperative relationships with other countries.

(2) Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation including overseas transfers of defense equipment, and strive to enhance our partners' military capabilities and maintain/strengthen medium and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by combining other efforts such as training and exercises and capacity building assistance as necessary.

(3) Capacity Building Assistance

Japan will work with countries of the Indo-Pacific region to support advance capacity development efforts based

on their voluntary ownership, so as to enable counterpart military organizations to contribute further towards international peace and regional stability, thus creating security environment that is desirable to Japan. In this regard, Japan will effectively utilize knowledge and expertise accumulated by SDF, coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and coordinate with partner countries such as the U.S. and Australia undertaking capacity building assistance, so as to maximize results by combing various measures efficiently.

(4) Maritime Security

Based on the understanding that open and stable seas are a foundation of the peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation and in line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will promote initiatives such as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, information sharing and visits by ships and aircraft as warranted by the occasion, with foreign countries that share the understanding of maritime security. Through these, Japan will show the will and ability to stabilize maritime order in an active and visible manner.

(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. In particular, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, dissemination of United Nations (UN) military engineer unit manuals and capacity building assistance in Japan's field of expertise by making good use of accumulated experiences. While Japan will also proceed with education and training that match missions conducted on the basis of the Legislation for Peace and Security, GSDF will take the necessary measures towards newly establishing an International Activities Unit with high-level emergency response capabilities and high-level technology in areas such as facilities and the operation of UAVs by unifying the Central Readiness Regiment and the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit.

The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.

Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for counter-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities.

(6) Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation

In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF's knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the UN and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous

Weapons Systems (LAWS).

6. Elements Supporting Defense Capability

(1) Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, SDF's joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way while fully grasping the environment of the surroundings of the training areas and making absolutely sure that safety is secured. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan and conduct effective training and exercises. SDF will also facilitate to expand joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. SDF will also strive to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the implementation of training by GSDF and MSDF in collaboration with U.S. Marines, SDF will strive to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and abroad.

Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. SDF will also actively utilize the opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises as a way not only for considering and verifying plans for the actual operations of SDF, but also for actively considering and verifying comprehensive issues including civil protection.

(2) Medical Care

SDF will enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel's vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad.

In order to respond to various situations, SDF will strive to enhance the capacity to rapidly deploy medical bases and conduct Damage Control Surgery (DCS) to stabilize the symptoms of patients, and the capacity to manage patients being sent back as part of strengthening the system to seamlessly cover the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations including the perspective of joint operations. In this regard, SDF will establish a system to jointly possess patient information from the frontline to final destinations. SDF will also strive to standardize medical supplies for the sake of interoperability and to stockpile necessary supplies. Furthermore, in order to transport patients safely, SDF will take necessary measures to introduce armored ambulances. Taking conditions and characteristics of each region into account, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan's southwestern region.

In order to conduct the control and coordination regarding medical operations of SDF on a steady-state basis, SDF will strive to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through further endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. Furthermore, SDF will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to enrich the clinical experience of medical officers to better secure the number of medical officers, and promoting the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel (physicians). In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed with the establishment of hygienic education and training foundations common to each SDF service that are necessary to improve medical care capabilities for combat injuries and the requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance.

(3) Collaboration with Local Communities

MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures including sound insulation projects at residences. MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations.

In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF's emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. MOD/SDF will also promote various measures that contribute to the local community by such means as striving to secure opportunities for local small and medium enterprises to receive contract orders based on the contracting policy of the nation, etc., concerning small and medium enterprises while also being mindful of efficiency.

(4) Intellectual Base

MOD/SDF will contribute to the promotion of national security education through such means as dispatching instructors to educational institutions and holding public symposiums. In addition, MOD/SDF will provide efficient and highly trustworthy information to increase public access to the research results regarding security. Moreover, MOD/SDF will promote various measures to improve the capabilities for providing information including that in foreign languages, the further utilization of increasingly diversified social networks, and MOD/SDF will also expand networks and institutional

collaboration with research and education organizations, and think-tanks in Japan and abroad in order to further strengthen the research system of MOD/SDF with the National Institute for Defense Studies playing central roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will contribute to policy development through timely and appropriate supply of high-quality research results, based upon expertise and research capabilities, to the policy development departments.

IV. Quantities of Major Procurement

The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III.

V. Expenditures

1. The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in this program amount to approximately ¥27,470 billion in FY 2018 prices.
2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this program is expected to be around approximately ¥25,500 billion over the next five years. In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue flexible and swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fiscal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fiscal conditions among other budgets.
3. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17,170 billion in FY 2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project efficiency such as maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately.
4. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

VI. Other

While maintaining U.S. Forces deterrence, Japan will steadily implement specific measures stipulated in "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" and other SCC documents and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

Annex Table

Service	Equipment	Quantity
Ground Self-Defense Force	Mobile Combat Vehicles	134
	Armored Vehicles	29
	New Utility Helicopters	34
	Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)	3
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles	3 companies
	Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	5 companies
	Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore)	2
	Tanks	30
	Howitzers	40
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Destroyers	10
	Submarines	5
	Patrol Vessels	4
	Other Ships	4
	Total (Tonnage)	23 (approx. 66,000t)
	Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	12
	Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability))	13
	Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	3
	Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)	1
	Air Self-Defense Force	Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-2D)
Fighters (F-35A)		45
Fighter Upgrade (F-15)		20
Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A)		4
Transport Aircraft (C-2)		5
Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)		4 groups (16 fire squadrons)
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)		1

Notes 1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the “NDPG for FY 2019 and beyond,” but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the “MTDP (FY 2019 - FY 2023).”

2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs.

Reference 8 Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2014 - FY 2018)

December 17, 2013,
National Security Council Decision
Cabinet Decision

The Cabinet decided as per attached sheet the “Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2014 - FY 2018)” according to the “Guidelines Regarding to Defense Program after FY 2014” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2015.)

(Attached sheet)

Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2014 - FY 2018)

I Program Guidelines

Japan will build-up its defense capability from FY2014 to FY 2018 according to the “Guidelines Regarding to Defense Program after FY 2014” (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013. Hereinafter “2013 Guidelines”,) striving toward collective optimization for functions and capabilities requiring particular emphasis, and build up the “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” aiming integrated, effective, and maneuverable defense capabilities that can act seamlessly in various situations in a timely manner. At the same time, the defense capabilities needs to possess superior readiness, continuity, tenacity, and connectivity in both tangible and intangible factors; supported by advanced technologies and the intelligence, command, control, and communication abilities; and paid close attention to establishment of a wide basis for combat service supports. Because of this, the government will efficiently prepare the highly effective integrated defense capabilities to enhance the force structure of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) responding to supposed situations, giving priority to particularly important functions and capabilities identified based on joint operations capability assessments from the perspective for general functionality and ability of the SDF.

With this in mind, the government will efficiently and effectively prepare, maintain, and operate the defense capabilities based on a plan that have following as essential parts.

- 1 Warning and surveillance abilities, intelligence functions, transportation abilities, and command control communication intelligence abilities will be placed importance as well as the functions and capabilities to defense Japan’s remote islands, intercept ballistic missile attacks, act in outer space and cyberspace, respond large disasters, and take part in international peace cooperation activities (this means the cooperative actions of the members of international society to improve international security environment, including Peace Keeping Operations of United Nations, and actions to deal with non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, the same hereinafter;) paying attention to further improvement of joint function to seamlessly and flexibly cope with its duties to effectively deter and counter in various incidents, stabilize Asia-Pacific region, and improve global security environment. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strive for the steady improvement of the base to effectively exert these functions and abilities.
- 2 Particular attentions should be also paid to place the priority to building up defense capabilities to maintain superiority at the sea and the air certainly as a premise for effective deterrence and coping with various incidents including enforcement of defense force posture in Japan’s south-west region, also making much account of preparing maneuver deployment ability.

On the other hand, an ability to repel an opposition

attempting to land on Japan’s territory, which was expected mainly in the Cold War era, will be brought greater efficiency and rationality, however the minimum specialized knowledge and technics will be maintained to be inherited to deal with possible changes of situation in the future.

- 3 In acquiring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new high performance equipment with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, the MOD/SDF will efficiently secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity.” Particular attentions should be paid to reduce the life-cycle cost by strict management for projects through equipment’s life-cycle including research and development.
- 4 The MOD/SDF promote the measures for the human resource system reforms including more effective utilization of SDF female personnel and SDF reserve personnel to maintain the SDF powerful despite increasingly sophisticated and complicated equipment and diversified and internationalized duty, recognizing importance to effective use of human resource that makes the SDF’s backbone.
- 5 The MOD/SDF promote proactively the initiative to make stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) more smooth and effective by enhancing various cooperation and discussion in broader fields including reviewing of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, in order to deal with increasingly hostile security environment and enhance the effectiveness of a deterrent and repellency of the Japan-U.S. coalition along with U.S. rebalance to Asia-Pacific region.
- 6 The MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development while caring about other policies and measures of the government.

II Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

- 1 The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), considering the change of security environment around Japan, will newly establish the Ground Component Command, making command and administration functions of each Army Headquarters more efficient and rational and reviewing functional parts of some Army Headquarters, in order to make it possible to operate operational basic units (Rapid Deployment Divisions, Rapid Deployment Brigades, Armored Division, and other Divisions and Brigades) and other units nationwide in speedy and flexible manner under joint operations. The Central Readiness Force are closed and its assigned units are assigned to the Ground Component Command with that.

The MOD/SDF reorganizes two conventional divisions and two conventional brigades respectively to two Rapid Deployment Divisions and two Rapid Deployment Divisions, extremely mobile units with high warning and surveillance capabilities for basically operated in maneuvers, in order to respond immediately to various incidents including opponent attacks to Japan’s islands effectively and agilely. Moreover, force posture in South West region should be strengthened by newly organized Coast Observation Unit and initially responding Security Force. The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade with genuine amphibious operation capability are to be organized from several special amphibious regimental-sized units in order to quickly land, recapture, and secure the islands invaded by an adversary.

Furthermore, the units equipped with newly adopted Mobile Combat Vehicles are to be created sequentially; tanks equipped in divisions and brigades in outside Hokkaido and

Kyushu islands are to be disused in a steady manner, and the tanks in Kyushu island are to be put into newly created tank units under the direct command of the Western Army in order for swift and flexible operation. At the same time, the preparedness against invasions by large ground forces such as landing assaults in large scale should be made efficient and narrative thoroughly. The artilleries disposed in divisions and brigades in outside Hokkaido island are to be put into artillery units under the direct command of each Army in a steady manner.

- 2 The Maritime Self-Defense Force effectively conducts regular and uninterrupted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities (hereinafter “continuous surveillance”) and various operations including anti-submarine warfare to defend the sea area around Japan and secure the safety of sea traffic. MSDF will keep four Escort Flotillas each consisting mainly one Helicopter Destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-Equipped Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs) as a core, and five Escort Divisions consisting other kind of Destroyers and Frigates to conduct international peace cooperation activities etc. flexibly. Meanwhile, the MSDF continuously takes measures required to increase the number of submarines.
- 3 The Air Self-Defense Force will move one Fighter Squadron to Naha Air Base to upgrade air defense posture in South West region of Japan. Moreover, the ASDF creates one Airborne Early Warning Squadron under Airborne Warning and Control Wing and deploys it to Naha Air Base.
The ASDF will integrate the units having training support functions in order to improve advanced tactical skills still more to avert relative degradation of Japan’s air defense capability and maintain sound air superiority.
- 4 The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY 2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY 2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY 2013.

III Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities

- 1 Effective Determent and Countermeasure to Various Situations
 - (1) Ensuring Security at the Sea and in the Air around Japan
Procurement of Aegis-Equipped Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs), All Purpose Destroyers (DDs), submarines, P-1 fixed-wing patrol aircrafts, and SH-60K patrol helicopters shall be continued, and service life expansion for existing destroyers, submarines, P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircrafts, and SH-60J patrol helicopters shall be conducted; furthermore, the MOD/SDF will investigate ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles with patrol capability, and take required actions; in order to enhance early detection abilities for various indications through continuous surveillance in a wide area. Moreover, the MSDF will introduce new frigates that combine improved multi-mission capabilities and compact hulls to increase the number of its surface combatant vessels. Furthermore, new early warning and control aircrafts or early warning aircrafts and fixed warning and control radars will be introduced, as well as the improvement of existing E-767 early warning and control aircrafts shall be continued. In addition, long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles shall be introduced to create a joint unit

to enhance continuous surveillance capabilities in wide areas. Besides, a system development to unify air rescue capabilities from ground bases, which the Maritime Self-Defense Force units and Air Self-Defense Force units take charge of separately now, shall be started.

- (2) Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands
 - (A) Establishment of Continuous Surveillance System
A GSDF coast observation unit shall be deployed on Yonagunijima Island to establish a system required for continuous surveillance under normal circumstances time to make it possible to quickly respond various incidents. Moreover, new early warning and control aircrafts or early warning aircrafts shall be introduced, as mentioned (1) above, based on operational conditions of existing E-767 early warning and control aircrafts and E-2C early warning aircrafts, and one airborne early warning squadron shall be created equipped with E-2C aircrafts under Airborne Early Warning Group and deployed to Naha Air Base, as mentioned in II-3 above. Furthermore, an airtight warning and surveillance system shall be maintained by construction of the deployment platform for Mobile Warning and Control Radars in islands in South West region.
 - (B) Secure and Maintain Air Superiority
As mentioned in II-3 above, the number of fighter squadrons in Naha Air Base will be increased into two. And the introduction of F-35A fighter jets, the modernization of F-15 fighter jets, and the enhancement of air-to-air combat capability and network functions of F-2 fighter jets are still continued. Besides, the ASDF shall take required action to replace some of F-15 jets that are not suitable for the modernization mentioned above with fighters with higher capability. Moreover, the introduction of the Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missile shall be continued, and the capability improvement of Patriot Surface-to-Air Guided Missile System shall be proceeded further to mount PAC-3MSE capability enhanced intercept missiles with cruise missiles and aircrafts defense capability and ballistic missiles defense capability both. In addition, new tanker/transport aircrafts shall be introduced and the addition of aerial refueling functionality to C-130H transport aircrafts and the procurement of UH-60J rescue helicopters shall be continued. Besides, the investigation of whole concept of air defense systems for remote islands in Pacific side shall be continued.
 - (C) Secure and Maintain Maritime Superiority
Procurement of Aegis-Equipped Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs), All Purpose Destroyers (DDs), submarines, P-1 fixed-wing patrol aircrafts, and SH-60K patrol helicopters shall be continued, and service life expansion for existing destroyers, submarines, P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircrafts, SH-60J patrol helicopters shall be conducted, as well as new frigates that combine improved multi-mission capabilities and compact hulls shall be introduced. Furthermore, ship-based multipurpose helicopters needed for continuous operation of surface combatant vessels responding various incidents shall be newly introduced, and acquisition of minesweepers, US-2 rescue flying boats, and ground-to-ship guided missiles are to be continued.

(D) Improvement of Rapid Response Capabilities

The procurement of C-2 transport aircrafts and CH-47JA transport helicopters shall be continued to ensure rapid and large-scale transport/deployment capabilities and improve effective response capabilities. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will newly introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (C) above as well as tilt-rotor aircrafts that can complement CH-47JA transport helicopters by their excellent cruise speed and range. Meanwhile, the MOD/SDF will investigate required specifications for the new multipurpose helicopters to succeed existing UH-1J multipurpose helicopters, and take actions as appropriate. For these procurement for air transport capabilities, duplication of equipment functions shall be avoided through clarification of the roles sharing between equipment.

To enhance the transport and deployment capability to land various units to islands from the sea, the MOD/SDF will acquire amphibious vehicles and refit existing landing ships. Furthermore, a conclusion shall be derived from the investigation for a multifunction warship with command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operation capabilities for amphibious operations. In addition, the MOD/SDF will investigate active use of transportation abilities in private sector, including methods using funds and stocked information of private business entities as well as the SDF Reserve Personnel, and take necessary actions for efficient large-scale transportation by the joint transportation capabilities of private sector and the SDF.

Rapid Deployment Regiments equipped with Mobile Combat Vehicles capable for air transport for immediate response to various incidents will be created in operational basic units basically operated in maneuvers (Rapid Deployment Divisions and Rapid Deployment Brigades) mentioned in II-1 above, and Security Force will be created in remote islands in South West region for initial response; and maneuver deployment trainings for quick units deployment to remote islands will be conducted. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will acquire guide unit kits for precision-guided bomb and ground-to-ship guided missiles, and promote the development to improve the ability of ship-to-ship guided missiles including range extension.

(E) Completion of Command, Control, Intelligence, and Communication System

The MOD/SDF, considering complete joint function, will create the Ground Component Command to make the command and administration functions of each Army Headquarters more efficient and rational and review some functions of some Army Headquarters as mentioned in II-1 above; and will station SDF personnel among each service mutually in major command centers of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF to make it possible to use their knowledge and experience; in order to complete command and control system in which a commander can employ various units mobile and nationwide and concentrate them to needed areas including remote islands.

These nationwide operations must be supported by superior intelligence and communication capability.

For that, the MOD/SDF will extend the SDF executive line to Yonagunijima Island, and a mobile multi-channel communication equipment to Naha Air Base. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will improve its data link function among three services of the SDF as well as field communication system, and acquire high-performance X band communication satellites as part of promotion of outer space utilization. The MOD/SDF also still investigates whether the satellite communication network will require further improvement and take actions as appropriate.

(3) Response to Missile Attacks

The MOD/SDF will improve comprehensive capabilities to deal with ballistic missiles considering North Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities.

The MOD/SDF will acquire new Aegis-equipped Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs) and continue to refit existing DDGs to enhance multi-layered continuous defense system for entire country. Moreover, the capability improvement of Patriot Surface-to-Air Guided Missile System shall be proceeded further to mount PAC-3MSE capability enhanced intercept missiles with cruise missiles and aircrafts defense capability and ballistic missiles defense capability both, as mentioned in (2)(B) above. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will enhance the ability of Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) and promote the procurement and performance enhancing of FPS-7 ground-based air surveillance, warning and control radar.

The Japan-U.S. cooperative development program relating to SM-3 Block IIA enhanced intercept missiles for ballistic missiles defense will be continued, and the investigation to move them on the following production and deployment phase will be conducted and necessary actions are to be taken as appropriate. Meanwhile, the MOD/DSF will conduct Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises to improve effectiveness of ballistic missile defense (BMD) system of both country, and strive to secure the deployment bases to respond to ballistic missiles.

The MOD/SDF will investigate the way future BMD system ought to be as a whole including new equipment for BMD. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will investigate the way response capability to launching means ought to be and take actions as appropriate to enhance Japan's own ability to deter and respond to ballistic missiles in order to enhance the deterrent of Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole based on appropriate role sharing between two countries.

The procurement of various surveillance equipment, Light Armored Vehicle, NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, and CH-47JA transport helicopter will be continued to protect important facilities including nuclear power plants, and to search and destroy enemy forces invaded into there, considering parallel attacks by guerrillas and special forces along with ballistic missiles attack. Furthermore, joint trainings with related organizations to validate cooperation procedures in the area with many nuclear power plants will be conducted. Investigation for the way the deployment platforms ought to be in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant also will be conducted, and the necessary actions will be taken.

(4) Responses in Outer Space and Cyberspace**(A) Promotion of Space Utilization**

The MOD/SDF will continue to improve intelligence

collection capabilities utilizing various satellites with different sensors, and enhance the command, control, intelligence, and communication ability through steady procurement of high-performance X band satellite network. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strive to improve the survivability of satellites through active promotion of the initiatives related to space surveillance as well as the investigation related to defense of satellites. During that, the MOD/SDF will promote the cooperation with related domestic organizations including the ones to develop human resources, considering these organizations and U.S. organizations have accumulated cutting-edge technologies and knowledges related to outer space.

(B) Response to Cyber Attack

The MOD/SDF, considering to enhance joint functionality and make resource allocation efficient, will conduct required system preparation including improvement of survivability of various command control systems and intelligence communication networks of the SDF, enhancement of information collection capability and investigate and analysis functionality, and preparation of the practical training environment enabling to validate cyber attack response capabilities, in order to ensure adequate cyber security against cyber attacks on the regular basis. During that, preparing capabilities preventing the adversary from using cyberspace will be also considered to ensure the counter capabilities against cyberspace in which the attacking side is predominant. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strive to grasp always cyber security related risks, counter measures, and technological trend through cooperation with private sector as well as strategy dialogues and joint exercises with allied nations.

The MOD/SDF, recognizing that retaining excellent human resources having deep expertise is essential in the current situation in which the method of cyber attacks becomes increasingly sophisticated and complicated, will develop human resources systematically by improving special education courses in the services, dispatching human resources actively to higher education institutes inside and outside Japan, and managing personnel in the way boosting expertise of them.

The MOD/SDF will enhance close cooperation with Cabinet Office and relevant ministries under normal circumstances through offering knowledges and personnel of the MOD/SDF, and enrich training and exercises to make it possible for the government to respond cyber attacks comprehensively as whole.

(5) Responses to Large-Scale Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond to it by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF troops based on a joint operational approach, and make maintaining the long term response posture possible by establishment of personnel rotation system. During the response, an enough attention shall be paid to the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake such that damage information collection and rapid rescue mission using aircrafts are vital in initial phase after disaster, and rapid relief activities

such as elimination of road obstacles are essential for smooth transportation of relief supplies by private sector. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will promote various policy including conducting and planning of various training and exercises, as well as preparing substitute functionalities and deploying platforms in close coordination and cooperation with Cabinet Office, relevant ministries, local governments, and private sector.

(6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

The MOD/SDF will strengthen capabilities for each stage of collection, processing, analysis, sharing, and protection of intelligence, because an advanced intelligence functionality is fundamental to MOD/SDF to fulfill its role appropriately.

The MOD/SDF will take drastic measures to strengthen intelligence collection activities related to different sources including radiation intelligence and imagery intelligence through driving acquisition and enhancement of intelligence collection facilities as well as active use of outer space and long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles in order to flexibly respond to the changing needs resulted from the altering security environment. During this, the MOD/SDF will effectively utilize geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), for example visualizing and predicting the future situation with various information merged in imageries and maps, and acquire data infrastructures in an integrated and effective manner. Furthermore, foreign information collection system shall be enhanced through improvement of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capability including an increase in the number of military attaches for new recipient countries, as well as by strengthening cooperation with allied countries and collection system for open information.

Furthermore, comprehensive information collection and analyze capabilities shall be strengthened through investigating appropriate recruitment method and personnel composition, integrating and enhancing educational courses for information lies across different organizations, and steady implementation of temporary posting of intelligent section personnel to policy or operation section.

The MOD/SDF will promote comprehensive analyze by which powerful synergistic effect can be expected, through thorough information sharing among persons who need to know including ones of Cabinet Office and relevant ministries, considering the importance of information security (INFOSEC), for more effective intelligent collection even in the difficult fiscal condition of the nation.

2 Stabilizing the Asia-Pacific Region and Improving Global Security Environments

The MOD/SDF will proactively conduct international peace cooperation activities aiming to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationship and conduct timely and properly various actions such as training and exercises, and respond appropriately to global security challenges, in order to stabilize Asia-Pacific region, from the perspective of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation. The MOD/SDF will place special importance on following during that.

(1) Carrying out Training and Exercises

As well as carrying out the SDF training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, Japan will proactively

promote bilateral and multilateral training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating Japan's will and advanced capabilities towards regional stabilization. In addition, Japan will improve interoperability, and build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

(2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Enhancing mutual understanding and trusty relationships with other countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. In addition to the above, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multilayered manner in various levels including not only higher levels but also inter-units levels in order for building and strengthening proactive cooperative relationships focused on security issues of common interest, including HA/DR and maritime security as well as ensuring the stable use of the outer space and cyberspace.

(3) Promoting Capacity Building

The MOD/SDF will take steps to enhance the military capabilities of recipient countries in HA/DR, landmine and explosive ordnance disposal, and military medicine utilizing SDF's accumulated abilities effectively in order to stabilize security environment and strengthen the relationships with defense authorities of the countries. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will strive to implement effective and efficient capacity building support, cooperating with the United States and Australia that proactively conduct that kind of support, and take measures to coordinate with foreign policy including Official Development Assistance (ODA).

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security

The MOD/SDF will closely cooperate with allied countries for counter-piracy activities off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as capacity building support for coastal countries concerned in order to secure the safety of maritime traffic and strengthen the international order of "Open and Stable Seas" which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime state. Joint training and exercises in waters other than off the coast of Japan, such as Indian Ocean and South China Sea, with the countries sharing the view on the importance of maritime security will also be enhanced.

(5) Carrying out International Peace Cooperation Activities

The MOD/SDF will enhance initial response readiness and transportation capabilities for quick start of activities in dispatched destination; strive to improve security by enhancing information collection capabilities on sight and improving bullet-proof performance of equipment; and keep taking necessary steps to improve systems for communication, supply, medical and sanitary affairs, and family support in order to continue stable actions over a long period of time. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will strive to implement international peace cooperation activities that meet the needs of dispatched destination while enhancing engineers units' posture that is highly needed in many cases. Furthermore, the MOD/ SDF will take part in international peace cooperation activities more effectively by dispatching SDF personnel to mission headquarters in the site and UN Department of Peace Operations, and will take necessary steps for developing human resources in the long run to retain required

personnel in a stable manner.

MOD/SDF will improve the educational content of the International Peace Operations Center and accept students from other than the SDF to the center as a necessary steps to promote cooperation with other organizations in education considering the importance of cooperation with Cabinet Office and relevant ministries, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations.

In addition, Japan will continue to investigate the way to take part in UN peace keeling operation ought to be, considering actual conditions of the action.

(6) Cooperating in Efforts to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation

Japan will continue to actively engage for cooperation in various activities in the fields of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations, including personnel contribution. Moreover, since the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that could potentially serve as delivery means for the kind of weapons all pose a severe threat to the peace and stability of whole international community as well as Japan, Japan will promote efforts towards nonproliferation including participation to Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in cooperation with relevant countries, international organizations, and other institutions.

3 Foundations for Demonstrating Defense Capabilities

(1) Training and Exercises

In order to effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, joint training and exercises of the SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises will be conducted in a tailored and visible way. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, studies and reviews of the overall response concept are to be regularly implemented. During that, the MOD/SDF will expand the usage of excellent training environment in Hokkaido by various units from the whole nation for effective training and exercises, and improve mobility performance of each units using landing ships and civil transportation proactively so that the units with high skill level stationed in Hokkaido can deploy to anywhere in the country. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will take necessary steps for the SDF units to use U.S. facilities and areas more widely in South West region which has restriction on training areas, paying attention to relationship with local society in order to realize effective training and exercises. In addition, the MOD/SDF will strive to develop and upgrade amphibious operation capability by tackling bilateral training proactively with United States Armed Forces including U.S. Marines inside and outside of Japan.

The MOD/SDF will promote cooperation with related organizations such as police, fire departments, and Japan Coast Guard, and conduct simulation of various situations and comprehensive training and exercises under normal circumstances including ones for civil protection, in order to respond in integrated manner as a nation to various situations.

(2) Operational Infrastructure

The survivability of camps and bases will be improved, considering they are critical foundation to deploy and respond rapidly against various situations and to keep require action long period of time. Especially, the ability to recover rapidly various support functions of camps and bases including keeping runways and information

communication infrastructures working, and ensuring stable supply of fuels shall be enhanced. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will take necessary steps to make it possible for SDF to use civil airports and sea ports against several situations in a timely manner, paying a special attention to secure deployment infrastructures in South West region. Moreover, required ammunition and spare parts shall be stored in appropriate place and cantonments in the vicinity of camps or bases shall be secured steadily. In addition, the MOD/SDF will take several family support measures taking care of family members of each personnel in order to make long term deployment to respond situations.

The MOD/SDF will investigate the factors that hinder higher equipment operating rate, and take necessary steps for wider adoption of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) in which consideration for the equipment are linked to achieved maintenance cost, since it enhances predictability especially in longer contracts and bring higher overall cost-effectiveness.

(3) Personnel and Education

Given the increased sophistication and complexity of equipment, along with the diversification and internationalization of the SDF duties in recent years, the SDF will promote measures to maintain and improve powerful troops and make effective use of human resources in the midst of a period of severe fiscal conditions, taking into consideration a variety of factors, including skills, experience, physical strength, and morale.

(A) Ranks and Age Distribution

The MOD/SDF will promote measures to retain and train the appropriate number of officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers with required ability, and retain capable new recruits to be enlisted in a systematic manner in order to realize ranks distribution suitable to accomplish the tasks of each service most appropriately and continuously, considering the characteristics of each service or unit.

The MOD/SDF will take measures to realize appropriate age distribution in the ranks of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and other enlisted men and women, by reviewing the way of retirement ages ought to be in positions with the retirement age of 60, utilizing proactively the mid-career leaving system, and appropriate human resource management for enlisted personnel other than NCOs. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will investigate new mid-career leaving system with reference to the ones of foreign countries. The MOD/SDF will take measures to allow the SDF aircraft pilots to leave the service early and take a career in private sector as a pilot (hereinafter "Release Program".) In addition, the final promote rate of officers, warrant officers, and NCOs will be reviewed, and more appropriate human resource management considering physical fitness of the personnel will be conducted to maintain SDF powerful.

(B) Effective Use of Human Resources

To achieve more effective human resource utilization, the MOD/SDF will promote the use of female SDF personnel, and proactively reappoint fixed term enlistee who has advanced knowledge, skills, and

experience, when it is recognized as comprehensively useful to make SDF powerful.

The MOD/SDF will promote measures concerning honors and privileges including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges in order to enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high moral and pride.

To strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, as well as secure a sufficient amount of personnel having a broad outlook and ideas along with a wide range of experience related to Japan's security affairs, and capable of responding flexibly and rapidly against various situations as a member of government, through secondments to the Joint Staff, Cabinet Office and other relevant ministries and agencies.

(C) Recruitment and Re-Employment Support

MOD/SDF will improve the environment to promote understanding of national defense and security, the effective recruiting advertisement suited to the rapid change of times, and the collaboration with Cabinet Office, relevant ministries and local governments in order to make SDF a popular place of employment to retain capable talents for many years to come in a stable manner even in the worsening recruiting environment due to declining birth rate and the popularization of higher education.

In view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system comparing other public officers, the MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment environment by such means as investigating measures to provide higher incentive for employer firms and promoting the use of retired SDF personnel in public sector while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel.

(D) Utilization of Personnel Including SDF Reserve Personnel

The MOD/SDF will promote to utilize SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF ready reserve personnel in wide range of fields, to support units operation in different and lengthening situations in these days. Because of this, the MOD/SDF will promote the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel to positions that match their specialized knowledge and skills assuming that they can serve in headquarters, and enhance call-up trainings for the reservists. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will investigate the utilization of experienced SDF Reserve Personnel as crew of warships to utilize the civil transport capacity, and take necessary measures, as well as promote the appointment SDF reserve personnel with specialized skills such as aircraft pilots who has left SDF early using the Release Program. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will widely investigate the way SDF Reserve Personnel ought to be, including call-ups in various situations, and take necessary measures. In addition, the MOD/SDF will make SDF Reserve Personnel system public and take measures to give stronger incentive to both reservists and employer companies in order to improve replenishment rate.

(4) Medical Care

In order to keep the SDF personnel in good health and enhance medical functionality to engage in a diverse range of missions such as various situation responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, networking among hospitals and camp dispensaries, contributing to community medicine, and improving the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strive to retain medical personnel having more specialized and higher skills, through endeavors enhancing education for medical officers, nurses, and emergency life-saving technicians. Besides, the SDF will examine revisions to regulations pertaining to emergency life-saving treatment while responding to situations. It will also improve first aid capabilities on the frontline and establish a posture for rapid medical evacuation based on the viewpoint of enhancing joint functions. In addition, the SDF will enhance the functionality of National Defense Medical College as the educational and research hub for military medicine.

(5) Defense Production and Technological Bases

The MOD/SDF will develop a strategy showing Japan's future vision of its defense production and technological bases to maintain and strengthen them, considering that maintaining defense production and technological bases in appropriate level is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance, and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment suitable for operating environments and this may also potentially contribute to improve deterrence.

The MOD/SDF proactively promote defense equipment and technology cooperation for international joint development with foreign countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields which Japan has a comparative advantage, from the viewpoint of improving the technological capabilities, productivity, and technological bases in defense production of Japan. In addition, the MOD/SDF will promote the conversion of aircraft developed by MOD/SDF for civilian use cooperating with Cabinet Office and other relevant ministries.

During that, the MOD/SDF will investigate to make the international joint development and production as well as the promotion of the conversion for civil use beneficial to both manufacturer and government, and promote necessary measures.

(6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

The MOD/SDF will enhance the equipment project management consistently through the lifecycle stages through planning, research and development, mass production and acquisition, maintenance, performance improvement, and disposition, considering technological perspective, by the institutionalization of the project manager system in order to acquire equipment more effectively and efficiently. During that, the database of past contracts and the simulation model for price estimation using the data shall be created in order to add up proper acquisition price independently. Furthermore, human resources for the positions that require specialized knowledge, skills, and experience related to acquisition

operations, such as a cost analyze specialist, shall be proactively developed and assigned. Moreover, a system shall be created to investigate and review specifications and project plan in the case of the discrepancy between actual life-cycle cost and the estimation resulted from the analyze above.

Discretionary contracts shall be used only through classification and clarification of usable cases ensuring transparency and fairness in order to conduct acquisition operations more quickly and efficiently. In addition, the MOD/SDF will investigate the introduction of newer contract framework to strengthen incentives for cost reduction, the availability of longer term contracts that can bring lower costs by permitting companies higher predictability, and a flexible order receiving framework such as joint ventures that allow the companies with international competitiveness to bring their own technologies, and take necessary measures as appropriate.

(7) Research and Development

The MOD/SDF will place the priority to research and development that meet the needs related to the operation of the SDF considering cost effectiveness in the midst of difficult fiscal condition of Japan.

To enhance air defense capabilities, the MOD/SDF will promote a technological investigation for future surface-to-air guided missiles, in view of replacing the role of Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles of GSDF and Patriot Surface-to-Air Guided Missile System of ASDF. Furthermore, the MOD/GSF will promote a strategic investigation of future fighter aircrafts including technological demonstration to make the new development including international joint development possible to be considered as a feasible option by the time of the retirement of F-2 jets and take necessary measures. The MOD/SDF will develop the electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircrafts, and promote the research of new fixed warning and control radars as well as an sonar that has improved detection ability through using several sonars in a parallel manner. In addition, the MOD/SDF will research on unmanned equipment that allows flexible operation in various situations including large-scale disasters, and promote the research and development to improve the performance of existing equipment such as vehicles, warships, and aircrafts.

The MOD/SDF will draw up the Future Equipment Vision in which the medium-to long-term directions for research and development for each major equipment are explained to systematically conduct advanced researches based on medium-to long-term perspective, considering the newest scientific and technological trend, changes in battle aspects, the possibility of international joint research and development, and the possibility of effective integrated mutual operation of major equipment in order to respond new threats and ensure technological superiority in critical strategic fields.

From the perspective of security, assessing trends in science and technology under normal circumstances, including information related to technological development, and bringing together the capabilities of the government, industry, and academia enables civilian technology to be effectively utilized in the field of security. To this end, the MOD will work towards proactively making use of civilian technology that can also be applied to defense (dual-use technologies)

through enhanced partnerships with universities and research institutes, while also strengthening functions for controlling capabilities to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies. The MOD will also develop the use of defensive technologies for commercial sector.

The MOD/SDF will review again the research and development posture of the MOD/SDF itself and take necessary measures in order to make it more effective and efficient based on the points mentioned above.

(8) Collaboration with Local Communities

The MOD/SDF will strive to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local governments and local residents, considering the importance of close cooperation with them for effective response to various situations as well as recruitment and reemployment of SDF personnel, through continuing to promote measures targeting the areas around defense facilities to harmonize and coexistence with the area, as well as active public relations of the policies and activities of MOD/SDF.

In light of the fact that the presence of SDF units substantially contributes to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in certain regions, and in others, supports community-based health care through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircrafts, the MOD and SDF will consider the attributes of each area when reorganizing units and arranging and operating military camps, bases, and similar, in order to gain the understanding of local governments and communities. During that, the MOD/SDF will promote various measures to make contribution to local economy including expansion local medium to small sized enterprises' access to orders from the government, considering the government's basic policy for contracts related to SMEs.

(9) Boosting Communication Capabilities

The MOD/SDF, bearing in mind that the understanding and support of Japanese people and foreign countries is critical for the SDF to execute their mission stably, will strive to improve and reinforce active information dissemination including the further utilization of various media including social networks taking note of ensuring consistency of the transmitted contents, and will disseminate information about the MOD/SDF's initiatives, including the overseas activities of the SDF, to foreign countries with, for example, improvement and reinforcement of web-pages in English.

(10) Enhancing the Knowledge Base

The MOD/SDF will contribute to the promotion of security education in educational institutes through the activities by MOD/SDF personnel such as paper publications and temporarily lecturing as security and crisis management specialists in order to promote understanding of Japanese people on national security and crisis management. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will improve the function of National Institute for Defense Studies through facilitating collaboration with the policy-making sector by moving the institute to Ichigaya area and promoting research exchange with foreign research institutes such as ones in the United States and Australia, and will strive to achieve timely and appropriate operation to respond the policy agenda that the MOD faces.

(11) Promoting MOD Reforms

The MOD will promote reforms by constantly reviewing

its work methods and organization, thereby fostering a sense of unity among civil servants and SDF personnel, achieving total optimization in building up defense capabilities, strengthening joint operation functions, and enhancing policymaking and communication functions. During that, the MOD will establish the plan structure to build-up of defense capability with particular emphasis on competency evaluation of defense capabilities in view of joint operation in order to optimize building-up of defense capability as a whole, and take measures to make the equipment acquisition more efficient and appropriate, considering creating external organs. Furthermore, MOD will eliminate the operation overlaps actually existing between the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff by centralizing the tasks related to units operations to the latter, and review the way of organizations, including revision or repeal of the Bureau of Operational Policy, in order to make the SDF operations more rapid and efficient.

IV Measures to Strengthen Japan-U.S. Alliance

1 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to ensure Japan's national security by maintaining and strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation while also strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

Simultaneously, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities, and the shared use of U.S. armed forces and SDF facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also further tighten Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination such as BMD, bilateral defense planning, and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Alliance will strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building, HA/DR, peacekeeping, and counter terrorism, but also in the fields of maritime affairs, outer space, and cyberspace.

In addition, Japan will strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts in intelligence cooperation and information security, as well as cooperation in defense equipment and technology.

2 Initiatives for Smooth and Effective Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

The MOD/SDF will secure Japan's cost share of expenses for the stationing of the USFJ stably from the point of view to ensure smooth and effective stationing.

V Quantities of Major Procurement

The Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2014-FY2018) shows details of the procurement quantities of major equipment items mentioned in III above. The goal is to construct the posture mentioned in Annex Table of 2013 NDPG in about 10 years, and the defense capabilities for immediate response to current situation shall be acquired in this period of the plan.

VI Expenditures

- 1 The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in the MTDP (FY2013-FY2018) amount to approximately ¥24.67 trillion in FY2013 prices.
- 2 During this plan period, the MOD/SDF will save substantially around ¥700 billion by making every effort

for more effective and rational building-up of defense capability through procurement reforms while caring about government's other measures, and will limit the Defense-Related Expenditures of budgeting in each fiscal year under this plan within around ¥23.97 trillion.

- 3 The MOD/SDF will review this plan three years later as necessary, considering various conditions at that time such as international situations, the trend of technological level including information and communication technology, and fiscal situations.

VII Additional Points

The MOD/SDF will implement concrete measures including the ones for force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan to mitigate the impact for local society including Okinawa Prefecture while maintaining deterrence and capabilities of the USFJ as well as actions related to Japan-US Special Action Committee (SACO) in a steady manner.

Annex Table

Service	Equipment	Quantity
Ground Self-Defense Force	Mobile Combat Vehicles	99
	Armored Vehicles	24
	Amphibious Vehicles	52
	Tilt-rotor aircraft	17 aircraft
	Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)	6 aircraft
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles	9 companies
	Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	5 companies
	Tanks	44
	Howitzers (excluding mortars)	31
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Destroyers	5
	(Aegis-equipped Destroyers)	2
	Submarines	5
	Others	5
	Total	15
	(Tonnage)	(Approx. 52,000 tons)
	Fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1)	23 aircraft
	New patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 aircraft
Utility Helicopters (ship-based)	9 aircraft	
Air Self-Defense Force	New Early Warning (Control) aircraft	4 aircraft
	Fighter aircraft (F-35A)	28 aircraft
	Fighter aircraft (F-15) modernization	26 aircraft
	New Aerial Refueling/Transport aircraft	3 aircraft
	Transport aircraft (C-2)	10 aircraft
	Enhancement of abilities of Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles (PAC-3MSE)	2 Wings and training requirements
Cooperative Units	Anti-Air Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	3 aircraft

Note: Ship-Based Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with patrol capabilities shall be able to be acquired additively within the number of patrol helicopters (SH-60K) mentioned above.

Reference 9 **Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People**

(July 1, 2014, National Security Council Decision)
Cabinet Decision

Since the end of WWII, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to the basic policy of maintaining an exclusively defensive-oriented stance, not becoming a large military power that poses a threat to other countries, and upholding the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has flourished as a key economic power through the hard work of its people. Japan has also built a stable and affluent way of life for its citizens. In addition, as a peace-loving nation, Japan has been proactively engaging in international activities in cooperation with the international community and international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), while strictly upholding the tenets of the United Nations Charter. Japan's path as a peace-loving nation has won a high level of praise and respect from the international community, a position that must be further reinforced from now on.

Meanwhile, the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed in the 67 years between the enforcement of the Japanese Constitution and today, and it continues to evolve even further. Japan is also confronting complicated and significant national defense issues. There are no prospects for the realization of the so-called formal United Nations Command, which has been held up as an ideal in the UN Charter. Moreover, in the quarter-century following the end of the Cold War alone, shifts in global power balance, the rapid advancement of technological innovation, the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats from international terror organizations and similar have led to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region. Any threats, no matter where they arise in the world, could have a direct impact on the security of Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that hinder free access to the oceans, space, and cyberspace, as well as their utilization, have been spreading and growing more serious. It is already no longer possible for any one country to uphold peace by itself. The international community expects Japan to take on a more proactive role in a way that is commensurate with its national capabilities.

The most important responsibility for the Government is to maintain the peace and security of Japan and ensure its survival, along with protecting the lives of its people. In order to adapt to the changing security environment surrounding Japan and fulfill its responsibility, the Government must first and foremost create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by promoting impactful diplomacy with sufficient institutional architecture. The Government must also resolve conflicts peacefully by acting in conformity with international law and placing importance on the rule of law.

Furthermore, it is important to appropriately build up, maintain, and operate Japan's own defense capabilities, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan's ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region. In particular, for the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific Region, it is necessary to avoid armed conflicts and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further improving the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. On that basis, to resolutely protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of its people in any situation, as well as contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of a "Proactive

Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop national legislation that will enable a seamless response.

In accordance with the basic orientation presented by then Prime Minister Abe at a press conference on May 15, which took place after the report of the "Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security" was submitted that same day, discussions have been repeatedly held between governing parties, and examination has also been conducted by the Government. Based on the results of discussions by governing parties, the Government will promptly develop national legislation necessary for protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of its people in accordance with the following basic policies.

1. Responses to Infringements that Do Not Amount to Armed Attacks

- (1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks that could potentially develop into more serious situations. For infringements that do not amount to armed attacks, it has become even more important to prepare and ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant agencies, including police organizations and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), assuming the basic division of roles.
- (2) Specifically, under a basic policy in which relevant agencies, including the police and the Japan Coast Guard, are to respond in close cooperation with one another in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary efforts in all areas, such as enhancing each agency's response capabilities, strengthening collaboration including information sharing, examining and developing specific response guidelines, accelerating procedures to issue orders, and improving various types of exercises and training in order to respond to various unlawful acts.
- (3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to an external infringement not amounting to an armed attack that occurs in regions surrounding remote islands and similar where there are either no police forces available nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in which police agencies cannot respond due to the nature of the weapons held by the armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application of related provisions for ordering public security operations or maritime security operations in advance and establish a common understanding among the relevant agencies. At the same time, to avoid the spread of damages caused by unlawful acts while procedures are being followed, the Government will also consider specific measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures in accordance with the circumstances.
- (4) Moreover, to ensure Japan's security, it is crucial for the SDF and United States armed forces to respond seamlessly and in close cooperation to situations in which an attack is launched on U.S. armed forces units currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan, and due to the circumstances, escalates into an armed attack. Assuming a case of an infringement not amounting to an armed attack against U.S. armed forces units in the course of various peacetime activities carried out in coordination between the SDF and the U.S. armed forces, and referring to the concept of "use of weapons" for the purpose of protecting its own weapons and other equipment under the

provision of Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” at the minimum extent necessary for protecting the weapons and other equipment of the U.S. armed forces units should they be currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises) in cooperation with the SDF under the provision of Article 95 of the SDF Law, assuming a request or consent has been received from the U.S.

2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community

(1) So-called Logistics Support and “Integration with the Use of Force”

1. So-called logistics support is a support activity that does not in itself constitute a “use of force.” For instance, when international peace and security are threatened and the international community is united in responding to the situation in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution, there are situations in which it is necessary for Japan to carry out such support activities for armed forces of other countries carrying out a legitimate “use of force” in line with the resolution. Meanwhile, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution, legal frameworks limiting Japan’s support activities to “rear areas,” or so-called “non-combat areas,” etc. have been established in past legislation to ensure that the issue of “integration with the use of force” does not arise. This is to prevent Japan from being legally assessed as having carried out a “use of force” by itself, which is not permitted under the Constitution, as Japan’s support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force by other countries and thereby constitute “integration with the use of force.”
2. Even under such legal frameworks, the SDF has been steadily carrying out various support activities, leading to growing expectations for and trust in Japan. Amid further major changes in the security environment, it is necessary to enable the SDF to play a sufficient role through a wide range of support activities for the peace and stability of the international community from the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is also vital from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan’s peace and security, thereby enabling such activities to be carried out more than ever before without any hindrances.
- C. Under the premise of the so-called theory of “integration with the use of force” itself, and in light of the accumulation of discussions related thereto, considering factors such as the actual experiences of the SDF to date and the reality of the UN’s collective security measures, the Government does not support a conventional framework that uniformly limits the area of SDF activities to “rear areas” and “non-combat areas,” i.e., areas where the issue of “integration” does not arise. Instead, the Government recognizes that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation, which are carried out at places other than “sites where combative actions are currently being carried out” by other countries, do not constitute “integration with the use of force” of that country. Taking into account the following considerations based on that recognition, the Government will proceed to develop legislation that will enable the SDF to carry out activities necessary to support the armed forces of other countries engaging in

activities for ensuring Japan’s security and the peace and stability of the international community.

- (i) Not carrying out support activities at “sites where combative actions are currently being carried out” by the armed forces of other countries that are subject to support by Japan.
 - (ii) Immediate pausing or ceasing support activities in places where Japan is carrying out support activities, should these places become “sites where combative actions are currently being carried out” due to changing conditions.
- (2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities
1. Japan has been developing necessary legislation up to present, alongside conducting international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In conducting such activities, the right of SDF personnel to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation activities has been limited to so-called self-preservation and protection of its own weapons and other equipment. This is because the use of weapons in association with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or the “use of weapons for the purpose of executing a mission” could constitute a “use of force,” which is prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution in cases where such use of weapons is directed against “a state or quasi-state organization.”
 2. From the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan must further enhance its efforts towards promoting the peace and stability of the international community. To that end, it is important to enable full and proactive participation in international peace cooperation activities such as UN peace keeping operations (PKO). Moreover, given that many Japanese nationals are actively working overseas, thus face the possibility of being involved in emergency situations such as acts of terrorism, it is necessary to enable the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas involving the use of weapons subject to receiving consent from the territorial state, which has an obligation to extend protection to foreigners within its territory under international law.
 3. In light of the above, the Government will proceed to develop legislation that enables the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations and the “use of weapons for the purpose of executing a mission” in international peace cooperation activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including UN peacekeeping operations, as well as policing activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescue of Japanese nationals based on consent from the territorial state, upon ensuring that “a state or a quasi-state organization” does not appear as an adversary. This legislation is based on the following considerations.
 - (i) With respect to UN peacekeeping operations and similar, since “consent of acceptance from the country that controls the regions in which the activities are conducted” and “consent of acceptance from the Parties to Armed Conflict conducting the activities” are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for Participation in PKO, “a quasi-state organization” other than the Parties to Armed Conflict who have given their

consent of acceptance is not expected to appear as the adversary in principle. This has been backed up by Japan's experiences taking part in UN peacekeeping operations and similar for over 20 years. When the use of weapons in the execution of missions is expected to exceed the scope of self-preservation or the protection of its own weapons and other equipment, it is necessary that consent of acceptance from the Parties to Armed Conflict is stably maintained, especially due to the nature of the activities. This also includes cases in which the SDF is tasked with maintaining order, such as protecting citizens, which is considered to be an important mission in recent UN peacekeeping operations.

- (ii) When SDF units carry out policing activities not involving a "use of force," including the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, based on consent from the government of the territorial state, the activities are conducted in the area for which consent from the government of the territorial state is valid, or in other words, in the area for which authority is maintained in the territory, as a matter of course. This means that no "quasi-state organizations" will be present in that area.
- (iii) The Cabinet will determine whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained, as well as the area for which consent of the government of the territorial state is valid, etc., based on deliberations etc. by the National Security Council.
- (iv) The use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent constraints of the strict principle of proportionality, which is similar to the principle of police proportionality.

3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

- (1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people in any situation, the Government has examined what constitutional interpretations would be appropriate, as sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained as the status quo. In this regard, logical consistency and legal stability are required for the Government's constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, the Government must form a logical conclusion for protecting the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limits of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date.
- (2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit any "use of force" in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of "the right (of the people) to live in peace," as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution, and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution, which stipulates that "their (all the people's) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these

rights of the people. Hence, "use of force" to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to any "use of force" permitted in exceptional circumstances under Article 9 of the Constitution. It is clearly shown in the document *Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution* submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.

This basic logic must continue to be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution.

- (3) Up to now, the Government had considered that, under this basic logic, "use of force" was permitted only in the case of an armed attack against Japan. However, as stated in the introduction, in light of the current situation, that is, one in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continues to evolve due to shifts in global power balance, the rapid advancement of technological innovation, and threats from weapons of mass destruction and similar, even an armed attack on another country could actually constitute a threat to Japan's survival, depending on its purpose, scale, and mode, etc.

Should a dispute arise, Japan will make the utmost diplomatic efforts to settle the dispute peacefully and take any action necessary in accordance with existing national laws and regulations developed based on the constitutional interpretation to date, and the development of laws and regulations capable of implementation within the limits of the constitutional interpretation, as a matter of course. However, Japan still needs to take all necessary measures to ensure its survival and protect its people.

Under the recognition of such issues and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded in accordance with the basic logic of the Government's view to date that the Constitution should be interpreted as permitting the use of force to the minimum extent necessary as a measure for self-defense not only in the case of an armed attack on Japan, but also in cases where an armed attack on another country having a close relationship with Japan threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger in terms of fundamentally overturning people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, and further, there are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack, ensure Japan's survival, and protect its people.

- (4) Japan's "use of force" will be carried out while observing international law as a matter of course. At the same time, the legal basis under international law needs to be understood separately from the constitutional interpretation. In certain situations, the aforementioned "use of force" permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has concluded that although this "use of force" includes cases that are triggered by an armed attack on another country, these cases are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense necessary for ensuring Japan's survival and protecting its people, or in other words, in defense of Japan.
- (5) Moreover, even when the "use of force" is permitted under the Constitution, since it is carried out to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, an assurance of democratic control is required as a matter of course. In the draft legislation, the Government will stipulate that

in principle, the approval of the Diet is required prior to ordering the SDF to be dispatched for carrying out a “use of force” permitted under the Constitution in the case of an armed attack not on Japan but on another country, in the same manner as procedures related to defensive dispatches as prescribed in the current laws and regulations.

4. The Way Forward for Developing National Legislation

When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make its decision in line with deliberations, etc.

by the National Security Council. Including such procedures, national legislation serving as the legal basis will be necessary in enabling the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Under the basic policies described above, the Government will commence drafting legislation that enables a seamless response to any situation to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. Alongside this, the Government will carry out a full examination, and as soon as preparations are complete, will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations.

Reference 10 Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned

(As of March 31, 2023)

Type	Recoilless Guns	Mortars	Field Artillery	Rocket Launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft Machine Guns	Tanks	Armored Vehicles	Mobile Combat Vehicles
Approximate number owned	2,600	1,200	370	40	50	450	980	160

Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.

Reference 11 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2023)

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	8	300	2 (8)	14.2	17.7	Turboprop, twin-engines
		Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	44	120	2	13.6	3.6
	OH-1		Observation	37	140	2	12.0	3.3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
	UH-1J		Utility	112	110	2 (11)	12.7	2.8	Turboshaft, single-engine
	UH-2		Utility	7	130	2 (11)	13.1	2.9	Turboshaft, twin-engines
	CH-47J/JA		Transport	50	150/140	3 (55)	15.9	3.8/4.8	Turboshaft, twin-engines
	UH-60JA		Utility	40	150	2 (12)	15.6	5.5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
	AH-64D	Combat	12	150	2	15.0	5.7	Turboshaft, twin-engines	
Tilt Rotor	V-22	Transport	13	280	3 (24)	17.5	15.5	Turboshaft, twin-engines	
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-1	Patrol	34	450	11	38.0	35.4	Turbofan, quadruple-engine
		P-3C	Patrol	35	400	11	35.6	30.4	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		US-2	Rescue	7	320	11	33.3	33.2	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	10	150	4	15.3	4.4	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60K	Patrol	73	140	4	15.9	4.4	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		MCH-101	Minesweeping and transport	10	150	4	19.5	5.1	Turboshaft, triple engine
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Fighter	200	Mach 2.5	1/2	19.4	13.1	Turbofan, twin-engine
		F-2A/B	Fighter	91	Mach 2	1/2	15.5	11.1	Turbofan, single-engine
		F-35A	Fighter	33	Mach 1.6	1	15.6	10.7	Turbofan, single-engine
		C-1	Transport	6	Mach 0.76	5 (60)	29.0	30.6	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-2	Transport	16	Mach 0.82	2-5 (110)	43.9	44.4	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	13	320	6 (92)	29.8	40.4	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		KC-767	Aerial refueling transport	4	Mach 0.84	4-8 (200)	48.5	47.6	Turbofan, twin-engine
		KC-46A	Aerial refueling transport	2	Mach 0.86	3-14 (104)	50.4	47.6	Turbofan, twin-engine
		KC-130H	Aerial refueling transport	3	320	6 (92)	29.8	40.4	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		E-2C	Early warning	10	320	5	17.6	24.6	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-2D	Early warning	3	350	5	17.6	24.6	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	48.5	47.6	Turbofan, twin-engine
		RQ-4B	Surveillance	2	570 km/h	0	14.5	39.9	Turbofan, single-engine
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	15	160	5 (48)	15.9	4.8	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60J	Rescue	37	140	5	15.7	5.4	Turboshaft, twin-engines

- Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2023.
 2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.
 3. The full lengths and widths of rotary-wing aircraft and tilt-rotor aircraft do not include the rotor diameter.
 4. Maximum speed is approximate.

Reference 12 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service

(As of March 31, 2023)

Category	Destroyer	Submarine	Mine Warfare Ship	Patrol Combatant Craft	Amphibious Ship	Auxiliary Ship
Number (vessels)	50	22	21	6	10	29
Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)	279	63	22	1	28	130

Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Reference 13 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense- Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense- related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
Fiscal Year										
1955	75,590	9,915	△0.8	8,107	△2.8	1,349	△3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	△0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	△2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.9	0.959	6.65	11.2
2013	4,877,000	926,115	2.5	539,774	5.3	46,804 47,538	0.8 0.8	0.960 0.975	5.05 5.13	8.67 8.81
2014	5,004,000	958,823	3.5	564,697	4.6	47,838 48,848	2.2 2.8	0.956 0.976	4.99 5.09	8.47 8.65
2015	5,049,000	963,420	0.5	573,555	1.6	48,221 49,801	0.8 2.0	0.955 0.986	5.01 5.17	8.41 8.68
2016	5,188,000	967,218	0.4	578,286	0.8	48,607 50,541	0.8 1.5	0.937 0.974	5.03 5.23	8.41 8.74
2017	5,535,000	974,547	0.8	583,591	0.9	48,996 51,251	0.8 1.4	0.885 0.926	5.03 5.26	8.40 8.78
2018	5,643,000	977,128	0.3	588,958	0.9	49,388 51,911	0.8 1.3	0.875 0.920	5.05 5.31	8.39 8.81
2019	5,661,000	994,291 (1,014,571)	3.8	599,359 (619,639)	5.2	50,070 52,574	1.4 1.3	0.884 0.929	5.04 5.18	8.35 8.48
2020	5,702,000	1,008,791 (1,026,580)	1.2	617,184 (634,972)	2.5	50,688 53,133	1.2 1.1	0.889 0.932	5.02 5.18	8.21 8.37
2021	5,595,000	1,066,097	3.8	669,020	5.4	51,235 53,422	1.1 0.5	0.916 0.955	4.81 5.01	7.66 7.99
2022	5,646,000	1,075,964	0.9	673,746	0.7	51,788 54,005	1.1 1.1	0.917 0.957	4.81 5.02	7.69 8.02
2023	5,719,000	1,143,812	6.3	727,317	8.0	66,001 68,219	27.4 26.3	1.154 1.193	5.77 5.96	9.07 9.38

Notes: 1. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2005 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, 25.6 billion yen in FY2019, 13.8 billion yen in FY2020, 14.4 billion yen in FY2021, 13.7 billion yen in FY2022, and 11.5 billion yen in FY2023), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, 167.9 billion yen in FY2019, 179.9 billion yen in FY2020, 204.4 billion yen in FY2021, 208.0 billion yen in FY2022, and 210.3 billion yen in FY2023), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, 6.2 billion yen in FY2019, 0.03 billion yen in FY2020, 0.03 billion yen in FY2021, and 0.008 billion yen in FY2022) as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the lower figures include them.

2. Annual expenditure on general account and the lower figures in parentheses in the general annual expenditures column for FY2019 and FY2020 include temporary/special measures.

3. Includes 18.7 billion yen in the FY2021 annual budget amount, 31.8 billion yen in the FY2022 annual budget amount and 33.9 billion yen in the FY2023 annual budget amount as expenses related to the Digital Agency.

Reference

Reference 14 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country	FY	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Japan (100 million yen)		49,388	50,070	50,688	51,235	51,788	66,001
		51,911	52,574	53,133	53,422	54,005	68,219
		0.8%	1.4%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	27.4%
U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)		600,683	653,986	690,420	717,581	726,632	771,260
		5.6%	8.9%	5.6%	3.9%	1.3%	6.1%
		1.3%	1.3%	1.1%	0.5%	1.1%	26.3%
China (100 million yuan)		11,070	11,899	12,680	13,553	14,505	15,537
		8.3%	7.5%	6.6%	6.8%	7.1%	7.2%
		28,270	29,974	31,688	35,761	46,787	49,816
Russia (100 million RR)		△0.9%	6.0%	5.7%	12.9%	30.8%	6.5%
		431,581	466,971	501,527	528,401	546,112	570,143
		7.0%	8.2%	7.4%	5.4%	3.4%	4.4%
Republic of Korea (100 million won)		36,231	38,562	42,612	44,568	47,979	51,028
		3.0%	6.4%	10.5%	4.6%	7.7%	6.4%
		37,800	38,800	41,400	46,000	48,200	50,900
U.K. (1 million GBP)		5.0%	2.6%	6.7%	11.1%	4.8%	5.6%
		42,700	44,400	46,000	47,700	49,600	53,100
		4.7%	4.0%	3.6%	3.7%	4.0%	7.1%
Germany (1 million euro)		38,520	43,228	45,053	46,930	50,495	58,526
		4.1%	12.2%	4.2%	4.2%	7.6%	15.9%

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.

2. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (5.1 billion yen for FY2018, 25.6 billion yen for FY2019, 13.8 billion yen for FY2020, 14.4 billion yen for FY2021, 13.7 billion yen for FY2022, and 11.5 billion yen for FY2023), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (216.1 billion yen for FY2018, 167.9 billion yen for FY2019, 179.9 billion yen for FY2020, 204.4 billion yen for FY2021, 208.0 billion yen for FY2022, and 210.3 billion yen for FY2023), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (31.2 billion yen for FY2018, 6.2 billion yen for FY2019, 0.03 billion yen for FY2020, 0.03 billion yen for FY2021, and 0.01 billion yen for FY2022), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen for FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.

3. The figures for the U.S. are Department of Defense budget expenditures from the Historical Table. Figures for FY2023 are estimated values.

4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. The rate of growth over the previous year is calculated by comparing the defense expenditures in the central ministry expenditures or based on the figures officially announced by China..

5. Russia's defense expenditures are based on the FY2019-2022 expenditures and the FY2023 budget released by the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Treasury.

6. The figures for the Republic of Korea are based on the budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website.

7. The figures for Australia are based on the budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.

8. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the budget proposal in the budget statements.

9. The figures for France are based on the budget in "Projet de loi de finances" released by the French Ministry for the Armed Forces (including pensions).

10. The figures for Germany are the budget based on the Budget Act. The figures for FY2022 and FY2023 include the federal armed forces special fund.

Reference 15 Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main provisions for authority
Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)	(1)When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2)When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan's survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior approval required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required	○ Use of force necessary to defend Japan, etc. ○ Control of the Japan Coast Guard (limited to situations involving an armed attack)
Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued.	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)	○ Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area [Use of weapons] ○ SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main provisions for authority
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others' Military Actions Related Measures Act)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Authorized by Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services (2) Approval of the Diet: not required for supplies; required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) for services (3) Cabinet decision: not required for supplies; required (approval of the Prime Minister) for services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others' Military Actions Related Measures Act ○ Provision of services as a related measure <p>[Use of weapons]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent measures, traffic control, etc., pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law ○ The Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc., Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ○ The Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, etc.) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. <p>[Use of weapons]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant coast guard officers, are not present.
Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc., Prevention and Suppression of Crime, etc.) is applied mutatis mutandis. ○ The Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard <p>[Use of weapons]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations. ○ SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.
Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission 	<p>[Use of weapons]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc., Prevention and Suppression of Crime, etc.) is applied mutatis mutandis. ○ The Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. <p>[Use of weapons]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations. ○ SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main provisions for authority
Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	○ The Police Duties Law (Questioning; Measures for Refuge; Entry (all only when police officers are not present); Prevention and Suppression of Crime) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ○ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations. ○ SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)	○ The Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ○ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations. ○ Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-2 and Anti-Piracy Measures Act)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister approves the counterpiracy operation and when the operation is completed) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense shall submit the response guidelines to the Prime Minister	○ The Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ○ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel engaged in counter-piracy operations. ○ If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counterpiracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by the missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required when measures taken) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister	[Use of weapons] ○ SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	○ The Police Duties Law (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ○ The Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84)	When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required	○ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (issuing warnings, guiding intruders away, use of weapons, etc.)
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2)	—	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required	○ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3)	Emergency situations overseas	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to rescue Japanese nationals under threat of harm to life or body; competent authorities of the country concerned are currently working on maintaining public safety and order and no acts of combat are confirmed to take place; the country concerned provides consent for the SDF to take rescue measures	[Use of weapons] ○ SDF personnel engaged in duties of rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or those who have come under the protection of SDF personnel during the duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main provisions for authority
<p>Transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4)</p>	<p>Natural disasters, turmoil, and other emergency situations overseas</p>	<p>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to transport Japanese nationals in need of life or physical protection</p>	<p>[Use of weapons] ○ SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own, other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.</p>
<p>Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)</p>	<p>Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security</p>	<p>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)</p>	<p>[Use of weapons] ○ SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which are established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect lives or bodies of their own as well as other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. ○ SDF personnel ordered to conduct ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and others engaged in duties together or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</p>
<p>Cooperation and support operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Support Act, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)</p>	<p>Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened and the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community, and when a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN is adopted</p>	<p>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister for implementing response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)</p>	<p>[Use of weapons] ○ SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or those who have come under the protection of SDF personnel during the duties; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which are established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly station with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect lives or bodies of their own as well as other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code. ○ SDF personnel ordered to conduct ship inspection may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and others engaged in duties together or those who have come under the protection of SDF personnel during the duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.</p>
<p>International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Disaster Relief Law)</p>	<p>In the case that a large-scale disaster has happened or is about to happen overseas, especially in developing countries/areas</p>	<p>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">—</p>

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main provisions for authority
<p>International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)</p>	<p>United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, and international humanitarian assistance</p>	<p>(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit)</p> <p>(2) Approval of the Diet: (when SDF units, etc., conduct so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations) required (prior consent required in principle); (other than so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations) not required</p> <p>(3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan)</p> <p>(4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)</p>	<p>[Use of weapons]</p> <p>○ SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, International Peace Cooperation Corps, or those who have come under the protection of SDF personnel during the duties; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces’ units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “rush-to-guard” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, or other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.</p>

Reference 16 **Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East**

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet
on December 27, 2019
December 11, 2020
December 24, 2021
November 1, 2022
Partially revised)

Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels (meaning Japanese-flag ships and foreign-flag ships that Japanese nationals are on board, as well as foreign-flag ships operated by Japanese shipping business operators or foreign-flag ships transporting Japanese cargoes that are important for stable economic activities of Japanese people; hereinafter the same) in the Middle East, which is the world's major energy source.

In the Middle East, amidst ongoing high tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, each country is engaging in efforts to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft. Under the International Maritime Security Construct, the United States is carrying out activities utilizing ships, etc., together with the United Kingdom and other countries. France is participating in the initiative by European countries and has established a command in the UAE. India and the ROK are also carrying out activities using ships independently. In this manner, the international community is making all-out efforts to ensure safety, while gathering information for the safety of navigation by diverse means.

In this context, Japan has decided to make government-wide efforts and implement comprehensive measures in collaboration among relevant ministries and agencies with regard to the following points as Japan's independent initiative to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) better utilization of the SDF's ships and aircraft to strengthen information gathering posture. In light of the significance of these measures, Japan will take actions as follows based on the Cabinet decision.

1. Further diplomatic efforts

Japan has built good relations with countries involved in the stability of the Middle East, such as maintaining good relations with Iran for many years while being an ally of the United States. Taking advantage of these relations, Japan will make further diplomatic efforts, including reaching out to the countries concerned at various levels, to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In addition, Japan will continue to seek cooperation from the coastal countries that play an important role in the safe navigation of vessels. As for SDF's activities in the Middle East region, Japan has made efforts to gain the understanding of related countries in the region. Continued efforts will be made to gain the understanding of the countries concerned in the region regarding the SDF's information gathering activities described in 3 below.

2. Thorough implementation of navigation safety measures

Japan will thoroughly implement its navigation safety

measures, including meticulous information sharing with related industries. Specifically, a system of cooperation within the government and between the government and related industries will be established, which will also cover the sharing of information obtained through the SDF's information gathering activities described in 3 below by related ministries and agencies. In addition, whenever information that suggests the existence of a risk to the safe navigation of vessels is obtained, the government will promptly share such information with related industries to call for vigilance in a timely manner, encouraging them to thoroughly implement navigation safety measures at their own initiative.

3. Information gathering activities by the SDF

Although there is no immediate need to implement protective measures for Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, given the ongoing high tensions in the region, it is necessary to strengthen the information gathering system to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. Therefore, Japan has decided to have the SDF conduct information gathering activities, considering the distance from Japan to the Middle East region, the SDF's experience in operating in the region, and the importance of cooperation with units and organizations from other countries.

The SDF's information gathering activities are part of the government's navigation safety measures and are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (Act No. 164 of 1954), as they would need smooth decision making and order issuance in relation to Maritime Security Operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Act No. 165 of 1954) described in (4) below.

Basic implementation policies are as follows. Details are to be provided in the Defense Minister's order.

(1) Information to Be Gathered

The SDF will gather information that directly affects or is necessary for ensuring safe navigation in the waters described in (3) below.

(2) Equipment

A single destroyer will be dispatched. In addition, the SDF will also use fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C of the units currently engaged in the Counter-Piracy Operations (hereinafter referred to as "counter-piracy units") under Article 7, paragraph (1) of the Acts of Punishment and Countermeasures against Piracy (Act No. 55 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as the "Piracy Countermeasures Act"). Information gathering activities by the counter-piracy units will be carried out to an extent that does not interfere with the counter-piracy operation.

(3) Geographical Scope of Activities

The geographical scope of the information gathering activities by destroyer and fixed-wing patrol aircraft described in (2) consists of three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). For resupply, destroyer will call at a port facing the three seas.

(4) Responding to Unforeseen Circumstances or Other Changes in the Situation

In the event of unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, the relevant ministries and agencies will work together to understand the situation, share information

closely and promptly with each other, and strengthen the government's response. Then, if further measures by the SDF are deemed necessary in response to the situation in question, Maritime Security Operations will be ordered in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. When issuing such an order, the MOD will make best efforts for prompt decision making.

The measures that can be taken in the course of Maritime Security Operations will be based on international laws, including the flag state principle, and will vary depending on the circumstances, such as whether the protected vessel is a Japanese or foreign-flagged vessel and the type of infringement.

(5) Ensuring the Safety of the SDF Units

In conducting information gathering activities, the SDF units take all possible measures to ensure their own safety, including the collection of sufficient information on the situation in the areas of operation, the installation of equipment necessary to ensure safety, and appropriate prior education and training

(6) Cooperation among Relevant Ministries and Agencies

In order to ensure the effectiveness of information gathering activities and responses to changes in the situation including the rise of unforeseen circumstances, relevant ministries and agencies will work closely together to share understanding regarding such responses, improve response capabilities through training, and develop a system that allows for a

prompt response to the situation.

(7) Cooperation with Other Countries

Although Japan does not participate in any specific framework related to the safety of navigation in the Middle East and the SDF's information gathering activities are to be conducted at its own initiative, Japan will communicate and cooperate with other countries as necessary.

(8) Duration of the SDF's Activities

The period during which the SDF should engage in the information gathering activities (including preparation and training periods) under the Cabinet decision is from December 27, 2019, to December 26, 2021. If it is deemed necessary to extend the SDF's activities based on the Cabinet decision, another Cabinet decision or any changes to it will be made in that regard. If, prior to the expiration of the above period, the SDF's activities are no longer deemed necessary in light of the necessity described in this paragraph, the SDF will terminate such activities at that point. If there is a noticeable change in the situation, the National Security Council will consider a response.

4. Report to the Diet

In view of the fact that matters pertaining to the SDF operations under the Anti-Piracy Measures Act are reported to the Diet in accordance with Article 7, paragraph (3) of the Anti-Piracy Measures Act, the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision or any changes to it is made and a report on the results of such activities upon termination.

Reference 17 Number of Days and Total Incursions into the Territorial Waters Around the Senkaku Islands by Ships Belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau, etc.

Year	Period	Number of times	Number of ships
2018	Jan.-Apr.	8	27
2018	May-Aug.	8	31
2018	Sep.-Dec.	3	12
2019	Jan.-Apr.	12	48
2019	May-Aug.	12	46
2019	Sep.-Dec.	8	32
2020	Jan.-Apr.	7	28
2020	May-Aug.	13	38
2020	Sep.-Dec.	9	22
2021	Jan.-Apr.	15	36
2021	May-Aug.	19	52
2021	Sep.-Dec.	6	22
2022	Jan.-Apr.	5	18
2022	May-Aug.	20	50
2022	Sep.-Dec.	12	35
2023	Jan.-Mar.	9	32

Reference 18 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1993	May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan
1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory The Security Council approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2005	Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD
2006	July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch
2007	Deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis-equipped destroyers started
2009	March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan
2012	March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
2014	North Korea launched a total of 11 ballistic missiles in March, June, and July
2015	March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan
2016	North Korea launched 23 ballistic missiles including what it claimed to be a "satellite" in a single year February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 22: At the Nine Ministers' Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the BMD enhanced-capability interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA) would proceed to the joint production and deployment stage
2017	North Korea launched 17 ballistic missiles beginning in February June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea December 19: NSC and the Cabinet meeting approved introducing two units of Aegis Ashore systems.
2018	January 31: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IIA June 1: The MOD announced candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore (GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture) July 30: The MOD selected the components of Aegis Ashore (LMSSR) October 26: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea October 29: The MOD started surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore December 11: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA
2019	North Korea launched a total of 25 ballistic missiles and other objects since May May 27 and 28: The MOD explained results of surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore and results of study by the MOD to the governors of Akita and Yamaguchi Prefectures December 17: The MOD provided the heads of the relevant local governments in Yamaguchi Prefecture with explanations anew on the results of the resurvey on deployment of Aegis Ashore
2020	North Korea launched eight ballistic missiles in March June 15: The MOD announced suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment process December 18: Security Council and Cabinet approved the installation of two Aegis System Equipped Vessels in place of Aegis Ashore
2021	North Korea has launched six ballistic missiles since March
2022	North Korea has launched 59 ballistic missiles since January November 16: Aegis-equipped destroyer conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea
2023	North Korea has launched 10 ballistic missiles since January (as of May 31, 2023)

Reference 19 Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity

2012	<p>April: Agreed in a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole</p> <p>June: Cyber incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC)</p> <p>September: "Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces" formulated</p>
2013	<p>May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting</p> <p>July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC)</p> <p>August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area</p> <p>October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities</p>
2014	<p>March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command</p> <p>November: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted</p>
2015	<p>January: Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet</p> <p>January: National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat</p> <p>May: Joint statement issued by the CDPWG</p> <p>September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision</p>
2016	<p>April: The MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology</p>
2018	<p>January: Japan was approved to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) located in Estonia</p> <p>July: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision</p> <p>December: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity revised</p>
2019	<p>March: Dispatched MOD personnel to the CCDCOE in Estonia</p> <p>April: Established the "Cybersecurity Council," a NISC-lead public-private collaboration framework</p> <p>April: Shared the view at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues, and affirmed that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</p> <p>December: Officially participated in "Cyber Coalition 2019," a cyber defense exercise organized by the NATO, for the first time</p>
2021	<p>March: Held MOD cyber contest</p> <p>April: Officially participated in "Locked Shields 2021," a cyber defense exercise organized by the CCDCOE, for the first time</p> <p>September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision</p>
2022	<p>March: Newly established the SDF Cyber Defense Command as a joint unit of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF</p> <p>April: Officially participated in Locked Shields 2022, which was the second time Japan participated in this cyber defense exercise held by the CCDCOE</p> <p>August: MOD Cyber Contest held</p> <p>September: At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting, both sides agreed that information security and cybersecurity are of vital importance for deepening Japan-U.S. defense cooperation</p> <p>October: The MOD decided to officially participate in the activities of the CCDCOE in Estonia</p>
2023	<p>January: At the Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting, both sides agreed to advance efforts in a wide range of fields, including the effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under Japan-U.S. cooperation, strengthening cooperation in the space and cyber domains, and deepening equipment and technology cooperation</p>

Reference 20 Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2022)

Types of Exercise	Training content (estimated)	Date	Location (cumulative times)
Simulation/ Field exercise	Terrorism using explosives	November 6, 2022	Nagasaki Prefecture (6 times)
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	November 17, 2022	Akita Prefecture (5 times)
	Terrorism using chemical agents and explosives	January 31, 2023	Mie Prefecture (8 times)
	Anticipated Armed Attack Situations Assuming Training	February 10, 2023	Osaka Prefecture (6 times)
		February 10, 2023	Kyoto Prefecture (5 times)
February 10, 2023		Hyogo Prefecture (5 times)	
Field exercise	Terrorism using chemical agents	December 20, 2022	Tokushima Prefecture (14 times)
	Initial response training, local coordination center operation training	February 2, 2023	Oita Prefecture (9 times)
Simulation exercise	Regional block review meeting	May 12, 2022	Saga Prefecture (5 times)
		July 14, 2022	Ehime Prefecture (11 times)
		November 8, 2022	Toyama Prefecture (14 times)
	Terrorism using explosives	November 8, 2022	Nagano Prefecture (4 times)
	Regional block review meeting	November 9, 2022	Gifu Prefecture (5 times)
	Terrorism using explosives	November 15, 2022	Niigata Prefecture (5 times)
	Regional block review meeting	November 16, 2022	Akita Prefecture (6 times)
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	November 25, 2022	Kanagawa Prefecture (8 times)
	Review meeting for preparation of evacuation procedures	December 15 to 16, 2022	Shimane Prefecture (6 times)
	Terrorism using explosives	January 17, 2023	Miyagi Prefecture (6 times)
	Training assuming evacuation of remote islands	January 18, 2023	Kagoshima Prefecture (6 times)
	Regional block review meeting	January 19, 2023	Gunma Prefecture (5 times)
	Initial response training, emergency response headquarters establishment and operation training	January 20, 2023	Fukui Prefecture (15 times)
		January 23, 2023	Tokushima Prefecture (15 times)
	Review meeting for response to missile incidents	January 24, 2023	Yamanashi Prefecture (5 times)
	Initial response training, emergency response headquarters establishment and operation training	January 26, 2023	Fukuoka Prefecture (8 times)
		January 26, 2023	Fukushima Prefecture (5 times)
		January 27, 2023	Nara Prefecture (6 times)
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	February 3, 2023	Aichi Prefecture (8 times)
	Review meeting for preparation of evacuation procedures	February 7, 2023	Hiroshima Prefecture (3 times)
	Initial response training, emergency response headquarters establishment and operation training	February 8, 2023	Okayama Prefecture (5 times)
	Regional block review meeting	February 9, 2023	Osaka Prefecture (7 times)
	Training assuming an armed attack situation	February 13, 2023	Gifu Prefecture (6 times)
	Initial response training, emergency response headquarters establishment and operation training	February 14, 2023	Ishikawa Prefecture (4 times)
		February 15, 2023	Tottori Prefecture (6 times)
	Review meeting for response to missile incidents	February 16, 2023	Nagasaki Prefecture (7 times)

Reference 21 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)

FY	2018	2018 July Heavy Rain (2018)	2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (2018)	2019	2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai)	2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis)	2020	2020 July Heavy Rain	2021	Heavy Rain from July 1, 2021	2022
Number of Dispatches	430	12	1	447	1	1	530	1	382	1	381
Personnel	22,665	Approx. 957,000	Approx. 211,000	43,285	Personnel working in the field Approx. 54,000 Overall personnel Approx. 96,000	Personnel working in the field Approx. 84,000 Overall personnel Approx. 880,000	58,828	Personnel working in the field Approx. 61,000 Overall personnel Approx. 350,000	Approx. 18,000	Personnel working in the field Approx. 11,000 Overall personnel Approx. 27,000	Approx. 50,000
Vehicles	3,090	Approx. 49,500	Approx. 17,800	7,597	Approx. 19,000	Approx. 49,400	8,132	Approx. 13,000	Approx. 3,200	Approx. 3,500	Approx. 5,600
Aircraft	644	340	230	707	Approx. 20	Approx. 1,610	567	Approx. 270	Approx. 450	Approx. 30	Approx. 660
Vessels	11	150	20	9	Approx. 20	Approx. 100	4	4	0	0	Approx. 20

* A heavy rain in July 2018, 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi earthquake, 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (No.15, Faxai), 2019 East Japan Typhoon (No.19, Hagibis), a heavy rain in July 2020, and a heavy rain from July 1, 2021 are to be removed from the dispatched missions of each year.

* The number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/back-up and other rear-service personnel in addition to personnel working in the field.

* Education support in relation to COVID-19 included in FY2020 is only recorded in terms of number of personnel.

Reference 22 Record of Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas / Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas by the SDF (Cabinet Decision on April 22, 2022)

Date	Outline	Details
April 2004	Transportation of Japanese nationals in Iraq	(Background) Frequent incidents of foreigners being taken hostage, including Japanese nationals. Members of the media expressed their desire to be immediately evacuated from Samawa to the Government of Japan, which consequently determined it to be of particular importance. (Operation) A total of 10 Japanese nationals (journalists and other media-related personnel) were transported from Iraq (Tallil Air Base) to Kuwait (Mubarak Air Base) via a C-130 aircraft.
January 2013	Transportation of Japanese nationals in Algeria	(Background) A hostage crisis involving Japanese nationals in the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria required their transportation back to Japan as soon as possible. (Operation) A total of 16 Japanese nationals (seven survivors and the bodies of nine deceased persons) were transported from Algeria (Houari Boumediene Airport) to Japan (Haneda Airport) via a B-747 government aircraft.
July 2016	Transportation of Japanese nationals in Bangladesh	(Background) An attack involving Japanese nationals in the People's Republic of Bangladesh required their transportation back to Japan as soon as possible. (Operation) A total of 24 persons (the bodies of seven deceased Japanese nationals and 17 family members) were transported from Bangladesh (Hazrat Shahjalal Airport) to Japan (Haneda Airport) via a B-747 government aircraft.
July 2016	Transportation of Japanese nationals in South Sudan	(Background) Gunfire attacks in the Republic of South Sudan required the transportation of Japanese nationals out of South Sudan as soon as possible. (Operation) Four Japanese nationals (embassy staff) were transported from South Sudan (Juba Airport) to the Republic of Djibouti (Djibouti Airport) via a C-130 aircraft.
August 2021	Transportation of Japanese nationals in Afghanistan	(Background) The Taliban takeover of Kabul, the capital of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, required the transportation of Japanese nationals and others out of Afghanistan as soon as possible. (Operation) A Joint Task Force was formed to transport one Japanese national and, on the request of the U.S., 14 Afghan people from Afghanistan (Kabul Airport) to a neighboring country via a C-130 aircraft. On this occasion, transport assistant unit (GSDF Unit) was dispatched for the first time.
April 2023	Transportation of Japanese nationals in Sudan	(Background) Armed clashes broke out in Khartoum, the capital of the Republic of the Sudan, between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces, which required the transportation of Japanese nationals and others out of Sudan as soon as possible. (Operation) A Joint Task Force was formed and transported 45 Japanese nationals and their families from Sudan (Port Sudan New International Airport) to the Republic of Djibouti via a C-2 aircraft.

Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas by the Self-Defense Forces

(April 22, 2022
Cabinet Decision)

With the enforcement of the Act for Partial Revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense and Other Laws (Act No. 26 of 2022), the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas under Article 84-4 of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Law (Law No. 165 of 1954) shall be conducted in accordance with the following policy, and the “Transportation

of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas by the Self-Defense Forces” (Cabinet Decision on November 29, 2013) shall be abolished.

1. Based on the experiences of transporting Japanese nationals and others including the one in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Government of Japan shall further enhance comprehensive measures for transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas including: strengthening coordination within the Government in preparation for rapid changes in the situation; strengthening coordination with other countries that are engaged in similar transportation

activities; consistently being aware of the Japanese and foreign nationals prescribed in Article 84-4, paragraph (1) of the SDF Law and foreign nationals by Japan’s diplomatic missions; and reinforcing the readiness of the SDF.

2. In preparation for future transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, the Government will make constant efforts to collect information on the availability of transportation bases and routes, and other information.
3. In consideration of the usefulness of transport aircraft in emergency situations and the abolishment of the provision requiring the use of the government aircraft in principle for transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, the Government shall routinely consider effective transport procedures based on the characteristics of aircraft, vessels, or vehicles that are expected to be used for transportation (hereinafter referred to as “Aircraft and other means”), and shall have more flexibility in choosing the best means of transportation to dispatch the SDF quickly in emergency situation.
4. The SDF has transported Japanese nationals and others overseas when the Minister of Defense deems that such transportation can be carried out safely. Specifically, considering the anticipated risks, transportation was carried out with measures in place including: maintaining airfield functions through control and security by the Party or a third country; controlling crowds on and off the airfield through security by the Party or a third country; and selecting the method of transportation based on collected information and coordination with relevant countries (including the use of self-protection devices such as chaffs, flares, and bulletproof armor).

In light of Article 84-4, paragraph (1) of the SDF Law,

which prescribes that measures shall be taken to avoid the risks anticipated in transporting Japanese nationals and others overseas, safety shall continue to be ensured in conducting such transportation.

5. When there is a possibility of transporting Japanese nationals and others overseas, and it is deemed that such a mission cannot be carried out in a timely manner if the SDF departs Japan after a decision is made, the Minister of Defense shall, based on a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, relocate the Aircraft and other means to places outside Japan in preparation for transportation and put them on standby, and shall strive to make even quicker decisions regarding the relocation and standby.
6. The arms carried by SDF personnel transporting Japanese nationals and others overseas shall be necessary and appropriate in light of local transportation bases, transportation routes, the nature of the work required to carry out the transportation, and within the scope of the relevant provisions of the SDF Law.
7. Diplomatic missions shall be consistently aware of the Japanese and foreign nationals prescribed in Article 84-4, paragraph (1) of the SDF Law. Furthermore, in conducting the transportation, the relevant ministries and agencies shall cooperate to examine local identification, immigration procedures, and treatment after their entry into Japan. In principle, the transportation of foreign nationals prescribed in the same paragraph shall be conducted only when they need to be evacuated under the same circumstances as Japanese nationals from a humanitarian standpoint and when the government of the country to which the foreign national belongs makes a request to Japan for the transportation of the said foreign national.

Reference 23 Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2)

Period	Country	Type of protected Asset (Type of SDF Asset which conducted asset protection)	Category of “Activities which contribute to the Defense of Japan” conducted by the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries				Total
			ISR activities including ballistic missile alert	Transportation and Logistics under the “Important Influence Situation”	Joint exercises which improve capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan	Others	
2017	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	1	0	2
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	1	0	
2018	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	3	0	3	0	16
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	10	0	
2019	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	1	0	14
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	9	0	
2020	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	0	0	25
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	21	0	
2021	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	10	0	22
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	7	0	
	Australia	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	1	0	
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	0	0	
2022	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	18*	0	31
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	5	0	
	Australia	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	4*	0	
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	0	0	

Note: With regard to the first coordinated asset protection among Japan, the U.S., and Australia announced in November 2022, this is counted as one case each for both the U.S. and Australia

Reference 24 **The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation**

(April 27, 2015)

I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

In order to ensure Japan's peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments' national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the "National Security Strategy" and the "National Defense Program Guidelines." The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation ("the Guidelines") provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

- A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.
- B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements.
- C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
- D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for

either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.

The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan's peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.

B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command.

C. Bilateral Planning

The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange

relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan's peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan's Peace and Security

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan's peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan's peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

- assess the situation;
- share information; and
- develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.

To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan's peace and security.

A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan's peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan's peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities

and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan's peace and security.

2. Air and Missile Defense

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.

3. Maritime Security

The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary.

4. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other's assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

5. Training and Exercises

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern.

6. Logistic Support

Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements.

7. Use of Facilities

In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of

facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries' respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.

In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country's capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants.

The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.

2. Maritime Security

Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.

3. Measures to Deal with Refugees

If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan's peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.

4. Search and Rescue

The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat

search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

5. Protection of Facilities and Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.

6. Logistic Support

The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

7. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

a. Principles for Coordinated Actions

If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite

diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region.

Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security.

Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments.

The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other's forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan.

b. Concept of Operations

i. Operations to Defend Airspace

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense

operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies.

iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

v. Cross-Domain Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other's ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces' special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate.

c. Operational Support Activities

The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations.

i. Communications and Electronics

The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness.

ii. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

iii. Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

iv. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection

The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for

maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan's request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan's survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:

1. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.

2. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

3. Maritime Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate.

4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.

5. Logistics Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan's peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan's activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces' cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.

When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

A. Cooperation in International Activities

The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities

will include:

1. Peacekeeping Operations

When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.

2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.

3. Maritime Security

When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities.

4. Partner Capacity Building

Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.

5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.

6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets.

7. Training and Exercises

In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and

the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures.

8. Logistic support

When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations.

The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.

VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

A. Cooperation on Space

Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.

B. Cooperation on Cyberspace

To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private

sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:

- maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
- share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
- ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance;
- contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
- conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

VII. Bilateral Enterprise

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:

- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security

- Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level.
- In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information.
- The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing.

C. Educational and Research Exchanges

Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side's research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

VIII. Processes for Review

The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

Guidelines for Japan – U.S. Defense Cooperation (New York, September 23, 1997)

I. The Aim of the Guidelines

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan–U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the United States will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the “National Defense Program Outline.” In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward-deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable

international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations

Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

2. Various Types of Security Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

When either or both Governments participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

3. Bilateral Programs

Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan

remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an armed attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

(1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions

(a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.

(b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective forces' ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(c) The United States will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attacks against Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may

involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication. The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations. U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.

(d) Responses to Other Threats

(i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.

(ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

(a) Command and Coordination

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command and control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

(b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

(c) Communication and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

(d) Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

(e) Logistics Support Activities

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

(i) Supply

The United States will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(ii) Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the United States to Japan.

(iii) Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan. The United States will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

(iv) Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

(v) Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of

the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated
When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

(a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a flow of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the flow; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.

(b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operations in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

(c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the

use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arise with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

(d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

(2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

(a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

(b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

(3) Japan–U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

(Annex Table) Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Functions and Fields		Examples of Items for Cooperation
Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government	Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transportation of personnel and supplies to the affected area • Medical services, communications and, transportation in the affected area • Relief and transfer operations for refugees and provision of emergency materials to refugees
	Search and rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Search and rescue operations in Japanese territory and in waters around Japan, and information sharing related to such operations
	Noncombatant evacuation operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information sharing and communication with, and assembly and transportation of noncombatants • Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports by U.S. aircraft and vessels for transportation of noncombatants • Customs, immigration, and quarantine of noncombatants upon entry into Japan • Assistance to noncombatants in such matters as temporary accommodations, transportation, and medical services in Japan
	Activities for ensuring effectiveness of economic sanctions for maintenance of international peace and stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections • Intelligence sharing
Japan's support for activities by U.S. Forces	Use of facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for supplies and other purposes by U.S. aircraft and vessels • Reservation of spaces for loading/unloading of personnel and materials by the U.S. and of storage areas at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports • Extension of operating hours for SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for use by U.S. aircraft and vessels • Use of SDF facilities by U.S. aircraft • Provisions of training and exercise areas • Construction of offices, accommodations, etc., inside U.S. facilities and areas

Functions and Fields		Examples of Items for Cooperation	
Japan's support for activities by U.S. Forces	Rear area support	Supplies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports • Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. facilities and areas
		Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land, sea, and air transportation of personnel, materials and POL inside Japan • Sea transportation of personnel, materials and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas • Use of vehicles and cranes for transportation of personnel, materials and POL
		Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repair and maintenance of U.S. aircraft, vessels and vehicles • Provision of parts for repair • Temporary provision of equipment and materials for maintenance
		Medical Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medical treatment of sick and wounded individuals staying in Japan • Transport of sick and wounded individuals staying in Japan • Provision of medical supplies and hygiene equipment
		Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of U.S. facilities and areas • Seas surveillance around U.S. facilities and areas • Security of transportation routes inside Japan • Information and intelligence sharing
		Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of frequencies (including those for satellite communications) and equipment for communications among relevant Japanese and U.S. agencies
		Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for port entry and exit by U.S. vessels • Loading and unloading of materials at SDF facilities, civilian airports and ports • Sewage disposal, water supply, and electricity inside U.S. facilities and areas • Temporary increase in the number of workers at U.S. facilities and properties
Japan-U.S. cooperation	Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence sharing 	
	Minesweeping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and on the high seas round Japan, and intelligence sharing on mines 	
	Sea and airspace management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime traffic coordination in and around Japan in response to increased sea traffic • Air traffic and airspace management in and around Japan 	

VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the United States to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures

Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient

manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

(1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances.

The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

(2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

The two Governments will similarly establish

common standards for preparations of cooperative measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved.

They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan–U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

Reference 25 Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1951	Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed
1952		The treaty enters into force
1958		Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)
1960	Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force
1968		(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan)
1969	Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation	Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)
1972		(Okinawa is returned to Japan)
1976		(Agreement on the establishment of the Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)
1978	End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines	Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)
1991		(Collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War)
1996	Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton talks)
1997		SACO Final Report
1997	New security environment and the establishment of the new Guidelines	Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines)
2001		9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.
2003		The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
2006	Formulation of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program	Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
		The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
		The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)
2007		Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)
2010		50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
2012		Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks)
2013		Agreement on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
2014		The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks)
2015		Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
2017		Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks)
2017		Joint Statement (Abe-Trump Talks)
2018		Joint Statement (Abe-Trump Talks)
2020		60th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
2021		Joint Statement (Suga-Biden Talks)
2022		Joint Statement (Kishida-Biden Talks)
2023		Joint Statement (Kishida-Biden Talks)

Reference 26 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2019)

	Outline and Results
<p>Jan. 16, 2019 Meeting with the U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The U.S. side supported the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), and welcomed that Japan expressed its strong resolve to enhance its defense architecture and to play a larger role in accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP. • In regards to the current security environment, both sides shared views that competition among states is becoming more apparent. They also agreed that gaining technological superiority in new domains such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly important. • Both sides also confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made pursuant to Japan's NDPG and MTDP, and the United States' National Defense Strategy (NDS) respectively, as well as to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond following the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. With the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific in mind, they agreed to work together to shape a desirable security environment with Japan-U.S. alliance being the cornerstone of cooperation with other nations. • Both sides confirmed to strengthen and expand cooperation in wide range of fields including the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Promote Japan-U.S. cooperation in the "new domains," including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. The United States welcomed Japan's first participation in the Schriever Wargame. ○ Closely coordinate in bilateral exercises and capacity building assistance, taking into account increasing both nations' presence in the Indo-Pacific. ○ Welcome and even make progress in the two countries' cooperation in the operational field following Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines (e.g. U.S. Forces asset protection mission conducted by the SDF, provision of supplies and services). ○ Make continued effort in streamlining FMS process, while welcoming the recent progress and improvements in issues related to FMS. Cooperate in ensuring cost transparency, improving late case closure, strengthening activities to realize and promote multi-year procurement. ○ Continue cooperation to realize Japan's smooth and prompt introduction, including cost management of U.S.-made advanced defense equipment such as Aegis Ashore, E-2D and F-35. ○ Enhance cooperation in defense equipment and technology as well as promoting Japan-U.S. joint development and researches. • Both sides confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the UNSC resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter North Korea's illicit "ship-to-ship" transfers. • Both sides confirmed that deterrence through Japan-U.S. Alliance and U.S.-ROK Alliance is essential in maintaining the security of the region, and agreed that both countries will steadily implement Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises. • In regards to the East and South China Seas, both sides affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established. • Both sides also reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan's administration of the islands. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea. • Both sides affirmed the recent progress in the construction project of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), and reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to mitigate impact on the local communities including Okinawa. Both sides confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives and training relocation. • Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.
<p>Apr. 19, 2019 "2+2" Meeting / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan Secretary of State Pompeo</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." • The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will jointly increase their presence in the region, while collaborating with partners in the region through bilateral/multilateral exercises, port calls, and other activities. • The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, including Japan's NDPG. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. • The Ministers shared the view that they will seek to achieve North Korea's abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions, including combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers. • The Ministers also reaffirmed that U.S. force stance in the region would remain robust, and shared the view on deepening consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also shared the view that they will continue to engage in close cooperation between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK. • The Ministers shared the view on calling upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately. • Regarding the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, the Ministers expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). • The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands. • The Ministers confirmed that they will deepen cooperation on space capabilities, and shared the view on promoting cooperation for enhancing space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities through Japan's development of a Deep Space Radar and hosting of U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan's Quasi Zenith Satellite System. • The Ministers shared the view on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues. They affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. • The Ministers confirmed that it is important to develop defense capabilities efficiently and effectively in order to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will cooperate to introduce advanced weapon systems to Japan and to further streamline the FMS process. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of information security, and shared the view on the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance. • In order to improve Japan-U.S. Alliance readiness, the Ministers shared the view on further deepening operational cooperation, such as mutual asset protection, logistical support, and joint ISR operations. • The ministers shared the view that they will steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The Ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FRF and reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids its continued use. • Foreign Minister Kono conveyed to the U.S. side that it is important to mitigate the impact on the local people, including making progress, one by one, on the issues surrounding the operation of U.S. forces and the SOFA, while steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces. • Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of U.S. forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft. • The two ministers also requested the U.S. side to prevent incidents and accidents.

Outline and Results	
<p>Apr. 19, 2019 Meeting with Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers welcomed the successful holding of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting and affirmed that the defense authorities of Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate with each other to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea. • The Ministers also agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. • They affirmed the importance of deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance and agreed to steadily conduct Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises. • The Ministers agreed to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations and affirmed that the two countries will further promote cooperation in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. • The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the United States will further streamline the FMS process and agreed to strengthen defense equipment and technology cooperation by promoting Japan-U.S. joint research and development. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.
<p>Jun. 4, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Iwaya and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The two ministers affirmed that they will closely cooperate with each other in line with the policy confirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting. • The Ministers affirmed the need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. They affirmed that they will promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations. • Defense Minister Iwaya welcomed the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report by the United States. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation with the United States to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as indicated in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. The Ministers affirmed the importance of cooperating with diverse partners. • The Ministers discussed the regional situation and other matters in light of the discussions held at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue. • Regarding North Korea, they affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and they also confirmed that Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation will be maintained. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.
<p>Aug. 7, 2019 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. • The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established. • The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability in the East China Sea. • The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. • They confirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. • The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Japanese side also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.
<p>Nov. 18, 2019 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Thailand</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers confirmed that the recent series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious threat to regional security. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and freedom of navigation are firmly established. • The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to further strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond, including promotion of bilateral cooperation in new domains, in order to materialize aligned strategies of both countries. • The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. • The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process. • The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to sustain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and Japan and the U.S. continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from local communities is crucial for maintenance of the operational readiness. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Japanese side also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.

	Outline and Results
<p>Jan. 14, 2020 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers discussed the situation in the Middle East. • The Japanese side expressed its deep concern about the rising tensions in the Middle East. The Ministers confirmed that we have to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Middle East. • The Japanese side explained the cabinet decision to send the SDF to the Middle East. • The Ministers confirmed that repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious challenge not only to Japan but also to the international community. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit "ship-to-ship" transfers of goods by North Korea. • The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established. • The Ministers welcomed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance has become stronger than ever before particularly when we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. • The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond in order to materialize the aligned strategies of both countries. • The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. • The ministers welcomed the recent progress made by the Japanese Government in the acquisition of Mageshima, a candidate site for FCLP, and confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henokosaki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan's efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. • The Ministers discussed the bilateral cooperation in addressing the issue of PFOS and confirmed to advance comprehensive studies. • The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to sustain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and that Japan and the United States continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from the local communities is crucial for the maintenance of the operational readiness. • Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.
<p>August 29, 2020 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Guam</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers affirmed their opposition to power-based unilateral attempts to change the status-quo and importance of cooperation on establishing the rule of law and freedom of navigation in the East China Sea and South China Sea. • The Ministers agreed to closer cooperation to ensure the peace and stability of the East China Sea, and reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both countries oppose any unilateral actions that would undermine Japan's administration of the islands. • The Ministers confirmed that it is importance to strengthen cooperation with diverse partners through activities such as joint trainings and capacity building assistance, with Japan and the United States serving as the cornerstones, in order to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • In addition to exchanging views on the latest situation regarding North Korea, the Ministers confirmed that the repeated launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea are a violation of the UN Security Council resolution and are a serious challenge not only to Japan but also to the international community. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMD and ballistic missile programs of all ranges. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together with interested countries to address the issue of ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. • The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the United States will play an even greater role in peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region based on a strong Japan-U.S. alliance with an eye toward a post-COVID-19 world. • The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to materialize aligned strategies of both countries. • As a part of the above, the Ministers agreed on the importance of strengthening comprehensive ballistic missile defense capabilities and ISR capabilities based on stimulated military activities and military technology advances in surrounding countries. • The Ministers confirmed the progress on the relocation project in Guam and welcomed its steady progress. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station. • The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will work closely together in order to prevent the spread and mitigate the impacts of COVID-19. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of maintaining the responsiveness of U.S. Forces in Japan and agreed that for such maintenance, Japan and the United States will continue to work together under the recognition that local understanding and cooperation are indispensable.

	Outline and Results
<p>March 16, 2021 "2+2" Meeting / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Kishi Minister for Foreign Affairs Motegi U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin U.S. Secretary of State Blinken</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and renewed the unwavering commitment of both countries to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Amid growing geopolitical competition and challenges such as COVID-19, climate change, and revitalizing democracy, the Ministers concurred to promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order. • In light of the severe security environment, the Ministers concurred to further deepen coordination to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Japan expressed its resolve to enhance its capabilities to bolster national defense and the Alliance. The U.S. underscored its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear. • In light of the "2+2" discussion and joint statement, the Ministers instructed their respective offices to advance concrete works to strengthen the Alliance. They concurred to hold another SCC later this year to confirm their outcomes. • The Ministers acknowledged that China's behavior, where inconsistent with the existing international order, presents political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the Alliance and to the international community. They also committed to opposing coercion and destabilizing behavior toward others in the region, which undermines the rules-based international system. • The Ministers opposed any unilateral action that seeks to change the status quo, including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and expressed serious concerns about China Coast Guard law. The Japanese side expressed its resolve to defend its territory with every means. The Ministers reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and affirmed that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands. • The Ministers reiterated their objections to China's unlawful maritime claims and activities in the South China Sea. • The Ministers underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Ministers also shared serious concerns regarding the human rights situation in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions towards the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and concurred to continue the cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. They also confirmed the necessity of the immediate resolution of the abductions issue. • The Ministers confirmed their cooperation among Japan, the U.S., Australia and India. They also pledged to work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), affirming their strong support for its centrality and unity, as well as for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. • Recognizing the increasingly serious regional security environment, the Ministers concurred to further deepen coordination to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of Japan-U.S. Alliance by consulting on Alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. • The Ministers concurred to closely align the strategies and policies of the two countries, as the U.S. undertakes various policy reviews. • The Ministers concurred to deepen defense cooperation across all domains and to bolster extended deterrence. They also highlighted the importance of cooperation in domains such as space and cyber, as well as further strengthening information security. • The Ministers reiterated that realistic bilateral and multilateral exercises and training are necessary to maintain the Alliance's operational readiness and deterrent posture, as well as to meet future challenges. • The Ministers shared the view that they will steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The four ministers welcomed progress on force realignment efforts and reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the current arrangements in ways that maintain operational readiness and a sustainable presence, while mitigating the impact on local communities. • The Ministers reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma, and committed to completing construction as soon as possible. • Regarding Host Nation Support, having agreed to a one-year extension amendment to the current Special Measures Agreement, the Ministers instructed their negotiators to work toward a new mutually beneficial multi-year agreement. • The Japanese side stressed the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, and requested the U.S. side for safe operations of the U.S. forces with utmost consideration to the impact on local communities as well as appropriate responses to incidents and accidents. • The Japanese side reiterated their appreciation for the assistance provided by the U.S. in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake. In remembrance of the lives lost, the Ministers reaffirmed the spirit of cooperation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
<p>March 16, 2021 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Kishi U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers confirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is more important than ever for the regional peace and stability in the security environment that is rapidly growing severe. • The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the U.S. will work to maintain and reinforce a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. • The Japanese side expressed the strong resolve to the defense of Japan and stated that Japan will play an active role for the regional peace and stability. The U.S. side welcomed the statement and confirmed the unwavering commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan. • The Ministers concurred that they will work together to further strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond. • As China's behaviors that do not conform to international order pose challenges to the Alliance and the international community, the Ministers agreed to have consultations going forward on actions to be taken by defense authorities. • The Japanese side stated it is entirely unacceptable that China Coast Guard Law, which includes problematic stipulations in terms of the consistency with the international law, heightens tension in the waters such as the East and South China Seas, and the Ministers expressed their serious concern. The Ministers also shared the recognition on the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. • The Ministers reconfirmed the commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea and strongly urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under the UN Security Council Resolutions. The Ministers also agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea-related vessels. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of strengthening cooperation with various partners in the region and beyond to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers agreed to work together to deepen cooperation in all domains including space and cyberspace, aligning the respective strategies of both countries through close consultations. • The Ministers concurred on the importance of strengthening the readiness of both Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces in Japan through measures such as various high-end training including bilateral training in order to enhance the Alliance capabilities to respond and deter. • The Ministers confirmed that the two countries will closely coordinate with each other regarding the Global Posture Review of the United States. • The Ministers welcomed the realignment initiatives of U.S. Forces in Japan so far including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko and facility development of Mageshima, and agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely work together to steadily advance them. • The Ministers reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma and agreed to continuously advance the project. • The Ministers confirmed that it is essential to gain understanding and cooperation from the local communities for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily operations, and affirmed the importance of ensuring safe and environmentally conscious operations of the U.S. forces.

	Outline and Results
<p>April 16, 2021 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting At Washington D. C.</p> <p>Participants Prime Minister Suga President Biden</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The two leaders noted their shared universal values, including freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and they shared the view on strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. • They also confirmed that Japan and the United States will strengthen their unity and cooperation while partnering with like-minded countries such as Australia, India, and ASEAN countries towards the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” • They shared the view on opposing any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas and any acts of intimidation. It was pointed out that candid conversations with China were necessary to address these issues, and they shared the view on pursuing stability in international affairs while defending universal values. • The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and shared the view to urge North Korea to abide by its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. • They strongly condemned the situation in Myanmar where the use of force against civilians by Myanmar military and police continues to cause a large number of deaths and injuries in the country and reaffirmed that the two countries will work together to strongly urge the Myanmar military to immediately stop resorting to violence against civilians, release the detainees and swiftly restore Myanmar’s democratic political system. • The two leaders committed to enhancing deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of this increasingly severe regional security environment. • The leaders shared the view on steady implementation of the realignment plan of the U.S. forces in Japan, including the relocation of the Futenma Replacement Facility to Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, to mitigate the impact on Okinawa and other local communities. • The two leaders shared the view on strengthening the close economic relationship between Japan and the United States and confirmed the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and the global economy. In view of these discussions, the two leaders agreed to issue a U.S.-Japan Joint Leader’s Statement titled “U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era.” • The two leaders agreed on the “Japan-U.S. Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership” to lead “Build Back Better” in the world. Based upon this partnership, they shared a view on promoting competitiveness and innovation including in the digital and science and technology fields, common priorities to both countries, and cooperating in areas such as the COVID-19 response, green growth, and climate change. • Regarding climate change, the leaders confirmed that Japan and the United States will lead the world in decarbonization towards COP26 and beyond, including at the Climate Summit to be hosted by the United States.
<p>January 7, 2022 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting Video teleconference meeting</p> <p>Participants Minister of Defense Kishi Foreign Minister Hayashi U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin U.S. Secretary of State Blinken</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan and the United States affirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s critical role as the cornerstone of regional peace, security, and prosperity. They concurred to constantly advance the Alliance’s capabilities to address evolving security challenges in an integrated manner. • Japan reiterated its resolve to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities to bolster its national defense and contribute to regional peace and stability. The United States welcomed Japan’s resolve and expressed its determination to optimize its posture and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. • The United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear and reaffirmed that Article V of the Treaty applies to the Senkaku islands. The two sides affirmed the critical importance of ensuring that U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient. • Japan and the United States concurred to stand in firm solidarity in opposing any unilateral action that seeks to change the status quo or to undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands and on their strong objections to China’s unlawful maritime claims, militarization and coercive activities in the South China Sea. Both sides also consented to work together to deter and, if necessary, respond to destabilizing activities in the region. • Japan and the United States also expressed serious and ongoing concerns about human rights issues in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Hong Kong. • Furthermore, regarding Taiwan, Japan and the United States underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • As for North Korea, Japan and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and expressed strong concerns over its advancing nuclear and missile development activities. • With regard to cooperation with like-minded countries, Japan and the United States reaffirmed the September 2021 commitment confirmed in the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Summit Meeting (QUAD), to promote the free, open, rules-based order and concurred on the importance of strengthening collaboration and cooperation with partners such as Australia, European countries, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN. • Japan and the United States exchanged their views on issues of common interests including the situation around Ukraine, and reiterated their consistent support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. • Japan and the United States concurred on the importance of vigorously continuing their efforts to ensure the Alliance maintains its competitive edge into the future, such as further enhancing information security, deepening cooperation in space and cyber domains, and advancing technological cooperation to harness emerging technologies and of pursuing investments to strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities looking ahead to the future. • Japan and the United States confirmed to continue their close collaboration to align both countries’ strategies and policies. • Japan and the United States welcomed their robust progress on evolving Alliance roles, missions, and capabilities, and on bilateral planning. • Japan and the United States underscored the importance of strengthened cross-domain capabilities. Japan and the United States confirmed to deepen security cooperation in both space and cyber domains. • Japan and the United States affirmed the two sides will advance and accelerate collaboration on emerging technologies based on the framework Exchange of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Sustainment. • Japan and the United States shared the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan U.S. Alliance. • Japan and the United States committed to continuing construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. • Japan and the United States confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on the U.S. Forces in Japan realignment efforts, including land returns South of Kadena based on “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa”, and the relocation of approximately 4,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. • Japanese side requested the U.S. side for safe operations of the U.S. forces in Japan with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents including sharing information in a timely manner, and cooperation on issues such as PFOS, and both sides confirmed to continue to closely cooperate. • Japan and the United States welcomed the substantial agreement on a new Host Nation Support arrangement and the signing of the Special Measures Agreement that will enhance Alliance readiness and resiliency.

Outline and Results	
<p>January 21, 2022 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting By virtual meeting</p> <p>Participants Prime Minister Kishida President Biden</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The two leaders shared the intention to coordinate closely under the strong Japan-U.S. Alliance and to deepen cooperation with like-minded countries such as Australia, India, ASEAN, and Europe, toward realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” • The two leaders opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas and any economic coercion, and shared the intention to coordinate closely in addressing various issues related to China. • The two leaders underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • The two leaders shared serious concerns about the situation in Hong Kong and the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. • Based on the common understanding that North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities, including the ballistic missile launches, pose a threat to the peace and stability of Japan, the region and the international community, the two leaders shared the intention to continue close coordination between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. • Regarding the situation around Ukraine, the two leaders shared the intention to continue coordination between Japan and the United States, and committed to work closely together to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine. • Endorsing the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) held on January 7, 2022, in light of the increasingly severe security environment in the region, the two leaders shared the intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The U.S. side strongly reaffirmed the U.S.’s unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan and extended deterrence, including the application of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. • The two leaders confirmed their intention to advance cooperation on space and cyber, information security and advanced technology. • The two leaders agreed to continue working closely together to prevent the spread of COVID-19, including by aligning efforts in and around U.S. facilities and areas in Japan. • The two leaders concurred on the launch of the ministerial Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic “2+2”), and shared the intention to expand and deepen bilateral economic cooperation and mutual exchanges based on the “Japan-U.S. Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership.”
<p>May 4, 2022 The Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting Washington D. C.</p> <p>Participants Minister of Defense Kishi U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers severely condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, stating that it is a unilateral change to the status quo by force that poses serious challenge to the international order and such actions are absolutely unacceptable. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to work together to support Ukraine as much as possible. • The US side expressed his appreciation to Japan’s leadership in supporting Ukraine. Japanese side stated his vision to strengthen the commitment to security in Europe from the viewpoint that security of the Indo-Pacific region and Europe cannot be regarded separately. • Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. • Both sides discussed the recent behaviors of China in the Indo-Pacific region such as coercive actions in the East and South China Seas. Both sides determined that any change to the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be condoned, and confirmed that both countries would continue to strengthen cooperation to deter and, if necessary, respond to such actions. • The US side affirmed that the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The US side also expressed opposition to any unilateral attempts to undermine the administration of Japan. • Both sides also reiterated the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. • Both sides agreed on the view that North Korea’s repeated missile launches and nuclear development, etc. are a serious threat against peace and stability of the region and the international community and that such actions cannot be tolerated. Both sides also confirmed to advance close bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea in response to North Korea’s provocations. • Both sides concurred to strengthen defense cooperation with partner countries in the region and beyond such as Australia, India, Southeast Asian and Pacific Island nations, and European nations. • Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States would promptly materialize various measures to enhance the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond. • Japanese side expressed his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities through formulating the National Security Strategy (NSS), etc. The US side welcomed the statement and both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States would align their respective strategies through close consultations. • The US side stated that the U.S. commitment to providing the extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. Japanese side stated that bilateral efforts at various levels to ensure nuclear deterrence remains credible and resilient is more important than ever under the current international security situation, and shared the recognition with the US side. • Both sides concurred on the importance of information security and cyber security which is the basis for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, and agreed to work together to strengthen them. • Both sides concurred to further deepen cooperation in the area of equipment and technology including cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology. • Both sides welcomed the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan so far including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki and facility development of Mageshima and agreed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely work together for steady progress. • Both sides shared the importance of continuing to closely work together and further expedite the cooperation to mitigate impact on Okinawa this year, which marks the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.
<p>May 23, 2022 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting Tokyo</p> <p>Participants Prime Minister Kishida President Biden</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prime Minister Kishida extended his sincere welcome to President Biden’s visit to Japan as it demonstrates the continued commitment of the U.S. to the Indo-Pacific region under any circumstances, and President Biden stated that he hopes to demonstrate the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region through this visit to Japan. • As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine shakes the very foundations of international order, the two leaders reaffirmed the need to resolutely defend free and open international order based on the rule of law. The two leaders also recognized that the Indo-Pacific is a region of vital importance to global peace, security and prosperity, and concurred that Japan and the United States will lead the international community towards the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” • Regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to promoting support for Ukraine and imposing sanction measures against Russia, in continued close coordination with the G7 and the international community. The two leaders concurred that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate towards strong international solidarity. • The two leaders concurred on the importance of clearly demonstrating that any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, such as the recent aggression, should not be tolerated in any region, and that such attempts should have significant cost. • The two leaders discussed the possible impact of the situation in Ukraine on the Indo-Pacific region and concurred to be attentive to developments such as the recent China-Russia joint military exercises. The two leaders strongly opposed any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas and economic coercion, expressed serious concern about the development in Hong Kong and the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and concurred to continue to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. • The two leaders confirmed that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element in security and prosperity in the international community, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • The two leaders condemned North Korea’s nuclear and missile development activities, including its ICBM-class ballistic missile launches. The two leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under these resolutions. The two leaders concurred to further strengthen cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, including security cooperation. • Prime Minister Kishida expressed his appreciation for President Biden’s meeting with the family members of the abductees by North Korea. He asked for full understanding and cooperation again for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and gained further support from President Biden. • The two leaders concurred to swiftly strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. President Biden reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, and the two leaders concurred to communicate more closely between Japan and the U.S. to ensure that extended deterrence remains unwavering. • They reiterated their opposition to any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands. • Prime Minister Kishida stated his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities and secure substantial increase of its defense budget needed to effect it, which received strong support from President Biden.

	Outline and Results
<p>June 27, 2022 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Elmau</p> <p>Participants: Prime Minister Kishida President Biden</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Japanese side emphasized the significance of the President Biden's visit to Japan in May. The two leaders confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination toward further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and realizing a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". The two leaders concurred in working together for the success of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic "2+2") at the Ministerial level to be held in July. The two leaders confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination regarding their response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In this regard, the two leaders also discussed responses to rising oil prices, such as putting a price cap on Russian oil.
<p>September 14, 2022 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Hamada U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Ministers had a wide range of discussions on the challenging security environment surrounding the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers once again strongly condemned China's ballistic missile launches in early August including the landing of missiles inside Japan's EEZ as a grave issue related to the security of Japan and the safety of its people. The Ministers reiterated the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and concurred that they would call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. The Ministers confirmed that they would not condone unilateral change to the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, and that both sides would cooperate closely and seamlessly to that end. The Ministers confirmed that Russia's aggression against Ukraine is an outrage that undermines the foundation of international order. They confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to work together to carry on support for Ukraine. Regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, the Ministers welcomed the Japan-U.S.-ROK exercise during the missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon in August. The Ministers confirmed that they would further advance even closer Japan-U.S. bilateral and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation in order to promptly respond to North Korea's provocative actions in a concerted manner. The Ministers concurred that they would strengthen cooperation with partner countries in the region and beyond to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Japanese side expressed its determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities through formulation of new National Security Strategy, etc., examining all options including the so-called "counterstrike capabilities." The Japanese side also stated that the MOD was working to secure substantial increase of the defense budget needed to effect it. The U.S. side expressed his strong support for these efforts. The Ministers confirmed that the strategies of Japan and the United States share the same direction and that they would align their respective strategies even more closely to strengthen the Alliance. The U.S. side reaffirmed that the U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States would deepen discussions including at the ministerial level on efforts to ensure that extended deterrence of the U.S. including nuclear capabilities remains credible and resilient. The Ministers agreed upon the importance of strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as part of strengthening the Alliance's capabilities to deter and respond. From such perspective, the Ministers welcomed the progress towards the temporary deployment of USAF MQ-9s to MSDF Kanoya Air Base. The Japanese side stated that the temporary deployment of MQ-9s contributes to the deepening of ISR activities by unmanned aerial vehicles of SDF. The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would jointly analyze information acquired by Japanese and the U.S. assets including MQ-9s. The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would further accelerate cooperation in the area of equipment and technology to ensure technological edge of the Alliance. From such perspective, the Ministers agreed to continue joint analysis on counter-hypersonic technology and based on its progress, to begin consideration of joint research on technologies and components. The Ministers also concurred to further accelerate cooperation in unmanned aerial vehicles that have the potential to collaborate with manned aircraft such as F-X, as well as efforts to strengthen supply chains, etc. The Ministers concurred that information security and cyber security is crucially important to deepening Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The Japanese side explained that Japan would work to fundamentally strengthen cyber security. The Ministers confirmed that the understanding and cooperation from local communities as well as safe and environment-friendly operations of the U.S. forces are important for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily activities. The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would continue to work closely together for the steady progress of the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki as well as facility development of Mageshima. The Ministers affirmed that they would continue to work together to mitigate impact on local communities including Okinawa.
<p>November 13, 2022 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Phnom Penh</p> <p>Participants: Prime Minister Kishida President Biden</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At the outset, the two leaders shared the recognition that the security environment surrounding us is becoming increasingly severe due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, North Korea's repeated provocative actions, and continuing unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. They then shared the recognition that the strong Japan-U.S. relationship has a significant role to play in regional peace and stability and beyond, and concurred to work together to ensure peace and prosperity in the region and the international community, by further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and promoting efforts to realize a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." The two leaders exchanged their views on regional issues. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) The two leaders concurred to continue close coordination between Japan and the U.S. in addressing various issues related to China. They also confirmed the importance of peace and stability in the region. (2) The two leaders concurred that North Korea's ballistic missile launches in an unprecedented frequency and manner are absolutely unacceptable, and confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UNSCRs. Prime Minister Kishida also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the resolution of the abductions issue, and gained full support from President Biden. (3) The two leaders, regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, confirmed their commitment to impose strong sanctions against Russia and to support Ukraine, in solidarity with the G7 and other like-minded countries, while further reaching out to the Global South. They also confirmed that they have a serious concern about Russia's nuclear threat, which is absolutely unacceptable, let alone the use of such weapons. The Japanese side explained that Japan is in the process of formulating a new national security strategy by the end of this year amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. The Japanese side reiterated his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities and to secure a substantial increase of defense budget needed to effect it, which received strong support from the U.S. side. While welcoming the progress made on the IPEF and the economic "2+2," the two leaders shared the recognition that engagement of the U.S. in the economic order and economic security in the region is becoming increasingly important. The Japanese side urged the U.S. to return to the TPP at an early time. The Japanese side also conveyed Japan's thoughts on the U.S. credits for clean vehicles. The two leaders concurred to continue close coordination between Japan and the U.S. toward the success of the G7 Hiroshima Summit Meeting in 2023.

	Outline and Results
<p>January 11, 2023 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting / Washington D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Hamada Foreign Minister Hayashi U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin U.S. Secretary of State Blinken</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the beginning of the meeting, the U.S. side expressed its sincere welcome to the visit of the two Japanese ministers to the U.S. and its great pleasure that this Japan-U.S. “2+2” could be held face-to-face for the first time in two years in a timely manner, immediately after the release of the strategic documents of the two countries. They also stated that the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance has never been higher than ever amidst an increasingly severe security environment, and they also stated that they would like to demonstrate the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region to achieve a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The Japanese side stated that this is an excellent opportunity to have discussion on further deepening of the Alliance, while aligning the two countries’ perceptions of the security environment, based on both countries’ strategic documents. They added that they are fully committed to continuously strengthening the Alliance and sincerely look forward to working closely with the two Secretaries. They also stated that the strategies do not end when they are formulated, and it is important to work together to promptly implement their respective strategies. • Japan and the U.S. welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and confirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals. • The Japanese side stated that, it would reinforce its defense capabilities by acquiring new capabilities and enhancing its warfighting sustainability early under the substantially increased defense budget. In response, the U.S. side stated that this is an important initiative to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities, and stated that the U.S. strongly supports this initiative. • The U.S. side restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and reaffirmed Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. • The Japanese side stated that Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and security roles to proactively create a peaceful and stable international environment, and to enhance a free and open international order based on the rule of law. Then both sides aligned their perspectives on the security environment as follows: • Japan and the U.S. concurred that China’s foreign policy-based actions aimed at reshaping the international order for its own benefit are of serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community, and pose the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond. • The U.S. side also reiterated its strong opposition to China’s intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan’s longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands. • Japan and the U.S. recognized that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • Japan and the U.S. strongly condemned North Korea’s unprecedented number of unlawful and reckless ballistic missile launches over the past year. The Japanese side stated that if North Korea ,which has announced its policy of mass production of tactical nuclear weapons and other initiatives, decides to conduct another nuclear test, this test needs to be recognized as an event that is completely different from the previous six nuclear tests. In addition, the U.S. side expressed its full support for the abductions issue. • Japan and the U.S. strongly condemned Russia’s brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. The Japanese side stated that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region are indivisible, and that as the G7 chair this year, Japan will lead the discussion on how to respond to Russia and support Ukraine. • The Japanese side stated that the strategies of both countries are aligned in that both sides seek to fundamentally reinforce their own defense capabilities to enhance deterrence, to increase investment for this purpose, and to strengthen cooperation with allies and like-minded countries. The both sides discussed measures to maximize Alliance deterrence and response capabilities under their strategies. • The Japanese side stated that it is necessary to achieve a more effective division of roles and missions between Japan and the U.S. based on fundamentally reinforced Japan’s defense capabilities. Japan and the U.S. reemphasized the necessity to further enhance bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism in order to cope with the full spectrum of possible situations in a timely and integrated manner. The U.S. side welcomed Japan’s decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters. • Japan and the U.S. decided to deepen bilateral cooperation toward the effective employment of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the U.S. • Japan and the U.S. decided to deepen bilateral coordination, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and flexible deterrent options. • The Japanese side stated that cooperation in equipment and technology is important both for maintaining the technological edge and for swiftly achieving the reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, and that it is necessary to further accelerate such cooperation. The U.S. side expressed its willingness to make efforts with Japan toward maintaining their technological edge. • The Japanese side stated that deepening cooperation in the space and cyber domains is a core element in modernizing the Alliance. Both sides committed to deepening cooperation on space-related capabilities. In addition, Japan and the U.S. consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Japanese side stated that this is an important achievement in terms of strengthening the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance. • The Japanese side stated that, with regard to multilateral cooperation, it will build and expand a multilayered network of allies and like-minded countries to strengthen deterrence. • Japan and the U.S. took time to have in-depth discussions on extended deterrence as one of the agenda, based on the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. • Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient. • Furthermore, Japan and the U.S. concurred to deepen the substantive discussions at the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as well as through various senior-level meetings. • Japan and the U.S. affirmed the need to optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in the region, including for the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan. They also concurred on the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenmato Henoko which is the only solution that avoids its continued use. • Japan and the U.S. concurred to readjust the force posture of U.S. forces in Japan in light of the current severe security environment. Facing a severely contested environment, Japan and the U.S. confirmed that the forward posture of U.S. forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities. In line with such policy, Japan and the U.S. affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, as adjusted by the SCC on April 27, 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa and the 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025. This effort will be carried out while maintaining the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities. • The Japanese side expressed appreciation for the dedicated activities of U.S. forces in Japan to address the severe security environment. The Japanese side also introduced the steady progress of the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility and the facility development on Mageshima. Japan and the U.S. also reconfirmed the steady implementation of ongoing projects supporting realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan and the importance of relationships with local communities, and underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/ Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. They also welcomed the progress and future prospects for the development of the SDF facility on Mageshima. • Japan and the U.S. confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on U.S. force realignment efforts, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Japanese side requested the U.S. side for safe operations of the U.S. forces with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents including sharing information in a timely manner, and cooperation on environmental issues. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will work in close cooperation.

	Outline and Results
<p>January 12, 2023 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Hamada U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministers concurred that they would promptly implement the respective new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and discussed concrete measures based on the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting. • The Japanese side expressed its strong resolve, under its new strategies, to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike, at an early stage through a substantial increase of its defense budget. The U.S. side expressed its strong support for such efforts of Japan. • The Ministers confirmed that they would direct to promptly have intensive discussions on roles and missions of the Alliance based on the fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities of Japan. The Ministers confirmed the necessity of deepening discussions on effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under the bilateral cooperation, joint efforts to deter the occurrence of contingencies from peace time, prompt and effective bilateral coordination at every phase, among others. • The U.S. side reiterated that the U.S. extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. The Ministers confirmed that they would deepen efforts to ensure that extended deterrence of the United States including nuclear capabilities remains more credible and resilient, including discussions at Japan-U.S. “2+2.” • The Ministers welcomed the temporary deployment of U.S. Air Force MQ-9s to MSDF Kanoya Air Base as well as the commencement of Bilateral Information Analysis Cell from the perspective of strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. • Recognizing the vital importance of ensuring the technological edge of the Alliance for the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance, the Ministers concurred that they would further deepen cooperation in equipment and technology area. As a framework that forms such foundation, the Ministers signed the Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects as well as Security of Supply Arrangement toward strengthening supply chain cooperation. In addition, the Ministers welcomed the progress for discussions toward joint research and development in counter-hypersonic technology, high-power microwaves and autonomous systems. • The Ministers confirmed that information security and cyber security is fundamental to the Alliance. The Japanese side expressed its resolve to thoroughly implement measures to fundamentally strengthen security in such area. • The Ministers agreed to implement the U.S. Forces posture initiatives confirmed in the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting which will substantially strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance, and confirmed that they would continue consultations for realizing such initiatives. The Japanese side highlighted the importance of mitigating impact on Okinawa and the Ministers concurred that the understanding and cooperation from local communities is important for the stable stationing of the U.S. forces and their daily activities.
<p>January 13, 2023 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Washington D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Prime Minister Kishida President Biden</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the outset, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his pleasure to meet with his close friend, President Biden, on his first visit to Washington, D.C. as Prime Minister of Japan in the new year 2023. In response, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to the U.S. and stated that the partnership between the two leaders and the Japan-U.S. Alliance are stronger than ever. • The Japanese side stated that as Japan and the U.S. face the most severe and complex security environment in recent years, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities, and substantially increase its defense budget, based on the new National Security Strategy and other documents released last December, and the U.S. side reiterated his full support. a • The Japanese side expressed his high appreciation for the U.S. National Security Strategy released last October, and the U.S. side reiterated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan. The two leaders then welcomed the national security strategies of the two countries are aligned with each other and renewed their determination to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including seeking to create synergies in the implementation of the strategies. • The two leaders instructed to further deepen concrete consultations regarding Japan-U.S. cooperation on the security front, taking into account the discussions at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) on January 11. • The two leaders exchanged views on the regional issues, based on the viewpoint that any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia, must not be tolerated. • (1) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • (2) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions on strengthening regional deterrence, including security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK, and on responses at the UN Security Council. The Japanese side also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained full support from the U.S. side. • (3) Regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing to strongly promote sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded countries. They also reaffirmed their views that Russia’s nuclear threat is absolutely unacceptable, and Russia should never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The Japanese side explained that, at the G7 Hiroshima Summit, it would like to demonstrate the G7’s vision and determination to uphold the international order based on the rule of law and also discuss the Indo-Pacific substantially. In addition, Prime Minister Kishida stated that as the Prime Minister of Japan, the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, he hopes to join with the G7 leaders, including President Biden, in sending a pledge from Hiroshima to the world that humanity will never repeat the scourge of nuclear weapons. The two leaders then concurred on working together toward a world without nuclear weapons, while taking into account the severe security environment. Furthermore, the leaders shared the view that it is important for the G7 to work in solidarity in such areas as the global economy, including energy and food security, economic security, and global issues such as climate change, health and development. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment that Japan and the U.S. will work closely together toward the success of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. • The two leaders shared the view that the Japan-U.S. economic relations were elevated to a strategic stage in 2022, with the launch and progress of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic “2+2”) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The two leaders then concurred that, with Japan holding the G7 Presidency and the U.S. holding the APEC Chair this year, the two countries will lead the international community toward sustainable and inclusive economic growth and maintaining and strengthening a rules-based, free and fair international economic order, while also utilizing this year’s Economic “2+2.” • In addition, the Japanese side once again conveyed Japan’s thoughts on the U.S. credits for clean vehicles. • Furthermore, the two leaders shared the recognition that U.S. engagement in the regional economic order is becoming increasingly important, and concurred on cooperating for the progress of IPEF negotiations. The Japanese side, meanwhile, conveyed Japan’s position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from a strategic perspective. The two leaders also concurred on promoting DFFT (Data Free Flow with Trust). • The two leaders concurred on strengthening supply chain resilience among like-minded countries to handle economic security challenges, including economic coercion. • Furthermore, the two leaders shared the importance of working toward strengthening energy security. • The two leaders concurred on further promoting Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of outer space. • The two leaders shared the recognition that commitment to a free and open international order based on the rule of law has never been more important. • The Japanese side then stated that he will strengthen efforts to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”. In response, the U.S. side expressed its support for the Japanese side’s initiatives and reiterated the unwavering U.S. commitment to the region. • The two leaders concurred that Japan and the U.S. will continue to promote endeavors to realize a FOIP to ensure the peace and prosperity of the region and the international community. • The two leaders reconfirmed unprecedented Japan-U.S. cooperation, rooted in the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and a peaceful and prosperous world, and guided by the shared values, including the rule of law, and issued the Joint Statement of the United States and Japan.

	Outline and Results
<p>May 18, 2023 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Hiroshima</p> <p>Prime Minister Kishida President Biden</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the outset, the Japanese side expressed his pleasure to meet again with President Biden since his visit to Washington D.C. in January. The Japanese side also stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and that our multilayered cooperation is not limited to security and economy, but to all fields. In response, the U.S. side stated that Japan and the U.S share fundamental values, and that this Alliance is stronger than ever. • The Japanese side stated that Japan is working closely with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of the leading universities in the U.S., to conduct a feasibility study to establish a “Global Startup Campus” in central Tokyo (Meguro / Shibuya) in order to create an ecosystem of innovation and startup in the field of deep tech. The two leaders concurred that it is important for Japan and the U.S. to coordinate closely in the field of startup and innovation. The two leaders also welcomed the finalization of a Memorandum of Cooperation on education and technology. • The two leaders exchanged their views on Japan-U.S. security cooperation, and concurred to continue to cooperate for further strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, based on the outcomes of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) and the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in January. The two leaders reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the region, coupled with Japan’s enhanced defense capabilities. • The U.S. side reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and, in this context, the two leaders reaffirmed their intent to ensure full bilateral coordination throughout every phase of a developing situation. The two leaders commended the robust and in-depth consultations on U.S. extended deterrence at the latest Japan-U.S. “2+2” and Extended Deterrence Dialogue meetings, and reaffirmed the importance of further strengthening such consultations. • The two leaders exchanged views on regional issues, on the basis of the recognition that any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia, must not be tolerated. • (1) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • (2) The Japanese side, touching upon its visit to the ROK earlier this month, expressed its intention to work on further advancement of Japan-ROK relations. In response, the U.S. side welcomed improvement in Japan-ROK relations. The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions in strengthening regional deterrence, including security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK, and on responses at the UN Security Council. The Japanese side also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained full support from the U.S. side. • (3) Regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing severe sanctions against Russia and strong support for Ukraine in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded countries. • (4) The two leaders confirmed the importance of engagement with and support for the so-called “Global South”. • Looking toward the G7 Hiroshima Summit from the 19th, the two leaders concurred to coordinate closely to demonstrate to the world the G7’s unwavering solidarity in addressing the issues of the international society and the region. • The two leaders shared the recognition that U.S. engagement in the economic order of the region is becoming increasingly important and had a discussion on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The Japanese side conveyed Japan’s views and efforts on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). • The two leaders shared the importance of promoting and protecting critical technologies. The two leaders welcomed a planned signing of partnerships between Japanese and U.S. universities and companies in the area of quantum and semiconductor and concurred on expanding cooperation into the areas of biotechnology and the AI. Furthermore, the two leaders shared the importance of working together toward strengthening energy security. The two leaders also concurred on further materializing economic security cooperation through the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic “2+2”).

Reference 27 **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) (January, 2023)**

Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi, and Minister of Defense Hamada (referred to collectively as “the Ministers”) convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, D.C., on January 11, 2023.

Recognizing the convergence of their nations’ new national security and defense strategies toward bolstering deterrence in an integrated manner, the Ministers provided a vision of a modernized Alliance postured to prevail in a new era of strategic competition.

The Ministers firmly reiterated their commitment to champion a free and open Indo-Pacific region, heralding the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the cornerstone of regional peace, security, and prosperity. They resolved to advance bilateral modernization initiatives to build a more capable, integrated, and agile Alliance that bolsters deterrence and addresses evolving regional and global security challenges. The Ministers affirmed that the Alliance is stalwart in the face of these challenges and steadfast in support of shared values and norms that underpin the international rules-based order. They renewed their commitment to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo by force regardless of the location in the world.

The Ministers welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and confirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals. This forms a solid foundation for their efforts to constantly modernize the Alliance in order to address the increasingly severe security environment.

Japan reiterated its resolve, under its new strategies, to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike, through a substantial increase of its defense budget. Japan also reaffirmed its determination to lead in its own defense and to expand its roles, in cooperation with the United States and other partners, to actively engage in maintaining regional peace and stability. The United States expressed its strong support for Japan’s updated national security policies as a significant evolution that bolsters Alliance deterrence.

The United States expressed its determination to optimize its force posture in the Indo-Pacific, including in Japan, by forward-deploying more versatile, resilient, and mobile capabilities. Japan supported the U.S. plan to optimize its force posture and welcomed its strong commitment to maintain a robust presence in the region.

The United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. The Ministers held an in-depth discussion on U.S. extended deterrence for Japan, as well as on the recently released U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, and reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient, bolstered by Japan’s capabilities. They reiterated both countries intend to deepen the substantive discussions at the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as well as through various senior-level meetings.

In accordance with their new strategies, the Ministers decided to accelerate work on evolving Alliance roles and missions and to employ interoperable and advanced capabilities, to address current and future security challenges. The Ministers also resolved to jointly strengthen Alliance activities with allies and partners within and beyond the region.

A New Era of Strategic Competition

The Ministers concurred that China's foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order to its benefit and to employ China's growing political, economic, military, and technological power to that end. This behavior is of serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community, and represents the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to China's intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands. The United States reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The Ministers condemned China's dangerous and provocative military activities around Japan, including China's ballistic missile launches in August 2022, during which some missiles landed in waters near Japan's Sakishima Islands. They shared their continuing concerns regarding China's ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is also characterized by its lack of transparency.

They also reiterated their strong objections to China's unlawful maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features, and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for unimpeded lawful commerce and full respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. In this context, they recalled with emphasis that the July 12, 2016, Award in the South China Sea Arbitration (*The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China*), constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), is final and legally binding on the parties to that proceeding. They confirmed, also in this context, that they will work together closely to address non-market policies and practices as well as economic coercion. The Ministers stated that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community. They encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. They expressed serious concerns about the state of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms as well as human rights issues, including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The Ministers strongly condemned North Korea's unprecedented number of unlawful and reckless ballistic missile launches over the past year, including of multiple intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class missiles, and of the ballistic missile that overflew Japan. They expressed strong concern over North Korea's stated policy to enhance its nuclear arsenal at maximum speed, both in quality and quantity, and reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

The Ministers urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and confirmed the need for an immediate resolution of the abductions issue. The Ministers also committed to deepen cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, which is critical to addressing the grave threat North Korea presents and to promoting security, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers strongly condemned Russia's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. They recognized that Russia's violation of the UN Charter and its attempts to unilaterally change borders by force, including through its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, present a serious security threat for the European region and shake the foundation of the international order. The Ministers condemned Russia's reckless

nuclear rhetoric and its attacks against civilian infrastructure, and they reiterated the need for Russia to be held accountable for its atrocities in Ukraine. The Ministers also highlighted with concern Russia's growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with China, including through joint operations and drills in the vicinity of Japan.

Modernizing the Alliance

In light of evolving Alliance roles and missions, and enhancing interoperable capabilities to meet the aforementioned security challenges, the Ministers decided to accelerate their consultations, including on the following areas:

(1) Alliance Coordination

The Ministers reemphasized the necessity to further enhance bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism in order to cope with the full spectrum of possible situations in a timely and integrated manner. In this context, the United States welcomed Japan's decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters. They committed to exploring more effective Alliance command and control relationships to enhance interoperability and responsiveness. The Ministers also shared the need to improve effective coordination with partner countries for more robust policy and operational cooperation.

(2) Allied Efforts in Peacetime

The Ministers underscored the critical importance of joint efforts in peacetime to deter an armed attack against Japan and destabilizing activities in the region. They decided to deepen bilateral coordination, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and flexible deterrent options. They welcomed the U.S. deployment of MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles to Kanoya Air Base and the launch of the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell to increase intelligence sharing. In order to maximize the effects of these efforts, they decided to further expand their cooperation in the field of asset protection missions, broader engagement of partners, and strategic messaging. They welcomed the joint/shared use of additional facilities on Kadena Ammunition Storage Area by JSDF. They also committed to expand joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and to increase bilateral exercises and training in areas including Japan's Southwest Islands.

The Ministers stressed the importance of flexible use of air and seaports to ensure the resiliency of defense assets and their operational effectiveness in a contingency.

Accordingly, they decided to work together through exercises and planning to enable such use.

(3) Allied Capability to Deter and Respond

The Ministers concurred that Alliance efforts, consistent with new strategy documents, should focus on mission areas such as integrated air and missile defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious and airborne operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT), logistics, and mobility. They decided to deepen bilateral cooperation toward the effective employment of Japan's counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States. The Ministers welcomed the steady progress on bilateral planning for contingencies as well as on realistic training and exercises such as Keen Sword 23, Resolute Dragon 22, Orient Shield 22, and MV-22 low altitude training.

The Ministers underscored the critical importance of strengthened cross-domain capabilities, particularly integrating the land, maritime, air, space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains.

(4) Space, Cyber, and Information Security

Recognizing the growing importance of outer space to the peace, security and prosperity of the Alliance, the Ministers renewed their commitment to deepening cooperation on space capabilities to strengthen mission assurance, interoperability, and operational cooperation, including through enhanced collaboration in space domain awareness after the operationalization of Japan's Space Situational Awareness system scheduled in 2023.

The Ministers consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Ministers also affirmed that a decision as to when such an attack would lead to an invocation of Article V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat.

The Ministers emphasized the foundational importance of cybersecurity and information security for the Alliance. They welcomed the establishment of JSDF Cyber Defense Command in March 2022, and concurred to intensify collaboration to counter increasingly sophisticated and persistent cyber threats. The United States welcomed Japan's initiatives to bolster its national cybersecurity posture such as the creation of a new organization to coordinate whole-of-government cybersecurity policies, and the introduction of a risk management framework, which would provide a foundation for a wider range of U.S.-Japan cooperation. The Ministers welcomed progress in strengthening industrial cybersecurity, including Japan's efforts to establish the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry. Lastly, the Ministers highlighted important progress made so far under the bilateral information security consultations.

(5) Maintaining the Technological Edge

Emphasizing the importance of integrating technological developments into Alliance capabilities, the Ministers committed to bolster technology cooperation and joint investments in emerging technologies to further sharpen the competitive edge of the Alliance. The Ministers also emphasized that resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains of defense equipment are essential to ensure national security.

In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects and the Security of Supply Arrangement as well as the substantial progress on the Reciprocal Government Quality Assurance.

With these achievements as well as steady progress on defense science and technology cooperation, including discussions on joint research projects on high-power microwaves and autonomous systems, the Ministers concurred to further promote their efforts toward joint research and development of defense equipment. Based on the progress of joint analysis on counter-hypersonic technology, the Ministers concurred to begin joint research on important elements including advanced materials and hypersonic testbeds. The Ministers also concurred to begin discussion on potential joint development of a future interceptor. The Ministers also shared the importance of deepening technological cooperation with like-minded allies and partners, which complements bilateral efforts.

Expanding Alliance Partnerships

The Ministers renewed their commitment to further advance their partnership with Australia by building on outcomes from the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in August 2022 and Trilateral Defense Ministers Meeting in June and October 2022 and by taking advantage of the expanding activities under the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed in October 2022. In this context, they highlighted the successful completion of the first coordinated asset protection mission among the three countries in November 2022. They also expressed their determination to increase trilateral training and exercises to enhance interoperability, including on ISR, as well as to explore opportunities for technological cooperation. In this context, they reaffirmed the importance of increasing trilateral training opportunities including in northern Australia, based on the Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations issued in December 2022. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to supporting quality, transparent infrastructure development that addresses the needs of Indo-Pacific partners and welcomed the renewal of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership MOU with Australia.

The Ministers also emphasized the importance of further deepening their cooperation with the Republic of Korea and exploring opportunities for multilateral and trilateral exercises and other activities, including in areas such as ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, maritime security, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

The Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. They acknowledged the importance of further promoting economic and security cooperation with partners in Southeast Asia and Pacific Island countries through such activities as joint training, capacity building, and potential transfers of defense equipment. The Ministers welcomed further cooperation under the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which will support the Pacific Islands Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of the Quad, which has made positive contributions to the region through promoting practical cooperation in various fields.

Noting that likeminded nations are facing similar, and mutually-reinforcing threats to the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, the Ministers welcomed greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific by Euro-Atlantic partners—both bilaterally and through multilateral entities such as NATO and the EU. They expressed support for expanded exercises and deployments, facilitated by Japan's new bilateral agreements including forthcoming Reciprocal Access Agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom. The United States endorsed Japan's efforts to finalize its NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Program, and welcomed Japan's enhanced emphasis on European security through its provision of assistance to Ukraine. The United States likewise hailed Japan's increased cooperation with NATO, and Japan's leadership role in NATO's Asia Pacific partners' group. From this perspective, the United States welcomed Prime Minister Kishida's attendance at the NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022—the first time a Japanese Prime Minister has participated in a NATO Summit.

Optimizing Alliance Posture

The Ministers affirmed the need to optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in the region, including for the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan.

Facing a severely contested environment, they confirmed that the forward posture of U.S. forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities.

In line with such policy, the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, as adjusted by the SCC on April 27, 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa. The 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025.

The Ministers reiterated their commitment to the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, and confirmed that these readjustments do not affect the lands scheduled to be returned in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, nor continued progress for the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to achieve an end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap as revised in 2012.

The Ministers also confirmed that these readjustments do not require any changes to Japan's cash contribution and construction projects based upon the amended Guam International Agreement.

To further strengthen Alliance maritime mobility in Japan, the Ministers welcomed the establishment of the Composite Watercraft Company at Yokohama North Dock scheduled in 2023.

The Ministers affirmed that these initiatives demonstrate the steadfast commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan and share the same direction with Japan's fundamental

reinforcement of its defense capabilities. They confirmed that the optimized posture of the U.S. forces in Japan, with enhanced JSDF capabilities and posture in areas including the Southwestern Islands, would substantially strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.

The Ministers decided to continue close consultation on these initiatives and ways to further optimize U.S. force posture in Japan.

The Ministers also reconfirmed the steady implementation of ongoing projects supporting realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan and the importance of relationships with local communities. The Ministers underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The Ministers welcomed the progress and future prospects for the development of the SDF facility on Mageshima, which will be used for purposes including Field Carrier Landing Practice. They confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on U.S. force realignment efforts, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Ministers affirmed the importance of continued bilateral coordination for sharing timely information on incidents and accidents, enhancing environmental cooperation, as well as mitigating impacts on, and supporting strong relationships with, local communities while communicating with them about the importance of Alliance activities.

Reference 28 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Outline) (January, 2023)

Overview

- At the beginning of the meeting, the U.S. side expressed its sincere welcome to the visit of the two Japanese ministers to the U.S. and its great pleasure that this Japan-U.S. "2+2" could be held face-to-face for the first time in two years in a timely manner, immediately after the release of the strategic documents of the two countries. They also stated that the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance has never been higher than ever amidst an increasingly severe security environment, and they also stated that they would like to demonstrate the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region to achieve a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." The Japanese side stated that this is an excellent opportunity to have discussion on further deepening of the Alliance, while aligning the two countries' perceptions of the security environment, based on both countries' strategic documents. They added that they are fully committed to continuously strengthening the Alliance and sincerely look forward to working closely with the two Secretaries. They also stated that the strategies do not end when they are formulated, and it is important to work together to promptly implement their respective strategies.
- Japan and the U.S. welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and confirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals.
- The Japanese side stated that, it would reinforce its defense capabilities by acquiring new capabilities and enhancing its warfighting sustainability early under the substantially increased defense budget. In response, the U.S. side stated that this is an important initiative to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities, and stated that the U.S. strongly supports this initiative.
- The U.S. side restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and reaffirmed Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.

Regional Security Environment

- The Japanese side stated that Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and security roles to proactively create a peaceful and stable international environment, and to enhance a free and open international order based on the rule of law. Then both sides aligned their perspectives on the security environment as follows:
- Japan and the U.S. concurred that China's foreign policy-based actions aimed at reshaping the international order for its own benefit are of serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community, and pose the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond.
- The U.S. side also reiterated its strong opposition to China's intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands.
- Japan and the U.S. recognized that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

- Japan and the U.S. strongly condemned North Korea's unprecedented number of unlawful and reckless ballistic missile launches over the past year. The Japanese side stated that if North Korea, which has announced its policy of mass production of tactical nuclear weapons and other initiatives, decides to conduct another nuclear test, this test needs to be recognized as an event that is completely different from the previous six nuclear tests. In addition, the U.S. side expressed its full support for the abductions issue.
- Japan and the U.S. strongly condemned Russia's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. The Japanese side stated that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region are indivisible, and that as the G7 chair this year, Japan will lead the discussion on how to respond to Russia and support Ukraine.

Modernizing the Alliance

- The Japanese side stated that the strategies of both countries are aligned in that both sides seek to fundamentally reinforce their own defense capabilities to enhance deterrence, to increase investment for this purpose, and to strengthen cooperation with allies and like-minded countries. The both sides discussed measures to maximize Alliance deterrence and response capabilities under their strategies.
- The Japanese side stated that it is necessary to achieve a more effective division of roles and missions between Japan and the U.S. based on fundamentally reinforced Japan's defense capabilities. Japan and the U.S. reemphasized the necessity to further enhance bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism in order to cope with the full spectrum of possible situations in a timely and integrated manner. The U.S. side welcomed Japan's decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters.
- Japan and the U.S. decided to deepen bilateral cooperation toward the effective employment of Japan's counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the U.S.
- Japan and the U.S. decided to deepen bilateral coordination, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and flexible deterrent options.
- The Japanese side stated that cooperation in equipment and technology is important both for maintaining the technological edge and for swiftly achieving the reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities, and that it is necessary to further accelerate such cooperation. The U.S. side expressed its willingness to make efforts with Japan toward maintaining their technological edge.
- The Japanese side stated that deepening cooperation in the space and cyber domains is a core element in modernizing the Alliance. Both sides committed to deepening cooperation on space-related capabilities. In addition, Japan and the U.S. consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Japanese side stated that this is an important achievement in terms of strengthening the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance.
- The Japanese side stated that, with regard to multilateral cooperation, it will build and expand a multilayered network of allies and like-minded countries to strengthen deterrence.

Extended Deterrence

- Japan and the U.S. took time to have in-depth discussions on extended deterrence as one of the agenda, based on the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.
- Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient.
- Furthermore, Japan and the U.S. concurred to deepen the substantive discussions at the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as well as through various senior-level meetings.

U.S. Force Posture and U.S. Forces in Japan

- Japan and the U.S. affirmed the need to optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in the region, including for the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan. They also concurred on the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko which is the only solution that avoids its continued use.
- Japan and the U.S. concurred to readjust the force posture of U.S. forces in Japan in light of the current severe security environment. Facing a severely contested environment, Japan and the U.S. confirmed that the forward posture of U.S. forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities. In line with such policy, Japan and the U.S. affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, as adjusted by the SCC on April 27, 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa and the 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025. This effort will be carried out while maintaining the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities.
- The Japanese side expressed appreciation for the dedicated activities of U.S. forces in Japan to address the severe security environment. The Japanese side also introduced the steady progress of the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility and the facility development on Mageshima. Japan and the U.S. also reconfirmed the steady implementation of ongoing projects supporting realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan and the importance of relationships with local communities, and underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. They also welcomed the progress and future prospects for the development of the SDF facility on Mageshima.
- Japan and the U.S. confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on U.S. force realignment efforts, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Japanese side requested the U.S. side for safe operations of the U.S. forces with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents including sharing information in a timely manner, and cooperation on environmental issues. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will work in close cooperation.

Reference 29 Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2022

Joint Staff

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.5.25	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] 35th Fighter Wing	F-15 × 4	F-16 × 4
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Ballistic Missiles Defense Exercise	22.6.5	—	—	—	—
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.6.7	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] 35th Fighter Wing	F-15 × 4	F-16 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.6.28	Northern Arabian Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Samidare"	Number of vessels: 1	Destroyer USS "Gonzalez"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	From 22.10.1	Around Japan (including the Sea of Japan)	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Asahi"	Number of vessels: 1	Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Chancellorsville," Destroyer USS "Benfold," Replenishment ship USS "Yukon"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.4	Airspace west of Kyushu	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 5th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] Marine Aircraft Group 12	F-15 × 4, F-2 × 4	F-35B × 4
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.11.5	Airspace northwest of Kyushu	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 8th Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] 28th Bomb Wing, 35th Fighter Wing	F-2 × 5	B-1B × 2, F-16 × 2
Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise and Tomodachi Rescue Exercise 04 RIDEX/TREX	22.11.9	Kozushima Island, Izu Oshima Island of Tokyo, and their surrounding waters and airspace, etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Yokosuka District, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. [U.S. Armed Forces] U.S. Army Aviation Battalion Japan, 36th Transportation Battalion, III Marine Expeditionary Force	—	—
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise (field training) Keen Sword 23 (Note 1)	22.11.10 to 11.19	SDF facilities, U.S. Forces Japan facilities, Tsutarajima Island, Amami Oshima Island, Tokunoshima Island, Waters and airspace surrounding Japan, etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Joint Staff; Ground Staff Office; Maritime Staff Office; Air Staff Office; Defense Intelligence Headquarters; SDF Cyber Defense Command; Ground Component Command; various army units, etc.; Self-Defense Fleet; various regional districts, etc.; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; Space Operations Group, etc. [U.S. Armed Forces] U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, U.S. Forces Japan, Space Force, etc.	Number of personnel: approx. 26,000 Number of vessels: approx. 20 Number of aircraft: approx. 250	Number of personnel: approx. 10,000 Number of vessels: approx. 10 Number of aircraft: approx. 120
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.11.18	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 6th Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] 35th Fighter Wing	F-15 × 4	F-16 × 4
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.11.19	Airspace northwest of Kyushu	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 8th Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] 28th Bomb Wing	F-2 × 5	B-1B × 2

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
FY2022 Japan-U.S. Bilateral Integrated Air and Missile Defense Exercise	23.2.17, 2.20 to 2.22	GSDF Camp Matsudo, Camp Shimoshizu, Camp Aonohara, Camp Iizuka, Camp Miyakojima, Vice-Camp Yaese; MSDF Yokosuka Area, Sasebo Area; ASDF Chitose Air Base, Misawa Air Base, Yokota Air Base, Iruma Air Base, Komatsu Air Base, Kasuga Air Base, Tsuiki Air Base, Nyutabaru Air Base, Naha Air Base	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, Ground Self-Defense Force Air Defense School, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command [U.S. Armed Forces] Seventh Fleet headquarters, 5th Air Force, others	—	Several vessels, others
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.2.19	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] —	F-15 × 3	B-1B × 2, F-16 × 4
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.17	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] 35th Fighter Wing	F-15 × 4	F-16 × 4
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.18	Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Atago" [U.S. Armed Forces] —	Number of vessels: 1	Destroyer USS "Milius"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.19	Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Atago" [U.S. Armed Forces] —	Number of vessels: 1	Destroyer USS "Milius"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.19	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] —	F-15 × 4	B-1B × 2, F-16 × 4

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Field Training with U.S. Army in Japan (Orient Shield 22)	22.8.14 to 9.9	Camp Kengun, Camp Amami, Camp Fukuoka, Camp Ebino, Vice-Camp Takayubaru, Vice-Camp Setouchi, Kirishima Maneuver Area, Oyanohara Maneuver Area, etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Western Army Headquarters, 4th Division, Western Field Artillery Unit, 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Western Army System Signal Group, etc. [U.S. Armed Forces] U.S. Army Japan Headquarters, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, 1-24 Infantry Battalion, 17th Artillery Brigade, 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, etc.	—	—
Field Training with U.S. Marines in Japan (Resolute Dragon 22)	22.10.1 to 10.14	Kamifurano Maneuver Area, Shikaribetsu Maneuver Area, Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, Shizunai Antiaircraft Training Area (including Camp Shizunai); the ASDF Kenebetsu Takeoff and Landing Site, Sapporo Air Base (including Camp Okadama), Tokachi Air Base (including Camp Obihiro)	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Division Headquarters, 3rd Rapid Deployment Regiment, 1st Artillery Brigade, 1st Electronic Warfare Unit, 3rd Engineer Brigade, Northern Air Group, 2nd Logistic Support Regiment, etc. [U.S. Armed Forces] 12th Marine Regiment, Marine Battalion, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, Marine Aircraft Group 36, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, units from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, etc.	—	—
Field Training with U.S. Army in the U.S. (Joint Readiness Training Center 22)	22.10.20 to 11.25	Fort Polk, Louisiana State, U.S.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 1 Infantry company / 33rd Infantry Regiment key unit [U.S. Armed Forces] Key units of 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division	—	—

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army Command Post Exercise (Japan) (YS-83)	22.11.28 to 12.13	Camp Asaka, Camp Higashi-Chitose, Camp Kengun, etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Northern Army, Western Army, Training Evaluation Research, Development Command, etc.; Joint Staff; MSDF; ASDF [U.S. Armed Forces] U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters; U.S. Army Japan Headquarters; First Corps; 11th Airborne Division; 7th Infantry Division; 3rd Marine Division, etc.; U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Pacific Air Forces, etc.	—	—
Field Training with U.S. Marines (Iron Fist 23) (Note 2)	23.2.16 to 3.12	Hijiyudai Maneuver Area, Tokunoshima Island, Kikaijima Island, Camp Hansen (training area), Vice-Camp Takayubaru, etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Ground Component Command (Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, etc.), Western Army (Western Air Group, etc.), MSDF Mine Warfare Force (Landing ship tank JS "Osumi") [U.S. Armed Forces] 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc.; 7th Fleet (amphibious assault ship USS "America," Dock transport landing ship USS "Green Bay," Dock landing ship USS "Ashland")	—	—
FY2022 Field Training in the U.S.	23.1 to 2	U.S.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Special Operations Group [U.S. Armed Forces] Special Operations Command	—	—

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.4.8 to 4.17	Area surrounding Japan (including East China Sea and Sea of Japan)	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyers JS "Inazuma," JS "Kongo"	Number of vessels: 2	Aircraft carrier USS "Abraham Lincoln," Cruiser USS "Mobile Bay," Destroyer USS "Spruance," Replenishment ship USNS "Tippecanoe," Dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS "Richard E. Byrd"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.4.13, 4.14	Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Kongo"	Number of vessels: 1	Cruiser USS "Mobile Bay," Destroyer USS "Spruance"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.5.8 to 5.16	South of Kanto	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Teruzuki," P-3C, UP-3D	Number of vessels: 1 Number of aircraft: 2	Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Antietam"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.5.9	South China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Number of vessels: 2	Destroyer USS "Gridley"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Bilateral Cyber Defense Exercises)	22.5.11, 5.12	U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] MSDF Communications Security Group, Communications Command	—	U.S. Navy NIOC-HAWAII N3J Department (U.S. Navy Information Operation Command-Hawaii N3J Department)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.5.18	Sagami Bay	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] SH-60J	Number of aircraft: 1	MH-60R
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX22-1)	22.5.18	Area surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Replenishment ship JS "Hamana"	Number of vessels: 1	Destroyer USS "Rafael Peralta"
Medical Care Special Training	22.5.20	Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka and United States Naval Hospital Yokosuka	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Yokosuka District Headquarters, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity YOKOSUKA, Medical Service Unit YOKOSUKA [U.S. Armed Forces] United States Naval Hospital Yokosuka	Number of personnel: approx. 60	Number of personnel: approx. 200
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.5.24 to 5.26	South of Kanto	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Teruzuki"	Number of vessels: 1	Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Antietam," Destroyer USS "Benfold"
Special Anti-Submarine Exercise	22.5.31	South of Boso Peninsula	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] SH-60K, Submarine	Number of vessels: 1 Number of aircraft: 1	MH-60R
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.6.5, 6.7	South China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Harusame"	Number of vessels: 1	Destroyer USS "Fitzgerald," Replenishment ship USNS "Tippecanoe"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.6.17 to 6.19	Pacific Ocean	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	Number of vessels: 2	Destroyer USS "Sampson," Replenishment ship USSN "Rappahannock"

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Mine disposal Training and Minesweeping Special Training	22.6.21 to 6.30	Area surrounding Iwo Jima	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Minesweeper Tender JS “Bungo” Minesweeper Ocean JS “Hirado” Minesweeper Coastal JS “Hirashima,” JS “Sugashima,” JS “Ukushima,” JS “Aishima,” JS “Kuroshima”	Number of vessels: 7	Approx. 10 personnel engaged in underwater treatment
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX22-2)	22.6.25	Pacific Ocean	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Takanami”	Number of vessels: 2	Replenishment ship USNS “Henry J. Kaiser”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Bilateral Cyber Defense Exercises)	22.6.27 to 6.29	Hawaii (Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam and Destroyer JS “Izumo”)	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] MSDF Communications Security Group, Communications Command	—	U.S. Navy NIOC-HAWAII (U.S. Navy Information Operation Command-Hawaii)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX22-3)	22.7.6	Atlantic Ocean	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Number of vessels: 2	Replenishment ship USS “Arctic”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.7.13	Area surrounding Nansei Islands	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] P-3C	Number of aircraft: 1	P-8A
Mine Warfare Training (Mutsu Bay) and Minesweeping Special Training	22.7.17 to 7.29	Mutsu Bay	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Minesweeper Tender × 1, Minesweeper Ocean × 2, Minesweeper Coastal × 10, MCH-101 × 2, P-3C × 4, P-1 × 2	Number of vessels: 13, Number of aircraft: 8	Minesweeper × 2, MH-53E × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.7.23 to 7.24	Pacific Ocean	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS “Kirisame”	Number of vessels: 1	Littoral combat ship USS “Jackson,” Dry cargo ship USNS “Carl Brashear”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.7.25	Area surrounding Japan (Pacific Ocean)	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyers JS “Hyuga,” JS “Inazuma,” JS “Makinami,” JS “Yugiri,” JS “Kirishima,” P-1, EP-3, OP-3C, UP-3D	Number of vessels: 5	EA-18G
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.7.25	Sagami Bay	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS “Yamagiri”	Number of aircraft: 4	UH-60L × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX22-4)	22.7.30	Area surrounding Micronesia	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS “Kirisame”	Number of vessels: 1	Dry cargo ship USNS “Cesar Chavez”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX22-5)	22.8.1	Pacific Ocean	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Number of vessels: 1	Replenishment ship USS “Richard E. Byrd”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX22-6)	22.8.7	Area surrounding Hawaii	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Takanami”	Number of vessels: 2	Replenishment ship USS “Pecos”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.8.8	Area surrounding Solomon Islands	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS “Kirisame”	Number of vessels: 1	Littoral combat ship USS “Oakland”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX22-7)	22.8.10	Pacific Ocean	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Number of vessels: 2	Replenishment ship USS “Pecos”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.8.13 to 8.24	East of Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS “Yamagiri,” JS “Onami”	Number of vessels: 2	Aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” Amphibious assault ship USS “Tripoli,” Amphibious transport dock ship USS “New Orleans,” Dock landing ship USS “Rushmore”
Special Anti-Submarine Exercise	22.8.25	South of Boso Peninsula	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] P-1, Submarine	Number of vessels: 1, Number of aircraft: 1	P-8A, MH-60R
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.9.12 to 9.22	Area surrounding Japan (including East China Sea)	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS “Amagiri”	Number of vessels: 1	Aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” Cruiser USS “Chancellorsville,” Destroyers USS “Barry,” “Benfold,” Replenishment ship USNS “Rappahannock”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Transport Special Training)	22.9.16 to 9.19	Area surrounding Japan (Pacific Ocean) and Numazu Beach Training Area	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Landing ship tank JS “Kunisaki,” LCAC	Number of vessels: 2	Amphibious assault ship USS “Tripoli,” Dock landing ship USS “Rushmore,” LCU, MH-60S
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.9.21 to 9.23	East China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] EP-3, OP-3C	Number of aircraft: 2	EP-3E
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Noble Fusion 22)	22.10.19 to 10.21	South China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS “Kirisame”	Number of vessels: 1	Littoral combat ship USS “Oakland”
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.26, 10.27	Area surrounding Japan (Pacific Ocean)	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] P-3C	Number of aircraft: 1	P-8A
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.27, 10.28	South of Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] P-3C	Number of aircraft: 1	P-8A
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Bilateral Cyber Defense Exercises)	22.11.1, 11.2	U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] MSDF Communications Security Group, Communications Command	—	U.S. Navy NIOC-HAWAII N3J Department (U.S. Navy Information Operation Command-Hawaii N3J Department)

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Mine Warfare Training (Hyuga-nada Sea) and Minesweeping Special Training (Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise)	22.11.18 to 11.28	Hyuga-nada Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Minesweeper Tender × 1, Minesweeper Ocean × 3, Minesweeper Coastal × 16, MCH-101 × 3	Number of vessels: 20, Number of aircraft: 3	Minesweeper × 2, MH-53E × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.11.21	Sagami Bay	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Yamagiri"	Number of vessels: 1	UH-60L × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.12.2 to 12.8	Waters and airspace from south of Kanto through south of Shikoku	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Ikazuchi"	Number of vessels: 1	Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Shiloh," Replenishment ship USNS "John Ericsson"
Special Anti-Submarine Exercise	22.12.6	South of Kanto	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Izumo," P-1, Submarine	Number of vessels: 2, Number of aircraft: 1	P-8A, MH-60R
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.12.19	Waters and airspace from south of Iwo To through east of Guam	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] P-1	Number of aircraft: 1	Aircraft carrier USS "Nimitz," P-8A, F/A-18, E-2D, E/A-18G, B-52
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.1.15 to 1.23	Waters and airspace from south of Kanto through south of Shikoku and around Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Ashigara"	Number of vessels: 1	Cruisers USS "Antietam," USS "Chancellorsville," USS "Shiloh," Destroyer USS "Rafael Peralta," Replenishment ship USNS "John Ericsson," Dry cargo ship USNS "Washington Chambers"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX23)	23.1.26	Area surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Replenishment ship JS "Oumi"	Number of vessels: 1	Cruiser USS "Antietam"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Note 3)	23.1.27	Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] P-3C, F-35A	Number of aircraft: 2	P-8A, F-16, E-3, F-35B
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.1.30, 1.31	South of Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] P-1, P-3C	Number of aircraft: 2	P-8A
Mine Warfare Training (Ise Bay) and Minesweeping Special Training (Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise)	23.2.1 to 2.10	Ise Bay	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Landing ship tank × 1, Minesweeper Ocean × 2, Minesweeper Coastal × 7, MCH-101 × 3	Number of vessels: 10, Number of aircraft: 3	Approx. 15 personnel engaged in underwater treatment and UUV operation
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.2.5	South China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Makinami"	Number of vessels: 1	Littoral combat ship USS "Charleston"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.2.22	Area surrounding Guam	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Asagiri," Training ship JS "Shimakaze"	Number of vessels: 2	Aircraft carrier USS "Nimitz," Destroyers USS "Wayne E. Meyer," USS "Decatur"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (ILEX23-2)	23.2.22	Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Replenishment ship JS "Masyu"	Number of vessels: 1	Destroyer USS "Barry"
Dispatched Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare Training in the U.S.	23.2.24 to 3.7	Naval Air Station Whidbey Island (Washington, USA) and airspace around the base	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 81st Air Patrol Squadron (EP-3)	Aircraft Number of personnel: approx. 40	
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.2.27 to 3.12	Areas surrounding Hiroshima Bay and west of Kyushu through Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Landing ship tank JS "Osumi," LCAC, Minesweeper Coastal JS "Hirashima," JS "Yakushima"	Number of vessels: 4	Amphibious assault ship USS "America," Dock landing ship USS "Ashland," Dock landing ship USS "Green Bay," LCAC, LCU, MH-60S
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Cope Angel)	23.2.28 to 3.3	South of Shikoku and South of Kyushu	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] US-2	Number of aircraft: 1	MC-130J, CV-22, HH-60
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.1	Sagami Bay	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] SH-60K	Number of aircraft: 1	MH-60R
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (Note 4)	23.3.23 to 3.26	Waters and airspace from Pacific Ocean through East China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Ise," 5th Surface-to-ship guided missile regiment, AH-64, UH-60	Number of vessels: 1, Aircraft	Aircraft carrier USS "Nimitz," Cruiser USS "Bunker Hill," Destroyers USS "Decatur," USS "Wayne E. Meyer"
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.24 to 3.25	South China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	Number of vessels: 1	Destroyers USS "Milius," "Chung-Hoon"

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.6.3	Airspace above Pacific Ocean east of Aomori Prefecture	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 2	B-1 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.6.22	Airspace above Pacific Ocean south of Naha	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 2	B-1 × 2

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.6.29	Airspace above East China Sea and Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing, 6th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 8, F-2 × 4	B-1 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.7.6, 7.11 to 7.12	Airspace above Sea of Japan, Pacific Ocean, and East China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 5th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 12, F-2 × 8	F-22 × 12, F-35A × 4, F-15C × 13, E-3 × 1, KC-135 × 1, P-8 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.8.4	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 3	F-15C × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.8.9	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4	F-15C × 6
Training relocation from Misawa Air Base to Komatsu Air Base related to U.S. military reorganization	22.8.29 to 9.2	Komatsu Air Base, airspace off the coast of Komatsu	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 6th Air Wing	F-15 × approx. 6	Number of personnel: approx. 90 F-16 × approx. 6
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.9.9	Airspace above Sea of Japan west of Aomori Prefecture	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4	F-16 × 15, KC-135 × 2, F-35B × 4
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.9.13, 9.15	Airspace above Pacific Ocean south of Naha	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Airborne Warning and Control Wing, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 23, E-2C × 1, C-130H × 1, U-125A × 1, UH-60J × 1	F-15C × 16, KC-135 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Tactical Airlift Training	22.9.25 to 9.30	Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam (Hawaii, USA) and airspace surrounding the base	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Air Support Command	Number of personnel: approx. 20, C-2 × 1	—
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.9.28	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4	F-15C × 4, KC-135 × 1, F-35B × 3
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.13	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 2	F-15C × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.18	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 2	F-15C × 6
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.26	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 20	F-15C × 8, KC-135 × 3, FA-18 × 2, KC-130 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.27	Waters and airspace north of Miyako Island and Tarama Island	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] Air Rescue Wing	U-125A × 1, UH-60J × 1	CV-22 × 1, MC-130J × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.10.27	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing, 7th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4, F-2 × 8	B-52 × 2
Training relocation from Iwakuni Air Base to Nyutabaru Air Base related to U.S. military reorganization	22.11.8 to 11.18	Nyutabaru Air Base, airspace off the coast of Shikoku etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 5th Air Wing	F-15 × approx. 8	Number of personnel: approx. 110 FA-18 × approx. 10
Training relocation from Misawa Air Base to Hyakuri Air Base related to U.S. military reorganization	22.11.10 to 11.18	Hyakuri Air Base, airspace off the coast of Hyakuri, etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 7th Air Wing	F-2 × approx. 8	Number of personnel: approx. 130 F-16 × approx. 12
Training relocation from Kadena Air Base to Tsuiki Air Base related to U.S. military reorganization	22.11.10 to 11.18	Tsuiki Air Base, airspace off Shikoku, etc.	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 8th Air Wing	F-2 × approx. 12	Number of personnel: approx. 190 F-15 × approx. 12
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.11.29	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4	F-22 × 2, KC-135 × 1, EA-18G × 2, F-35B × 4

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.12.14	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4	F-15C × 1, KC-135 × 2, EA-18G × 2, F-35B × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.12.20	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 6th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4, F-2 × 4	B-52 × 2, C-17 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	22.12.21	Airspace above the Sea of Japan west of Aomori Prefecture	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 3rd Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-35A × 3	F-16 × 14, EA-18G × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.1.10	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 2	B-1 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.1.19	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Airborne Warning and Control Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-2 × 3, F-15 × 12, E-767 × 1	F-15 × 10, KC-135 × 1, E-3 × 1, HH-60 × 2, P-8 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.2.28	Airspace above Pacific Ocean east of Ibaraki Prefecture	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 7th Air Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-2 × 2	B-52 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.2	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 3rd Air Wing, 7th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-35A × 4, F-2 × 4, F-2 × 4	B-1 × 2, F-16 × 4, KC-135 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.3	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 3rd Air Wing, 6th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-35A × 4, F-15 × 4, F-2 × 4	B-1 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.6	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 8th Air Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-2 × 2	B-52 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.14	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 9th Air Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-15 × 4	F-22 × 2, F-16 × 4, KC-135 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	23.3.30	Airspace above Sea of Japan and East China Sea	[Self-Defense Forces (SDF)] 2nd Air Wing, 6th Air Wing, 5th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing [U.S. Armed Forces] 2nd Bomb Wing	F-15 × 12, F-2 × 4	B-52 × 2

Notes: 1. Australian, Canadian, and U.K. vessels as well as Australian and Canadian aircraft participated in some of the training.

2. The MSDF also participated

3. The ASDF also participated

4. The GSDF also participated

5. In addition to this, small-scale exercises and similar were constantly carried out between the U.S. armed forces and each service of the SDF

6. The number of personnel is based on the publicly announced number

Reference 30 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

Item	Summary	Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development	Completion date
	Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, electronic device mounted on successor aircraft to P-3C, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications, hybrid electric drive, High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization, and Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader, Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader		Completed
SM-3 Block IIA	Development of advanced missile interceptor	June 2006	March 2019 (moved to the joint produce/deployment stage)
Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures	Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel	November 2015	Ongoing
High-Temperature Case Technologies	Research on rocket motor case made of high-temperature CFRP* (CFRP: Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic)	July 2018	Ongoing
Next Generation Amphibious Technologies	Research on the feasibility of the technology by simulations based on digital models of amphibious vehicles	May 2019	Ongoing
Mission Partner Gateway eXtended	Research on interfaces between networks in Japan and the United States	September 2020	Ongoing
Modular Hybrid Electric Vehicle System	Research on modular hybrid electric vehicle systems	October 2020	Ongoing

Reference

Reference 31 **United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation)**

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa

(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.

(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
 - Camp Kuwae: Total return.
 - Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
 - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
 - Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
 - Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
 - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d) Relationships among Initiatives

- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
 - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagami Area.
 - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
 - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace

- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
- A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
- The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
 - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
 - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
 - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
 - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations

and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.

- The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
 - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
 - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.
- #### 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
 - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
 - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
 - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
 - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
 - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
 - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
- #### 5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
 - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
 - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
 - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.

6. Training Relocation

- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
 - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities — Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
 - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
 - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
- In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
 - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
 - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

(Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

Reference 32 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility

Month & Year	Background
April 1996	Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.
December 1996	SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).
November 1999	Then Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use
December 1999	Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab
July 2002	“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided
November 2003	Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.
August 2004	A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.
October 2005	“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)
April 2006	“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).
May 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved “Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. • “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.
August 2006	Establishment of “The Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”
August 2007	The EIA scoping document was sent to the Governor, municipal mayors etc., of Okinawa Prefecture.
April 2009	Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the Governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa Prefecture.
September 2009	Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.
November 2009	Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.
December 2009	Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.
May 2010	“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”
August 2010	Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report
June 2011	“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.
December 2011- January 2012	The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
February 2012	The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
April 2012	“2+2” Joint Statement → The four Ministers reconfirmed that the current plan to relocate MCAS Futenma to Henoko continues to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
December 2012	Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the Governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa Prefecture.
March 2013	The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the Landfill Permit Request on public waters to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
April 2013	Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.
October 2013	“2+2” Joint Statement → The four Ministers reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
December 2013	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approved reclamation of the public water related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project
July 2014	Started the construction of replacement facilities
April 2015	“2+2” Joint Statement → The four Ministers reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma

Month & Year	Background
October 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture's revocation of the landfill permit for public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit
November 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative lawsuit to retract the revocation of the landfill permit. Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Stated that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution.
March 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The government announced it would accept the court's settlement recommendation Landfill work was suspended The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to repeal the revocation of the landfill permit on public waters Dissatisfied with the instruction for correction by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a request for review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council
April 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court suggested settlement under the philosophy of "haste makes waste," and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that it understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe's strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation.
June 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
July 2016	The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a lawsuit to confirm the illegality of omission
September 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
December 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in a lawsuit to confirm the illegality of omission (finalized victory of the national government) The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture retracted the revocation of the landfill permit on public waters Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction
February 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
April 2017	Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation
June 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
July 2017	Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit (injunction lawsuit) against the central government, arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed and conduct other such acts without securing the permission of the governor
August 2017	<p>Joint statement of "2+2"</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → The four Ministers reconfirmed that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
November 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
March 2018	Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture's lawsuit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc.
April 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
August 2018	The Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture revoked (withdrew) the landfill permit on public waters.
October 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture's withdrawal of the landfill permit on public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution. Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.
November 2018	Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to suspend execution, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a request for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.
December 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed an appeal by Okinawa Prefecture regarding a lawsuit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. Started landfill work in the waters on the south side of Camp Schwab.
January 2019	<p>Meeting between then Minister of Defense Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
February 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for a review by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture of the suspension of execution by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Okinawa Prefecture held a prefectural referendum on whether or not people support the land-fill work related to the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, Nago City. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → 114,933 voted for the work, 434,273 voted against it, and 52,682 voted neither (605,385 total votes cast, 52.48% voter turnout).

Month & Year	Background
March 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit to revoke the determination to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. Okinawa Prefecture withdrew a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding a lawsuit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. (finalized victory of the central government).
April 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regarding the request for a review from the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to revoke the withdrawal of the landfill permit by the Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. Joint statement of "2+2" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → The four Ministers reconfirmed that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture withdrew its claim regarding the lawsuit to revoke the determination to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture requested for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.
June 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meeting between then Minister of Defense Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review with the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture over the decision made by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.
July 2019	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture was dissatisfied with the dismissal by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and filed a lawsuit with the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court to revoke the central government's determination.
August 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit (appeal lawsuit) to revoke the determination. Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
October 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination. The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination.
November 2019	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
January 2020	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
March 2020	The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination (finalized victory of the central government).
April 2020	The Landfill Permit Revision Request due to the additional implementation of soil improvement work was submitted to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
August 2020	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
November 2020	The Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture's lawsuit to revoke the determination (appeal lawsuit)
December 2020	Okinawa Prefecture appealed to the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court in the lawsuit to revoke the determination (appeal lawsuit)
March 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma Joint statement of "2+2" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → The four Ministers reconfirmed that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
April 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma Completed landfill from the sea level to 3.1m (4.0m along some seawalls) in the waters on the south side of Camp Schwab
August 2021	The height of the reclaimed land in the south side of Camp Schwab achieved up to 4.0 m from the sea level
November 2021	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture disapproved the permit revision request
December 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Director General of Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review with the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism seeking revocation of disapproval The Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch dismissed the appeal filed by Okinawa Prefecture in the lawsuit to revoke the determination (appeal lawsuit) Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court in the lawsuit to revoke the determination
January 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint statement of "2+2" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → The four Ministers confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station, will be continued.
April 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined to revoke the disapproval by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in response to the request for a review by the Director General of Okinawa Defense Bureau The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Permit Revision Request.
May 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture requested for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council. Dissatisfied with the instruction for correction by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture requested for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council. Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → The two leaders confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station.
July 2022	The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture's request for a review of the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.
August 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dissatisfied with the dismissal by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit with the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court to revoke the central government's determination. The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council determined that the instruction for correction by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism was not illegal. Dissatisfied with the determination by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit with the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court to revoke the central government's instruction for correction.

Month & Year	Background
September 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Concurred to make steady progress of the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko and facility development of Mageshima. Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit (appeal lawsuit) to demand a revocation of the decision.
January 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint statement of “2+2” → The four Ministers confirmed to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
March 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch rendered a judgment in a lawsuit to revoke the central government’s determination and instruction for correction (dismissed the lawsuit relating to the determination and the request relating to the instruction for correction). The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court in the lawsuit to revoke the central government’s determination and instruction for correction.

Reference 33 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures	
West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	Returned (March 31, 2015)
The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned (August 31, 2013)
Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned (March 31, 2019)
A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	Returned (March 31, 2020) ¹
Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided	
Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)	JFY2025 or later
Lower Plaza Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later ^{2, 3}
Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area	JFY2025 or later
Naha Port	JFY2028 or later
Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1	JFY2022 or later
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma	JFY2022 or later
Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan	
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	—
The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2024 or later ⁴

Notes: 1. Shirahi River area was returned at the same timing.

2. Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

3. Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.

4. Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

Reference 34 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces

June 6, 2011	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.
June 13, 2012-	Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc., to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 29-	Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). • Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. • The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.
July 23	Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 19	Released the report "MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa" (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey's operations.
October 6	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
January 28, 2013	The Okinawa Citizens' Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.
April 30	The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).
July 30	The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 25	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
May 11, 2015	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.
December 13, 2016	Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.
February 1, 2017	Planned maintenance interval of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.
March 14	Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.
August 5	Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.
April 3, 2018	U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and that a total of ten Osprey would be deployed gradually over the next few years.
August 22, 2018	Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed at Yokota Air Base on October 1, 2018, and that a total of ten CV-22 would be deployed at Yokota Air Base gradually by around 2024.
October 1, 2018	Five CV-22 Ospreys were deployed at Yokota Air Base.
July 6, 2021	Sixth CV-22 Osprey was deployed at Yokota Air Base.

Reference 35 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan

1. Purpose

It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.

2. Special Measures, etc.

(1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

- In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents' lives more convenient and to developing industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.
- The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.

(2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts

- Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.
- Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council's meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).

(3) Measures for USFJ local employees

- Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.

3. Expiration of the Law

This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment.

- Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.
2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc., under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation. However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan's financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.

Reference 36 Outline of 23 Issues

(As of April 1, 2022)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
	20. Awase Meadows Golf Course	47			◎		Returned on July 31, 2010
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on November 30, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on September 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha) Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	22. Former Higashi-Onna Ammunition Storage Area	98	◎				Returned on March 31, 2005 (9ha) Returned on October 31, 2006 (58ha) Returned on March 31, 2022 (31ha)
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of the eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(18. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
MCAS Futenma	21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan)	4		◎			Returned on July 31, 2017
	17 facilities, 22 issues	1008	8	8	3	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Change agreed on December 21, 2001
	1 facility, 1 issue	0.5	1	0	0	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1009	9	8	3	3	

- Notes: 1. For the "Area" column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
 2. A single circle in the "Classification" column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
 3. The numbers in the "Scope" column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.
 4. "SCC" in the "Classification" column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

Reference

Reference 37 The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the

Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

- Futenma Air Station—See attached.
- Northern Training Area
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:
 - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
 - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
- Aha Training Area
Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Sobe Communication Site
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port
Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).

- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
- Parachute drop training
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

- Accident reports
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.
- Supplemental automobile insurance
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
- Payment for claims
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
 - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
 - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
 - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.
- Quarantine procedures
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.
- Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

**The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station
(an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)**

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction

- a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
- b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.
- c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.

2. Decisions of the SCC

- a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
- b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
- c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
- d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

- e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

3. Guiding Principles

- a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
- b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
- c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
- d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
- e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
- f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.

4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

- a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
- b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
- c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

5. The Next Steps

- a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
- b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
- c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

[Return of Lands]

1. Already returned facilities

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc. February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,000 ha) returned
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 191 ha) returned
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station

2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation December 2015: Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement on partial early land return to be used for municipal roads. <hr/> <p>[Already returned area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> May 1997: Partially returned (approximately 473 m²) September 1997: Partially returned (approximately 62 m²) July 2017: Partially returned (approximately 4 ha) March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 0.4 ha) December 2020: Partially returned (approximately 0.1 ha)
Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation July 2002: Youth Center was furnished January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities. December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital. February 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (helipad) December 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (utility). May 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (barracks for non-accompanied enlisted sailors) October 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 1) October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 2) September 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities (barracks for non-accompanied officers, blood storage facility, etc.) February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened December 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished <hr/> <p>[Already returned Area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38 ha)
Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation December 2015: the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on partial land return for the expansion of national highway March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3ha) <hr/> <p>[Already returned area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> May 1997: Partially returned (approximately 38 m²) September 2001: Partially returned (approximately 1 ha) August 2013: Return of north access road (approximately 1 ha) March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3 ha) March 2019: Return of area near Gate 5 (approximately 2 ha) May 2021: Partially returned (approximately 0.2 ha)
Naha Port (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation <hr/> <p>[Already returned area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> June 2000: Partially returned (approximately 1 ha)

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*	(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • March 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on conducting the construction work (Phase IV Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished • April 2020: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on conducting the construction work (Phase IV Futenma) * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa • April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the Okinawa Housing Consolidation (OHC) plan under the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was reevaluated, and that based on the family housing requirement after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, approximately 910 family housing units (including the replacement of units to be demolished at the construction areas) will be constructed in addition to the 56 units which have already been agreed to
	[Already returned area] • March 1997: Partially returned (approximately 371 m ²) • May 1997: Partially returned (approximately 598 m ²) • June 1997: Partially returned (approximately 353 m ²) • December 1997: Partially returned (approximately 0.3 ha) • March 1998: Partially returned (approximately 2 ha) • February 2000: Partially returned (approximately 3 ha) • December 2006: Partially returned (approximately 145 m ²) • March 2015: Return of West Futenma Housing Area (approximately 51 ha) • March 2020: Partial return of the Facilities and Engineering Compound (approximately 11 ha)

[Adjustment in training or operation]

Point	State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997
Parachute Drop Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000

[Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]

1. Initiatives already taken

Point	State of Progress
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway. April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility. February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar. July 2013: Ramp, etc., were furnished. July 2014: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc. December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc. January 2017: Relocation completed February 2020: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the implementation of demolition of part of the existing facilities March 2021: Completed demolition of part of the existing facilities
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> July 2000: Furnished

2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment

















Point	State of Progress
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.







Reference 39 Consultative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okinawa

Name (year)	Member	Purpose
Okinawa Policy Council (1996)	Entire cabinet excluding Prime Minister and Governor of Okinawa	Consultation concerning issues pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa and basic policies relating to Okinawa
Subcommittee of the Okinawa Policy Council (2013)	Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Governor of Okinawa	Responses to various issues relating to the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture
Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa (2014)	Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Governor of Okinawa, and Mayor of Ginowan	Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of Futenma Air Station
Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa (2014)	State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Director General of Minister's Secretariat, Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Director General of Bureau of Policies for Regional Society, Chief of Staff of Joint Staff, Chief of Staff of GSD, Chief of Staff of MSDF, and Chief of Staff of ASDF	Deliberation on basic policies regarding the early return of USFJ facilities and areas, and regarding the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa with the aim of smooth and effective implementation of measures based on those policies
Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture (2016)	Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Governor of Okinawa, and Deputy Governor of Okinawa	Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture

Reference 40 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements

(As of March 31, 2023)

	Security and Defense Cooperation Documents	Status of Forces Agreement/ Reciprocal Access Agreement	Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement	Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	Information Security Agreement
 United States	Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Set forth in November 1978 Set forth in September 1997 Set forth in April 2015 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996	Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement January 1960 Signed June 1960 Entered into force September 2015 Supplementary Agreement on the Environment, signed and entered into force January 2017 Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component, signed and entered into force	Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983 Established the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006	Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in October 1996 Signed in April 1998 and revised in September 1999 Signed in February 2004 and revised in July 2004 Signed in September 2016 and entered into force in April 2017	Signed and entered into force in August 2007
 Australia	Signed memorandum in September 2003 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security in March 2007 Revised memorandum in December 2008 New Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security in October 2022	Signed Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement in January 2022	Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in December 2014	Signed in May 2010 Entered into force in January 2013 Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in September 2017	Signed in May 2012 Entered into force in March 2013
 India	Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security in October 2008 Signed memorandum in September 2014		Signed in December 2015 Entered into force in March 2016	Signed in September 2020 Entered into force in July 2021	Signed and entered into force in December 2015
 Indonesia	Signed memorandum in March 2015		Signed and entered into force in March 2021	—	—
 Viet Nam	October 2011 Memorandum signed (defense cooperation and exchanges) September 2015 Memorandum signed (PKO field) April 2018 Japan-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement signed May 2019 Memorandum signed (cooperation between defense and industry) November 2021 Memorandum signed (cyber field) November 2021 Memorandum signed (medical care field)		Signed and entered into force in September 2021	—	—
 The Philippines	Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015		Signed in February 2016 Entered into force in April 2016	—	—
 Thailand	Signed memorandum in November 2019		Signed and entered into force in May 2022	—	—
 Laos	Signed memorandum in October 2019		—	—	—
 Malaysia	Signed memorandum in September 2018		Signed and entered into force in April 2018	—	—
 Republic of Korea	Signed statement of intent in April 2009		—	Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011	Signed and entered into force in November 2016
 United Kingdom	Signed memorandum in January 2004 Revised memorandum in June 2012 Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security in August 2017	Signed Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement in January 2023	Signed and entered into force in July 2013	Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in August 2017	Signed in July 2013 Entered into force in January 2014 Signed amending protocol in October 2014 Entered into force amending protocol in April 2015
 France	Signed statement of intent in July 2014		Signed in March 2015 Entered into force in December 2016	Signed in July 2018 Entered into force in June 2019	Signed and entered into force in October 2011
 Canada	Japan-Canada Joint Declaration on Political, Peace and Security Cooperation in November 2010		—	Signed in April 2018 Entered into force in July 2019	Concurred to begin formal negotiations for an information security agreement at the Japan-Canada Foreign Ministers' Meeting in October 2022
 New Zealand	Signed memorandum in August 2013		—	Agreed to consider at the Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014	Concurred to begin formal negotiations for an information security agreement at the Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in April 2022
 NATO	Announced: Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between Japan and NATO in May 2014		—	—	Signed and entered into force in June 2010
 Germany	—		Signed and entered into force in July 2017	Concurred to seek a legal framework facilitating joint activities of the SDF and the Bundeswehr at the Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting in March 2023	Signed and entered into force in March 2021

	Security and Defense Cooperation Documents	Status of Forces Agreement/ Reciprocal Access Agreement	Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement	Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	Information Security Agreement
 Italy	Signed statement of intent in June 2012 Signed memorandum in May 2017		Signed in May 2017 Entered into force in April 2019	—	Signed in March 2016 Entered into force in June 2016
 Sweden	Signed memorandum in December 2013		Signed and entered into force in December 2022		
 Russia	Signed memorandum in August 1999 Revised memorandum in January 2006		—	—	—
 Ukraine	Signed memorandum in October 2018				Agreed to begin coordination for concluding an information security agreement at the Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting in March 2023
 UAE	Signed memorandum in May 2018		—	—	—
 Brazil	Signed memorandum in December 2020		—	—	—

Notes: Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Czech, Finland, Oman, Israel, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Poland, and Brunei, and signed statement of intent with Turkey

Reference 41 International Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2022)

(Number of students)

Country Institution	(Number of students)																	
	United States	Australia	India	Indonesia	Vietnam	The Philippines	Thailand	Cambodia	Myanmar	Laos	Malaysia	Timor-Leste	Republic of Korea	Mongolia	France	Germany	Pakistan	Sub total
National Institute for Defense Studies	2	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	7
National Defense Academy	8	—	—	4	11	2	4	2	3	1	1	1	2	2	6	—	—	47
Ground Self-Defense Force (Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc.)	2	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	3	12
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	—	2	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	6
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1	1	1	1	1	12	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	23
Joint Staff College	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	1	9
Total	13	7	5	6	12	14	7	2	4	1	2	1	11	4	6	1	6	104

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sep. 2019	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force
	Oct. 2019	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Oct. 2019	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Nov. 2019	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
		☆2019 Japan-Australia Defence Ministers Kono/Reynolds joint statement on advancing defence cooperation
	Nov. 2019	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Apr. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	May 2020	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	May 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force
	Jul. 2020	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army
	Aug. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy
	Aug. 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force
	Oct. 2020	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Oct. 2020	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
		☆2020 Japan-Australia Defense Ministers Joint Statement on Advancing Defence Cooperation
	Oct. 2020	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force
	Dec. 2020	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army
	Apr. 2021	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army
	May 2021	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jun. 2021	Ninth Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) (VTC)
	Jun. 2021	Video teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force
	Nov. 2021	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Army
	Jan. 2022	☆Signing of Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement
	Jan. 2022	Teleconference between the Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Feb. 2022	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2022	Teleconference between the Defense Ministers of Japan and Australia
	Feb. 2022	Teleconference between the Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Feb. 2022	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Hawaii)
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and the Australian Chief of the Defence Force (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (U.S.)
	Apr. 2022	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy
	May 2022	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (IP22)
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Brussels, NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (VTC)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS; Australian Chief of the Defence Force; and Australian Chief of Joint Operations (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Video Teleconference between the GSDF Chief of Staff and the Australian Chief of Army
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (U.K)
Aug. 2022	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference	
Aug. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy	
Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Australia)	
Oct. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Japan)	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (WPNS)	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Malabar KLE)	
Dec. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of Joint Operations (Japan)	
Dec. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Japan)	
Dec. 2022	Tenth Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	
Feb. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Australia)	
Feb. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army	
Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)	
Mar. 2023	Japan-Australia Vice Minister’s Meeting (Canberra)	
Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Japan)	
Mar. 2023	Official visit by MSDF Chief of Staff	

Regular discussions between defense authorities	May 2019	Japan-Australia Military-Military Dialogue (MM) (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2021	Japan-Australia Military-Military Dialogue (MM) (VTC)
	Jul. 2022	Japan-Australia Military-Military Dialogue (MM) (Canberra)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Sep.-Oct. 2019	Visit to Komatsu Air Base by the Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A and a unit-to-unit exchange by refueling and transport aircraft units (sister squadron exchange)
	Nov. 2019	Visit to the Air Defense Command Headquarters by Australian Chief of Joint Operations
	Jan. 2020	Dispatch of ASDF C-130 to Australia (International Disaster Relief Activities)
	Mar. 2022	Unit-to-unit exchanges coinciding with a visit to Japan by the Royal Australian Air Force P-8As
	Aug. 2022	Unit-to-unit exchanges coinciding with a visit to Australia by the Ground Component Command Headquarters
	Sep. 2022	Royal Australian Air Force exercise (Pitch Black 22) ASDF F-2 × 6, Royal Australian Air Force F-35 × 10, E/A-18G × 10, KC-30 × 1
	Jan. 2023	Participation by the head of the Australian Defence Force Parachuting School in New Year's Jump 2023 by 1st Airborne Brigade
Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation (See reference 46 for training and exercise)	Mar. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral ISR Exchange ASDF RC-2, MSDF EP-3, OP-3C, U.S. Air Force RC-135, Royal Australian Air Force P-8A
	May 2019	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Jun. 2019	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2019	6th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (Chief of Staff)
	Aug. 2019	7th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leader Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Jul. 2020	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Sep. 2020	8th Trilateral Senior Leaders Seminar (VTC) (Chief of Staff, GSDF)
	Jul. 2021	9th Trilateral Senior Leaders Seminar (VTC) (Chief of Staff, GSDF)
	Feb. 2022	Trilateral navy-to-navy conversation between Japan, Australia, and the United States (Hawaii) (Chief of Staff, MSDF)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2022	10th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leaders Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Oct. 2022	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)
Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS; Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)	

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)
Japan-Australia field exercise	Aug. 2022	Australia	Special Operations Group	—	Special Operations Command

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)
Japan-Australia bilateral navigation training	May 20-22, 2019	Waters south of Honshu through surrounding Guam	Destroyers JS "Ariake," JS "Asahi"	Two vessels	Frigates HMAS "Melbourne," and HMAS "Parramatta"
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident)	Sep. 17-29, 2019 Oct. 15-23, 2019	Waters and airspace south of Kanto through west of Kyushu via surrounding Okinawa	Destroyers JS "Harusame," JS "Teruzuki," JS "Asahi," and JS "Atago," Underway Replenishment Ship JS "Mashu," fixed-wing patrol aircraft	Approx. 6 vessels Aircraft	Vessel and submarine
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Sep. 13-17, 2020	South China Sea	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Ikazuchi"	Two vessels	Destroyer HMAS "Hobart," Replenishment Vessel HMAS "Sirius"
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Nov. 12, 2020	Waters and airspace west of Kyushu	Destroyer JS "Shimakaze"	One vessel	Frigate HMAS "Arunta"
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Mar. 29-31, 2021	South China Sea	Destroyer JS "Akebono"	One vessel	Frigate HMAS "Anzac"
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Jun. 2, 2021	South of Kanto	Destroyer JS "Murasame"	One vessel	Frigate HMAS "Ballarat"
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Sep. 18, 2021	North of Australia	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Murasame"	Two vessels	Patrol boat HMAS "Maitland"
Japan-Australia bilateral exercises (Nichi-Gou Trident)	Nov. 10-12, 2021	South of Shikoku	Destroyer JS "Inazuma"	One vessel	Frigate HMAS "Warramunga"
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Mar. 5, 2022	Bay of Bengal	Destroyer JS "Yudachi"	One vessel	Frigate HMAS "Arunta"

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Bushido Guardian 19)	Sep. 11-Oct. 8, 2019	Chitose Air Base, Misawa Air Base and their surrounding airspace	Air Defense Command	F-15 × 10 F-2 × 3	F/A-18A/B fighters × 7 KC-30 aerial tanker × 1 C-17 transport aircraft × 1 C-130J transport aircraft × 1 Approx. 150 personnel
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Mar. 28-30, 2022	Airspace above the Pacific Ocean, east of Kanto	Air Tactics Development Wing	RC-2 × 1	P-8A × 1

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 43 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

[India]

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2019	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2019	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Oct. 2019	Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2019	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus))
	Nov. 2019	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting, 1st Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (Delhi)
	Dec. 2019	Visit to Japan by Indian Army Chief
	Jan. 2020	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jan. 2020	Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS (Raisina Dialogue)
	Feb. 2020	Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Apr. 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief
	May 2020	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Aug. 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief
	Sep. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief
	Sep. 2020	☆Signing of the Japan-India Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (Japan-India ACSA), entered into force (Jul. 2021)
	Sep. 2020	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
	Sep. 2020	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief
	Nov. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Indian Chief of Defence Staff
	Dec. 2020	Visit to India by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Dec. 2020	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2021	Teleconference for Air Chiefs hosted by Indian Air Force (Aero India) (VTC)
	Mar. 2021	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
	Apr. 2021	Chief of Staff, JS participates in the Raisina Dialogue (VTC)
	Jun. 2021	Video teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief
	Jun. 2021	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
	Sep. 2021	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief ((Newport, U.S.) International Seapower Symposium)
	Oct. 2021	Video teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief
	Feb. 2022	Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2022	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and the Indian Chief of Integrated Defense Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (New Delhi, (Raisina Dialogue))
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Indian Chief of Eastern Naval Command ((Sydney, Australia), IP22)
	May 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief (Tokyo)
	May 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief
	Jun. 2022	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and the Indian Chief of Integrated Defense Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))	
Jul. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief	
Sep. 2022	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting, 2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (Tokyo)	
Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and India Air Chief (Washington D.C. (International Air Chiefs Conference hosted by the U.S.))	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief (WPNS)	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief (Malabar KLE)	
Mar. 2023	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief	
Mar. 2023	Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS, meeting with Indian Chief of Defence Staff (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)	

Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Apr. 2019	Exchange between fighter pilots (ASDF)
	Jun. 2019	Exchange between fighter pilots (ASDF)
	Sep. 2019	Exchange between the Indian Air Force and air defense-related units, etc. (ASDF)
	Oct. 2020	Exchange between Japanese and Indian helicopter units on salt damage countermeasures (VTC) (ASDF)
	Mar. 2023	Exchange between rotary-wing aircraft pilots (ASDF)
	Mar. 2023	Exchange between intelligence officials (ASDF)

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)
Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in India (Dharma Guardian 19)	Oct. 15- Nov. 5, 2019	Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (Mizoram, India) and its surrounding area	Fifth Company, 34th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division	Approx. 30 personnel	Approx. 30 personnel
Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in India (Dharma Guardian 21)	Feb. 27- Mar. 10, 2022	Commando Training Center Belgaum and its surrounding area, Karnataka, India	30th Infantry Regiment, 12th Division	Totaling Approx. 40 personnel	Approx. 40 personnel
Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in Japan (Dharma Guardian 22)	Feb. 17- Mar. 2, 2023	Aibano Maneuver Area, etc.	36th Infantry Regiment	—	5th Infantry Battalion

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)
Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy	Apr. 24, 2019	Waters and airspace off the coast of Goa (India)	5th Air Patrol Squadron	P-3C × 1	1 Submarine P-8I × 1
Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy	Apr. 28, 2019	Visakhapatnam Port (India) and its surrounding waters	32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Samidare," Escort Division 4	One vessel	Destroyer INS "Rajput"
Japan-India bilateral exercise	May 23-24, 2019	Waters and airspace north of Sumatera (Andaman Sea)	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame"	Two vessels	Frigate INS "Sahyadri"
Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy	Dec. 23, 2019	Waters and airspace surrounding Mumbai Port (India)	34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Sazanami"	One vessel	Frigate INS "Tarkash," submarine
Japan-India goodwill exercise	Jun. 27, 2020	Indian Ocean	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimayuki"	Two vessels	Destroyer INS "Rana," Corvette INS "Kulish"
Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX 2020)	Sep. 26-28, 2020	Waters and airspace west of India	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Ikazuchi"	Two vessels	Destroyer INS "Chennai," Frigate INS "Tarkash," Fleet tanker INS "Deepak," Aircraft
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Jun 13 2021	Indian Ocean	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Setoyuki"	Two vessels	Corvette INS "Kulish"
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Jun 29 2021	East China Sea	Replenishment ship JS "Hamana"	One vessel	Corvette INS "Kiitan"
Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX 2021)	Oct 6-8, 2021	West of India	Destroyers JS "Kaga," "Murasame"	Two vessels	Destroyer INS "Kochi" Frigate INS "Teg" MiG29K, P-8I, etc.
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Jan 13, 2022	Bay of Bengal	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Two vessels	Frigate INS "Shivalik" Corvette INS "Kadmatt"
Japan-India bilateral exercise	May 23, 2022	Arabian Sea	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Replenishment vessel INS "Aditya"
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Jul. 23, 2022	Indian Ocean	Destroyer JS "Samidare"	One vessel	Patrol vessel INS "Sukanya"
Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX 2022)	Sep. 11-17, 2022	From Andaman Sea to Bay of Bengal	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	Two vessels	Destroyer INS "Ranvijay," Frigate INS "Sahyadri," Corvettes INS "Kadmatt," INS "Kavaratti," Patrol vessel INS "Sukanya," Fleet tanker INS "Jyoti," Submarines, P-8I, MiG29K, DORNIER-228, etc.
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Oct. 29-30, 2022	East of Okinawa	Replenishment ship JS "Hamana"	One vessel	Frigate INS "Shivalik," Anti-submarine corvette INS "Kamorta"

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)
Japan-India bilateral exercise (Shinyuu Maitri 2019)	Oct. 15-25, 2019	Arjan Singh Air Force Station, West Bengal, India	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, etc.	C-130H × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	C-130J, etc.
Bilateral fighter exercise with the Indian Air Force (Veer Guardian 23)	Jan. 16-26, 2023	Hyakuri Air Base and its surrounding airspace and Iruma Air Base	7th Air Wing, Air Tactics Development Wing, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-2 × 4, F-15 × 4	Approx. 150 personnel Su-30MKI × 4 C-17 × 2 (only for transportation during deployment and withdrawal) IL-78 × 1 (only for support during deployment and withdrawal)
Bilateral transport aircraft exercise with the Indian Air Force (Shinyuu Maitri 23)	March 1-2, 2023	Komatsu Air Base and its surrounding airspace	3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	C-2 × 1, around 10 personnel	C-17×1 Approx. 10 personnel

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
 3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
 4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

[United Kingdom]

High-level talks, etc.	Jul. 2019	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Sep. 2019	Visit to Japan by U.K. Parliamentary Under Secretary
	Nov. 2019	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jan. 2020	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Apr. 2020	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	May 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and U.K. Air Chief
	Jul. 2020	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	Sep. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff
	Jan. 2021	Japan-UK Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Feb. 2021	4th Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) (VTC)
	Mar. 2021	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff
	Mar. 2021	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jun. 2021	Video teleconference between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and U.K. Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence
	Jul. 2021	Visit to Japan by U.K. Defence Secretary
	Jul. 2021	Visit to Japan by First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff
	Jul. 2021	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force
	Jul. 2021	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the British Army
	Jul. 2021	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Second Sea Lord and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Singapore)
	Jul. 2021	Video teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	Aug. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force ((Colorado Springs, U.S.) Space Symposium)
	Sep. 2021	Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State (Minister for Defence Procurement)
	Oct. 2021	Video teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	Oct. 2021	Video teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	Jan. 2022	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the British Army
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Director of the Space Directorate of the U.K. Ministry of Defence (Tokyo)
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (Brussels, NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting)
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff of the U.K. ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	Jul. 2022	Visit to the U.K. by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jul. 2022	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Oct. 2022	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff of the U.K. (WPNS)	
Feb. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and U.K. Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence	
Mar. 2023	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	
Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force	
Mar. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff	
Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and U.K. Space Command Commander (DSEI)	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Sep. 2020	18th Japan-U.K. Politico-Military Dialogue (VTC)
	Oct. 2020	14th Japan-U.K. Military-Military Dialogue (VTC)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Dec. 2019	Japan-U.K. Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Coningsby) (ASDF)
	Feb. 2023	Japan-U.K. Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Coningsby) (ASDF)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)
Japan-U.K. Joint Training Against Piracy	Aug. 29, 2020	Western waters of the northern Arabian Sea	Destroyer JS "Onami"	One vessel	Frigate HMS "Argyll"
Bilateral Exercises with U.K. Aircraft Carrier Strike Group	Nov. 11, 2021	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Yugiri"	One vessel	Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Destroyers HMS "Diamond," HMS "Defender," Replenishment ships RFA "Fort Victoria," RFA "Tidespring"

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)
Field exercise with the U.K. Army in the United Kingdom (Vigilant Isles 19)	Sep. 29-Oct. 24, 2019	Garelochhead Training Camp, Strone Camp and area around the Loch Ewe (the U.K.)	[JSDF] Fuji School, etc. [British Armed Forces] Honourable Artillery Company, 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade	Approx. 20 personnel	Approx. 30 personnel
Field exercise with the U.K. Army (Vigilant Isles 22)	Nov. 22-30, 2022	Soumagahara Maneuver Area, Shirakawanunobikiyama Maneuver Area, Misawa ATG Range, GSDF Fuji School	1st Airborne Brigade	—	1st Regiment Royal Horse Artillery

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Oct. 18, 2019	Waters and airspace south of Kanto	Destroyer JS "Teruzuki"	One vessel	Survey vessel HMS "Enterprise"
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Sep. 14-15, 2021	Area surrounding Japan	Submarines	One vessel	Submarines
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Jun. 20, 2022	Atlantic Ocean (English Channel)	Training ships JS "Kashima," "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Offshore patrol vessel HMS "Mersey," Survey vessel HMS "Enterprise"
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Jun. 26, 2022	Atlantic Ocean (English Channel)	Training ships JS "Kashima," "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Offshore patrol vessel HMS "Severn"

[France]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2019	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the French Army
	Nov. 2019	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manama (15th Manama Dialogue))
	Jan. 2020	Visit to France by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2020	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich (56th Munich Security Conference))
	Apr. 2020	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jun. 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force
	Jul. 2020	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and French Chief of the Defence Staff
	Oct. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy
	Nov. 2020	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the French Navy
	Dec. 2020	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the French Army Staff
	Jan. 2021	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	May 2021	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army
	May 2021	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy
	May 2021	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force
	Jul. 2021	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (Singapore)
	Aug. 2021	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army
	Oct. 2021	Video teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and French Chief of the Defence Staff
	Nov. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force (Dubai)
	Jan. 2022	Sixth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (VTC)
	Feb. 2022	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff of French Air and Space Force, and Commander of the French Space Command (Space Symposium held by the U.S.)
	May 2022	Visit to France by Chief of Staff, JS
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force (International Air Chiefs Conference held by the U.S.)
	Sep. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (WPNS)
	Jan. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army
	Jan. 2023	Visit to France by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense

Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2020 Oct. 2021 Oct. 2021 Nov. 2022	22nd Japan-France Politico-Military Dialogue (VTC) 23rd Japan-France Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo) 19th Japan-France Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo) 20th Japan-France Military to Military Dialogue (Paris)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jun. 2019 Jun. 2019	Dispatch of MSDF P-1 to France (participation in International Paris Air Show) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to France (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges, and participation in Paris Air Show)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (France)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Air Force	Jan. 27, 2020	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Aircraft "PUMA"
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy	Feb. 21, 2020	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Frigate FS "FORBIN"
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy	Mar. 18, 2020	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Amphibious Assault Ship FS "Mistral"
Bilateral exercise with a French aircraft carrier strike group	Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 2023	Western Gulf of Aden and northern Arabian Sea	Destroyer JS "Suzutsuki"	One vessel	Aircraft carrier FS "Charles de Gaulle," Destroyers FS "Forbin," FS "Provence," Replenishment vessel FS "Marne"

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (France)
Bilateral exercise with the French Navy	Apr. 14, 2019	Waters and airspace west of Kyushu	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Frigate FS "Vendémiaire"
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise	May 4, 2021	Area surrounding Okinawa	Underway Replenishment ship JS "Masyu"	One vessel	Frigate FS "Surcorf"
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny)	Sep. 17, 2021	Area surrounding New Caledonia	Destroyer JS "Shiranui"	One vessel	Patrol aircraft
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny)	Mar. 17, 2022	East China Sea	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Frigate FS "Vendémiaire"
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-2)	May 25, 2022	Arabian Sea	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Multipurpose support vessel FS "Loire"
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-3)	Jun. 14, 2022	Mediterranean Sea (off the coast of Toulon)	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Frigate FS "Auvergne"
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-4)	Jun. 27, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	Two vessels	Frigate FS "Prairial"
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-5)	Aug. 25-26, 2022	Area surrounding New Caledonia	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Patrol vessel FS "D'Entrecasteaux," patrol aircraft Falcon 200, etc.

[Germany]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by German Parliamentary State Secretary
	Nov. 2019	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2020	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich (56th Munich Security Conference))
	Apr. 2020	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Oct. 2020	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and German Inspector of the Army
	Nov. 2020	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Nov. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and German Inspector of the Navy
	Dec. 2020	Japan-Germany Ministerial Forum (VTC)
	Feb. 2021	Video Teleconference between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and German Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Defence
	Mar. 2021	☆ Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Germany concerning the Security of Information
	Apr. 2021	1st Japan-Germany Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) (VTC)
	Jun. 2021	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Nov. 2021	Visit to Japan by German Inspector General of the Bundeswehr
	Nov. 2021	Visit to Japan by Inspector of the German Navy
	Nov. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force (Dubai)
	Nov. 2021	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Army
	Jan. 2022	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Army
	Mar. 2022	Video Teleconference between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and German State Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Defense
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and German Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (Brussels (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	May 2022	2nd Japan-Germany Defense Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2022	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force
	Jun. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Navy
	Jul. 2022	Visit to Germany by GSDF Chief of Staff
Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force	
Nov. 2022	2nd Japan-Germany Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) (Hybrid)	
Feb. 2023	3rd Japan-Germany Defense Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Munich (59th Munich Security Conference))	
Mar. 2023	Visit to Germany by Chief of Staff, JS	
Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force	
Mar. 2023	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo (Japan-Germany Inter-Governmental Consultations))	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Nov. 2019	17th Japan-Germany Political Director Level Politico-Military Dialogue, 14th Japan-Germany Military to Military Dialogue (Berlin)
	Jun. 2021	18th Japan-Germany Political Director Level Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo), 15th Japan-Germany Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2021	16th Japan-Germany Military to Military Dialogue (VTC)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (German)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the German Navy	Aug. 29, 2021	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS “Yugiri”	One vessel	Frigate “Bayern”
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the German Navy	Jan. 29, 2022	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS “Yudachi”	One vessel	Frigate “Bayern”

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (German)
Japan-Germany Bilateral Exercise	Sep. 24, 2021	Eastern Indian Ocean	Destroyers JS “Kaga,” JS “Murasame”	Two vessels	Frigate “Bayern”
Japan-Germany Bilateral Exercise	Nov. 4-5, 2021	South of Kanto	Destroyer JS “Samidare”	One vessel	Frigate “Bayern”
Japan-Germany Bilateral Exercise	Dec. 13, 2021	South of Okinawa	Destroyer JS “Yugiri”	One vessel	Frigate “Bayern”
Japan-Germany Bilateral Exercise	Jan. 29, 2022	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS “Yudachi”	One vessel	Frigate “Bayern”

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (German)
Bilateral exercise with the German Air Force	Sep. 28, 2022	Airspace on the deployment route	7th Air Wing	F-2×3	Eurofighter 2000×3

[The Netherlands]

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2021	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy ((Newport, U.S.) International Seapower Symposium)
	Oct. 2021	Video teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces
	Nov. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (Dubai)
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (Brussels (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (U.K. Royal International Air Tattoo)
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy ((Venice, Italy) RSS)

[NATO]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Apr. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Nov. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Apr. 2021	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Oct. 2021	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	May 2022	NATO visit by Chief of Staff, JS
	Jun. 2022	Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples (Naples, Italy)
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between State Minister of Defense and NATO Deputy Secretary General (Brussels (1st EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum))
Mar. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2020	16th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultations (VTC)
	Dec. 2022	17th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultations (Tokyo)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)
NATO cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition 2019)	Dec. 2019	Estonia, Japan	Japan (Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command), NATO member countries/partner countries, EU	Approx. 20 personnel
NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise (Locked Shields 2021)	Apr. 2021	Estonia, Japan	Japan (Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command), Approx. 30 countries including NATO member countries	Approx. 30 personnel (Including participants other than those from the MOD/SDF.)
NATO cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition 2022)	Nov.-Dec. 2022	Estonia, Japan	Japan (Joint Staff, etc.), NATO member countries/partner countries, EU, etc.	7 personnel
NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise (Locked Shields 2022)	Apr. 2022	Estonia, Japan	Japan (Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, GSDF C5 Command, MSDF Communications Command, ASDF Operations Support Wing, ASDF Air Communications and Systems Wing, SDF Cyber Defense Command), Approx. 30 countries including NATO member countries	Approx. 70 personnel (Including participants other than those from the MOD/SDF.)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (NATO)
Japan-NATO bilateral exercise	Jun. 6, 2022	Mediterranean Sea	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Frigates ITNS "Carlo Margottini," TNS "Salihreis"

[Ukraine]

High-level talks, etc.	Feb. 2020	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich (56th Munich Security Conference))
	Mar. 2021	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Mar. 2022	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Apr. 2022	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Mar. 2023	Japan-Ukraine State Minister of Defense Meeting (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Sep. 2019	1st Japan-Ukraine Military-Military Dialogue (Kiev)

[Austria]

High-level talks, etc.	Feb. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Secretary General of the Federal Ministry of Defense (Tokyo)
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[Poland]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2020	Teleconference between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Polish Vice-Minister of National Defense
	Feb. 2022	Japan-Poland Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Feb. 2022	☆ Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland on Cooperation and Exchange in the field of Defence
	Mar. 2022	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (Brussels, NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting)
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Minister - Secretary of State of Poland (Warsaw Security Forum)
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Poland by Chief of Staff, JS

[Czech]

High-level talks, etc.	Jan. 2023	Japan-Czech Republic State Ministers of Defense Meeting (Prague)
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[EU]

High-level talks, etc.	Feb. 2020	Meeting between Minister of Defense and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Munich (56th Munich Security Conference))
	Jun. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of EU Military Committee
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of EU Military Committee (Brussels, NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting)
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs of the European External Action Service
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of Operation Atalanta of the EU Naval Force Somalia (including signing ceremony for the Administrative Arrangement concerning the Japan-EU joint anti-piracy exercises)
	Mar. 2023	Attendance by State Minister of Defense at the 1st EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum (speech in the plenary session)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Mar. 2023	Meeting between State Minister of Defense and Secretary General of the European External Action Service (Brussels (1st EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum))
	Jan. 2020	2nd Japan-EU Security and Defense Talk (Tokyo)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (EU)
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Jan. 18, 2020	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Frigate SPS "VICTORIA"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Feb. 7-8 2020	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Frigate SPS "VICTORIA"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Jun. 12, 2020	Waters west of the Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Onami"	One vessel	Frigate SPS "NUMANCIA"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Jun. 21, 2020	Waters west of the Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Onami"	One vessel	Frigate SPS "SANTA MARI"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Feb. 19, 2021	Western waters of the northern Arabian Sea	Destroyer JS "Ariake"	One vessel	Landing platform dock SPS "CASTILLA"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Italy)	Sep. 14, 2021	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Yugiri"	One vessel	Frigate ITS "Federico Martinengo"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Oct. 16, 2021	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Yugiri"	One vessel	Frigate SPS "VICTORIA"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU (France)	Sep. 11, 2022	Northern Arabian Sea	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Frigate FS "GUEPRATTE"
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU (Spanish Air Force)	Nov. 4, 2022	Gulf of Aden	P-3C×1	One aircraft	P-3M×1

[Italy]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2019	☆ Entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Italy concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jan. 2020	Visit to Italy by ASDF Chief of Staff
	May 2020	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Aug. 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force
	Oct. 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force
	Aug. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force ((Colorado Springs, U.S.) Space Symposium)
	Oct. 2021	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force
	Mar. 2022	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Italian Air Force Air Education & Training Command ((Colorado Springs, U.S.) Space Symposium)
	Apr. 2022	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Italian Navy (RSS)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (U.K.)
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2022	Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2022	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Italy by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Mar. 2023	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	
Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (DSEI)	
Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Feb. 2020	6th Japan-Italy Military to Military Dialogue (Rome)
	Nov. 2022	7th Japan-Italy Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

[Spain]

High-level talks, etc.	Jan. 2023	Japan-Spain State Minister of Defense Meeting (Madrid)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2019	3rd Japan-Spain Military-Military Dialogue (Madrid)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Spain)
Bilateral exercise with the Spanish Navy	Oct. 25, 2022	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Frigate SPS "Numancia"

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Spain)
Japan-Spain Goodwill exercise	Feb. 26, 2021	Around Guam	Destroyer JS "Yugiri"	One vessel	Training vessel "Juan Sebastián de Elcano"
Japan-Spain Bilateral exercise	Jun. 16, 2022	Atlantic Ocean (west of the Strait of Gibraltar)	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Frigates SPS "Victoria," SPS "Almirante Juan de Borbón"

[Finland]

High-level talks, etc.	Aug. 2020	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Sep. 2022	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces
	Oct. 2022	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Sep. 2019	3rd Japan-Finland Military-Military Dialogue (Helsinki)
	Oct. 2022	4th Japan-Finland Military-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

[Denmark]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Japan-Denmark Defense Ministerial Teleconference
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[Sweden]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2022	Japan-Sweden State Ministers of Defense Meeting (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2022	☆ Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Sweden concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

[Lithuania]

High-level talks, etc.	Jul. 2022	1st Japan-Lithuania Military to Military Dialogue (Vilnius)
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[Slovenia]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))
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[Belgium]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Belgian Chief of Defence (Brussels, NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting)
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[Bulgaria]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Bulgarian Commander of the Navy ((Venice, Italy) RSS)
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[Romania]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Romanian Chief of the Naval Forces ((Venice, Italy) RSS)
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[Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Cooperation]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2023	Japan-U.K.-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting
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- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
 3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
 4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 45 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

High-level talks, etc.	Nov. 2019	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus))
	Sep. 2022	Japan-ROK Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Seoul (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation (See reference 58 for training and exercise)	May 2019	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Seoul)
	Jun. 2019	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2019	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Washington D.C.)
	Nov. 2019	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (VTC)
	Nov. 2019	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus))
	May 2020	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (VTC)
	Nov. 2020	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (VTC)
	Apr. 2021	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Hawaii)
	Oct. 2021	Japan-U.S.-ROK Director General Level Meeting (telephone)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Director General Level Meeting (telephone)
	Feb. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Director General Level Meeting (telephone)
	Feb. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Mar. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Hawaii)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Washington D.C.)
Nov. 2022	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of ROK Navy (Japan-U.S.-ROK (WPNS))	

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.

Reference 46 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Canada and New Zealand (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

[Canada]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Canada by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2020	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich (56th Munich Security Conference))
	Feb. 2020	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force
	May 2020	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jun. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces
	Nov. 2020	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Nov. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy
	Jan. 2021	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force
	Apr. 2021	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Aug. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Hawaii) Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium)
	Aug. 2021	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (Hawaii)
	Sep. 2021	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy ((Newport, U.S.) International Seapower Symposium)
	Nov. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Dubai)
	Dec. 2021	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Mar. 2022	5th Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (VTC)
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force ((Colorado Springs, U.S.) Space Symposium)
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces ((Brussels) NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force ((Washington, D.C.) International Air Chiefs Conference)	
Oct. 2022	Visit to Canada by Chief of Staff, JS (meeting with Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces)	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (WPNS)	
Mar. 2023	Online Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Dec. 2019	11th Japan-Canada Politico-Military Dialogue, 12th Japan-Canada Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2022	12th Japan-Canada Politico-Military Dialogue, 13th Japan-Canada Military to Military Dialogue (Ottawa)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jul. 2019	Visit to Komaki Air Base by Canadian CC-177 and exchanges between inflight refueling and airlift troops

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX19-1)	Jun. 13-15, 2019	Waters and airspace off the coast of Viet Nam (South China Sea)	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame," JS "Akebono"	Three vessels	Frigate HMCS "Regina" Motor Vessel HMCS "Asterix"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX19-2)	Oct. 16-17, 2019	Waters and airspace south of Kanto	Destroyers JS "Shimakaze," JS "Chokai"	Two vessels	Frigate HMCS "Ottawa"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise	Aug. 13, 2020	Waters and airspace around Hawaii	Destroyer JS "Ashigara"	One vessel	Frigate HMCS "Regina," HMCS "Winnipeg"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX20)	Nov. 17, 2020	Waters and airspace west of Kyushu	Destroyer JS "Shimakaze"	One vessel	Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX21)	Jan. 19, 2021	East China Sea	Destroyer JS "Jintsu"	One vessel	Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX22)	Sep. 21-23, 2022	Off the coast from Malaysia to Singapore	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	Two vessels	Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"

[New Zealand]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Aug. 2019	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force (Bangkok)
	Sep. 2019	Visit to Japan by New Zealand Army Commander
	Nov. 2019	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus))
	Nov. 2019	Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander
	May 2020	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Sep. 2020	Teleconference between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Secretary of Defence, New Zealand Ministry of Defence
	Dec. 2020	Teleconference between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Secretary of Defence, New Zealand Ministry of Defence
	Apr. 2021	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Dec. 2021	Teleconference between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and New Zealand Deputy Secretary for Defence Policy and Planning
	Jan. 2021	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and New Zealand Air Component Commander ((Washington, D.C.) International Air Chiefs Conference)
	May 2022	Visit to New Zealand by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (On the occasion of his visit to Japan for participation in PALS)
Jun. 2022	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))	
Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander Joint Forces of the New Zealand Defence Force (WPNS)	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Sep. 2019	12th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Wellington)
	Dec. 2020	13th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (VTC)
	Dec. 2021	14th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (VTC)
	Mar. 2023	15th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Nov. 2020	Exchange between MSDF personnel and patrol aircraft crews from the Royal New Zealand Air Force at the MSDF Kanoya Air Base

*See Reference 52 regarding multilateral exercises

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2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 47 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Member States (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

[Indonesia]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Vice-Defense Minister of Indonesia (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2019	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMMPlus))
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	May 2020	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Aug. 2020	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Sep. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces
	Nov. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy
	Nov. 2020	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Nov. 2020	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army
	Mar. 2021	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo (2nd Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2"))) ☆ Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Indonesia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Aug. 2021	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh (7th ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministerial Meeting))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
Aug. 2022	Visit to Indonesia by GSDF Chief of Staff	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy (WPNS)	
Dec. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force	
Feb. 2023	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Aug. 2019	9th Japan-Indonesia Military to Military Dialogue (Jakarta)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Indonesia)
Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy	May 10, 2019	Jakarta Port and its surrounding waters	32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Samidare," Escort Division 4	One vessel	Corvette KRI "Bung Tomo"
Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy	Oct. 6, 2020	South China Sea	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Ikazuchi"	Two vessels	Frigate KRI "John Lie," Corvette KRI "Sutanto"
Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy	Jun. 30, 2021	North of Surabaya	FY2021 Overseas Training Cruise/Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Setoyuki"	Two vessels	Frigate KRI "Gusti Ngurah Rai KRI-332"
Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy	Feb. 26, 2023	Area surrounding Bitung	Destroyer JS "Asagiri," Training ship JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Frigate KRI "Fatahillah"

[Vietnam]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2019	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)
	May 2019	☆ Memorandum between defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam regarding the future of promoting cooperation between defense and industry
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Deputy Minister of National Defence (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2019	Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs (Hanoi (7th Japan-Vietnam Deputy Secretary-level talks))
	Dec. 2019	Visit to Vietnam by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2020	Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
	Mar. 2020	Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Staff, JS
	Jun. 2020	Japan-Vietnam Deputy Secretary-level talks (VTC)
	Nov. 2020	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jun. 2021	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jul. 2021	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam
	Sep. 2021	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)
	Sep. 2021	☆ Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Vietnam concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Nov. 2021	Video Teleconference between Joint Staff Chief of Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam
	Nov. 2021	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) and Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice Minister of Defense (8th Japan-Vietnam Deputy Secretary-level talks)
	Nov. 2021	☆ Memorandum related to cooperation in the cybersecurity field
	Nov. 2021	☆ Memorandum related to cooperation in the medical care field
	May 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the Vietnam People's Navy ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh (7th ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministerial Meeting))
Jun. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of Air Defence-Air Force, Vietnam People's Army	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Vietnam People's Navy (WPNS)	
Feb. 2023	Visit to Vietnam by GSDF Chief of Staff	
Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Deputy-Minister of National Defence (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)), 9th Japan-Vietnam Deputy Secretary-level talks	

Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2019	7th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Oct. 2019 Mar. 2021 Sep. 2021	Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (ASDF) Dispatch of ASDF U-4, C-2, C-130H units to Vietnam (overseas flight training) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to Vietnam (overseas flight training)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Vietnam)
Goodwill exercise with the Vietnam People's Navy	Jun. 17, 2019	Off the coast of Cam Ranh	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame"	Two vessels	Corvette HQ-381
Goodwill exercise with the Vietnam People's Navy	Oct. 26, 2021	Off the coast of Haiphong	Destroyer JS "Shiranui"	One vessel	Patrol vessel No. 266
Goodwill exercise with the Vietnam People's Navy	Jun. 7, 2021	Off the coast of Cam Ranh	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Murasame"	Two vessels	Frigate "Dinh Tien Hoang"
Goodwill exercise with the Vietnam People's Navy	Feb. 26, 2022	Off the coast of Da Nang	Destroyer JS "Inazuma," Training ship JS "Hatakaze"	Two vessels	TT400TP HQ-277

[Singapore]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2019	Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2019	Visit to Singapore by Chief of Staff, JS (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2019	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus))
	Feb. 2020	Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	May 2020	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Aug. 2020	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore
	Sep. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy
	Nov. 2020	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Army
	Dec. 2020	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Apr. 2021	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy
	Jul. 2021	MSDF Chief of Staff's visit to Singapore (International Maritime Security Conference (IMSC))
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	May 2022	Meeting between the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Phnom Penh (ADSOM-Plus))
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2022	☆ Revision of the Memorandum on Defence Exchanges
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Air Force
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Seoul (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Venice, Italy) RSS)	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (WPNS)	
Nov. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and the Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Siem Reap, 9th ADMM-Plus)	
Feb. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Air Force	
May 2023	Visit to Singapore by the MSDF Chief of Staff (IMDEX2023)	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Nov. 2020	16th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Dialogue (Singapore)
	Apr. 2022	17th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2023	18th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jul. 2019	Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Paya Lebar) (ASDF)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Singapore)
Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise	Jun. 22, 2020	South China Sea	Training ship JS "Kashima," JS "Shimayuki"	Two vessels	Frigate RSS "Stalwart"
Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise	Mar. 6, 2022	Bay of Bengal	Destroyer JS "Yudachi"	One vessel	Frigate RSS "Tenacious"
Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise	Aug. 27, 2022	South of Kanto	Destroyer JS "Yamagiri"	One vessel	Frigate RSS "Intrepid"

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2019	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Philippine Defense Undersecretary (Bangkok)
	Apr. 2019	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2019	Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2019	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus))
	Nov. 2019	Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs (Manila (6th Japan-Philippines Deputy Secretary-level talks))
	Dec. 2019	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
	Apr. 2020	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	May 2020	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jul. 2020	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy
	Aug. 2020	Telephone talks between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army
	Oct. 2020	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Nov. 2020	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Jan. 2021	7th Japan-Philippines Deputy Secretary-level talks (VTC)
	Jun. 2021	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jun. 2021	Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army
	Sep. 2021	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy ((Newport, U.S.) International Seapower Symposium)
	Sep. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force ((Hawaii) Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium)
	Nov. 2021	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Jan. 2022	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Apr. 2022	1st Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2022	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy (Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	May 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Philippine Defense Undersecretary (Phnom Penh (ADSOM-Plus))
	Jun. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps (PALS)
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army
	Jul. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Representative of the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Nov. 2022	Conversation between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Dec. 2022	8th Japan-Philippines Deputy Secretary-level talks (Manila)
	Dec. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff, Chief of the Philippine Army, and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps (Japan-Philippines-United States Land Forces Chiefs Meeting)
Feb. 2023	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	
Feb. 2023	Conversation between the ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force	
Feb. 2023	☆ Signing of the Terms of Reference (TOR) between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in the Republic of the Philippines	
Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))	
Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Representative of the Philippine Defense Undersecretary (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2019	8th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2022	9th Japan-Philippines Military to Military Dialogue (Manila)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jul. 2019	Dispatch of ASDF C-1 to the Philippines (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)
	Jan. 2022	Visit by ASDF C130-H to the Philippines (overseas flight training)
	Dec. 2022	Unit-to-unit exchange with the dispatch of ASDF F-15

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Philippines)
U.S.-Philippines hosted exercise (Kamandag 21)	Sep. 28-Oct. 8, 2021	Republic of the Philippines	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade	—	(Philippine Marine Corps) Marine Battalion

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (the Philippines)
Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy	May 15, 2019	Waters and airspace east of Palawan Island	32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Samidare," Escort Division 4	One vessel	Submarine chaser BRP "Federico Martir" Islander 312 (fixed-wing)
Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy	Jun. 28, 2019	Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (Sulu Sea)	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame," JS "Akebono"	Three vessels	Landing dock ship BRP "Davao del Sur"
Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy	Sep. 26, 2019	Port of Subic (the Philippines) and its surrounding waters and airspace	33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Asagiri"	One vessel	Corvette BRP "Emilio Jacinto"
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise	Jul. 18, 2020	South China Sea	Destroyer JS "Teruzuki"	One vessel	C-90
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise	Jul. 11, 2021	Celebes Sea	Training Ships JS "Kashima" JS "Setoyuki"	Two vessels	Corvette BRP "Apolinario Mabini"
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise	Nov. 14, 2021	South China Sea	Destroyers JS "Kaga" JS "Murasame"	Two vessels	Frigate BRP "Jose Rizal"
Japan-Philippines Goodwill Exercise	Apr. 9, 2022	Off the coast of Subic	Destroyer JS "Suzutsuki"	One vessel	Frigate BRP "Jose Rizal"
Japan-Philippines Goodwill Exercise	Nov. 26, 2022	Area surrounding Subic	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Patrol vessel BRP "Conrado Yap"

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (the Philippines)
Bilateral Training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) with the Philippine Air Force	Jul. 5-8, 2021	Clark Air Base and surrounding aerial domains, Republic of the Philippines	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command C-130H	C-130H×1	—
Bilateral Training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) with the Philippine Air Force	Jun. 21-24, 2022	Clark Air Base, Colonel Ernesto Ravina Air Base and surrounding aerial domains, Republic of the Philippines	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	C-130H×1 Around 20 personnel	C-130H×1 Around 50 personnel

Note 1: Due to an incident with the Philippine Air Force directly prior, Philippine Air Force aircraft did not participate in the training.
2: For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 52

[Thailand]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2019	Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	May 2019	Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Air Force's visit to Japan
	Aug. 2019	Visit to Thailand by Chief of Staff, JS
	Sep. 2019	Visit to Thailand by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2019	Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus)) ☆Signing of the Memorandum of Arrangement between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense
	Mar. 2020	Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Mar. 2020	Visit to Thailand by Chief of Staff, JS
	Sep. 2020	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army
	May 2021	Japan-Thailand Defense Video Teleconference
	Jan. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy
	May 2022	☆Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Thailand concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	Jun. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant Ronnarong of the Royal Thai Marine Corps (PALS)
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy (WPNS)
Feb. 2023	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy	
Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Thai Deputy Minister of Defence (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))	

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Thailand)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Thai Navy	Jan. 6, 2020	Phuket Port (Thailand) and its surrounding waters and airspace	34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Sazanami"	One vessel	Patrol craft HTMS "Songkhla" S-76 Helicopter
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Thai Navy	Mar. 30, 2022	Off the coast of the Port of Thailand, Thailand	Over seas Training Cruise deployment unit JS "Suzutsuki"	One vessel	Patrol vessel HTMS "Tapi"

[Cambodia]

High-level talks, etc.	Jul. 2019	Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Feb. 2020	Visit to Cambodia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Sep. 2020	Telephone Talks between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army
	Jun. 2021	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Feb. 2022	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army
	Apr. 2022	Visit to Cambodia by Chief of Staff, JS
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh (7th ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministerial Meeting))
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Cambodia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Dec. 2019	5th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Dialogue, 6th Japan-Cambodia Military to Military Dialogue
	Dec. 2021	6th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Dialogue, 7th Japan-Cambodia Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2023	7th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Dialogue, 8th Japan-Cambodia Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Cambodia)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Cambodian Navy	Mar. 15, 2022	Maritime domains surrounding Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, Cambodia	Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment (IMED 21) Units, Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Two vessels	Royal Cambodian Navy
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Cambodian Navy	Mar. 28-30, 2023	Sihanoukville Autonomous Port and Ream Naval Base	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One Vessel	Personnel from Ream Naval Base

[Myanmar]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Myanmar Deputy Minister of Defense (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2019	Japan-Myanmar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok (6th ADMM-Plus))
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Nov. 2019	Japan-Myanmar unit-to-unit exchanges (Mingaladon) (ASDF)

[Laos]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Japan-Laos State Minister of Defense Meeting (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Oct. 2019	☆Signing of the Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defence of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Defense of Laos (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Jun. 2021	Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial video teleconference
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Mar. 2020	3rd Japan-Laos Security Dialogue (Vientiane)

[Malaysia]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Visit to Japan by Royal Malaysian Navy Chief
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Malaysia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (19th Doha Forum)
	Feb. 2020	Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Jul. 2020	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Sep. 2020	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Malaysian Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
	Apr. 2021	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial video teleconference
	Apr. 2021	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of Navy of the Royal Malaysian Navy
	Jul. 2021	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force
	Nov. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (Dubai)
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of Navy of the Royal Malaysian Navy (Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	Feb. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force
Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Malaysian Deputy Defence Minister (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))	
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2022	7th Japan-Malaysia Military to Military Dialogue (Kuala Lumpur)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Mar. 2021	Japan-Malaysia Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Malaysia) (ASDF)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Malaysia)
Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy	Apr. 18, 2019	Iyonada	Training Support Ship JS "Kurobe"	One vessel	Frigate KD "LEKIU"
Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy	May 29, 2019	Waters and airspace off the coast of Port Klang (Malaysia)	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame"	Two vessels	Frigate KD "LEKIU"
Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy	Sep. 20, 2019	Kuantan Port (Malaysia) and its surrounding waters	33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Asagiri"	One vessel	Guided missile boats KD "Handaran," KD "Ganyang," KD "Perdana"
Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy	Dec. 1, 2019	Maritime domains surrounding Penang, Malaysia	Indian Ocean area maritime training units JS "Bungo," JS "Takashima"	Two vessels	Corvette KD "Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil"
Goodwill exercise with the Malaysian Navy	Apr. 2, 2021	Aerial and maritime domains surrounding Port Klang, Malaysia	Over seas Training Cruise deployment unit JS "Akebono"	One vessel	Frigate HMAS "Ballarat"

[Brunei]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Tokyo (11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting))
	Mar. 2020	Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Jul. 2020	Japan-Brunei Deputy Secretary-level Consultation (telephone)
	May 2021	Japan-Brunei Defense Ministerial level Video Teleconference
	Dec. 2021	Japan-Brunei Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Brunei Ministerial-level Meeting (Phnom Penh (7th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of Royal Brunei Navy
	Feb. 2023	Japan-Brunei State Minister of Defense/Deputy Minister of Defence Meeting (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Apr. 2019	Japan-Brunei unit-to-unit exchanges (MSDF)
	Jan. 2020	Japan-Brunei unit-to-unit exchanges (MSDF)
	Dec. 2021	MSDF Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment units calling at port (Muara)
	Jan. 2022	Deployment of ASDF C-130s to Brunei (overseas flight training)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Brunei)
Bilateral exercise with the Royal Brunei Armed Forces	Apr. 26, 2019	Waters and airspace off the coast of Brunei	Air Patrol Squadron 5	P-3C × 1	1 aircraft (helicopter) (Air Force) One vessel (Navy)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Brunei Navy	Jun. 26, 2019	Waters and airspace off the coast of Muara	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame," JS "Akebono"	Three vessels	Patrol vessel KDB "Daruttagwa"
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Brunei Navy	Jun. 8, 2021	Waters and airspace off the coast of Muara	Training Squadron JS "Kashima," JS "Setoyuki"	Two vessels	Patrol vessel KDB "Daruttagwa," fast patrol boat KDB "Afiat"
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Brunei Navy	Dec. 27, 2021	Waters and airspace off the coast of Muara	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uruga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Two vessels	Patrol vessel KDB "Darulehsan"

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 48 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Asian Countries (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

[Sri Lanka]

High-level talks, etc.	Jul. 2019	Visit to Sri Lanka by State Minister of Defense
	Jul. 2019	☆ Memorandum concerning defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Sri Lankan Ministries of Defense signed
	Jul. 2021	Video Teleconference between Defense Minister of Japan and President Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka (has jurisdiction over the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Sri Lanka)
Bilateral exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy	Jan. 21, 2020	Waters and airspace west of Sri Lanka	Air Patrol Squadron 2	P-3C × 2	Fast Missile Vessel SLNS "Suranimila" High-Speed Patrol Boat "FAC-21"
Bilateral Exercise with the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (JA-LAN EX)	Sep. 24, 2020	Colombo Port and its surrounding waters and airspace	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Ikazuchi"	Two vessels	Patrol Vessel SLNS "Gajabahu"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Jun. 20, 2021	Colombo Port and its surrounding waters	Training Squadron JS "Kashima," JS "Setoyuki"	Two vessels	Patrol Vessel SLNS "Sagara"
Bilateral Exercise with the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (JA-LAN EX)	Oct. 4, 2021	Area surrounding Colombo	Destroyer JS "Kaga"	One vessel	Patrol Vessel SLNS "Sagara"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Jan. 18, 2022	Off the coast of Trincomalee	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Two vessels	Patrol Vessel SLNS "Sagara"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Feb. 28, 2022	Off the coast of Colombo	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Two vessels	Patrol vessel SLNS "Sindurala"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	May 21, 2022	Off the coast of Colombo	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Patrol vessel SLNS "Sayurala"

[Pakistan]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	☆ Memorandum concerning defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Pakistan Ministries of Defense signed
	Aug. 2020	Video Teleconference between Defense Minister and Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan (WPNS)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2019	7th Japan-Pakistan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation, 10th Japan-Pakistan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation (Islamabad)
	Jun. 2021	8th Japan-Pakistan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation, 11th Japan-Pakistan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation (VTC)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Nov. 2021	Unit-to-unit exchanges between Japan and Pakistan Air Forces (during participation in the Dubai Airshow)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Pakistan)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Pakistan Navy	Oct. 3, 2020	Gulf of Aden	36th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Onami"	One vessel	Frigate PNS "Zulfiquar"
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Pakistan Navy	Feb. 26 and Mar. 1, 2021	Western waters of the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden	37th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Ariake"	One vessel	Frigate PNS "Alamgir"

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Pakistan)
Japan-Pakistan Goodwill exercise	Jul. 10, 2021	Off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan	Destroyer JS "Yugiri," on-board aircraft (SH-60Js)	One vessel Aircraft	Frigate PNS "Alamgir" Z-9EC

[Mongolia]

High-level talks, etc.	Dec. 2019	Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2020	Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (Sydney)
	Nov. 2022	Visit to Japan by Commander of Air Force of the Mongolian Armed Forces
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Apr. 2019	5th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense and security authorities (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2019	5th Japan-Mongolia Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

[Kazakhstan]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2022	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan
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- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
 3. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 49 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

[Papua New Guinea]

High-level talks, etc.	Feb. 2020	Visit to Papua New Guinea by State Minister of Defense
	Jun. 2020	Japan-Papua New Guinea Defense Ministerial Teleconference

[Tonga]

High-level talks	Feb. 2020	Visit to Tonga by State Minister of Defense
	Aug. 2020	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2022	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Component Commander of the Tongan Maritime Force
	Jul. 2022	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Component Commander of the Tongan Maritime Force (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Tonga)
Japan-Tonga Goodwill exercise	Aug. 20, 22, 2022	Area surrounding Nuku'alofa	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Patrol vessel VOEA "Ngahau Siliva"

[Fiji]

High-level talks	Sep. 2019	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Fijian Navy
	Jan. 2020	Visit to Fiji by State Minister of Defense
	Aug. 2020	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Feb. 2022	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Fijian Navy (WPNS)
	Aug. 2019	Port call by the MSDF Training Squadron (implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Fiji)
Japan-Fiji Goodwill exercise	Aug. 15, 2022	Area surrounding Fiji	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Patrol vessel RFNS "Kikau"

[Solomon Islands]

High-level talks, etc.	Aug. 2022	Visit to the Solomon Islands by State Minister of Defense
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[Palau]

High-level talks, etc.	Aug. 2022	Visit to Palau by the State Minister of Defense
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Oct. 2019	Dispatch of ASDF U-4 to Palau (overseas flight training)
	Jan. 2023	Dispatch of ASDF U-4 to Palau (overseas flight training)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Palau)
Japan-Palau Goodwill exercise	Sep. 1, 2021	Area surrounding Palau	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Murasame," JS "Shiranui," on-board aircraft (SH-60Ks)	Two vessels Aircraft	Patrol vessel PSS "Kedam," PSS "Remerik II"
Japan-Palau Goodwill exercise	Mar. 6, 2022	Area surrounding Palau	Destroyer JS "Inazuma," Training ship JS "Hatakaze"	Two vessels	Patrol vessel PSS "Kedam"
Japan-Palau Goodwill exercise	Jul. 20-22, 2022	Area surrounding Palau	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Patrol vessel PSS "Kedam"

[Federated States of Micronesia]

Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Oct. 2019	Dispatch of ASDF U-4 to the Federated States of Micronesia (overseas flight training)
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Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Federated States of Micronesia)
Japan-Federated States of Micronesia Goodwill exercise	Jul. 29-31, 2022	Area surrounding the Federated States of Micronesia	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Operation Center, Federated States of Micronesia Border Control and Maritime Surveillance

[Republic of Vanuatu]

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Republic of Vanuatu)
Japan- Republic of Vanuatu Goodwill exercise	Sep. 13-16, 2021	Area surrounding Vanuatu	Destroyer JS "Shiranui"	One vessel	Operation Center, Vanuatu Police Force Maritime Wing
Japan- Republic of Vanuatu Goodwill exercise	Aug. 10, 2022	Area surrounding Vanuatu	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	One vessel	Operation Center, Vanuatu Police Force Maritime Wing

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Middle Eastern Countries (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

[UAE]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Visit to UAE by Chief of Staff, JS
	Oct. 2019	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Nov. 2019	Visit to UAE by ASDF Chief of Staff (Dubai Air and Space Show)
	Mar. 2020	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jun. 2020	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jul. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff, UAE Armed Forces
	Mar. 2021	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff, UAE Armed Forces
	Mar. 2021	Japan-United Arab Emirates Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Mar. 2021	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and UAE Chief of the Naval Staff
	Nov. 2021	Japan-United Arab Emirates Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Nov. 2021	Visit to UAE by ASDF Chief of Staff (Dubai Airshow)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Sep. 2022	3rd Japan-UAE Military to Military Dialogue (Abu Dhabi)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jun. 2019	Japan-UAE Unit-to-Unit Exchanges (ASDF)
	Nov. 2019	Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show)
	Nov. 2021	Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show)

[Israel]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Visit to Israel by Chief of Staff, JS
	Sep. 2019	☆ Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technologies between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel signed
	Jun. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander-in-Chief of the Israel Defense Forces
	Nov. 2021	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Israeli Air Force (Dubai)
	Mar. 2022	Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Israeli Air Force
	May 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Israeli Air Force (U.K.)
	Aug. 2022	Japan-Israel Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jan. 2021	2nd Japan-Israel Politico-Military Dialogue (VTC)
	Dec. 2022	6th Japan-Israel Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo), 3rd Japan-Israel Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

[Iran]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jan. 2020	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2021	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Apr. 2022	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference

[Egypt]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Visit to Egypt by Chief of Staff, JS
	Jun. 2020	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces

[Oman]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Meeting (Muscat)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman	May 2, 2019	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Asagiri"	One vessel	Patrol ship SNV "AL MABRUKAH"
PASSEX with the Royal Navy of Oman	Jun. 26, 2022	Muscat Port (Oman) and its surrounding waters	Destroyer JS "Samidare"	One vessel	Patrol ship "HKASAB"
PASSEX with the Royal Navy of Oman	Jan. 5, 2023	Waters east of Salalah, Oman	Destroyer JS "Suzutsuki"	One vessel	Corvette SNV "SADH"

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman	Sep. 1, 2019	Muscat Port (Oman) and its surrounding waters	Destroyer JS "Asagiri"	One vessel	Patrol Vessel SNV "Al Seeb"
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman	Dec. 21, 2019	Waters and airspace around Duqm Port (Oman)	Destroyer JS "Sazanami"	One vessel	Corvet SNV "Al Shamikh"

[Qatar]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2019	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2019	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Doha (19th Doha Forum))
	Oct. 2021	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces

[Saudi Arabia]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Sep. 2020	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2021	Teleconference between Minister of Defense and Deputy Minister of Defence, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (Sydney, Australia) IP22)

[Turkey]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2019	Visit to Japan by Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of General Staff, Turkish Armed Forces (Brussels (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Turkey)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Turkish Navy	Oct. 28, 2022	Gulf of Aden	Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Frigate TCG "Burgazada"

[Bahrain]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2019	Teleconference between Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force
	Nov. 2019	Meeting between Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force (Manama (15th Manama Dialogue))
	Aug. 2020	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff, Bahrain Defence Force
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2020	4th Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (VTC)

[Jordan]

High-level talks, etc.	Dec. 2019	Visit to Jordan by Minister of Defense (meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lieutenant General Yousef Huneiti)
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Jordan by the Chief of Staff, JS
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2019	1st Japan-Jordan Politico-Military Dialogue (Amman)
	Oct. 2020	2nd Japan-Jordan Politico-Military Dialogue (VTC)
	Nov. 2021	3rd Japan-Jordan Politico-Military Dialogue (VTC)
	Dec. 2022	4th Japan-Jordan Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
 3. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 51 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

[Brazil]

High-level talks, etc.	Jul. 2019	Visit to Japan by Brazilian Army Commander
	Dec. 2020	Japan-Brazil Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference ☆Signing of the Japan-Brazil Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

[Others]

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2019	Visit to Djibouti by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Jamaica Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2019	Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Meeting (Djibouti)
	May 2022	Visit to Djibouti by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	May 2022	Visit to Djibouti by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of the Bangladesh Navy ((Sydney, Australia) IP22)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Principal Staff Officer of the Armed Forces Division of Bangladesh (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Colombian Navy (WPNS)
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy (WPNS)
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and General Commander of the Peruvian Navy (WPNS)
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff, Bangladesh Navy (WPNS)
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Djibouti by Chief of Staff, JS

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Maldives)
Goodwill exercise with the Maldives National Defence Force	Apr. 25, 2019	Port of Male (Maldives) and its surrounding waters	32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement; Destroyer JS "Samidare," Escort Division 4	One vessel	Maldivian Coast Guard ship "Huravee"
Goodwill exercise with the Maldives National Defence Force	Jul. 22, 2019	Waters and Airspace east of Maldives	Air Patrol Squadron 2	P-3C × 1	Maldivian Coast Guard ship "Shaheed Ali"
Goodwill exercise with the Bangladesh Navy	Oct. 8, 2019	Chattogram (People's Republic of Bangladesh) and its surrounding waters	Minesweeper Tender JS "Bungo," Minesweeper Coastal JS "Takashima," Minesweeper Division 3	Two vessels	Corvette BNS "Prottoy" Patrol Craft BNS "Durjoy"
Goodwill exercise with the Peruvian Navy	Nov. 27, 2021	East China Sea	Destroyer JS "Abukuma"	One vessel	Corvette BAP "Guise"
Japan-Bangladesh Goodwill exercise	Jan. 10-11, 2022	Area surrounding Chattogram	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Two vessels	Frigate BNS "Prottasha," Missile boat BNS "Nirmul"
Japan-Djibouti Goodwill exercise	May 31, 2022	Gulf of Aden	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Patrol vessels DBNS "Captain Elmi Robleh," DBNS "Adjutant Ali M. Houmed"
Japan-Colombia Goodwill exercise	Jul. 17, 2022	Caribbean Sea	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Two vessels	Frigates ARC "Antioquia," ARC "Caldas"
Japan-Chile Goodwill exercise	Aug. 5, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	Destroyer JS "Takanami"	One vessel	Frigate CNS "Almirante Lynch"
Japan-Mexico Goodwill exercise	Aug. 5, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	Destroyer JS "Izumo"	One vessel	Frigate ARM "Benito Juarez," tank landing ship ARM "Usumacinta"

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
 3. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 52 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

High-level talks	Jun. 2019	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Dec. 2019	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Beijing)
	Dec. 2020	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Dec. 2021	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jun. 2022	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	May 2019	11th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (Otaru)
	Jan. 2020	2nd Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism Annual and Experts Meeting (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2021	12th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (VTC)
	Mar. 2021	3rd Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism Annual and Experts Meeting (VTC)
	Dec. 2021	13th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (VTC)
	Nov. 2022	14th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (VTC)
	Feb. 2023	Japan-China Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Apr. 2019	Visit to China by MSDF Chief of Staff and MSDF vessels (Qingdao (attend the International Fleet Review to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army Navy))
	Oct. 2019	Visit to Japan by a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel
	Nov. 2019	Visit to the Eastern Theater Command, etc., by delegate of the SDF (head: Western Army Commanding General)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (China)
Japan-China goodwill exercise	Oct. 16, 2019	Waters and airspace south of Kanto	Destroyer JS "Samidare"	One vessel	Destroyer CNS "Taiyuan"

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
 3. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

High-level talks, etc.	May 2019	Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting, 4th Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2") (Tokyo)
	May 2019	Visit to Russia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2019	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Navy

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Russia)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Russian Navy	Jan. 20-21, 2020	Gulf of Aden	35th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement; Destroyer JS "Harusame"	One vessel	Frigate RFS "YAROSLAV MUDRY" Replenishment ship RFS "YELNYA" Tug boat RFS "VICTOR KONETSKY"

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Russia)
Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise	Jun. 10-15, 2019	Port of Vladivostok and waters and airspace around Vladivostok	Destroyer JS "Suzunami"	One vessel	Destroyer RFS "Admiral Panteleyev" Several vessels

- Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
 2. The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 54 Record of Major Multilateral Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

		Dialogue	Date	
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Indo-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) • Ministerial Meeting • ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM-Plus) • ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG) • Experts' Working Group (EWG) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Counter-Terrorism EWG HA/DR-EWG Maritime Security EWG Military Medicine EWG Peacekeeping Operations EWG Humanitarian Mine Action EWG Cyber EWG ○ ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting ○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Defence Officials' Dialogue • Security Policy Conference 	<p>(Nov. 2019, Dec. 2020, Jun. 2021, Nov. 2022)</p> <p>(Apr. 2019, Jul. 2020, Nov. 2020, Apr. 2021, May 2022)</p> <p>(Jan. 2020, Jun. 2020, Nov. 2020, Feb. 2021, Jun. 2021, Feb. 2022, Mar. 2022, Apr. 2022, Oct. 2022, Feb. 2023)</p> <p>(Apr. 2019, Sep. 2019, Nov. 2019, Dec. 2019, Jun. 2021, Dec. 2021)</p> <p>(Apr. 2019, Jul. 2019, Oct. 2019, Apr. 2021, Nov. 2021, May 2022, Oct. 2022)</p> <p>(May 2019, Sep. 2019, Mar. 2021, Jul. 2021, Feb. 2022, May 2022, Jul. 2022, Aug. 2022, Feb. 2023)</p> <p>(Oct. 2019, Mar. 2021, Jun. 2021, Jun. 2022, Nov. 2022, Mar. 2023)</p> <p>(Mar. 2019, Sep. 2019, Apr. 2021, Sep. 2021, Dec. 2021, Oct. 2022, Dec. 2022, Mar. 2023)</p> <p>(Sep. 2019, Dec. 2019, Sep. 2021, Jul. 2022, Feb. 2023)</p> <p>(May 2019, Aug. 2019, Mar. 2021, Nov. 2021, Jul. 2022, Nov. 2022)</p> <p>(Nov. 2019, Dec. 2020, Jun. 2022)</p> <p>(May 2019, Jul. 2020, May 2021, Apr. 2022)</p> <p>(May 2019, Jul. 2020, May 2021, Jun. 2022)</p>	
		Hosted by the private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) ○ IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue) 	<p>(May 2019, Jun. 2022)</p> <p>(Nov. 2019)</p>
		Hosted by the Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Doha Forum 	<p>(Dec. 2019)</p>
		Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum ○ International Conference of Cadets ○ Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue 	<p>(Oct. 2019, Mar. 2023)</p> <p>(Mar. 2022)</p> <p>(Sep. 2021)</p>

Reference 55 Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the Ministry of Defense

		Security Dialogue	Outline	Recent Situations
Organized by Ministry of Defense	Internal Bureau and others	Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level officials and others from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	In March 2023, the MOD held the 12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in person for the first time in approximately four years in Tokyo, in which vice-ministerial level officials and others from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat engaged in a frank exchange of information and views on the security environment surrounding the region, the regional situation, and the security and defense policies of respective countries, among others.
		Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD)	JPIDD was held in 2021 for the first time. It was organized by the MOD, with participation by Pacific Island countries and partner countries. The event was an opportunity to exchange views on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, maritime security, responses to COVID-19, climate change, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and similar issues, as well as promote mutual understanding and confidence-building between participating countries.	The 1st JPIDD was held as a video conference in September 2019, with participation by 13 Pacific Island countries and six partner countries (the U.S., the U.K., France, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand). Participants exchanged views, and the Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue Joint Statement was adopted.
		Professional Airmanship Program (PAP)	Hosted by the MOD and part of efforts under the Vientiane Vision 2.0, the principle for Japan's defense cooperation with ASEAN, PAP is a place to share knowledge and exchange views, targeting air force officers and others of the ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat.	The third PAP was held in person in February 2023, in which participants, including ASDF personnel playing an active role in daily activities on the frontline, further promoted mutual understanding and trust between the MOD/SDF and participants from ASEAN as well as the sharing of technical and practical knowledge in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).

Reference

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations
G5D	G5 Dialogue (G5D)	Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively contribute to regional peace and stability.	In February 2018, with the participation of five service branches from four countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under the theme of "Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for" and field trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.
	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 23rd Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2019. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 25 countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme "Logistic in Urban Disaster Response (including Measures for the Olympic Games)."
MSDF	Indo-Pacific Naval College Seminar (IPNCS)	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Indo-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.	The 26th seminar was held (in person for the first time in three years) in February 2023, with participants from Captain-class naval officers of 19 countries. Participants actively exchanged views on the importance of cooperation among navies in a situation with pandemics, climate change, regional conflicts, and other uncertainties under the theme of "Uncertain Seas: Naval Cooperation for Next Generation."
	Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program (WPNS STEP)	Hosted by the MSDF, this program has been held annually since 2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the WPNS countries. The program is designed to provide them with opportunities to deepen their understanding of Japan's security environment, defense policy and buildup, and culture and history.	The 10th Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program for Officers of the Next Generations (WPNS STEP) was held in person and online in October 2021. Participants, including naval officers and other personnel from 38 countries, engaged in presentations and actively exchanged views on the prospect of new efforts and equipment of navies across the world under the topic of how navies can adapt to the changing environment.
ASDF	Air and Space Power Symposium	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2022, with the participation of officials related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education. (From 1996 to 2014 and from 2015 to 2021, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar and Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Staff College Seminar, respectively.)	Air staff college personnel and researchers from around the world were invited to take part in research presentations and exchange views via an online teleconference held in September 2022. The topic was "Air and Space Power in Great Power Competition."
	International Air Command and Staff Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of air staff college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.	The 22nd seminar was held online in November 2022, with participation by air staff college students and others from 24 countries. Participants exchanged views on the topic of "Change and Creation."
National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.	The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research." This seminar ended in 2016.
	International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from each country. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	In March 2019, the 22nd conference was held, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of "The Changing World and Consistent Belief."
National Institute for Defense Studies	International Symposium on Security Affairs	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The symposium is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues in addition to enhancing public awareness of security issues.	The 23rd International Symposium on Security Affairs was held online in December 2022. Experts from the U.S., China, Australia, the Philippines, India, and Japan exchanged views on the topic of "The New Normal of Great Power Competition: The U.S.-China-Russia Relationship and the Indo-Pacific Region."
	International Forum on War History	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	The 20th International Forum on War History was held online in September 2022. Distinguished researchers from Canada, U.K., Singapore and Japan exchanged views on the topic of "War and Information in History."
	ASEAN Workshop	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common. Since 2018, participating regions are limited to ASEAN countries.	In February 2023, the ASEAN Workshop was held online, by inviting scholars from Australia, Indonesia, and the U.S. The participants held discussions under the theme of "The Impact of Great Power Competition on the Southeast Asian Region."

Reference 56 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue		Overview
Internal Bureau	South Pacific Defense Minister's Meeting (SPDMM)	A meeting in which defense ministers from South Pacific nations participate to discuss various security topics essential for the maintenance of peace and stability of the region. Japan first joined the 7th meeting in 2022 as an observer.
	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)	Started in October 2010. It is a government-sponsored official meeting of the defense ministers in the Indo-Pacific region, which provides opportunities to exchange views on issues related to regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM-Plus held in October 2017 that this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.
Internal Bureau and others	ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting	First held in 2014. It is a platform for defense ministers of all of the ASEAN nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security related issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.
	ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum	A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through political and security dialogue and cooperation. Currently 25 countries and 1 region (10 ASEAN nations, 15 non-ASEAN nations including Japan, and 1 region) as well as 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. In the ARF, authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.
	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (AMORS)	AMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
	Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)	This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012.
	Doha Forum	Doha Forum is an international conference hosted by the Government of Qatar and participated in by ministers and government officials, intellectuals and personnel from international organizations specialized in diplomacy, security, global issues (climate change and emergence of global powers, etc.), and energy-related problems. Participants have unrestricted discussions. The Forum has been held every year since 2001, and Japan participated in this forum for the first time in 2019.
	Indo-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	ICHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Indo-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
Joint Staff	Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 47th Seminar was held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries and organizations in 2018.
	Raisina Dialogue	Raisina Dialogue is an international conference co-hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and participated in by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, etc., from over 100 countries worldwide. Participants discuss matters in diverse fields including the field of security. The MOD has participated in the Dialogue since its third session in 2018 (1st: Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; 2nd: Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs; 3rd: Chief of Joint Staff and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister; 4th and 5th: Chief of Joint Staff).
GSDF	Indo Pacific Army Chiefs Conference (IPACC)	IPACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when IPAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999.
	Indo Pacific Armies Management Seminar (IPAMS)	IPAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Indo-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993.
	Land Forces Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC)	This is a symposium held each year in Hawaii, the U.S., by the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). It is a place for high-level government officials from each service of the armies of several countries from the Indo-Pacific region to exchange opinions in respect of strategic issues within the region through panel discussions, conversations, and similar.
	Chief of Army Symposium (CAS)	This seminar was called "Chief of Army's Exercise (CAEX)" until 2016. It is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.
	Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)	While the seminar was initially called either the Chief of Army's Exercise (CAEX) or the Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar (CALFS), it has been referred to as the Chief of Army Symposium since 2021. It is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. Since its first participation in 2012, the GSDF has joined the seminar six times thus far.
	Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)	Hosted annually by AUSA in Washington, D.C., the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff of the GSDF participate in the meeting, exchange opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and deliver speeches.

Hosted by the Government

Reference

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue		Overview	
Hosted by the Government	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.
		Asia Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
		Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)	This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.
		RAN Sea Power Conference (SPC) (From 2022, the name has been changed to the Indo Pacific Sea Power Conference (IP).)	Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference, the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.
		Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS)	Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.
		International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS)	Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Navy Chief of Staff from mostly western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.
		Galle Dialogue	Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Navy Chief of Staff from nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.
Hosted by the Government	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)	PACS is a conference hosted by the United States every other year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		Space Symposium	Space Symposium is hosted by the United States every year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the symposium since the 35th meeting in 2019.
		Global Air and Space Chief's Conference	Air and Space Power Conference hosted by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom is held every year and Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces exchange views on issues in the aerospace field in line with themes set up for each year. Japan has participated in this conference 10 times since 2009.
		Air and Space Power Conference (APC)	APC is an international conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference seven times since 2000.
		Air Force Symposium	Air Force Symposium is hosted by the Philippine Air Force annually to exchange opinions under the themes concerning security. Japan has participated in this symposium six times since 2015.
		Aerospace Medicine Conference	Aerospace Medicine Conference is hosted by the Indian Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning aerospace medicine. Japan has participated in this conference twice since 2019.
		Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference	Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference is hosted by the UAE Air Force biennially. Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces gather and exchange opinions on issues in line with themes set up for each year. Japan has participated in this conference five times since 2013.
		Colombo Air Symposium	Colombo Air Symposium is hosted by the Sri Lankan Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning air power and air strategy. Japan has participated in this symposium three times since 2016.
		Military Flight Training International Conference	Military Flight Training International Conference is hosted by the PLA Air Force biennially to exchange opinions concerning flight training, etc. Japan has participated in this conference twice since 2016
	National Institute for Defense Studies	Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting			Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001. In September 2018, the 22nd meeting was held in Tokyo for the first time in 17 years. Japan participated in the conference held in Singapore in November 2019. The 2020 meeting was cancelled due to the impact of COVID-19, but Japan most recently participated in a conference held online in October 2021. (No conference held in FY2022)
NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)			CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries in turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013). The 2020 CoC was cancelled due to the impact of COVID-19, a conference in Denmark in October 2021 and in Germany in May 2022, respectively.

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue		Overview
Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)	Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Indo-Pacific region participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. From Japan, the Minister of Defense has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002 (except for the 3rd and 11th conferences in 2004 and 2012; and the State Minister of Defence participated in the 11th conference).
	IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting	A Sherpa meeting (preparation meeting) for the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the IISS. Defense authorities (Director General/Vice Chief of Staff level) of the countries that attend the Shangri-La Dialogue exchange opinions on regional security issues. Japan has participated in this meeting since the 1st meeting was held in 2013.
	IISS Regional Security Summit (IISS Manama Dialogue)	Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held every year since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the State Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th, 12th and 13th Conferences in 2010, 2016, and 2017. The Defense Minister participated in the 15th Conference for the first time.
	Munich Security Conference	This Conference was established in 1962. It is one of the most prestigious international conferences on security in Western countries. Foreign dignitaries such as Cabinet members, Diet/Parliament members, officers of defense authorities from Germany, which is the host country, NATO member countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.), Russia, and central and eastern Europe countries attended. Japan participated for the first time in the 45th Conference in 2009, sending the Minister of Defense. The State Minister of Defense participated in the 52nd, 53rd, 54th and 55th Conferences in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. The Defense Minister participated in the 56th Conference in February 2020.
	Halifax International Security Forum	Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each EU country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the 1st Conference in 2009.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)	Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California, San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, North Korea, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993 (except in 2018).

Key Elements

- Reviewing our efforts over the past three years on defense cooperation with ASEAN under the Vientiane Vision announced in November 2016
- Redefining the vision in line with the concept of the “Indo-Pacific”
- Presenting three principles for our defense cooperation with ASEAN and including enhancement of resilience as one of the ends

Contents

1. Review of our efforts under the Vientiane Vision

(1) Multilateral efforts: Ship Rider Cooperation Program, HA/DR Invitation Program and Professional Airmanship Program

- Heart-to-heart cooperation: Japan has contributed not only to enhancing participants’ abilities by offering various practical programs, but also to creating a sense of unity among all ASEAN member state participants by offering opportunities to work together on common issues.

(2) Bilateral efforts: Defense cooperation programs (e.g. maritime security, HA/DR and engineering), defense equipment and technology cooperation, human resource development and academic exchanges, etc.

- Tailored and lasting cooperation: Aiming to establish a self-standing system in partner countries, Japan has implemented various projects based on elaborate multi-year plans with special emphasis on the transparency of process.

(3) Having contributed to the enhancement of ASEAN’s capabilities as a whole, especially in

- (i) Ensuring the rule of law, (ii) Strengthening maritime security, and (iii) Assisting ASEAN’s autonomous responses to regional challenges, such as natural disasters and non-traditional threats.

In so doing, we have also reaffirmed the importance of continuing and developing our efforts to uphold ASEAN’s resilience, which is a basis for ASEAN centrality and unity.

⇒ Pursuing further practical cooperation to support ASEAN’s resilience, and in turn, its centrality and unity

2. Redefining the Vientiane Vision in line with the concept of the “Indo-Pacific”

(1) As the hinge connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, ASEAN is the key to regional cooperation.

(2) ASEAN’s principles outlined in the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” such as openness, transparency, inclusivity and a rules-based framework, share the same bases with those of Japan’s vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

(3) Under its vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” and with full respect for the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” Japan will promote equal and open cooperation through partnership with ASEAN member states and all other countries that share the principles outlined above.

3. Three Principles for Japan’s Defense Cooperation with ASEAN

(1) Heart-to-heart Cooperation: Upholding ASEAN’s principles, valuing people-to-people connections and listening sincerely to partners’ needs

(2) Tailored and Lasting Cooperation: Pursuing sustainable outcomes through well-planned, transparent and ongoing engagement

(3) Equal and Open Cooperation: Pursuing wide-ranging international collaboration that supports ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience

I. Ends: With a view to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific that holds Southeast Asia as its hinge, the Japan Ministry of Defense aims to

- (i) enhance the Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership and (ii) contribute to ASEAN centrality and unity by supporting its resilience.

II. Ways: On the basis of the above three principles, Japan aims to support ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience by taking the following approaches with special emphasis on the three key areas of cooperation.

(i) Approaches based on the principles of ASEAN centrality and unity

- Japan promotes international collaboration between ASEAN member states and countries outside ASEAN, with a central emphasis on ASEAN-led frameworks
- Japan promotes confidence-building and interoperability among ASEAN member states by enhancing connectivity and promoting shared norms and practices among defense authorities

(ii) Key areas of cooperation with a view to upholding ASEAN’s resilience

- Ensuring the rule of law: Promoting the development and sharing of universal norms regarding the sea and air space
- Strengthening maritime security: Promoting ASEAN’s efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness capabilities, and supporting individual states’ efforts to enhance their national security, and in turn, regional peace and stability
- Assisting ASEAN’s organizational responses to regional challenges: Promoting ASEAN’s efforts to enhance its capacity to deal with natural disasters and non-traditional threats

III. Means: As part of a concerted whole of government effort, JMOD conducts practical cooperation by combining the following diverse measures.

- (i) Promoting Shared Understanding of International Norms: Holding programs such as seminars with a view to share knowledge on international norms and practices
- (ii) Defense Cooperation Program: Assisting ASEAN’s proactive efforts for enhancing its collective capabilities by sending JSDF personnel to Southeast Asia, and inviting ASEAN practitioners to Japan
- (iii) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation: Transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources, holding seminars on defense industries, etc.
- (iv) Joint Training and Exercises: Conducting bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, expanding forms of participation and inviting ASEAN observers to JSDF training
- (v) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchanges: Reinforcing human networks among students and trainees, inviting opinion leaders to Japan, etc.

Reference 58 Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2019 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2019 - Mar. 31, 2023)

Joint Staff

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
PSI Exercise hosted by the ROK (Eastern Endeavor 19)	Jul. 10-11, 2019	Busan	The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, others (observer countries)	Joint Staff, GSDF Chemical School	3 personnel	—
ADMM-Plus HA/DR Exercise (staff training and communication training)	Jul. 30-Aug. 1, 2019	Staff training: Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) Communication training: Ichigaya	Malaysia, the U.S., Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, the ROK, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam	Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Approx. 5 personnel	—
Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2019)	Sep. 21-Oct. 5, 2019	New Caledonia	France, Australia, Canada, Fiji, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Genia, Solomon Islands, Tonga, the U.K., the U.S., Vanuatu	Joint Staff, Joint Staff College	3 personnel	—
NATO cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition 2019)	Dec. 2-6, 2019	Estonia, Japan	NATO member countries, NATO partner countries, EU	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command	Approx. 20 personnel	—
Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 20	Jan. 26-Mar. 9, 2020	Thailand	Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the ROK, China, India	Joint Staff, etc., GSDF, MSDF, ASDF	C-130H × 1 Approx. 240 personnel	—
Japan-EU-ROK joint naval exercise against piracy	Jul. 16-17, 2020	West of the Gulf of Aden	Spain, the ROK	36th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Onami"	1 vessel	(Spanish Navy) Frigate SPS "Santa Maria" (ROK Navy) Destroyer ROKS "Dae Jo-yeong"
Japan-EU joint naval exercise against piracy	Oct. 5-6, 2020	Gulf of Aden	Spain, Germany	36th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS "Onami"	1 vessel	(Spanish Navy) Frigate SPS "Santa Maria" (Spanish Air Force) P-3M (German Navy) P-3C
NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise (Locked Shields 2021)	Apr. 13-16, 2021	Estonia, Japan	Around 30 countries including some NATO member states	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Office, Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Supervised Units of Communication Systems	Approx. 30 personnel (Includes participants other than those from the MOD/SDF.)	—
Counter-piracy joint naval exercise with French Navy etc.	May 1, 2021	Gulf of Aden	France, the U.S.	Destroyer JS "Setogiri"	1 vessel	(French Navy) Aircraft carrier "Charles de Gaulle," Destroyer "Chevalier Paul" (U.S. Navy) Destroyer USS "Mahan"
Counter-piracy joint naval exercise with European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) and Djiboutian Navy etc.	May 10, 2021	Gulf of Aden	Italy, Spain, Djibouti	Destroyer JS "Setogiri"	1 vessel	(Italian Navy) Frigate "Carabiniere" (Spanish Air Force) P-3M aircraft (Djiboutian Navy and Coast Patrol Unit) Patrol boat "Damer Jog"
Multilateral Exercise Cobra Gold 2021	Jul. 10-Aug. 23, 2021	Thailand and Ichigaya Area, Ministry of Defense	Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the ROK, China, India, and Australia	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Self-Defense Fleet, Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Supervised Units of Communication Systems	Approx. 20 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Counter-piracy bilateral naval exercise with U.K. Carrier Strike Group	Jul. 11-12, 2021	Gulf of Aden	The U.K., the U.S., Netherlands	Destroyer JS "Setogiri" P-3C patrol aircraft	1 vessel Aircraft	(Royal Navy) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Frigates HMS "Richmond," HMS "Kent," Fast fleet tanker RFA "Tidespring," Solid Replenishment ship RFA "Fort Victoria" (U.S. Navy) Destroyer USS "The Sullivans" (Royal Netherlands Navy) Frigate "Evertsen"
Large-Scale Global Exercise 2021 "LSGE21" organized by the United States First half	Aug. 2-8, 2021	Sea and airspace from Coral Sea to eastern offshore of Philippines	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS "Makinami," SH-60K helicopter on-board	1 vessel Aircraft	(U.S. Navy) Amphibious assault ship USS "America," Amphibious transport dock USS "New Orleans" (Royal Australian Navy) Amphibious assault ship HMAS "Canberra," Frigate HMAS "Ballarat," P-8A patrol aircraft
Large-Scale Global Exercise 2021 organized by the United States "LSGE21" Second half	Aug. 24, 2021	Sea and airspace of southern offshore of Okinawa	The U.S., the U.K., Netherlands	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, CH-47JA helicopters from 1st Helicopter Brigade, AH-64D helicopters from JGDSF Western Army Aviation Group, Destroyer JS "Ise" with SH-60K helicopters on board, Destroyer JS "Asahi" F-15J/DJ jets from the 9th Wing, Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	2 vessels Aircraft	(U.S. Armed Forces) Amphibious assault ship USS "America" with F-35B jets on board, Amphibious transport dock USS "New Orleans," Destroyer USS "The Sullivans," F-15C jets, MV-22B tiltrotor aircraft (British Armed Forces) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth" with F-35B jets and Merlin MK2 helicopters on board, Destroyer HMS "Defender," Frigate HMS "Kent" (Royal Netherlands Navy) Frigate "Evertsen"
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise (Deep Sabre21) organized by Singapore	Oct. 28-29, 2021	In Japan (participated by videoconference)	Singapore, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Self-Defense Force Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit	3 personnel	—
Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2022	Feb. 18-Mar. 4, 2022	Thailand and Japan (Ministry of Defense organizations in Ichigaya area and Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Asaka)	Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the ROK, China, India, Australia	Joint Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Self-Defense Fleet, Communications Command, Air Communications and System Wing, SDF Supervised Units of Communication Systems, Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Approx. 60 personnel	—
NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise (Locked Shields 2022)	Apr. 19-22, 2022	Estonia, Japan	Around 30 countries including some NATO member states	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Office, JGSDF C5 Command, JMSDF Communications Command, JASDF Operations Support Wing, JASDF Air Communications and System Wing, JSDF Cyber Protection Unit	Approx. 70 personnel (includes participants other than those from the MOD/SDF)	—
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by French Forces in Polynesia [MARARA22]	May 8-19, 2022	French Polynesia	France, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Ground Component Command	5 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise (Fortune Guard 22) Organized by the United States	Aug. 8-12, 2022	Hawaii	The U.S., etc.	Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chemical School	4 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 6, 2022	Sea of Japan	The U.S., the ROK	Destroyer JS “Chokai”	1 vessel	(U.S. Navy) Cruiser USS “Chancellorsville” (ROK) Destroyer ROKS “Sejong Daewang”
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 6, 2022	Waters surrounding Japan	The U.S., the ROK	Destroyer JS “Ashigara”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Several warships (ROK) Several warships
Joint Naval Exercise against Piracy Planned by CTF-151 Deployed Unit with Spanish Navy and Turkish Naval Forces	Oct. 25-28, 2022	Gulf of Aden	Spain, Turkey	Destroyer JS “Harusame”	1 vessel	(Spain) Frigate SPS “NUMANCIA” (Turkey) Frigate TCG “BURGAZADA”
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2022)	Nov. 14-25, 2022	French New Caledonia	France, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Ground Component Command	4 personnel	—
NATO Cyber Defense Exercise (Cyber Coalition 2022)	Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 2022	Estonia, Japan	NATO member countries, NATO partner countries, EU, etc.	Joint Staff Office, etc.	7 personnel	—
Bilateral Exercises with French Aircraft Carrier Strike Group	Jan. 9-14, 2023	The western Gulf of Aden and the northern Arabian Sea	France, the U.S.	Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki”	1 vessel	(France) Aircraft Carrier FS “Charles de Gaulle,” Guided-missile destroyer FS “Forbin,” Frigates FS “Provence,” Replenishment tanker FS “Marne” (U.S.) Destroyer USS “Truxtun”
Multilateral Exercise Cobra Gold 23	Feb. 9-Mar. 10, 2023	Thailand and Japan (Ichigaya Area, Ministry of Defense)	Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, the ROK, Singapore, Australia, China, India	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Self Defense Fleet, Communications Command, Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Communications and System Wing, Air Materiel Command Headquarters, JSDF Cyber Defense Command, Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Approx. 130 personnel, equipment, etc.	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Feb. 22, 2023	Sea of Japan	The U.S., the ROK	Destroyer JS “Atago”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS “Barry” (ROK) Destroyer ROKS “Sejong Daewang”

Ground Self-Defense Force

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention	Mar. 23-Apr. 5, 2019	Puckapunyal training area (Victoria, Australia)	Australia, etc.	Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Fuji School, etc.	Approx. 20 personnel	—
Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo)	May 10-Jun. 14, 2019	Shoalwater Bay Training Area (Queensland, Australia)	The U.S., Australia	13th Infantry Regiment, 12th Brigade	Approx. 160 personnel	(Australian Army) Approx. 720 personnel (U.S. Marines Corps) Approx. 250 personnel
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 19)	Jun. 14-28, 2019	Mongolia (Five Hills Training Area)	Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, China, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, the ROK, Rwanda, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, the U.K., Ukraine, Uruguay, the U.S., Vietnam, Zambia	Ground Component Command, etc.	Approx. 60 personnel	—
Field Training Exercise ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations	Sep. 8-22, 2019	Indonesian National Armed Forces Peacekeeping Mission Center	10 ASEAN countries, the U.S., Australia, China, India, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia	Ground Component Command, etc.	Approx. 20 personnel	—
U.S.-Philippines-hosted exercise (KAMANDAG19)	Oct. 6-23, 2019	The Philippines	The U.S., the Philippines	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.	Approx. 80 personnel	—
Field Training with French Army and U.S. Marines in Japan 2021 "ARC21"	May 11-17, 2021	Camp Ainoura, Kirishima Maneuver Area, and the western sea and airspace of Kyushu	The U.S., France	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, JGDSF Western Army Aviation Group	—	(French Army) 6th Light Armored Brigade (U.S. Marine Corps) 3rd Marine Division, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Field Training with U.S. and Australian Armed Forces in Australia (Southern Jackal 21)	May 23-Jul. 4, 2021	Northern Territory of Australia Mount Bundy Training Area	The U.S., Australia	Key units of 50th Infantry Regiment, 14th Brigade	—	(Australian Army) 1st Brigade (U.S. Marine Corps) Marine Rotational Force - Darwin from 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force
Field Training with Armed Forces of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom in Australia "Talisman Sabre 21" (Note 2)	Jun. 25-Aug. 7, 2021	Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia etc.	The U.S., Australia, the U.K.	2nd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade	—	(Australian Army) 1st Division (U.S. Marine Corps) Marine Rotational Force - Darwin from 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (Royal Marines) Royal Marine Commando
Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo 22)	May 9-27, 2022	Shoalwater Bay Training Area and Gallipoli Barracks (Queensland, Australia)	The U.S., Australia	13th Infantry Regiment, Central Readiness Regiment	—	(Australian Army) 6th Infantry Regiment of 7th Division (U.S. Marine Corps) Marine Rotational Force - Darwin from 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 22)	Jun. 6-20, 2022	Mongolia	Mongolia, the U.S., etc.	Ground Component Command Headquarters, Central Readiness Regiment, International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, 18 Infantry Regiment	—	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the U.S. Navy (RIMPAC 2022) (Note 2)	Jul. 3-25, 2022	Pacific Missile Range Facility (Kauai Island, Hawaii, the United States)	The U.S., etc.	5th Surface-to-ship Missile Regiment (Type 12 Surface-to-ship Missile) of Western Field Artillery Unit, etc., JMSDF Air Patrol Squadron 3	—	(U.S.) 17th Artillery Brigade, Patrol Aircraft Units, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Unit
U.S.-Indonesia Field Training in the U.S. and Indonesia (Garuda Shield 22)	Jul. 26-Aug. 5, 2022	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.) and its surroundings, Sumatra Island (Indonesia), Baturaja Training Area and its surroundings	The U.S., Indonesia	1st Airborne Brigade	—	(U.S.) 11th Airborne Brigade, 374th Airlift Wing, etc. (Indonesian Army) 18th Airborne Brigade
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 22) (Note 2)	Aug. 25-29, 2022	Guam, and the waters and its surrounding airspace	The U.S., Australia, the ROK, Canada	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami," etc.	—	(U.S. Navy) Submarine, Dry cargo replenishment ship USNS "Amelia Earhart" (U.S. Marine Corps) 5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, III Marine Expeditionary Force (Australian Navy) Destroyer HMAS "Sydney" (ROK Navy) Destroyer ROKS "Sejong Daewang," etc. (Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
U.S.-Philippine Marine Corps. Field Training in the Philippines (Kamandag 22)	Oct. 3-14, 2022	In and around Naval Education, Training, And Doctrine Command(NETDC) in Luzon (the Philippines)	The U.S., the Philippines	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, NBC Countermeasure Medical Unit	—	(U.S. Marine Corps) 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (U.S. Navy) U.S. Seventh Fleet (Philippine Marine Corps) 6th Marine Battalion, etc.

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-India-Philippines Multilateral Exercise	May 3-9, 2019	Waters west of Kyushu through the East China Sea	The U.S., India, the Philippines	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame"	2 vessels	(U.S.) Guided-missile destroyer USS "William P. Lawrence" (India) Guided-missile destroyer INS "Kolkata," Replenishment tanker INS "Shakti" (The Philippines) Frigate BRP "Andres Bonifacio"
Japan-France-Australia-U.S. Multilateral Exercise (La Perouse)	May 19-22, 2019	Waters and Airspace west of Sumatra (Indian Ocean)	France, Australia, the U.S.	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Murasame"	2 vessels	(France) Aircraft Carrier FS "Charles de Gaulle," Guided-missile destroyer FS "Forbin," Frigates FS "Provence," FS "Latouche Treville," Replenishment tanker FS "Marne" (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Toowoomba," submarine (U.S.) Guided-missile destroyer USS "William P. Lawrence"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 19-1)	May 23-28, 2019	Waters and airspace around Guam	The U.S., Australia, the ROK	Destroyers JS "Ariake," JS "Asahi"	2 vessels	(U.S.) Amphibious command ship USS "Blue Ridge," Guided-missile cruiser USS "Antietam," Destroyer USS "Curtis Wilbur," Replenishment oilers USNS "Rappahannock," USNS "Richard E. Byrd," P-8A, EA-18G (Australia) Frigates HMAS "Melbourne," HMAS "Parramatta," Submarine HMAS "Farncomb" (ROK) Destroyer ROKS "Wang Geon"
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	May 29, 2019	Waters and airspace around Guam	The U.S., Australia	Destroyers JS "Ariake," JS "Asahi"	2 vessels	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Curtis Wilbur" (Australia) Submarine HMAS "Farncomb"
Mine warfare training (Mutsu Bay) and minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise)	Jul. 18-30, 2019	Mutsu Bay	The U.S., India	Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper Coastal, Minesweeping Controller	18 vessels MCH-101 × 3 P-3C × 4 P-1 × 1	(U.S.) 1 Minesweeper Ocean, MH-53E × 2, Approx. 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (India) Approx. 4 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel
Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise (Malabar 2019)	Sep. 26-Oct. 4, 2019	Anchor phase: Sasebo On-the-sea phase: waters and airspace of Sasebo through south of Kanto	The U.S., India	Destroyers JS "Samidare," JS "Chokai," and JS "Kaga" Underway Replenishment Ship JS "Oumi"	4 vessels P-1 × 1	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "McCampbell," P-8A, Submarine (India) Frigate INS "Sahyadri," Corvette INS "Kiltan," P-8I
U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise	Late Oct. - mid-Nov., 2019	Waters around Bahrain	The U.S., Australia, countries in the Middle East, Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and South America, etc.	Minesweeper Tender JS "Bungo," Minesweeper Division 3, Minesweeper Coastal JS "Takashima"	2 vessels Approx. 180 personnel	—
U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Exercise (MTA Sama Sama 2019)	Oct. 14-19, 2019	Waters and airspace east of Palawan Island	The U.S., the Philippines	Air Patrol Squadron 5	P-3C × 2	(U.S.) P-8A × 1, 2 vessels, etc. (The Philippines) C-90 × 1, 1 vessel, etc.
8th Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise (Pacific Reach 2019)	Nov. 4-15, 2019	On-the-sea exercise: waters west of Perth Land training and events: HMAS Stirling of Royal Australian Navy	The U.S., Australia, the ROK, Singapore, Malaysia (Approx. 20 observer countries)	Submarine Rescue Ship JS "Chiyoda"	1 vessel Approx. 150 personnel	—
MSDF training (field training [Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral training])	Nov. 4-21, 2019	Waters and airspace around Japan	The U.S., Australia, Canada	—	Approx. 20 vessels Approx. 40 aircraft	(U.S.) Approx. 5 vessels (Australia) 2 vessels, 2 aircraft (Canada) 1 vessel
Minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral training)	Nov. 18-28, 2019	Hyuga-nada Sea	The U.S., Australia	Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper Coastal, Minesweeping Controller,	17 vessels MCH-101 × 2 or 3 Approx. 1,000 personnel	(U.S.) 1 Mine countermeasures ship, MH-53E × 2, approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (Australia) 2 Mine countermeasures ships
FY2019 multilateral exercise for fixed-wing aircraft hosted by U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2020)	Jan. 20-31, 2020	Waters and airspace around Guam	The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK	Air Development Squadron 51	P-3C × 1 Approx. 30 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Cope North 20) (Note 3)	Jan. 31-Mar. 6, 2020	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.) and its surrounding waters and airspace	The U.S., Australia	71st Fighter Squadron	US-2 × 1 Approx. 30 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Jul. 19-23, 2020	Waters and airspace of South China Sea and the eastern offshore of the Philippines through Guam	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS “Teruzuki”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” Guided-missile cruiser USS “Antietam,” Guided-missile destroyer USS “Mustin” (Australia) Amphibious assault ship HMAS “Canberra,” Destroyer HMAS “Hobart,” Frigate HMAS “Arunta,” “Stuart,” Replenishment ship HMAS “Sirius”
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the U.S. Navy (SEACAT 2020)	Jul. 21-23, 2020	—	The U.S., etc.	Maritime Staff Office	—	—
Rim of the Pacific Exercise hosted by the U.S. (RIMPAC 2020)	Aug. 17-31, 2020	Waters and airspace around Hawaiian Islands	—	Destroyers JS “Ise” JS “Ashigara”	2 vessels Approx. 550 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 20)	Sep. 12-13, 2020	Waters and airspace around Guam	The U.S., Australia, the ROK	Destroyers JS “Ise,” JS “Ashigara”	2 vessels	(U.S.) Destroyer USS “Barry,” Replenishment ship USS “John Ericsson,” submarine, aircraft (Australia) Frigate HMAS “Arunta,” “Stuart” (ROK) Destroyer ROKS “Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin,” ROKS “Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong”
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 19-20, 2020	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS “Kirisame”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS “John S. McCain” (Australia) Frigate HMAS “Arunta”
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Nov. 6-7, 2020	Bay of Bengal	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS “Onami”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS “John S. McCain” (Australia) Frigate HMAS “Ballarat”
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Malabar 2020)	Nov. 3-6, 2020	Waters and airspace east of Indian Ocean (Bay of Bengal)	The U.S., India, Australia	Destroyer JS “Onami”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS “John S. McCain” (India) Destroyer INS “Ranvijay,” Frigate INS “Shivalik,” Replenishment ship INS “Shakti,” submarine INS “Sindhuraj,” P-8I, etc. (Australia) Frigate HMAS “Ballarat”
	Nov. 17-20, 2020	Waters and airspace north of Arabian Sea	The U.S., India, Australia	Destroyer JS “Murasame,” Air Development Squadron 51	1 vessel 2 personnel	(U.S.) Aircraft carrier USS “Nimitz,” Cruiser USS “Princeton,” Destroyer USS “Sterett,” P-8A (India) Aircraft carrier INS “Vikramaditya,” Destroyers INS “Kolkata,” “Chennai,” Frigate INS “Talwar,” submarine INS “Khanderi,” Replenishment ship INS “Deepak,” P-8I, MiG29K, DORNIER, etc. (Australia) Frigate HMAS “Ballarat”
Japan-U.S.-France Trilateral Exercise	Dec. 15-17, 2020	Waters and airspace around Okinotorishima Island	The U.S., France	Destroyer JS “Hyuga”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS “John S. McCain,” P-8A (France) Submarine FS “Émeraude”
FY2020 Multilateral Exercise for Fixed-wing Aircraft hosted by U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2021)	Jan. 14-28, 2021	Waters and airspace around Guam	The U.S., etc.	Air Division 12	P-1 × 2 Approx. 40 personnel	—
Multilateral Exercise hosted by Pakistan Navy (AMAN21)	Feb. 11-16, 2021	Waters and airspace north of Arabian Sea	Pakistan, etc.	Destroyer JS “Suzunami”	1 vessel 2 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-France Trilateral Exercise	Feb. 19, 2021	Waters and airspace west of Kyushu	The U.S., France	Underway Replenishment Ship JS “Hamana”	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS “Curtis Wilbur” (France) Frigate FS “Priaril”

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-France-Belgium Trilateral Exercise	Mar. 17-18, 2021	Gulf of Aden	France, Belgium	Destroyer JS "Ariake"	1 vessel	(France) Aircraft carrier FS "Charles de Gaulle," Destroyer FS "Provence," Replenishment ship FS "Var" (Belgium) Frigate BNS "Leopold I"
Japan-U.S.-France-Belgium Multilateral Exercise	Mar. 19-20, 2021	Arabian Sea	The U.S., France, Belgium	Destroyer JS "Ariake"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Guided missile cruiser USS "Port Royal," amphibious assault ship USS "Makin Island" (France) Aircraft carrier FS "Charles de Gaulle," Destroyer FS "Provence," "Chevalier Paul" (Belgium) Frigate BNS "Leopold I"
Japan-France-U.S.-Australia-India Multilateral Exercise "La Pérouse 21"	Apr. 5-7, 2021	Bay of Bengal	France, the U.S., Australia, India	Destroyer JS "Akebono"	1 vessel	(France) Landing helicopter dock "Tonnerre," Frigate "Surcouf" (U.S.) Amphibious transport dock USS "Somerset" (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Anzac," Replenishment vessel HMAS "Sirius" (India) Frigate INS "Satpura," Corvette INS "Kiltan," P-8I
Japan-Australia-Canada Multilateral Exercise	Apr. 8, 2021	Western sea area of the Island of Sumatra	Australia, Canada	Destroyer JS "Akebono"	1 vessel	(Australia) Frigate HMAS "Anzac," Replenishment vessel HMAS "Sirius" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Calgary"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-France Multilateral Exercise "ARC21" (Note 4)	May 11-17, 2021	East China Sea	The U.S., Australia, France	Destroyers JS "Ise," JS "Ashigara," JS "Asahi," and JS "Kongō" Landing ship tank JS "Ōsumi" Missile boats JS "Otaka" and JS "Shirataka" Patrol aircraft Submarines	8 vessels Patrol aircraft	(U.S.) Amphibious transport dock USS "New Orleans," P-8A patrol aircraft and MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Parramatta" (France) Landing helicopter dock "Tonnerre," Frigate "Surcouf"
Multilateral Exercise organized by United States and Sri Lanka "CARAT"	Jun. 30, 2021	Off the coast of Trincomalee	The U.S., Sri Lanka	Destroyer JS "Yugiri"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Littoral combat ship USS "Charleston," P-8A aircraft (Sri Lanka) Patrol vessels SLNS "Gajabahu," SLNS "Sayurala," Bell-212 helicopter etc.
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise	Jun. 30-Jul. 3, 2021	Eastern sea area of Australia	The U.S., Australia, the ROK	Destroyer JS "Makinami" and SH-60K helicopter on board	1 vessel Aircraft	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Rafael Peralta" (Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Brisbane" (ROK) Destroyer "Wang Geon"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise "Pacific Vanguard 21"	Jul. 5-10, 2021	Eastern sea area of Australia	The U.S., Australia, the ROK	Destroyer JS "Makinami" and SH-60K helicopter on board	1 vessel Aircraft	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Rafael Peralta," P-8A aircraft (Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Brisbane," Submarine, P-8 aircraft (ROK) Destroyer "Wang Geon"
Japan-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise	Jul. 14-17, 2021	Eastern sea area of Australia	Australia, the ROK	Destroyer JS "Makinami" and SH-60K helicopter on board	1 vessel Aircraft	(Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Brisbane," Frigate HMAS "Parramatta" (ROK) Destroyer "Wang Geon"
Multilateral Exercise organized by the United States and Australia "Talisman Sabre 21" (Note 4)	Jul. 18-27, 2021	Eastern sea area of Australia	The U.S., Australia, Canada, the ROK	Destroyer JS "Makinami" and SH-60K helicopter on board	1 vessel Aircraft	(U.S.) Amphibious assault ship USS "America," Amphibious transport dock USS New Orleans, Dock landing ship USS "Germantown," Destroyer USS "Rafael Peralta," Dry cargo ship USNS "Alan Shepard," Replenishment oiler USNS "Rappahannock," P-8A patrol aircraft (Australia) Amphibious assault ship HMAS "Canberra," Landing ship dock HMAS "Choules," Destroyer HMAS "Brisbane," Frigate HMAS "Parramatta," P-8 aircraft (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Calgary" (ROK) Destroyer "Wang Geon"

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral Exercise organized by the U.S. Navy "SEACAT2021"	Aug. 10-20, 2021	Republic of Singapore and other areas (held online)	The U.S., etc.	Maritime Staff Office	2 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise "Malabar 2021" Phase 1 first half	Aug. 23-Sep. 10, 2021	Guam and adjacent sea area	The U.S., India, Australia	Special Boarding Unit	—	(U.S.) Destroyer USS Barry, Replenishment ship USNS "Yukon," Replenishment oiler USNS "Big Horn," P-8A, C-17 aircraft, Special Operations Command Pacific (India) Frigate INS "Shivalik," Corvette INS "Kadmatt," P-8I aircraft Navy Special Operations Unit (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Warramunga"
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise "Malabar 21" Phase 1 second half	Aug. 26-29, 2021	Western Pacific (Philippine Sea)	The U.S., India, Australia	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Murasame," and JS "Shiranui" Submarines P-1	4 vessels P-1	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Barry," Replenishment ship USNS "Yukon," P-8A aircraft (India) Frigate INS "Shivalik," Corvette INS "Kadmatt," P-8I aircraft (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Warramunga"
Japan-U.K.-U.S.-Netherlands Multilateral Exercise "PACIFIC CROWN21-1"	Aug. 25-26, 2021	South of Okinawa	The U.K., the U.S., Netherlands	Destroyers JS "Ise," JS "Asahi," SH-60K helicopters on board	2 vessels Aircraft	(U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Frigate HMS "Kent," Destroyer HMS "Defender" (U.S.) Destroyer USS "The Sullivans" (Netherlands) Frigate "Evertsen"
Japan-UK-U.S.-Netherlands Multilateral Exercise "PACIFIC CROWN21-2"	Aug. 27-28, 2021	East of Okinawa and East China Sea	The U.K., the U.S., Netherlands	Destroyers JS "Ise," JS "Teruzuki," SH-60K helicopters on board	2 vessels Aircraft	(U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Destroyer HMS "Defender," Replenishment ships RFA "Fort Victoria," RFA "Tidespring" (U.S.) Destroyer USS "The Sullivans" (Netherlands) Frigate "Evertsen"
Japan-U.K.-U.S.-Netherlands-Canada Multilateral Exercise "PACIFIC CROWN21-3" (Note 3)	Sep. 2-7, 2021	Sea area from East China Sea through South of Shikoku to South of Kanto	The U.K., the U.S., Netherlands, Canada	Destroyers JS "Ise," JS "Asahi," JS "Harusame," JS "Takanami," JS "Kirishima," JS "Onami," JS "Teruzuki," SH-60J/K helicopters on board Submarines P-1	8 vessels Aircraft	(U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Destroyer HMS "Defender," F-35B jets (U.S.) Destroyer USS "The Sullivans," P-8A aircraft, F-35B jets (Netherlands) Frigate "Evertsen" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Japan-U.K.-U.S.-Netherlands-Canada Multilateral Exercise "PACIFIC CROWN21-4" (Note 3)	Sep. 8-9, 2021	Kanto region	The U.K., the U.S., Netherlands, Canada	Destroyers JS "Ise," JS "Izumo," and SH-60J/K helicopters on board MCH-101	2 vessels Aircraft	(U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Destroyer HMS "Defender," Replenishment ships RFA "Fort Victoria," RFA "Tidespring," and F-35B jets (U.S.) F-35B jets (Netherlands) Frigate "Evertsen" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Japan-U.S.-U.K.-Netherlands-Canada-New Zealand Multilateral Exercise	Oct. 2-3, 2021	South West of Okinawa	The U.S., the U.K., Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand	Destroyers JS "Ise," JS "Kirishima," JS "Yamagiri"	3 vessels	(U.S.) Aircraft carriers USS "Ronald Reagan," USS "Carl Vinson," Cruisers USS "Shiloh," USS "Lake Champlain," Destroyers USS "The Sullivans," USS "Chafee" (U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Frigate HMS "Kent," Destroyer HMS "Defender," Replenishment ships RFA "Fort Victoria," RFA "Tidespring" (Netherlands) Frigate "Evertsen" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg" (New Zealand) Frigate HMNZS "Te Kaha"

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-U.K.-Netherland-Canada-New Zealand Multilateral Exercise	Oct. 4-9, 2021	South China Sea	The U.S., the U.K., Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand	Destroyer JS "Shiranui"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "The Sullivans" (U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Frigate HMS "Kent," Destroyer HMS "Defender," Replenishment ships RFA "Fort Victoria," RFA "Tidespring" (Netherlands) Frigate "Evertsen" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg" (New Zealand) Frigate HMNZS "Te Kaha"
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise "Malabar 21" Phase 2	Oct. 11-14, 2021	Bay of Bengal	The U.S., India, Australia	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Murasame"	2 vessels	(U.S.) Aircraft carrier USS "Carl Vinson," Cruiser USS "Lake Champlain," Destroyer USS "Stockdale," Replenishment oiler USNS "Yukon," P-8A aircraft (India) Destroyer INS Ranvijay, Frigate INS "Satpura," P-8I aircraft submarines (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Ballarat," Replenishment vessel HMAS "Sirius"
Multilateral exercise organized by the United States and Philippines "Exercise SAMA SAMA 2021"	Oct. 11-12, 2021	Maritime Staff Office	The U.S., Philippines	Maritime Staff Office	3 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia-U.K. Multilateral Exercise "Maritime Partnership Exercise"	Oct. 15-18, 2021	Bay of Bengal	The U.S., Australia, the U.K.	Destroyers JS "Kaga," JS "Murasame"	2 vessels	(U.S.) Aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, Cruiser USS "Lake Champlain," Destroyers USS "Stockdale," USS "The Sullivans," Replenishment oiler USNS "Yukon," P-8A aircraft (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Ballarat" (U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Destroyer HMS "Defender," Frigate HMS Richmond, Replenishment ships RFA "Fort Victoria," RFA "Tidespring"
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 25, 2021	East of Okinawa	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS "Akizuki"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Benfold" (Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Brisbane"
MSDF Field Training Exercise (Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise and Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada-Germany multilateral exercise)	Nov. 21-30, 2021	Area surrounding Japan	The U.S., Australia, Canada, Germany	—	Approx. 20 vessels Approx. 40 aircraft	(U.S.) Warships: 10 (Australia) Warships: 2 (Canada) Warship : 1 (Germany) Warship: 1
FY2022 multilateral exercise for fixed-wing patrol aircraft organized by the U.S. Navy "Sea Dragon 2022"	Jan. 2-20, 2022	Sea area around Guam	The U.S., etc.	P-1 aircraft 2	2 aircraft Approx. 50 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise in "Cope North 2022" (Note 3)	Feb. 2-18, 2022	Andersen Air Force Base, the United States territory of Guam, and sea and airspace around the island	The U.S., Australia	US-2 search and rescue amphibious aircraft	US-2 aircraft x 1 Approx. 30 personnel	—
International maritime exercise hosted by the U.S. "IMX/CE22"	Jan. 31-Feb. 17, 2022	Around Bahrain	The U.S., etc.	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	2 vessels Approx. 200 personnel	—
Multilateral exercise organized by Indian Navy "MILAN2022"	(1) Harbor Phase From Feb. 25, 2022 to Feb. 28, 2022 (2) Sea Phase From Mar. 1, 2022 to Mar. 4, 2022	Eastern India Around Visakhapatnam	India, etc.	(1) Harbor Phase Chief of Staff, MSDF, five officers including staffs of Maritime Staff Office (2) Sea Phase Destroyer JS "Yudachi"	1 vessel 6 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Mar. 14-16, 2022	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS "Yudachi"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Momsen," P-8 aircraft (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Arunta," AP-3C aircraft

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise "NOBLE PARTNER 22"	Jun. 19-24, 2022	The Pacific	The U.S., Australia	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	2 vessels	(U.S.) Aircraft carrier USS "Abraham Lincoln," Cruiser USS "Mobile Bay" Destroyers USS "Gridley," USS "Sampson," USS "Spruance" (Australia) Amphibious assault ship HMAS "Canberra," Frigate HMAS "Warramunga," Replenishment ship HMAS "Supply"
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the U.S. Navy "RIMPAC 2022" (Note 4)	Jun. 29-Aug. 4, 2022	Hawaii Islands, and the waters and airspace around the islands	The U.S.	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami," 3 embarked aircraft, 1 P-1, 4th Maintenance and Supply Squadron, JGSDF Western Army	2 vessels 4 aircraft 40 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Jul. 4-6, 2022	Waters and airspace from the East China Sea to the east of Okinawa	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS "Asahi"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Dewey" (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Parramatta"
"Pacific Partnership 2022"	Jul. 15-19, 2022	The Republic of Palau and its surroundings	The U.S., the U.K., Palau	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Hospital ship USNS "Mercy," patrol vessel USS "Myrtle Hazard" (U.K.) Patrol ship HMS "Tamar" (Palau) Patrol vessel PSS "Kedam"
Japan-U.S. Solomon Islands Goodwill Exercise	Aug. 8, 2022	Area surrounding the Solomon Islands	The U.S., Solomon Islands	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Littoral combat ship USS "Oakland" (Solomon) Patrol vessel RSPV "Taro"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Missile Defense Exercise "PACIFIC DRAGON 2022"	Aug. 8-14, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	The U.S., Australia, ROK, Canada	Destroyer JS "Haguro"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyers USS "Fitzgerald," USS "William P. Lawrence," F/A-18F (Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Sydney" (ROK) Destroyer ROKS "Sejong Daewang" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Japan-Canada-New Zealand Trilateral Exercise	Aug. 9, 2022	The Pacific	Canada, New Zealand	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	2 vessels	(Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg" (New Zealand) Replenishment ship HMNZS "Aotearoa"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Multilateral Exercise "Pacific Vanguard 22" (Note 4)	Aug. 21-29, 2022	Guam and its surroundings	The U.S., Australia, ROK, Canada	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami," Submarine, P-1, UP-3D, JGSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.	3 vessels 2 aircraft	(U.S.) Submarine, Dry cargo replenishment ship USNS "Amelia Earhart," P-8A, EA-18G, 5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, III Marine Expeditionary Force (Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Sydney," Frigate HMAS "Perth" (ROK) Destroyers ROKS "Sejong Daewang," ROKS "Mun Mu Daewang" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Japan-France-Australia Trilateral Exercise "La Perouse 22"	Aug. 30-Sep. 1, 2022	Area surrounding New Caledonia	France, Australia	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	1 vessel	(France) Frigate FS "Vendémiaire" (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Warramunga"
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Exercise "NOBLE RAVEN 22"	Aug. 30-Sep. 7, 2022	Area surrounding Guam through the South China Sea	The U.S., Canada	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	2 vessels	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Higgins," Replenishment ships USNS "Rappahannock," USNS "John Ericsson" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by Royal Australian Navy "KAKADU 2022"	Sep. 12-26, 2022	Area surrounding Darwin	Australia, etc.	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	1 vessel	—
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Exercise "NOBLE RAVEN 22-2"	Sep. 23-Oct. 1, 2022	South China Sea	The U.S., Canada	Destroyers JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami," Submarine	3 vessels	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Higgins," Replenishment ship USNS "Big Horn" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Sep. 30, 2022	Sea of Japan	The U.S., ROK	Destroyer JS "Asahi"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Chancellorsville," Destroyers USS "Barry," USS "Benfold," Submarine (ROK) Destroyer ROKS "Mun Mu Daewang"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada Multilateral Exercise "NOBLE MIST 22"	Oct. 4-8, 2022	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia, Canada	Destroyer JS "Kirisame"	1 vessel	(U.S.) Destroyers USS "Milius," USS "Higgins," Patrol vessel USCGC "Midgett" (Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Hobart," Frigate HMAS "Arunta," Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the U.S., Australia, and the Philippines "Exercise SAMASAMA/ LUMBAS 2022"	Oct. 11-18, 2022	Sulu Sea	The U.S., Australia, the Philippines, France, the U.K.	Destroyer JS "Kirisame," US-2	1 vessel 1 aircraft	(U.S.) Destroyer USS "Milius," P-8A (Australia) Destroyer HMAS "Hobart," Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart" (The Philippines) Frigate BRP "Jose Rizal," C-90, etc. (France) Falcon 200 (U.K.) Patrol vessel HMS "Spey"
Multilateral Exercise	Nov. 6-7, 2022	South of Kanto	Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, the U.S.	—	—	—
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise "Malabar 2022"	Nov. 8-15, 2022	South of Kanto	The U.S., India, Australia	Destroyers JS "Takanami," JS "Shiranui," JS "Hyuga," Landing Ship Tank JS "Kunisaki," Replenishment ship JS "Oumi," Submarine, P-1, UP-3D, Special Boarding Unit	6 vessels 2 aircraft	(U.S.) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Chancellorsville," Destroyer USS "Milius," P-8A, Special Operations Unit (India) Frigate INS "Shivalik," Anti-submarine corvette INS "Kamorta," P-8I, Special Operations Unit (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Arunta," Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart," Submarine, P-8A
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Nov. 19-20, 2022	South of Kanto through South of Shikoku	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS "Setogiri"	1 vessel	Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Chancellorsville," Destroyer USS "Milius" (Australia) Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart"
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the U.S. and Sri Lanka "CARAT 2023"	Jan. 19-27, 2023	Off the coast of Colombo	The U.S., Sri Lanka, Maldives	JMSDF Maritime Staff Office	—	(U.S.) Landing ship USS "Anchorage," P-8A (Sri Lanka) Frigates SLNS "Gajabahu," SLNS "Vijayabahu" (Maldives) Maldives National Defense Force Headquarters, etc.
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by Pakistan Navy "AMAN 23"	Feb. 9-14, 2023	North of the Arabian Sea	Pakistan, etc.	Destroyer JS "Suzutsuki," JMSDF Staff Office	1 vessel	—
International Maritime Exercise Hosted by the U.S. "IMX/CE23"	Feb. 26-Mar. 19, 2023	Area surrounding Bahrain	The U.S., etc.	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uruga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Awaji"	2 vessels Approx. 200 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Note 3)	Mar. 6-8, 2023	Area surrounding Kyushu	The U.S., Australia	EP-3, OP-3C, RC-2	3 aircraft	(U.S.) RC-135 (Australia) P-8A

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral Exercise "La Pérouse 23"	Mar. 13-14, 2023	East of Sri Lanka	France, the U.S., Australia, India, the U.K., Canada, New Zealand	Destroyer JS "Suzutsuki"	1 vessel	(France) Amphibious assault ship FS "Dixmude," Frigate FS "La Fayette" (U.S.) Littoral combat ship USS "Charleston" (Australia) Frigate HMAS "Perth" (India) Frigate INS "Sahyadri," Replenishment ship INS "Jyoti" (U.K.) Patrol ship HMS "Tamar" (Canada) RCN HQ (New Zealand) RNZN HQ, etc.
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by U.S. Navy "Sea Dragon 2023"	Mar. 13-30, 2023	Guam, and the waters and airspace surrounding the island	The U.S.	Air Patrol Squadron 1	Aircraft Approx. 40 personnel	—

Air Self-Defense Force

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)	Feb. 7-Mar. 19, 2019	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands, Saipan, Tinian Island, Rota and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace	The U.S., Australia	8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	Approx. 20 aircraft Approx. 450 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)	Dec.4-16, 2019	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands (the U.S.), Palau and Micronesia, and their surrounding airspace	The U.S., Australia, New Zealand	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	1 aircraft Approx. 30 personnel	(U.S.) C-130J × 3 (Australia) C-130J × 1 (NZ) C-130J × 1
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise and Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral HA/DR Exercise (Cope North 20) (Note 2)	Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise: Jan. 31-Mar. 8, 2020	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands, Tinian Island and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace	The U.S., Australia	8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	F-15J/DJ × 8 F-2A/B × 6 U-125A × 2 E-2C × 2 C-2 × 1 KC-767 × 1 Approx. 450 personnel	—
	Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral HA/DR Exercise: Feb. 12-26, 2020	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Northern Mariana Islands, Saipan, Tinian Island and Rota, and their surrounding airspace	The U.S., Australia	Air Rescue Wing, Air Tactics Development Wing, 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command, Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron, etc.	U-125A × 2 C-2 × 1 Approx. 70 personnel	—
Multilateral Virtual Exercise hosted by U.S. Space Force (Schriever Wargame 2020)	Nov. 4-5, 2020	Ichigaya (Online)	The U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the U.K.	Air Staff Office, Joint Staff Office, Internal Bureau	18 personnel	—
Multilateral Virtual Exercise hosted by U.S. Space Force (Schriever Wargame 2021)	Sep. 29-30, 2021	Ichigaya (Online)	The U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the U.K.	Air Staff Office, Joint Staff Office, Internal Bureau	18 personnel	—
Multilateral Virtual Exercise hosted by U.S. Space Force (Schriever Wargame 2023)	Mar. 20-31, 2023	Maxwell Air Force Base (the U.S.)	The U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the U.K.	Air Staff Office, Joint Staff Office, Internal Bureau	18 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise and Japan-U.S.-Australia-France Multilateral HA/DR Exercise (Cope North 21) (Note 2)	Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise: Jan. 18-Feb. 28, 2021	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Farallon de Medinilla Target Range and their surrounding airspace, Palau Babeldaob Island Roman Tometuchel International Airport and Angaur Island	The U.S., Australia	2nd Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, 3rd tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	F-15J/DJ × 6 F-2A × 3 E-767 × 1 C-2 × 1 Approx. 250 personnel	—
	Japan-U.S.-Australia-France Multilateral HA/DR Exercise: Jan. 18-Feb. 28, 2021 (Note 5)	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Farallon de Medinilla Target Range and their surrounding airspace, Palau Babeldaob Island Roman Tometuchel International Airport and Angaur Island	The U.S., Australia	Base Defense Development & Training Squadron, 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	C-2 × 1 Approx. 110 personnel	—
Japan-U.K.-U.S.-Netherland-Canada Multilateral Exercise "PACIFIC CROWN 2021" (Note 2)	Sep. 2-9, 2021	Airspaces offshore Shikoku and Kanto over the Pacific Ocean, and Yokota Air Base	The U.K., the U.S., Netherlands, Canada	3rd Wing, 5th Wing, 8th Wing, 9th Wing, Airborne Warning and Control Wing, 1st Tactical Airlift Group	F-2A/B × 4 F-15J/DJ × 8 F-35A × 2 E-767 × 1, E-2C/D × 1 KC-767 × 1	(U.K.) Aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth," Frigate HMS "Kent," Destroyer HMS "Defender," Replenishment ship RFA "Tidespring," F-35B jets (U.S.) Destroyer USS "The Sullivans," P-8A aircraft, F-35B jets (Netherlands) Frigate "Evertsen" (Canada) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Joint Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. "Christmas Drop"	Dec. 1-13, 2021	Andersen Air Base in the United States territory of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands of the United States, Republic of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and the surrounding airspaces of the islands	The U.S., etc.	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command	C-130H × 1 20 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise etc. "Cope North 2022" (Note 2)	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise: Feb.22, 2022 to Feb.18, 2022	Andersen Air Base in the United States territory of Guam, Farallon de Medinilla Island Bombing Range, and surrounding airspace of them.	The U.S., Australia	2nd Wing, 8th Wing, Air Tactics Development Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Warning and Control Wing, 1st Tactical Airlift Group	F-15J/DJ × 6 F-2A × 6 U-125A × 1 E-767 × 1 KC-767 × 1 UH-60J × 1 380 personnel	—
	Joint Training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR): 22.2.2 to Feb. 18	Andersen Air Base in the United States territory of Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana, and surrounding airspace of them.	The U.S., Australia, France	Air Rescue Wing, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, 2nd Tactical Airlift Group, 3rd Tactical Airlift Group, Air Traffic Control Group, Air Weather Group, Aero-Medical Evacuation Squadron	U-125A × 1 UH-60J × 1 150 personnel Including assets participating in Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise in parallel	—
Australian Air Force Exercise "Pitch Black 22"	Aug. 20-Sep. 8, 2022	RAAF Base Darwin (the northern territory of Australia) and the airspace surrounding the base	Australia, etc.	7th Air Wing	F-2A × 6 Approx. 150 personnel	—
Joint Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. "Christmas Drop"	Nov. 30-Dec. 12, 2022	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), the Northern Mariana Islands (the U.S.), Palau, and Micronesia, and the airspace surrounding these areas	The U.S., Australia, etc.	Air Support Command	C-130 × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating SDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise "Cope North 23"	Feb. 8-24, 2023	(1) Guam (the U.S.) (2) Northern Mariana Islands (the U.S.) (3) Area surrounding the locations set forth in the preceding two items (4) Roman Tmetuchl International Airport (Republic of Palau) (5) JMSDF Iwo Jima Air Base	The U.S., Australia, etc.	8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Tactics Development Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Warning and Control Wing, 1st Tactical Airlift Group, 2nd Tactical Airlift Group, 3rd Tactical Airlift Group, Air Traffic Control Service Group, Air Weather Group, Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron	F-15J/DJ × 6 F-2A/B × 6 UH-60J × 1 E-767 × 1 C-130H × 2 KC-767 × 1 Approx. 500 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Note 2)	Mar. 6-8, 2023	Airspace surrounding Kyushu	The U.S., Australia	Air Tactics Development Wing, Fleet Air Wing 31	RC-2 × 1 EP-3 × 1 OP-3C × 1	(U.S.) RC-135 × 1 (Australia) P-8A × 1

- Notes: 1. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release. The total number of personnel may not match the actual number if it is the sum of approximate numbers.
2. The MSDF also participated (written in duplicate in the MSDF section)
3. The ASDF also participated (written in duplicate in the ASDF section)
4. The GSDF also participated (written in duplicate in the GSDF section)
5. Changes are made to participating countries, etc., due to the impact of COVID-19

Reference 59 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations

(As of March 31, 2023)

(1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997–Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004–Jul. 31, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDf personnel (Major General) ¹
Jun. 23, 1997–Jun. 23, 2000	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDf officer (Captain)
Oct. 1, 2002–Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDf personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005–Jul. 10, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDf personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009–Jan. 8, 2013	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDf personnel (Major)
Aug. 27, 2013–Aug. 31, 2016	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDf officer (Captain)
Dec. 2, 2002–Jun. 1, 2005	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005–Nov. 27, 2008	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jan. 16, 2011–Jan. 15, 2014	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 18, 2013–Sep. 17, 2016	Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 1, 2015–Nov. 30, 2017	Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Colonel)
Mar. 1–Aug. 31, 2016	Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)	1 administrative official ²
Aug. 29, 2016–Aug. 26, 2019	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York) ³	1 GSDf personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Feb. 11, 2017–Feb. 18, 2020	Strategic Support Service, Logistics Division, Department of Operational Support, United Nations (New York) ⁴	1 administrative official
Apr. 1, 2018–Dec. 31, 2020	Group of Experts, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (New York)	1 instructor
Oct. 19, 2019–May 8, 2022	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Colonel)
Aug. 8, 2020–	Support Partnerships Service, Division for Special Activities, United Nations Department of Operational Support (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 15, 2021–	Support Partnerships Service, Division for Special Activities, United Nations Department of Operational Support (New York)	1 administrative official
Jul. 3, 2022–	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Dec. 5, 2022–	Military Performance Evaluation Team, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)	1 GSDf personnel (Colonel)

- Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.
2. Dispatched as an official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from "Department of Peacekeeping Operations" to "Department of Peace Operations."
4. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from "Department of Field Support" to "Department of Operational Support."

(2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Nov. 21–30, 2008	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
May 22–Jun. 6, 2009	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)
Aug. 28–Sep. 5, 2009	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Apr. 10–17, 2010	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel) *1
Aug. 14–30, 2010	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Nov. 15–20, 2011	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 31–Aug. 5, 2012	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Dec. 15–19, 2012	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 9–14, 2013	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Aug. 28–Sep. 1, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Oct. 5–9, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Mar. 8–13, 2014	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Mar. 23–May 25, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Aug. 12, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Oct. 5–9, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Oct. 6–23, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 19–Apr. 1, 2015	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Jun. 4–Jul. 1, 2015	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia) *2	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 5–20, 2015	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Oct. 22–Nov. 7, 2015	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 21–Apr. 1, 2016	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
May 31–Jun. 17, 2016	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 4–19, 2016	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 6–19, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 2–18, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Dec. 1–15, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 30–Jul. 15, 2018	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Aug. 22–28, 2018	Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre (Indonesia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 2–18, 2018	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 3–15, 2019	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 28–Jul. 12, 2019	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 8–22, 2019	International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia) *3	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 6–15, 2020	International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 4–16, 2022	International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

*1 First dispatch of female SDF personnel.

*2 In June 2015, the name changed from "International Peace Keeping Training Centre" to "Peace Support Training Centre."

*3 In October 2019, the name changed from "Peace Support Training Center" to "International Peace Support Training Institute."

Reference 60 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

Item	International Peace Support Act	International Peace Cooperation Act	Japan Disaster Relief Team Law	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)
Purpose	○Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community	○Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts towards international peace	○Contribution to promotion of international cooperation	○Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	○Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	○Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	○Cooperation and support activities ¹ ○Search and rescue activities ¹ ○Ship inspection operations ³	○International peacekeeping activities ○Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security ○International humanitarian assistance ○International election monitoring activities ○Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities	○Rescue activities ○Medical treatment (including prevention of epidemics) ○Activities for disaster emergency response and disaster recovery ○Transportation of personnel or equipment/ goods for the abovementioned activities	○Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○Support activities for ensuring security	○Replenishment support activities
Areas of Operation	○Territories of Japan ○Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. ○High seas and the airspace above	○Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)	○Regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions	○Territories of Japan ○Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq) ² ○High seas and the airspace above ²	○Territories of Japan ○Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required) ² ○High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above ²
Diet Approval	○Prior approval required without exception	○To be discussed in advance in the Diet in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety-ensuring operations ⁴	N/A	○To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures ⁴	(Note 5)
Diet Report	○Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay	N/A	○Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay

- Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place.
2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.
3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries.
4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.
5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval.

Reference 61 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments

(1) Dispatch to the Persian Gulf for minesweeping

(As of March 31, 2023)

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Persian Gulf, etc.	Persian Gulf Minesweeping Dispatch Unit	Apr.-Oct. 1991	Approx. 510	Approx. 510	- Minesweeping and disposal in the Persian Gulf

(2) International Peace Cooperation Assignments

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (PKO)	Ceasefire Monitors	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	8	16	- Monitor custody of weapons collected - Monitor observance of ceasefire
	Engineer unit	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	600	1,200	- Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure - Supply fuel and water - Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities for work and medical care
United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	5	10	- Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	48	144	- Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees (Humanitarian aid)	Rwandan refugee relief unit	Sep. - Dec. 1994	260	260	- Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	Sep. - Dec. 1994	118	118	- Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies - Air transport of personnel of international organizations, etc., and materials
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 1996 - Feb. 2009	1st-13th personnel: 2	38	- Create PR and budgets, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations
		Feb. 2009 - Jan. 2013	14th-17th personnel: 3		
	Transport unit	Feb. 1996 - Aug. 2012	1st-33rd personnel: 43	1,463	- Transport food and other supplies - Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance
Aug. 2012 - Jan. 2013		34th personnel: 44			
Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	Nov. 1999 - Feb. 2000	113	113	- Air transport of relief supplies and UNHCR related personnel
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	Oct. 2001	138	138	- Air transport of relief supplies
United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2002 - Jun. 2004	1st rotation: 10 2nd rotation: 7	17	- Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations
	Engineer unit	Mar. 2002 - Jun. 2004	1st and 2nd rotation: 680 3rd rotation: 522 4th rotation: 405	2,287	- Maintain and repair roads and bridges - Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations - Public welfare support operations
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees (Humanitarian aid)	Air transport unit	Mar. - Apr. 2003	50	50	- Air transport of relief supplies
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims (Humanitarian aid)	Air transport unit	Jul. - Aug. 2003	98	98	- Air transport of materials
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (PKO)	Arms monitors	Mar. 2007 - Jan. 2011	6	24	- Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Oct. 2008 - Sep. 2011	2	12	- Coordination in UNMISS concerning overall logistics of the military sector - Database management
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013	2	12	- Coordination of facility-related duties and overall military logistics
	Engineer unit	Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013	1st rotation: 203 2nd rotation: 346 3rd and 4th rotation: 330 5th and 6th rotation: 317 7th rotation: 297 Withdrawal support unit: 44	2,184	- Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (PKO)	Military liaison officer	Sep. 2010 - Sep. 2012	2	8	- Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Nov. 2011 -	4	51	- Coordination regarding the demand of overall military logistics - Management of database - Planning and coordination of engineering duties - Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports
	Engineer Unit	Jan. 2012 - May 2017	1st rotation: 239 2nd - 4th rotation: 349 5th and 6th rotation: 401 7th - 10th rotation: 353 11th rotation: 354 Withdrawal support unit: 58	3,912	- Development of infrastructure (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) - Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities - Coordination regarding logistics
	Local support coordination center	Jan. 2012 - Dec. 2013	(Number of personnel for 1st to 4th rotations includes personnel at the local support coordination center)		- Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities - Coordination regarding logistics
International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula (Internationally coordinated operation)	Headquarters staff	Apr. 2019 -	2	8	- Liaison and coordination between Egypt and Israel and the MFO
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Ukrainian Refugees (Humanitarian aid) refugees	Air transport unit	May-Jun., 2022	142	142	- Air transportation of UNHCR relief supplies

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and Republic of South Sudan).
2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(3) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane disaster)	Medical unit	Nov.-Dec. 1998	80	185	- Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		105		- Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc.
Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake disaster)	Maritime transport unit	Sep.-Nov. 1999	426	426	- Marine transportation of materials required for international disaster relief activities (e.g., temporary dwellings)
International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake disaster)	Material support unit	Feb. 2001	16	94	- Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78		- Air transport of aid materials and support units, etc.
Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake disaster)	Air transport unit	Dec. 2003-Jan. 2004	31	31	- Air transport of materials required for international disaster relief activities (tents, etc.)
International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake/tsunami disaster)	Dispatched maritime unit	Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005	590	590	- Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	Jan.-Mar. 2005	22	925	- Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228		- Air transport of aid materials - Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Maritime transport unit		593		- Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams - Marine transportation of aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		- Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia (submarine accident)	Maritime transport unit	Aug. 2005	346	346	- Rescue of a Russian submarine
International Disaster Relief Activities in response to an earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (earthquake disaster)	Air support unit	Oct.-Dec. 2005	147	261	- Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		- Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Team
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)	Medical support unit	May-Jun. 2006	149	234	- Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85		- Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)	Joint liaison office	Oct. 2009	21	33	- Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Medical support unit		12		- Medical treatment
International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti (earthquake disaster)	Joint liaison office	Jan.-Feb. 2010	33	234	- Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others
	Air transport unit		97		- Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams - Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit
	Medical support unit		104		- Medical treatment

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in response to floods in Pakistan (flood disaster)	Joint operations coordination center	Aug.–Nov. 2010	27	514	- Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Air support unit		184		- Air transport of materials, etc.
	Marine convoy		154		- Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
	Air transport unit		149		- Air Transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
Transportation of materials and personnel required for the implementation of International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)	Air transport unit	Feb.–Mar. 2011	40	40	- Air transport of personnel engaging in international disaster relief activities and materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in the Philippines (typhoon disaster)	Joint Operations Coordination Center	Nov.–Dec. 2013	Approx. 10	Approx. 1,100	-Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Joint Task Force		Approx. 1,080		- Medical treatment (examination/vaccination) - Prevention of epidemics - Transport of relief supplies, etc.
International Disaster Relief Activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (searching)	Local operation support center	Mar.–Apr. 2014	Approx. 10	Approx. 140	- Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and others
	International disaster relief squadron		Approx. 130		- Rescue operations including searching
Transport of materials necessary for International Disaster Relief Activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)	Local coordination center	Nov.–Dec. 2014	4	14	- Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities
	Air transport unit		10		- Air transport
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)	Local support coordination center	Dec. 2014 - Jan. 2015	3	Approx. 350	- Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries
	International disaster relief surface force		Approx. 350		- Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501
International Disaster Relief Activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)	Epidemiological study support	Apr.– May 2015	1	1	- Support for WHO's epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone
International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)	Joint operations coordination center	Apr.– May 2015	4	Approx. 140	- Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries
	Medical support unit		Approx. 110		- Medical treatment
	Air transport unit		Approx. 30		- Air transport of equipment and materials required for medical treatment
International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)	Air patrol unit	Nov. 2016	Approx. 30	Approx. 30	- Evaluation of damages
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake and tsunami disaster)	Local coordination center	Oct. 2018	Approx. 10	Approx. 60	- Information gathering concerning damages and operations in the affected areas - Coordination with relevant organizations of Indonesia and relevant countries
	Air transport unit		Approx. 50		- Transportation of personnel/materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in Djibouti (heavy rain/flood disaster)	Part of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement *	Nov.-Dec. 2019	Approx. 230	Approx. 230	- Drainage work and function recovery of public facilities (elementary and junior high schools), transport and distribution of emergency relief supplies
International Disaster Relief Activities in Australia (bush fire disaster)	Local coordination center	Jan.-Feb. 2020	Approx. 10	Approx. 80	- Coordination with relevant organizations of the Commonwealth of Australia and relevant countries
	Air transport unit		Approx. 70		- Air transport of materials and personnel required for firefighting and relief activities
International disaster relief activities for volcanic hazard in Kingdom of Tonga	Field Coordination Headquarters	Jan.-Feb. 2022	7	Approx. 370	Coordinating with related organizations of Kingdom of Tonga, Australia, and other related countries
	International Disaster Relief Airlift Detachment etc.		Approx. 120		Air transport for emergency relief supplies
	Joint Task Force		Approx. 240		Sea transport for emergency relief supplies and emergency water-supply
International Disaster Relief Activities in the Republic of Türkiye (earthquake disaster)	Field Coordination Headquarters	Feb.-Mar. 2023	10	Approx. 60	- Coordination with relevant organizations of the Republic of Türkiye, relevant countries, etc.
	International Disaster Relief Airlift Detachment etc.		Approx. 50		- Air transport of emergency relief supplies and equipment necessary for international disaster relief activities

* Units dispatched for a counter-piracy mission (see (7) Counter-Piracy Operations) carried out the activities

(4) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Indian Ocean	Units carrying out replenishment support activities	Nov. 2001 - Nov. 2007	Approx. 320	Approx. 10,900	- Materials supplies for foreign vessels
U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.	Units carrying out replenishment support activities		—	Approx. 2,900	- Transportation of materials

(5) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Indian Ocean	Replenishment support unit	Jan. 2008 - Feb. 2010	Approx. 330	Approx. 2,400	- Materials supplies for foreign vessels

(6) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Southeast Iraq, etc.	Reconstruction assistance group (1st to 10th) Operation assistance unit (1st to 5th)	Jan. 2004 - Jul. 2006	Approx. 600	Approx. 5,600	- Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
Kuwait, etc.	Evacuation operation unit	Jun.- Sep. 2006	Approx. 100	Approx. 100	- Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
Persian Gulf, etc.	Maritime transport unit	Feb.- Apr. 2004	Approx. 330	Approx. 330	- Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
Kuwait, etc.	Air transportation unit (1st to 16th term)	Dec. 2003 - Dec. 2008	Approx. 210	Approx. 3,500	- Air transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
Kuwait, etc.	Withdrawal operation unit	Dec. 2008 - Feb. 2009	Approx. 130	Approx. 130	- Operation related to withdrawal

(7) Counter-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden	Maritime Force	Mar. 2009 - Dec. 2016	Approx. 400	Approx. 10,000	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
		Dec. 2016 -	Approx. 200*	Approx. 3,800*	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Air Unit (MSDF)	May 2009 - Feb. 2011	Approx. 100	Approx. 1,640	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.
		Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012	Approx. 120		
		Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014	Approx. 110		
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti		Jul. 2014 - Jul. 2015	Approx. 70	Approx. 210	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti		Jul. 2015 -	Approx. 60*	Approx. 1,980*	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc. (Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor where counter-piracy operations are carried out, and within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea since January 2020)
Djibouti	Support Unit (MSDF)	Jul. 2014 - Feb. 2023	Approx. 30	Approx. 580	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation, etc.
		Feb. 2023 -	Approx. 40		
Bahrain, etc.	Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Deployed Unit at the Headquarters	Aug. 2014 - Jun. 2021	Under 20	Approx. 70	Communication and coordination with foreign troops taking part in CTF 151
	CTF-151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters	Jun. 2021 -	Under 15	4	Communication and coordination with foreign troops taking part in CTF 151
	CMF Deployed Unit at the Headquarters	Jun. 2021 -	2	7	Communication and coordination with Headquarters of CTF 151 and foreign troops of the CTF
Djibouti	Local Coordination Center	Jul. 2012 - Jul. 2014	3	Approx. 12	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation

Djibouti	Air Unit (GSDF)	May 2009 - Feb. 2011	Approx. 50	Approx. 970	Security of activity base and P-3C
		Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012	Approx. 60		
		Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014	Approx. 80		
Djibouti	Support Unit (GSDF)	Jul. 2014 - Feb. 2023 Feb. 2023 -	Approx. 80 Approx. 90	Approx. 1,530	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation, etc.

(8) Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait	Maritime Force	Feb. 2020 - Feb. 2022	Approx. 200	Approx. 1,200	Information gathering activities for ensuring the safety of Japan-related vessels
	Surface Detachment (Concurrently served by Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement)	Feb. 2022 -	Approx. 200	Approx. 800	Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Air Detachment (MSDF) (Concurrently served by Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement)	Jan. 2020 -	Approx. 60	Approx. 840	Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, where counter-piracy operations are carried out, and within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea since January 2020.

* The number and the cumulative number of personnel and of Surface and Air Detachments are included in (7) Counter-piracy Operations* respectively, because the information correction activity in Middle East are conducted with personal of the counter-piracy forces.

Reference 62 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since FY2012)

(March 31, 2023)

Date	Exercise	Location	Participation of the MOD/SDF
July 2012	PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan	Japan	Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Air Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, GSDF Seventh Chemical Weapon Defense Unit and Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, Internal Bureau (including two aircraft)
September 2012	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK	ROK	Joint Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one ship and one aircraft)
February 2013	PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE	UAE	Dispatch of observer (Joint Staff)
August 2014	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the United States	United States	Joint Staff (including one ship)
November 2015	PSI interdiction exercise hosted by New Zealand	New Zealand	Joint Staff
September 2016	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Singapore	Singapore	Joint Staff
September 2017	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Australia	Australia	Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one aircraft)
July 2018	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Japan	Japan	Joint Staff, Ground Defense Command, Self Defense Fleet, Eastern Army, Yokosuka Regional Unit, Chemical School, Internal Bureau (including two vessels, two aircraft and three vehicles)
July 2019	PSI interdiction exercise hosted by ROK	ROK	Joint Staff and Chemical School
October 2021	PSI exercise hosted by Singapore	Singapore	VTC participation by the Joint Staff Office and GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit
August 2022	PSI exercise hosted by the U.S.	United States	Joint Staff and Chemical School, etc.

Reference 63 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014)

The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports") and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government's existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures.

An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as "peace contribution and international cooperation"). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan's ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan's defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan's enhancement

of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

- 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
- 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
- 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure

In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan's security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as "the ally and partners"),—enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan's security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan's security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc., to a licensor.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.

For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

Reference 64 Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

April 1, 2014

Adopted by the National Security Council

Amendment : November 24, 2015

Amendment : March 22, 2016

Amendment : March 8, 2022

In accordance with the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (hereinafter referred to as “the Three Principles”, which was adopted by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014), the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles (hereinafter referred to as “the Implementation Guidelines”) is decided as follows:

Note: Definitions of terms in addition to those in the Three Principles are described in 6. below.

1. Cases in which Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology may be Permitted

Cases in which overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology may be permitted are as follows:

- (1) Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation, and when:
 - A. the recipient is a foreign government, or

- B. the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System, organizations conducting activities based on a UN resolution, organizations conducting activities on a request of international organizations or organizations conducting activities which are requested by a country which is located in the area of the activity and supported by any of the principal organs of the UN.

- (2) Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan's security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan's security, and that:

- A. are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,

- B. contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., and of the following:

- (a) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services conducted by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in accordance with Japanese laws,

- (b) provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S.,

- (c) provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed forces, or

- (d) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or

- (e) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in equipment and goods transferred by the Minister of Defense to Ukraine facing the aggression in violation of international law pursuant to the article 116-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

- C. are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the SDF (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are:

- (a) temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items,

- (b) export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials, or

- (c) export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas.

- (3) Overseas transfers whose impact from the viewpoint of Japan's security is judged to be very small such as return of misdelivered items, export of samples to be returned later and re-export of equipment that was brought into Japan by police officers of a foreign governmental agency.

2. Focuses of the Strict Examination of Overseas Transfers

Prior to granting an export authorization for an individual case that is judged as a case in which overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted as referred to in 1. above, the Government will conduct strict examination on desirability of the transfer, taking into consideration the following two focuses in a composite manner:

- Appropriateness of the destination and end user
- Extent the overseas transfer of the defense equipment and technology may raise concern for Japan's security

More specifically, as for the appropriateness of the destination, the Government will consider it taking into account such factors as what impact the country or region of destination is posing to the international peace and security as well as Japan's security. As for the appropriateness of the end user, the Government will consider it taking into account such factors as the use of defense equipment and technology by the end user and the certainty of appropriate control.

As for the extent of the security concern, the Government will consider it taking into account such factors as nature, technical sensitivity, use (purpose), quantity and form (whether finished products or parts, goods or technology, etc.) of the defense equipment and technology to be transferred, as well as the possibilities of extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties.

From the focuses including those described above, the Government will make a comprehensive judgment when deciding whether it will finally approve or disapprove each transfer in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regimes and based on the information available at the time of the overseas transfers.

3. Ensuring Appropriate Control

Prior to overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties in order to ensure appropriate control of the defense equipment and technology after the overseas transfer. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of a control system at the destination when:

- (1) the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, and when:
 - A. the transfer is in urgent need or highly important from humanitarian perspective,
 - B. the recipient is the UN System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution.
 - C. the transfer is for the provision of technical information or specimens which are necessary for participating in an international tendering.
 - D. the defense equipment to be transferred is small in price and quantity and thus deems to have small security concern.
- (2) the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc. ,
- (3) the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licensor,
- (4) the contribution of parts or technology to be transferred to the recipient country is judged to be considerably small,
- (5) the overseas transfer is necessary for the activities of the SDF etc. or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, or
- (6) the transfer is judged to have very small impact from the viewpoint of Japan's security such as return of misdelivered items, export of samples to be returned later and temporary landing of goods.

When confirming the control system at the destination, the Government will conduct the confirmation, in so far as reasonable, through a document such as a certification issued by the recipient government or other person responsible for the control of the defense equipment and technology to be transferred. In addition, the Government will confirm the circumstances surrounding the control of defense equipment and technology at the destination, the reliability of the organization controlling defense equipment

and technology, the export control system and the circumstances surrounding its implementation in the country or region of destination, based on the information available at the time of the transfer.

If it is found that the defense equipment and technology is not appropriately controlled after its overseas transfer, the Government will take strict measures against the person etc. who transferred the defense equipment and technology, including imposing penalties in accordance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No. 228 of 1949, hereinafter referred to as "the Foreign Exchange Act").

4. Procedures upon the Deliberations

(1) Deliberations at the NSC

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be deliberated at the NSC in the following cases. When judging the possibility of approving the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology falls under B or C below in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will give due consideration to the deliberation.

- A. when the basic policy is considered,
- B. when especially careful consideration is required as for the application of the conditions for approving the transfers,
- C. when especially careful consideration is required as for the appropriateness of the destination and the extent of security concerns, etc. with particular care, or
- D. when the status of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology is reported.

(2) Deliberations at the NSC board

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be deliberated at the NSC board in the following cases. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will make a decision based on such deliberations when deciding whether or not to approve overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology that refer to B below in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act.

- A. when the basic policy is considered,
- B. when the Government has never made a decision to permit overseas transfers of similar types, or
- C. when the status of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology is reported

(3) Cooperation among the Government ministries and agencies concerned

Given that a comprehensive judgment is required for deciding whether or not to approve overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology, the Government ministries and agencies concerned will coordinate closely for necessary arrangements and what appropriate control for such overseas transfers should be. The following department or division will serve as a point of contact for each ministry or agency. However, other department or division may also serve as such a point of contact as necessary for each transfer.

- A. National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat (NSS)
- B. National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
- C. Security Export Control Policy Division, Trade Control Department, Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
- D. International Cooperation Division, Department for Equipment Policy, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), Ministry of Defense (MOD)

5. Regular Reporting and Information Disclosure

(1) Regular reporting

The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will prepare an annual report on the status of the approval of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology, submit it to the NSC, and publish it.

(2) Information disclosure

For transfers that were deliberated at the NSC pursuant to 4 (1) above, the Government will disclose relevant information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999). The Government will pay due consideration to information disclosure so that it does not lack transparency compared to the cases where the Government has taken exemption measures on a case-by-case basis.

6. Miscellaneous Items

(1) Definition

“International joint development and production” refers to international joint development including international joint research or international joint production in which the Government or Japanese companies participate and includes:

- A. International joint development between the Government and a foreign government
- B. Participation by a Japanese company in the development of defense equipment and technology by a foreign government,
- C. Production licensed from a foreign country that is carried out by a Japanese company in partnership with a foreign counterpart,

D. Development or production that is carried out by a Japanese company using Japanese and foreign technologies in partnership with a foreign company,

E. Participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and

F. Provision of technical information or specimens for a feasibility study regarding international joint development or international joint production.

(2) Relationship with the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines

Since the Three Principles is a guideline newly adopted upon reviewing the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines, future overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be examined in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act based on the Three Principles. The exemption measures that were taken under the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines prior to the adoption of the Three Principles will be examined as the cases that may be permitted to transfer overseas under the Three Principles.

(3) Date of enforcement

The Implementation Guidelines is enforced on April 1, 2014.

(4) Revision

Given that the Three Principles is an implementation standard for the Foreign Exchange Act, the Implementation Guidelines may be revised when a draft is prepared by METI in consultation with NSS, MOFA and MOD and is adopted by the NSC.

Reference 65

Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them (Over the Past 10 Years)

(As of March 31, 2023)


Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff etc.	Total
Authorized	150,500	45,293	46,994	4,367	247,154
Actual	137,024	43,106	43,694	4,019	227,843
Staffing Rate (%)	91.0	95.2	93.0	92.0	92.2

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel						Fixed-Term Personnel	
	Officer		Warrant Officer		Enlisted (upper)		Enlisted (lower)	
Authorized	46,487		4,924		141,371		54,372	
Actual	43,166	(2,712)	4,677	(117)	138,900	(9,866)	24,519	(3,723)
Staffing Rate (%)	92.9		95.0		98.3		75.6	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
 2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.

Reference

(Number of personnel) **Changes in Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel**



Reference 66 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel

Classification		Number Applied	Number Recruited	Application/Recruitment Ratio	
Officer candidates	GSDF	1,938 (327)	194 (25)	10.0 (13.1)	
	MSDF	1,050 (181)	119 (20)	8.8 (9.1)	
	ASDF	1,308 (324)	101 (27)	13.0 (12.0)	
	Total	4,296 (832)	414 (72)	10.4 (11.6)	
Non-commissioned officers	Technical Petty Officer	MSDF	34 (8)	12 (2)	2.8 (4.0)
	Technical Sergeant	ASDF	4 (0)	1 (0)	4.0 (-)
Aviation Cadet	MSDF	651 (83)	70 (6)	9.3 (13.8)	
	ASDF	1,216 (158)	75 (2)	16.2 (79.0)	
	Total	1,867 (241)	145 (8)	12.9 (30.1)	
Non-commissioned officer candidates	GSDF	14,058 (2,762)	3,448 (514)	4.1 (5.4)	
	MSDF	4,583 (926)	1,351 (277)	3.4 (3.3)	
	ASDF	6,200 (1,747)	1,333 (420)	4.7 (4.2)	
	Total	24,841 (5,435)	6,132 (1,211)	4.1 (4.5)	
Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)	GSDF	14,252 (2,772)	2,269 (437)	6.3 (6.3)	
	MSDF	4,134 (852)	588 (127)	7.0 (6.7)	
	ASDF	5,448 (1,652)	1,131 (297)	4.8 (5.6)	
	Total	23,834 (5,276)	3,988 (861)	6.0 (6.1)	
National Defense Academy Students	Recommended	Humanity and social science	141 (46)	44 (16)	3.2 (2.9)
		Science and engineering	278 (48)	137 (24)	2.0 (2.0)
		Total	419 (94)	181 (40)	2.3 (2.4)
	Selective exam	Humanity and social science	75 (15)	17 (5)	4.4 (3.0)
		Science and engineering	123 (16)	44 (7)	2.8 (2.3)
		Total	198 (31)	61 (12)	3.2 (2.6)
	General exam	Humanity and social science	4,192 (1,780)	48 (13)	87.3 (136.9)
		Science and engineering	5,829 (1,293)	232 (38)	25.1 (34.0)
		Total	10,021 (3,073)	280 (51)	35.8 (60.3)
National Defense Medical College students		6,006 (2,057)	80 (13)	75.1 (158.2)	
National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)		1,484 (1,121)	73 (70)	20.3 (16.0)	
GSDF High Technical School Students	Recommended	392	115	3.4	
	General exam	1,551	238	6.5	
	Total	1,943	353	5.5	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.
 2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2022.

Reference 67 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.

(As of March 31, 2023)

	Special Service		Regular Service	
	Authorized Strength	Non-Authorized Strength	Authorized Strength	Non-Authorized Strength
Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)	Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense		Administrative Officials, and others 26	Part-Time Officials
	SDF Personnel			
	Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense	Candidates for SDF Personnel		
	Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	Reserve Personnel 47,900		
	Director, Director General, and others 824	Ready Reserve Personnel 7,981		
	Administrative Officials, and others 20,118	Candidates for Reserve Personnel 4,621		
	Uniformed SDF Personnel 247,154	National Defense Academy students		
		National Defense Medical College students		
		GSDF High Technical School students Part-Time Officials		

Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations (as for uniformed SDF Personnel, the number is the authorized number specified in the laws and regulations)
 2. "Others" in the title includes Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense

Reference 68 Main Measures for Re-employment Support

Classification	Measures for re-employment support	Description	
Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel	Occupational aptitude testing	Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes	
	Career guidance	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment	
	Business management training	Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement	
	Vocational training	Technical training	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift operation, electrician, hazardous material engineer, boiler engineer, heavy-duty vehicle operation, regular-sized vehicle operation, crane operators, first-level training for nursing care workers, large-sized special vehicle operation, registered seller, financial planner, pharmacy work, electrical work construction management engineer, qualified firefighting equipment inspector, gas welding work supervisor, etc.)
		Disaster prevention and risk management training	Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area is a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office's Regional Disaster Prevention Manager license)
		Correspondence courses	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (hazardous materials engineer, electrician, financial planner, real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, health manager, boiler engineer, certified administrative procedures legal specialist, fire defense equipment officer, support to personnel who wish to go to university, etc.)
	Internship program	Implement internship programs for uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire in order to prevent early retirement due to reemployment mismatches as well as to expand places of re-employment	
Outsourcing career counseling, etc.	Outsource career counseling, etc., to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel		
Measures for internal support personnel	Training for support personnel	Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel	
Measures for promotion outside of SDF	Support for publicity aimed at to business owners	Publicizing to business owners, etc., the effectiveness of uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire	
	Inviting business owners on unit tours	Invite business owners to SDF units, etc., and provide them with tours, explanations of the re-employment support situation, etc.	

Reference

Reference 69

Employment of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Local Government Disaster Prevention Agencies

(As of March 31, 2023 640 personnel)

Prefectural Government	Government employment situation
Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Sapporo City Office (2 persons), Hakodate City Office (2 persons), Otaru City Office, Asahikawa City Office, Muroran City Office, Kushiro City Office, Obihiro City Office (2 persons), Iwamizawa City Office, Tomakomai City Office, Wakkanai City Office, Bibai City Office, Ashibetsu City Office (2 persons), Akabira City Office, Monbetsu City Office, Shibetsu City Office, Nayoro City Office (2 persons), Chitose City Office (3 persons), Takikawa City Office, Sunagawa City Office, Furano City Office, Noboribetsu City Office, Eniwa City Office (2 persons), Date City Office, Kitahiroshima City Office (2 persons), Hokuto City Office, Matsumae Town Office, Shiriuchi Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town Office, Mori Town Office, Kaminokuni Town Office, Shimamaki Village Office, Kuromatsunai Town Office, Rankoshi Town Office, Niseko Town Office, Kutchan Town Office, Yoichi Town Office, Naganuma Town Office, Tsukigata Town Office, Toma Town Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Nakafurano Town Office (2 persons), Minami Furano Town Office, Shimokawa Town Office, Teshio Town Office, Hamatonbetsu Town Office, Toyotomi Town Office, Rebun Town Office, Rishiri Town Office, Bihoro Town Office (2 persons), Engaru Town Office (2 persons), Sobetsu Town Office, Atsuma Town Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Otofuke Town Office (3 persons), Kamishihoro Town Office, Memuro Town Office, Makubetsu Town Office, Ashoro Town Office, Kushiro Town Office (2 persons), Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office, Betsukai Town Office
Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Aomori City Office (4 persons), Hirosaki City Office, Hachinohe City Office (3 persons), Towada City Office, Misawa City Office, Tsugaru City Office, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office
Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Morioka City Office, Miyako City Office, Hanamaki City Office, Kamaishi City Office, Hachimantai City Office, Takizawa City Office, Shizukuishi Town Office, Yahaba Town Office, Otsuchi Town Office, Yamada Town Office, Noda Village Office
Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government Office, Sendai City Office (2 persons), Ishinomaki City Office, Natori City Office, Kakuda City Office, Tagajo City Office, Tome City Office, Kurihara City Office, Higashimatsushima City Office, Tomiya City Office, Shibata Town Office, Marumori Town Office, Watari Town Office, Yamamoto Town Office, Rifu Town Office, Taiwa Town Office, Ohira Village Office, Minamisanriku Town Office
Akita	Akita Prefectural Government Office (3 persons), Akita City Office, Odate City Office, Yuzawa City Office, Katagami City Office, Daisen City Office, Ugo Town Office
Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government Office, Yamagata City Office, Yonezawa City Office, Sakata City Office, Kaminoyama City Office, Murayama City Office, Tendo City Office, Higashine City Office
Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Fukushima City Office (2 persons), Koriyama City Office, Iwaki City Office, Date City Office
Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government Office, Koga City Office, Ryugasaki City Office, Shimotsuma City Office, Takahagi City Office, Kasumigaura City Office, Sakai Town Office (2 persons)
Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government Office, Utsunomiya City Office, Sano City Office, Oyama City Office
Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Yoshioka Town Office, Nakanohojo Town Office
Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government Office, Saitama City Office (2 persons), Kawagoe City Office, Gyoda City Office, Fukaya City Office (2 persons), Asaka City Office, Wako City Office, Okegawa City Office, Kuki City Office, Fujimi City Office, Yoshikawa City Office, Kawajima Town Office
Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government Office, Chiba City Office, Ichikawa City Office (2 persons), Funabashi City Office, Tateyama City Office, Kisarazu City Office, Matsudo City Office, Mobarra City Office, Narita City Office, Sakura City Office, Narashino City Office, Kashiwa City Office, Ichihara City Office, Nagareyama City Office, Yachiyo City Office, Kimitsu City Office, Futtsu City Office, Urayasu City Office, Yotsukaido City Office, Yachimata City Office, Inzai City Office, Tomisato City Office, Katori City Office, Sammu City Office, Isumi City Office, Oamishirasato City Office, Shisui Town Office, Kyonan Town Office
Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government Office (8 persons), Sumida Ward Office, Koto Ward Office, Shinagawa Ward Office (3 persons), Meguro Ward Office, Ota Ward Office (2 persons), Shibuya Ward Office (2 persons), Kita Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office, Adachi Ward Office, Katsushika Ward Office, Hino City Office, Komae City Office, Mizuho Town Office
Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government Office (4 persons), Yokohama City Office (9 persons), Kawasaki City Office, Sagami City Office, Yokosuka City Office (2 persons), Hiratsuka City Office, Kamakura City Office, Fujisawa City Office (4 persons), Odawara City Office, Chigasaki City Office, Zushi City Office, Miura City Office, Isehara City Office, Ebina City Office (4 persons), Zama City Office, Minamishigara City Office, Ayase City Office, Oiso Town Office, Nakai Town Office, Oi Town Office, Matsuda Town Office, Yamakita Town Office, Kaisei Town Office, Hakone Town Office (2 persons), Yugawara Town Office, Aikawa Town Office
Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government Office, Niigata City Office, Kamo City Office, Tsubame City Office, Joetsu City Office, Tainai City Office, Seiro Town Office, Sekikawa Village Office
Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government Office, Toyama City Office, Tonami City Office
Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government Office, Kanazawa City Office, Wajima City Office, Hodatsushimizu Town Office
Fukui	Fukui Prefectural Government Office (4 persons), Katsuyama City Office, Awara City Office
Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government Office, Fujiyoshida City Office, Minami-Alps City Office, Minobu Town Office, Yamanakako Village Office, Fujikawaguchiko Town Office
Nagano	Nagano Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Nagano City Office, Matsumoto City Office, Chino City Office, Shiojiri City Office, Azumino City Office
Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Gifu City Office, Mizunami City Office, Kakamigahara City Office, Hida City Office, Kaizu City Office
Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government Office (6 persons), Shizuoka City Office, Hamamatsu City Office, Shimada City Office (2 persons), Gotemba City Office (3 persons), Shimoda City Office, Susono City Office, Makinohara City Office, Oyama Town Office
Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government Office, Nagoya City Office, Toyohashi City Office (2 persons), Handa City Office, Kasugai City Office, Hekinan City Office, Kariya City Office, Toyota City Office, Nishio City Office, Gamagori City Office, Tokoname City Office, Komaki City Office, Inazawa City Office, Tokai City Office, Obu City Office, Chita City Office, Takahama City Office, Toyoake City Office, Misshin City Office, Tahara City Office, Kiyosu City Office, Kitayagoya City Office (3 persons), Yatomi City Office, Miyoshi City Office, Ama City Office, Nagakute City Office, Toyoyama Town Office, Oguchi Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Office, Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office, Kota Town Office
Mie	Mie Prefectural Government Office, Tsu City Office, Yokkaichi City Office, Ise City Office, Kuwana City Office, Nabari City Office, Kameyama City Office, Toba City Office, Shima City Office
Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government Office, Konan City Office, Takashima City Office
Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Kyoto City Office, Maizuru City Office, Joyo City Office, Yawata City Office (2 persons), Kyotanabe City Office, Kizugawa City Office (2 persons), Seika Town Office (2 persons)
Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government Office, Osaka City Office (2 persons), Sakai City Office, Kishiwada City Office, Ikeda City Office, Izumiotsu City Office, Kaizuka City Office, Ibaraki City Office, Izumisano City Office, Tondabayashi City Office, Kawachinagano City Office, Daito City Office, Takaishi City Office, Shijonawate City Office, Osakasayama City Office, Chihayaakasaka Village Office
Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government Office, Kobe City Office (2 persons), Himeji City Office, Akashi City Office, Toyooka City Office, Nishiwaki City Office, Kawanishi City Office, Ono City Office, Shiso City Office, Kato City Office, Inagawa Town Office
Nara	Nara Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Nara City Office (2 persons), Yamatotakada City Office, Kashihara City Office, Gojo City Office (2 persons), Ikoma City Office, Tawaramoto Town Office (2 persons)
Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government Office, Shirahama Town Office, Nachikatsuura Town Office
Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Tottori City Office, Yonago City Office, Nambu Town Office
Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government Office, Matsue City Office, Hamada City Office, Izumo City Office, Utsunomiya City Office, Utsunoyama City Office, Okuizumo Town Office
Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government Office, Kurashiki City Office, Asakuchi City Office, Kagamino Town Office
Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government Office (3 persons), Hiroshima City Office, Kure City Office, Mihara City Office, Fuchu City Office, Miyoshi City Office, Otake City Office, Hatsukaichi City Office, Kaita Town Office, Kumano Town Office, Saka Town Office
Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government Office, Shimonoseki City Office, Yamaguchi City Office, Hagi City Office, Hofu City Office (2 persons), Iwakuni City Office, Hikari City Office, Nagato City Office, Waki Town Office

Prefectural Government	Government employment situation
Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government Office (6 persons), Tokushima City Office, Anan City Office, Yoshinogawa City Office (2 persons), Awa City Office, Mima City Office, Katsuura Town Office
Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government Office, Marugame City Office, Sakaide City Office, Zentsuji City Office, Kanonji City Office, Sanuki City Office, Mitoyo City Office, Ayagawa Town Office, Manno Town Office
Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government Office, Matsuyama City Office, Imabari City Office, Uwajima City Office, Niihama City Office, Saijo City Office, Seiyu City Office, Ainan Town Office
Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government Office, Kochi City Office, Susaki City Office, Konan City Office
Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government Office, Kitakyushu City Office, Fukuoka City Office (2 persons), Kurume City Office (2 persons), Izuka City Office (2 persons), Chikugo City Office, Yukuhashi City Office, Ogori City Office, Kasuga City Office, Onojo City Office (2 persons), Munakata City Office, Dazaifu City Office, Asakura City Office, Miyama City Office, Nakagawa City Office (2 persons), Sasaguri Town Office, Hisayama Town Office, Kasuya Town Office, Ashiya Town Office, Okagaki Town Office, Tachiarai Town Office
Saga	Saga Prefectural Government Office (4 persons), Karatsu City Office, Takeo City Office, Ureshino City Office, Yoshinogari Town Office, Kamimine Town Office, Genkai Town Office
Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Nagasaki City Office (2 persons), Sasebo City Office (2 persons), Shimabara City Office, Omura City Office, Iki City Office, Saikai City Office, Unzen City Office
Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Kumamoto City Office, Yatsushiro City Office, Arao City Office, Minamata City Office, Kikuchi City Office, Koshi City Office, Ozu Town Office, Kikuyo Town Office, Yamato Town Office, Ashikita Town Office, Kuma Village Office, Asagiri Town Office
Oita	Oita Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Oita City Office, Beppu City Office (2 persons), Hita City Office, Kitsuki City Office (2 persons), Yufu City Office, Hiji Town Office
Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government Office (3 persons), Miyazaki City Office, Miyakonojo City Office (4 persons), Nobeoka City Office (2 persons), Nichinan City Office, Kobayashi City Office (2 persons), Hyuga City Office, Kushima City Office, Saito City Office, Ebino City Office, Takaharu Town Office, Takanabe Town Office, Shintomi Town Office, Tsuno Town Office, Kadogawa Town Office
Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Kagoshima City Office, Kanoya City Office, Izumi City Office, Taramizu City Office, Satsumasendai City Office (2 persons), Kirishima City Office (2 persons), Aira City Office, Satsuma Town Office, Yusui Town Office, Kinko Town Office
Okinawa	Tomigusuku City Office, Tarama Village Office

Notes: Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2023 (part-time personnel included).

Reference 70 List of Maneuver Areas

Category	Name	Location	Size				Notes
			Administrative properties	Properties of other ministries	Private properties	Total	
Large maneuver areas	Yausubetsu	Hokkaido	168,134	—	15	168,149	
	Hokkaido	Hokkaido	95,805	143	9	95,957	Consists of 7 areas.
	Ojojihara	Miyagi	42,487	11	4,059	46,557	
	Kitafuji	Yamanashi	19,659	6	26,930	46,595	
	Higashifuji	Shizuoka	29,338	5,139	53,831	88,308	
	Hijudai	Oita	49,870	—	—	49,870	
	Total	6	405,293	5,299	84,844	495,436	
Medium maneuver areas	Onishibetsu	Hokkaido	14,925	—	—	14,925	
	Kamifurano	Hokkaido	42,851	—	14	42,865	
	Shikaribetsu	Hokkaido	33,288	—	4	33,292	
	Iwatesan	Iwate	22,891	—	0	22,891	
	Shirakawanunobikiyama	Fukushima	18,108	1	1,716	19,825	
	Soumagahara	Gunma	6,312	—	2,725	9,036	
	Sekiyama	Niigata	15,856	—	2,994	18,850	
	Aibano	Shiga	22,555	—	2,234	24,789	
	Aonogahara	Hyogo	6,085	—	—	6,085	
	Nihonbara	Okayama	14,654	—	4,982	19,635	
	Onohara	Nagasaki, Saga	5,992	—	83	6,075	
	Oyanohara	Kumamoto	16,328	12	—	16,340	
	Jumonjibaru	Oita	6,328	—	79	6,407	
	Kirishima	Miyazaki, Kagoshima	11,093	5	—	11,098	
Total	14	237,266	18	14,831	252,113		
Small maneuver areas	50	62,176	106	3,393	65,675		
Total	70	704,735	5,423	103,068	813,224		

Unit: 1,000 square meters

* Rounded to the nearest unit

* "0" indicates less than the unit, and "—" indicates there is no applicable quantity.

Reference 71 Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs (Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ○Disposal operations in FY2022: a total of 1,372 disposal operations (average of approximately 26 operations per week), weighing approximately 41.9 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 13.1 tons (accounting for about 31% of such bombs removed across the nation) in 467 disposal operations (accounting for about 34% of the nationwide total). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Removal of Underwater Mines (Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others. ○Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. ○Disposal operations in FY2022: a total 3,779 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 2.7 tons in total. (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Medical Activities (Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College Hospital in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (eight out of 11 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ○The National Defense Medical College Hospital serves as an advanced treatment hospital (provision of advanced medical treatment, etc.) and a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services (acceptance of emergency patients in critical condition). ○In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs. ○The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. ○The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on disaster and emergency medicine.
Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings (Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services. ○The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.
Exchanges with Local Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.

Reference 72

List of U.S. Forces Japan Facilities/Areas (including joint use facilities)

As of January 1, 2023

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location						Area (km ²)	2-1(a) Area		2-4(b) Area
									2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area	
Camp Chitose	Communications	Chitose City, Hokkaido					4,274	4,274	4,263	0	
Camp Higashi Chitose	Maneuver area	Chitose City, Hokkaido					81	0	0	81	
Hokkaido Chitose Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Eniwa City, Hokkaido	Chitose City, Hokkaido	Sapporo City, Hokkaido	Kita Hiroshima City, Hokkaido		92,288	0	0	92,288	
Chitose Air Base	Air base	Chitose City, Hokkaido	Tomakomai City, Hokkaido	Erimo Town, Horozumi County, Hokkaido			2,584	0	0	2,584	
Betsukai Yausubetsu Large Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Batsukai Town, Notsuke County, Hokkaido	Akkeshi Town, Akkeshi County, Hokkaido	Hamanaka Town, Akkeshi County, Hokkaido			168,178	0	0	168,178	
Camp Kushiro	Barracks	Kushiro Town, Kushiro County, Hokkaido					26	0	0	26	
Camp Shikaoi	Maneuver area	Shikaoi Town, Kato County, Hokkaido					59	0	0	59	
Kamifurano Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Kamifurano Town, Sorachi County, Hokkaido	Nakafurano Town, Sorachi County, Hokkaido	Furano City, Hokkaido			34,688	0	0	34,688	
Camp Sapporo	Maneuver area	Sapporo City, Hokkaido					8	0	0	8	
Shikaoi Shikaribetsu Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Shikaoi Town, Kato County, Hokkaido					32,832	0	0	32,832	
Camp Obihiro	Maneuver area	Obihiro City, Hokkaido					757	0	0	757	
Asahikawa Chikabumidai Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Asahikawa City, Hokkaido					1,416	0	0	1,416	
Camp Okadama	Other	Sapporo City, Hokkaido					2	0	0	2	
Nayoro Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Nayoro City, Hokkaido					1,734	0	0	1,734	
Takikawa Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takikawa City, Hokkaido	Shintotsukawa Town, Kabato County, Hokkaido				1,367	0	0	1,367	
Bihoro Training Area	Maneuver area	Bihoro Town, Abashiri County, Hokkaido					2,269	0	0	2,269	
Kutchan Takamine Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Kutchan Town, Abuta County, Hokkaido					928	0	0	928	
Engaru Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Engaru Town, Mombetsu County, Hokkaido					1,082	0	0	1,082	
Misawa Air Base	Air base	Miasawa City, Aomori	Hachinohe City, Aomori	Tohoku Town, Kamikita County, Aomori	Mutsu City, Aomori		15,968	15,780	5,183	188	
Hachinohe POL Depot	Storage	Hachinohe City, Aomori	Miasawa City, Aomori	Oirase Town, Kamikita County, Aomori			173	173	1	0	
Misawa ATG Range	Maneuver area	Miasawa City, Aomori	Rokkasho Village, Kamikita County, Aomori				7,656	7,656	7,655	0	
Camp Sendai	Maneuver area	Sendai City, Miyagi					51	0	0	51	
Camp Hachinohe	Barracks	Hachinohe City, Aomori					53	0	0	53	
Iwate Iwatesan Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takizawa City, Iwate	Hachimantai, City, Iwate				23,264	0	0	23,264	
Taiwa Ojojihara Large Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Shikama Town, Kami County, Miyagi	Taiwa Town, Kurokawa County, Miyagi	Ohira Village, Kurokawa County, Miyagi			45,377	0	0	45,377	

Reference

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km ²)	2-1(a) Area		2-4(b) Area
										2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area	
Kasuminome Air Field	Air base	Sendai City, Miyagi	Iwanuma City, Miyagi						260	0	0	260
Aomori Kotani Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Aomori City, Aomori							3,183	0	0	3,183
Hirosaki Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Nishimeya Village, Tsugaru County, Aomori	Hirosaki City, Aomori						4,904	0	0	4,904
Jinmachi Otakane Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Murayama City, Yamagata	Higashine City, Yamagata						1,308	0	0	1,308
Shariki Communication Site	Communications	Tsugaru City, Aomori							135	135	0	0
Akasaka Press Center	Office	Minato Ward, Tokyo							27	27	0	0
Yokota Air Base	Air base	Fussa City, Tokyo	Mizuho Town, Nishitama County, Tokyo	Musashimurayama City, Tokyo	Hamura City, Tokyo	Tachikawa City, Tokyo	Akishima City, Tokyo	Sayama City, Saitama	7,139	7,136	139	3
Tama Service Annex	Other	Inagi City, Tokyo	Tama City, Tokyo						1,948	1,948	0	0
Kisarazu Air Field	Air base	Kisarazu City, Chiba							2,095	2,095	2,082	Buildings only
Camp Asaka	Communications	Wakou City, Saitama							118	118	0	0
Tokorozawa Communications Station	Communications	Tokorozawa City, Saitama							966	966	0	0
Iruma Air Base	Maneuver area	Iruma City, Saitama	Sayama City, Saitama						4	0	0	4
Owada Communication Site	Communications	Niiza City, Saitama	Kiyose City, Tokyo						1,199	1,199	0	0
Iwo Jima Communication Site	Communications	Ogasawara Village, Tokyo							6,630	3,810	132	2,820
New Sanno U.S. Forces Center	Other	Minato Ward, Tokyo							7	7	0	0
Takada Sekiyama Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Myoko City, Niigata	Joetsu City, Niigata						14,080	0	0	14,080
Hyakuri Air Base	Air base	Omitama City, Ibaraki							1,089	0	0	1,089
Soumagahara Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takasaki City, Gunma	Shinto Village, Kitagunma County, Gunma						5,796	0	0	5,796
Camp Asaka	Maneuver area	Asaka City, Saitama	Wako City, Saitama	Niiza City, Saitama					17	0	0	17
Haneda Air Mail Control Activity Office	Office	Ota Ward, Tokyo							Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only
Negishi Dependent Housing Area	Housing	Yokohama City, Kanagawa							429	429	0	0
Yokohama North Dock	Port facility	Yokohama City, Kanagawa							523	523	Buildings only	0
Camp Zama	Office	Sagamihara City, Kanagawa	Zama City, Kanagawa						2,292	2,292	170	0
Naval Air Facility Atsugi	Air base	Ayase City, Kanagawa	Yamato City, Kanagawa						5,056	2,497	1,076	2,559
Sagami General Depot	Manufacturing	Sagamihara City, Kanagawa							1,967	1,967	0	0
Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex	Housing	Zushi City, Kanagawa	Yokohama City, Kanagawa						2,884	2,884	0	0
Azuma Storage Area	Storage	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							802	802	254	0
U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka	Port facility	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							2,363	2,363	49	Buildings only
Sagamihara Housing Area	Housing	Sagamihara City, Kanagawa							593	593	0	0
Nagasaka Rifle Range	Maneuver area	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							97	0	0	97
Urago Ammunition Depot	Storage	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							194	194	0	0
Fuji Barracks Area	Barracks	Gotemba City, Shizuoka							1,177	1,177	47	0
Tsurumi POL Depot	Storage	Yokohama City, Kanagawa							184	184	0	0

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km ²)	Area		
										2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Numazu Training Area	Maneuver area	Numazu City, Shizuoka						28	28	28	0	
Fuji Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Fujiyoshida City, Yamanashi	Yamanakako Village, Minamitsuru County, Yamanashi	Gotemba City, Shizuoka	Oyama Town, Sunto County, Shizuoka	Susono City, Shizuoka		133,925	0	0	133,925	
Camp Takigahara	Maneuver area	Gotemba City, Shizuoka						8	0	0	8	
Gifu Air Base	Other	Kakamigahara City, Gifu						1,626	0	0	1,626	
Komatsu Air Base	Air base	Komatsu City, Ishikawa	Wajima City, Ishikawa	Kyotanngo City, Kyoto				1,606	0	0	1,606	
Imazu Aibano Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takashima City, Shiga						24,085	0	0	24,085	
Camp Itami	Maneuver area	Kawanishi City, Hyogo	Itami City, Hyogo					20	0	0	20	
Kyogamisaki Communications Site	Communications	Kyotango City, Kyoto						36	36	0	0	
Fukukchiyama Rifle Range	Maneuver area	Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto						55	0	0	55	
Akizuki Ammunition Depot	Storage	Etajima City, Hiroshima						559	559	0	0	
Kawakami Ammunition Depot	Storage	Higashiroshima City, Hiroshima						2,604	2,604	0	0	
Hiro Ammunition Depot	Storage	Kure City, Hiroshima						359	359	0	0	
Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni	Air base	Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi	Otake City, Hiroshima					8,648	8,648	5,615	0	
Sofu Communications Site	Communications	Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi						24	24	0	0	
Kure Pier No.6	Port facility	Kure City, Hiroshima						12	12	0	0	
1st Service School training facility	Maneuver area	Etajima City, Hiroshima						Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only	
Haramura Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Higashiroshima City, Hiroshima						1,687	0	0	1,687	
Nihonbara Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Nagi Town, Katsuta County, Okayama	Tsuyama City, Okayama					18,844	0	0	18,844	
Miho Air Base	Air base	Sakaiminato City, Tottori	Yonago City, Tottori					778	0	0	778	
Haigamine Communication Site	Communications	Kure City, Hiroshima						1	1	0	0	
Itazuke Air Base	Air base	Fukuoka City, Fukuoka						515	23	0	491	
U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo	Port facility	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						496	488	12	9	
Sasebo Dry Dock Area	Port facility	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						83	41	28	41	
Akasaki POL Depot	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						754	754	0	0	
Sasebo Ammunition Supply Point	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						582	582	0	0	
Iorizaki POL Depot	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						227	227	45	0	
Yokose POL Depot	Storage	Saikai City, Nagasaki						679	679	0	0	
Harioshima Ammunition Storage Area	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						1,297	1,297	48	0	
Tategami Basin Port Area	Port facility	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						135	135	28	0	
Nyutabaru Air Base	Air base	Shintomi Town, Koyu County, Miyazaki						1,833	0	0	1,833	
Sakibe Rifle Range	Maneuver area	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only	
Hario Dependent Housing Area	Housing	Sasebo City, Nagasaki						354	354	0	0	
Hijudai-Jumonjibaru Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Kusu Town, Kusu County, Oita	Kokonoe Town, Kusu County, Oita	Yufu City, Oita	Beppu City, Oita	Hiji Town, Hayami County, Oita	Kitsuki City, Oita	Oita City, Oita	56,317	0	0	56,317
Tsuiki Air Base	Air base	Yukuhashi City, Fukuoka	Chikujo Town, Chikujo County, Fukuoka	Kasuga City, Fukuoka				906	0	0	906	
Omura Air Base	Other	Omura City, Nagasaki						Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only	

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location					Area (km ²)	2-1(a)		2-4(b) Area
								Area	Area	
Oyanohara-Kirishima Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Yamato Town, Kamimashiki County, Kumamoto	Ebino City, Miyazaki	Yusui Town, Aira County, Kagoshima			26,965	0	0	26,965
Camp Kita Kumamoto	Maneuver area	Kumamoto City, Kumamoto					21	0	0	21
Camp Kengun	Maneuver area	Kumamoto City, Kumamoto					39	0	0	39
Kanoya Air Base	Air base	Kanoya City, Kagoshima					490	0	0	490
Northern Training Area	Maneuver area	Kunigami Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Higashi Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa				36,590	35,331	0	1,259
Okuma Rest Center	Other	Kunigami Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa					546	546	0	0
Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield	Maneuver area	Ie Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa					8,015	8,015	0	0
Yaedake Communication Site	Communications	Nago City, Okinawa	Motobu Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa				37	37	1	0
Camp Schwab	Maneuver area	Nago City, Okinawa	Ginoza Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa				20,626	20,626	7,077	0
Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot	Storage	Nago City, Okinawa					1,214	1,214	0	0
Camp Hansen	Maneuver area	Kin Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Ginoza Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Onna Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Nago City, Okinawa		48,728	48,114	39,385	615
Kin Red Beach Training Area	Maneuver area	Kin Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa					14	14	0	0
Kin Blue Beach Training Area	Maneuver area	Kin Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa					381	381	0	0
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	Storage	Yomitan Village, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Kadena Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Onna Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Uruma City, Okinawa	26,276	26,276	121	0
Tengan Pier	Port facility	Uruma City, Okinawa					31	31	0	0
Camp Courtney	Barracks	Uruma City, Okinawa					1,339	1,339	0	0
Camp McTureous	Barracks	Uruma City, Okinawa					379	379	0	0
Camp Shields	Barracks	Okinawa City, Okinawa					700	700	0	0
Torii Communication Station	Communications	Yomitan Village, Nakagami County, Okinawa					1,895	1,895	0	0
Kadena Air Base	Air base	Kadena Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Naha City, Okinawa	Itoman City, Okinawa	19,856	19,856	23	Buildings only
Camp Kuwae	Barracks	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa					676	676	0	0
Camp Zukeran	Barracks	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Kitanakagusuku Village, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Ginowan City, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Uruma City, Okinawa	5,342	5,342	0	0
Awase Communication Station	Communications	Okinawa City, Okinawa					552	552	0	0
White Beach Area	Port facility	Uruma City, Okinawa					1,568	1,568	221	0
Futenma Air Station	Air base	Ginowan City, Okinawa					4,758	4,758	0	0
Makiminato Service Area	Storage	Urasoe City, Okinawa					2,675	2,675	0	0

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location						Area (km ²)	Area		
									2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Naha Port	Port facility	Naha City, Okinawa					559	559	3	0	
Army POL Depots	Storage	Uruma City, Okinawa	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Kadena Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Ginowan City, Okinawa	1,277	1,277	14	0	
Tori Shima Range	Maneuver area	Kumejima Town, Shimajiri County, Okinawa					41	39	0	2	
Idesuna Jima Range	Maneuver area	Tonaki Village, Shimajiri County, Okinawa					245	245	245	0	
Kume Jima Range	Maneuver area	Kumejima Town, Shimajiri County, Okinawa					2	2	0	0	
Tsuken Jima Training Area	Maneuver area	Uruma City, Okinawa					16	16	0	0	
Kobi Sho Range	Maneuver area	Ishigaki City, Okinawa					874	874	0	0	
Sekibi Sho Range	Maneuver area	Ishigaki City, Okinawa					41	41	0	0	
Oki Daito Jima Range	Maneuver area	Kitadaito Village, Shimajiri County, Okinawa					1,147	1,147	1,147	0	
Ukibaru Jima Training Area	Maneuver area	Uruma City, Okinawa					254	0	0	254	
Naha Air Base	Other	Naha City, Okinawa					7	0	0	7	
National total	130 facilities/ areas						979,841	262,610	75,091	717,232	
Mainland total (excluding Okinawa)	97 facilities/ areas						793,179	78,084	26,855	715,095	
Okinawa total	33 facilities/ areas						186,662	184,525	48,236	2,137	

- Notes:
- This table lists of the facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces based on Article 2, Paragraph 1 (a) of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (Exclusively used by the U.S., and includes those used by the SDF based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (a) of the Agreement) and the facilities and areas (controlled by Japan) used by the U.S. forces for a certain period of time based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (b) of the Agreement.
 - The figures in the "Area" column are the total size of facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces based on Article 2, Paragraph 1 (a) of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, and facilities/ areas used by the U.S. military for a certain period of time based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (b) of the Agreement.
 - The figures in the "2-4 (a) Area" column are the sizes of facilities and areas temporarily used by the SDF based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (a) of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and are included in the "2-1(a) Area" column.
 - Totals may not match because of rounding off.
 - "0" indicates that there is no corresponding area.

Reference 73 Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

Category	Measures	Description of Measures	Examples of Covered Facilities and Projects
Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities, ^{*1} etc.	Subsidies to finance disturbance prevention projects	Subsidies are granted to local governments' projects to prevent or mitigate disturbance caused by frequent use of armored vehicles and other heavy vehicles, and frequent shooting, bombing and use of other explosives by the SDF, etc.	- Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, community reception facilities for television broadcast
	Subsidies to finance noise prevention projects	Subsidies are granted to local governments' projects to prevent or mitigate significant noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc.	- Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as healthcare centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly
	Subsidies to finance soundproofing works for housing	Subsidies are granted for soundproofing works by homeowners, etc. in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc., is serious.	- Housing
	Compensation for relocations	In areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc., is especially serious, compensation, etc., is provided for the loss ordinarily incurred by relocating buildings, etc., to other areas or by removing them.	- Compensation for relocating buildings - Land purchase - Development of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated
	Improving green zones	Works such as the development of green zones are conducted on land in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas necessary for preventing the occurrence of new disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc., and for improving the living environment in their vicinities.	- Planting trees, installing grass fields
	Subsidies for developing facilities meant to stabilize people's lives	In cases where installation or operations of a certain defense facility is found to disturb daily lives or business activities of the residents of the surrounding areas, subsidies are granted for local government's facility development projects to mitigate such disturbance.	- Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes for the elderly, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. - Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities
	Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants	In consideration of the level of the influence of the installation or operations of a certain defense facility on the living environment and regional development of the surrounding areas, grants are provided to municipalities affected by the specified defense facilities for their projects contributing to the development of public facilities, improvement of the living environment, or smooth implementation of regional development.	- Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities - Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.
Act on Special Measures for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan, ^{*2} etc.	Realignment grants	In consideration of the increase of influence that the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan may exert on residents' stable daily lives, grants are provided to the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment for their projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry when they are found necessary to promote smooth and steady realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.	
	Grants for realignment-related training relocations	Considering that the influence of aircraft noise, etc., on residents' stable daily lives may continue even after the provision of the realignment grants ends in areas around the realignment-related specified defense facilities where training relocations are conducted, grants are provided for projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry.	- Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities - Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.
	Project to develop specified areas affected by the realignment	With the aim of promoting smooth realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, grants are provided to the prefectures that accommodate defense facilities, for which special attention needs to be paid with regard to the significant increase of influence on residents' stable daily lives due to the realignment, for their projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry that they implement from a broader point of view.	
	Realignment promotion project	Grants are provided for the development of facilities conducted by the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment, in light of the significance of promoting measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and properly and promptly implementing the realignment.	- Facilities similar to those meant to stabilize people's lives
Special Local Grant for Carrier Aircraft Units' Deployment	In consideration of the important role that carrier-based aircraft squadrons play for Japan's security and the significant influence on residents' stable daily lives including aircraft noise due to the deployment of the squadrons, grants are provided for projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry.	- Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities - Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.	
Training Grants	In consideration of the influence of trainings by the SDF or foreign armed forces on the living environment in the surrounding area or on the development of that area, grants are provided for the development of public facilities by the municipalities that accommodate the facilities used for trainings, or for projects for the smooth improvement or development of the living environment.	- Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities - Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.	

^{*1} Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Act No. 101 of 1974)

^{*2} Act on Special Measures for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (Act No. 67 of 2007)

Reference 74 Achievements of Antarctic Research Expedition

Expedition	Duration	Days of activity	Days in Antarctica	Transport volume of goods	Number of observers	Wintering party	Total voyage (nautical miles)
43rd	2001.11.11–2002.4.6	151	91	Approx. 1,100t	56	40	Approx. 22,000
44th	2002.11.11–2003.4.7	151	99	Approx. 1,230t	57	40	Approx. 22,000
45th	2003.11.11–2004.4.8	151	99	Approx. 1,120t	56	40	Approx. 21,000
46th	2004.11.11–2005.4.9	151	99	Approx. 980t	55	40	Approx. 21,000
47th	2005.11.11–2006.4.10	151	99	Approx. 1,080t	53	37	Approx. 22,000
48th	2006.11.11–2007.4.11	151	99	Approx. 1,110t	56	36	Approx. 21,000
49th	2007.11.11–2008.4.12	151	99	Approx. 870t	49	35	Approx. 20,000
51st	2009.11.10–2010.4.9	151	99	Approx. 1,130t	48	28	Approx. 21,000
52nd	2010.11.11–2011.4.5	146	99	Approx. 1,310t	60	28	Approx. 20,000
53rd	2011.11.11–2012.4.9	151	98	Approx. 820t	56	30	Approx. 19,000
54th	2012.11.11–2013.4.10	151	99	Approx. 680t	55	31	Approx. 21,000
55th	2013.11.8–2014.4.7	151	99	Approx. 1,160t	46	30	Approx. 20,000
56th	2014.11.11–2015.4.10	151	99	Approx. 1,017t	53	24	Approx. 18,000
57th	2015.11.16–2016.4.14	151	89	Approx. 1,040t	52	30	Approx. 24,000
58th	2016.11.11–2017.4.10	151	99	Approx. 1,060t	62	33	Approx. 20,000
59th	2017.11.12–2018.4.11	151	99	Approx. 1,000t	59	27	Approx. 20,000
60th	2018.11.10–2019.4.9	151	99	Approx. 1,000t	57	31	Approx. 20,000
61st	2019.11.12–2020.4.10	151	99	Approx. 1,000t	57	31	Approx. 20,000
62nd	2020.11.6–2021.2.22	109	51	Approx. 1045t	44	31	Approx. 16,000
63rd	2021.11.10–2022.3.28	139	99	Approx. 1140t	69	31	Approx. 20,000
64th	2022.11.11–2023.4.10	151	99	Approx. 1120t	69	27	Approx. 18000

* The 50th expedition not conducted.

Reference 75


External Construction Project Achievements

Fiscal year	Number of projects by construction				
	Total	Grading	Roads	Snow removal	Other
Before 1988	7,987	5,152	2,208	307	320
1989	39	33	4	2	0
1990	40	33	5	2	0
1991	29	23	6	0	0
1992	27	23	4	0	0
1993	25	22	2	0	1
1994	20	19	1	0	0
1995	20	15	5	0	0
1996	10	7	3	0	0
1997	11	9	2	0	0
1998	13	11	2	0	0
1999	12	10	1	0	1
2000	10	9	1	0	0
2001	7	6	1	0	0
2002	5	5	0	0	0
2003	3	3	0	0	0
2004	2	2	0	0	0
2005	1	1	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0	0
2007	0	0	0	0	0
2008	2	2	0	0	0
2009	0	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0	0
2011	1	1	0	0	0
2012	0	0	0	0	0
2013	1	0	1	0	0
2014	2	0	2	0	0
2015	1	1	0	0	0
2016	1	0	1	0	0
2017	0	0	0	0	0
2018	0	0	0	0	0
2019	0	0	0	0	0
2020	1	1	0	0	0
2021	1	0	1	0	0
2022	0	0	0	0	0
Total	8,271	5,388	2,250	311	322


Outline of the survey period: November 17-December 25, 2022

For details, refer to <<https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r04/r04-bouei/index.html>>


1 Interest in the SDF




2 Impression toward the SDF




3 Defense capabilities of the SDF




5 SDF's future overseas activities




7 Use of advanced science and technology for defense purposes



4 Role expected of the SDF (multiple responses)



6 The Legislation for Peace and Security's positive impact on Japan's national security



Reference

Reference 77 Record of Disclosure of Administrative Documents by the Ministry of Defense [FY2022]

	Ministry of Defense Headquarters	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches	Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency	Total
1 Number of disclosure requests	3,386	1,356	156	4,898
2 Number of decisions regarding disclosure	3,602	1,478	166	5,246
Requests accepted	1,865	571	86	2,522
Requests partially accepted	1,564	884	78	2,526
Requests declined	173	23	2	198
3 Number of requests for review	5,106	0	1	5,107
4 Number of lawsuits	2	0	0	2

Defense Chronology

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events		
1945	Aug. 15	World War II ends	1952	Jan. 19	RÖK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line)	1957	Aug. 06	Japan-U.S. Security Council inaugurated		
	Aug. 17	Higashikuniomiya Cabinet established		Feb. 28	Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement signed		Aug. 26	USSR announces successful ICBM test		
	Aug. 17	Republic of Indonesia declares independence		Apr. 26	Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard		Aug. 27	Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura		
	Aug. 28	Provisional government of People's Republic of Vietnam established		Apr. 28	Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded		Sep. 10	National Defense Council decision to produce P2V-742 aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17		
	Sep. 02	GHQ established		Apr. 28	Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty enter into force		Oct. 04	USSR launches the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1		
	Oct. 09	Shidehara Cabinet established		Apr. 28	Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ Abolished		Nov. 23	World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration		
	Oct. 15	General Staff Office and Military Command abolished		May 01	May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza		1958	Jan. 01	Japan becomes non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council	
	Oct. 24	United Nations established		May 26	U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Germany			Jan. 01	European Economic Community (EEC) starts	
	Nov. 30	Army and Navy Ministries abolished		May 27	European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed			Jan. 14	First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28)	
	1946	Jan. 04		GHQ orders purge from public office	Jul. 21			Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force	Jan. 31	U.S. successfully launches an artificial satellite
		Jan. 10		First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14)	Jul. 26			Japan-U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed	Feb. 17	ASDF begins scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace
Jan. 27		GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands	Aug. 31	National Safety Agency Law promulgated	Apr. 18	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs				
Feb. 26		Far East Commission formed	Jul. 01	National Safety Agency established; Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency; Coastal Safety Force inaugurated	Jun. 12	Inauguration of second Kishi Cabinet; Sato becomes Minister of State for Defense				
Mar. 05		Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech	Oct. 15	National Safety Force inaugurated	Aug. 23	Chinese People's Liberation Army attack on Quemoy intensifies				
Apr. 05		First meeting of Allied Council on Japan	Oct. 30	Inauguration of fourth Yoshida Cabinet; Kimura becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency	Sep. 11	Fujiyama-Dulles talks (Washington, D.C.); agreement on revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty				
Apr. 24		Civil administration of Okinawa established	Oct. 31	U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test	Oct. 04	Treaty Commencement of Japan-U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty				
May 03		International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened	Nov. 01	U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test	Oct. 23	Dulles talks with Chiang Kai-shek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China				
May 22		Yoshida Cabinet established	Nov. 12	Japan-U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed	Dec. 17	U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM				
Oct. 01		International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg renders judgment	1953	Jan. 01	Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated	1959	Jan. 12	Ito becomes Minister of State for Defense		
Nov. 03		The Constitution of Japan promulgated		Apr. 01	National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established		Mar. 30	Tokyo District Court rules the stationing of U.S. Forces unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case		
Dec. 19	First Indochina War starts (through 1954)	May 21		Inauguration of fifth Yoshida Cabinet	Jun. 18		Inauguration of second reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Akagi becomes Minister of State for Defense			
1947	Mar. 12	Truman Doctrine announced		Jul. 27	Korean War Armistice Agreement signed		Aug. 25	China-India border dispute		
	May 03	The Constitution of Japan takes effect		Aug. 12	USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test		Sep. 18	USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete military reductions at U.N.		
	Jun. 01	Katayama Cabinet established		Sep. 27	Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk		Sep. 26	Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon Vera		
	Jun. 05	Marshall Plan announced		Oct. 01	U.S.-RÖK Mutual Defense Treaty signed		Sep. 27	U.S.-Soviet Summit Meeting; joint statement issued at Camp David		
	Aug. 15	India and Pakistan gain independence		Oct. 30	Ikeda-Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength		Nov. 06	National Defense Council decision to produce 200 F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on November 10		
	Aug. 15	First India-Pakistan conflict (through 1965)		Dec. 25	Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored		Dec. 01	Antarctica Treaty signed		
	Oct. 05	Cominform established		1954	Jan. 21		U.S. launches world's first nuclear submarine (USS Nautilus)	Dec. 16	Supreme Court reverses original ruling in the Sunagawa case	
	Dec. 17	Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)			Mar. 01		U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll	1960	Jan. 11	Defense Agency moves to Hinokki-cho
	1948	Mar. 10	Ashida Cabinet established		Mar. 01	Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident	Jan. 19		New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed (enters into force June 23)	
		Apr. 01	USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949)		Mar. 08	Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed	Feb. 13		France conducts its first nuclear test in the Sahara	
		Apr. 27	Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated		May 14	Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels	May 01		U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace	
May 14		Israel gains independence; First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949)	Jun. 02		House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas	May 24	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the earthquake and tsunami in Chile			
Jun. 11		U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution	Jun. 09		Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA	Jul. 19	Ikeda Cabinet established; Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense			
Jun. 26		Berlin airlift starts	Jul. 01		Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated	Jul. 20	U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM			
Aug. 15		Republic of Korea (RÖK) declares independence	Jul. 21		Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed	Dec. 08	Inauguration of second Ikeda Cabinet; Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense			
Sep. 09		North Korea established	Sep. 03		Chinese People's Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time	Dec. 20	Formation of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front			
Oct. 19		Inauguration of the second Yoshida Cabinet	Sep. 08		Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact	1961	Jan. 13		National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20	
Nov. 12		International Military Tribunal for the Far East renders judgment	Dec. 02	U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed	Apr. 12		USSR successfully launches manned spacecraft			
1949		Jan. 25	Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) established	Dec. 10	Hatoyama Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense		May 16	Military junta seizes power in a coup in RÖK		
	Feb. 16	Inauguration of third Yoshida Cabinet	1955	Mar. 19	Inauguration of second Hatoyama Cabinet; Sugihara becomes Minister of State for Defense		Jul. 06	Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed		
	Apr. 04	North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) (NATO established)		Apr. 18	Africa-Asia conference held at Bandung		Jul. 11	Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed		
	Apr. 21	Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive		May 05	West Germany formally admitted to NATO		Jul. 18	Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Fujieda becomes Minister of State for Defense		
	May 06	Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany)		May 06	Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies		Jul. 18	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Second Defense Build-up Plan		
	Jul. 05	Shimoyama incident		May 08	Protests occurring at Sunagawa Base		1962	Jul. 18	Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (second term); Shiga becomes Minister of State for Defense	
	Jul. 15	Mitaka incident		May 14	Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO) starts			Jul. 23	International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva International Conference	
	Aug. 17	Matsukawa incident		Jul. 31	Sunada becomes Minister of State for Defense			Aug. 15	GSDF completes 13 division organization	
	Sep. 24	USSR declares possession of atomic bomb		Aug. 06	First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima			Oct. 15	Type 61 tank first introduced	
	Oct. 01	People's Republic of China established		Aug. 31	Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	Oct. 20		China-India border dispute (through November 22)		
	Oct. 07	German Democratic Republic established (East Germany)		Nov. 14	Japan-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed	Oct. 24		U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20)		
Oct. 07	Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan	Nov. 22		Inauguration of third Hatoyama Cabinet; Funada becomes Minister of State for Defense	Oct. 28	Premier of the Soviet Union Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba				
Dec. 07	Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan	Dec. 19	Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated	Nov. 01	Defense Facilities Administration Agency established					
1950	Jan. 27	U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries	1956	Feb. 09	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councillors, February 10)	Nov. 09		Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)		
	Feb. 14	Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed		Feb. 14	Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West	1963		Jun. 20	Agreement signed for U.S.-Soviet hotline	
	Jun. 21	John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan		Mar. 23	Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki			Jul. 18	Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (third term); Fukuda becomes Minister of State for Defense	
	Jun. 25	Korean War (ends July 27, 1953)		Apr. 17	USSR announces dissolution of Cominform		Aug. 08	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.-USSR-U.K. (enters into force on October 10)		
	Jun. 28	Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet		Apr. 26	First Japan-made destroyer Harukaze completed		Sep. 14	Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty		
	Jul. 07	United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea		Jul. 02	National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated		Sep. 16	Malaysian Federation established		
	Jul. 08	General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men		Jul. 26	Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal		Dec. 09	Inauguration of third Ikeda Cabinet		
	Aug. 10	National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect		Sep. 20	First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered		Dec. 17	RÖK transits to civilian government, Park Chung-hee becomes President		
	Aug. 13	Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins		Oct. 19	Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese-Soviet relations		1964	Jun. 15	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan	
	Aug. 14	Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Police Reserve		Oct. 23	Hungarian Revolution			Jul. 18	Inauguration of third reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Koizumi becomes Minister of State for Defense	
	Sep. 07	National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima		Oct. 29	Second Middle East War (Suez War, through November 6)			Aug. 02	Gulf of Tonkin incident	
Sep. 15	U.N. troops land at Inchon	Dec. 18	Japan joins the U.N.	Oct. 16	China successfully carries out its first nuclear test					
Oct. 25	Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War	Dec. 23	Ishibashi Cabinet established; Prime Minister concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 09	Sato Cabinet established					
Nov. 24	U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan	1957	Jan. 31	Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 12	U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time				
Dec. 18	NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces		Feb. 02	Kotaki becomes Minister of State for Defense	1965	Feb. 07		U.S. starts bombing of North Vietnam		
1951	Jan. 23		Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve	Feb. 25		Kishi Cabinet established		Feb. 10	Diet debate on Mitsuyasu study	
	Jan. 29		First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations)	Mar. 15		House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs		Jun. 03	Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Matsuno becomes Minister of State for Defense	
	Mar. 01		Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins	May 15		U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test				
	Apr. 11		MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers	May 20		National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Basic Guidelines for National Defense				
	Jul. 04		Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (second term)	Jun. 14		National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on First Defense Build-up Plan				
	Aug. 30		U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed	Jun. 21		Kishi-Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued				
	Sep. 01		Australia-New Zealand-U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty	Jul. 10		Inauguration of reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Tsushima becomes Minister of State for Defense				
	Sep. 08		49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan; Japan-U.S. Security Treaty concluded							
	Oct. 20		Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth							
	Oct. 26	House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councillors approval given November 18)								
	Dec. 26	Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (third term)								

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events
1965	Jun. 22	Japan-ROK Basic Treaty signed	1972	Sep. 29	Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China	1979	Jan. 11	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of E-2C
	Sep. 01	Second India-Pakistan conflict (to September 22)		Oct. 09	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, Key Matters for Inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, and Measures to Enhance Civilian Control		Feb. 11	Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran
	Nov. 10	Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)	Dec. 21	East-West Germany Basic Treaty signed	Feb. 17	Sino-Vietnamese War (through March 5)		
1966	May 16	Cultural Revolution starts in China	Dec. 22	Inauguration of second Tanaka Cabinet	Mar. 26	Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed		
	Jul. 01	France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined April 4, 2009)	1973	Jan. 23	14th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanito Program)	Jun. 18	SALT II signed	
	Aug. 01	Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Kambayashiyama becomes Minister of State for Defense		Jan. 27	Vietnam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect on January 28)	Jul. 17	Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980-FY1984)	
	Oct. 27	China successfully carries out its first nuclear missile test	Feb. 01	Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength	Jul. 25	Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26)		
	Nov. 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan	Feb. 21	Laos Peace Treaty signed	Nov. 09	Inauguration of second Ohira Cabinet; Kubota becomes Minister of State for Defense		
Dec. 03	Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuda becomes Minister of State for Defense	Mar. 29	U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Vietnam	Dec. 27	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan			
1967	Jan. 27	Outer Space Treaty signed	May 29	Yamanaka becomes Minister of State for Defense	1980	Feb. 04	Hosoda becomes Minister of State for Defense	
	Feb. 17	Inauguration of second Sato Cabinet	Jun. 22	General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed		Feb. 26	Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18)	
	Mar. 14	National Defense Council decision adopted on Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan (Cabinet decision on March 14)	Jul. 01	Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa	Apr. 11	Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses		
	Mar. 29	Sapporo District Court renders judgment on Eniwa Case	Sep. 07	Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgment)	May 18	China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific Ocean for the first time		
	Jun. 05	Third Middle East War (through June 9)	Sep. 21	Japan-North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations	Jul. 17	House of Councillors establishes special committee for Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Territories issues		
	Jun. 17	China successfully carries out its first hydrogen bomb test	Oct. 06	Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25)	Jul. 17	Suzuki Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense		
	Jul. 01	Formation of European Community (EC)	Oct. 08	Japan-Soviet Summit Meeting (Moscow)	Aug. 18	Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles		
	Aug. 08	Formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	Oct. 17	Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies	Aug. 19	Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced		
	Nov. 25	Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet	Nov. 07	Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO	Aug. 21	Soviet nuclear submarine has an accident off the main island of Okinawa		
	Nov. 25	Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet	Nov. 25	Inauguration of second reshuffled Tanaka Cabinet	Sep. 03	First meeting of the Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (Washington, D.C., through September 4)		
1968	Jan. 16	Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. troops east of Suez	1974	Jan. 05	Japan-China Trade Agreement signed	1981	Sep. 22	Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war
	Jan. 19	U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time		Jan. 18	Israel and Egypt sign Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Treaties		Jan. 06	February 7 decided as Northern Territories Day (Cabinet understanding)
	Jan. 23	Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea	Apr. 20	Japan-China Aviation Agreement signed	Apr. 22	Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation		
	Feb. 26	New Japan-U.S. nuclear agreement signed	Apr. 25	National Defense Medical College opens	Jul. 07	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit		
	May 13	First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris	May 18	India carries out its first underground nuclear test	Jul. 13	Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgment in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits		
	Jun. 26	Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan	Jul. 03	U.S. President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed	Oct. 01	(GSD) First Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3)		
	Jul. 01	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed	Oct. 08	Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize	Nov. 30	Inauguration of reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet; Ito becomes Minister of State for Defense		
	Aug. 20	Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia	Nov. 11	Inauguration of second reshuffled second Tanaka Cabinet (second term); Uno becomes Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 13	Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military Council of National Salvation		
	Aug. 24	France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific	Nov. 13	Japan-China Marine Transport Agreement signed	1982	Feb. 15	(GSD) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Takigahara, through February 19)	
	Nov. 30	Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Arita becomes Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 15	U.N. forces in Korea discovers a North Korean infiltration tunnel		Apr. 02	Falklands dispute (ends June 14)	
	1969	Jan. 10	National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet	Nov. 23	U.S. President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement on SALT II	Apr. 25	Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula	
		Mar. 02	Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island)	Dec. 09	Miki Cabinet established; Sakata becomes Minister of State for Defense	May 15	Use of some sections of land within facilities and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law	
		Apr. 15	North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane	1975	Apr. 01	Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29)	Jun. 06	Israeli forces invade Lebanon
Jun. 10		South Vietnam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government	Apr. 23		U.S. President Ford declares end of Vietnam War	Jun. 08	BWC enters into force in Japan	
Jul. 25		U.S. President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine)	Apr. 30	South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally	Jun. 09	Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded		
Nov. 21	Sato-Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)	Aug. 01	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki)	Jun. 29	Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.-Soviet Union (Geneva)			
1970	Jan. 14	Inauguration of third Sato Cabinet; Nakasone becomes Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 17	First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), held annually since	Jul. 23	1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and approved by National Defense Council		
	Jan. 24	Formation of integrated WFO (Warsaw Pact) forces (involving seven countries)	1976	Apr. 05	Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident)	Aug. 17	U.S.-China Joint Statement about U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan	
	Feb. 03	Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty		Jun. 04	Publication of second white paper on defense, "The Defense of Japan" (henceforth published annually)	Sep. 09	Supreme Court renders judgment on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case	
	Feb. 11	First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched	Jun. 08	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan	Oct. 12	China successfully tests SLBM water launch		
	Mar. 05	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force	Jul. 02	Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unified Vietnam) proclaimed	Oct. 20	Yokohama District Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit		
	Mar. 31	Yodo hijacking	Jul. 08	Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) established	Nov. 27	Nakasone Cabinet established; Tanikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense		
	Apr. 16	U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks	Aug. 05	Sapporo High Court renders judgment in Naganuma Nike suit	1983	Jan. 01	U.S. establishes new Unified Combatant Command (Central Command)	
	Apr. 24	China successfully launches its first satellite	Aug. 18	U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom by North Korea		Jan. 14	Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S. (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary)	
	Jun. 23	Automatic extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	Sep. 06	MIG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport	Mar. 23	U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)		
	Aug. 12	West Germany-USSR sign non-aggression pact	Sep. 15	Inauguration of reshuffled Miki Cabinet	Jun. 12	Director Tanigawa first Minister of State for Defense to inspect Northern Islands		
	Oct. 20	Publication of "The Defense of Japan," the first white paper on defense	Oct. 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977	Sep. 01	KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fighters near Sakhalin		
	Nov. 25	Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSD Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya	Nov. 05	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Immediate-term Defense Build-up and Handling Major Items in Preparations for Defense Forces	Oct. 09	19 ROK Government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorists		
	1971	Feb. 11	Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes	Dec. 24	Fukuda Cabinet established; Mihara becomes Minister of State for Defense	Oct. 25	U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada	
Jun. 17		Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed	1977	Feb. 17	Mito District Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit	Nov. 08	Signing of negotiation statement for sharing military technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement	
Jun. 29		Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed		Jun. 30	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective)	Dec. 12	(ASDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (Fuchu, through December 15)	
Jul. 05		Inauguration of third reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 01	Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200-mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters	Dec. 27	Inauguration of second Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense		
Jul. 30		All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi)	Aug. 01	North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea	1984	Jan. 01	Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN on January 7)	
Aug. 02		Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 10	Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study		Jun. 11	(MSDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (Yokosuka, through June 15)	
Aug. 09		India-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed	Nov. 28	Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Kanemaru becomes Minister of State for Defense	Oct. 16	Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies		
Sep. 30		U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war	Dec. 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of F-15s and P-3C	Nov. 01	Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet; Kato becomes Minister of State for Defense		
Oct. 25		U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan	1978	Apr. 12	Chinese fishing fleet infringes on waters around Senkaku islands	1985	Mar. 12	U.S.-Soviet Union arms control talks begin
Nov. 24		House of Representatives resolution on nonnuclear weapons		Aug. 12	Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China signed in Beijing		Apr. 02	USAF begins to station F-16 fighters at Misawa
Nov. 27	ASEAN declares SEA neutrality	Sep. 21	Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study	Jun. 04	China announces the reduction of one million personnel from the People's Liberation Army			
Dec. 03	Third India-Pakistan conflict	Nov. 03	Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Agreement signed	Aug. 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the JAL aircraft crash			
Dec. 03	Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 27	(ASDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1)	Sep. 18	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program; National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on introduction of Patriots			
Dec. 05	ASDF first domestic supersonic aircraft ASDF XT-2 delivered	Dec. 05	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28	Dec. 27	Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded			
1972	Jan. 07	Sato-Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases	Dec. 07	Ohira Cabinet established; Yamashita becomes Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 28	Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet (second term)		
	Feb. 08	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan	Dec. 25	Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia (withdrawal completed on September 26, 1989)	1986	Feb. 24	First Japan-U.S. bilateral joint command post exercise (Hino-cho, headquarters of USFJ, etc., through February 28)	
	Feb. 27	U.S. President Nixon visits China; China-U.S. Joint Communiqué	1979	Jan. 01		U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifies termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty after one year	Apr. 09	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit
	Apr. 10	Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)		Jan. 07	Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced			
	Apr. 18	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on SDF deployment in Okinawa						
	May 15	Return of Okinawa						
	May 26	SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit of U.S. President Nixon to USSR						
Jul. 03	India-Pakistan truce signed							
Jul. 04	ROK and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peaceful unification							
Jul. 07	Tanaka Cabinet established; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense							

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events		
1986	Apr. 26	Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union		Jun. 21	Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security		Jun. 11	North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.-North Korea consultations		
	Jul. 01	Security Council Establishment Law enacted		Aug. 02	Iraq invades Kuwait		Jul. 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12)		
	Jul. 22	Inauguration of third Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense		Aug. 02	U.S. President G.H.W. Bush gives speech at Aspen		Aug. 04	Signing of peace treaty in Rwanda civil war		
	Aug. 10	U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San Francisco, through August 11)		Oct. 03	German unification		Aug. 09	Hosokawa Cabinet established; Nakanisshi becomes Minister of State for Defense		
	Aug. 15	Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations		Oct. 16	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet		Sep. 01	U.S. DoD announces the Bottom Up Review		
	Sep. 05	Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S.		Oct. 24	USSR conducts underground nuclear tests in the Arctic		Sep. 13	Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy		
	Sep. 22	Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm)		Nov. 10	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled		Sep. 23	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)		
	Oct. 15	USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan		Nov. 12	Coronation of Emperor		Oct. 13	Japan-Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed		
	Oct. 27	First Japan-U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise (eastern and southern part of Honshu island, etc., through October 31)		Nov. 23	Great Thanksgiving Festival		Nov. 01	Maastricht Treaty comes into effect; European Union established		
	Dec. 20	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-FY1995)		Dec. 29	Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ikeda becomes Minister of State for Defense		Dec. 02	Aichi becomes Minister of State for Defense		
1987	Jan. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity	1991	Jan. 17	Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters	1994	Feb. 24	Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kadena Air Base noise suits		
	Jan. 30	Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)		Jan. 17	Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm		Mar. 23	First female aviation students join MSDF		
	May 27	Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas		Jan. 24	Government pledges an additional U.S.\$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region		Mar. 24	First female aviation students join ASDF		
	May 29	Director Kurihara first incumbent Director to visit China (through June 4)		Jan. 25	Cabinet decision adopted on ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled April 19)		Mar. 30	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit		
	Jul. 15	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits		Mar. 13	Kanazawa District Court renders judgment on the 1st and 2nd Komatsu Air Base noise suits		Apr. 28	Hata Cabinet established; Kanda becomes Minister of State for Defense		
	Jul. 20	U.N. Security Council adopts Iran-Iraq Conflict Cease Fire resolution (Number 598)		Mar. 31	WPO (Warsaw Pact structures) dismantled		Jun. 08	U.S. DoD submits "Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation" pertaining to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons		
	Aug. 26	Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted		Apr. 11	Gulf War formally ended		Jun. 30	Murayama Cabinet established; Tamazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense		
	Oct. 06	First Japan-U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7)		Apr. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on "Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf"		Sep. 22	U.S. DoD announces "Nuclear Posture Review"		
	Oct. 21	Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and announced		Apr. 26	Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf		Oct. 21	U.S.-North Korea talks, both sides sign "Framework Agreement" relating to support for North Korean light water reactors, and provision of substitute energy		
	Nov. 06	Takeshita Cabinet established; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense		Jun. 03	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Fugendake on Mt. Unzen		Dec. 01	First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17)		
	Nov. 29	KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists over the Bay of Bengal		Jul. 31	U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow		Dec. 01	Commander of U.S.-ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces		
	Dec. 08	INF Treaty signed		Sep. 06	Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states		Dec. 05	START-I comes into force		
	Dec. 18	Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas		Sep. 17	U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations		Dec. 18	Russia starts military operations against Chechnya		
	1988	Mar. 02		Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)	Oct. 09		SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time	Dec. 20	First visit to Japan by the ROK's naval training vessel (Harumi, through December 23)	
		Mar. 14		Armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Spratly Islands	Nov. 05		House of Representatives establishes the Committee on National Security	Dec. 26	Kanazawa branch of Nagoya High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Komatsu Air Base noise suits	
		Apr. 12		Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries	Nov. 05		Miyazawa Cabinet established; Miyashita becomes Minister of State for Defense	1995	Jan. 17	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (through April 27)
		May 29		U.S.-Soviet Union Summit Meeting (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged)	Nov. 26		Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines		Mar. 09	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established
		Jun. 01		Supreme Court renders judgment on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident	Dec. 05		Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of Ukrainian Republic		Mar. 20	SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23)
Jul. 23		Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka)	Dec. 08	CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at Summit Meeting (Brest, Belarus)	May 11	NPT extended indefinitely				
Aug. 17		First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada)	1992	Feb. 07	Twelve EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty)	May 19	Enactment of "Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use by United States Forces in Japan" (effective June 20)			
Aug. 20		Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran-Iraq War		Feb. 25	China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China	Jun. 05	The defense authorities of Japan and the ROK both issue the "letter concerning the prevention of accidents between aircraft of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and military aircraft of the Republic of Korea"			
Aug. 24		Tazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense		Apr. 01	Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency	Jul. 28	Vietnam officially joins ASEAN			
Sep. 20		First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced		Apr. 01	First female students enter National Defense Academy of Japan	Aug. 01	1st KEDO Meeting (Japan-U.S.-ROK) held (New York)			
Oct. 17		U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised Military Bases Agreement		Apr. 27	Tokyo District Court renders judgment in suits pertaining to the surrender of land for Atsugi Air Base	Aug. 08	Inauguration of reshuffled Murayama Cabinet; Eto becomes Minister of State for Defense			
Nov. 29		Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development		May 22	North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fire guns	Sep. 04	Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa			
Dec. 07	General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops	May 23		START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet States including Russia	Sep. 15	Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention				
Dec. 27	Inauguration of reshuffled Takeshita Cabinet	May 25		IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities (through June 5)	Oct. 27	Announcement of "Law Relating to the Treatment of Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International Organizations" (effective January 1, 1996)				
1989	Jan. 07	Demise of Emperor Showa		Jun. 19	Announcement of "International Peace Cooperation Law" (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of "Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams" (enacted June 29)	Nov. 17	Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa			
	Feb. 15	Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan		Aug. 10	International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force	Nov. 19	Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACCO)			
	Feb. 24	Emperor Showa's funeral		Aug. 24	China and the ROK establish diplomatic relations	Nov. 28	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996			
	Mar. 09	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started (Vienna)		Sep. 17	Departure commences of 1st Cambodia Dispatch Facilities Battalion (All units returned to Japan by September 26, 1993)	Dec. 14	Security Council of Japan decision adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000) (Cabinet decision on December 15)			
	Mar. 09	Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) started (Vienna)	Sep. 19	Departure of Electoral Observer to Cambodia (Marita)	Dec. 14	Security Council of Japan makes decision "Regarding upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter" (December 15, Cabinet approval), Model of Next-Generation Support Fighter "F-2" decided				
	Mar. 15	Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court renders judgment in the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit	Sep. 30	U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines)	Dec. 14	Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris				
	Mar. 30	New BADGE system begins operations	Nov. 09	CFE Treaty becomes formally effective	Dec. 20	IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations				
	Apr. 01	Consumption Tax Law enforced	Nov. 24	U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal from Philippines complete)	Dec. 26	Tokyo High Court renders judgement on remanded appeal trial for 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit				
	May 10	START-I reopened at U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through May 11)	Dec. 03	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military action by multinational forces in Somalia	1996	Jan. 11	Hashimoto Cabinet established; Usui becomes Minister of State for Defense			
	Jun. 03	Uno Cabinet established; Yamasaki becomes Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 12	Inauguration of reshuffled Miyazawa Cabinet; Nakayama becomes Minister of State for Defense		Jan. 26	START-II ratified by U.S. Senate			
	Jun. 04	Chinese martial law units fire on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident)	Dec. 16	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy peacekeeping operations in Mozambique		Jan. 31	SDF units dispatched to United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)			
	Jun. 20	Supreme Court renders judgment in the Hyakuri Base suit	Dec. 18	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-FY1995)		Mar. 08	China carries out three missile firing exercises in total, naval and air force live-fire drills and, ground, naval and air force integrated exercises in the waters close to Taiwan March 8-25			
	Jun. 22	Yokohama District Court renders judgment in the Atsugi Air Base suit to vacate the premises	Dec. 21	Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit		Mar. 23	Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections; Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected			
	Jun. 24	Zhao Ziyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin	1993	Jan. 03		U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow); START-II signed	Apr. 12	Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied)		
Aug. 10	Kaifu Cabinet established; Matsumoto becomes Minister of State for Defense	Jan. 13		Japan signs CWC		Apr. 15	Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective October 22)			
Sep. 26	Vietnam completely withdraws from Cambodia	Feb. 25		Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit and 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits		Apr. 16	Cabinet decision adopted on promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture			
Nov. 09	GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall)	Mar. 12		North Korea announces secession from NPT		Apr. 17	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued			
1990	Feb. 13	U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. troops in Europe		Mar. 25		Aegis ship (Kongo) enters service	Jul. 12	Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna)		
	Feb. 20	Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide "military technology related to FS-X" to U.S.		Apr. 08		Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Cambodia	Jul. 20	U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan		
	Feb. 28	Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ishikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense		May 04		Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II)	Jul. 26	First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30, Russian Navy's 300th anniversary naval review)		
	Mar. 03	Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, G.H.W. Bush, Palm Springs, through March 4)		May 04		Death of Superintendent Haryuyuki Takada, a civilian police officer in Cambodia	1990	Jun. 19	Japan-U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items)	
	May 29	Naha District Court renders judgment in administrative handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for USFJ Land		May 11		Mozambique Dispatch Transport Coordination Unit begin departing for Mozambique (All units returned home by January 8, 1995)				
	1990	Jun. 19		Japan-U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items)	May 14	United Nations Operation in Mozambique headquarters staff depart for Mozambique				
		Jun. 01		Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established	May 29	North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test over the central sea of Japan				
		Jun. 09		Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince	Jun. 01	Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established				

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events
	Jul. 29	China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45th), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing		Jun. 15	Shooting incident between North Korean Naval ships which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South Korean Naval ships	2002	Jan. 29	U.S. President G.W. Bush depicts "Axis of Evil" in the State of the Union Address
	Aug. 28	First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6)		Jul. 23	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 2nd Atsugi Air Base noise suit		Feb. 15	Cabinet decision adopted on international cooperation execution plan for Timor-Leste
	Aug. 28	Supreme Court renders judgement in lawsuit regarding mandamus pertaining to proxy signature with regard to the Act on Special Measures Concerning USFJ Land Release		Aug. 05	First Bilateral Exercise of Search and Rescue Exercise between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu)		Mar. 02	680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to Timor-Leste (through June 25, 2004)
	Sep. 10	U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)		Aug. 25	The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force		Mar. 06	Kanazawa District Court renders judgement in 3rd and 4th Komatsu Air Base noise suits
	Sep. 18	North Korean mini submarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory (clearing operation completed November 7)		Sep. 02	North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a new military demarcation line on the sea		Mar. 27	Introduction of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel System
	Sep. 26	Hong Kong protest vessels (Baodia) etc., intrude into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands		Sep. 23	SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22)		Apr. 22	2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2)
	Sep. 27	Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of the provisional government		Sep. 29	Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya		May 04	Russia completes return of the Cam Ranh base to Vietnam.
	Oct. 03	Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed		Sep. 30	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura (through October 3)		May 20	The United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISSET)
	Nov. 07	Inauguration of second Hashimoto Cabinet; Kyuma becomes Minister of State of Defense		Oct. 05	Inauguration of second Obuchi Cabinet; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense		May 24	Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
	Nov. 18	Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina		Nov. 22	SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000)		May 30	Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Dec. 02	SACO final report approved by Japan-U.S. Joint Security Council		Nov. 22	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station		Jun. 13	U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
	Dec. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters		Dec. 17	U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in place of UNSCOM		Jun. 29	Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL
1997	Jan. 02	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Russian Nakhodka shipwreck and oil spill disaster (through March 31)		Dec. 20	Rule over Macao transferred to China		Jul. 16	U.S. Government releases "National Strategy for Homeland Security"
	Jan. 20	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters		Dec. 27	Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the "Joint Response Manual for Suspicious Ships"		Jul. 29	Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed
	Apr. 29	CWC enters into force		Dec. 27	Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station		Sep. 04	Incident in central Sea of Japan (response to a suspicious ship)
	May 12	Russia-Chechnya peace treaty signed		Dec. 27	Cabinet decision adopted on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station		Sep. 17	Japan-North Korea Summit Meeting; Kim Jong-Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions
	Jun. 09	Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through June 2002)		Dec. 28	Anti-personnel mine disposal begins		Sep. 20	U.S. Government announces "National Security Strategy"
	Jul. 01	Hong Kong reverts to China		Jan. 17	First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17)		Sep. 30	Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ishiba becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jul. 03	The first artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa conducted on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji, through July 9)	2000	Feb. 16	Enactment of the "Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act"		Oct. 01	Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and Planning Branch) (through July 6)
	Jul. 16	North Korean soldiers cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops		Apr. 01	Mori Cabinet established		Oct. 13	First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)
	Sep. 11	Inauguration of second reshuffled Hashimoto Cabinet		Apr. 05	Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II)		Oct. 15	Five of those abducted return to Japan
	Sep. 23	Guidelines for New Japan-U.S. defense cooperation approved by Security Consultative Committee (SCC)		Apr. 14	Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President		Oct. 16	U.S. Government issues statement that North Korea admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, during Assistant Secretary of State Kelly's visit to North Korea
	Nov. 10	China-Russia Summit Meeting; China-Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China-Russia eastern border declared		May 07	Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building		Oct. 16	Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 3rd, 4th and 5th Atsugi Air Base noise suits
	Dec. 03	Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee		Jun. 16	The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force		Oct. 31	Naha branch of Fukuoaka High Court renders judgement in the suit pertaining to the surrender of land for Sobe Communication Site
	Dec. 19	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000)		Jul. 04	Inauguration of second Mori Cabinet; Torashima becomes Minister of State for Defense		Nov. 01	Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect classified information (defense secrets)
1998	Mar. 26	Introduction of a system of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel		Jul. 21	Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23)		Nov. 14	KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December
	Apr. 28	The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement		Aug. 25	Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established		Nov. 18	First SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido
	May 11	India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13)		Sep. 13	SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China		Nov. 21	NATO Prague Summit Meeting decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe
	May 22	Naha branch of Fukuoaka High Court renders judgement in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kadena Air Base noise suits		Nov. 20	The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF		Dec. 02	SDF personnel dispatched for the first time to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)
	May 28	Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30)		Dec. 05	Inauguration of second reshuffled Mori Cabinet; Saito becomes Minister of State for Defense		Dec. 12	North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities
	Jun. 06	U.N. Security Council resolution adopted that condemns nuclear tests by India and Pakistan		Dec. 15	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001-FY2005)		Dec. 16	Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (December 5) in Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
	Jun. 12	Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Government Reform		Feb. 05	SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11), following the major earthquake which hit western India on January 26	2001	Dec. 17	U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system (ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles and PAC-3)
	Jun. 12	Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12)		Feb. 09	Collision between Ehime Maru and U.S. submarine		Jan. 10	North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
	Jun. 22	A North Korean submarine intrudes into the east coast of ROK, seized by ROK forces		Mar. 01	The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect		Jan. 24	U.S. Department of Homeland Security established
	Jul. 27	China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, "Defense of China"		Mar. 07	Former Maritime Self-Defense official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy		Jan. 28	Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air Station Replacement
	Jul. 29	Bilateral search and rescue exercise between MSDF/ASDF and Russian Navy — the first full-fledged bilateral exercise between Japan and Russia		Apr. 01	Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force		Feb. 08	Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some exceptions)
	Jul. 30	Obuchi Cabinet established; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense		Apr. 01	Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes		Mar. 20	U.S. and U.K. Forces begin military operations in Iraq
	Aug. 31	North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace		Apr. 26	Koizumi Cabinet established; Nakatani becomes Minister of State for Defense		Mar. 27	Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency Establishment Act, etc. (changes in SDF personnel quota and number of Ready Reserve Personnel) enters into force
	Sep. 01	Temporary freezing of Japan-North Korea normalization talks		Jun. 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established		Mar. 30	International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2)
	Sep. 02	Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented		Aug. 08	Disaster relief teams dispatched for submarine rescue ship Chihaya to cooperate in raising the Ehime Maru (returned December 16)		May 01	U.S. President G.W. Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
	Sep. 24	Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement concluded (Takeshima Issue shelved)		Sep. 11	Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur		May 13	Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Sep. 30	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded		Sep. 12	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution condemning the terrorist attacks		May 31	U.S. President G.W. Bush proposes Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for the first time
	Oct. 21	KEDO signed		Sep. 19	Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S.		Jun. 01	U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting, enforcement of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
	Nov. 14	Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations in region November 18-December 1, return to Japan December 5)		Oct. 02	In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty		Jun. 06	Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
	Nov. 15	First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (two Jima)		Oct. 06	International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12)		Jul. 17	International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18)
	Nov. 20	Norota becomes Minister of State for Defense		Oct. 07	U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan (October 19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, first ground fighting)		Jul. 26	Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
	Dec. 17	U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20)		Oct. 08	Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the first meeting		Aug. 27	First Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through August 29)
	Dec. 22	Cabinet decision adopted on introduction of information gathering satellite		Oct. 29	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session		Sep. 12	First PSI exercise held in the Coral Sea northeast of Australia (through September 14)
	Dec. 22	Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO)		Nov. 02	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002)		Sep. 22	Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet (second term)
	Dec. 25	Security Council approves Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies		Nov. 25	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities		Sep. 30	Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of award for people engaged in dangerous activities (November 3, 2003 Former SDF personnel are conferred the award for people engaged in dangerous activities for the first time)
1999	Jan. 14	Inauguration of reshuffled Obuchi Cabinet		Nov. 27	Exchange of fire in the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ)		Oct. 07	Joint communiqué signed for the first time at Japan-China-ROK Summit meeting
	Mar. 23	Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24)		Dec. 05	U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I		Oct. 10	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years
	Mar. 29	GSDF establishes first brigade		Dec. 20	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)		Oct. 15	China launches its first manned spacecraft Shenzhou 5
	Apr. 01	Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet)		Dec. 22	Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman		Nov. 19	Inauguration of second Koizumi Cabinet
	May 24	Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the "Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement" (adding cooperation for operations to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan) approved in Diet (effective September 25)		Dec. 22	Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu	2003	Nov. 29	Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq
	May 28	Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan promulgated (enters into force August 25), Act for Partial Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act promulgated and enters into force		Dec. 29	Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba		Dec. 18	Iran signs IAEA agreement

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events
	Dec. 19	Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program		Nov. 30	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits		Oct. 03	The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," is announced
	Dec. 19	Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions)		Dec. 14	The first East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur)		Oct. 17	First Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (MSDF, U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force)
	Dec. 30	Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (January 1-2, 2004)		Dec. 16	U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the human rights situation in North Korea		Nov. 01	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
2004	Jan. 22	ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait	2006	Jan. 10	Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment	2008	Jan. 16	Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January 24, 25)
	Feb. 03	Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities		Feb. 04	Japan-North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/ missile issues are held (through February 6)		Jan. 25	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed
	Feb. 09	Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet		Mar. 06	At the Japan-China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (through March 7)		Feb. 19	Collision between Aegis vessel MSDF and fishing boat
	Feb. 09	MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8)		Mar. 27	Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles, etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture		Feb. 20	U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down out-of-control satellite outside the earth's atmosphere with an SM-3
	Mar. 04	Disaster relief teams dispatched for the first time in response to bird flu (Tanbacho, Kyoto Prefecture, through March 11)		Apr. 23	Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ		Feb. 21	Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean (through January 15, 2010)
	Mar. 26	Diet decides on installation of ballistic missile defense system (FY2004 draft budget passed in the House of Councillors plenary session)		May 01	The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) announces the "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"		Mar. 18	Cabinet decision adopted on "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy"
	Apr. 15	First transport of Japanese nationals living overseas implemented, 10 nationals transported from Iraq to Kuwait		May 11	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State for Defense sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ		Mar. 26	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. reorganization of the SDF Command and Communication Unit)
	Apr. 15	Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Defense Agency/SDF		May 29	First P-3C visit to Australia		Apr. 24	Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack
	Apr. 28	U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction		Jun. 01	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java on May 27 (through June 22)		Jun. 24	First visit of MSDF vessel to China (through June 28)
	May 22	Japan-North Korea Summit Meeting (Pyongyang). Five family members of abductees return to Japan		Jun. 20	The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDP contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces		Jun. 26	Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea
	Jun. 01	U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq		Jun. 23	Agreement concerning provision of arms and military technologies to the United States is signed		Jun. 26	Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Futenna Air Station noise suits
	Jun. 14	Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in House of Councillors plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved		Jun. 29	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, joint document "The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century" announced		Jul. 07	G8 Hokkaido Toyoko Summit (through July 9)
	Jun. 14	Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed		Jul. 05	North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan		Jul. 15	Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released
	Jun. 18	Cabinet agreement for SDF's activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces)		Jul. 13	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd, 4th and 5th Aisugi Air Base noise suits		Jul. 17	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Jun. 28	Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government		Jul. 31	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (inc. reinforcement of facilities administration function of the agency, establishment of the Equipment headquarters and reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices)		Aug. 02	Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Hayashi becomes Minister of Defense
	Aug. 13	U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa		Aug. 16	A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia		Aug. 08	Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces
	Sep. 27	Inauguration of second reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ohno becomes Minister of State for Defense		Aug. 29	U.S. Navy, deploys Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 at Yokosuka naval facility		Aug. 10	Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China
	Oct. 25	PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan for the first time (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27)		Aug. 29	The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenna Air Station established, and its first meeting held		Aug. 29	TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1
Nov. 10	Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan's territorial waters-Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12)	Sep. 26	Abe Cabinet established; Kyuma becomes Minister of State for Defense	Sep. 24	Aso Cabinet established; Hamada becomes Minister of Defense			
Nov. 16	Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine's intrusion into Japan's territorial waters	Oct. 09	North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test	Sep. 25	The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS "George Washington" arrives in the port of Yokosuka for the first time			
Dec. 10	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005" and "Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005-FY2009"	Oct. 13	Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test	Sep. 25	China launches a manned spacecraft "Shenzhou 7," and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the first time			
Dec. 28	MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand's Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia's Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)	Dec. 19	U.N. General Assembly adopts draft resolution condemning abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea	Oct. 03	U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan			
2005	Jan. 04	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean that occurred on December 26, 2004 (all teams returned home by March 23)	2007	Jan. 09	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of the Defense Agency into the Ministry of Defense and stipulation of the SDF's international peace cooperation activities as its primary mission)	2009	Jan. 08	ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri Air Base)
	Jan. 19	The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged submarines in Japan's territorial waters		Jan. 09	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of the Defense Agency into the Ministry of Defense and stipulation of the SDF's international peace cooperation activities as its primary mission)		Jan. 15	Ministry of Defense decides on "Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space"
	Feb. 10	North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement implying its manufacture of nuclear weapons (May 11, announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods)		Jan. 09	Kyuma becomes Minister of Defense		Feb. 10	Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the redeployment group
	Feb. 17	Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit		Jan. 12	China conducts an anti-satellite test		Feb. 17	Signing of the "Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam"
	Feb. 19	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) — common strategic objectives confirmed		Feb. 13	North Korea agrees to disable all of its nuclear facilities during the 5th Six-Party Talks		Feb. 27	Naha branch of Fukuoaka High Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit
	Mar. 08	ROK's Government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft approaching Takeshima without authorization		Mar. 05	First Aviation Training Relocation associated with realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Tsukiki, through March 8)		Mar. 13	Cabinet decision adopted on counter-piracy Measures Law
	Mar. 14	National People's Congress adopts "Anti-Secession Law"		Mar. 13	Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed		Mar. 13	SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security operations as part of counter-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
	Mar. 14	A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20)		Mar. 23	Emergency response procedures for destruction measures against ballistic missiles are prepared		Mar. 14	Two MSDF ships are dispatched to protect vessels with ties to Japan from the piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
	Mar. 16	Shimane Prefecture establishes "Takeshima Day"		Mar. 28	Establishment of the GSDP Central Readiness Force		Mar. 27	SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (through April 6)
	Mar. 25	Cabinet decision adopted on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians		Mar. 30	A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Inuma Air Base for the first time		Mar. 30	MSDF ships begin escort missions as part of counter-piracy measures
	Apr. 25	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the railroad accident on JR West's Fukuchiyama Line		Mar. 30	SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers (through January 18, 2011)		Apr. 03	Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti
	Jul. 14	Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in the East China Sea		Apr. 16	First Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise (MSDF, U.S. Navy and Indian Navy)		Apr. 05	North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace
	Aug. 05	An MSDF vessel dispatched to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All units returned home by August 10)		Apr. 16	Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya District Court renders judgment on the 3rd and 4th trials for the suits pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base			
	Sep. 09	First China-Russia joint military exercises "Peace Mission 2005" (through August 25)		May 01	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) announces the joint statement "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation"			
	Sep. 09	Five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovereignty Class, are navigating in the sea area surrounding "Kashi" gas field near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea		May 18	ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility			
	Sep. 21	Inauguration of third Koizumi Cabinet		May 29	Supreme Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits			
	Oct. 12	SDF units dispatched for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to large-scale earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All units returned home by December 2)		Jun. 01	Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance and the Local Defense Bureau, joint units of GSDP, MSDF and ASDF, etc.) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted			
	Oct. 20	GSDP and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attacks for the first time		Jul. 04	Koike becomes Minister of Defense			
Oct. 29	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) joint announces "Japan-U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future"	Jul. 20	Enactment of the "Basic Act on Ocean Policy"					
Oct. 31	Inauguration of third reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 10	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S. General Security of Military Information Agreement					
Oct. 31	Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year)	Aug. 27	Inauguration of reshuffled Abe Cabinet; Koumura becomes Minister of Defense					
2005	Nov. 11	Cabinet decision adopted on "The Government's actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee held on October 29, 2005"	Sep. 01	Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created				
	Nov. 27	Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture	Sep. 26	Fukuda Cabinet established; Ishiba becomes Minister of Defense				

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events
	Apr. 10	Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits		Dec. 17	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond and the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011 to FY2015)		Apr. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	May 04	1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines)					May 17	Signing of the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement
	May 15	Order issued for P-3C to be dispatched to Djibouti for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden	2011	Jan. 11	China conducts test flight of fighter aircraft touted as the next-generation stealth aircraft		Jun. 04	Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (second term); Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense
	May 19	"Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam" comes into force		Jan. 14	Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet (second term)		Jul. 01	26 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait (through July 2)
	May 25	North Korea conducts the 2nd underground nuclear test		Jan. 21	Signing of the new Special Measures Agreement in connection with cost-sharing arrangements on the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan (comes into effect on April 1)		Jul. 03	First PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Hokkaido, through July 5)
	Jun. 02	Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated		Jan. 27	Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th Kadema Air Base noise suit		Jul. 11	Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands
	Jul. 04	North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan		Feb. 04	The United States releases "National Security Space Strategy" (NSSS)		Jul. 12	One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands
	Jul. 14	Ratification of Convention on Cluster Munitions		Feb. 05	New START comes into effect		Jul. 12	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law for Establishment of Cabinet Office
	Jul. 17	Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their Possession		Feb. 23	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in New Zealand (through March 3)		Aug. 10	South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima
	Jul. 24	Counter-Piracy Measures Law enacted, Order issued for anti-piracy operations		Mar. 11	Four pirates that had shot at Japanese vessels off the Oman Coast in the Arabian Sea were arrested under the Counter-Piracy Law		Sep. 07	"Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the MOD/JSDF" is released
	Jul. 31	Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq		Mar. 11	Great East Japan Earthquake strikes		Sep. 11	Government's purchase of the three Senkaku Islands
	Aug. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. establishment of the Defense Council and the Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the Defense Councilors System)		Mar. 11	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through August 31)		Sep. 23	SDF dispatch to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ended
	Sep. 16	Hatoyama Cabinet established; Kitazawa becomes Minister of Defense		Mar. 12	Nuclear disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through December 26)		Sep. 25	The first Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" commissioned
	Oct. 05	SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia (through October 17)		Mar. 16	Cabinet decisions adopted on first disaster call-up of SDF Reserve Personnel and Ready Reserve Personnel in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake		Oct. 01	Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (third term)
	Oct. 27	Destroyer collides with ROK cargo ship in the Kammon Straits		Mar. 16	Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch GSDF Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel (through August 31)		Oct. 16	Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island for the first time
	Nov. 10	North and South Korean ships engage in fire in the Yellow Sea		Mar. 19	The coalition force led by the U.S., U.K., and France commence military operations against Libya		Nov. 26	Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Nov. 23	Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) receives the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea		Apr. 11	Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake established		Dec. 04	Launch of capacity building program in East Timor
	Dec. 01	Lisbon treaty comes into effect		Apr. 15	Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch MSDF and ASDF reserve personnel (through August 31)		Dec. 07	SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated December 12)
	Dec. 03	Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Supreme Court)		Apr. 27	Partial revision to the Environmental Improvement Law (extended target projects for subsidies to improve the environment surrounding specified defense facilities)		Dec. 12	North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a "Satellite"
	Dec. 05	START I lapses		May 02	U.S. President Obama announces the killing of Osama bin Laden, leader of the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda		Dec. 13	A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands)
	Dec. 17	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on the build-up of defense capability for FY2010		Jun. 01	SDF activity base in Djibouti initiates operation		Dec. 26	Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes Minister of Defense
2010	Jan. 11	China announces that it has performed missile interception test		Jun. 21	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" in Washington, D.C.) joint statement; release of "Toward a Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance: Building on 50 years of Partnership"	2013	Jan. 16	Abduction of Japanese nationals in Algeria
	Jan. 17	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in Haiti (February 14, operation completed)		Jun. 22	U.S. President Obama announces guidelines to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan		Jan. 19	A Chinese naval vessel may direct fire-control radar at a helicopter based on a JMSDF destroyer
	Jan. 19	"2+2" joint statement on the 50th anniversary of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty		Jun. 24	Exercise of the Basic Act on Reconstruction		Jan. 20	SDF dispatch to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) ended (ceremony to return unit flag)
	Jan. 29	First test flight of Russian fifth-generation fighter PAK FA		Jun. 28	First meeting of the headquarters for reconstruction measures		Jan. 20	As a measure for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas (JNO) prescribed in the Self-Defense Forces Act, SDF transports Japanese victims of the Algerian hostage crisis from Algeria to Japan (return home on January 24)
	Feb. 05	Decision made to dispatch SDF units to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (February 6, deployment commences) (January 25, 2013, operation completed)		Jul. 08	U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1996 to establish UNMISS		Jan. 25	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on build-up of defense capability for FY2013
	Feb. 27	U.S. announces "Quadrennial Defense Review" (DDR) and "Ballistic Missile Defense Review" (BMDR)		Jul. 09	Independence of the Republic of South Sudan		Jan. 25	"Basic Plan on Space Policy" is decided by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development
	Mar. 07	Russia publishes new Navy doctrine		Aug. 10	Conducts its first navigation Chinese aircraft carrier Yaryang		Jan. 30	A Chinese vessel directs fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer in the East China Sea
	Mar. 11	ASDF Hyakuri Air Base, joint civilian use of runway		Aug. 24	The Chinese fisheries patrol ships enter Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands		Jan. 31	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast of Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 26	ROK naval patrol ship "Cheonan" sank in the Yellow Sea by a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine		Sep. 02	Noda Cabinet established, Ichikawa becomes Minister of Defense		Jan. 31	Entry into force of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Mar. 26	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (new establishment of the 15th Bridge and reorganization of the Youth Technical School)		Sep. 09	24 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait		Jan. 31	Partial enforcement (regarding Japan-Australia ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Apr. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of GSDF students)		Sep. 27	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Tokyo), Japan-Philippines joint statement made		Feb. 01	Partial enforcement (regarding pilot allowance) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Apr. 06	U.S. announces "Nuclear Posture Review" (NPR)		Sep. 29	Chinese space laboratory "Tiangong 1" launched		Feb. 07	Russian fighters intrude into Japan's territorial airspace
	Apr. 12	1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., through April 13)		Sep. 30	Cabinet decisions adopted on "Promotion of the operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System project" and "Promoting development and utilization of aerospace"		Feb. 12	North Korea's underground nuclear test
	May 01	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to foot and mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27)		Oct. 10	ATR to Guam as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through October 28)		Feb. 20	Naha District Court renders judgement on Henoko environmental assessment case
	May 19	Signing of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)		Oct. 11	Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Futema Air Station noise suit		Feb. 23	Meeting between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Abe
	May 23	The MOD/SDF dispatches units to the Pacific Partnership 2010 for the first time (through July 15)		Oct. 24	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-France Information Security Agreement		Mar. 01	Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on participation of Japan's industries in the production of the F-35A
	May 26	Enactment of the "Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf"		Oct. 31	NATO ends operations in Libya		Mar. 15	SDF dispatch for the MINUSTAH mission ended (ceremony to return unit flag)
	May 27	U.S. announces "National Security Strategy" (NSS)		Nov. 15	Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF personnel as headquarters staff for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (departing Japan on November 28)		Mar. 22	Entry into force of Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement
	May 28	Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")		Nov. 22	Six Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Mar. 26	Partial enforcement (regarding shift of Air Rescue Wing's affiliation) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Jun. 08	Kan Cabinet established		Dec. 18	Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq		Mar. 30	Four Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 09	U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding additional sanction on Iran		Dec. 20	Decision made by the Security Council and seconded by the Cabinet regarding "acquisition of the next-generation fighter aircraft"		Apr. 02	North Korea announces that it will readjust and restart the graphite moderated reactor that was mothballed and disabled under an agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks
	Jun. 25	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Nato Information Security Agreement		Dec. 20	Cabinet Decision on dispatching engineer units, etc. for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (deployed from January 11, 2012) (Operation completed on May 31, 2017)		Apr. 26	Cabinet decision adopted on "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy"
	Jun. 28	Release of the U.S. "National Space Policy" (NSP)		Dec. 27	Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc.		May 07	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast of the Yonaguni Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jul. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of SDF recruits)		Dec. 28	Environmental impact statement for the Futema Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture (through January 6, 2012)		May 27	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Jul. 13	Cabinet decision adopted on "Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf"	2012	Jan. 11	1st Advance unit for UNMISS starts departing Japan		Jul. 04	Signing of the Japan-U.K. Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies and the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement
	Jul. 29	Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Futema Air Station noise suits		Jan. 13	Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet; Tanaka becomes Minister of Defense		Jul. 05	China-Russia first joint naval exercise "Naval Interaction 2013" (through July 11)
	Aug. 31	Air transport activities by helicopter in aid of flood disaster in Pakistan (through October 10)		Feb. 10	Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency		Jul. 13	Chinese naval fleets sail through Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk
	Sep. 07	Chinese fishing boat collides with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in waters near the Senkaku Islands		Mar. 16	Chinese government ship "Haijian" enters Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands		Jul. 22	China Coast Guard sign put up
	Sep. 10	Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF officers as key military contact personnel (military observers) to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (dispatched on September 27)		Mar. 26	Transfer of ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base		Jul. 24	Chinese early warning aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean for the first time
	Sep. 17	Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet		Mar. 27	Prime Minister Noda attends the Nuclear Security Summit		Aug. 21	Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition of the lowest enlisted ranks)		Mar. 30	SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated April 13)		Aug. 22	Russian bombers intrude into Japan's airspace
	Nov. 01	Russian President Medvedev visits the Kunashiri Island		Apr. 13	North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a "Satellite"		Aug. 27	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 23	North Korea shells the ROK's Yeonpyeong Island		Apr. 13	Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission		Aug. 30	"Direction of the MOD Reform" released
	Dec. 07	Establishment of a governmental committee to review information security, as a result of the leakage of the video showing the fishing boat collision of the Senkaku Islands		Apr. 17	Ten-month extension of SDF dispatch to support the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (through February 28, 2013)		Sep. 08	Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
2010				Apr. 27	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee "2+2" joint statement		Sep. 09	Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unidentified nationality flies over the East China Sea
						2013	Sep. 10	1st meeting of MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games held

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	
	Sep. 27	U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2118 on elimination of Syrian chemical weapons	2014	Aug. 12	Russian Armed Forces conduct exercises in the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands	2015	Jul. 29	China's intelligence gathering aircraft, early warning aircraft, and two bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (July 30)	
	Oct. 03	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2", Tokyo)		Aug. 19	Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to U.S. Forces' patrol aircraft		Jul. 30	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 6th, 7th and administrative 1st and 2nd Atsugi Air Facility noise suits	
	Oct. 03	Signing of the "Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam"		Aug. 20	Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11)		Aug. 17	Seven Chinese vessels sail Tushima Strait northward. Subsequently, China-Russia naval combined exercise, Joint Sea 2015 (II), is held (Sea of Japan) (August 20-28). Following the exercise, five vessels sail Soya Strait eastward (August 29), sail in the high seas in the Bering Sea (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 2), and enter into U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 4). Shelling incident occurs between North Korea and the ROK	
	Oct. 16	Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon No. 26 (through November 8)		Aug. 28	MOD formulates "Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space (revised)"		Aug. 22	Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island	
	Oct. 23	Five Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Sep. 01	Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo); "Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership"		Aug. 26	Signing of agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan	
	Oct. 30	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean		Sep. 03	Eto becomes Minister of Defense		Sep. 15	Presumed Russian aircraft intrudes into Japanese territorial airspace over the coast of the Nemuro Peninsula	
	Nov. 12	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to typhoon disaster in the Philippines (through December 18)		Sep. 03	2nd Reshuffled Abe Cabinet is established		Sep. 19	Legislation for Peace and Security ("Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security" and "International Peace Support Bill") is passed in the House of Councillors plenary session	
	Nov. 15	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decides on detailed terms of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, etc.		Sep. 10	U.S. President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL		Sep. 28	Signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship Relating to the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFJA)	
	Nov. 22	Revisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (e.g., expanded category of people who may be transported by the JSDF, in the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas) promulgated and entered into force		Sep. 22-	The United States and other coalition countries begin airstrikes on ISIL in Syria		Oct. 01	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (unification of actual unit operations into Joint Staff, establishment of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, etc.)	
	Nov. 23	China announces establishment of the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone"		Sep. 26	Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York)		Oct. 01	Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office are abolished; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency is established	
	Nov. 24	Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., China, Russia) reach first phase agreement for the comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue		Sep. 27	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Mt. Ontake (through October 16)		Oct. 03	Shooting attack in Bangladesh (one Japanese national is killed; ISIL Bangladesh claims responsibility for the attack in a statement)	
	Dec. 04	National Security Council established		Sep. 29	Afghanistan's new government is launched		Oct. 07	Inauguration of the third reshuffled Abe Cabinet	
	Dec. 08	The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identification Zone		Oct. 26	Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF (Hyakur)		Oct. 15	Iwakuni Branch of Yamaguchi District Court renders judgment in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Iwakuni Air Base noise suits	
	Dec. 13	Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets promulgated		Nov. 16	Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Nakaima in Okinawa gubernatorial election		Oct. 26	U.S. naval destroyer USS Lassen sails within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation	
	Dec. 14	Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing		Nov. 21	"Global Hawk" is decided as the model of unmanned aerial vehicle		Oct. 27	Cabinet verbal understanding regarding "Revocation of reclamation approval based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface pertaining to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project"	
	Dec. 17	National Security Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on "National Security Strategy," "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond," and "Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)"		Nov. 24	ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near Takeshima		Oct. 28	Written notice regarding start of construction work related to Futenma Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture	
	Dec. 23	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean		Nov. 28	Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, through December 11)		Nov. 11	A Chinese Navy AGI repeatedly conducts east-west passages near the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands (through November 12)	
	Dec. 23	Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned (incorporated into Pacific Fleet)		Dec. 01	Self-Defense Officials dispatched to NATO for the first time		Nov. 26	Suit is instituted for "Case regarding retraction order request for revocation of the landfill permit based on provisions of Article 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act" ("administrative suit")	
	Dec. 27	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approves application for public water reclamation for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project		Dec. 04	Five Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean		Nov. 27	China's four bombers and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson of China announces flight by PLA Air Force aircraft). At around the same time, four bombers and early warning aircraft conduct operations near the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island	
2014	Jan. 01	Entry into force of the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement		Dec. 10	Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets enters into force		Dec. 04	Japan-U.S. Joint Press Release "Implementation of Bilateral Plans for Consolidating Facilities and Areas in Okinawa"	
	Jan. 07	National Security Secretariat launched		Dec. 19	Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2)		Dec. 07	Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean	
	Jan. 15	Collision accident between transport vessel and fishing vessel in the Hiroshima Bay		Dec. 24	Inauguration of the third Abe Cabinet, Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense		Dec. 12	Japan-India Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (New Delhi)	
	Jan. 22	Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa established		Dec. 24	Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect		Dec. 12	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-India General Security of Military Information Agreement	
	Feb. 14	Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa established		Dec. 26	Deployment of U.S. Forces TYP-2 ("X-band radar") to Kyogamisaki is completed		Dec. 13	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean	
	Mar. 01	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Dec. 31	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11)		Dec. 26	A China Coast Guard vessel carrying weapons that appear to be cannons intrudes into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time	
	Mar. 03	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles	2015	Jan. 02	ISIL releases video of Japanese hostages (videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals subsequently released on January 24 and February 1)		Dec. 31	Russia revises National Security Strategy	
	Mar. 11	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the missing Malaysian Airplane (through April 28)		Jan. 09	"Basic Plan on Space Policy" is decided by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development		2016	Jan. 06	North Korea conducts fourth nuclear test which it called a "hydrogen bomb test"
	Mar. 18	Russian "annexation" of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea		Jan. 21	First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (London)		Jan. 11	Chinese Ministry of National Defense announces organizational realignment of the Central Military Commission (dismantlement of four general departments, CMC's introduction of multiple section system)	
	Mar. 19	A submarine seen navigating underwater in Japan's contiguous zone (waters east of Miyako Island)		Feb. 06	The United States releases "National Security Strategy" (NSS)		Jan. 26	Two Russian bombers conduct flight along the perimeter of Japan	
	Mar. 24	Prime Minister Abe attends 3rd Nuclear Security Summit (Hague, through March 25)		Feb. 12	Minsk agreement II (German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders agree on new ceasefire agreement)		Jan. 30	A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation	
	Mar. 26	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles		Feb. 13	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Jan. 31	China's intelligence gathering aircraft and early warning aircraft pass Tushima Strait for the first time through to the Sea of Japan	
	Apr. 01	Partial enforcement (establishment of Faculty of Nursing at National Defense Medical College) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.		Feb. 14	China's intelligence gathering aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (February 15)		Feb. 01	Chinese Ministry of National Defense dismantles seven Military Regions and announces the establishment of five theaters of operations	
	Apr. 01	Cabinet decision adopted on "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology"		Mar. 02	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles		Feb. 02	Four Chinese vessels sail through Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean	
	Apr. 28	U.S. and Philippines sign Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)		Mar. 13	Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Tokyo)		Feb. 04	A Chinese Navy AGI conducts round-trip northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through February 8)	
	May 02	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Apr. 21	National Defense Medical College instructor dispatched to support WHO's epidemiological studies on the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, etc. (through May 29)		Feb. 07	North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a "Satellite"	
	May 07	Collision and confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels occur (through mid-July)		Apr. 27	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to earthquake in Nepal (through May 22)		Feb. 16	Locations of equipment deemed to be surface-to-air missile in Woody Island, Paracel Islands are confirmed	
	May 14	"Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam" comes into force		Apr. 27	The new "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" is approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting ("2+2", New York)		Feb. 29	Japan-Philippines Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Manila)	
	May 15	The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security submits its report		Apr. 30	Promulgation and enforcement of the Special Measures Act on the Number of Years of the National Subsidization of Specific Defense Procurements (so-called "Long-term Contract Act")		Mar. 04	Entry into force of the Japan-India Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	
	May 21	Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 6th, 7th, and administrative 1st and 2nd Atsugi Air Base noise suits		May 09	North Korea announces SLBM launch test was conducted successfully		Mar. 04	The government announces it would accept the court's settlement recommendation in the "Case regarding retraction order request for cancellation of the reclamation permit based on provisions of Article 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act" ("administrative substitute execution suit") and suspends landfill work (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)	
	May 24	Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft		May 14	Cabinet decision on "Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security" and "International Peace Support Bill"		Mar. 10	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles	
	Jun. 07	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		May 14	Cabinet decisions on "Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law," "The Government's Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group," and "Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas"		Mar. 18	North Korea launches a ballistic missile	
	Jun. 11	Japan-Australia "2+2" (Tokyo)		May 21	Two Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson announces first flight by Chinese Air Force aircraft in this airspace)		Mar. 22	Terror bombing attacks occur in Brussels, Belgium	
	Jun. 11	Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft		May 26	China releases defense white paper, "China's Military Strategy"				
	Jun. 19	Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases released		May 31	Dispatched MSDF personnel as commander of Combined Task Force (CTF 151) for counter-piracy operations (through August 27)				
	Jun. 21	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (response to early retirement system)		Jun. 11	Naha District Court's Okinawa Branch renders judgment in 4th, 6th, 7th and 8th Futenma Air Station noise suits				
	Jun. 29	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles		Jun. 12	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean				
	Jun. 29	ISIL declares establishment of "Islamic State" and caliphate		Jul. 01	U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey releases National Military Strategy				
	Jul. 01	Cabinet decision adopted on "Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People"		Jul. 03	Disaster relief teams dispatched to support search of missing persons in Mt. Ontake (through August 7)				
	Jul. 08	Japan-Australia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed		Jul. 18	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean				
	Jul. 09	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles							
	Jul. 13	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles							
	Jul. 25	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs)							
	Jul. 26	North Korea launches a ballistic missile							
	Aug. 01	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (quota for SDF personnel posts of Internal Bureau, establishment of Air Tactics Development & Training Wing, etc.)							
	Aug. 8-	U.S. Central Command begins airstrikes on ISIL in Northern Iraq							

Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events	Year	Date	Major Events
2016	Mar. 28	Two Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean	2016	Nov. 15	Cabinet Decision on changes in the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)" (mission of "kaketsuke-keigo" was added)	2017	Jul. 20	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft, an intelligence gathering aircraft and four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea. Four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 28	Establishment of Camp Yonaguni		Nov. 18	The Russian Forces announces the deployment of surface-to-ship missile on the islands of Etorou and Kunashiri		Jul. 24	Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea
	Mar. 29	Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security ("Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security" and "International Peace Support Act")		Nov. 23	Signing and entry into force of Japan-ROK General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement		Jul. 28	Minister of Defense Kishida came into office
	Mar. 31	Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C.) (through April 1)		Nov. 25	Two bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets fly over the sky between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly from the south of Sakishima Islands)		Jul. 28	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan's EEZ)
	Apr. 07	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Dec. 01	Entry into force of the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology		Aug. 01	China conducts a flag raising ceremony for the Support Base in Djibouti
	Apr. 08	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Dec. 10	Two Chinese fighter jets, two bombers, and two intelligence gathering aircraft fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly toward the Bashi Channel)		Aug. 03	Minister of Defense Onodera came into office
	Apr. 14	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (through May 30)		Dec. 22	The implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law (decided by the National Security Council)		Aug. 09	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea
	Apr. 15	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Dec. 22	Transition to the joint production and deployment phases of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA) (decided at the National Security Council)		Aug. 10	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	Apr. 17	Disaster relief call-up order for to Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through May 9)		Dec. 25	Six Chinese naval vessels including an aircraft carrier sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance into the Pacific Ocean (first time a Chinese aircraft carrier is observed sailing into the Pacific Ocean)		Aug. 12	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft and two bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
	Apr. 20	China's early warning aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean		Dec. 26	Governor of Okinawa Onaga withdraws his cancellation of the reclamation approval (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)		Aug. 13	Two Chinese electronic warfare aircrafts pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
	Apr. 23	North Korea launches an SLBM		Dec. 27	"China's Space Activities in 2016" is released		Aug. 14	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea
	Apr. 25	Entry into force of the Japan-Philippines Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	2017	Jan. 09	Six Chinese bombers, an early warning aircraft, and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly over the Tsushima Strait and advance to the Sea of Japan		Aug. 17	A car runs into pedestrians in Barcelona, Spain
	Apr. 28	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles		Jan. 14	Signing of the new Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)		Aug. 18	Entry into force of the Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Apr. 28	Alleged murder case involving a civilian component member of the USFJ in Okinawa Prefecture		Jan. 24	Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan		Aug. 23	Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan
	Apr. 29	Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan is established		Jan. 26	Signing of the Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)		Aug. 24	Six Chinese bombers, after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, fly over the Pacific Ocean in the south of Kyushu and Shikoku, turn around off the Ki Peninsula, and fly to the East China Sea on a similar route (First time for a Chinese aircraft to fly northeast bound after advancing to the Pacific Ocean)
	May 10	A U.S. destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as part of the "Freedom of Navigation Operation"		Feb. 08	U.S. Navy P-3 patrol aircraft and Chinese military aircraft fly abnormally close to each other (South China Sea)		Aug. 26	MSDF SH-60J helicopter falls into the sea west of Tappizaki, Aomori Prefecture
	May 17	A Chinese PLA fighter jet flies abnormally close to a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea		Feb. 12	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Aug. 26	India announces agreement between India and China on disagreement of border personnel at Doklam following the confrontation of their forces
	May 22	U.S. President Obama visits Vietnam (through May 25), fully lifts arms embargo on Vietnam		Mar. 02	A Chinese early warning aircraft, six bombers (probable), and six fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean (total of 13 aircraft, the largest fleet so far)		Aug. 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan)
	May 31	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Mar. 02	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea		Sep. 03	North Korea conducts sixth nuclear test which it called a "hydrogen bomb test for ICBM"
	Jun. 07	A Chinese PLA fighter jet conducts dangerous flight, approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea		Mar. 05	Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait Ocean		Sep. 09	Entry into force of the new Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Jun. 09	A Chinese naval combatant vessel enters the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands for the first time		Mar. 06	North Korea launches four ballistic missiles (three of them fell into Japan's EEZ)		Sep. 15	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan)
	Jun. 15	A Chinese naval intelligence gathering vessel sails in Japan's territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture and then sails within Japan's contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducts east-west passages outside the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands. (June 19 through 20)		Mar. 22	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Oct. 01	Shooting in Las Vegas, United States
	Jun. 16	Five Chinese naval vessels sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Mar. 23	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea		Oct. 10	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	Jun. 20	Ten Russian vessels pass through the Soya Strait and move to the Okhotsk Sea.		Mar. 27	Transfer of MSDF TC-90 to the Philippines		Oct. 11	A U.S. Forces helicopter conducts an emergency landing and catches fire in Higashi-son, Kunigami-gun, Okinawa Prefecture
	Jun. 22	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles		Mar. 27	Completion of development of future transport aircraft (XC-2)		Oct. 17	ASDF UH-60J helicopter crashed in the Pacific Ocean south of Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture
	Jul. 2	Bangladeshi militants take hostages (7 Japanese nationals are killed); ISIL claims responsibility on the Internet		Apr. 02	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean		Nov. 11	Three U.S. carrier strike groups conduct joint exercises in the western Pacific (through November 14)
	Jul. 8	The U.S. and ROK decide on the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea		Apr. 05	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Nov. 18	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the Bashi Channel
	Jul. 9	North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile		Apr. 06	U.S. launches strikes on Syria		Nov. 19	Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island from the East China Sea to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea
	Jul. 11	ASDF aircraft dispatched to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, to transport Japanese nationals overseas due to the situation deterioration in South Sudan (through July 26)		Apr. 16	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Nov. 20	The United States re-designates North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
	Jul. 12	The arbitral tribunal renders a final award in which nearly all of the Philippines' submissions are ruled in favor of the Philippines with regard to arbitral proceedings pursuant to the South China Sea		Apr. 18	Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait		Nov. 23	Four Chinese bombers and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea
	Jul. 15	Terror attack with a truck occurs in Nice, France		Apr. 20	China launches its first unmanned cargo spacecraft "Tianzhou 1"		Nov. 28	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea
	Jul. 18	Chinese Air Force announces that it will be conducting combat patrol in the South China Sea on a regular basis		Apr. 24	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean		Nov. 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan's EEZ)
	Jul. 19	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles		Apr. 25	Commencement of seawall construction (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)		Dec. 05	Chinese vessels sail east bound from the Osumi Strait and advances to the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 3	2nd Reshuffled 3rd Abe Cabinet is established		Apr. 26	China's first domestically built aircraft carrier is launched		Dec. 07	A Chinese early warning aircraft and four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 3	Inada becomes Minister of Defense		Apr. 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Dec. 07	A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea
	Aug. 3	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (one of them fell into Japan's EEZ)		May 14	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Dec. 09	Four Chinese bombers and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 5	200 to 300 Chinese fishing vessels operate in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. Chinese government vessels intrude into Japan's territorial waters following the fishing vessels for the first time (total of 15 vessels in 5 days / through August 9)		May 18	An object believed to be a small unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) flies over the front of the bridge of a Chinese government ship which is within Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands		Dec. 09	The Iraqi government declares liberation of all areas from the ISIL
	Aug. 12	Three Chinese naval vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		May 21	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Dec. 11	Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and thereafter two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent. The bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel via the south of Sakishima Islands on the Pacific Ocean side
	Aug. 18	A Chinese early warning aircraft and two bombers fly over Tsushima strait and advance to the Sea of Japan		May 23	Martial law is declared in Mindanao in the Philippines		Dec. 11	President Putin visits Syria and announces withdrawal of the main part of troops (The two bases in Syria will continue daily operation)
	Aug. 24	North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile		May 24	A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" (reported)		Dec. 13	Fall of a U.S. Forces helicopter window onto Futenma Dai-ni Elementary School in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture
	Aug. 30	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Iwate Prefecture (through September 16)		May 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (fell into Japan's EEZ)		Dec. 17	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft and two electronic warfare aircrafts pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly to the East China Sea
	Aug. 31	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Hokkaido (through September 18)		May 31	Dispatch of SDF units to UNMISS is terminated		Dec. 18	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies to the East China Sea
	Sep. 05	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles (fell into Japan's EEZ)		Jul. 01	Establishment of Southwestern Air Defense Force			
	Sep. 09	North Korea conducts its fifth nuclear test		Jul. 02	A Chinese naval Dongfiao-class intelligence gathering ship sails within Japan's territorial waters near the southwest of Kojima Island, Matsumae Town, Hokkaido			
	Sep. 12	First training relocation involves Tilt-Rotor/Rotary wing aircraft outside of Okinawa Prefecture in the context of the realignment of the U.S. Forces (through October 5)		Jul. 02	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)			
	Sep. 25	Four Chinese bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean (fighter jets [probable] are observed for the first time passing)		Jul. 04	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan's EEZ)			
	Oct. 15	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Jul. 05	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the heavy rain in North Kyushu in July 2017 (through August 20)			
	Oct. 20	North Korea launches a ballistic missile		Jul. 05	16 Russian vessels pass through the Soya Strait and move to the Sea of Japan			
	Oct. 20	Three Chinese naval vessels pass through the Osumi Strait and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Jul. 13	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean. Four other bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea			
	Oct. 21	A U.S. destroyer sails around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea as part of the "Freedom of Navigation Operation"		Jul. 15	Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan's territorial waters in the southeast of Tsushima-shimajima (Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture) and north of Okinoshima (Munakata City, Fukuoka Prefecture)			
	Oct. 27	China's early warning aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean		Jul. 17	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Germany Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology			
	Oct. 28	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement		Jul. 17	Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan's territorial waters in the west-northwest of Henashisaki (Nishitsuguru County, Aomori Prefecture) and northeast of Tappizaki (Higashitsuguru County, Aomori Prefecture)			
	Nov. 01	Cabinet Decision regarding changes to the procedures for responding to piracy (reducing the number of ships to engage in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden from two to one)						

Year	Date	Major Events
	Dec. 18	The United States releases the National Security Strategy
	Dec. 18	A Chinese Su-30 fighter jet's advance to the Sea of Japan is confirmed for the first time
	Dec. 19	National Security Council and Cabinet approval on the "fundamental improvement in ballistic missile defense capability"
	Dec. 19	The United States denounces North Korea for the cyber attack using malware "WannaCry" in May 2017
	Dec. 20	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies to the East China Sea

Year	Defense	Domestic	International	
2018	Jan. 09	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jan. 09	North-South High Level Official's Meeting
	Jan. 09	FY2017 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (command post exercise) (through February 3)	Jan. 10	A Chinese submerged submarine enters Japan's contiguous zone near Miyakojima Island and Taisho Island (through January 11)
	Jan. 15	Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 11	A Chinese vessel enters Japan's contiguous zone near Taisho Island
	Jan. 21	Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 18 (through February 23)	Jan. 17	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (reported)
	Jan. 26	Deployment of the first F-35A at ASDF Misawa Air Base	Jan. 19	The U.S. National Defense Strategy is released
	Jan. 26	Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Jan. 29	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea
	Jan. 27	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 29	A Chinese vessel sails Tsushima Strait northward and after advancing to the Sea of Japan temporarily, sails the strait southward
	Jan. 29	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture (through February 2)	Jan. 31	U.S. President Trump delivers the State of the Union address
	Jan. 30	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Wajima City, Ishikawa Prefecture (through February 2)	Feb. 02	The United States releases the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
	Feb. 06	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Fukui Prefecture (through February 10)	Feb. 05	Maldives declares a state of emergency
	Feb. 15	Disaster relief to help remove snow in Fukui City, Fukui Prefecture (through February 18)	Feb. 08	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Feb. 16	Cabinet Decision on revision of the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)"	Feb. 09	PyeongChang Olympics (through February 25)
	Feb. 21	Disaster relief for collection of fuel, etc. in Tohoku Town, Kamikita County, Aomori Prefecture (through March 7)	Feb. 10	Sri Lanka declares a state of emergency
	Feb. 28	Japan-Latvia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 14	South African President Zuma resigns
	Mar. 26	Transfer of MSDF's five TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines completed	Feb. 15	Ethiopian Prime Minister resigns
	Mar. 27	22nd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March 28)	Feb. 15	The United States and other countries denounce Russia for a large scale of damage caused by ransomware "Not Petya" in June 2017
	Mar. 27	Establishment of the Ground Component Command and the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, and first reorganization to rapid deployment divisions/brigades	Feb. 16	Ethiopia declares a state of emergency
	Apr. 06	Launch of X-band communications satellite "Kiramekki"	Feb. 23	U.S.-Australia Summit Meeting
	Apr. 09	Signing of the Japan-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement	Feb. 26	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through February 28)
	Apr. 09	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 27	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft's passage of Tsushima Strait Western Channel is confirmed for the first time
	Apr. 09	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Oda City, Shimane Prefecture (through April 11)	Mar. 01	Russian President Putin introduces new weapons at the annual presidential address
	Apr. 11	Disaster relief for rescue operations in response to the landslide in Nakatsu City, Oita Prefecture (through April 23)	Mar. 05	1st session of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) (through March 20)
	Apr. 18	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Malaysia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Mar. 05	ROK special envoys visit North Korea and meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un
	Apr. 20	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Mar. 09	PyeongChang Paralympics (through March 18)
	Apr. 21	Signing of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	Mar. 18	President Putin is re-elected as president (4th term)
	Apr. 29	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Irabujima, Miyakojima City, Okinawa Prefecture (through May 2)	Mar. 18	The Turkish government announces taking control of Afrin, Syria
	May 04	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Helsinki)	Mar. 23	Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter turn around, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again and fly to the continent. At the same time, two fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the East China Sea
	May 06	Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tallinn)	Mar. 23	Hostage siege in Trébes, south of France
	May 09	Defense authorities of Japan and China sign the Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism	Mar. 23	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	May 10	Signing of the Japan-UAE Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Mar. 25	Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea visits China (through March 28)
	May 15	Cabinet Decision adopted on "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy"	Mar. 26	China-North Korea Summit Meeting
	May 18	Cabinet Decision on revision of the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)"	Mar. 26	Presidential election in Egypt
	May 21	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 05	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean
	May 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)	Apr. 10	An aircraft that appears to be a Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (BZK-005) flies over the East China Sea (within Japan's air defense identification zone)
	May 31	Revised Japan-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP)	Apr. 12	China conducts a naval review on the South China Sea
	Jun. 02	Defense Minister Onodera attends the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June 3)	Apr. 14	The United States, United Kingdom and France conduct military operations against facilities related to chemical weapons in Syria
	Jun. 02	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 18	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 02	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 19	Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter the two bombers, an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 02	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 20	North Korea announces a halt to "nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire" and abolishment of nuclear test sites
	Jun. 02	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 20	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 02	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 20	A flight of carrier-based fighter jets (probable) of the Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" over the Pacific Ocean is confirmed for the first time
	Jun. 03	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 21	Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advance to the East China Sea
	Jun. 03	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 24	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through April 29)
	Jun. 03	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 26	Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. The two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward the continent. The two bombers, an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 08	Launch of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China	Apr. 27	The Inter-Korean Summit Meeting, Panmunjom Declaration agreement
	Jun. 14	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Apr. 28	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea
	Jun. 18	Disaster relief in response to Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake (through June 26)	May 08	China-North Korea Summit Meeting
	Jun. 19	FY2018 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through June 22)	May 08	U.S. President Trump announces withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran
	Jun. 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 11	Two Chinese bombers and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter, the two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward the continent. Two bombers fly toward the Bashi Channel. Two bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the Pacific Ocean in the direction of the Bashi Channel and move to the East China Sea
	Jul. 06	Disaster relief in response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster (through August 18)	May 12	Attack occurs near the Paris Opera House in the center of Paris, France
Jul. 11	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel in response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster	May 13	Terror attacks by suicide bombers occur in churches in Surabaya, Indonesia	
Jul. 11	Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through July 31)	May 13	China conducts the first sea trial of its first domestic aircraft carrier (through May 18)	
Jul. 13	Signing of the Japan-France Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	May 18	A Chinese bomber and other aircraft conduct a takeoff and landing training in the South China Sea (pointed out as Woody Island, the Paracel Islands)	
		May 21	The United States releases a new Iran strategy	
		May 25	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island through to the East China Sea	
		May 26	The Inter-Korean Summit Meeting	
		May 27	A U.S. naval destroyer and cruiser conduct the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)	
		Jun. 03	A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean	
		Jun. 04	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and after flying toward the Bashi Channel, it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again	
		Jun. 04	A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and moves to the East China Sea	
		Jun. 12	U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting	

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
Jul. 31	Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Moscow)	Nov. 09 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 17 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
Jul. 31	Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Moscow)	Nov. 14 Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 18 U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Freedom Guardian exercise
Aug. 06	Disaster relief to provide water and food in Tozawa Village, Mogami County, Yamagata Prefecture (through August 8)	Nov. 14 Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 19 Chairman Kim Jong-Un visits China (through June 20)
Aug. 10	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 15 Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 19 China-North Korea Summit Meeting
Aug. 10	Disaster relief to search for missing aircraft near Mt. Kusatsu-Shirane, Gumma Prefecture (through August 11)	Nov. 15 21st ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 22 U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Korean Marine Exchange Program
Aug. 20	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi)	Nov. 15 East Asia Summit (Singapore)	Jun. 23 A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
Aug. 21	Japan-Sri Lanka Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sri Jayawardanepura Kotte)	Nov. 15 Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 24 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through June 29)
Sep. 01	FY2018 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (outside Japan) (through September 9)	Nov. 15 Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 24 Presidential election and general election in Turkey
Sep. 03	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 15 Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 27 Permanent ceasefire agreed in South Sudan
Sep. 04	Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Hague)	Nov. 16 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Australia)	Jun. 29 A Chinese hospital ship enters Japan's contiguous zone north of Taisho Island, Senkaku Islands
Sep. 04	Meeting between Defense Minister Onodera and Director-General of the OPCW (The Hague)	Nov. 17 Japan-Papua New Guinea Summit Meeting (Port Moresby)	Jun. 29 Relocation of the Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea from Seoul to Pyeongtaek
Sep. 06	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Rome)	Nov. 18 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Port Moresby)	Jun. 29 U.S. NBC reports that North Korea has increased its production of fuel for nuclear weapons (enriched uranium) at secret sites
Sep. 06	Disaster relief in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (through October 14)	Nov. 18 Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Port Moresby)	Jul. 01 China Coast Guard is integrated into the People's Armed Police
Sep. 07	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake	Nov. 19 Japan-Burkina Faso Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 07 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
Sep. 07	Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through September 24)	Nov. 27 Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 10 ROK Government announces suspension of its independent "Ulchi exercise" in the summer of 2018, followed by suspension of U.S.-ROK joint exercises
Sep. 11	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 30 G20 Buenos Aires Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires) (through December 1)	Jul. 12 NATO Summit Brussels 2018
Sep. 11	Signing of the Japan-Malaysia Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Nov. 30 Japan-France Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Jul. 23 "38 North," a website dedicated to analysis of North Korea, announces the start of dismantlement of the main facility on the satellite launch site in Dongchang-ri "The report on August 22 announces that no new dismantlement activity has been apparent since August 3"
Sep. 21	Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 30 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Jul. 27 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
Oct. 02	Minister of Defense Iwaya came into office	Nov. 30 Japan-India Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Jul. 27 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan
Oct. 03	International disaster relief activities in response to the earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia (through October 25)	Nov. 30 Japan-China Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 03 China announces a successful launch test of its new model of a hypersonic projectile
Oct. 10	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney)	Dec. 01 Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 06 Three Chinese vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea
Oct. 10	Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Sydney)	Dec. 01 Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 08 Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
Oct. 12	Signing of the Japan-Ukraine Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Dec. 01 Japan-Turkey Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 14 A car attack occurs in London, U.K.
Oct. 13	FY2018 Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREC) Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces (through October 14)	Dec. 01 Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 28 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through August 29)
Oct. 14	FY2018 review (Asaka)	Dec. 02 Japan-Uruguay Summit Meeting (Montevideo)	Aug. 29 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
Oct. 19	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 02 Japan-Paraguay Summit Meeting (Asuncion)	Aug. 29 14 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and move to the Sea of Okhotsk (through August 30)
Oct. 19	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 05 Fukuoka High Court renders judgement on a demand for an injunctive order for actions that crush the reef, etc. (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)	Sep. 01 Two Russian patrol aircraft fly and circle around Japan
Oct. 19	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 11 Japan-Ghana Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 01 28 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and moved to the Sea of Japan (through September 2)
Oct. 19	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 13 Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 06 U.S.-India Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2)
Oct. 20	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 18 Japan-Zambia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 09 North Korea stages a military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of its foundation as a nation in Pyongyang, without ICBM or other ballistic missiles.
Oct. 20	ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 18 National Security Council and Cabinet Decisions on "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond," and "Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023)"	Sep. 11 Russia starts the exercise phase of a large scale military exercise "Vostok 2018" (through September 17)
Oct. 20	5th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (Singapore)		Sep. 12 Government of South Sudan and relevant parties including anti-government forces sign the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict
Oct. 24	Disaster relief to provide water supply support in Suo-oshima Town, Yamaguchi Prefecture (through November 7)		Sep. 14 Inter-Korean Liaison Office opens (Kaesong)
Oct. 29	Keen Sword19/30FTX (through November 8)		Sep. 18 U.S. DoD releases its Cyber Strategy
Dec. 06	Disaster relief for search and rescue of U.S. aircraft crew off the coast of Shikoku (through December 11)		Sep. 18 President of the ROK Moon Jae-in visits North Korea (through September 20)
Dec. 11	FY2018 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (in Japan) (through December 14)		Sep. 18 The Inter-Korean Summit Meeting (through September 19)
Dec. 20	Incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft occurs		Sep. 18 Syrian Army accidentally shoots down a Russian aircraft
Dec. 25	First disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seki City, Gifu Prefecture (through December 27)		Sep. 19 Three Russian aircraft, including a fighter, make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan (an Su-35 fighter is confirmed through scramble for the first time)
Dec. 28	Footage of the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft released		Sep. 20 U.S. DoD designates the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission of China as a subject to sanctions
			Sep. 24 U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US\$330 million)
			Sep. 30 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reefs and Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands (reported)
			Sep. 30 A Chinese naval destroyer approaches abnormally close to a U.S. vessel
			Oct. 02 Three Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Oct. 02 Inauguration of a new government in Iraq
			Oct. 02 A Saudi Arabian journalist dies in the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Turkey
			Oct. 04 U.S. releases National Strategy for Counterterrorism
			Oct. 19 U.S. and ROK Governments announce suspension of the Vigilant Ace exercise, a joint military exercise scheduled for December 2018
			Oct. 20 President Trump announces an intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty
			Oct. 20 General election in Afghanistan (House of the People)
			Oct. 22 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
			Oct. 22 First ASEAN-China maritime exercise (Zhanjiang) (through October 28)
			Oct. 25 Prime Minister Abe visits China (through October 27)
			Oct. 25 Israel-Oman Summit Meeting
			Oct. 29 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through October 29)
			Oct. 29 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
			Nov. 11 Ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I (Paris)
			Nov. 17 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Papua New Guinea) (through November 18)
			Nov. 24 Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen resigns as chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party after suffering a major defeat in the general election
			Nov. 25 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through November 26)
			Nov. 26 A U.S. naval cruiser conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
			Nov. 26 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
			Nov. 28 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
			Dec. 01 U.S.-China Summit Meeting (Osaka)
			Dec. 05 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Peter the Great Gulf (reported)
			Dec. 06 Yemen peace talks (through December 13)
			Dec. 07 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Dec. 08 A Chinese vessel sails westward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Dec. 11 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Dec. 12 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Dec. 14 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Dec. 14 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Dec. 27 UAE reopens its embassy in Syria
			Dec. 27 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
2019	Jan. 11 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brest)	Jan. 08 Japan-Rwanda Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 01 A U.S. Aegis destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" in the Paracel Islands
	Jan. 11 Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Brest)	Jan. 08 Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 01 Chairman Kim Jong-un expresses his intention to neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them in his "New Year's Address" in 2019
	Jan. 14 Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 (through February 23)	Jan. 09 Japan-Netherlands Summit Meeting (Rotterdam)	Jan. 07 Chairman Kim Jong-un visits China (through January 10)
	Jan. 17 Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 10 Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (London)	Jan. 07 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles around the Paracel Islands
	Jan. 21 FY2018 SDF Joint Exercises (command post exercise) (through January 26)	Jan. 22 Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow)	Jan. 07 ROK releases Defense White Paper 2018
	Jan. 21 The MOD published its final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft	Jan. 23 Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Davos)	Jan. 15 A Russian Su-24 tactical reconnaissance aircraft flies from off the coast of Sado Island through off the coast of Akita Prefecture
	Jan. 23 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 29 Japan-Qatar Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 16 During the same period, another aircraft of the same type flies from off the coast of Rebun Island through off the coast of Okushiri Island
	Jan. 23 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Tokigawa Town, Hiki County, Saitama Prefecture (through January 25)	Feb. 04 Japan-Austria Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 17 United States releases the Missile Defense Review (MDR)
	Jan. 24 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Tanabe City, Wakayama Prefecture (through January 26)	Feb. 05 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 17 A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of Hokkaido
	Feb. 05 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 20 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 17 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
	Feb. 05 Signing of the Japan-Finland Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Feb. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 24 Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Feb. 05 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Aichi Prefecture, etc. (through February 9)	Mar. 08 Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 02 U.S. provides Russia with formal notice to withdrawal from the INF Treaty
	Feb. 14 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through February 20)	Mar. 24 Replacement of government aircraft from B-747 to B-777	Feb. 11 Two U.S. destroyers conduct the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Mischief Reef
	Feb. 19 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Mizunami City, Gifu Prefecture (through February 21)	Mar. 31 Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area near Gate 5	Feb. 15 Two Russian Tu-95 bombers fly from off the coast of Sanin north along the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk, two Su-35 fighters fly from off the coast of Sanin to off the coast of Sado Island, and another two Su-35 fighters fly from off the coast of Sado Island to off the coast of Rebun Island
	Feb. 20 Air rescue in response to a radar losing track of an F-2 of Tsuiki Air Base	Apr. 04 Japan-Panama Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 16 Three Chinese vessels advance to the Sea of Japan (through February 24)
	Mar. 08 ADMN-Plus Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX 2019) (Lucknow) (through March 18)	Apr. 06 Naha Branch of Fukushima High Court renders judgement in 3rd and 5th Futenma Air Station noise suits	Feb. 23 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies over the East China Sea again
	Mar. 12 23rd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March 13)	Apr. 23 Japan-France Summit Meeting (Paris)	Feb. 25 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
	Mar. 12 Turnover ceremony for the UH-1H parts, etc., grant of a portion of the parts, etc.	Apr. 24 Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Rome)	Feb. 27 2nd U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting (through February 28)
	Mar. 25 Signing of the Japan-Oman Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Apr. 24 Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Mar. 04 Russia notifies the U.S. of the suspension of Russia's obligation under the INF Treaty
	Mar. 25 Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 25 Japan-Slovakia Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Mar. 15 51 people are killed in a shooting incident in Christchurch, New Zealand
	Mar. 26 Establishment of Camp Amami and Camp Miyakojima	Apr. 25 3rd "V4 plus Japan" Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Mar. 19 A flight by two Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft within Japan's air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time
	Mar. 27 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through March 30)	Apr. 25 Japan-Czech Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Mar. 24 General election in Thailand (House of Representatives)
	Mar. 28 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 1)	Apr. 25 Japan-EU Summit (Brussels)	Mar. 24 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
	Apr. 02 Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plan for International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula"	Apr. 26 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Mar. 25 U.S. President Trump recognizes Israel's sovereign right over the Golan Heights
	Apr. 04 Entry into force of the Japan-Italy Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Apr. 28 Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Ottawa)	Mar. 27 A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of Hokkaido
	Apr. 05 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Sakuho Town, Nagano Prefecture (through April 7)	Apr. 30 Taiirei-Seiden-no-gi	Mar. 28 Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 09 Air rescue in response to the crash of an F-35A fighter of Misawa Air Base		Mar. 30 Four Chinese H-6 bombers, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft, and two presumed fighter jets fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, the aircraft fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Apr. 10 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 13)		Mar. 31 Two Chinese military aircraft cross over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
	Apr. 17 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)		Apr. 01 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and two H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Apr. 17 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through April 19)		Apr. 02 Three Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait southward and move to the East China Sea
	Apr. 19 Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.)		Apr. 02 Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Apr. 19 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Washington, D.C.)		Apr. 05 Three Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island temporarily to the Pacific Ocean
			Apr. 05 A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
			Apr. 06 A French vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Apr. 09 General election in Israel
			Apr. 15 A Chinese vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island southeastward, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on the same day, the vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northwestward to the East China Sea
			Apr. 15 Four Chinese H-6 bombers and an Y-9 electronic warfare aircraft fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and fly over the East China Sea
			Apr. 15 U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US\$500 million)
			Apr. 17 Presidential election in Indonesia
			Apr. 21 Bomb attacks by Islamic extremists occur simultaneously in Colombo and other places, Sri Lanka
			Apr. 24 Chairman Kim Jong-un visits Russia (through April 26)
			Apr. 26 Five Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Apr. 28 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
			Apr. 28 Four Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Apr. 29 China-Russia joint naval exercise "Joint Sea 2019" (Qingdao) (through May 4)
	May 02 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)	May 01 Kenji-to-Shokei-no-gi	May 03 Two Russian Tu-142 patrol aircraft pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and fly to the East China Sea. Thereafter, they pass through the Tsushima Strait again, and fly over the Sea of Japan
	May 02 Signing of the Memorandum on the orientation of promotion of defense industry cooperation between the Defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam	May 01 Sokui-go-Choken-no-gi	May 04 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
May 17 Cabinet Decision on revision of the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)"	May 06 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 06 Two U.S. vessels conduct the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reefs and Johnson South Reef	
May 17 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through May 20)	May 17 Enactment of the revised Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities	May 06 Five Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan	
May 18 Disaster relief to rescue stranded residents due to heavy rain in Yakushima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture (through May 20)	May 23 Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	May 09 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles	
May 19 Disaster relief in response to water supply failure, etc. due to heavy rain in Kuchinoerabujima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture (through May 24)	May 27 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 11 Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean	
May 21 FY2019 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through May 24)	May 29 Japan-Bangladesh Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 19 Federal election in Australia	
May 22 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 30 Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 19 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal in Zhongsha Islands	
May 23 Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 31 Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk	May 22 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait	
May 27 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Hinohara Village, Tokyo (through May 29)	May 31 Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 23 Pakistan conducts a test launch of ballistic missiles	
May 27 Disaster relief to rescue missing persons due to ship collision off the coast of Inubosaki, Chiba Prefecture (through May 31)	May 31 Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 26 A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on May 30, the vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea	
May 27 Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Omura Town, Hokkaido (through June 4)	Jun. 01 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 10th and 11th Yokota Air Base noise suits	May 27 Taiwan conducts a military field exercise "Han Kuang 35" (through May 31)	
May 30 Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 10 Japan-Switzerland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 29 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. Just around the same time, a Chinese Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft flies over the East China Sea to near the Tsushima Strait	
May 30 Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Jun. 12 Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (Teheran)	May 30 Inauguration of 2nd Modi government of India	
May 31 Defense Minister Iwaya attends the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue (hosted by IIS) (through June 2)	Jun. 14 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 01 U.S. DoD releases the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR)	
Jun. 01 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 25 Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 07 A U.S. Navy ship and a Russian Navy ship sail abnormally close to each other in the Philippine Sea	
Jun. 01 Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 26 Japan-France Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 08 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk	
Jun. 01 Japan-U.S.-AUKL Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 27 Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 08 Two Russian vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea	
Jun. 01 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 27 Japan-India Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 10 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning," sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean	
Jun. 03 Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 27 Japan-Argentina Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 12 Three Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait	
Jun. 04 Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Tokyo)	Jun. 27 Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 13 Commercial vessels, including one related to Japan, are suffered near the Straits of Hormuz	
Jun. 05 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Yamagata City, Gifu Prefecture, etc. (through June 8)	Jun. 27 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 14 China Coast Guard vessels sail in the Japanese contiguous zone around Senkaku Islands for the longest-ever period of 64 consecutive days	
Jun. 17 Establishment of Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Headquarters	Jun. 27 Japan-China Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 16 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea	
	Jun. 28 G20 Osaka Summit chaired by Prime Minister Abe (through June 29)	Jun. 16 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again	
	Jun. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 18 Two Canadian vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait	
	Jun. 28 Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 20 Two Russian Tu-95 bombers fly around Japan, and intrude into Japan's territorial airspace twice when flying northward over the Pacific Ocean	
	Jun. 28 Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 20 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shoot down a U.S. drone over the Straits of Hormuz	
	Jun. 28 Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jun. 28 Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jun. 29 Japan-South Africa Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jun. 29 Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jun. 29 Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jun. 30 Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jul. 01 Japan-Turkey Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
	Jul. 23 Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jul. 23 Ministerial meeting on the TICAD7 (Tokyo)		
	Aug. 02 Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk		

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
Jun. 01	Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Oct. 06 Japan-EU Summit Telephone Talk	May 05 Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Ladakh, India)
Jun. 09	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Oct. 07 Japan-Italy Summit Telephone Talk	May 09 Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Sikkim, India)
Jun. 16	Japan-PNG Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Oct. 12 Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	May 13 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
Jun. 26	"Revised Japan-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP)"	Oct. 13 Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	May 17 A Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait
Jul. 04	Disaster relief in response to July 2020 Flooding Disaster (through August 8)	Oct. 20 Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting	May 24 North Korea announces that it will hold the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the KWP
Jul. 05	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel in response to July 2020 Flooding Disaster	Oct. 28 Japan-Turkey Summit Telephone Talk	May 29 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
Jul. 05	"Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through July 23)"	Oct. 29 Japan-Singapore Summit Telephone Talk	May 29 Three Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
Jul. 08	Japan-U.S.-Australia Virtual Trilateral Defense Meeting	Nov. 12 Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Suga and President-elect Biden	Jun. 04 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
Jul. 09	Disaster relief call-up order for Reserve Personnel is issued (through July 23)	Nov. 13 12th Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting (Online)	Jun. 10 A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebus Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
Jul. 20	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 14 15th East Asia Summit (EAS)	Jun. 15 Clash between Chinese and Indian forces in the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with fatalities on both sides
Jul. 21	Telephone Conversation between Defense Minister Kono and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg	Nov. 15 4th RCEP Summit and signing of the RCEP Agreement (Online)	Jun. 16 North Korea blows up Inter-Korean Liaison Office
Aug. 06	Video Teleconference between Defense Minister Kono and Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Bajwa	Nov. 17 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 17 Two Russian vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, then northeastward through the Tsushima Strait. On June 19, a Russian vessel sails northeastward through the Tsushima Strait
Aug. 12	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 20 Japan-New Zealand Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 18 A submerged submarine moves westward through the waters northeast of Amami Oshima Island (within the Japanese contiguous zone), and then westward through the waters west of Yokoate Island (outside the Japanese contiguous zone) on June 20
Aug. 12	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Nov. 21 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Online)	Jun. 20 Three Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
Aug. 18	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Okinawa Prefecture (through August 31)	Dec. 02 Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 21 A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on June 23, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
Aug. 19	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Dec. 07 Japan-Netherlands Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 21 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
Aug. 25	Conclusion of the contract of Air Surveillance Radar System to the Republic of the Philippines Equipment to be delivered	Dec. 09 The Supreme Court renders judgment in 10th and 11th Yokota Air Base noise suits	Jun. 22 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
Aug. 27	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Dec. 14 Japan-Philippines Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 26 A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on June 28, the vessel sails northward to the East China Sea
Aug. 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Guam)	Dec. 16 Japan-Norway Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 28 Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea, and after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island they fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they fly toward the Bashi Channel and then turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
Sep. 04	Disaster relief in response to Typhoon Haishen (through September 7)		Jul. 04 Two U.S. carrier strike groups conduct joint exercise in the South China Sea
Sep. 08	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation		Jul. 13 A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on July 18, the vessel sails northward to the East China Sea
Sep. 09	Signing of the Japan-India Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)		Jul. 14 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
Sep. 17	Minister of Defense Kishi came into office		Jul. 14 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
Sep. 26	"Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Takasaki City, Gunma Prefecture (through October 1)"		Jul. 28 Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
Oct. 07	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation		Aug. 05 Three Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait
Oct. 12	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation		Aug. 10 A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
Oct. 19	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)		Aug. 14 A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebus Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
Oct. 23	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference		Aug. 18 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
Oct. 26	Keen Sword21/02FTX (field exercise) (through November 5)		Aug. 19 "Two Russian bombers fly over the Sea of Japan from off the coast of the Oki Islands. In conjunction with this movement, two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of the Oki Island to off the coast of Sado Island, another two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of Sado Island to off the coast of Rebus Island in Hokkaido, and another two aircraft fly from off the coast of Rebus Island in Hokkaido to the Sea of Japan"
Nov. 02	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference		Aug. 27 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
Nov. 05	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Mitoyo City and Higashikagawa City, Kagawa Prefecture (through November 9)		Aug. 28 Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan
Nov. 10	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference		Aug. 30 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
Nov. 10	Cabinet Decision on Revision of the Implementation Plan for the International Peace Cooperation Assignments in Sinai Peninsula (through November 30, 2021)		Sep. 14 Six Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
Nov. 14	Telephone Conversation between Minister of Defense Kishi and U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Miller		Sep. 15 Israel, UAE, and Bahrain sign normalization agreements
Nov. 16	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference		Sep. 18 A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
Nov. 25	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation		Sep. 19 A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
Nov. 25	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Munakata City, Fukuoka Prefecture (through November 27)		Sep. 23 A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on September 26, the vessel sails northward to the East China Sea
Nov. 26	FY2020 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (in Japan) (through December 3)		Sep. 25 Two Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
Nov. 26	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Awaji City, Hyogo Prefecture (through November 28)		Sep. 27 Three Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait
Nov. 28	FY2020 air review (Iruma)		Oct. 02 A Russian Mi-8 helicopter violates airspace over Japan's territorial waters at Cape Shiretoko in Hokkaido
Dec. 02	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Mitoyo City, Kagawa Prefecture (through December 4)		Oct. 09 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
Dec. 07	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference		Oct. 10 North Korea conducts a military parade
Dec. 07	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Mihara City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through December 9)		Oct. 14 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
Dec. 08	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Hokkaido (through December 21)		Oct. 23 Signing of the Libya ceasefire agreement
Dec. 10	7th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus and 6th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Online)		Oct. 23 Israel and Sudan agree to normalize relations
Dec. 11	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through December 26, 2021)		Nov. 06 A Russian early warning and control aircraft flies from off the coast of the Oki Islands northward across the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk. In addition to this, two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of the Oki Islands northward across the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk, another two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of the Oki Island to off the coast of Sado Island, another two aircraft fly from off the cost of Sado Island to off the coast of Rebus Island in Hokkaido, and yet another two aircraft fly from off the cost of Rebus Island in Hokkaido northward across the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk
Dec. 11	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Minamasa City, Okayama Prefecture (through December 14)		Nov. 06 Three Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait
Dec. 14	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference		Nov. 20 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
Dec. 14	Japan-Germany Defense Ministers' Forum "Indo-Pacific, Japan and Germany's Engagement in the Region" (Online)		Nov. 21 A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebus Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
Dec. 15	Japan-Brazil Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference		Nov. 24 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around Peter the Great Gulf
Dec. 15	Signing of the Japan-Brazil Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges		Dec. 10 Israel and Morocco agree to normalize relations
Dec. 15	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Osaka (through December 28)		Dec. 19 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
Dec. 17	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Kan-Etsu Expressway (through December 18)		Dec. 21 A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on December 23, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
Dec. 18	Cabinet Decision on the "Procurement of a New Missile Defense System, etc., and Strengthening Stand-off Defense Capability"		Dec. 22 Two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers carried out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea
Dec. 22	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation		Dec. 22 A Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
Dec. 24	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Isumi City, Chiba Prefecture (through December 31)		Dec. 22 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
Dec. 29	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Iga City, Mie Prefecture (through January 1, 2021)		Dec. 24 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Con Dao Islands
			Dec. 27 Three Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait
			Dec. 31 Two U.S. vessel sail through the Taiwan Strait

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
			Aug. 26 Terror attack by suicide bomber outside Kabul International Airport in Afghanistan
			Aug. 27 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
			Aug. 31 The U.S. announces completion of the removal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan
			Aug. 31 A Chinese vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Sep. 03 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
			Sep. 03 Two Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean. On September 5, the two vessels are joined by another Chinese vessel and sail northward between Taiwan and Yonaguni to the East China Sea.
			Sep. 04 U.K. carrier strike group makes a port call in Japan
			Sep. 08 The Taliban announce provisional cabinet in Afghanistan
Sep. 02	Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (Online)	Sep. 15 Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 08 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
Sep. 11	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)	Sep. 15 Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference	Sep. 10 A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait
Sep. 11	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Vietnam Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Sep. 23 Japan-India Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Sep. 10 A presumed Chinese submerged submarine moves westward through the waters east of Amami Oshima Island (outside the Japanese contiguous zone), and then westward through the waters southwest of Yokoate Island (outside the Japanese contiguous zone) on September 12
Oct. 03	Disaster relief to support water supply following the collapse of a water pipe bridge in Wakayama City, Wakayama Prefecture (through October 9)	Sep. 24 2nd Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Sep. 11 Four Chinese vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait
Oct. 20	Disaster relief to search for missing persons in Tottori Prefecture (through October 22)	Oct. 05 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 12 Russian An-261 aircraft violates airspace over Japan's territorial waters at Cape Shiretoko in Hokkaido
Nov. 09	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Oct. 05 Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference	Sep. 14 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
Nov. 16	Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission (through November 19, 2022)	Oct. 07 Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 15 The governments of Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. establish the trilateral security cooperation framework AUKUS
Nov. 19	FY2021 SDF Joint Exercises (field exercise) (through November 30)	Oct. 08 Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 15 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Nov. 23	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 08 Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 16 The EU releases its first Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Nov. 23	Signing of the Japan-Vietnam Memorandum on cooperation in the medical care field between the two countries' Defense Authorities	Oct. 12 G20 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting about the situation in Afghanistan	Sep. 17 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
Nov. 23	Signing of the Japan-Vietnam Memorandum on cooperation in the cybersecurity field between the two countries' Defense Authorities	Oct. 13 Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 18 A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
Nov. 27	FY2021 Review (Asaka)	Oct. 15 Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 19 A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
Dec. 03	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Oct. 15 24th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Online)	Sep. 20 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
Dec. 09	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Oct. 27 24th ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit Meeting (Online)	Sep. 21 A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait
Dec. 12	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ogawara Town, Miyagi Prefecture (through December 14)	Oct. 27 16th East Asia Summit (EAS) (Online)	Sep. 23 A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
Dec. 24	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through November 19, 2022)	Oct. 30 Prime Minister Kishida attends the G20 Rome Summit (Online)	Sep. 24 A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
Dec. 27	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Nov. 02 Prime Minister Kishida attends COP26 (Glasgow)	Sep. 28 North Korea holds the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (through September 29)
Dec. 28	Japan-Brunei Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Nov. 02 Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Glasgow)	Sep. 28 North Korea launches what could be a ballistic missile
		Nov. 02 Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and UN Secretary-General António Guterres	Sep. 29 A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait
		Nov. 02 Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Glasgow)	Oct. 10 UN ceasefire monitors start activity in Libya
		Nov. 02 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Glasgow)	Oct. 11 North Korea holds its Defense Development Exhibition 'Self-Defense-2021' (through October 22)
		Nov. 12 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Online)	Oct. 11 Six Chinese vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Nov. 15 Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 14 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
		Nov. 17 Japan-Philippines Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 18 Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
		Nov. 18 Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 18 Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail southeastward in the waters about 40 km southeast of Cape Shiriya in Aomori Prefecture
		Nov. 22 Japan-Thailand Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 19 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
		Nov. 22 Japan-Singapore Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 20 Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail southward about 130 km east of Cape Inubo in Chiba Prefecture
		Nov. 24 Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting	Oct. 21 Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail westward between the Izu Islands' Smith Island and Tori-shima and then perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
		Nov. 25 13th ASEM Summit (Online)	Oct. 22 Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea and, on October 23, perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
		Dec. 01 Japan-Cambodia Leaders Video Teleconference	Oct. 23 Five Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan and, on October 24, perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
		Dec. 01 Japan-Turkey Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 31 A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
		Dec. 02 Japan-Malaysia Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 31 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and two Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again.
		Dec. 09 Prime Minister Kishida attends the Summit for Democracy hosted by the U.S. (Online)	Nov. 01 Two Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again.
		Dec. 14 Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Talk	Nov. 02 Ethiopian government declares nationwide state of emergency in Ethiopia following the oppositions from the Tigray People's Liberation Front
			Nov. 03 Start of EU Training Mission in Mozambique
			Nov. 05 German frigate "Bayern" makes a port call in Japan
			Nov. 10 U.S.-Israel-UAE-Bahrain joint exercise (through November 14)
			Nov. 12 Three Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Nov. 13 Two Chinese vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Nov. 16 A Chinese vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Nov. 17 A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands
			Nov. 18 A Russian vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Nov. 18 Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Nov. 19 A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Nov. 19 A Chinese vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Nov. 19 Two Chinese H-6 bombers and Two Russian Tu-95 bombers carry out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea
			Nov. 23 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Nov. 23 Five Russian vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and, on November 27, sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait
			Nov. 24 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again.
			Nov. 25 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again.
			Nov. 28 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
			Nov. 29 The U.S. releases its Global Posture Review (GPR)
			Dec. 01 North Korea holds the 5th Political Bureau Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK
			Dec. 09 The U.S. announces the end of combat mission from U.S. troops in Iraq
			Dec. 14 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Dec. 14 A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk. It then turns around over the Pacific Ocean and flies back to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk.
			Dec. 15 A Russian vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Dec. 15 Four Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail southeastward in the waters about 350 km west from the Danjo Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture). On December 16, they sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean, and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff in the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
			Dec. 15 A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk. It then turns around over the Pacific Ocean and flies back to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk. Another eight presumed Russian aircraft fly over the Sea of Japan.

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
			Dec. 19 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters about 300 km east from Kitadatojima (Okinawa Prefecture) and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
			Dec. 20 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters about 315 km southeast from Okidatojima (Okinawa Prefecture) and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
			Dec. 25 Five Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Dec. 27 North Korea holds the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through December 31)
			Dec. 29 Three Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
2022	Jan. 04 Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Saijo City, Ehime Prefecture (through January 6)	Jan. 06 Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference	Jan. 05 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jan. 06 Signing of the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement	Jan. 21 Japan-U.S. Leaders Video Teleconference	Jan. 06 The CSTO decides the deployment of Collective Peacekeeping Forces to Kazakhstan
	Jan. 07 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Online)	Jan. 31 Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 11 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jan. 11 Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Okinawa Prefecture (through January 17)	Feb. 09 Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 14 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jan. 20 Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Online)	Feb. 09 Japan-Iran Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 17 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jan. 20 International disaster relief activities in the Kingdom of Tonga (through February 17)	Feb. 11 Prime Minister Kishida attends the One Ocean Summit (Video Message)	Jan. 19 North Korea holds the 6th Political Bureau Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK
	Jan. 27 Japan-U.S. joint exercise 2021 (command post exercise) (through February 3)	Feb. 15 Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 19 The CSTO announces the completed withdrawal of its Collective Peacekeeping Forces from Kazakhstan
	Feb. 17 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Feb. 16 Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 20 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Feb. 10 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Feb. 17 Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 27 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Feb. 21 Japan-Poland Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Feb. 22 Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 30 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Feb. 21 Signing of the Japan-Poland Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Feb. 24 G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Feb. 02 Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan
	Feb. 27 Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Takamori Town, Aso District, Kumamoto Prefecture (through February 28)	Feb. 28 Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 04 Beijing Olympics (through February 20)
	Mar. 16 Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Mar. 01 Japan-Laos Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 04 Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan
	Mar. 16 Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Taketa City, Oita Prefecture (through March 18)	Mar. 01 Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 11 The U.S. releases its Indo-Pacific Strategy
	Mar. 17 Disaster relief to support water supply following an earthquake measuring upper 6 on Japan's seismic intensity scale with an epicenter off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture (through March 24)	Mar. 02 Japan-Poland Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 14 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 24 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Mar. 03 Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Leaders' Video Teleconference	Feb. 15 Since February 1, 24 Russian vessels were active in the Sea of Japan and the south part of the Sea of Okhotsk
	Apr. 7 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 04 Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 15 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again.
	Apr. 8 Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Yokohama, Aomori Prefecture (through April 11)	Mar. 08 Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 16 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Apr. 9 Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Mar. 16 Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya District Court renders judgment on the 5th and 6th trials for the suits pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base	Feb. 16 Nine Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Apr. 12 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 17 Japan-Kenya Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 16 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again.
	Apr. 13 Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Mar. 19 Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi)	Feb. 22 Russian President requests approval from the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Russia to dispatch troops out of the country
	Apr. 13 Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Mar. 20 Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Feb. 24 Russia begins aggression against Ukraine
	Apr. 16 Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Shiraori, Hokkaido (through April 19)	Mar. 24 Prime Minister Kishida attends the G7 Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Feb. 26 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Apr. 23 Disaster relief in response to the tourist boat accident off the coast of Shiretoko, Hokkaido (through June 1)	Mar. 24 Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Feb. 27 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 26 A multilateral conference on support for Ukraine (Online)	Apr. 5 Japan-Turkey Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 27 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 28 Cabinet Decision on "international peace cooperation activity for relief activities of those people affected by the Ukraine War" (through July 15)	Apr. 13 Japan-Turkmenistan Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 28 A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again.
	May 02 Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Thailand Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Apr. 18 Japan-Switzerland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 02 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	May 04 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Apr. 19 Summit-Level Video Conference on the Situation in Ukraine	Mar. 02 A Russian helicopter violates airspace over Japan's territorial waters at the Nemuro Peninsula in Hokkaido
	May 09 Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Towada City, Aomori Prefecture (through May 11)	Apr. 20 Japan-Malaysia Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 04 Beijing Paralympics (through March 13)
	May 23 Minister of Defense Kishi participates in a multilateral conference on support for Ukraine (Online)	Apr. 20 Partial revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act (abolition of the restriction that the means of transportation for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas should be government aircraft in principle, revision of the requirements for safety at the time of implementation, and expansion of the scope of the main people eligible for transportation, etc.) promulgated and enters into force	Mar. 04 Three Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	May 26 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Apr. 21 Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 05 5th Session of the 13th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (through March 11)
	Jun. 11 Minister of Defense Kishi attends the 19th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) (through June 12)	Apr. 23 Japan-Tuvalu Summit Meeting (Kumamoto)	Mar. 05 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jun. 15 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 23 Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Kumamoto)	Mar. 10 Ten Russian vessels sail westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Jun. 20 FY2022 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through June 23)	Apr. 23 Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Kumamoto)	Mar. 11 China and India agree to maintain dialogue to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at the earliest possible timing
	Jun. 22 ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Apr. 26 Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 14 Six Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Jul. 09 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Apr. 28 Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 14 A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Jul. 29 Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Apr. 29 Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Jakarta)	Mar. 15 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Aug. 04 Disaster relief in response to heavy rain starting from August 3 (through August 8)	May 01 Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Hanoi)	Mar. 16 A flight by a Chinese BZK-007 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle within Japan's air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time
	Aug. 16 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 02 Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Mar. 16 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Aug. 19 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 04 Japan-Vatican City Summit Meeting (Vatican City)	Mar. 20 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Aug. 30 Japan-Israel Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 04 Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Rome)	Mar. 24 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Sep. 08 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting, Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	May 05 Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (London)	Mar. 24 A Russian vessel sails southward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Sep. 14 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	May 09 G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Mar. 28 Two Chinese vessels sail northward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Sep. 19 Disaster relief in response to the heavy rain due to Typhoon No. 14 (through September 25)	May 11 Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 29 A Russian vessel sails southward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Sep. 26 Disaster relief in response to the heavy rain due to Typhoon No. 15 (through October 3)	May 12 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 01 The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces a truce in Yemen
	Oct. 01 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)	May 23 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 03 Two Chinese vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Oct. 04 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 23 Summit-level meeting on the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (Tokyo)	Apr. 07 A flight by a Chinese Y-9 electronic warfare aircraft over the Pacific Ocean is confirmed for the first time
	Oct. 11 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	May 24 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 11 A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Oct. 22 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (signing of the new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation)	May 24 Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 13 A Chinese vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Oct. 26 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 26 Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 19 Six Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Oct. 28 Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture (through October 30)	May 26 Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 20 A Chinese vessel sails eastbound between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 01 Cabinet Decision on the Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (November 9, 2023)	May 27 Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 25 North Korea conducts a military parade
	Nov. 03 Japan-Germany Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (Online)	Jun. 01 Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 26 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 04 Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture (through November 7)	Jun. 09 Japan-Uzbekistan Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 26 Two Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Nov. 04 Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Kasumigaura City, Ibaraki Prefecture (through November 8)	Jun. 11 Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Singapore)	May 01 Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean, and perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff in the East China Sea
	Nov. 06 FY2022 Fleet Review (International Fleet Review) (Sagami Bay)	Jun. 29 G7 Elmau Summit (through June 28)	May 02 A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
		Jun. 26 Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 03 Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail over the Pacific Ocean, and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through May 15)
		Jun. 26 Japan-France Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 04 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
		Jun. 27 Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 07 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
		Jun. 27 Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and President of the European Council (Elmau)	May 10 A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
		Jun. 27 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 10 Inauguration of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in the ROK
		Jun. 27 Japan-Senegal Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 12 North Korea holds the 8th Political Bureau Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK
		Jun. 27 Japan-South Africa Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 12 North Korea launches three ballistic missiles
		Jun. 28 Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and President of the European Commission (Elmau)	May 18 A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
		Jun. 28 Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 18 Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
		Jun. 29 Attendance at the NATO Summit Meeting (Madrid)	May 19 Three Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
		Jun. 29 Japan-Sweden Summit Meeting (Madrid)	May 19 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
		Jun. 29 NATO Asia-Pacific Partners Leaders' Meeting (Madrid)	May 20 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
		Jun. 29 Japan-Spain Summit Meeting (Madrid)	May 21 Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
		Jul. 09 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 22 A Chinese vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Jul. 12 Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	May 23 A Chinese vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Jul. 12 Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	
		Jul. 13 Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	
		Jul. 13 Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	
		Jul. 20 Japan-Ireland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	
		Jul. 27 Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	
		Aug. 01 Prime Minister Kishida attends the 10th Review Conference of the Parties	
		Aug. 01 Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and UN Secretary-General (New York)	

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
Nov. 10	FY2022 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (Field Training Exercise Keen Sword 23) (through November 19)	Aug. 06 Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and UN Secretary-General (Hiroshima)	May 23 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
Nov. 17	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Nikko City, Tochigi Prefecture (through November 19)	Aug. 26 Japan-Tunisia Leaders Video Teleconference	May 24 Two Chinese vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
Nov. 27	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Izumi City, Kagoshima Prefecture (through November 30)	Aug. 26 Japan-Comoros Leaders Video Teleconference	May 24 Two Chinese H-6 bombers advance to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea, are joined by two Russian Tu-95 bombers in the Sea of Japan, and carry out joint flights to the East China Sea. Then the two Chinese bombers are replaced, and a total of four aircraft, consisting of two presumed Chinese bombers (H-6s) newly flown in and the two Russian bombers, carry out long distance joint flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. In addition, a Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebus Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula and a Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
Dec. 05	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Toyohashi City, Aichi Prefecture (through December 7)	Aug. 27 Japan-Congo Leaders Video Teleconference	
Dec. 09	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting, Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Aug. 27 Japan-Egypt Leaders Video Teleconference	
Dec. 15	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Misawa City, Aomori Prefecture (through December 22)	Aug. 27 Japan-Senegal Leaders Video Teleconference	
Dec. 19	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Sweden Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Aug. 28 Japan-Tanzania Leaders Video Teleconference	May 25 One Chinese vessel moves northwest through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, sailing toward the East China Sea
Dec. 19	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Sera, Hiroshima Prefecture (through December 21)	Sep. 08 Summit-Level Video Conference on the Situation in Ukraine	May 25 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Dec. 20	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow from December 17, 2022 (through December 22)	Sep. 09 Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 25 Four Chinese vessels sail eastbound between Amami Oshima Island and Yokote Island to the Pacific Ocean
Dec. 30	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Sera, Hiroshima Prefecture (through January 2)	Sep. 13 Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 01 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
Dec. 31	Disaster relief in response to the landslide disaster in Tsuruoka City, Yamagata Prefecture (through January 2)	Sep. 15 Japan-Qatar Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 02 The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces an extension of the truce in Yemen
		Sep. 20 Japan-Turkey Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 02 The German Bundestag passes a bill to establish a special fund for the Federal Armed Forces
		Sep. 21 Address by Prime Minister Kishida at the Seventy-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly	Jun. 03 North Korea launches eight ballistic missiles
		Sep. 21 Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 05 A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Sep. 21 Prime Minister Kishida attends the High-Level Meeting of the Friends of the CTBT (New York)	Jun. 07 Four presumed Russian aircraft (presumed) fly from the Sea of Japan and fly straight east from the west side of Hokkaido toward Japan's airspace, and then two of the aircraft (presumed) turn around and carry out circular flights on the west side of Hokkaido, and two of the aircraft (presumed) fly north from the west side of Hokkaido in the direction of Sakhalin
		Sep. 22 Japan-Pakistan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 07 North Korea holds the enlarged meeting of 5th General Assembly (Plenary Meeting) of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through June 10)
		Sep. 26 Japan-Gabon Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 09 A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
		Sep. 26 Japan-Tanzania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 09 Five Russian vessels sail in the waters about 170 km southeast from the Nemuro Peninsula
		Sep. 26 Japan-Papua New Guinea Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 12 A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Sep. 27 Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 12 A Chinese vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Sep. 27 Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 13 Three Chinese vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Sep. 27 Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 15 Seven Russian vessels sail southward in the waters about 280 km southeast of Cape Erimo and on the 16th sail southwestward about 180 km southeast of Cape Inubo
		Sep. 27 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 16 Two Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
		Sep. 27 Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 16 Two Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
		Sep. 28 Japan-Morocco Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 16 Five Russian vessels sail southwestward in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima
		Sep. 28 Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 17 Two Russian vessels sail southwestward in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima
		Sep. 28 Japan-Lesotho Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 17 Nine Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Sep. 28 Japan-Cuba Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 19 Five Russian vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
		Sep. 28 Japan-Togo Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 19 Three Chinese vessels sail southward in the waters about 220 km east of Jinhuashan, and on the 20th sail southwestward about 220 km southeast of Cape Inubo
		Sep. 28 Japan-Bahrain Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 21 Five Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Sep. 28 Japan-Sri Lanka Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 21 North Korea holds the 3rd enlarged meeting of the 8th Central Military Commission of the KWP (through June 23)
		Sep. 28 Japan-Kosovo Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 21 Three Chinese vessels sail westbound in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima
		Sep. 28 Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 21 Three Chinese vessels sail southward in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
		Sep. 28 Japan-Comoros Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 21 Two Chinese vessels sail southward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
		Sep. 28 Japan-Moldova Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 22 A Chinese vessel sails southward in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
		Sep. 30 Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 23 Five Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
		Oct. 04 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 23 Three Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
		Oct. 06 Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 24 A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
		Oct. 11 G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Jun. 24 A Chinese vessel sails northward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the East China Sea
		Oct. 18 Japan-Luxembourg Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 24 A U.S. military aircraft transits through the Taiwan Strait
		Oct. 22 Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Perth)	Jun. 26 A Chinese vessel sails westbound in the waters between Mikurajima Island and Hachijojima Island
		Oct. 26 Japan-Lithuania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 29 The NATO Summit Meeting approves a new Strategic Concept
		Oct. 28 Japan-Uruguay Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 29 Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
		Oct. 28 Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	Jul. 01 Three Russian vessels sail northeastward in the waters between Yonaguni and Iriomotejima Island
		Nov. 02 Japan-Italy Summit Telephone Talk	Jul. 04 A Chinese vessel enters Japan's contiguous zone southwest of Uotsurijima Island
		Nov. 04 Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Jul. 04 Three Russian vessels sail northward inside the contiguous zone between Kubajima Island and Taishojima Island to the East China Sea
		Nov. 12 ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 05 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
		Nov. 12 Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 05 Three Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Nov. 13 Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 06 A Russian vessel sails westbound inside the contiguous zone of Okinotorishima Island
		Nov. 13 Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 07 A Chinese vessel sails southward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
		Nov. 13 East Asia Summit (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 09 A Russian vessel sails northwestward in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
		Nov. 13 Japan-ROK Summit Meeting	Jul. 11 A Russian vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Nov. 13 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 13 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Parcel Islands
		Nov. 13 Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 16 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
		Nov. 14 Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Bali)	Jul. 19 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
		Nov. 14 Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Bali)	Jul. 20 A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands
		Nov. 15 G20 Bali Summit (through November 16)	Jul. 20 A Russian vessel sails eastbound from Soya Strait
		Nov. 16 Emergency Meeting of the Leaders of the G7/NATO Member Countries on the Occasion of the G20 Summit	Jul. 21 A Chinese vessel sails southward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
		Nov. 16 Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Bali)	Jul. 22 A Chinese vessel sails southward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean, and on the 27th sails northward in the waters about 70 km west of Uotsurijima Island
		Nov. 17 Japan-China Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Jul. 25 A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around south of the Sakishima Islands and flies toward the Bashi Channel
		Nov. 17 Japan-Chile Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Jul. 27 Two Chinese vessels sail northeastward from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
		Nov. 17 Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Jul. 27 A Chinese vessel cruises from south to north through the waters from about 120 km to about 70 km west of Uotsurijima Island (through to the 31st) and on the 31st sails northward in the waters about 180 km northwest of Uotsurijima Island
		Nov. 18 Meeting with Leaders of Like-minded Countries on North Korea's Ballistic Missile Launch (Bangkok)	Jul. 29 A Chinese vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
		Nov. 18 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Bangkok) (through November 19)	Jul. 29 A Russian vessel sails eastbound from Soya Strait
		Nov. 29 Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 30 A Chinese vessel sails southward in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
		Dec. 03 Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and President of the Republic of Iceland	Jul. 31 A Chinese vessel sails southward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
		Dec. 03 Japan-Moldova Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 01 A Chinese vessel sails northward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the East China Sea
		Dec. 13 G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Aug. 01 A Chinese vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
		Dec. 16 National Security Council and Cabinet Decisions adopted on "National Security Strategy," "National Defense Strategy," and "Defense Program"	Aug. 01 The U.S. President announces the killing of the leader of al-Qaeda
		Dec. 19 Japan-Senegal Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 02 The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces an extension of the truce in Yemen
			Aug. 03 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Aug. 04 A Chinese vessel cruises from south to north through the waters from about 100 km to about 60 km west of Uotsurijima Island and then sails northwestward in the waters about 80 km west of Uotsurijima Island
			Aug. 04 A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle and a TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around south of the Sakishima Islands and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. In addition, a presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea and carries out circular flights above the high seas off the coast of northeast Taiwan
			Aug. 04 China conducts large military drills in the vicinity of Taiwan and launches ballistic missiles toward waters near Japan, including Japan's EEZ
			Aug. 12 A Russian vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Aug. 20 Four Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
			<p>Aug. 21 Ten Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Aug. 21 A Russian vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Aug. 28 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait</p> <p>Aug. 28 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Aug. 29 Three Chinese vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait and on the 30th sail to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Aug. 30 A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around south of the Sakishima Islands and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again</p> <p>Aug. 31 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Sep. 01 Russia starts the large scale military exercise "Vostok 2022." A total of 14 countries including China, India, etc. participate (through September 7)</p> <p>Sep. 02 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait</p> <p>Sep. 03 Three Chinese vessels and three Russian vessels implement shooting using machine guns in the waters about 190 km west of Cape Kamui and on the 4th sail eastbound from the Soya Strait</p> <p>Sep. 07 North Korea holds the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (through September 8)</p> <p>Sep. 08 China and India announce the start of disengagement from the Gogra-Hot Springs area on the Line of Actual Control (LAC)</p> <p>Sep. 09 A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait</p> <p>Sep. 11 Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait</p> <p>Sep. 12 Two Chinese vessels sail northeastward between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Sep. 14 Two Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea</p> <p>Sep. 15 A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands</p> <p>Sep. 16 Four Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Sep. 20 A U.S. vessel and a Canadian vessel transit through the Taiwan Strait</p> <p>Sep. 21 Russia promulgates the Executive Order On Declaring Partial Mobilisation</p> <p>Sep. 23 Three Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Sep. 23 A Chinese vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Sep. 26 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea</p> <p>Sep. 25 North Korea launches a ballistic missile</p> <p>Sep. 26 Three Chinese vessels sail westbound in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima and on the 27th they sail westbound in the waters about 300 km south-southeast of Cape Shionomisaki on the Kii Peninsula</p> <p>Sep. 27 Four Russian vessels sail southwestward in the contiguous zone between Mikurajima Island and Hachijojima Island</p> <p>Sep. 27 Three Chinese vessels and four Russian vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait and then sail in a formation with each other in the East China Sea</p> <p>Sep. 28 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</p> <p>Sep. 28 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Sep. 29 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</p> <p>Sep. 30 Four Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Sep. 30 Russia unilaterally declares the "accession" of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine</p> <p>Oct. 01 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</p> <p>Oct. 02 The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces an extension of the truce in Yemen</p> <p>Oct. 02 A Chinese vessel sails northeastward toward the Tsugaru Strait in the waters about 100 km west of Cape Tappi, turns around in the waters about 20 km west of Cape Tappi, and then sails southwestward to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Oct. 20 A Chinese vessel sails northward along the west side of the Nansei Islands and on the 3rd sails westbound in the waters about 90 km southwest of the Kusagaki Islands to the East China Sea</p> <p>Oct. 03 A Chinese vessel sails southwestward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea</p> <p>Oct. 04 North Korea launches a ballistic missile</p> <p>Oct. 06 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</p> <p>Oct. 07 Three Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Oct. 09 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</p> <p>Oct. 10 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Oct. 12 U.S. announces National Security Strategy</p> <p>Oct. 13 Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Oct. 14 North Korea launches a ballistic missile</p> <p>Oct. 16 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (through October 22)</p> <p>Oct. 27 U.S. announces National Defense Strategy</p> <p>Oct. 27 The United States releases the Nuclear Posture Review</p> <p>Oct. 27 United States releases the Missile Defense Review</p> <p>Oct. 28 A Russian vessel sails westbound in the waters about 160 km west of Cape Tappi (Aomori Prefecture). Then, on the 29th it sails southeastward toward the Tsugaru Strait and then turns around and sails northwestward to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Nov. 02 A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Kuchinoerabu-jima and Yakushima islands</p> <p>Nov. 02 The Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front agree to a truce</p> <p>Nov. 02 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles and an object which could be a ballistic missile</p> <p>Nov. 03 North Korea launches six ballistic missiles</p> <p>Nov. 05 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Nov. 07 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea</p> <p>Nov. 09 North Korea launches a ballistic missile</p> <p>Nov. 09 The President of France announces the end of the military operation in the Sahel region</p> <p>Nov. 09 The President of France announces the "National Strategic Review 2022"</p> <p>Nov. 10 A presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea and proceeds southward temporarily to the north of the Senkaku Islands, then turns around and proceeds northward and proceeds northwestward toward the continent</p> <p>Nov. 11 ROK announces its first "Indo-Pacific Strategy"</p> <p>Nov. 12 Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea</p> <p>Nov. 13 Five Russian vessels sail northeastward in the waters between Yonaguni and Iriomotejima Island to the East China Sea</p> <p>Nov. 14 A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle, a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around east of the main island of Okinawa and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again</p> <p>Nov. 16 Five Russian vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Nov. 17 North Korea launches a ballistic missile</p> <p>Nov. 18 North Korea launches a ballistic missile</p> <p>Nov. 27 Canada announces Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy</p> <p>Nov. 29 A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands</p> <p>Nov. 29 Two Chinese vessels sail northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan</p> <p>Nov. 30 Two Chinese H-6 bombers pass the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan and then fly northward toward the continent. In addition, two presumed Russian aircraft (presumed) fly southward from the Sea of Japan and then turn around and fly northward toward the continent</p> <p>Nov. 30 Two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers carry out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea and then to the Pacific Ocean. When these bombers fly from the East China Sea they are joined by two presumed Chinese fighters, and in addition when these bombers advance to the Pacific Ocean they are joined by two Chinese fighters (presumed J-16) for the advance to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Nov. 30 Two presumed Russian aircraft (Tu-95) (presumed) pass the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan and then fly northward toward the continent</p> <p>Nov. 30 U.S. Central Command announces the death of the leader of ISIL</p> <p>Dec. 01 A Chinese vessel sails southwestward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea</p> <p>Dec. 03 Two Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</p> <p>Dec. 04 A Russian vessel sails southwestward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea</p> <p>Dec. 08 A Russian vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</p>

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Dec. 12	A Chinese vessel sails southwestward on the west side of the Nansei Islands and then on the 14th sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 14	Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 14	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Russian fighters fly from the continent and fly southward over the Sea of Japan toward Japan's airspace, and then turn around off the coast of the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture and fly northward toward the continent
					Dec. 15	A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 16	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 17	Five Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters about 260 km southwest of Okidaitojima (Okinawa Prefecture) and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
					Dec. 17	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters of the Pacific Ocean and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through December 31)
					Dec. 18	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Dec. 19	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands
					Dec. 19	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around southeast of Okidaitojima and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Dec. 21	Four Russian vessels sail southwestward from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Dec. 23	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Dec. 26	North Korea holds the 6th Enlarged General Assembly (Plenary Meeting) of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through December 31)
					Dec. 28	Four Russian vessels sail northward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 31	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles
2023	Jan. 06	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Murakami City, Niigata Prefecture (through January 12)	Jan. 06	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 01	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Jan. 09	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Shiroato, Ibaraki Prefecture (through January 14)	Jan. 09	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Paris)	Jan. 01	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jan. 11	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 10	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Rome)	Jan. 01	It is confirmed for the first time that a Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle has flown from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reached the Pacific Ocean, flown south of the Sakishima Islands, and then turned around and passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Jan. 11	Signing of Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement	Jan. 12	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Ottawa)	Jan. 01	A Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the Sakishima Islands, and then turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Jan. 12	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 13	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 02	Three Chinese vessels sail northeastward in the waters between Yonaguni and Iriomotejima Island and sail northward in the waters about 70 km west of Utsurijima Island
	Jan. 10	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Miyoshi City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through January 18)	Jan. 30	Japan-Greece Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 04	A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Jan. 19	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Maebashi City, Gunma Prefecture (through January 22)	Jan. 01	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the NATO Secretary General (Tokyo)	Jan. 05	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Jan. 27	SDF Joint Exercises (command post exercise) (through February 3)	Feb. 02	Japan-Micronesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 15	Two Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jan. 27	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow, etc. from January 20, 2023 (through January 30)	Feb. 07	Japan-Cook Islands Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 19	A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 02	Disaster relief in response to the collision accident involving a cargo ship off the coast of Kurushima Strait, Ehime Prefecture (through February 7)	Feb. 09	Japan-Viet Nam Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Jan. 19	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the main island of Okinawa, and then turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Feb. 03	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Yachiyo, Ibaraki Prefecture (through February 8)	Feb. 13	Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 20	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Feb. 10	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Bando City, Ibaraki Prefecture (through February 14)	Feb. 17	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 26	A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Feb. 10	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 22	Japan-Albania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 02	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Prefecture (through March 4)	Feb. 24	G7 Leaders' Video Conference	Feb. 04	The U.S. military shoots down a Chinese surveillance balloon in the skies above U.S. territorial waters
	Mar. 06	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Tainai City, Niigata Prefecture (through March 10)	Mar. 07	Japan-Romania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 08	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Mar. 08	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Koriyama City and Shirakawa City, Fukushima Prefecture (through March 10)	Mar. 13	Japan-Angola Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 12	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoshima islands
	Mar. 16	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 14	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 16	ROK releases Defense White Paper 2022
	Mar. 16	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 14	Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 18	Two Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 16	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 16	Japan-Republic of Korea Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 18	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Mar. 18	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 18	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 20	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Mar. 24	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Yomogita, Aomori Prefecture (through March 26)	Mar. 20	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi)	Feb. 21	Russia announces that it suspends its participation in New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (new START)
	Mar. 28	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Chitose City, Hokkaido	Mar. 21	Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting (Kyiv)	Feb. 27	A U.S. military aircraft transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Mar. 22	Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Warsaw)	Mar. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Mar. 31	Telephone Talk Between Prime Minister Kishida and the President of the European Commission	Mar. 05	1st session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) (through March 13)
					Mar. 13	U.K. announces the Integrated Review Refresh
					Mar. 14	In the skies above the Black Sea, a Russian military aircraft flies dangerously around a U.S. unmanned aircraft vehicle and the U.S. unmanned aircraft vehicle crashes
					Mar. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northeastward in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Mar. 16	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Mar. 18	A Chinese vessel sails northward in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan, and sails northward approximately 80km west of Utsuri on Mar 19
					Mar. 19	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Mar. 23	A Russian vessel sails westbound in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Mar. 26	A Russian vessel sails northeastward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Mar. 26	Three Chinese vessels sail southwestward from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea
					Mar. 27	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Mar. 28	A Chinese vessel sails southwestward from the Osumi Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Mar. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail northward from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan